Kuwait Aff

7/29/2019 Kuwait Aff

1/17

Speech:InherencyThe war in the Middle East is failing. All we do in the MiddleEast is failing. We must rethink our foreign policy and then

go back if we must, starting with Kuwait since the troopsthere are not as significant as the ones in other MiddleEastern countries.Journo 09(Elan, fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, Winning the Unwinnable war, May 2009)http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr oduction-an-unwinnable-war/SYLAcross all fronts U.S. soldiers are made to fight under thesame, if not even more stringent, battlefield rules. Prior tothe start of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, for instance, the militaryslegal advisors combed through the Pentagons list of potential targets, and expansiveno-

strike lists were drawn up.[3]Included on the no-strike lists were cultural sites,electrical plants, broadcast facilitiesa host of legitimate strategic targetsruled untouchable, for fear of affronting or harmingcivilians. To tighten the ropes binding the hands of the military, some artillery batterieswere programmed with a list of sites that could not be fired on without a manual override, whichwould require an OK from the top brass.[4] From top to bottom, the Bush administrationconsciously put the moral imperative of shielding civilians and bringing them elections above thegoal of eliminating real threats to our security.This book shows how our own policy ideas led to 9/11 and then crippled our response in theMiddle East, and makes the case for an unsettling conclusion: By subordinating military victory toperverse, allegedly moral constraints, Washingtons policy has undermined our national security.Only by radically re- thinking our foreign policy in theMiddle East can we achieve victory over the enemy thatattacked us on 9/11.
http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr%20oduction-an-unwinnable-war/http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr%20oduction-an-unwinnable-war/http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr%20oduction-an-unwinnable-war/http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr%20oduction-an-unwinnable-war/http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr%20oduction-an-unwinnable-war/


2/17

Thus the plan:The United States Federal Government should withdraw alltroops from Kuwait that are not transient.


3/17

Advantage 1Kuwait- Iraq relationshipUS presence in Kuwait causes tension between the twocountries.Terril,Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITISTRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAMhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf. )Another problem that has sometimes bothered Kuwaitis isthe perception that the United States does not make aserious effort to consult them or their Gulf neighbors onregional issues. Pique over this issue was apparent in a

remark by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammad Sabahstating, Yes we are allies of the U.S. but we are not itspuppies . . . . Our interests compel transparency indelivering our concerns . . . and to cooperate with the U.S.only where this is needed.189 This demand for respect isespecially compelling since it comes from one of Kuwaitsmost pro-American political figures.The Kuwaitis have alsomade it clear that they do not like to be harshly scolded bythe United States over such issues as the price of fuel for

the U.S. military. The Kuwaitis supplied free fuel to the military during the 2003 waragainst Saddam, but did request payment for some fuel at a preferential rate of $21 per barrel asthe conflict in Iraq continued. The U.S. leadership agreed to pay $7 per barrel, but they did soonly after the Kuwaiti leadership received a letter from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)scolding them for their ingratitude for the 1991 liberation.190 This matter could have been settledsatisfactorily without such harshness which is often more painful when a powerful state

addresses a weaker ally, since it implies a subordinate status relationship.Otherproblems exist as well, including a past tendency of somepolicymakers to stop in Kuwait on the way to Iraq withoutspending any time there. This approach has sometimes

caused the Kuwaitis to feel their views are not appreciated.Recently, significant progress was made in reversing thisperception when the United States helped to organize aJanuary 2007 conference with Americas Gulf allies(and Egyptand Jordan) to discuss Iraq and Iraq-related problems. The U.S.Secretary of State attended this conference to present President Bushs priorities and to listen tothe concerns of the attending Arab states. While some disagreement occurred on the issue ofIran (discussed later), all parties considered the discussions important, and the value of these
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf


4/17

sorts of activities should not be underestimated.191 Additionally, congressional delegations areshowing a much increased interest in Kuwaiti opinions on regional security, probably as a result

of ongoing problems in Iraq. Previously, Kuwaitis would at timesbecome irritated at U.S. political leaders who would call fora strategic redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Kuwait

without any hint that the Kuwaitis might seek input intosuch a matter.


5/17

And the US- Kuwaiti relationship is crucial.Kuwait Times 2/22/10(daily in the Arabian Gulf, US-Kuwait rlationship foundational:Jones) SYLKUWAIT:The US-Kuwaiti relationship has becomefoundational, dating back to the founding of the AmericanHospital in Kuwait and later solidifying and maturing in thewake of the invasion and the liberation of the Gulf state,saidUS Ambassador to Kuwait Deborah Jones. "The US-Kuwaiti relationship has becomefoundational.


6/17

And Dramatically reducing military presence solvesKenneth M.Pollack2003, Pollack is an expert on national security, military affairs and thePersian Gulf. He was Director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He alsospent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4

(Jul. -Aug., 2003) Securing the Gulf JSTORIn this approach, the United States would dramatically reduce itsmilitary footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the currentarrangements in place. The headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain (where a U.S.Navy flag has been welcome for 50 years), but fewer American warships would ply the waters ofthe Gulf. The air force would retain its huge new base at Udeid in Qatar, again because theQataris seem pleased to have it there. The army, might keep some prepositioned equipment inKuwait and and might regularly rotate in battalions to train on itif those states were comfortablewith such guests. In addition, if a future Iraqi government were amenable, the United Statesmight retain an air base and some ground presence there. Alternately, army bases in the regionmight be dispensed with altogether, and instead the United States could simply rely on equipment

stored on container ships stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. On the political level,the United States would preserve its informal relationships with the gcc states and possibly add asimilar association with a friendly new Iraqi government. It would continue to contain Iran bymaking clear that any Iranian aggression would be met by an American military response. And itwould continue its efforts to secure European, Japanese, and Russian support in pressuringTehran both economically and diplomatically so as to end Iran's support for terror and its

unconventional weapons programs.This smaller military footprint wouldgo a long way toward alleviating the internal problemscaused by the presence of U.S. combat forces in the PersianGulf regionso not surprisingly,this is the strategy that the GulfArabs themselves favor.With Saddam gone, their overriding goal now is tominimize domestic discontent, andthey believe that the United States cankeep peace in the region with a minimal presence.This approachwould also be popular in certain quarters of the American military which would be glad to shedthe burdens of policing an inhospitable and less than luxurious region far from home


7/17

And US military withdrawal fixes Kuwait- Iraq relations.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S. -KUWAITISTRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAMhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf. )At the time of this writing,Kuwait is clearly safe from an Iraqiconventional military attack even without the U.S. alliance.The Bagdad government is currently unable to control its own capital and is certainly not in a

position to undertake foreign military adventures. The Iraqi Army is weak anddivided, and the Iraqi Air Force has very little offensivecapability(beyond a few helicopters).158 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis are psychologicallyunable to rule out a future threat from Iraq. The current Iraqi political system is widely viewed inKuwait and the world as transitional, and it is not impossible that a strong and dictatorialgovernment will once again emerge. This may occur only after a prolonged civil war in which avictor emerges and consolidates power. While Iraq is in turmoil now, it may eventually becomemuch stronger. Moreover, if the future of Iraq is defined by intense and protracted civil war, the

parties left standing are likely to be radical, militarized, and inclined to violent confrontation.Radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, for example,is a strong Iraqi nationalistwho could conceivably threaten Kuwait in the future,although he would almost certainly be deterred from a directconventional invasion. Sadr has called upon Kuwait to endits relationship with the United States and evict the U.S.troops currently in that country on the grounds that they areno longer necessary to protect the emirate from Saddam.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdfhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf


8/17

Advantage 2Foreign AidForeign aid is not important and not needed.Milner and Tingley 10(Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, The Political Economyof U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid, July 2010, vol2(2)) Foreign economic aid, like all other economic policies, hasdistributional consequences (Peltzman, 1984; Przeworski, 2009; Stigler, 1971).The U.S. gave over US $20 billion in foreign developmentassistance in 2004, the most of any donor country. While asmall fraction of American GDP, this amount was regularlyclose to, or even greater than, funding for other major

budget items in American politics. In the 1990s, for instance, foreign aidclaimed on average 0.5% of the U.S. government budget, while much talked about spendingcategories, like farm income support and higher education funding, took up roughly the same

magnitude of spending (eat ac 0.9%) (GBO, 2007).Aid is not an insignificantpart of American foreign policy. Nor is aid spending smallcompared with several major domestic policy areas.


9/17

And Foreign aid is not as widely supported as most peoplethinkSogge 2000 (David, fellow at Transnational Institue in Amsterdam, Christian Century, pg.206-209) SYLAs the crusade against communism waned, foreign aid programs had to find new reasons for

existing, which is not easy. Thoughthe public wants the government to help end povertyand injustice, itincreasingly doubts that aid really helps. Powerfulglobal financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, hithertoindulgent of aid agencies and their micro-projects, today prefer to act at the macro level: theywant to fix the rules by which poor and "transitional" countries manage their entire economies and

workforces, run their governments, and take their places in the world system. Criticism offoreign aid is not new, but it is now getting acrimonious. Moreintensive efforts to steer the debate have been coming lately from ideological heavy-hitters likethe OECD Development Center in Paris and the World Bank in Washington, as well as from ex-volunteers and ex-staff at aid agencies. In the 1980s books appeared with titles such as Giving IsTaking, Deadly Helpand Lords of Poverty. Those titles sound rather timid when stacked against

titles that appeared in the late 90s: The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid andInternational Charity; Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa;andAiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda.


10/17

Moreover, foreign aid it is not favored by Kuwait who viewthe U.S. as a threat.Encyclopedia of the New American Nation2011 (a new encyclopedia,E-N)Attacks on globalization and its supporters in the foreign aid establishment, interestingly,

resembled earlier excoriations of the imperialistic taint of foreign aid programs. In a 1987 study,Michael Hunt contended that "development was the younger sibling of containment" and "drew itsinspiration from the old American vision of appropriate or legitimate processes of social changeand an abiding sense of superiority over the dark-skinned peoples of the Third World." Writing in

1978, Ian J. Bickerton noted that "foreign aid has enabled former colonialpowers, such as the United Kingdom and France,to maintain their historicpolitical, economic, and cultural ties with former colonies it is precisely this network of Atlantic-European dominationand imperialism that forms the basis of the current aidprograms." Thisassessmentwas echoed by theWorld Trade

Organization protesters in Seattle, who accused the UnitedStates and other Western countries of perpetuating amechanism of worldwide economic imperialismne globalism.In the view of globalization's critics, this process is justanother way for rich countries like the United States,with only afraction of the world's population, area, and natural resources,to manipulate theglobal money market, to control much of the world's trade,and to reserve most of the world's raw materials for its ownuse.


11/17

Kuwaitis blame the US for mismanaged occupation sparkingpublic oppositionTerril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07 (Andrew, StrategicStudies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)The Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003, introduced a major new element into the U.S.-Kuwaitistrategic relationship in which both parties retain a stake. Despite overwhelming Kuwaiti

enthusiasm for Saddams ouster,some Kuwaitis for a considerable timehave blamed the United States for what they describe as amismanaged occupation.160 This blame is often private, and some Kuwaitis alsotemper it with a belief that Iraq is an inherently violent society that is almost impossible torehabilitate. Additionally, the Kuwaiti leadership has been especially reluctant to criticize theUnited States in public on this issue. In 2004, for example, Speaker of the Parliament Jasem alKharafi responded to Kuwaiti public criticisms of U.S. actions in Falluja by calling upon citizens tostay out of other states business to spare [Kuwait] unwarranted and uncalled for tensions and

confrontations.161 Kuwaiti leaders did, however, feel compelled tospeak out in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal.162Saddam had previously held a number of Kuwaitis at theprison, leaving Kuwaitis especially sensitive about humanrights abuses there.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)


12/17

Kuwaiti claims US military caused disaster in the region equivalent to

damage from Iranian radiation leakTourni(Habib, August 11 2010, Kuwaiti claims US military caused

disaster in the region equivalent to damage from Iranian)PSA Kuwaiti environment watchdog that has accused the USmilitary of causing a disaster in the region almost equivalent tothe damage that may occur by a radiation leak from Iransnuclear reactors, has deplored the lack of official reactions inboth Kuwait and the US.Khaled Al Hajri, chairman of Green Line Environmental Group(GLEG), on Saturday warned against the impact of the US

Armys radioactive waste on the region, accused the Americanadministration of having double standards in dealing withenvironmental issues and urged the Gulf countries to takeappropriate action on the issue.He issued the charges and warnings amid reports that the USplanned to take a radioactive shipment from Iraq, across Kuwait,and bury it in Adeed military base in Qatar.However, Al Hajri said that the groups recent revelations about

the radioactive waste left by the US Army in Iraq, which itreportedly plans to ship through Kuwait for storage at a site inQatar, have so far received no response from the Kuwaitigovernment, although other parties have already expressedinterest in the news.Many international environmental organizations have contactedus and asked about the information we have published, Al Hajritold Kuwait Times in an interview published on Wednesday. Wealso received inquiries from people in Qatar who were looking

into this issue, but the weirdest thing is that we have not seenany interest on behalf of the Kuwaiti government in this regard sofar.The activist said that the press release issued by GLEG onSaturday included actual steps that can be taken by the Kuwaitigovernment to prevent any potential risks to the health ofKuwaits population by these shipments.


13/17

We hope we could be of help in this regard because that is whatwe aim to do, he said, according to the Kuwaiti daily.GLEG said that the White House was guilty of double standardsand that it acted very selfishly while dealing with after effects of

environmental disasters.The US Administration made a very big noise about the oil spillin the Gulf of Mexico. However, it has made the American armythe biggest violator of environmental human rights, not only inthe whole world, but also in the whole of history, and this isespecially apparent in the damage done to the environment inthe Arabian Gulf,the watchdog said. The US military in Iraqdecided to transfer and store radioactive waste, consisting of ironscrap and remnants of destroyed military vehicles contaminated

with radioactive particles, to Qatar, making it the biggest store ofradioactive waste in the Gulf region.GLEG said that thanks to the help of environmental activists inthe region, we received official information that the waste will betransferred from there during the month of Ramadan.In his statement, Al Hajri warned about the consequences of notexercising tight environmental control on the US military after ithas caused massive damage to environment and public health inIraq.He said that the Gulf region could be exposed to nucleardisasters if the regions governments do not take necessaryprecautions and measures, especially in the face of deepeningradioactive waste crisis in Kuwait and Iraq, and the presence ofwarships, carriers and nuclear-powered aircrafts, besides theprospects of getting atomic reactors in the region.Gulf governments need to take a strict environmental position toensure an end to the US militarys environmental destruction inits military operations.Qatar today has become the largest store of munitions outsidethe US and it is storing items with depleted uranium besides theradioactive waste, which makes the issue extremely dangerous,

Al Hajri said. Green Line has notified environmental authoritiesin Qatar to take measures to prevent the US military from storingradioactive waste in Qatar and called on Gulf states to review


14/17

security and military agreements with the US military and includeclauses prohibiting it from causing environmental pollution andobliging it to bear the expenses of waste treatment.Environmental authorities in the Gulf States should conduct a

comprehensive environmental survey of all US military bases,especially after the scandal caused by hazardous waste in Iraqcame to light, the activist said.The activist warned that waste from the US military in Kuwaitwas being leaked to scrap markets such as Amghara whereGreen Line activists found a variety of military waste more thanonce.The Green Line also did a survey of the desert north of Kuwaitand found remnants of many US military equipment that were left

behind after entering Iraq.The US administration need not deny or confirm the informationobtained by Green Line, but it should collect the radiationcontaminated waste and ship it from Iraq to the United Statesand deal with it there under the control and supervision ofinternational environmental organizations, especially because itused internationally banned weapons, he said.The GLEG chairman said that his organization, in cooperationwith other parties interested in environmental protection, will

follow up on this issue.We are very interested in pursuing this serious matter. At thesame time, we understand the sensitivity of this issue, and that iswhy we understand how important it is to deal with it withpatience and wisdom because we need the government tounderstand that we are talking about an actual threat, and thatwe are not simply playing cat and mouse with them, said AlHajri.


15/17

Besides, Aid has no effect on growth and may, in fact, even

undermine growth.Radelet 06(Steven, Center for Global Development, A Primer on Foreign Aid, working paper

number 2, July 2006) SYLFirst,aid simply could be wasted, such as on limousines or presidential palaces,orit

couldencourage corruption, not just in aid programs but more broadly.Second, it can help keep bad governments in power, thus helping to

perpetuate poor economic policies and postpone reform.Some argue

that aid provided to countries in the midst of war might inadvertently

help finance and perpetuate the conflict, and add to instability.Third, countries may have limited absorptive capacity to use aid

flows effectively if they have relatively few skilled workers, weak

infrastructure or constrained delivery systems. (Aid could help redress theseweaknesses, but it may not be aimed to do so).Fourth, aid flows can reduce domestic saving, both private saving

(through its impact on interest rates)and government saving (though its impacton government revenue).Fifth, aid flows could undermine private sector incentives for

investment or to improve productivity. Aid can cause the currency to

appreciate, undermining the profitability of the production of all

tradable goods(known as the Dutch disease). Food aid, if not managed

appropriately, can reduce farm prices and hurt farmer income.


16/17

Finally, Of those rare times when aid leads to growth on some

countries, the results diminish as the volume of aid increases.Radelet 06 (Steven, Center for Global Development, A Primer on Foreign Aid,working paper number 2, July 2006) SYLFirst, the classic view is that aid augments saving, finances investment,

and adds to the capital stock. In this view, poor countries are unable to

generate sufficient amounts of saving to finance the investment

necessary to initiate growth, or at best only enough for very slow

growth. In the strongest version of this view, the poorest countries

may be stuck in a poverty trap in which their income is too low to

generate the saving necessary to initiate the process of sustained

growth (Sachs, et. Al., 2004).


17/17

Documents

Kuwait Aff