La Guerre Revolutionnaire

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Lieu tenan t Colonel Dorm A. St ar ry, United States Armg _

o N3over July 1962 France turnedcontrol of Algeria to theD&mcratic Peoples Republic of Al-geria. The French Empire had with-ered as a result of spreading anti-colonialism and the mortal debilita-tion of French etrength in the firstgreat war of tbk century.At the end of World War II, theFrench were the first to meet the ex-pending Cormpnnist revolution in aform which has rsceived wide recog-nition in the reet of the world onlyrecsntly. For when most of the worldwas fusused on traditional ideas ofgeneral war and its doctrine of mae-sive retaliation, the French were inIndoshina struggling with Ho ChLminhs inheritance from Mao Tse-tungthewar of national liheration~ theComnmniet revolution.In the IndocNlneee War, the Frenchmilitary forces, in tragic defeat, feltthe lees of their traditional expertiseand their profmsienal ability. Follow-

ing defsat at Dien Bien Phu, they setabout to restore their a~llity to con-htmmy1967k.. .,

duct this new form of war. For twoyaars at least, possibly more, militaryintellectuals struggled with theory anddoctrine, and evolved a theory of rev-olutionary war and how to deal withi- guerre ?@volutfonmuireand ac-tbapWchologique.Ssarcely had they come to a satis-

factory theory of h gusrre r&volution-naire and a doctrine for combating itthan they were obliged to put it to thetest in Algeria. New doctrines andnew organisation yielded rsmdts. Ashad been the caae in Indochina, how-ever, military and political voices werenot in harmony. Althongh the miii-tary forces abettsd tbe fall of theThird Republic, and the rise of theGaullist Fifth Republic, their politicalhopeful never quite communicated tohis military leaders. As a rsanlt, theprofessional officer corpe revolted.Their revolt a defeat, their generalsin disgrace and condemned to death,their sseret army in Algeria a failure,the army came home to be rseonsti-tuted in a new image.

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LA 6UERREIt is significant that throughout the

empires, republice, restoration, andgovernments that rose and fell, tbearmy remained loyal to France. TheFrench Army avoided politjcs and wasgenerally contemptuous of the govern-ment, but quite unwilling to trike posi-tive action against it. La grwrve r6vo-lzthmaire, however, as they came tounderstand it, challenged the very coreof the profeeeion.Contributing FactoraIn the attempt to restore expertnessto the profeaeion in the face of thisnew challenge of war, the army metits demise. There were many contrib-uting factors:

q General develo~nt of the pa-rameter of tbe cold war.. Tbe worldwide fttte of colonialempires.q A political kaleidoscope of chang-ing governments in France.q Traditional aloofness of theFrench military services from tbe restof tbe populace.q Continuing deaf ears in Parie tothe voices of military counsel.q French military defeat in the

war in Indochina, and conquest with-out victory in Algeria.q Prideful struggle of tbe Frenchmilitary leaders to restore professionalknow-how.Tb9 war in Indochina had been Iost,but the army came out with come hard-Lieutenant Colonel Dorm A. Sta~is amng mth the 18t Field IbreeHeadquarters itI Vietnam. He in agraduate of the U. S. Armv C%rmnandand General Staff College, the USArmed Forvea Stifl College, and com-pZeted the US Arrnu War CoUegecoune in Juna 19$6. He haa nervedwith Hsadquartsr8, 8th US Arnnt, inKorea, and with the $d Armored Di-

vision in Erbrope.u.

won lessons. They conceived that rev.ohrtionary ware are fought for theallegiance of people, and that tbe pointof convergence of the effort is largelysocial and psychological-not military,They saw the need and application Ofconflicting prm%ces: education andsocial programs on one band; props.ganda, psychological programs, invel.untary population resettlement, andpolitical indoctrination on the other,Two significant lessons struckFrench military intellectual ruminaLing on their experience with tbrCommuniet revolution in Indochine,The principal lesson they drew wtathe way that an inferior force couldalways defeat a modern army-asps.cirdly a modern mechanized army-ifit had the suppert of the local pepu-lace. They were also impressed by theseeming cohesion of politico-militarycommand action demonstrated by theVietminb. They concluded that properpsychological meeeures could form thecobeaive bond between tbe civiliansupporters and ttgbters that thk warrequired. A kind of formula emerged:revolutionary war = partisan war+psychological war.FiveStafesCommandant Jacques Hogard, vr-cal among the military intellectualanalyzed ta guerre rdvolutiermaire infive stagee:q Propagandists and agitatorswork secretly among ths people sound-

ing out and ap~ling to reaentrnenbagainst prevadm social and economicconditiork.q Having gained a foothold, agi-tators and organizer form eynp-thir..sre into age, occupation, and othergroups. Gradually, theee groupe sprda net of resletence to the regime overthe country.q Some of the groups are organlrtd

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IA 6UERREinto armed bands for ambush, raids,mbotege, terror, and. assassination.q The level of terrorism risw, forc-

ing gove~ment elements to withdrawfrom some areas which are momptlyseiied by the agitatora and declaredliberated aonea.q A general psychological and po-litical campaign against the govern-

ment cnd a.military eamuaiffn againet

ical value codee ehould bring liberal.iem to the top providing it could dem-onstrate equal aptitude in the appli-cation of psychological techniques.

q Subversion, especially in theearly stages, requiree a greet deal oftime to organize. Security forcee,properly warned, can intervene dur-ing thle time.q The imetrrxente. eeoecielly at the

Algeria wee a war for the control of civilian support and loyaltyits armed forces is gradually devel- outset, seldom have an adequate lo-qwd. gistice base and are, therefore, vul-From this analysis, the intellcc- nerable to a starve-out eiimpaign,We then sought a emtnterrevolution- witbering them on the vine.w doctrine, aimed at the weakneasee q !Cheinsurgents can draw out theof la guarre mfvolutionmzire, which battle indefinitely, but can almostthey saw se: never produce a decisive milita~ blowq The superiority of Weetern eth- unleee given an unusual opportunity.

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IA SUERREq Population control is based on aclandestine politico-military networkof cells, groups, and sympathizers cov-ering the country. If this organiza-

tion can be broken up, the insurgencycollapses.The action program to support thedoctrine de~eloped plans to isolate theinsurgents from outside sources of

settlement of the population as rquired to deprive the insurgentssupport and a culture in whichgerminate; and to reeducate insigentz captured or who surrenderedThe theory then developed a pgram of action and successful ration as shown in the chart.Against la gczerre rf%oktkm?mij

INSURGENCY ACTION AND REACTIONlnsurgsmt1. Forms agitation and propagandacells.

2. Expande and coordinates resist-ance into effective extensive net-work.3. Intensifies propaganda; terror,sabotage, assassination, and otherarmed action.

4. Creates liberated areas; inetalleprovisional government; gradualchange from irregular to regularwar.5. Regular war with fully developeddiplomatic activity.

4, Regularization fails; reverts toguerrilla war.3. Reduced liberated zones; emall-scale guerrilla war.2. Opposition and some sabotagecontinue.1. Continuee propaganda and agita-tion.

Police and intelligence activity in-crease; strengthena administrativeand military controle; propagand~social, and economic reforms.

Mobilizes states political and physical resources; attscke the subversiwinfrastructure; organizes self-defense units; resettles populationregains control over Iiherated areasisolates and destroys enemy regulars

Destroys regular forces; continuesdiplomatic, psychological, social, ampolitical action.

Reduces auxiliary military effort:continues reforms.

Continues reforms and reeducationnew order emerges.supply and help; destroy ineurgent the French sought to bring the msdregular forces and large guerrilla touted Communiet weapons of psychrrbands; protect eesential communica- Iogical action and political indoctrias-tions and economic centers, but not tion in the context of a general wartie down regular military forces to common to Marx-Lenin-Mao. To convthis task; accomplish community re- plement their action program, they34 MulteryR*


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ieve lop e r f a c t ion p s~ch o log iq u eatheory of psychopolitical action.In 1957 the French Army took ac-tionto reorganize the staff and com-mand effort, implementing the newconceptsof countering Zaguerre r&so-Wionwatre. To their four-part general~taf.type organization, they added atMh section, G5, in the army, fieldarmy,corpe, and division staffs. At thetop level, there was a third deputychief of staff specialized in paycholog-irsl and political operations. Finally,in the French military schools, therewere introduced courses of instruc-tionin psychological war and politicaloperations.At the height of its organizationalexperience, the G5s responsibilitiesincludedpsychological action, psycho-logical warfare, moral=ivilian andndlitsry-troop and public informat-ion, chaplain activities, and civil af-fairs. G5 coordinated with G2 on in-telligence bearing on psychological orcivil affaira matters, and with G3 onplanning matters. With this organi-sotion and theory, the French Armywent to Algeria.Sourceof RevoltThe source of the Algerian revoltwas Marxist chiefly becauee its the-ories of revolutionary war were de-rived from Karl Marx, Nikolai Lenin,ondMao Tae-tung. The leaders of theAlgerian revolt were quick to realizethat the Communist theory of warsef national liberation was the con-text in which many changes were inprogreesaronnd the world. This helpedtbanrdescribe their view of the na-ture of their struggl~gainst im-pwiafism, total and ~nticolonial.On the other hand, the political at-titudes of the Algerian rebels, theirliking for strong centralism in theirCeeialdemocratic ztatelmost in the

LA 6UERRE jimage of 1789and their preoccnpa- :tion with the liberty metalrhysic rew ;resented Jacobh national~em at itsbest.Finally, the rebele apparently feltthey could outlast the French as HoChLminh had done, taking skillful ad-vantage of each opportunity, whilebuilding a subterranean nation.SimilaritiesAnalvats of la ouerre revolution- .. -.. .naire held the view that the revolu-tion played into tbe hands of interna-tional communism; that it was plotted,channeled, and controlled to a remark-able degree. Much of the French Arroyeventually believed thk. Actually, theAlgerian war was much more spon-taneous, far more confused, and lesscohesively directed than the Indochi-nese War had been. But to the French,Algeria became the model into whichIndochina, Greece, -Malaya, and thePhilippine fit with precieion. Someof these similarities were:

q AlgeMa was a war for the con-trol of civilian eupport and loyalty.. Algeria was a etrnggle of psy-chological and propaganda mecha-nisms with both eidee rising a widevariety of psychological and politicalaction techniques.

q There was in Algeria a total al-location of resources in a limited area.It was general war, but general with-in the borders of a single countryapattern to be repeated in later wareof national liberation.q Ideology became a factor of con-test, openly on the Algerian side, moresurreptitiously on the French eide.q Algeria was fought against thebackground of ths cold war.Eventually, abnoet three-fifths ofFrances active military establishment

was committed to Algeria, augmentedthere by the genrhzrmetie, eeveralktleery laa7 as


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LA 6UERREcivil-defense groups, and Moslem aux-iliaries. Their task was to fight theguerrillas, but, abnve all, to adminis-ter, control, and convert. This pre-ponderance of French forces and aux-iliarise enabled m,ilitary pacificationto proceed untii rebel units were re-duced and isolated, When thie oc-

to ite social rol~ppeared -in mkisterial directives and was the bsshfor the war for the crowd and Win the crowd theme in French min.tery writing. In Algeria, tbe wuagainst kt guswe rcfvoluthmaire WMdivided into twoarsse, rural andur.ban, ssch with a different line ofst.

The Alger ian war sgsirmt la uuerre riuokfkmnoire wee fought in rugged rurel m wellas urben arees

curred, reeieta~ce levels fell back toterrorism and smalksle skirmishes.The Sections Administnztives SP&ciaKnte8 (SAS), a group of reserveotlicers with a knowledge of the Al-gerian eituation 8nd $luency in Ara-bic, was called to duty and becamethe principal administrative unit inthe struggle to regain administrativecontrol. The army coordinated its ac-tivities with SAS at all levels throughits G6, making almoet complete im-mereiun in political and psychologicalaction inevitable.The psychological roIe of the mili-tary services-se Id to be second onlya

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IA 6UERREChairman Nikita Khrushchevs speechin January 1961, and President JohnF. Kennedys reaction to his Viennameeting with Chairman Khrushchev,had serious attention been given thisproblem at top levels of Governmentin the United States. With MarshalLin Piaos confirmation of the meth-odology of Indochina as the preferred

area and some degree of administra.tjve control.The problem we shall face increae.ingly is how to project aid to thw.sgovernments faced with insurgencywithout seeming to interfere in theinternal affairs of other states. So theproblem of doctrine development is,perhaps, more acute for the West to

Chinese method, the West is facedwith developing some type of doctrineto counter the Communist drive topower.Further complicating the problemof countering C%grterre rdvolutiOn-mzire is the fact that in the contempo-rary world most such wars will beconducted inside the border of an-other sovereign state. The French, atIeast were in the poeition of a colo-nial power with initial acceee to thew

day than it was when the French kgan their period of meditation aftwIndochins. Truly, the US military profession maybe said to be in its periodof meditation-searching for theorjand doctrine.It would seem that to be truiy u#fui, espeeial[y in a demoeracy, a dw-trine such ae action petichologigwmust be noliticallv viable. Dart of ibalanced national_ strateg~, Actien

ps@oloUigue was politically viebkMllitlryR* ~

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from the standpoint that it recog-nizedthat one. ~ure way to counter atetatitarian regime was to impose onesimilarly constructed to counter it.Having done %/X%&%%hstherin so dbeento destroy that which one soughttosave in the first place.teals and ObjectivesInitially, uctiom psvckologigue waspAitically viable in Algeria hemmse,given the world temperament andtreadsof the time, it was probably theoolymethod that could have succeededie countering the revolution and sav-ingAlgeria for France. But the min-uteFrance recognized self-determinat-ion for Algeria as the only appropri-ate goal, the doctrine fell apart.Doctrine can be politically viableonly so long as Iit is cast in pursuitof objectives of the state on whichthere is at least common understand-ing, if not consensus. Changing objec-tives, especially during an operation,is a hazardous undertaking as Gen-errdDouglas MacArthur and othershavetestified. In a military establish-ment with as elaborately constructedsad dogmatic a doctrine as k guerrer.holutionnadre and action peycholog.iwe, it is likely to bring down thewholestructure.Goals and objectives, clearly stated,aredficult to come by in a liberal de-mocracy. It is just not in the demo-

cratic way of doing businees for !sdsmoeracy to eetablieh clear, long-range goals and proceed either di-rectlyor indirectly from hereto there.Democracys soldier is continuallyplacedin the position of having to di-vine the intentions of his leaders. Hemust do thle to establish force struc-tureand get on with management ofbodgets, purchase of hardware, anddeployment of troops.Mreary1ss7 >

How he is supposed to do it is ob-viously a subject that needs somestudy. We Rave just looked at the casehistory of an entire military eetsb-lishment that misunderetood the goalaof ite government, and of a govern-ment that imposed on its militaryforce a national goal inimical to theeurvival of an elaborate aud intricatelycontrived network of dectrine andtheory.Negativist PrsmiseIe the doctrine of la ge6erre rdvolu-tiourraire and action psychblogiqwesound ?Strategically, the theory looks atthe world ae one continually at war.Juet as does Marxiem-Leninism-Mao-iem, twk view ignores the poeeibllityof mutual accommodation between na-tions, of balances of power, and ofspheres of influence. It, therefore, be-gins from a negativist premise.WMle the interpretation of la guerrertvolutionnaire ae a negative, totaldogma is quite correct, there ie noth-ing to say that this came philosophymust extend to the counterprogram,regardleee of ite rationale. To acceptthe negative caet of la gueme is todeny the very principles on which theliberal Weet reste its case. For betteror worse, the institution of Weeterndemocraey will eurvive or fall on thepositivist, humanist, individualistvalues of the liberal ethic. If groupsor governments of the Weet, in pur-euit of better methode for dealingwith communism, ehould adopt thephilosophic%] bias of communiem it-eelf, then liberalism ie doomed.Action pe~chologique as a counter-revolutionary dcctrine was ,probablycorrectly drawn for the colonial ex-perience. Given their long history ofcolonial ware, the French militaryleaders probably divined the right


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LA GUERREmethod of dealing with what theyfound in Indochin~ even in Algeria.Being broadly objective about 10guerre and action, however, we mustconclude that they were, in fact, the-oriee of propaganda and politicsl in-doctrination of large groups of peopleusing military power and organizationto get the job done. The French ex-tended the idea to activities not nor-malIy military.One cannot help but be struck bythe narrow vieion of this program. Itwae aimed at the right target-people,and it dealt with the key problempublic administration. But there aresure]y other waye of implementingprograme like this without turningeolely to the military cervices.The French Army took the entiretask upon itself largely because, inthe dogmae of Marx, Lenin, and Mao,such a course ie quite appropriate.But again thie is a method inimicalto the structure of liberal democracy.Armed forces can surely fight againstthe etfecte of subversion, but military

force in a democracy is not the properagent to deal with tbe causee of subversion.If such a program is to be mean.ingf ul and not self-defeating in ndemocracy, there must be a broaderbaae of disciplines, ekille, and rc.sources applied. Economic, political,

social, psychological, and educationalprograms with a nonmilitary bias cmall be constructed.When the world first recognizedgeneral war of the nuclear kind, therewas much talk of the economic andmilitary coordination necessary to prc-duce victory. With general war in thecounterrevolutionary senee, we mu e trealize that economic, military, Polit-ical, social, psychological, and eduwtional forces mu5t be brought to bermVictory may not be eo total ae we ormthought it to be. Re~ization of thetotality of war, and the ambiguity o!victory in this sense, ie eimply to ad.mit implicity that eince war ie totalthe milita~ services can no longerhandIe more than part of war,

LESSONS LEARNEDThe MILITAEYREVIEW ie particularly interested in receiv-ing manuscripts covering leseone learned by US units in

Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control,equipment, tactics, and fire support merit informed discus-sion. After complying with appropriate local regnlatione,authors may eubmit manuscripts direct to the MILITARYRE-VIEW.We will obtain the necessary eecurity review on t hoeeaccepted.

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La Guerre Revolutionnaire