Labor Case Digest (Latest Cases)

7/27/2019 Labor Case Digest (Latest Cases)

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Eparwa vs. Liceo de Cagayan University08/16/2013 G.R. No. 150402 November 28, 2006

Facts: Eparwa and Liceo de Cagayan University [LDCU], through theirrepresentatives, entered into a Contract for Security Services.

Thereafter, 11 security guards whom Eparwa assigned to LDCU from filed acomplaint before the NLRC. The complaint was filed against both Eparwa andLDCU for underpayment of salary, legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, rest day,service incentive leave, night shift differential, overtime pay, and payment for

attorneys fees.

To protect its interest LDCU made a cross-claim and prayed that Eparwa shouldreimburse LDCU for any payment to the security guards.The LA found that claim of the Security guards meritorious and order the same tobe paid by Eparwa and LDCU. LDCU

Issue:Whether or not LDCU alone ultimately liable to the security guards for thewage differentials and premium for holiday and rest day pay.

Held: No.

Adopting the ruling in Eagle Security Agency vs. NLRC which has the same factsin this case, the SC ruled- this joint and several liability of the contractor and theprincipal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance of the provisionstherein including the statutory minimum wage [Article 99, Labor Code]. Thecontractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal,on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractors employeesfor purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor beunable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees,payment of the workers performance of any work, task, job or project, thusgiving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution [SeeArticle II Sec. 18 and Article XIII Sec. 3].

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However, in the instant case, the contract for security services had alreadyexpired without being amended consonant with the Wage Orders. It is alsoapparent from a reading of a record that EAGLE does not now demand from PTSIany adjustment in the contract price and its main concern is freeing itself from

liability. Given these peculiar circumstances, if PTSI pays the securityit cannot claim reimbursement from EAGLE. But in case it is EAGpays them, the latter can claim reimbursement from PTSI in lieuadjustment, considering that the contract, [sic] had expired andbeen renewed.For the security guards, the actual source of the payment of their wagedifferentials and premium for holiday and rest day work does not matteas they are paid. This is the import of Eparwa and LDCUs solidary liabiliCreditors, such as the security guards, may collect from anyone of the sodebtors. Solidary liability does not mean that, as between themselves, t

solidary debtors are liable for only half of the payment.

LDCUs ultimate liability comes into play because of the expiration of thefor Security Services. There is no privity of contract between the securand LDCU, but LDCUs liability to the security guards remains becauseof106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Eparwa is already precluded fromLDCU for an adjustment in the contract price because of the expiration ocontract, but Eparwas liability to the security guards remains because ofemployer-employee relationship. In lieu of an adjustment in the contracEparwa may claim reimbursement from LDCU for any payment it may mthe security guards. However, LDCU cannot claim any reimbursement f

Eparwa for any payment it may make to the security guards.

Bitoy Javier vs. Fly Ace Corporation08/16/2013 G.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012

Who has the burden of proof to prove employer-employee relat

As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of emplowith Fly Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agreeAlthough Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRrelaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this ruleliberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. Labor officiaenjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and obwith little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules provided a license to completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. Theof proof required, however, must still be satisfied. Hence, when confronconflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of dito determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence recsubject only to the requirement that their decision must be supported by
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substantial evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by substantialevidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which heclaims illegal dismissal.Expectedly, opposing parties would stand poles apart and proffer allegations asdifferent as chalk and cheese.It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court todetermine whether the party on whom the burden to prove lies was able tohurdle the same. No particular form of evidence is required to prove theexistence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevantevidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Hence, while no particularform of evidence is required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest

on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidencedepends on its quantitative as well as its qualitativeaspects. Althoughsubstantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the x x xcircumstances of the instant case demand that something more should have beenproffered. Had there been other proofs of employment, such as x x x inclusion inpetitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmedthe finding of employer-employee relationship.

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandifalls on petitioner toestablish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his

or her right thereto x x x. Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence asbasis for the grant of relief.

In this case, the LA and the CA both concluded that Javier failed to establish hisemployment with Fly Ace. By way of evidence on this point, all that Javierpresented were his self-serving statements purportedly showing his activities asan employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier failed to pass the substantialityrequirement to support his claim. Hence, the Court sees no reason to departfrom the findings of the CA.

Huntington vs. NLRC08/15/2013 G.R. No. 158311. November 17, 2004

Facts:This case stemmed from the illegal dismissal complaint with claim fordamages initiated by respondent Jaime Orbase and eleven others againstpetitioners Huntington Steel Products, Inc. and its President, Serafin Ng. Privaterespondents filed an amended complaint to include Everson Metal Works as aparty, being the original employer of private respondents before it changed itsbusiness name to Huntington Steel Products, Inc. Thereafter, private

respondents filed their position paper.

Petitioner in their position paper seeks the dismissal of the complaint fileprivate respondents since the complaint they filed in the NLRC Arbitratiodoes not have a certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Under a Supremecircular, all initiatory pleadings filed in courts and other quasi-judicial agemust contain a Certificate of Non-forum Shopping.In this case the complaint was filed in the NLRC, a quasi-judicial body hemust comply with directives of the circular.

Thus, the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no Cof Non-forum Shopping. The NLRC reversed the decision of LA. It ratiocthat rules of procedure must be liberally applied in labor cases pursuant 221 of the Labor Code, which provides that- decisions in labor cases musupported by substantial evidence, and disregarding technical rules of prwill not sacrifice the fundamental requisites of due process. The Ca affirmdecision of NLRC.

Issue: whether the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on certification of non-forum sho

Held: NoAs a rule, the certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Cour04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLCourt Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further interpretation.

However, in the case of Melo v. Court of Appeals,the court said that in tcases where it excused non-compliance with the requirements of SupremAdministrative Circular No. 04-94, there were special circumstances or creasons that made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustifierule is crystal clear and plainly unambiguous that the certification is a mapart of an initiatory pleading, i.e., the complaint, and its omission may bonly upon manifest equitable grounds proving substantial compliance the

In the present case, the respondents reasoned that they failed to complyCircular because the complaint form supplied by the Labor Arbiter did nothe required undertaking. They simply filled up the blanks therein. Hencagree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondents should notfaulted for not having the certification of non-forum shopping in their co
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The strict application of the Circular in the instant case, in our view, would becontrary to the goals of the Rules of Civil Procedurethat is, just, speedy andinexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Technical rules ofprocedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would bedetrimental to the working-man.[24]Thus, the NLRC did not err in ordering thatthe corrections be made at the Arbitration Branch, since the NLRC has also thepower to order corrections in case of irregularities in the proceedings before it.

Pollo vs. Constantino-David; Termination of Employment

06/24/2013 G.R. No. 181881; October 18, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Briccio Pollo is an employee of the Civil Service Commission is theSupervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also theOfficer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under theMamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC. An anonymous lettercharging petitioner of misfeasance and malfeasance in his work prompted thesaid investigation. The anonymous letter charges that an employee of the CSCparticularly the head of the mamayan muna hindi mamaya na is lawyering for

people who have pending cases in the CSC. In response, respondentcommissioner, created a commission composed of IT experts, takske to searchand directed to make back-up files of all computer files in the office of the CSC.

Recovered in Petitioners computer are drafts of pleadings and other lettersrelative to pending cases in the CSC.

In defense petitioner asserted that it is not him who drafted the saidpleadings, rather he was authorized by his acquaintances to store their files in hiscomputer and that he often let the clients of the said office use his computer.

Moreover, petitioner alleges that his right to privacy was violated when hisemployer [the government] searched his computer without his knowledge andpermission.

Issue:(1) Whether or nor the search made by the employer violated the right ofpetitioner to privacy.

(2) Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner was valid.

Ruling:Relative to the case, the Supreme Court stressed that the following m

must be considered as objective and subjective prongs of reasonablenesinquiry:

1. the employees relationship to the item seized;2. whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee whwas seized; and3. whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the it

As to the first and second test, the Court ruled: "we answer the first in tnegative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) exof privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contpersonal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always lockedopen to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he usedpasswords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accecomputer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assoffice of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of

his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had beendischarging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incominreceiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishreport, Mamamayan MunaProgram, Public Sector Unionism, Correction oaccreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that istays in the office as a paying customer. Under this scenario, it can hadeduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society wourecognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at leastsubjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is nethe presence of policy regulating the use of office computers."

As to the third test, the CSC in this case had implemented a policy thaemployees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anythincreate, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or hummeans. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/nov2004/158311.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/nov2004/158311.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/nov2004/158311.htm#_ftn24http://sophialegis.weebly.com/11/post/2013/06/pollo-vs-constantino-david-termination-of-employment.htmlhttp://sophialegis.weebly.com/11/post/2013/06/pollo-vs-constantino-david-termination-of-employment.htmlhttp://sophialegis.weebly.com/11/post/2013/06/pollo-vs-constantino-david-termination-of-employment.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/nov2004/158311.htm#_ftn24


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computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

Moreover, the search of petitioners computer files was conducted inconnection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by ananonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomaliesin the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Nadivision is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified atinception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn upevidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

As to the dismissal of petitioner, since the evidence warranting his misconductwas not illegally seized, it is valid pursuant to the rules of CSC

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Labor Case Digest (Latest Cases)