SANYO PHIL. WORKERS UNION-PSSLU vs. CANIZARES

FACTS:

PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines, Inc. The CBA contained a union security clause which provided that the union shall have the right to demand from the company the dismissal of the members of the union by reason of their voluntary resignation from membership or wilful refusal to pay the union dues or by joining another labor organization. PSSLU through its national president informed the management of Sanyo the some of its members were removed for joining another union, anti-union activities, economic sabotage, etc. PSSLU wrote another letter recommending for the dismissal of some of the company’s non-union workers for engaging in anti-union activities, violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU, and threatened with bodily harm the officers of the union. The employees were under preventive suspension, however the company received no information on whether the said employees appealed to the PSSLE. Hence, it considered them dismissed.

The dismissed employees file a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal against respondents. PSSLU filed a motion to dismiis on the ground that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case invoking the law which provides that it is shall be the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration that has jurisdiction for the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Public respondent through the OSG alleged that the case involves the termination of employees which fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to decide the case.

HELD:

Yes. The Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, it is held that the facts do not fall under the meaning of “grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies”, the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

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In the present case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be rough to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute shall be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery designated by the members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees.

TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWASA ASIA BREWERY vs. ASIA BREWERY

FACTS:

Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with BLMA-INDEPENDENT effective for 5 years, the exclusive bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees, which was later renegotiated. The scope of the CBA excluded among others Confidential and Executive secretaries and Purchasing and Quality Control Staff. Subsequently, a dispute arose when ABI’s management stop deducting union dues from 81 employees believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. Those employees are QA sampling Inspectors /Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technicians who formed part of the Quality Control Staff and the rest are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers. . BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI’s actions restrained the employees’ right to self-organization and brought the matter to the grievance machinery. For failure to settle the controversy amicably, BLMA-INDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before the NCMB. The parties eventually agreed to submit the case for arbitration. The Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT that the position of the employees qualifies under the rank-and-file category because their functions are merely routinary and clerical and that the positions occupied by the secretaries/clerks in the different divisions are not managerial or supervisory. . On appeal, the CA reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator. BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, a certification election was held wherein petitioner TPMA won. As the incumbent bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees claiming interest in the outcome of the case, petitioner filed with the CA an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision and intervention. Both motions were denied. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a restraint in the exercise of the employees’ right to self-organization.

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HELD:

No. Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and checkers are not disqualified from membership in the Union of respondent’s rank-and-file employees. petitioner argues that respondent’s act of unilaterally stopping the deduction of union dues from these employees constitutes unfair labor practice as it “restrained” the workers’ exercise of their right to self-organization. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate workers’ right to organize. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that ABI was motivated by” ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor..” from ABI’s act in discontinuing the union dues deduction from those employees it believed were excluded by the CBA. Considering that the dispute arose from a simple disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA provision on excluded employees from the bargaining unit, respondent cannot be said to have committed unfair labor practice that restrained employees in the exercise of their right to elf-organization, nor have thereby demonstrated an anti-union stance.

EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER vs. BAYER PHIL.

FACTS:

Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines. During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayers proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

Pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Remigio and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers wage-increase proposal. The DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA.

Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution containing the decision of the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer. The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members.

Both groups wanted recognition from Bayer and demanded remittance of the union

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dues collected from its rank-and-file members. Bayer decided not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two groups is resolved.

EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (first ULP complaint) against Bayer for non-remittance of union dues. While the ULP case was still pending, Bayer decided to turn over the collected union dues to REUBP.

Aggrieved, EUBP lodged a complaint against Remigios group before the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from EUBP for commission of "acts that threaten the life of the union."Labor Arbiter dismissed the first ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a secondULP complaint against herein respondents. Petitioners complained that Bayer refused to remit the collected union dues to EUBP despite several demandst and that the latter opted to negotiate with Remigios group.

REUBP and Bayer agreed to sign a new CBA. In response, petitioners immediately filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction before the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter against respondents.

Labor Arbiter dismissed EUBPs second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision to dismiss the second ULP complaint, petitioners appealed the said decision, but was denied by the NLRC. The CA sustained both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRCs rulings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with Remigios group despite its validly existing CBA with the old union can be considered ULP

HELD:

Petition is partly meritorious. A CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between labor and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining agent it had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason for doing so and without first following the proper procedure. If such behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and negotiations between the employer and the union will never

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be truthful and meaningful, and no CBA forged after arduous negotiations will ever be honored or be relied upon.

This is the reason why in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization that has been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining representative and the employer becomes the law between them. Compliance with the terms and conditions of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to afford protection to labor and to promote industrial peace. Thus, when a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers and the employer, the latter shall observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. If the employer grossly violates its CBA with the duly recognized union, the former may be held administratively and criminally liable for unfair labor practice.

However, as to respondents Remigio and Villareal, the court finds that petitioners complaint was validly dismissed. The ULP complaint cannot prosper as against them because the issue, essentially involves an intra-union dispute

APALISOK vs. RADIO PHIL. NETWORK

FACTS:

Respondents terminated the services o petitioner effective June 15, 1995. Waiving her right to resolve her case through the grievance machinery, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents before the NLRC, which referred the case to the NCMB. By the submission of an agreement signed by their respective counsels, both parties agreed to submit for voluntary arbitration the dispute. The voluntary arbitrator subsequently ruled for the petitioner and rendered an award in her favor. Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the SC but was referred to the CA. The CA nullified and set aside the voluntary arbitration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It held that the option of the petitioner not to be subject of the dispute to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA was tantamount to relinquishing her right to avail of the aid of a voluntary arbitrator. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not voluntary arbitration has jurisdiction to decide the case despite the waiving of petitioner’s right to resolve her case through the grievance machinery.

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HELD:

Finding that he voluntary arbitrator had jurisdiction over the parties’ controversy, the SC set aside the decision of the CA. Article 262 of the Labor Code provides that upon agreement of the parties, the voluntary arbitrator can hear and decide all the labor disputes. According to the court, contrary to the finding of the CA, voluntary arbitration as amode of settling disputes was not forced upon respondents. Both parties agreed to submit the issue of the validity of the dismissal of the petitioner to the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator by the Submission Agreement duly signed by their counsels.

INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC, ET AL.

FACTS:

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc. They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from August 1, 1990 to July 31, 1993.Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the vice-president of the HR Department, the union president and a union director had a meeting. The representatives of the union were asking to make the new CBA effective for 2 years. Salazar (VP) informed them that it was still premature to discuss the new CBA. The following day, all the rank-and-file employees refused to follow their regular two-shift work, the employees stopped working without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on. Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were working thus substantially delaying the production of the company. Respondent company filed with the NLRC to declare illegal the petitioner union’s overtime boycott and work slowdown which amounted to illegal strike. The parties tried to settle things, but failed. The petitioners union staged a strike. The secretary of labor issued an assumption order over the labor disputes and issued a return-to-work order. Labor arbiter submitted his recommendation which was adopted by the secretary of labor declaring the overtime boycott and work slowdown as illegal strike and declared that the union officers concerned to have lost their employment status. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration, but was denied. Union appealed to the CA but was also dismissed. Hence, the petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction over labor or labor-related disputes.

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HELD:On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike committed by petitioner union, it is undisputed that the petition to declare the strike illegal before Labor Arbiter Caday was filed long before the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued the assumption order on 14 February 1994. However, it cannot be denied that the issues of overtime boycott and work slowdown amounting to illegal strike before Labor Arbiter Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary. In fact, on 16 March 1994, petitioner union even asked Labor Arbiter Caday to suspend the proceedings before him and consolidate the same with the case before the Secretary of Labor. When Acting Labor Secretary Brillantes ordered Labor Arbiter Caday to continue with the hearing of the illegal strike case, the parties acceded and participated in the proceedings, knowing fully well that there was also a directive for Labor Arbiter Caday to thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Secretary. As the appellate court pointed out, the subsequent participation of petitioner union in the continuation of the hearing was in effect an affirmation of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor.

The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and Employments jurisdiction over labor-related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where the Court declared:

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the opening proviso therein reading except as otherwise provided under this Code, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.

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SILVA, ET AL. Vs. NLRC AND PHILTREAD

FACTS:

Petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with the CBA.  Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses, expanded its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response. Thus, on December 5, 1988, petitioners lodged a complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice (ULP), damages and attorney’s fees against Philtread.

Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the NLRC lacked jurisdiction, there being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract, the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular courts; and (2) that petitioners had no locus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed between the union and Philtread.

Petitioners, however, challenging Philtreads motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was one for unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them, as mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. Being one for unfair labor practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code. abor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications.

Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated, regardless of age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions, subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case, did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction when both of them entertained the complaint?

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HELD:

We note that at the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney’s fees on December 5, 1988, the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217. Articles 261 and 262, on the other hand, defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. Under the above provisions then prevailing, one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor Arbiter. To their mind, Philtreads refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the 1986 CBA. At the time, any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is, however, a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Hence, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.

There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions, as well as interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies, have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. Similarly, all ULP cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. What RA 6715 merely did was to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBAs economic provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715.

 The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement.[17] This, instead of the inherent defect in the law, must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. Hence, we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5, 1988.

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BUKLURAN NA MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING vs. CA , ET AL.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

STAMFROD MARKETING CORP. vs. JULIAN

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER vs. NLRC

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

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