FLORES vs. CA

GR No. 160694, January 21, 2004

Facts:

Flores was employed by Eco-Triangle as Sales Supervisor. He was subsequently promoted to Senior Sales Supervisor and eventually, to Assistant Sales Manager. He was entrusted with sensitive and confidential information. In August 1998, Eco-Triangle’s Managing Director went on study leave. He entrusted the sales department to Flores. Flores entered into a covert agreement with Gouldstar, a former supplier, to engage in business in direct competition with Eco-Triangle. Flores took advantage of the absence of the Managing Director to sabotage Eco-Triangle’s business and, in connivance with Gouldstar, diverted the sales of Eco-Triangle to Gouldstar, etc. On December 27, 2000, Flores suddenly turned in his resignation letter stating that his resignation. Eco-Triangle filed a complaint for damages against Flores with the RTC. Flores filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground of lack of jurisdiction claiming that since the complaint stemmed from the employer-employee relations between the parties, the labor arbiter had jurisdiction.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction to hear the case?

Ruling:

The RTC has jurisdiction. The damages claimed by Eco-Triangle do not have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims enumerated under Article 217 of the Labor Code. The allegations in the complaint unequivocally reveal that the action was based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code and does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute. Plainly, the employer-employee relationship between Eco-Triangle and Flores is merely incidental and does not negate the jurisdiction of the trial court.Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship, which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

PAGCOR vs. BIR

GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011

Facts:

PAGCOR was one of the GOCCs exempted from paying corporate income tax as provided by RA 8424 (NIRC of 1997). When RA 9337 was enacted, PAGCOR was excluded from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from paying corporate income tax. PAGCOR argues that the omission is

unconstitutional as it is in violation of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

Issue: Is RA 9337 in violation of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No, RA 9337 is not in violation of the non-impairment clause. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.In Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna, the Court held that a franchise partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, etc. within the Philippines. Under Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. Hence, the provision in RA 9337, amending RA 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not in violation of the non-impairment clause.

Austria vs. NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner, Pastor Dionisio Austria worked with the Respondent, Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists. The petitioner worked with the SDA for 28 years. He then became the District Pastor of Bacolod City. He received several communications asking him to be accountable and responsible to the alleged amount of money which his wife failed to remit in Negros Mission. Meanwhile, the petitioner heard that Pastor Rodrigo was about to file a complaint against him in Negros Mission because of their dispute. Thus, he proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of Negros Mission in order to convene the Executive Committee. The petitioner and Pastor Buhat exchanged heated arguments which prompted the petitioner to bange the attaché case to Pastor Buhat’s table.

A fact finding committee was created to investigate the petitioner. After which, he received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer’s duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.

The NLRC ruled in favor of his dismissal holding that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner due to the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved and ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere.

Hence, this petition

Issues:

1) Does the Labor Arbiter/NLRC have jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA considering that the separation of the church and state is enshrined in our constitution? 2) Is the termination valid?

Ruling:

1. Yes. In the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law. It is palpable that the reason for petitioner’s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature since the grounds invoked for the dismissal were based on the labor code. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is

purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church.

2. No. In the procedural matter, the petitioner was not given enough opportunity to properly prepare his defense. The letter merely mentioned that petitioner and his wife were invited to a meeting wherein what would be discussed were the alleged unremitted church tithes and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. Thus the petitioner was surprised to find out that the alleged meeting turned out to be an investigation. On the substantial side, the case reveals that there is no basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust. With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct and commission of an offense against the person of the employer’s duly authorized representative, it is unmeritorious and, as such, do not warrant petitioner’s dismissal from the service. The respondent’s allegation of gross and habitual neglect of duties were not supported with evidence.

Salenga v. NLRC GR 174941 February 1, 2012

Facts:

There are two salient circumstances surrounding this case: 1) Petitioner Salenga filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Respondent Corporation (Clark Development Corporation) when the latter declared his position as head executive assistant to be redundant. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of

the Petitioner. When the decision was rendered, the new President of the Respondent Corporation ordered that the decision must not be appealed anymore. Despite this, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) appealed the decision on behalf of the Corporation and its former president. However, there was no board resolution giving authority to the appellants to represent the Corporation. 2) Pending the resolution of the first case, Petitioner applied for an early retirement which was approved. However, he insists that the computation of the retirement benefits should include the 40 years of government service he rendered and not just the 17 years he served under the present Corporation.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the NLRC had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal by the OGCC and CDC’s former president absent the board resolution.

2. Whether or not Petitioner is covered by the Civil Service Law.

Ruling:

1. No. The Rules of NLRC clearly provides that appeals must be verified and certified against forum shopping by the parties in interests. A corporation can only exercise its powers when there is a board resolution authorizing its officers to do so. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued is solely exercised by its board of directors. The purpose then for the

issuance of board resolution and verification is to secure that the allegations in the pleadings are true, correct, and filed in good faith. Thus, neither the OGCC thru Timbol – Roman nor Atty Mallari, can be considered as the “appellant” representing the “employer” under Rule VI Sections 4 – 6 of the NLRC. As the Court opined, “We cannot agree with the OGCC’s attempt to downplay this procedural flaw by claiming that, as the statutorily assigned counsel for GOCCs, it does not need such authorization. In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, 456 Phil. 273, 294-298 (2003), we exhaustively explained why it was necessary for government agencies or instrumentalities to execute the verification and the certification against forum-shopping through their duly authorized representatives. (Antonio P. Salenga and NLRC vs. Court of Appeals and Clark Development Corp., G.R. No. 74941, Feb. 1, 2012).” The exception to this is when equitable circumstances which are manifest from the records prevail.

2. Petitioner is not covered by Civil Service Law. It is not disputed that Respondent Corporation are GOCC’s without original charters, hence they are not under Civil Service Law. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled only his retirement benefits based on the number of years he was employed with the corporation under the conditions provided under its retirement plan, as well as granted to him by existing laws.

JV Angeles Construction Corporation vs NLRC

Facts: Petitioner assailed the decision of NLRC concerning a case between petitioner and private respondent Pedro Santos. Petitioner was the employer of Pedro for 23 years and after Pedro compulsorily retired, he filed a complaint for retirement benefits and service incentive leave pay under RA 7641. Petitioner contended that it should not be made to pay the demands of private respondent because the statute involved in this case cannot be given retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7641 can be applied retroactively in this case.

Ruling: No. Pedro was no longer an employee of petitioner at the time the said law took effect. Court said, "In CJC Trading Inc. v. NLRC, the aforecited doctrine was elaborated upon by enumerating the circumstances which must occur before the law could be given retroactive effect, to wit: (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant has complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits."

Executive Secretary v CA

Facts: Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals in a case between petitioner and respondent Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter (ARCO-Phil). Respondent assailed the constitutionality of several provisions of RA 8042 alleging among others that such law is an ex post facto law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 was constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. RA 8042 was constitutional. The Court said, "In People v. Diaz, we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an

amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively." Moreover, the law in question has already been applied in previous cases by the Supreme Court. The Court, thru Justice Callejo, went on to elaborate, "By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined."

People vs. Dela Piedra

GR.# 121777

FACTS: Maria Lordes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and her friends went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro after learning that Carol dela Peidra was there to recruit applicants for Singapore. They were welcomed by Jasmine and sat down while listening to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees. Dela Piedra said that she has been recruiting nurse for Singapore. Subsequently, the girls filed a bio-data submitted pictures and other documents. After the interview, Lourdes gave initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine who assured she is authorized to received the money.

Meanwhile, Atty. Ramos of POEA received a telephone call from an unidentified woman that asking about the legitimacy of the recruitment. Atty. Ramos together with his conducted surveillance. One of them pretended to be an

applicant. Ramos confirmed to the CIS to organize the arrest of the illegal recruiter. Subsequently, Dela Piedra was convicted for ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.

On appeal she questioned her conviction and even assailed the constitutionality of Article 13 of the Labor Code that it is void for vagueness.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not said provision as amended by Illegal Recruitment Law violates due process clause.

b. Whether or not the accused was denied equal protection clause because she was the only one charged and therefore should be exculpated.

HELD:

A. No. Section 13 of the labor code as amended is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged for proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

B. No. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application

to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.” In the case at bar, dela Piedra failed to show that, in charging her, there was “clear and intentional” discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.

People vs Gutierrez GR 124439

Facts: In the case at hand, there were four victims of illegal recruitment namely: Evelyn Ramos, Rosemarie Tugade, Generosa Asuncion and Rosalyn Sumayo. They suffered the same fate under the hands of the Flor Gutierrez who conspired with other “recruiter-agents”. The victims were applying as a domestic helpers in Dubai. All of them were able to comply with the various requirements / documents and pay a certain amount of money as placement fee, passport, medical fee, terminal fee and the like. They were hopeful that after they have complied with all the necessary documents and payments, their supposed departure to Dubai would push through. However, despite a series of promises by their recruiter, their departure never came into a reality. There were even a series of postponements of flights but it never materialized. With the promises of jobs abroad unfulfilled, complainants decided to verify if the accused was a licensed

recruiter. Upon learning from the POEA that she was not licensed, they proceeded to the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission to execute their affidavits. There the investigators are planning for an entrapment operation against the accused. She was then arrested as soon as she finished counting the mark money as payment to her by the 4 complainants. In her defense, she claimed that she cannot held liable for illegal recruitment because she is has the authority emanated from a Special Power of Attorney and Certification issued by a licensed agency in the name of Marketing Directress of Serafudin Manpower and General Services.

Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of illegal recruitment?

Ruling: Yes. Illegal Recruitment is committed when two elements concur, 1.) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; 2.) undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or any prohibited practices under Article 34 of the Labor Code In addition the crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the above mentioned elements concur with the addition of the third element: the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. In the case at hand, accused contended that she cannot be held liable for such crime because she has an authority from a duly licensed recruitment agency. However, the SC disagree

because under Section 11, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, it requires that every appointment of representatives or agents of licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the POEA. Since appellant Serafudin agency did not submit its appointment of Ms. Gutierrez as representative to the POEA, POEA has nothing to approve. Therefore, the appointment of Ms. Gutierrez is not authorized by POEA. Hence, as accused committed illegal recruitment against three or more persons, she is liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

People vs Segun GR 119076

Facts:Appellants Roger Segun and Josephine Clam without any license and/or authority to engage in recruitment and placement of workers from the Department of Labor and Employment, recruited the 13 persons allegedly to work in Manila namely: Mario Tambacan, Mary Jane Cantil, Richard Aranas, Victoria Collantes, Christine Collantes, Rogelio Collantes, Luther Caban, Loreta Caban, Jonard Genemelo, Jhonely Genemelo, Pedro Ozarraga, Pablo Ozarraga and Pacifico Villaver. They all came from Linamon, Lanao del Norte. All of them have different stories on how they were recruited by the appellants to work in Manila. It was also allegedly claimed that the transportation to Manila was free. It was established by the prosecution that the said appellants were neither licensed nor authorized by the DOLE to recruit workers. Secondly, it was corroborated by the Mayor of

Linamon that appellants per records were not authorized to conduct recruitment for local or overseas employment. On the other hand, both Roger and Josephine admitted that they did not have any license to recruit. They only helped their neighbors find jobs because they took pity on them when their neighbors begged them for jobs. However, the Iligan City RTC convicted appellants for violating Article 38 of the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale?

Ruling:No. The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when three elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “ recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) or any prohibited acts enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. Third, offender commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. In the case at hand, the first element is present when a certification issued by DOLE states that appellants were not authorized to conduct recruitment for local and overseas employment. The appellants also conceded that they have no license to recruit. As to the second element, the trial court was able to deduced the testimonies of different witnesses and came up with the conclusions that most of their testimonies were hearsy and

that during their direct or cross examinations, they used the term “recruit” which according to the Supreme Court is a conclusion of law. The prosecution failed to elicit from them the specific act constituting the recruitment. The victims must testify as to the facts that would prove recruitment. It does not suffice that the witness simply state that the accused “recruited” the “victim”. In sum, the prosecution failed to elicit from many witnesses the specific acts constituting the recruitment of the alleged victims. However, the prosecution was able to prove that appellants performed recruitment activity only in cases of Victoria Collantes and Loreta Cavan. Since the third element which is that the offender commits the acts against three or more persons is absent, therefore, appellants is only guilty of two counts of simple illegal recruitment.

People of the Philippines vs. Chowdury

Facts:C howdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by recruiting Calleja, Miranda, and Sasis for employment in Korea. Appellant (Chowdury) interviewed private complainant in at Craftrade’s office. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under temporary authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Chowdury’sprimary duty was to interview

job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged.

Held: No, an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment.

A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf.

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC vs

SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.

Facts:

On November 6, 1991 respondent Medequillo was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for a period of nine (9) months which stipulates a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime pay of $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment period commencing on 6 November 1991. Thus November 8, 1991, he joined the vessel MV “Stolt Aspiration.

However, on February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation, urging him to immediately proceed to the petitioner’s office where he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV “Stolt Pride” under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract which was was noted and approved by the POEA.

Nevertheless, despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed and refused to deploy him with the vessel MV “Stolt Pride”. And instead, when respondent demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other employment documents, he was constrained to sign a certain document involuntarily in exchange of his papers. With such, respondent filed an action

praying for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners’ bad faith in not complying with the Second Contract of deploying him.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction of cases involving non-deployment of employees under a perfected contract?

Ruling:

Considering that the breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment which provides that the penalty for non-deployment without valid reason is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

The absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer without claim for compensation arising from employer-employee relationship does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The Court do not forefend a seafarer

from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him. And thus decrees the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment. The law provides:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

And following the applicable law, the claim is cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC under the second phrase of the provision.