KSC-PLN-1723 2011 PH Hurricane Plan

KSC LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCESSING (PH) HURRICANE PLAN

(KSC-PLN-1723)

Revision C June 1, 2011

RELEASED - Printed documents may be obsolete; validate prior to use.

KSC-PLN-1723 REVISION C

JUNE 1, 2011

ii

KSC LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCESSING (PH) HURRICANE PLAN

PREPARED BY: __ __________ Westly W. Mosedale PH Hurricane Coordinator PH-L APPROVED BY: __ __________

Rita G. Willcoxon Director, Launch Vehicle Processing PH



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RECORD OF REVISIONS/CHANGES

REV LTR

CHANGE NO.

DESCRIPTION DATE

L This document supersedes Revision K July 20, 2000

M This document supersedes Revision L June 1, 2001

N This document supersedes Revision M June 1, 2002

O This document supersedes Revision N June 1, 2003

P This document supersedes Revision O June 1, 2004

Q This document supersedes Revision P June 1, 2005

R This document supersedes Revision Q June 1, 2006

S This document supersedes Revision R June 1, 2007

Basic This document supersedes KPH-HB-1040.1, Revision S and has been renumbered as KSC-PLN-1723 to comply with KSC Business Management System Documentation KNPR 1470.1

June 1, 2008

A This document supersedes Revision Basic June 1, 2009

B This document supersedes Revision A June 1, 2010

C This document supersedes Revision B June 1, 2011



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose .......................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Scope ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.3 Applicability .................................................................................................................... 1 1.4 References ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.5 Definitions ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.6 Policy ............................................................................................................................. 4

2.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................ 4 3.0 FACILITY/FLIGHT HARDWARE SECURING ...................................................................... 9

3.1 General .......................................................................................................................... 9 3.2 HURCON IV ................................................................................................................. 10 3.3 HURCON III ................................................................................................................. 10 3.4 HURCON II .................................................................................................................. 11 3.5 HURCON I ................................................................................................................... 11 3.6 Recovery ...................................................................................................................... 11 3.7 Safe Haven Facility Utilization/Protection of Exposed Flight Hardware ......................... 12 3.8 Loaded RSRM Railcar Handling .................................................................................... 13

ATTACHMENT A: RIDE OUT CREW and Damage Assessment Recovery Team (DART) OPERATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 16 ATTACHMENT B: HURRICANE CALL LIST AND NOTIFICATION RECORD ......................... 18 ATTACHMENT C: KSC WIND REQUIREMENTS .................................................................... 20 ATTACHMENT D: HURRICANE CONTINGENCY / ROLLBACK BARCHARTS ...................... 22



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1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this Plan is to augment KNPD 8710.1 Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Emergency Preparedness Program Policy (EPPP) and KNPR 8715.2 Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) as it pertains to the Launch Vehicle Processing Directorate (PH) and the associated contractors. This plan identifies NASA PH and United Space Alliance's (USA) unique preparatory actions and procedures to be taken for the protection of personnel, property, and material resources at KSC in the event of a hurricane. 1.2 Scope This plan describes the PH and USA hurricane preparation procedures. It is used in conjunction with KDP-KSC-P-3006, “Tropical Storm and Hurricane Preparation and Recovery”, KNPR 8715.2, “KSC Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”, and KNPD 8710.1, “KSC Emergency Preparedness Program Policy” as appropriate. 1.3 Applicability This plan is applicable to all PH, USA Florida Operations and other KSC organizations interfacing with PH (i.e., Engineering Directorate (NE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (SA)). For the purposes of hurricane preparedness, the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Resident Office, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Resident Office, and their associated contractors shall adhere to the requirements of this plan. 1.4 References 1. ”Tropical Storm and Hurricane Preparation and Recovery,” KDP-KSC-P-3006 2. “KSC Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan," KNPR 8715.2 3. “KSC Emergency Preparedness Program Policy,” KNPD 8710.1 4. “USA Florida Operations Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plan," USA005352 5. “Space Shuttle Hurricane Preparedness Management Plan,” NSTS 07700, Vol. VIII,

Appendix T 6. "Adverse Environment and Lightning Monitoring," OMI S0018.100 7. "USA Florida Safety Operating Plan," FSOP 6100 8. "SSV/MLP Return to VAB," OMI A5217 9. "Integrated Preparations for SSV/MLP Return to VAB," OMI S0038 10. "Contingency Railcar Movement," RCM-001 1.5 Definitions 1. Adverse Weather Condition: Lightning, heavy rain, hail and/or high wind (35 knots or

greater). 2. Adverse Weather Warning: A warning to KSC personnel that hazardous weather

conditions are imminent/present at KSC and constitute a danger to personnel and equipment.

3. All Clear: A term used to indicate KSC is safe for the workforce to return to work.



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4. 2011 Atlantic Hurricane Names:

Arlene Bret Cindy Don Emily

Franklin Gert Harvey Irene

Jose Katia Lee Maria

Nate Ophelia Philippe Rina

Sean Tammy Vince Whitney

5. Atlantic Hurricane Season: The 6-month period from June 1 to November 30. 6. Emergency Preparedness: Activities that develop the necessary and critical response

capabilities needed before an emergency event arises. Planning and training prior to an emergency are among the activities conducted under this phase of emergency management.

7. Gale Warnings: When winds of 38-55 miles per hour (33-48 knots) are expected, a gale

warning is added to the advisory message. 8. Hurricane Advisories: Range Weather Operations, CCAFS, receives hurricane and tropical

storm advisories from the National Hurricane Center at 04z, 10z, 16z, and 22z. The facility relays the observations and forecast information to 45th Space Wing organizations and to KSC. The weather forecaster can further define the threat to KSC resources, but the declaration of a Hurricane Condition is the responsibility of the KSC Center Director in coordination with the 45th SW Commander.

9. Hurricane Alert Conditions: Categories used at KSC and CCAFS to advise on the expected

time of arrival of 50-knot (58 mph), or greater, winds and initiate execution of hurricane precautionary measures:

HURRICANE CONDITION (HURCON) EXPECTATION Condition IV 72 hours Condition III 48 hours Condition II 24 hours Condition I 12 hours

These conditions are established at KSC by the KSC Center Director in coordination with the Commander, 45th SW. It may be necessary for the KSC Center Director to implement some modification or combination of these conditions in real-time based on the predictability of a storm/hurricane track. Personnel responsible for implementing this plan must be prepared to support and perform the required tasks.



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10. Hurricane Categories (Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale):

Storm Type Wind Speed in Knots

Category 1 64-82 (74-95 mph) Category 2 83-95 (96-110 mph) Category 3 96-113 (111-130 mph) Category 4 114-135 (131-155 mph) Category 5 >135 (>155 mph)

11. Hurricane Warning: When hurricane conditions are expected within 24-hours, a hurricane warning is added to the advisory. Hurricane warnings identify coastal areas where winds of at least 62 knots (74 miles per hour) are expected to occur. A warning may also describe coastal areas where dangerously-high water or exceptionally-high waves are forecast, even though winds may be less than hurricane force.

12. Hurricane Watch: If a hurricane continues its advance and threatens coastal and inland

regions, a hurricane watch is added to the advisory, covering a specific area and duration. A hurricane watch means that hurricane conditions are a real possibility; it does not mean they are imminent.

13. KSC Emergency Operations Center (EOC): Located in Room 2R21A of the Launch Control

Center (LCC), and activated when Hurricane Condition IV or greater is declared, the EOC is where all KSC hurricane preparations and recovery measures are controlled. A recording with the latest hurricane information is available at 861-7900.

14. Storm Warnings: When winds of 48-64 knots (55-74 miles per hour) are expected, a storm

warning is added to the advisory message. Gale and storm warnings indicate the coastal area to be affected by the warning, the time during which the warning will apply, and the expected intensity of the disturbance. When gale or storm warnings are part of a tropical cyclone advisory, they may change to a hurricane warning if the storm intensifies or changes direction.

15. Tornado: A local storm of short duration formed of winds rotating at very high speeds,

usually in a counterclockwise direction. These storms are visible as a funnel cloud or vortex that has touched ground. A whirlpool structure of winds rotating about a hollow cavity in which centrifugal forces produce a partial vacuum. The funnel cloud varies from gray to black, spins like a top, and may sound like the roaring of an airplane or locomotive.

16. Tornado Warning: A term used to indicate that a tornado has been detected/sighted in the

warning area. A tornado warning may be issued without a tornado watch being previously issued.

17. Tornado Watch: A term used to indicate that conditions are conducive to the formation of a

tornado. Tornado watches are usually issued hours before a tornado could form. A warning will not necessarily follow all tornado watches.

18. Weather Safe: A term used to indicate it is safe for the Ride-out Crew to proceed outside

for initial assessment and occurs once winds in excess of 50 knots (58 mph) have subsided for a sustained period of two hours or more.



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1.6 Policy 1. This plan is to be used in conjunction with the KSC CEMP, and provides additional

guidance to all PH, NE (as it applies to Shuttle) and USA personnel at KSC. 2. USA plans shall be compatible with this plan and with the KSC CEMP. 3. The decision to have a Ride-out Crew will be made by the Hurricane Decision Team (HDT)

and Hurricane Management Team (HMT) and will be implemented for Shuttle by the NASA Test Director (NTD) in coordination with the EOC.

4. The PH, NE (as it applies to Shuttle) and USA personnel are to protect hardware and

facilities as best they can. Personnel are not to endanger themselves in any attempt to protect facilities or hardware.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITIES The hurricane season begins June 1 and runs through November 30 each year. At the point when a developing tropical storm or a hurricane begins to pose a possible threat to KSC, key management personnel will begin conducting hurricane preparedness discussions at daily management meetings. These management teams, the HDT and the HMT will make decisions affecting Shuttle processing based on storm conditions and proposed track. The HDT will determine KSC Hurricane Conditions, provide general direction on securing activities, and make ride-out and release of personnel determinations. The HMT will determine securing actions for Shuttle hardware and facilities. The Shuttle Launch Director will instruct the NTD in the Firing Room to direct required securing actions. The NTD will relay these instructions to the Chief Test Conductor (CTC) for implementation. The Firing Room will be the central point of command and control for all Shuttle securing actions. For continuity of operations, it is imperative that the Firing Room keep the EOC informed of all securing actions. The NTD/CTC will direct the Test Team to carry out the hurricane securing actions. Details will be worked out at the regular daily scheduling meetings and passed on to the Firing Room for implementation. Any real-time deviations to securing actions must be coordinated and approved by the NTD/CTC.



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Institutional (KSC)

Hurricane Decision Team

(HDT)

Shuttle Decisions

Hurricane Management Team

(HMT)

Test Team Implementation

NASA Test Director (NTD)

Chief Test Conductor (CTC)

Figure 1: Command, Control, and Communications



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1. Hurricane Decision Team (HDT)

Team of KSC Senior Management and 45th Weather Squadron personnel which determine hurricane conditions for the center, provide general direction on securing activities, and make decisions regarding ride out crews and release of personnel.

Chaired and convened by the Center Director

2. Hurricane Management Team (HMT), NSTS 07700, Vol. VIII, Appendix T

Responsible for Shuttle flight hardware and launch facility securing decisions

Supports HDT in making ride-out/rollback decisions

Members: o Manager, Launch Integration (Chair) o Manager, Space Shuttle Program o KSC Director of ISS and Spacecraft Processing o Shuttle Launch Director

3. Center Director (AA)

Chairs the HDT

Responsible for the protection of KSC facilities and personnel.

Establishes Hurricane Conditions for KSC

Authorizes and directs the release of KSC personnel (NASA and contractor)

4. Manager, Launch Integration (MK), NSTS 07700, Vol. VIII, Appendix T

Responsible for overall management, coordination and approval of activities associated with the protection of Shuttle assets from hurricane damage, which includes both installed payloads and those located in the Payload Change-out Room (PCR)

Establishes an HMT and, as chair, convenes this team as necessary 5. KSC Shuttle Launch Director, NSTS 07700, Vol. VIII, Appendix T

Participates as member of HMT

Has full responsibility for implementing the Shuttle flight hardware and facilities securing plan and providing official notification to the KSC Operations Team and the KSC Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPO)

Works with the USA Chief Master Planner to determine specific flight hardware safing requirements

Notifies NTD of the securing plan and authorizes its implementation 6. USA Chief Master Planner

USA primary point of contact for real-time hurricane securing planning

Supports the HMT in developing facility and flight hardware securing plans 7. PH Hurricane Coordinator

Provides hurricane expertise and support to the HMT

Assists the Shuttle Launch Director in all phases of hurricane planning and execution

Planning and implementation interface between the KSC EPO and the PH and USA elements



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8. Site Manager

Responsible for hurricane preparedness of their sites and reporting of preparedness status to the NTD/CTC according to this plan and USA005352.

9. NTD

Responsible for the coordination and implementation of Shuttle hurricane preparations as directed by the HMT via the Shuttle Launch Director

Resolves questions regarding securing priorities in coordination with the HMT and KSC EOC

Notifies personnel in accordance with the “Hurricane Call List and Notification Record” (Attachment B)

Member of the Ride-out Crew/Damage Assessment and Recovery Team and reports status, as required, to the KSC EOC

The Ride-out NTD, starting at HURCON I, will hold telecon tag ups for PH Management on the PH Damage Assessment and Recovery Team (DART) teleconference number 30 minutes prior to Center Director’s EMT/ESF tag up. The Center tag up is currently scheduled for 8am and 5pm, but those times can be changed by the EOC

The DART NTD will report to the LCC at least 1 hour prior to the DART recall time and will brief the DART Team Leads in LCC 4P10. The DART NTD will also hold a telecon for PH Management on the PH DART teleconference number 1 hour after DART recall to provide team status, timeline assessment for DART completion, and establish the next telecon time later the same day.

10. CTC

Implements hurricane securing actions as directed by the NTD and reports status as required to the NTD and EOC.

Has overall USA responsibility to implement hurricane preparations.

Resolves questions regarding priorities between USA sites in consultation with NTD.

Will be on station at all times during hurricane preparations and ride-out.

Member of the Hurricane Ride-out Crew.

11. Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC)

Ensures the USA Emergency Preparedness Plan is accurate and is consistent with the PH Hurricane Plan and the KSC CEMP.

Ensures USA personnel responsible for implementation of hurricane preparedness. actions are properly trained and are aware of their responsibilities.

Supports hurricane securing and response actions as directed by the HMT.

12. KSC Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPO)

Government individual responsible for the KSC Emergency Preparedness Program

Assigned Incident Commander responsibilities during hurricane ride-out. 13. Hurricane Preparedness Planners (HPP)

PH Hurricane Preparedness Planners are organizational primary points of contact for hurricane planning and response (See Attachment B).

Responsible for internal notification within their organization via use of a calling tree.



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14. Ride-out Crew

Responsible for monitoring KSC facilities and flight hardware while riding out the storm.

Perform post storm inspections and initiate cleanup and recovery operations.

Released during HURCON III and must return to their designated locations at the declaration of HURCON II.

15. Damage Assessment and Recovery Team (DART)

Return to KSC to relieve the Ride-out Crew after “weather safe” and “DART recall” are announced.

DART Team Leads report to the LCC 4P10 1 hour prior to “DART Recall” report time.

Perform damage assessment of facilities and flight hardware.

Develop a recovery plan for KSC.

Mitigate hazardous situations, restore the infrastructure, and establish communications.

Open KSC.



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3.0 FACILITY/FLIGHT HARDWARE SECURING 3.1 General 1. All hurricane plans and sub-tasked documents will be reviewed and approved prior to

hurricane season. The PH Hurricane Coordinator will brief Shuttle program and PH management on hurricane preparedness. PH Hurricane Coordinator will verify all PH and USA Hurricane Preparedness Planners and site managers are ready to support the hurricane season.

2. USA shall appoint a site manager for the following facilities:

a. Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) 1&2

b. OPF 3

c. Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (HMF)

d. Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB)

e. Launch Control Center (LCC)

f. Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility (RPSF)

g. Launch Pads 39A and 39B

h. Hangar AF, Retrieval Vessels, and ET Barge

i. Mate-Demate Device (MDD)/Midfield Parksite.

j. LC-39 Logistics Facility

k. Mobile Launch Platform (MLP)

l. Assembly and Refurbishment Facility (ARF)

m. NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD)

n. Operations Support Building (OSB) I

o. OSB II

p. Processing Control Center (PCC)

q. Launch Equipment Shop (LES)

r. Thermal Protection System Facility (TPSF)

s. Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Shop 3. Starting with the declaration that KSC is going into a hurricane condition, hurricane

securing direction for the Shuttle processing facilities and flight hardware will be issued by HMT through the NTD.

4. The NTD and CTC will be located in one of the Firing Rooms in the LCC from HURCON IV to HURCON II. As soon as possible, after notification of HURCON II, the NTD and CTC will relocate to the EOC at the Central Operations Facility (COF) in LCC Room 2R21. The NTD resides at console 51915 (Phone 861-6831/861-1534). The CTC resides at console 51916 (Phone 867-3901/867-3903). The NTD/CTC will remain on station until “All Clear.”

5. Upon notification from the NTD of a change in Hurricane Conditions, all hurricane planners ensure their personnel are notified and appropriate securing actions are initiated.

6. Unique support securing requirements for each Shuttle processing facility shall be documented on the Kennedy Integrated Control Schedule daily schedule.



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3.2 HURCON IV 1. Personnel report for normal duty. 2. The HMT will begin developing securing plans and final configurations required for all

Shuttle facilities and hardware. 3. Ride-out Team and DART Team Lead briefings are conducted. 4. The EOC becomes operational at the onset of Condition IV or greater, the EOC can be

reached by telephone (867-9200/9201), Radio Nets 6404, or by using designated OIS-D channels. PH communications to the EOC will be through the NTD.

5. All site managers will report to their sites and will supervise the overall readiness preparation at their sites.

6. General cleanup and secure loose equipment. 7. Deliver shutters to staging areas; due to ineffectiveness, sand bags are no longer delivered. 8. The MDD and the midfield parksite will be secured and the VAB parking plan is determined. 9. Fill all motor vehicles with fuel. Keep tank at least 3/4 full. 10. Ride-out crews, if required, are identified by organizational hurricane coordinators. 11. The Rotating Service Structure (RSS) at the inactive pad will be jacked to the hurricane lock

position. 3.3 HURCON III 1. Personnel report for normal duty, nonessential personnel may be relieved from normal

duties to assist with hurricane preps as required. 2. Ride-out Crew rosters will be finalized and forwarded to the EOC. These personnel will be

released and must report back on station at the declaration of HURCON II. These personnel will ride out the hurricane in designated facilities. (Attachment A).

3. Site managers will ensure facilities and flight hardware securing status reports are provided every 2 hours to the Support Test Manager (STM). These reports will continue until all hurricane securing preparations are complete.

4. HMT makes a decision regarding Shuttle rollback preparations to the VAB when only one vehicle is on the launch pad.

5. Initiate railcar securing activities in accordance with RCM-001. 6. Relocate all vehicle records and Test Assembly Inspection Record (TAIR) books above the

floor level in a protected area. 7. Begin moving off ground floor all portable high value items that can be damaged by water. 8. Stage GSA vehicles not required for hurricane preparations. 9. Begin HVAC securing. 10. Secure the Utility Annex by isolating one of two power feeders from C5 substation to the

annex and by isolating a minimum of two chillers from the active power feeder. 11. Orbiters in storage in the VAB will be jacked up. 12. For orbiters in the OPF's, consideration will be given to retract the landing gear and close

payload bay doors. 13. Retract all swing arms and secure to Fixed Service Structure (FSS).

Orbiter Access Arm

External Tank GOX Vent Arm

ET Intertank Access Arm

Orbiter Weather Protection System (-Y strut, -Y curtain wall, +Y curtain wall) 14. USA will reposition and secure the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Visual Landing Aid ball

light to a position on the ground.



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3.4 HURCON II 1. Personnel not required for the remainder of hurricane preparations will be released from

duty at the direction of the HDT. 2. For OPF vehicles the orbiter payload doors will be closed and the vehicle powered down. If

the payload bay doors cannot be closed in the time available, the orbiter will be powered down and critical elements in the payload bay will be covered with plastic.

3. All hatches and covers on the flight hardware will be installed if possible. Exposed or sensitive flight hardware will be covered over with plastic film and tied down.

4. Environmental Controls System units for OPF and launch pads containing an orbiter will be in local control and will remain powered up.

5. Halon placed in manual mode. 6. RSS at the active pad will be in full retract position and jacked to hurricane lock position. 7. Rolled back SSV's secured in VAB by end of HURCON II.

3.5 HURCON I 1. Ride-out Crew staged inside secure facilities. All other personnel released from duty. 2. All KSC entrance gates to be closed and locked and all security personnel to move to

designated facilities to perform scheduled ride-out duties. 3. Individuals will refrain from taking unilateral actions unless all communications have been

lost and appropriate action must be taken for the protection of life and/or property. 3.6 Recovery 1. An EOC Team will perform an initial assessment of KSC grounds once winds have

subsided to 50 knots or less for 2 hours. 2. With approval of the EOC, the Ride-out Crew will begin initial facility and flight hardware

assessments, securing and emergency repairs where feasible. 3. After coordination with the Center Director, the "All Clear" will be declared by the EOC. 4. The DART will relieve the Ride-out Crew as soon as possible and continue assessment

and securing activities. 5. The Center Director will determine when it is appropriate for KSC personnel to return to

work. 6. The KSC Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will release information to the local news media

regarding the work status/schedule of KSC personnel. The PAO will work with all local radio and television stations to ensure that only official announcements concerning hurricane status or return-to-work instructions are broadcast.

7. The USA Duty Office recording (867-3900) and the EOC information recording (861-7900 or 1-866-572-4877) will be updated with the latest KSC status and work instructions.

8. The PH Hurricane Coordinator will conduct a post-test debriefing as soon as practical to review the hurricane response and capture lessons learned.



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3.7 Safe Haven Facility Utilization/Protection of Exposed Flight Hardware SSV Rollback and Safe Haven Facility Utilization When hurricane storm conditions are anticipated at the LC-39 area, the HMT may decide to rollback the SSV from the Pad. VAB High Bay Integration Cells 1 and/or 3 can be utilized to provide protection. VAB High Bay 2 Safe Haven is also available, but can only support a fully stacked SSV for approximately 10 days due to the lack of orbiter access, power and data. As a result, placement of a fully stacked SSV in VAB High Bay 2 should only occur as a last resort. The 10-day guideline is based on vehicle engineering’s assessment and may be extended at the discretion of the HMT based on the severity of storm conditions or changes to the flight hardware securing plan. Space Shuttle Flight Hardware VAB Storage/Securing Guidelines Flight hardware located in the VAB (Integration Cells, Safe Haven Facility, Transfer Aisle, ET Checkout Cells, High Bay 4 floor and Cell 7), such as orbiter, ET or SRB components, will be removed or appropriately secured to withstand the expected storm conditions. The methods and locations of storage and securing of flight elements will be decided in real time. Decisions will depend upon the severity of anticipated storm conditions and the time available. Payload Storage/Securing Guidelines Payloads installed in a Payload Canister at the launch Pad will be returned to the payload processing facility in the Industrial Area of KSC. If a Payload has been installed in the PCR, and the SSV is not at the Pad, a Payload Canister will be dispatched so the Payload can be returned to the payload processing facility. If the payload has been transferred to the PCR/Payload Ground Handling Mechanism, and an SSV is at the pad, the payload will be installed in the orbiter (with Shuttle/Payload management concurrence) and secured. Payloads already installed in the orbiter will be secured for rollback to the VAB. During rollback, conditioned purge air will be supplied to the payload bay through purge circuit 2.



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3.8 Loaded RSRM Railcar Handling As necessary and at the direction of HMT, the loaded Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) railcars located at KSC will be gathered and removed from KSC when hurricane storm conditions (Category 1 and above) are anticipated to arrive at KSC. The loaded RSRM railcars could be located at any of the following locations prior to HMT notification: Hurricane staging site, Suspect Siding, or the RPSF. Upon notification of HURCON III, a series of decisions/actions will occur to disposition the loaded RSRM railcars. This disposition will follow the flow diagram shown in Figure 3. Although the removal of loaded RSRM railcars is the highest priority, railcars that are empty or those that contain "spent" segments should also be removed from KSC. Reference Figure 3 for Railcar Siding locations. The controlling document for railcar handling is RCM-001, "Contingency Railcar Movement".

At HURCON IV, Florida East Coast (FEC)/CSX Railroads are notified by Thiokol Launch Support Services to be ready to move the loaded RSRM railcars out of the Brevard County area.

At HURCON III, the NTD/CTC will notify the STM to stage all loaded RSRM railcars on the rail tracks east of SR3, just south of Suspect Siding.

At no later than 48-60 hours prior to storm arrival, HMT determines if railcar removal from KSC is necessary.

If the railcars will remain at KSC, they will be secured at the staging site on the rail tracks east of SR3, just south of Suspect Siding.

If the railcars are to be removed from KSC, HMT will notify the NTD/CTC (at no later than 48-60 hours prior to storm arrival). The NTD/CTC will direct the STM to move the railcars from KSC to Jay-Jay Yard east of Titusville and the KSC Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPO) will inform the Brevard County EOC as well as the State Warning Point. The State will in-turn notify National authorities as required.

At no later than 48 hours prior to storm arrival, FEC Railroad will pick up the railcars and move them out of harm's way.

Following the storm, KSC senior management will determine if/when it is acceptable to return the railcars to KSC.



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Figure 3: Loaded RSRM Rail Car Handling Flow Chart

MSFC RMO, Thiokol LSS and Program Office

Develop Recommendation NTD/CTC direct

STM to Stage Loaded Railcars

East of SR3, south of Suspect Siding

Thiokol LSS Notifies FEC/CSX Railroads

to "get ready" to relocate railcars

HURCON IV Alert at

KSC

Move Railcars from KSC? (HMT

Decision)

Return Railcars to KSC?

Recommendations Reported to HMT

KSC EPO Informs Florida Emergency Management Team

Utilize Predetermined Checklists to

Secure Railcars at Staging Site

Thiokol LSS/USA Verifies Status of

EDR Units

Thiokol-Utah Logistics Notifies

FEC & CSX Railroads and

Generates "Shipper"

Documentation

NTD/CTC Direct STM to

have Move Railcars to Jay-

Jay Yard

FEC/CSX Railroads Transport Railcars Out of

Harms Way

FEC Railroad Picks Up Railcars at Jay-Jay Yard

Storm Occurs

HMT Evaluates Conditions for

RSRM Hardware Return to KSC

Thiokol-Utah Logistics Notifies FEC & CSX

Railroads

Program Dispositions Hardware

Resume Normal Processing

FEC/CSX Railroads Return Railcars to Jay-

Jay Yard

Thiokol QARs Download EDRs

Railcars returned to KSC

NOTES: EPO - Emergency Preparedness Officer EDR - Environmental Data Recorders QAR - Quality Assurance Representative

Inspections Performed

No

Yes

48-60 Hours

48 Hours

> 72 Hours

No

Yes



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Figure 4: RSRM Staging Locations


ATTACHMENT A KSC-PLN-1723

REVISION C JUNE 1, 2011

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ATTACHMENT A: RIDE OUT CREW AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RECOVERY TEAM (DART) OPERATIONS The KSC Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPO) leads the KSC ride out and DART personnel. The NTD/CTC is the lead of NASA and USA Shuttle Ride-out and DART personnel. The Ride-out Crew is the team, which remains on site during the storm and is responsible for monitoring KSC facilities and flight hardware resources throughout the storm period. With EOC approval, the Ride-out Crew performs initial safety inspections of KSC grounds and facilities for life-threatening hazards. The DART returns to KSC to relieve the Ride-out Crew and continue recovery efforts. The DART consists of personnel with trades and skills necessary to complete the damage assessment, restore the infrastructure to a safe configuration, and open KSC for safe operation. General

Ride-out Crew and DART pretest briefing is held at a location to be announced during HURCON IV.

Personnel on ride-out or DART duty for the month should have their hurricane evacuation home plan in place. Their homes should be stocked with adequate supplies and be “hurricane ready” as soon as a hurricane or tropical storm threat exists for KSC.

Following the storm the Ride-out Crew performs initial flight hardware and facility assessments, securing, and emergency repairs where feasible.

DART personnel report to KSC, relieve the Ride-out Crew and continue facility repairs, and bring the Center back on line.

Ride-out Crew

Ride-out Crew is released during HURCON III to get their personal property in order and return quickly after the declaration of HURCON II.

At HURCON IV, USA EMC delivers list of Ride-out Crew personnel to the EPO in the EOC

Food rations and water are available to Ride-out Crew from Logistics at specified locations.

Ride-out personnel are advised to bring in the following personal items for a possible 2 to 5 day stay:

Toiletries

Medications and special dietary foods

Change of clothing

Washcloth/towels

Bedding (cots will be provided)

Cards/games/books

Snacks

Battery operated radio with headphones and spare batteries

The senior supervisor at all ride-out locations will be the shelter manager.

Each group in the Ride-out Crew is to have available at least a portable RF radio and telephone access. It is the responsibility of all Ride-out Crew supervisors to assure that their crew is provided with an appropriate two-way portable radio and, if required, certified OIS headsets.


ATTACHMENT A KSC-PLN-1723


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Shelter managers will provide a status report to the NTD/CTC every 2 hours, which will be forwarded to the EOC.

An NTD/CTC Ride-out Crew member will always be on station in the COF and can be reached at 861-6831/867-3901/867-3903.

DART

DART members are identified prior to the hurricane season.

DART badges are no longer issued.

DART members are released during HURCON II when the Center is evacuated.

DART personnel are notified when to report to KSC through news media or through hurricane status numbers, 1-7900 / 7-3900 / 1-866-572-4877.

Upon returning to KSC, PH DART members are to contact the NTD/CTC for initial status and instructions, and where to report.

The initial PH DART will perform an assessment of Shuttle flight hardware and processing facilities and will consist of an OPE, NTD, S&MA representative and representatives from PH Facilities Engineering.

The PH DART develops a recovery plan designed to return KSC to Shuttle processing capability.

DART members should plan to be on station for up to 16 hours. PH and USA Ride-out Crew Location Table PH and USA Ride-out Crew staffing numbers and locations may be adjusted at the discretion of the Center Director, with input from the HDT and HMT, based on the path and severity of the storm and mission requirements. For a category 4 or 5 storm, all personnel stage in the LCC. Refer to KDP-KSC-P-3006 for total KSC Ride-out Crew numbers and functions.

PH AND USA RIDE-OUT CREW LOCATION TABLE

Building # / Facility Name NASA-PH USA

K6-696 / OPF-3 (Only if SSV Present) 3

K6-848 / VAB (Based on Flt. HW Present) 2

K6-894 / OPF-1/2 (2 SSV or 1 SSV) 5 or 3

K6-900 / Launch Control Center 1 15

Total (max) 1 25


ATTACHMENT B KSC-PLN-1723


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ATTACHMENT B: HURRICANE CALL LIST AND NOTIFICATION RECORD

The console NTD will notify each of the coordinators listed below or his/her alternate. The person notified will be responsible for internal notification within their organization via use of a calling tree. The NTD is responsible for keeping a record of the coordinator contacted for each HURCON level and to maintain that record on console. If the HURCON condition notification occurs on 1st shift during the weekday the notification will be sent via email with a “read receipt” from the console NTD. If the HURCON condition occurs during any other shift/day or if email delivery confirmation cannot be confirmed, the console NTD will use the calling list below to pass on pertinent information. Additional notification information may be obtained from the Emergency Employee List application, which can be accessed from the following WEB link: http://kscdevl2/EmpList/

Name Organization Office Phone Home / Cell Phone

A. LAUNCH AND LANDING DIVISION (PH-L) Wes Mosedale

Bill Heidtman PH-L PH-L

861-9327 861-9339

321-453-1633 / 252-423-1133 321-637-4612 / 321-591-1761

B. PROJECT ENGINEERING INTEGRATION DIVISION (PH-I)

Zulie Cipo PH-I 867-6624 321-536-3169 Steve Lewis PH-I 861-3964 321-269-2537/ 321-431-4726

C. OPERATIONS INTEGRATION DIVISION (PH-O)

Clark Ford PH-O 861-5971 407-365-5239 / 407-415-0157 Jean Flowers PH-O 861-9304 352-241-9074 / 321-432-1996

D. LOGISTICS DIVISION (PH-N) Troy Heron PH-N 861-5317 321-456-5791 / 321-750-2717 Kyle Longstreth PH-N 861-0276 321-383-1638 E. SAFETY & MISSION ASSURANCE SHUTTLE DIVISION (SA-B) Charles Cole SA-B4 861-4104 386-428-9927 / 386-314-1133 David Facemire SA-E2 867-7232 321-268-5669 / 321-289-2054 F. SHUTTLE PROCESSING OFFICE (PH-A) / PROJECT CONTROL OFFICE (PH-B) /

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT STAFF (PH-E) / CONSTELLATION OPERATIONS OFFICE (PH-C)

Ron Phelps PH-B 867-0837 321-269-9952 / 321-480-3133 /

321-258-1039 Janette Martin PH-B 861-3871 321-639-2012 / 321-626-2174


http://kscdevl2/EmpList/

ATTACHMENT B KSC-PLN-1723


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G. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER SUSTAINING ENGINEERING OFFICE Armando Oliu MV7 861-3042 321-631-7548 / 321-213-1471

Jamie Larson MV7 861-6849 321-289-2984 H. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER RESIDENT OFFICE

Diane Fleming SK 861-3205 321-636-3955 / 321-289-1566 Sandy Saville SK 867-4522 321-638-0139 / 321-543-1706 ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE (NE) I. AVIONICS DIVISION (NE-A)

Ken Jacobs NE-A 867-5693 321-890-5838 Brian Luther NE-A 861-3837 321-267-7546 / 321-795-8430 J. CONTROL & DATA SYSTEMS DIVISION (NE-C)

James Kania NE-C 867-5972 321-631-2035/ 321-537-8851 Al Folensbee

Lynn Svedin NE-C NE-C

861-3790 867-2970

321-639-2932 / 321-806-9003 321-383-2336 / 321-501-0988

K. ELECTRICAL DIVISION (NE-E)

Todd Corey NE-E 867-5921 321-453-1158 / 321-213-1272 Dean Petruzzello NE-E 861-4305 321-338-2606 / 321-323-4611 L. FLUIDS & LIQUID PROPULSION DIVISION (NE-F)

Jane Dumont NE-F 867-7617 321-452-9555 / 321-302-1030 Martin Hayes NE-F 861-3881 321-961-4172 M. MATERIALS SCIENCE DIVISION (NE-L)

Duane Dickey NE-L3 867-7288 321-636-4004 / 321-501-1345 Chris Davis (A) NE-L1 867-8804 321-453-7916 N. MECHANICAL DIVISION (NE-M) Cliff Manley NE-M 867-6382 321-459-1752 / 321-961-2530 Joe Porta NE-M 867-3748 321-268-0443 / 321-289-9052


ATTACHMENT C KSC-PLN-1723


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ATTACHMENT C: KSC WIND REQUIREMENTS

Wind Constraints Matrix

STEADY STATE

GUSTS LIMITATION

17.4 Knots 26.1 Knots No Payload Canister hoisting at Pads A and B.

18 Knots 22 Knots No Erection of or work on floats, spiders and scaffolding. No ECP hoisting (with SSME on board).

20 Knots 25 Knots No mobile crane hoisting. No high ranger or Condor operations. No ECP hoisting (SSME not on board). No SSME ESP hoisting.

30 Knots No work on facility roofs, structure tops, unprotected areas and no work outside of handrails. No ET Access Platform hoisting/positioning. No access to ET Platforms.

33.9 Knots 50.4 Knots No payload canister transportation (Vertical Configuration).

34 Knots 52 Knots No SRM transporting.

40 Knots 60 Knots No RSS rotation.

40 Knots 60 Knots SSV rollback to VAB has to be performed prior to 40 Knots.

43.4 Knots 65.2 Knots No payload canister transportation (horizontal configuration).

45 Knots NTD/CTC will proceed with the necessary securing operations per S0018. All work shall be terminated and personnel cleared from the FSS/RSS when winds exceed 45 knots steady state. Minimum payload contingency personnel may remain in the PCR under control of OIC or Security and maintain communication with the NTD/CTC. Ingress/egress is not permitted.

60 Knots Retract Orbiter Midbody Umbilical Unit (OMBUU), OAA, H2 Ground Umbilical, ET intertank access arm.

72 Knots Curtain walls and -Y strut shall be retracted and locked. NOTE: Decision to retract curtain walls will be made prior to 40 knots (Orbiter Weather Protection).

Wind restrictions listed are from USA Florida Safety Operating Plan FSOP 6100.


ATTACHMENT C KSC-PLN-1723


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Wind Matrix - Securing Timelines

OPERATION STEADY STATE WIND LIMIT

LEAD TIME REQUIRED

REMARKS/LIMITING FACTOR

Payload Canister Hoisting

17.4 Knots 32 Hours Completion of Payload Canister hoisting for Payload return to Payload Processing Facility; assumes canister was not at the launch pad

SSV Rollback Preparations

30 Knots 26 Hours Working at heights to complete SSV rollback preparations

Payload Canister Transportation

(Vertical)

33.9 Knots 4 Hours From launch pad surface to Payload Processing Facility

SSV Preps and Rollback without VAB rollaround

40 Knots 41 Hours Completion of SSV rollback to the VAB (includes 4 hours of contingency)

SSV Preps and Rollback with

VAB rollaround

40 Knots 47 Hours Completion of VAB MLP rollaround and SSV rollback to the VAB (includes 4 hours of contingency)


ATTACHMENT D KSC-PLN-1723


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ATTACHMENT D: HURRICANE CONTINGENCY / ROLLBACK BARCHARTS




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Documents

KSC-PLN-1723 2011 PH Hurricane Plan