MOR! Document ID:> 10897:10897

- - "N

• FrECE:1YED l1eGEORGE ~;"NaY·s OfFICE

1%5 SEP 16 PM 2 29

..

WEEKLY REPORT

oct No. 063;/65

Copy :z:r<?". 1.

LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory l-~vie'\V

~~e{fNLJ 1>:$'-1.23 l.Jocur:uent. 1/ .2<:' 4

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

. 15 Septem.ber 1965

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMlnEE OF THE INTEoiIAGENCY

VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITfEE

lBJ llB~ARV

MOR! Document ID:> 10897:10897

="p,." ,.

OCI No. 0637/6&

Pub1:1.ahed by the D::l.:re-c,,=,·~·ott. 0': rZlte11:l.cea.ce CeDtral %nte11LceZlca Ag.ncl"

THE SITUATION 15 SOU'l"ll VntTNA1I

(9 September - 15 September 1965)

COJfTBN'l'S

TBB wmm: XN PBRSPBCI':I'VE

MaP. South V.t.etll:lolUll .. ~o11O'W1.og page

:r.. 'l'BB SrrtJAT:IOB l:JIl SOVTa VIBTkAIf

A! POLrTICAL S:lTDATXcm Bue student .act~v1.tl" re~a::l.nB qu.:l.et (p. 1); Tr1 Quang e~ects trouble (p. 1); ~l::l.tarl" D::l.rector&te .ov1ng to Bet up c::l.v::l.l::l.an adv:l.aory oouDc::l.l (p. 2); Congress o~ the army CODV8Daa (p. 2); Qovernment act::l.oDS aga:l.Dst PULRO (p .. 3): Tbe CVT 1abOr group and Ba.:l.gQD leaders meet (p. 4); R::l.ca stocks tal1 .:LD Sa:l.goD and :l.a. the delta (p .. 4); Tbe p::taater"a value .t:l.l1 drop~ (p. 4).. '

1 1

B. MILrrARY SITUATION 5

V::l.et Cone CODceDtrates on ~err:l.l1. act:l.Y:i.t7 (p. 5); vc .tart uB::l.ng dogs (p. 5). Suspected res~.nta1 bu~1dup ~D Phuoc Lon~ Prov~nce (p. 6); VC concentrate OD 1~Des o~ commun~cat~ODa (p. 6 ); Operat~oD PIR.ANHA (p. 6); V~etnamese and US Adr Force aet~v~t7 (p. 7).

<,' 'U'

-:1.- .~ -,_J ~~ lBJ LIBRARY

-- - --------------------

•

MOR! Document ID:> 10897:10897

-.

c. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION'

n.

Marked ~nereasa 1n Cb~au Bot returnees (p.-s >f Bxper~eDtal ra~11er bamlets planued ~or each --Corps (p. 8 ); Rural reconstruction cadre tra1ninW to start (p. 8 >; Psywar d1r.~t1ve to RVNAF (p. 8 ).

THIRD COUNTRY DEVELoPMENTS

Two GVN ambassadorial .ppo1Dt~aDt. (p. 9 ); rncreased OVN rapreeeDt.~1oD 1n A1r1ea urCed (p. 9); General TbIeu to .1s1t Seoul. PreMier ky w111 ~o to MalaysIa (p. 9 ); AUstralians .end ~ore troops (p. 9 ); Hew Zealand _&die.l team earante (p_ 9 ); Switzerland atves .23.000 to Xnternat10nal Red crOSE (p. 10)~

MaP. North Vietnam. ~o11o.1Dg page 10

xu:. DEVELOPldENTS IN THE BLOC

Nineteenth SAM site spotted (p. 11); Kobil. SAM units •• y be deployed (p. 11); French CoInmun:ists urge DRV delegation to Degot~ate (p. 11). De2egat~on ~ay be ree~~Dg out overa22 8ent~~ent (p. 11); Bano1 caut~ou. w1tb statement on Ynd~a_Pak1stan (p~ 13). DRV concern over a1r str1k •• (p. 13); Ch1na .t111 r1~ aga~Dst Degot1.t~oDS (p~ 12): ~ezhDev aga10 denounce. US ~ns1Dcer~t7 (p. 12).

""""" 1 • 2. 3.

.~ GVN Land Reror- Proposa1s south ~etnam Batt1e StatS.tSea US Combat Ca.ua1t~es 1ft V1.t~am

= 8

"

11

('1"1:1. Week1" Report 00 the S.ituat1.on :In SOutb V:let~ 18 based on contr.ibut:lons %roa CIA. DXA and INR; .it .i8 ed.ited and pub1.ished by CIA w.itbout r1na1 coord.inat10n. A tu11y coord.inated MOntb1y Report ~~1 be d.issem1nat.d on the %.irst Fr1d~y 0% every month.)

C7' lBJ LIBRARY

.-~-.----~---~. ---.----.~- ... --. _.-----_ ..

MORl Document

,

lD:> 10897:10897

THE WEEK IN PZRSPECTlV"E

.. The poUtical situation In the northern provin'ees

bas remained quiet for the past ten days as a result Of the apparent failure of antigovernment student groups to attract open support froID the Buddhists or the public. Buddhist leader Tri .;:uang~ however. has warned that unrest in the area is likely to persist under the present governlDent and moay again lntensU'y. The lV"...1Utary Directorate In SaJ.gon~ nleanwhlle~ is moving ahead with its plan to set up a clvilian advisory council to the cablnet~ and last week end held a Dlajor military congress to delDonstrate bOth its firm control and the governlDent's responsiveness to suggestions about Its performance to date.

After the government resorted to n:.ilitary opera­tions to bring about the surrender or some 400 armed tribesmen {ronl the dissident autonomy xnove:rnent. FULRO. govern:rnent officials staged a ceremony in the highlands by welcolTling the dissidents back to the fold. Despite further govern:ment plans to nleet with local tribal leaders concerning their grievances. there are continuing signs or friction between Vietmunese and FULRO sylDpathizer8~ which threaten to affect the loyalty of trlbeslDsn serving in governJnsnt CIDG unitS. In Saigon~ the :military leadership continues to display an atUtude or. considerable reserve toward South Vietnam's leading labor union.

Viet Cong activity continued at the guerrilla level during the week. The only major rr~llitary actions were by US and GVN forces.

-Ui-

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

r--

~.

"'--­., ,. '"

LBJ

.'",'.'"

COR!".5

BOUNDARIES "~ ..

:.~ :-. ~3. - •....

LIBRARY

MORI Document ID:> 10897:10897

• ?J

~ _ .... 1iE SITUATION XN SOUTH VIE'l"NAM

A. POLITICAL SITuATION

1. The pol~~~c.l sl~uatloD ~n the northern prov~nee8 o£ So~th v~etnam rema1nB qu~et. there have been no open attacks on the KQVe~nmeDt ~n Saigon Or appeals for aet~on sinco the weekend o£ 4-$ September when t~e Bue student croups deCided to cease their antl-2overnment act1~ity_

2. The student campaign in Bue was muted almost certainly because it 1al1ed to arouse any w~despread public support. part1cularly any open endorsement 1rom Duddhlst leader 'rbicb Trl Quang or 1rom Btudent leaders 1n Salgon. and because it also 1al1ed to shake the outward show 01 unity among the military leaders themselves. Sources closo to the Buddhist" h~erarcby give the lmpresslon that Trl Quang was alarmed over a poss1ble trend toward .~01.nce and toward ~Dcre.sed ant~-Amerlcan seDtlmen~. and tbat b~s hasty tr1p to Hue ~n late August-ear1y September aay have bee~ to toue down the student protest movement.

3. A:tter h~s v~s1t Trl Quang nevertbe1ess t01d the OS conSul ~n Bue that he expected trouble in the nortbern prov1nces to cont~nue. Be ~mp14.d that agl.tatloD ml.gh't be resume-d ~:f developtnents .,..arranted it _ Be c1a:l.med tbat t;be .. peopl. ... in the area deSired primar:l.ly a 1ega1ly constl.t;uted cl.v11-lan sovernment. and would remal.n rest:l.ve 1~ the present ml11.tary government continued ln o~:fice and the war dragged on. Quan~ ~lal.med that the bes't; sol.ut1on would be to :torm a nat10nal assem'bl.y £rom tbe exl.st;lng elected prov;tllclal aDO muni-c .•

:I.pal cOunc:l.ls. wb:l.ch would tbeL choose new c1v~~ 11.n leaders 1.n Sa~gon. "

Quang's ~o':l.'t;1on contl.nues to re:tlect 80ae d:l.1~erences wl.th the v1ews o:t General Tb~. the m:l.l1tary commander 10 the northern prov1Dces. Tbl bas cbaracterl.zed the elected counc~le as the greatest mlstake 01 the ~ormer Quat gover~en~. and has blamed the cqunc~1B 10r much o:t the recent 10C81 unrellit-.

MORl Document

•

lD:> 10897:10897

4. UeanwbL1e. the KL1~t.r~ DLrecto~.~e ~n Sa~con appears to bp _ovLnB ahead wLth ~ts p1ans to es_ t.b1~sh a c~v~1ian advisory counc~1. Accord~DC ~o the secretary-genera1 o~ the Directorate. Genera1 Phalli Xuan Chi-eu. the .. 't.111:l\ry contomp1ate a c::ounc1.1 or about 100 ~erob~rs. to be seated by 1 November. Vietnam·s Nationa1 Day mark~ng the overthrow o£ the Diem reg1.e. Cb1.eu said that the counci1 wou1d prob.~1y inc1ude a representative rrom each o£ the 43 prov1nc1a1 and ~lve munieipa1 counci1s. .1.th the ba1anr.p. or its members careru117 se1ected rro= among var10us re1igious and proress1ona1 groups. 1abor unLODS. and po1it1ca1 partie.. Ambnssador Lodge bad orevious17 commented that ~he counci1 might prove troub1esome in view o£ Pr •• ier XY-s 1ack o£ any re11.ab1e civ11ian po1itica1 base~ but Genera1 Cb~eu appeared caut~ouB17 optim~Bt~c that tbe counc11 cou1d be ke~t under contro1. Be noted that the counci~ wou1d advi,se the cab-1net rather than the D~rectorate. and that. wbi1e ~he counc1.1 wou1d have DO 1--1ti.a1 1egis1ative autbor1.t7. 1t might evo1ve 1.oto a const1tuent assemb1y 1~ success£u1. ~

5. On 11 September, the Directorate convened :l.n Sa1gon • "congress o£ the entire' aru.7~·· comprisi.nllr • reported 1,868 de1egates representi.ng .i11~ary of£1cers down to the 1eve1 of company oommander. The congress was part17 intended to demonstrate the ~011darit7 o£ the armed ~orces. but was .180 desJ.gned to make it c1ear that the mi~:l.t.r7 intend to re.a1n £J.~17 in contr01 o~ the government. The cODc1ave adopted a reso1uti.on genera11y e.o­dora1ng the government's' programs. and heard speeches b7 Premier Xy and by Genera1s Th1eu and Co. The afternoon session was essent1a11y • caucus on the governmGnt's per£ormanoe. w1.tb 1ower-rank1ng o££~cers ~ree1y part1c1pat~ng and direct1ng the bu1k o£ the1r cri.ti.ci.sm at Ky's ~.i1ur. to curb 1nr1.t1OD and De~.~Be Minister Co's retreat on the mobi1~zati.on decree .£~ectins ~nte11ectu.~B. Vost o~r~cers reportedly con8~derod the congress a success. and s~m~1ar congresses are p1anned w~th the bope that eventua117 a11 o££1cers w111 have participated.

6. Two days before the congress, Genera1 . Tbieu de1ivere~ what was 1n e£fect a keynote

-2_

'-'.---~----'---"---"-"------ '---.---'._--

MORI Document ID:> 10897:10897

speocb. dec1ar~ng that the South V~etDames. peop1e .ou1d never &o1~c~t Degot~.t~ons w~th the Commun~sts and wou1d Dever be coapo11ed to accept _ &01Ut~OD wh~ch .ou1d ba~ter away th.~r 1eg~tLm.te ~Dtere$ts tbrough Deutr.1~ty or _ coa1~t~oD w~th the CommUD~8ts. ~

7. The US EQbassy assessment o~ recent deve10pments a~~ect~n~ ethn~c tr~besmeD 1n tbe centra1 b~gb1ands bas conc1uded that the a~tuat1on 1& at111 ~1u~d- desp~t. pree1p1tous moves by the government wh~ch threatened to shake the 1oya1ty o~ tbe tr1bes. The •• moves began on 7 SeptelOber when troops ~D one CXDG ""amp were d1sarmed because 100a1 V1etnamese commanders. Buspected that negot~.torB ~rom FOLftO--the d1s­a1dent 't:~~ba1 autonomy movem8n't: __ were &ta111ng 9J.th tbe government to &110w FVLRO u.r:::l.ta :l.n the .~ea to try to Subvert varJ.ous CEDG ~orces ~ thGJ.r cause. On 10 September. ,overnmen~ ~roops 'aunched s~mu1t.neous oper.~~ons ag.~~ a V~et Cong ~orce and • FOLRO ~orce near Ban Me Thuot. and sucoeeded ~n eaus~Dg ~be peaee~u1 surrender of' a 400-11U1D FtJLRO un~t. Deap~t.. 1;.be danger of' the government provok~ng Dew tr~b.l d~saf~ect~on by resort~ng to harsh act~ons. the conrllct has been temporar~ly patcbed up througb a ceremony attended ~y Pre~~er Ky on 15 September At that t~me. ~he surrendering FVLRO troops pledged the~r .11eg~.nce and were we~ca.ed back to the government aide.

8~ General Tj~h Loc, II Corps commander has advocated 1~rm action _galnst ~TJ~.~ d~$8i4entB. but Zor the present bas conceded to be More len~eDt~ On 1B September be p1ans to b.~D • ..r~ee of meetln~ ~n each blgh1and province among Sa~gon o~f'lc:l.a1s and tr~ba1 1eadeTs In a further att.mpt to .at~$1y tribal demandS. Tradlt~ona1 V~etDamese distrust of tbe Montagnards however. and ~algon·B chron~c 1oot-dragglng--not on1y on the ~ssue of autonomy but on providing .pecla1 servio •• for the tr~b$e--make :l.t 1~ke1y that ~he prob1e. w:l.'1 rem.~n unreso1ved~

9. The _~1~tary covernmen~·s d:l.staste ~or encouraging a strong 1abor movement. and 1ts ~ecent. ~

.. _--_ ... ---------- --~-. ------ --- ----------- . __ ._. - ~ .------ ---

MORl Document lD!> 10897:10897

+'''7''&

e:r:rorts to Gn:torce a decree aga:lnat the CVT-_"t:hG oountry·s ~.jQruD:lo~equ:lr:lng advance &overnment approval o~ un:lon maet:lngR threatened to prowoke • eeneral str1ke •. CV"X' •• 0:r1':l.c1als hava complat.ned o~ pol.:lce surve~11ance o~ tbe:lr beadquarters Jlnd 01 alleged d:l.scr:lm:lnat:l.on aga:l.nst them 1n %~vnr o~ r.:lval un:lon leaders. They protested the govern­ment rullng. but probably l~cked the strength to pose any ser:lous threat to the reg:l.me. They suc­ceeded. however. ln meetJng with labor mia:l.stry o~~:l.c:l.als and Wlth Sa~gon mll~t.ry and pollee author:l.tles. on 11 September. At that t~me, they a~red their er:levances and aims, and ~~proved their position ~or the present. A strlke now BeeMS unlikely. It ls .~il1 questlonable whether the CYT w:l.ll succeed 1n overcoming governQent bost:l.llty and wbether it w:l.ll re~aln a relat1vely .~~ectlve veh:lcle ~or a strong, non-Communlst labor movement.

Bconomlc Sltuatt.on

10. Rice stocks 1e11 to 63.792 ~etrlc tons ~n SaigOn, and a reported 50,875 metric tons In the de1ta by tbe end o~ Augus~. Altbougb 1mport shlp_ me~tB have recently been deliwered to Ds NanB. the supp1y 1n Salgon remalns a lIIa~ter o~ co~.cern. J;JoJ1thly requlrements ~or Sa:lgon and central VietJ1am total over ~o,ooo metr:l.c tons. The p-ewlon. decl1ne In r:l.ce prlee~ was reversed during the week. re~~ect1ng the .. t1gbter market.

11. The OVN Is cons:ldering r~ce dlstr.:lbutlon measures deslgned to lessen de~~dence on private tr.8'$. especi.ally ChinAse .ercbants. The pol1.cy .ay c.use the state to become more 1nwolved and •• y also cause a pr.lvate company 0% V:letJ1amese r~ce dealers to be establ:1.shed to compete w~th the Ch~nese. A decree establlsh1ns • R:l.ce Bureau 1D the ~rlce o~ SuPP~7 :1.8 DOW .wa~~~ng Premier Xy's a~gnature.

12. The 1ree marke~ value ~ the p1aster ~D ~erms of US dollars cont1nued to decl~De a1ter the ~ntro­duct ion 01 scr1p (MPC's) and the Dew exchange arrangements at the end 01 1ast month. On 11 September ODe US dollar brought $VN 1.5-150 co.pared w1~h $VN 131-132 on 28 August. The consu.er pr1ce ~ndex rose bv ~our percent last week. br~Dg1ng 1t ~h. level 5 percent h~gher than laat .ooth. and 22 percent above laat ~ear·. level. -4-

----':"~, -, -:J <C'-_~,_~C---- lBJ LIBRARY

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

... ; " i'" , "

B. 1I1L:ITARY SITUATION

1. V~et CODg act~v~ty cont~nued at ~be cuerr~lla 1evel throughout tbe week o~ 4~11 Sep_ 'tember. Tbe only" mQ."jor .t.l.1tary aeti.ons 'Were.- by VS and GVN forces'.

2. There were _even small attacks by tbe-Vi.et Cong; all but ODe were agai.nst Heg.1ona~ or Popular Force unita; three were ambushe.. The :lne.1dent total was 12 percent hi.gher than the prev~ous week-a. F.1rst-and XV Corps each totaled about 30 percent or all :lncidents. In the prev:lous week-. pattern. the XV Corps was high with ODe­th:lrd o~ all :lncidents. Terror.1sm accounted for 88 percent of the total. sabotage and prQpaganda :increased; aDd there were 50 percent Dore fir:ingB at- a:1rcra:tt.

3. %n % Corps Tact1cal Zone (CTZ) harass1ng f1re 1Qcreased 50 percent dur1ng the week. Cauti.oua emplo~ent o:t suerr:llla tore.. character.ized Vt..t Cons-~n~t.iated .:ll~tary act~v~t7. ODe ambugh and one nigbt attack were reported~ Xn IX CTZ. ~nc.i­dents cont1nued at a low level. ~th two V~et Cong attacks reported. Patrol1~ng ~ US and V~etnamese forces aloDg Route 19 met ~ncrea.1ne enemy rea~ataDce. The ~~rst known V1et Cong use or does occurred ~n the KODg sac area. of KODtum Prov1Dce: the d08'8 . alerted the guerr~11as to tbe presence of friend17 troops ~D ambush pos1tt.ons. The Viet CODS: ~D XXX Corps have been quiet exeept for ~our apparently coord.1nated act~oDS ~D Long Kbanh Province. Viet Cong act1vity virtually ceased ~n Lon« An Rnd &au Kgb!. provinces. Use of bel:lcopters at n1gbt appears to have contributed to this slowdown. on. prisoner has stated that a1eht be~ieopter operations against r:lver trafrlc decreased the mob:llity o:t hi. battali.on. and that night river cro.s~n8's. which formerly required two hours to complete. DOW take six to eight hours because of addltioual precautions taken.

•

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

-,

AD appareDt bu11dup o~ V~et CQng ~orcea 1A Due PhODg district. 1nvo1v1D& at 1eaat a regiment. auggests a threat asalAst the dlatrict town Wblcb 15 tho 0017 GVN cc~tcr o~ lD~'u.Dce 1~ eastern ~uoe Long Provln¢e. -~though DO .lgDl~lcau~ actions deve10ped -In rv CTZ. two ambushe. o~cOrred. The Viet Cone continue to haraas Iso1ated posta. using G7-~ and 7~ recol11eaa rl~1ea ~th inereas1ng ~reqv.DCy.

4. The Viet Cong are stl11 conceDtratlnc 00 obstructing 11nes o~ co.aunlcatlons. HatioDa1 Route ~ 1. c10sed 10 southern Quang Ngal. centra1 81Db DiDh. southern B~ob Tbuau apd a11 o~ Blnh Tuy provinees. Route 19 Is closed west o~ P1e:Ur;u City but opeo to tbe east. Route 9 1$ C10Bed In ~aDg Trl Province. Rovte 14 18 c10sed north o~ KODtum aod throughout Phvoc Loog aDd Blnh Long provlDcea. Route 17 1. c10sed In Klen Giang. eaat and weat o~ Bach 01a. %nterprovlncla1 Routes 1 a~d 10 are C~08ed ~n B1J1h Duong Prov:1nce. Route '7 :18 c108ed :1.n Pbu Yen aDd Phu Bon prov1ncea.

The nat~ona1 ral1road :1.s operating between 8algon and Xuan Loc. Long kbanh Provinee; betweea Song lII:ao. B:Lnh TbUao Province. and Nlnh Boa. Xbanh Boa Province; betWeen Da1at. Tuyen Duc Province. and Phan RADg-. N:lDb Thuan Provloce; and between Da Nang. QuaDS Jram Prov:1nce. and Dong Ba. quang Trl Province. -

5. Combined operat:lonB 1n % CTZ dominated the eoverumeut .:l1:lt~ .~rort. The k:l11 rat:lo 10_ ~avor o~ tb. QVN increased ~o 2.4 ~o 1. ~ro~ 1 •• t week". 2.1 to 1. 1arge1y because or two ml11tary setbaCks ~or the V:let cooS. :10 which US Marloes p1ayed prOlDi:nent ro1ee. :10 Qua,ng Nlita" Province. PZRANRA. an amphib:lous sweep o~ the heav:11y ~ortl11ed Cap Batangan area~ cost the Viet CODe 202 k:l11ed. 61 captured. and 18 weapons. Fr:lend17 10ssea were 11 k11Xed (ODe US) and 48 wounded (12 US). %n otker act:lon. In .astern ~ang Ham Province. strong V:Let Cong resistance requ1red ~be rap:Ld a1r_ 1:1~t:1n.g o~ lJS Va.r:1ne relD~orcements. :Enougb combat power was tbua deve10pe4. to ~orce eDe~y w:lthdrawa1

_6_

~~~JlBJ LIBRARY

---- -- --_. -.-- -- ,,-_.,,---------------- .. -~-----" -----_.------ - - ,---

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

>

•

and to net 92 V~et CODg k~11e~. ~1ve captured. and 1~ve weapons sG:1zed. Gover~eot 108SeS were 28 k:llied. 93 wounded. and ~wo m1B.1~g.

6. Blaewbere. go~ernmen~ m111tary operat10ns were not 81gD1~1caDt. Larger-scale operat:1oDS 10 progress averaged-.bout 14 per day. Smal1-UD1't operat1ol)$ totaled 19.965. aa. avera.ge 01' 2.852 • day. A total 01' 113 contacts were reportoeJ-­about one-hal~ o~ oa.e percent. CIDG aDd other uD1tB adV1sed by US Ara~ Spec~al Forces 1ecreased operat10ns and eont.ct&~ ClOG Camp BuOD 8r1enc :1n central Darlac Prov1nee was closed. and the Rbade tr1besmen cQlDpr1s:log the C:rDG 1'orce eSt..armed and demob1l:l.zed.

7. T1etnamese ~r Force operat10DS decl:l.ned; Dost .1&8:1.00S w~~~ :1.0 support 01' g?o~d operat:l.ons. US Air Force act:l.vt.t:v Sucreased •• 1tb a1:r;olafllded resupply .:l.ss:l.Oos accoUQt1ng :ror mQat 01' tbe ca~D. SAC B-S2"a m&de ~our b~gh_.lt1tude »rec~.10n bomb1ng m1sa1oDs. Sea. r~ver. &Ad coas~.1 ~Qrce operat:l.oD$ OODt~DUed. w1tb no 81eD1~~C.Dt develop­ment. reported •

-7-

L--·--~-/ ' ' -",' ,;- . -'-

::....:!--'--~.::............--

lBJ LIBRARY

-_ .. - ..... - ... _-_.

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

!}

•

c. RURAL COJ{STRVf:rION

x. During tbe per.1o<1 4-11 September 2.406 persona were recor<led as re.turnJ.ng to GVN contro1. -:l:D61uclecS were 179 .ll1tary. 40 po~lt1ca1 cadres. 13 drart dOdgers and deserters. and 2.174 clv111aDS. Tb1s week-a tota1 1& a .arked Increase over the prev.1ous week when a tota1 or 962 lndlv.1duals returDed. The c.1vll1.n category or returnees made the greatest gain. 2.174 versus Xaat week-s 738. The number or mll1t~ry ~eturDees decline~ this week. the number or po11t~.ca1 cadres ga:1ned s1:s'ght1y.

2. Ponds are now bG1ng re1eased under the ausp1ces or the Chieu Hoi program to establish eight exper1menta1 Quy Chanh (r&11:1er) h~1ets. Five are now under construc­~n and a sixth site In Vinh ~ng Province is be1ng readied. These special ham1ets are ~teDded to prdV1de homes ror Chieu Hoi returnees who can~ot go back to their own hamlets because or security or persona1 reasonS. Each Corps area wi11 have at 1east one o~ theae experlmen­ta1 h.m1e~s. Four wl11 be 1ocate~ neLr prov~ncia1 capita1s: Can Tho. B1en Hoa. Pl.ei.ku or Nha Trang. and Da "og.. on~ pl.anned bam1et in phu Bon Prov:lnee wi11 comb~n. rOZugeos and ra11iers on an experimenta1 basis ..

S. The Directorate ~or Rural. Op.rat~ons. UDder the K~nistry or Rura1 Construct~an. has recent1y been .ta~red and 1s current1y work:lng on the prob1em o~ de:f':ln:lDg the m~ss.t.OD of the rural CODStruction cadres. A trainl11g course ~or 100 rura1 construc't~oll cadres"'s .ehedu1ed to beg1n on 1 ~tober. The Rura1 Construet.t.on • .t.n18try~ ev:ldently pl.anning to expand the ~our5e. bae made plans to coustruct dorm:ltories .t.n Saigon capab1e o~ housiDK 200 students. . .

4. In PSYChOl0g.t.cal operations. General. 00 •• inlste~: o~ War. .t.n an order o£ the day. urged the RV6AF to :a._prove the.t.r sol.t.dar.t.ty w:lth the peop1e. to demonstrate their respect :tor d:lsc1p1~ne. and to e11minate arrogance and improper actions toward the c.t.vi11an populat~on. He IStressed . that recent victories over the V:let Cgng were the resu1t of tbe vo1untary lntell~geDce provided by tbe 10cal peop1e •

-8-

lBJ LIBRARY

MORl Document 10.:> 10897:10897

A.. AlUlASSADORXAL APPOXN'rMEln'S

There were ~ew', a:l.gf:l:l.f:1eant :lnternat:l.ona1: 'devel.opments th.:l. week. The CVN eont':lnues to postpone :I.n dee.:ldi.ng on ambassadorla1 appointments. Fo~er Budget and For.i.~n A:l.d D:l.rector General. Vu Van Thai.. bowever, has DOW been Dom:lnated as OVN Ambassador :l.n Wash:l.ngton. General. Tran Th:len Khlem. present1y Ambassador to the Un:l.ted States .... :1.11 reported1y ~·peome Ambassador to the Repub1:1.o o~ Cb:l.na.

BoO AFRICA

The US Embassy :l.n Sa:l.gon cont:l.nues to urge the GVN to adopt • aore act:l.ve p01:1.cy :In &~r:l.ca througb tbe ass:l.gnment o~ .oro d:i.p1omat:l.c rep:r.esentat,:lvos. The GVH _ has been urged to send • h:l.gb 1eve1 de1esat:l.on to a:l.x or e:l.~bt Afr:l.can countr:l.ea (both Aag10pb:i.e and Francoph:l.e). devot:lng about three days to each. US of~:l.c:l..1. have a1so suggested that the Gv.N .end • statement or :l.t. v:l.e~ on the V:tetnameso eonf1:1.ct to the Secretar:l.at of the OTgan~zat:l.on of A£r~c~an UD~ty ~or the upcom~ng OAU ··.umm:tt·· wh.;loh may bes::l.n on 21 October ::In .Aocra.

C.- ASrA

Genera1 Nguyen Van Th1.eu. eh.~rman 0% ~he D;lre~~orate "'Dd' Ch1.e:f of State, ... :1.11 reported1y 1Dake a atate 'V;1.~;1.t- . to Seou1 sbort1y :1.0 .ar1y October. Prem1.er Ky 16 .180 expected to v;ls1.t .a1ay8:1.a 1.a early October.

1>.

>. AUSTRALIA

Three hundred' and 1:1.:fty Au&traX~~ troops 1e1t Austra11. for South V1.etn.. on 11 Sep~ember. ~ha troops were prom.i. •• d by Pri..e II:lD:l.ster lIenz:tes :l.n August and . are to support: the Austra1:1.an :l.n1antry battal1.on a1ready ;In South V.i..toam.

2. NEW ZEALAND_

New zea1and under 1.t8 Co1ombo P1an co.m:l.tment. ...1.11 eend _ surg1.ca1 team to South V:l.etnBm to re1:leve the tea. now work~g there.

---------------------------~

MORl Document ID:> 10897:10897

.. Ie" -:-:e

~ i "" ~ t:j

oe tt'e_C"

, I

'------i ~-- --------~

" I

1. 1. • •

• v

--i .,_-:..~.:.>_' _-. _' -J-c'-.----,.<"----------j- .,.L--

LBJ LlB"ARY

• _ ••• __ • _______ ,, ___ ,_,_. __ , __ , ___ ~r ______ ••• ~ ________ • ----0.------0"--- .. -;-------

.-•

•

MORI Document 10:> 10897:10897

~'

3. SWI:TZERLA.ND

On 7 september the Sw.t.ss Government donated 100.000 sw~ss Francs (US $?3.000) to the IDternat~ona~ Red cross Comm~ttee ~or .~d to wa~ v~ct~ms 0% both North and South V~etDam. The sum w.t.11 be used %or c1otb~ng.-~ood. and ~ed.t.c.t.DeB %or c~v.t.1.t..ns. .

, _10_

LBJ LlB'?ARY

-.------- -------~-- -----.-----, - ------ "._ ... --

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

r--

•

XXI. DEVELOPMENTS :IN THE BLOC

A. M:ILXTARY DEVEbOPMENTS

1. A new. :f:1xed sur:face_to_a:1r 1II:15&:11e- ('SAM) s1te ~n North V1etnam was con:f:1rmed :1n analy5~s o:f 4 September drone photography dur:1ng the week. The s1te ~s located e1ght m1lea southwest of Hanoi. This brings to 19 the number 01 such de:fens1ve 111.:1&_ &:11e :1nstal~at:1ons :1n the DRY. In addit1on. 1t :1s now certain that at ~eas,t one lDob11e SAM un1t 1s be1ng employed :in the central coastal reg:1on of the DRY in the vicinity 01 Thanh Hoa_ Sim:11ar mObile un1ts are believed to be operat1ng northwest of HanOi and pOSSibly 1n the Laos border area o:f central North V:1etnam where VS str:1ke a:1rera:ft frequent~y fly.

B. NEGOTIATIONS

2. Pressure by Italian Commun1st Party 01:f:1c:1a18 on the Rome government to grant visas to the DRV dele­gation have met with no success. The Cornmun:1st 1eader~ 10 J:tlilly cla:1m that the delegation "ID:ight be earry1ng Bome :Lnterest:1ng proposal" (presllmably on end:Lng the war.) Hanoi:La known to have expressed an :interest several months ago 1n hav:1ng La Duc Tho stop :1n Italy for talks w:1th the Ital:1li1n Oommun:1ats.

3. J:t:Ls doubt£ul that Hano:i baa charged th:Ls rle1egat:Lon w:ith mak:Lng concrete proposals :1n e:Lther France or Italy on negot:Lat:Lng the war. but :it :is

--- .~--.".' .. --.--~~ ... ~.----,-.-.--- .. ~.--------

MORl Document ID:> 10897:10897

-:~,-.

p~ssib1e that the group ~s attempt~ng to fee1 out the sentiment of the Communist eommunity on the war issue as well as to probe for any US concessions in American terms for peace •

c. PROPAGANDA ..

1. The DRV's unwill~ngness to become embroiled in an ~ssue on whiCh its two major allies--Cb1na and the Soviet Union--have taken oPposing stands was re­flected in Hanai's propaf.anda treatment this week of the Xnd~a-PaklEitan war. ·"Wh11.e Moscow .and Peking were quick to voice their positions on the war, HanOi's first statement __ an authoritative "Observer-' artic1e in Nhan Dan __ did not appear until. 11 September. A DRv-aeBire to maintain a balance between its two allies was eVident in the artiCle. The statement pointed out that the issue of self_determination in Kashmir had touched 01f the conflict, and that "inappropriate" action by the Ind:Lan government had been largely respons~ble for aggravating the 8~tua­tion. The article scored Indian unwil.lingness to settle the issue peacefully, but fa~led to condemn New Delhi as the aggressor or to side with Pakistan, as bave the Ch:Lnese. Rather, it accused the US. Great Britain, and the UN of being the true violators of the rights of the people of Kashmir while callin~ for a "peaceful IScttl.ement" oj" t~e conflict in a fashion Bimil.ar to that expressed by the SOViet Union.

2. The most oxplicit statement in some time of Hanoi's concern OYer the effect 01 US air IStrikes on public morale was on 1l. September when a domestiC broadcast discussed conditions in tbe Viet Sac Autono­mous Reglon, in nor~heastern North Vietnam. The broadoast expressed particular dissatisfaction with evacuat~on practices in this region and impl.ied tbat local reSidents had taken to their heels with little regard for pl.anned evacuation procedures. Cadre members and state employoes were urged. to "expl.ain things" to the people 1n order "to reassure them." 'rhe broadcast also :re.,,·oal.ed the regime's continuing suspiCion that the Viet Bac area is ha:rboring spies and proYocateurs. All provinces were instruoted to counter the "erroneous views" allegedly &pread through the area by "the eneroy" and to ".mftiSh .ion time" all. counterpropaganda arguments." Tbe broadcast "..arlled

•

c:-. ~12- J -~~-. __ -'-.1 lBI LIBRARY

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

--

that "cadres: and peopl.e" 1.0 the area are not yet :l'ul.1y aware of the "tr:ieky. dangerous schemee." of the enemy. Dur:ing the week add:it:iona1 statement. about the effect the a:ir ra:ids are hav:iDg on publ.:ic hea1th. the product:ion of ~ed:ic:ines. and the :irr:i_ gat:ion and dam network :in North V~etnam fu~~~er po:inted up the apparentl.y r:is~ng concern :in ~ano:i.

3. Ch:ina'$ cont:inued opposJ..t:ion to negotJ..atJ..ons on V1.etnam was underscored 1.n an J..nterv:iew &ranted by Chou En-la1 to a correspondent Of the Middl.e East News Agency on 8 September. Chou was quoted :in an NCNA account Of the J..nterv1ew as declaring that there coul.d be no c~promise Bolut1.on Of the V1etnBm probl.em ~n exchange :for the "reetoratJ..on" of Ch:inese membersh:ip ~n the UN. Chou a11eged that the V:iet­namese were growJ..ng "ever stronger" 1n the:ir strugg1e aga1net the VS. and repeated Pek~ng'e pos~t~on that the "on1.y way" to so1.vo the V.letnamese probl.em .... as for "the VS to "respect the 1.954 Geneva agreements" and w:ithdraw ~ts ar~ed forces ~rom South V.letnam.

4. Sov1et Party chJ..e~ Brezbnev ~n a 10 September speech also took sharp .lsBue w:ith the US pol~cy 1n V~etnam. Brezbnev cla:lmed that Wash.lnKton·s "escal.a_ t~on" 01' tbe war demonstrates tbe ~ns:lncer~ty Of ~ts ca11 lor a peacefu1 settlement. He dec1ared that "m:i1J..tary garnbl.es" des:lgned to crush the "nat10nal l:ib.rat~on movement" Qre doomed to faJ.1ure. However, 1n a remark apparentl.y dJ.rected at both Wash:ington and Pek:i.ng, be warned tbQt "~t wou1d be a DI~stake" to underesti.mate the dangers Of the current s.ltuat~on B~nCe so_cal.1ed "1oca1 con~l.J.cts are fraught with the threat of a bJ..g war."

_13_

~~"-c-:,:1--~Bj LlS"ARY

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

~-

ANNEX

NEW GVN LAND REFORM PROPOSALS

As part of its announced "revolutionary'· Pl"ogram dc.~gned to win ma99 .upport~ the Ky government has taken a renewed interest in the long dormant GVN land reform program. The Cabinet haS approved new proposals which. if consistently implemented~ could help in winnine the support of the rural population~ despite certain limitations in the program.

A. PAST PROGRAM

1. Shortly after its inception. the Diem gOVern_ ment introduced a land reform program designed to benef:[t the country's 1,200.000 tenant rice farmers. A rent con­trol and tenure program was begun in 1955. which limited rents to 25 percent of the main crop. provided for five year renewable contracts at these terms for tenants, and set u~ village and district agrarian reform cummittees. Under Ordinance No. 57 of late }956, the government l~mi~ed ~nd~vidual ownerShip of ~ice lands to 100 hec~area. and l~m~ted to 30 hectares the amount that could be t~lled by the landlord himself. The excess over 100 hectares was to be sold ~o the government £or 10 percent each and the balance in non-negot~able bonds. Th~s land was then to be redlv~ded among tenants. with landless laborers, veterans, and war victims £ollowing in priority. The new owners would pay for it ~n Six yearly installment.. Sub­sequently. the payment period was lengthened to 12 yea~s. In 1958. under the terms of a 7r.nco-V~etnamese agreement. the French financed the purchase of approximately 225,000 bectares of French_owned land for red~stribution.

2. Compared with programs of other nat~ons ~nd V~et Minh land red~stribution. the Diem land reform pro­gram was limited. Even in the delta where land is rela­tively abundant. 100 hectares represents a very high retention limit (one hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres). The average family cultivates an area 01 three hectares or less. Because the title to tbe land remained with the government until payments we~e completed. the new owner could not borrow on h~s equity; moreover. the.law did not a110w him to mortgaKe ~he land ~or an .dd~tional ~our

A-1

LBI LIBRARY

---"'..:\ ~-

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

years. Prov~sions for .gricultura~ credit and tecbnical ~mprovements. necessary parts of a successful land reform program. were ~nadeqUate.

3. At the PTogr'amwB outset. ~t was es'L:I.mated that 300.000 tenants would become landowners. and %he re~a~n~ng 900.000 would be protected by the" -of; control and securi-ty .easures. However. to date. provisional land certi~1cates bave been issued to 11~.000 new owners for 264.000 hectarea out o~ a total o~ 436.000. hectares expropriated under Ordinance 57. The rent "control provisions proved unen_ rorceable. particularly '1n land_poor central Vietnam where the landlord clearly had the upper band and the practice of double cropping complicated application of the rent limitation. As a consequence of these difficulties. as well as of declining interest and lack of administrative capability. the GVN dropped ser~ouft attempts to enforce the law. Vnt~l DticOi"mber 1964. there ."ere no plans to d~.tr~bute tbe land formerly owned by the French landlo~ds. Where posB~ble. the government rented the land at the 25 percent rate.

B. THE PRESENT PROGRAM

1. The new GVN program the problems d~sc~$$ed above. elements:

is designed to meet some of 1t consists o£ three ma~n

a. The 225,000 hectares o~ former French holdings W1l1 be distributed witt provis~on& to ~mprove yields, part1cularly through water contrOl. 1rrigat~on improvements~ and establ~Bhment of farmer organizat~oDs to encourage technical development. Land values w~ll depend on y~elds. and payment will extend over 12 years. In the f~r.t year. the govern_ ment hopes to distribute 23,000 hectares now in areas under its control. Distribution of the remainder w~ll depend on improved security.

b. Village communal lands. now rented to highest bidders (rentals often exceed 50 percent of the crop). will be rented at rates from 15 to 25 percent of the average yield. Pr~orities in the use o~ this land. to be determ~ned locally, w~ll be given to disabled veterans. war victims. and Popular Forces member~. This program is now under way •

• A_2

lBJ UB ::\ARY

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

c. Full t~~les w~~l be granted ~o 811 owners under Ord~nance 57 regardle$S of whether they have completed payments. although the government w~ll ret.~n a l~en on the land unt~l payments are eom_ pleted. A motator~um of one or two year~on payments for Ord~nance 57 lands w111 be granted, e~fect~ve durina the CUrrent emergency. together w~th land t.~ forK~veness during the 12_year periOd o~ ~and paymen~s.

2. The GVN also 1ntends to exempt tenant ~armers 1'rom paying back rent toO-landlords ~or per~ods during wh~ch land was under V~et Cong control. The government is also considering sale Of communal lands. government purchase and red~str1but~on of land offered for sale volun~ar1Iy. and the poss~ble reduct~on of maximum rice land holdings to 50 hectares.

C. EVALUATION AND PROSPECTS:

1. If the new OVN program i8 effect~vely implemented. it may be a small but significant contribution to GVN ef_ forts to 2ain the support of the rural populat~oD. The transfer of former French laDds to tenants will provide·­ownership to a new group of farNere. while the temporary moratorium on Ordinance 57 payments and tho period of land tax forg~venesB w~ll eaBe financial pressures on owners of th~s land. ]1' the additional measures being considered are approved and implemented. the impact of the OVN pro­gram will be cons~derably extended_ The provision of full titles could have economic as well as psycbological s!gnif­~canee if the new owners can now use their land equity as secur~ty fox borrowing. The new allocat~on system for communal land~ a~med at bene1iting deserving ~ndividuals. and ~~empting tenants in ·newly pac~fied areas from paying back rents should have a favorable effect on peasant receptiveness to renewed OVN control.

Z. However, in view of past exper~ence and the currer.t .dm~n~strative weaknesses of the OVN, it is by no .eans certain that the new proposals w~ll be effectively and equ~tably carried out. The requirements ~or prov~d~ng ~r~~gation ~mproVements and establ~sh~ng farmers~ organ~_ ~ations may slow the rate of transfer of former French 1ands. Va1uation of land by product~v~ty rather than market value appears undes~rable_ The new system for .llocat~on of communal land may we11 be hampered by vested interest and t8adit~onal res~stance ~o change.- Lack of

A-3

lBJ lIB~ARY

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

secur1ty in many rura1 areas w111 ser1ous1y impede 1mp1e_ mentation of each or these proposa1s. Moreover. the reject::1on by the G,'U of more far-reaching proposa1s recom­mended by the US. _such as the extena1.on of a real. measure of authority to the v1~1ages. the expropr1a~On of 1and he1d by non-resident 1and1ords. and provision-for tenants to opt for purchase of 1and they occuPY. wi11 1imit tbe psychologica1 impact and economic importance of the program.

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

""'" ' e"

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS. 1965 'WEEKLY REPORT

•• II s ..... _ ... "E.S':~HNEl LOSSES llllL-L-IED IN AeTION .ISSING IN AeTION CAPTURED , -

-

~:::'~=-I! Iii i; iI I ",I I r /111 ! i ; Ii IIII i II H";' I" i -' 'I' , I ! I . l . I! I ; ! r 1 I I' ; . I; . i, , I .' • I ,I II , I'.' I"

; I' il! 1III ! ! : II I ! i II Ii 1\:1 I " IIII! I ! ' I, I , I ! ; 1 , ,

, 'A ")'J.I I ' f\' ,Ill I 'iN ~' !\!.L III! / ' II ' r J-).. I ' '\.' 1 V i i ~' 11'1 I 'i I

' , , I II 111111 III . III''' I III i V'}h

I -I -I _. -I -' I-I - I - I - - -, •• I

.--

lBJ LIBRARY

--- .. ----~----' .. ----- - --------""---."-~ ---

MORl Document lD:> 10897:10897

.'

_ COJIlaAT CJUUAI.1"IU IN VlnNAM - ,-, - _ .... - ...... _. -I !.' ___ • . d -." .. ~ --- '-'-'--. ,-, -'-, I .... _! .-r "

c..-'",_.,_,,_ _ _ 1_ ......

• .. '_ .. _,-- .. _,- .......... f • .. -_._- .. , I I I I I I I I II i I - • ..._ ....... '_ ... , , , • I \ I \ I \ I I I·\! , • , " , , , • -- , - - -' -• - r - I - I - I

_. I - I - I .- -. I ~ I -. - I

.. ---c-...._ ......... ~. __ ----'-·,-1--

'H+H+tAttl++tt+ttti<H

- - , ..... y -,-1-1-,-- _" , Me I

c::::.::J

•

lBI L!13-:;;'.RY

- .--~.---~-~-- --- ._-'--