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WESTPHAL , Kenneth R., 1998. Hegels Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion. In: J. Stewart, ed., The

Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: A Collection of Critical and Interpretive Essays(Albany, SUNY Press), 7691. 1

Hegels Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion

Kenneth R. Westphal

The revised, definitive version of this article appears in:J. Stewart, ed., The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: A Collection of Critical and Interpretive Essays(Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 7691. Originally published in: The History of Philosophy Quarterly5.2 (1988):17388.

ABSTRACT: I argue that the central methodological problem Hegel addresses in the Introduction tothe Phenomenology of Spiritis Sextus Empiricuss Dilemma of the Criterion, a dilemma purportingto show that no criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood can be established. I show that theDilemma is especially pressing for any epistemology that, like Hegels, rejects knowledge byacquaintance, aims to avoid dogmatism, and retains a realist, correspondence conception of truth.Hegels response to the dilemma appears to beg the question. I argue that a careful disambiguationof some of Hegels key phrases shows that he developed a sophisticated response to this dilemma

that does not beg the question. On Hegels view, the internal coherence of a form of consciousness(explained below) entails that the principle conceptions of knowledge and of the objects ofknowledge comprised by that form of consciousness are true of actual knowledge and of the actualobjects of knowledge. I indicate why this criterion can be made to work at the broad categorial levelof Hegels inquiry although it does not apply to problems of theory selection faced in philosophyof science. I begin by showing that Sextus Dilemma has not been adequately resolved by Chisholm,

Alston, Moser, or Fogelin, although their efforts are instructive about the genuine difficultiesinvolved in the Dilemma of the Criterion. ([email protected])

0. PREFACE (1996).

Recently, problems about epistemic circularity, and more recently, Sextus Empiricus Dilemma ofthe Criterion have been receiving thoughful attention from contemporary epistemologists.Epistemic circularity is involved in using a source of belief in the process of assessing or justifyingthat source of belief; the Dilemma of the Criterion (quoted below, 1) concerns establishing basiccriteria of justification in highly disputed domains. Because there are diverse and controversial viewson this issue, how can basic criteria of justification be established without infinite regress, viciouscircularity, or question-begging assumptions? I think these problems deserve careful attention, but1

I dont believe contemporary epistemologists have fully realized how sophisticated a resonsePyrrhonian skepticism requires.

Roderick Chisholm contends that there are three kinds of response to Sextus Dilemma:Particularists believe they have various particular instances of knowledge, on the basis of which theycan construct a general account of the nature and criteria of knowledge. Methodists believe theyknow the nature and criteria of knowledge, and on that basis can distinguish genuine fromillegitimate particular instances of knowledge. Skeptics believe that no particular cases of knowledgecan be identified without knowing the nature or criteria of knowledge, and that the nature or criteriaof knowledge cannot be known without identifying particular cases of genuine knowledge.2

Chisholm favors particularism, but thinks that any attempt to solve the problem must beg thequestion.3

Paul Moser has sought to avoid the dogmatism which arises from accepting either methodismor particularism by proposing to reach a reflective equilibrium between our considered judgmentsabout epistemic principles and our clearest intuitions about particular cases of knowledge or justifiedbelief. There may be merit to this suggestion, but convincing reasons must be provided to suppose4

that we would equilibrate toward genuine principles of justification and genuine cases of knowledge


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or justified belief. Moser apparently discounts this problem because of his staunch justificatoryinternalism, which permits him to consider propositions as justified for particular persons, even iftheir principles of justification are not truth-conducive. As his recent work reveals, this is muchmore a captilation to, rather than a solution of, serious skeptical challenges to knowledge and to ourunderstanding of it.

Recently, Moser has argued for conditional ontological agnosticism, the view that no agnostic-resistant, non-question-begging evidence for ontological claims (whether idealist or realist) can befound. He contends that philosophy nevertheless can undertake important semantic, explanatory,5

and evaluative projects. His explanatory project addresses whatever constitutes the correctnessof ones explanatory epistemic standards regarding the nature of justification; his evaluativeproject addresses whatever constitutes the correctness of the evaluative epistemic standards oneuses to discern justified beliefs. These projects must avoid the dilemma of being either naive or

viciously circular. Mosers semantic project purports to solve that dilemma through informativeanswers to questions about the point and significance of ones standards. The explanations his three6

projects involve are avowedly perspectival because they are supported ultimately by the varioussemantic commitments, explanatory ends, and standards of successin sum, by the conceptually

relative standpointsadopted by individual epistemologists.7

Moser contends that the dilemma he identifies for his explanatory and evaluative projects ismore basic that Sextus Dilemma of the Criterion. In part this is because he accepts Chisholms8

formulation of the Dilemma in terms of justification, instead of the criterial terms Sextus actually9

uses. This prevents him from recognizing how basic a problem Sextus poses and how sophisticatedSextus is in parlaying that problem into objections to all sorts of philosophical endeavors. Moreover,Mosers case for ontological agnosticism is tantamount to the less sophisticated, more dogmaticcousin of Pyrrhonian skepticism, Academic skepticism. Most important, however, is the fact that10

Moser doesnt recognize that direct permutations of Sextus Dilemma and its associated skepticaltropes arise for any attempt to assess the various explanations and evaluations offered by differentepistemologists. Indeed, they arise for any attempt to assess the merits of various semantic

commitments made by different epistemologists or of various standpoints they adopt.Acquiescing in ontological agnosticism and avowing conceptual relativism does not evadeSextus challenging questions; quite the contrary.

Having once argued that epistemic circularity need not be vicious, William Alston soon hadsecond thoughts. He states:

What I take myself to have shown in Epistemic Circularity is that epistemic circularity does notprevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that are ultimately based on senseperception, that sense perception is reliable. But whether one actually does succeed in this dependson ones being justified in those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our assumptionsabout justification, depends on sense perception being a reliable source of belief. In other words,if(and only if) sense perception is reliable we can show it to be reliable. And how can we cancel out

that if?Here is another way of posing the problem. If we are entitled to use belief from a certain source

in showing that source to be reliable, then any source can be shown to be reliable. For if all else fails,we can simply use each belief twice over, once as testee and once as tester. ... Thus if we allow theuse of mode of belief formation M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M are true, M is sureto get a clean bill of health. But a line of argument that will validate any mode of belief formation,no matter how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and need, something muchmore discriminating. Hence the fact that the reliability of sense perception can be established byrelying on sense perception does not solve our problem.11

Alston proposes several criteria for justifying doxastic practices. It counts in favor of a practice ifit is more firmly established. This involves a practice being more widely accepted, more definitelystructured, more important to guiding action, more difficult to abstain from, more innately based,


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or having principles that seem more obviously true. An acceptable doxastic practice cannot generatemassive inconsistency, and persistent massive inconsistency between two practices indicates that atleast one is faulty. Alston adopts a negative coherentism: an established doxastic practice isprima facierationally acceptable in the absence of significant disqualifying reasons. More positively, a practicemay generate self-support if it grounds our abilities to investigate how that practice is possible or

grounds our abilities to engage in other effective practices. The more such self-support a doxasticpractice generates, the more that counts in its favor. The failure to generate such self-support isa demerit. Analyzing doxastic practices in light of these criteria may help establish a rank orderingto which to appeal when massive conflicts arise among or within them. The aspirations of suchfree-wheeling philosophical analysis, within which every claim is open to criticism, are modest.12

Even showing that there is no practical and rational alternative to believing that our general belief-forming practices are reliable faces epistemic circularity, and someone who does not accept the basicreliability of a source of belief cannot be justified in accepting it by an epistemically circularargument.13

Robert Fogelin has examined contemporary foundationalism, reliabilism, coherentism, andexternalism, with Sextus skepticism in view. He concludes:

What I have tried to show, using a number of exemplary cases, is that Pyrrhonian skepticism, whentaken seriously and made a party to the debate, is much more intractable than those who haveproduced theories of empirical justification have generally supposed. As far as I can see, thechallenge of Pyrrhonian skepticism, once accepted, is unanswerable.14

Im happy to add Fogelins case studiesBonjour, Goldman, Nozick, Dretske, Chisholm, Lehrer,and Davidsonto those I gave in my bookDescartes, Kant, Carnap, and Alstonto show thatSextuss skepticism is a serious problem deserving serious consideration. Unlike Fogelin I believethat our epistemological situation is good, not dire. The surprise is that the proper response toSextus comes from a philosopher who is widely supposed to have had no theory of knowledge atall: Hegel. Hegel is an enormously sophisticated epistemologist whose views have goneunrecognized because his problems have gone unrecognized. Placing Sextus Dilemma of theCriterion in the foreground solves this problem. In one way or another, the solutions posed in theliterature require that we be self-critical in order, e.g., to avoid dogmatism (Chisholm), to distinguishjustifying from arbitrary reflective equilibria (Moser), to distinguish appropriate or adequateconceptualizations from inferior alternatives (Moser), or to distinguish genuine from sham self-support (Alston). Though not widely recognized, the real problem raised by Sextus Dilemma is tounderstand how self-criticism is possible. Hegel recognized this problem and developed a verysophisticated and powerful analysis of it.

Some of the importance and the difficulty involved in self-criticism can be seen by consideringhow Chisholms three responses to the Dilemma of the Criterion highlight the fact that differentphilosophers make different assumptions about human knowledge and about how to analyze it.

Such assumptions inform a philosophers entire approach to epistemology and they condition if notdetermine what, if anything, a philosopher will accept as credible. Because a philosophers assump-tions inform his or her theoretical formulations and his or her judgments about credibility, there isconceptual interdependence within the constellation of assumptions, principles, and paradigmexamples comprised in any philosophers basic approach to epistemology. Philosophers take many15

different assumptions as points of departure; not all are equally credible. Can we distinguish morefrom less credible basic assumptions? If so, how?

A further difficulty is reflected in Alstons point about the limits of proof involved inepistemically circular arguments: There is a conceptual distinction between evidence one has andevidence one accepts. In particular cases of knowledge or belief, as well as in particular epistemicanalyses, there may be a significant divergence between the evidence someone has and the evidence

he or she accepts. This contrast reflects the fact that there is a conceptual distinction between


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apparent evidence and genuine evidence, and that in any particular case there may again be asignificant divergence between them. These two distinctions are themselves distinct, and part of ourchallenge, both as cognizant agents and as epistemologists, is to align them, both in principle andin practice.

With these points in view, both the importance of and the difficulties involved in self-criticism

can be suggested more clearly. In view of these four pointsthe interdependence among the basicassumptions, principles, and favored cases comprised in an epistemology; the distinction betweenhaving and accepting evidence; the distinction between apparent and genuine evidence; and thedistinction between these two distinctionscan philosophers basic epistemic assumptions besubmitted to critical scrutiny? Can they be assessed without begging the question? If so, how?

Hegels solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion provides a very sophisticated and powerfulanswer to these questions. Hegels solution presents a series of forms of consciousness (explainedin 2), each of which adopts a distinct set of assumptions about human knowledge and applies theprinciples implied or embedded in those assumptions to relevant examples of putative knowledge.

The structure Hegel ascribes to forms of consciousness affords an internal critical assessment of thevarious assumptions and principles of knowledge those forms of consciousness illustrate. Even if

we cannot justify a theory of knowledge to a skeptic who refuses to take anyevidence or principleas credible, we still face a substantial problem providing a critical assessment of various epistemicassumptions and principles and achieving rational agreement among more credulous and credibleepistemologists. Hegel solves this methodological problem, and in his substantive analysis ofknowledge he shows how unwarranted is the radical skeptics refusal to count anything as evidenceor justification. Hegel thus provides a theoretical solution to the Dilemma which avoids vicious16

circularity, infinite regress, and self-certifying intuition. The assumptions he makes do not appearas premises in his proof and ultimately they can be discharged through self-critical assessment ofthem.17

My discussion has four parts. I begin by discussing the Dilemma of the Criterion and itsepsitemological significance (1). As a first step in presenting Hegels solution to this Dilemma, I

discuss his conception of forms of consciousness (2). Hegels main solution to the Dilemmainvolves analyzing a conception of knowledge as a relation between knower and known (3). Iconclude by briefly discussing a problem confronting Hegels solution to this dilemma (4).

Although I only discuss epistemology, the problem and reconstruction I offer extend quite directlyto Hegels concerns with ethics and action.

I. THE DILEMMA OF THE CRITERION AND ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

Hegel states that the aim of the Phenomenology of Spiritis to provide insight into what knowing is.18

Since there is severe and sustained disagreement on this topic, providing insight into the actualnature or structure of knowledge requires assessing competing views and defending ones own view.

The methodological problem Hegel confronts in the Introduction to the Phenomenology is howdiffering views of knowledge can be assessed, and indeed how this can be done without lapsing intodogmatism or begging the question against those who disagree. This problem was classicallyformulated as an argument purporting to show that no such assessment can be made because nocriterion for such assessment can be established. This is the Dilemma of the Criterion propoundedby Sextus Empiricus.

In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus poses the following dilemma:

[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess anaccepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an acceptedcriterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reducesitself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we

do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they


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offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. And furthermore,since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approveddemonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.19

The problem posed is one of settling disputesdisputes about appropriate criteria for assessing

knowledge claims. This kind of second-order dispute about what knowledge is could quickly developfrom disputes about the way the world is. (I will call claims about the world first-order knowledgeclaims.) Insofar as establishing first-order knowledge claims involves demonstrating that those claimsare warranted, second-order claims about what knowledge is and how to distinguish it from error

would be invoked. Of course these second-order claims, too, require warrants. Thus the problemof adjudicating among divergent claims to first-order knowledge recurs on a higher level as aproblem of adjudicating among differing claims to second-order knowledge about what knowledgeis. At this point, when what is called for are coordinated warrants for three types of claims (first-order claims, second-order claims about the principles warranting those first-order claims, andclaims warranting these second-order claims), the problem may look insoluble. Sextus may well seemthe wiser for having been compelled to suspend judgement by the multitude of divergent firstprinciples propounded in various philosophies (PHI 170, 178). Sextus uses this Dilemma to tryto undermine first-order knowledge claims. Hegel takes a methodological cue from SextussDilemma in recognizing that the dilemma arises and must be met at the second level ofepistemological debate.

What can be done to solve this Dilemma? What can be done to defend the claims made by atheory of knowledge? One ordinary strategy for defending claims to knowledge is unavailable here.In making claims about everyday things our beliefs are often justified by something that is not itselfa belief or claim, such as being in a perceptual state. In the case before us, however, there is no suchappeal to be made; we simply dont perceive what knowledge is in anything like the way we perceivetables and chairs. Justifying a theory of knowledge involves appealing to further claims, which inturn require justification.

One negative condition for an adequate account of knowledge derived from Kant, and adoptedby Hegel, is that any account of knowledge that cannot be known in accordance with its ownprinciples is self-refuting: its very promulgation demonstrates abilities unaccounted for by thattheory. This is a powerful condition. However, this condition does not distinguish between20

theories of knowledge that are reflexively self-consistent in this way and a theory that is, in addition,true. Furthermore, Kants condition doesnt address the problem of reaching agreement amongdissenting epistemologists. Something more needs to be established in order to respond to Sextus.

What resources are there for addressing this problem? On the one hand, simply acceptingvarious claims about what knowledge is leads to dogmatism and Hegel called the trustworthinessof these claims into question. (One cannot simply accept all prima facieclaims about knowledgebecause these claims contradict one another and so cannot all be true. ) On the other hand, simply21

rejecting such ideas altogether would leave us bereft of terms for even posing the problem, to saynothing of solving it. Thus some sort ofprima faciecognitive abilities and terminology for analyzingthese abilities must be granted in order to have a problem and a discussion of it at all. If there arereasons for questioning thoseprima facieabilities, then any solution to these difficulties will have tolie in the possibility of self-critically revising ourprima facieunderstanding of knowledge. It must becritical revision because there are reasons to suppose that our understanding of knowledge isinadequate; it must be self-critical revision because there is need to avoid question-begging anddogmatism. Hegels procedure for determining whichprima facieclaims are true is to examine a seriesof forms of consciousness, each of which adopts a specific set ofprima facie claims aboutknowledge. Hegel holds that the actual nature or structure of knowledge can be comprehendedthrough examining the defects and proficiencies of a range of accounts of knowledge and its objectsbased on theseprima facieideas.


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II. FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS .

What is a form (Gestalt) of consciousness? A form of consciousness is an expository deviceconsisting of a pair of basic principles. One of these principles specifies the kind of empiricalknowledge of which a form of consciousness presumes itself capable. The other principle specifies

the general structure of the kind of object which that form of consciousness presumes to find in theworld. Taken together, these two principles constitute what Hegel calls a form of consciousnesscertainty (Gewiheit). Idiomatically expressed, these principles specify what a form ofconsciousness is sure the world and its knowledge of it are like. The principles at issue are22

categorial ones, e.g. whether intuitive (a-conceptual) knowledge is humanly possible, or whether anontology of sensa is adequate.

Considering these principles as a form of consciousness is neutral between a particularindividuals consciousness and a groups collective outlook. Similarly, this device is neutral betweenhistorically identifiable, and summarily presented possible, views of knowledge and its objects. IfHegel is correct, historical epochs and extant philosophies are variations on, if not instances of, theforms of consciousness he recounts in the Phenomenology. This is because both forms of

consciousness, as well as historically identifiable positions, all devolve from the real characteristicsof consciousness. This is one point Hegel makes in claiming that his Phenomenologypresents the pathof the soul which is making its way through the sequence of its own transformations as through

waystations prescribed by its very nature ... (G 55.3639/M49).By grasping some aspect of its own nature as a cognizer, each form of consciousness adopts a

particular principle concerning what knowledge is. Now any epistemic principle implies certainconstraints on what the objects of knowledge could be. Therefore the adoption of an epistemicprinciple brings with it a concomitant ontological principle. To take examples from the first sectionof Hegels book, the form of consciousness designated as sense certainty holds that knowledgeis unmediated by conceptions or inferences and that the world contains nothing but sheer particularsthat can be grasped immediately. The form of consciousness called perception holds that

cognition occurs by perceiving objects and using observation terms, and that the world containsmultiply-propertied perceptible things. The form of consciousness called understanding holdsthat, in addition to perception, cognition requires inferences based on judgmental application of lawsof nature and that the world contains causally interacting substances structured by forces.

To take a pair of epistemic and ontological principles as aformof consciousness allows latitudefor developing from less to more sophisticated accounts of knowledge and its objects based on eachpair of principles. To take this pair of principles as a form ofconsciousnessis to consider them onlyas they can be adopted and employed by consciousness in attempts to comprehend the world to23

make the kind of claims sanctioned by a conception of knowledge about the kinds of objectsspecified by a conception of objects. Indeed, a form of consciousness epistemic principle isprecisely a principle concerning how to apply its conception of objects to the world in order to

comprehend the world. Hegels neutrality on the question of who holds a given set of principlesallows him to focus attention on the more important issue of the principles themselves inconnection with their putative domains of application.

The conceptions Hegel proposes to examine in the Phenomenologyinclude those of subject, object,knowledge, and world. However, these terms are too abstract to specify much of anything. So Hegelproposes to examine particular sets of specific versions of these conceptions through examiningtheir ideal employment by each form of consciousness. Each does entail every here; Hegelthinks he can give an exhaustive list of the forms of consciousness. Hegels defense of his own viewsabout knowledge rest on their resulting from an internal, self-critical assessment of every form ofconsciousness and on that basis rejecting all alternative accounts of knowledge and its objects. (Icomment on his problematic claim to completeness in 4.) Noting the proficiencies and deficiencies

of each form of consciousness, and through that of each more specific interpretation of theseabstract conceptions, will put us, Hegels readers, in a position to understand the adequate specifica-


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tion of these abstract conceptions that Hegel purports to give at the end of the Phenomenology. Hegelsargument is thus a sort of argument by elimination, where he seeks to eliminate the errors but retainthe insights of less adequate views through a self-critical process of revision.

III. K NOWLEDGE AS A RELATION.

Hegels defense of the possibility of self-criticism rests on two main points. First, being consciousis fundamentally a cognitive relation to the world, whether we realize it or not. (This may seem tobeg the question in favor of realism, but it does not. Even subjective idealism has to account for theapparent dualism of subject and object. ) Second, this cognitive relation to the world has a certain24

structure that allows critical assessment and revision of conceptions of knowledge and of the world.If such self-criticism is possible, then Sextus is wrong to charge that vicious circularity and question-begging are ineluctable.

A. The Problem.Hegel begins his analysis of the structure of cognition by appealing to a common sense realismaccording to which the cognizant subject both relates itself to a known object and distinguishes itselffrom that object (G58.2335/M52). Insisting that knowledge is a relation between subject and objectdoes not seem to enable self-criticism. Indeed, it seems only to highlight the very problem that needsto be solved. If knowledge is a relation between subject and object, how can one tell if the objectis as it seems to be? As Hegel notes,

To be sure, the object seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousnessseems, as it were, unable to get behind the object in order to see it, notas it isfor consciousness, but asit is in itself. Therefore consciousness also seems unable to examine its own knowledge by comparingit with the object. (G 59.3537/M54)

Because knowledge is a relation, any knowledge claim involves at least the conceptual distinctionbetween the object itself and the object as it is taken to be. This conceptual distinction may wellharbor a further distinction between the actual structure of the object and the content of thesubjects cognitive stateignorance, if not error. Hence on the face of it, any particular knowledgeclaim requires validation. However, any validation would involve further knowledge and claims.

These further states and claims would involve the same conceptual distinction between object andcognitive state or claim and the same possibility of ignorance or error. So how could any cognitivestate or claim be validated? One cannot simply compare ones putative knowledge with anunconceptualized object itself, knowledge by direct acquaintance is not humanly possible, so25

what could one do? Are we trapped within an opaque veil of representations? If not, how does

insisting on knowledge as a relation between subject and object help to show that were not? If thereis a solution to this problem, it must be one of utilizing putative knowledge in a virtuously circularmanner.

Surprisingly, Hegel seems to try to solve the problem of the circle of representations by simplyreiterating the very problem itself. Hegel states:26

But the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself is already present in the very fact thatconsciousness knows an object at all. Something is to itthe in-itself, but knowledge or the being ofthe objectforconsciousness is to itstill another moment. It is upon this differentiation, which existsand is present at hand, that the examination [of knowledge] is grounded. (G 59.3760.3/M54)

Hegel claims here that the distinction between the object known (the in-itself) and the knowledgeof it (the for itself) is available (vorhanden) to consciousness, so that consciousness can examine


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its own knowledge of the object. Now in what sense, exactly, is this differentiation between theobject and the knowledge of it available? As was just noted, this distinction is involved in theconception of knowledge as a relation, so that upon reflection one could recognize this conceptualdistinction. Does simply recognizing the problem solve it? Hardly.

I contend that there is a crucial ambiguity in Hegels text between two senses of in-itself and

that there is an important set of distinctions that Hegel marks by using different grammatical cases.(Due to space considerations I will be brief about these arguments here.) Cataloging these distinc-tions generates a list of four aspects of knowledge as a relation between subject and object.Furthermore, because the object of any form of consciousness is two-fold, both the world as anobject of empirical knowledge and empirical knowledge as an object of self-knowledge, the initiallist of four aspects of knowledge must be doubled into eight elements of consciousness as acognitive relation.

B. The Eight Elements of Knowledge as a Relation.Hegel begins explaining how a form of consciousness can provide and revise its own criterion orstandard of knowledge by refining a common sense notion of knowledge as a relation between

subject and object. He states:

In consciousness, one moment isfor another; ... At the same time, this other is to consciousness notonly somethingfor it; it is also [to consciousness] something outside this relationship or in itself: themoment of truth. Therefore, in what consciousness within its own self declares as the in-itselfor thetrue, we have the standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its own knowledge.(G 59.813/M53)

This passage bears close scrutiny because the ambiguity of the phrase in-itself and an importantgrammatical case distinction are found here.

1. Two Senses of In-itself. One sense of in-itself is that the object of knowledge is something

unto itself, regardless of what may be known about it. The preposition in is not important; whatis important is the object being what it is, with all of its properties known and unknown. In orderto avoid question-begging, Hegel does not make claims about the structure of this object (at leastnot before the end of the Phenomenology). This sense of in-itself may be labeled asThe ObjectItself(simpliciter).

The second sense of in-itself is crucial to Hegels project, for it is the standard thatconsciousness gives itself in order to assess (measure) its own knowledge. Hegel describes thisaspect of knowledge as what consciousness within its own self declares as the in itselfor the true...(ibid.). Hegels inclusion of the word declares (erklrt) here is crucial, for it necessitatesdistinguishing this sense of in-itself from the previous one. If the object itself is somethingoutside its relation to consciousness, then that object cannot be something simply declared by

consciousness, for anything created by a declaration originates from, and so is what it is only within,some relation to consciousness. Furthermore, if the object itself were something created byconsciousness declaration, it would be misdescribed by calling it an in itself.27

What Hegel points out here is that by adopting naive realism, common sense adopts aconception of the world as being something unto itself. It is consciousness having a conceptionof itsobject that Hegel signals by the phrase, declares from within itself. Adopting a conception of theobject known is precisely what happens in recognizing that the object known may not be as onetakes it to be. What consciousness posits is the conception thatthe object it knows is what it isregardless of its being known. This conception of the object is to be used as the standard for28

consciousness cognitive self-examination. (How this conception could fulfill such a function isdiscussed shortly.) In order to emphasize that this aspect of knowledge concerns what consciousness

takes its object to be, this aspect may be formulated asThe Object According to Consciousness


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or, alternatively, Consciousness Conception of Objects.

2. A Grammatical Case Distinction. In half a dozen passages in the Introduction Hegeldistinguishes between those objects or aspects of knowledge that areforconsciousness and thosethat are somethingto consciousness, a distinction between accusative and dative cases. What is the29

significance of this distinction? In the above passage, Hegel says that somethings beingfor30

consciousness indicates that consciousness knows that thing, that consciousness is cognitivelyrelated to it. However, this is an aspectof knowledge rather than the whole relation. Hegel agrees

with Kant that intuitions without conceptions are blind. Accordingly, there is no knowledge of anobject without applying conceptions to it. The objects being somethingforconsciousness resultsfrom the combination of the two aspects distinguished above (as two senses of in-itself): Anobject is somethingforconsciousness when consciousness applies its conception of objects to anobject itself. To put the same point slightly differently, an object is an object for consciousnessinsofar as consciousness takes that object to instantiate its conception of objects. This aspect ofknowledge may be labeledThe Object for Consciousness.

Hegels distinction between dative and accusative (grammatical) objects of consciousness marks

a distinction between levels of explicitness. What is for consciousness is something consciousnessis explicitly aware of; what is to consciousness is something consciousness is aware of, but notexplicitly so. Hegels dative construction designates features of an object itself that are closely relatedto those features of that object explicitly captured by consciousness conception of objects, but

which are not themselves explicitly captured by that conception. These are parts or features of theobject itself that consciousness has, so to speak, latched onto without yet understanding them.Consciousness mis-takings are takings nonetheless. The mis-taken parts or aspects of the objectitself fall into two cases. First, there are parts or aspects of the object itself of which consciousnessis cognizant, but which do not figure centrally into its conception of objects. Second, there are partsor aspects of the object itself of which consciousness is not cognizant, but which are closely relatedto those parts or aspects of the object captured by consciousness conception of objects. These

incidental parts or aspects of an object are the first ones consciousness confronts in discoveringthe inadequacy of its conception of objects. This aspect of knowledge may be labeledThe Objectto Consciousness.

To summarize, the four aspects of knowledge as a relation distinguished so far are these:

The object according to consciousness.

The object for consciousness.

The object to consciousness.

The object itself.

For convenience, I have sometimes labeled the first of these consciousness conception ofobjects.31

3. Consciousness as Reflexive; The List Doubled. So far, knowledge has been treated genericallyas a relation between subject and object. But what objects does consciousness have knowledge of?In general, there are two: the world as an object of empirical knowledge, and empirical knowledgeas an object of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is important to Hegels project because the32

possibility of self-criticism requires that consciousness be able to reflect on itself and its activity.Indeed, consciousness takes on a particular form (and so is a particular form of consciousness)

precisely by adopting, if only implicitly, a certain conception of what it, as a cognizer, is.

33

Consciousness conception of knowledge both constrains what its conception of the world can be


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and it guides the application of that conception to the world. Because the object of any form ofconsciousness is this pair of objectsits own knowledge as well as the object knownthe four-foldlist of aspects of knowledge developed above forms two parallel lists of four elements, one listconcerning the ontological side, the other concerning the noetic side, of knowledge. Each of thesefour-fold distinctions of elements of knowledge is generated in a manner parallel to that discussed

above, by taking the object of knowledge to be first, the world, and then, empirical knowledge asitself an object of self-knowledge. Hence there is no need to repeat that derivation again for thesetwo special cases. The complete list of elements of knowledge as a relation is the following:

1. Consciousness conception of the world:The WorldAc c o rd in g to Consciousness.

2. The world taken as instantiating consciousnessconception of the world:

The World Fo rConsciousness.

3. Those elements of the world closely related to,but not included in, consciousness conception ofthe world:

The World To Consciousness.

4. The world as it actually is, with all of itsproperties known and unknown:

The World I t s e l f .

A. Consciousness conception of knowledge:KnowledgeAc c o rd in g to Consciousness.

B. Knowledge taken as instantiatingconsciousness conception of knowledge:Knowledge Fo rConsciousness.

C. Those elements of knowledge closelyrelated to, but not included in, consciousnessconception of knowledge:Knowledge To Consciousness.

D. Knowledge as it actually is, with all of itsproperties known and unknown:Knowledge I t s e l f .

I grant that this double four-fold distinction of elements of consciousness as a cognitive relation toits objects is only tenuously indicated in the Introduction. However, I maintain that these

distinctions are to be found in the text and I would argue that it is only by making these distinctionsthat it is possible to construe the difficult remainder of the Introduction. This shows that these34

distinctions are operative in the Introduction. If Hegels analysis of knowledge as a relation is as richas this list indicates, then he has a good deal to work with in defending the possibility of self-criticism.35

C. Hegels Criterial Inference.The crucial question is this: How can consciousness determine if its conception of the worldcorresponds to the world itself if consciousness has no access to the world itself except insofar asthe world is for consciousness? Likewise, How can consciousness determine if its conception ofknowledge corresponds to knowledge itself, if consciousness has no access to knowledge itself

except insofar as knowledge is for consciousness? Hegels answer to this double question can beseen by examining the eight elements of knowledge as a relation. Since the correspondence ofconception and object is something that consciousness is supposed to be able to recognize that ithas achieved, consciousness must be able to recognize this correspondence on the basis of itsexplicit awareness of certain of the elements of knowledge. The elements of which consciousnessis (or at least comes to be) explicitly aware are its conceptions of the world and of knowledge andthe world and knowledge for it (elements 1, A, 2, and B). Now it may seem that if these elementsare all consciousness can work with, then its criterion of knowledge must be hopelessly subjective,in that the relevant standard would be the object itself and not just what consciousness takes itto be. This objection misses the main insight of Hegels response to Sextuss challenge: Because the

world for consciousness and knowledge for consciousness (elements 2 and B) result from

consciousness application of its conceptions of the world and of knowledge (elements 1 and A) tothe world itself and to knowledge itself (elements 4 and D), the world itself and knowledge itself


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figure centrally into the world and knowledge for consciousness (elements 2 and B). Because theworld itself and knowledge itself figure centrally into the world and knowledgeforconsciousness,if the world and knowledgeforconsciousness coincide with consciousness conceptions of the worldand of knowledge, then these conceptions also correspond to their objects, the world itself andknowledge itself. Conversely, if consciousness conceptions of the world or of knowledge do not

correspond to the world itself or to knowledge itself, then the theoretical and practical inferencesconsciousness bases on these conceptions will result in expectations that diverge from the actualbehavior of the world or from actual cognitive practices. The experience of defeated expectationsmakes manifest a divergence between the world or knowledge for consciousness and consciousnessconceptions of the world or of knowledge, and so between these conceptions and their objects.

What consciousness takes to instantiate its conception of knowledge or its conception of the worldwould be found notto instantiate those conceptions. This is why it is important to Hegels methodto consider principles in application to their putative domains, for so long as principles of knowledgeor its objects are inadequate, any examples taken from those domains will be far richer in kind thanis allowed by the principles under examination. By thorough and scrupulous application of epistemicand ontological principles, features of objects in their domains unaccounted for by those principles

can be brought to light. Such discoveries may only require reconsidering the importance ofpreviously recognized, though discounted, features of the objects or they may involve recognizingpreviously unknown features of knowledge or of the world. This is how categorial features ofknowledge or of the world that are initially objects to consciousness become explicitforit. Forexample, the form of consciousness called sense certainty finds that it is utterly unable to accountfor its ability to designate the particulars it knows without admitting the use of conceptions, and somust rescind its principle of aconceptual knowledge; the form of consciousness called perceptionfinds that perception alone cannot determine that the perceived white, cubical, and sour propertiesall belong to the same grain of salt, and so it must grant that there is more to empircal conceptionsthan observation terms. By making previously unaccounted or unrecognized features of the worldor of knowledge manifest in this way, defeated expectations supply information that can be used to

revise conceptions of the world and of knowledge. The internal coherence of a form ofconsciousness is only possible if its conceptions of the world and of knowledge correspond to theworld itself and to knowledge itself. This thesis grounds Hegels confidence in the internal self-criticism of forms of consciousness.36

There is, of course, an important distinction between the actual incoherence of an inadequateform of consciousness and the recognition of that incoherence. Only persistence in elaborating andapplying a pair of epistemic and ontological principles and intellectual integrity in assessing theiradequacy can lead to the detection of otherwise unrecognized incoherence and error. Hegelscritieron is thus a sine qua non for the truth of a pair of principles, and he adopts fallibalism.However, due to the second-order level of his inquiry, and due to the systematic interrelation of the

various categorial features of the objects under investigation (that is, the philosophically salient

features of empirical knowledge and of empirical objects in general ), Hegel can reasonably contend

37

that meeting the negative condition of the absence of detected incoherence in the long run is a verypowerful criterion for the positive condition sought, namely, for the correspondence of a pair ofconceptions of knowledge and its objects with the actual structure of human knowledge and withthe actual structure of the objects of human knowledge.

If Hegels criterial inference still seems implausible, it should be noted just how complex Hegelscriterion is. First, recall that this criterion is employed by a subject that is inherently related both tothe world itself and to knowledge itself. (In order for self-criticism to be possible, this claim simplyneeds to betrue; no particular form of consciousness needs also to knowthat it is true in order to beself-critical.) Because of this, even when there is a discrepancy between the object according toconsciousness and the object for consciousness (and hence a discrepancy between these elements

and the object itself), an objects beingfor

consciousness is nonethelessthe objects

being forconsciousness, even if that object is misconstrued; and the object itself is an object to consciousness


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throughout.38

Second, there isnt just one correspondence of object and conception being sought.Consciousness must not only reconcile its conception of the world with the world for it, and itsconception of knowledge with knowledge for it (with its manifest cognitive activity), this pair ofreconciliations must be mutually compatible. It does not suffice to eliminate discrepancies between

ones account of knowledge and ones cognitive activity only to wind up not being able to justifyclaims about the kinds of objects one takes oneself to have knowledge of.

Third, as an aspect of overcoming what Hegel calls merely natural ideas on these topics,consciousness must not only have conceptions that are adequate to its manifest cognition andobjects of knowledge, it must comprehend that it has adequate conceptions and what theseconceptions are. Given Hegels concern to avoid question-begging and his notion of determinatenegation, the adequacy of these conceptions can only be known through the comprehension of theproficiencies and deficiencies of less adequate conceptions.

Finally, Hegel holds that in order to be adequate, a theory of knowledge and its objects must beknowable in accordance with its own principles.

Taken together, these points form a set of five criteria:

1) No detectable discrepancy between the world for consciousness and the world accordingto consciousness (between elements 1 and 2).

2) No detectable discrepancy between knowledge for consciousness and knowledge accordingto consciousness (between elements A and B).

3) No detectable discrepancy between (1) and (2) (between the pairs of elements 1 & 2 and A& B).

4) A matched pair of accounts of the genesis and implementation of the conceptions of

knowledge and of the world indicating how they were generated through the criticalrejection of less adequate alternatives.

5) An account of how the conceptions of knowledge and of the world and theirimplementation can be learned, comprehended, and employed on the basis of those sameconceptions and applications.

This set of criteria, to be simultaneously satisfied, makes a formidable set of criteria indeed. Theywill not handle the first-order problems of theory selection faced by philosophy of science becausethey operate at a level of generality at which different conceptions of knowledge require differentconceptions of the objects of knowledge, and vice-versa. But at the second-order epistemological

level of inquiry pursued by Hegel, these criteria may be plenty. Indeed, it is not at all clear that anyphilosophy has ever satisfied them, including Hegels.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF COMPLETENESS.

Hegel claims to present the complete series of forms of consciousness, and the success of hisdefense of his own views depends on critically rejecting all alternatives. Certainly he hasntconsidered every logically possible position, and he hasnt provided any proof that he has. Whatplausibility can Hegel give to his claim to completeness? Three points may be briefly mentioned onthis topic.

Perhaps Hegels main support for his claim to completeness is his teleological philosophy of

history, according to which the series of forms of consciousness he recounts is the series requiredto complete the principal development of the world-spirit. If Hegel could make this part of his


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1. I summarize the main points of Sextus skepticism in Hegels Epistemological Realism(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989;abbreviated HER), 1116.

2. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 6566.

3. The Foundations of Knowing, 75, cf. 67. Robert Amico proposes to dissolve the Problem of the Criterion byshowing that the skeptic presupposes an impossible condition for justification, namely, settling both what countas proper criteria of knowledge and what count as proper instances of knowledge before providing an accountof knowledge; The Problem of the Criterion(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 11215. Amico is right thatthis is an impossible condition, but he wrongly ascribes to the Pyrrhonian skeptic a definitepositionon the natureof justification (ibid., 114). Thus he converts sophisticated, flexible, and undogmatic Pyrrhonian skepticism intodogmatic Academic skepticism. Sextus is far more subtle than that. Amico closes by noting that the interestingquestions only begin once this impossible condition on justifying a theory of knowledge is rejected. Hegels

analysis begins where Amicos leaves off, with these interesting questions.4. Knowledge and Evidence(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 26065.

5. Philosophy after Objectivity(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 57.

6. Philosophy after Objectivity, 7074, chs. 2, 3. Mosers semantic project specifies in informative terms, what itmeans to say that something (for example, a proposition or a belief) is epistemically justified (60). It requiresanswering the question [w]hat, if anything, constitutes the correctness (at least for myself) of my semanticstandards for epistemic justification as an answer to the semantic project regarding what it means to say thatsomething is epistemically justified? (72).

7. Philosophy after Objectivity, 227; on Mosers conceptual relativism see 9899 and ch. 4.

8. Philosophy after Objectivity, 7475.

9. Philosophy after Objectivity, 75. On Chisholms formulations of the Problem of the Criterion, see HER, 217.

10. Philosophy after Objectivity, 4157.

philosophy of history independently plausible, then he could have some powerful grounds for hisclaim to completeness. This topic cannot be explored here, but I, for one, am doubtful.

Setting Hegels philosophy of history aside, there is still something quite strong that Hegel cansay in his defense. He claims that each form of consciousness devolves from some characteristic ofhuman cognition. Part of the import of this claim is that the mere logical possibility of an epistemol-

ogy doesnt suffice to legitimize it: an adequate epistemology must also account for what knowledgeand its objects are likefor us. This is central to Hegels replacing epistemology with phenomenology,and it shows in his criteria as the insistence on what knowledge and its objects are like for us(elements 2 and B) in addition to our conceptions or theories of knowledge and its objects (elements1 and A).

Even if we grant that the adequacy of an epistemology rests on its plausibly being an accountof our cognitive abilities, it would be too much to say that Hegel had already treated every possiblenuance within the domain of plausibly human accounts of knowledge. However, because Hegelproceeds by showing, where we are supposed to reap the philosophical benefits of those displays,the line between what is strictly speaking to be found in Hegels text and what may only be able tobe read into or out of it may simply not exist. What matters for Hegels phenomenological enterprise

is that the structures and relations he claims are there areto be found in the indicated form ofconsciousness; how fully articulated they are may be quite another matter. If were now in a positionto ask more refined questions or consider more refined views than any of the forms ofconsciousness present, it is incumbent on us to see whether the points Hegel makes about these lessrefined forms of consciousness have telling analogues in the positions that we wish he hadconsidered. At the very least, since the instruction Hegel offers is suppose to be for us his readers,

we need to be willing to reconstruct what he displays in terms which, on the one hand, capture whathe says and does in those displays, while on the other hand, manage to address our (contemporary,linguistic, hermeneutic, or anlalytic) idioms for and approaches to the issues he discusses.39

NOTES


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11. William Alston, A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology (in M. Clay and K. Lehrer, eds., Knowledgeand Skepticism[Boulder: Westview, 1989], 129), 3; cf. The Reliability of Sense Perception(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1993), esp. ch. 5.

12. A Doxastic Practice Approach ..., 1320. I analyze Alstons views in detail, including his comments onSextus Dilemma, in HER, ch. 5.

13. Alston develops the argument for the practical rationality of accepting our current belief-forming practices(subject to on-going scrutiny) in A Doxastic Practice Approach ..., 920. He recognizes the epistemic circu-larity facing even that modest sort of argument in Belief-forming Practices and the Social (in: F. Schmitt, ed.,Socializing Epistemology; Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994; 2951), 4143. He recognizes that no one whodenies the reliability of a source of belief can be justified in accepting it by an epistemically circular argument inEpistemic Circularity (in Alston,Epistemic Justification[Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989], 31939), 328,334.

14. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 194, cf. 203.Fogelin focuses on Aggripas Five Modes (133f.) and does not discuss the Dilemma of the Criterion. Solvingthe Dilemma requires responding to the Five Modes, and also solving the level-regress and reflexive problemsinvolved in establishing criteria.

15. This introduces an element of holism independent of considerations about conceptual meaning. Hegel is a

(moderate) holist about meaning, but that doctrine cannot be appealed to in formulating a response to SextusDilemma without begging the question. However, Hegels response to Sextus Dilemma is sensitive to issuesraised by holistic theories of conceptual meaning and so lends itself to confronting issues about realism andrelativism raised by recent analytic philosophy of language.

16. The present paper is restricted to some core features of Hegels method. I sketch the structure of hissubstantive argument in HER, ch. 11. I present an hegelian argument against radical skepticism inTranscendental Reflections on Pragmatic Realism, in K. R. Westphal, ed., Pragmatism, Reason, & Norms: ARealistic Assessment(New York: Fordham, 1997), ch. 2.

17. See HER, 13738. Hegels solution does involve epistemiccircularity, which is inevitable in any critique ofreason, but through determinate negation (i.e., the internal critical rejection; see HER, 12526, 13536, 163)of alternative epistemologies he provides much more persuasive grounds to establish his epistemology than thegrounds suggested by Alston.

18. Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, G 25.1617/H27/K46/M17; cf. the Introduction to the same, G58.1314/H70/M52. Abbreviations are to the following works:

GW W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, eds. Gesammelte Werke(Hamburg: Meiner, 1968 ).

G Die Phnomenologie des Geistes. GW, Bd. 9.

H Die Phnomenologie des Geistes. J. Hoffmeister, ed. Hamburg: Meiner, 1952.

M The Phenomenology of Spirit. A. V. Miller, trans. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

K The Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. W. Kaufmann, trans. In: Hegel: Texts and Commentary. Garden City,

NY: Anchor, 1966.

Decimals after page references to GWrefer to line numbers. Translations are my own. I provide a full translationof Hegels Introduction in HER, 18996. In HER I place Hegels problem and solution into the context ofModern and contemporary epistemology, I reconstruct Hegels phenomenological method for addresssing thatproblem, and I reconstruct the structure of his epistemological argument for a socially and historically groundedrealism in the Phenomenology.

19. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism(R. G. Bury, tr.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933;abbreviated PH), Bk. II Ch. 4 20; cf. Bk. I Ch. 14 116117. Hegel briefly sketches this dilemma at the meta-level of epistmological inquiry in the middle of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spiritas a problem ofdistinguishing between real knowledge (which he here calls science) and merely apparent knowledge (which hecalls phenomenal knowledge). (The context makes clear the meta-level of Hegels concern.) He states:

[I]f this presentation [conducted in the Phenomenology] is viewed as a descript ion of the wayscienceis related


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tophenomenalknowledge, and as an investigationand critical examinationinto the reality of knowledge, it doesnot seem possible for it even to take place without some presupposition which will serve as thefundamental standard of measurement. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standardand in deciding, on the basis of final agreement or disagreement with the standard, whether what is beingtested is correct or incorrect. Thus the standard as such, and science too, were it the standard, is acceptedas the essence or the in itself. But here, where science will make its first appearance, neither science nor

anything else has justified itself as the essenceor as the in itself; and without some such basic principle itseems that an examination cannot take place. (G 58.1222/H70/M52)

The congruence between Hegels and Sextuss dilemmas should be no surprise, for Hegel wrote and extendedanalysis of classical and modern skepticisms for the Critical Journal of Philosophy. See Verhltnis des Skepticismuszur Philosophie; Kritisches Journal der PhilosophieBd. I Stuck 2 (GW4:197238); translated in Between Kant and Hegel(G. Di Giovani and H. S. Harris, trans. & eds.; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 31162.However, this early piece is not a reliable guide to Hegels use of Sextuss Dilemma in the Phenomenology, for twoyears later (in 1804) Hegel radically reassesses his adherence to Schellings philosophy and, with that, the problemof question-begging. See Anmerkung 1. Die Philosophie (GW7: 343347). For discussion, see my essay Kant,Hegel, and the Fate of the Intuitive Intellect, in: S. Sedgwick, ed., The System of Transcendental Idealism in Kant,Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel(forthcoming). (Sextus Dilemma is misprinted in HER, 14. If your or your librarys copy

lacks an erratum, please request one from the press.)20. Kant may not have stated this condition explicitly, but it is plainly an implication of his Refutation ofIdealism (Critique of Pure Reason, B274279) and so of his response to Hume.

21. Friederich Heinrich Jacobi, one of Hegels immediate predecessors, propounded a doctrine of immediateknowledge according to which there is no conceptual or inferential mediation in our knowledge. On his view,

prima facieknowledge claims count as knowledge, indeed, as the basic knowledge upon which any other knowledgedepends. Hegel points out that Jacobis view faces precisely thisamong many otherproblems (see Hegels

Enzyklopdie, 75). For discussion, see my Hegels Attitude Toward Jacobi in the Third Attitude of ThoughtToward Objectivity (The Southern Journal of Philosophy27 No. 1, 1989, 135156).

22. In the body of the Phenomenology Hegel specifies a form of consciousness principles by describing itscertainty. Part of Hegels point in labeling this pair of conceptions a certainty is to argue that certainty isnot an infallible, indubitable cognitive starting point, but rather is an end result of cognitive investigation, and a

corrigible one at that; the assurance of each form of consciousness that its principles are true is time and againundermined in the course of Hegels presentation.

23. Hegel indicates this in stating that the moments of truth present themselves, not as abstract, pure moments,but in the peculiar determinateness of being as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears inrelationship to them (G61.3336/H75/M56).

24. This claim may also seem to be a mere assertion about the structure of consciousness. However, Hegelrelinquishes responsibility for this claim by attributing it to common sense (see the next subsection) and byexamining a form of consciousness that adopts precisely this position, namely, sense certainty(G64.1522/M5866). Also see note 28.

25. Hegel argues for this important claim in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, Sense-certainty.

26. Michael Theunissen notes this in Begriff und Realitt (Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, R. P. Horstmann,

ed., Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1978; 32459), 330.27. This simple but significant fact was pointed out to me by Prof. Dr. H. F. Fulda.

28. From this being for another, however, we distinguish the being in itself; that which is related to knowledge isat the same time distinguished from it and is posited as existingoutside this relationship too. The side of this in-itself is truth (G 58.2931/H70/M52).

29. G58.2431/H70/M5253; G59.810/H71/M53; G59.2122/H71/M53; G59.2728/H72/M54;G59.3134/H72/M54; G59.3860.3/H72/M54.

30. The importance of Hegels distinction between dative and accusative cases has been insisted upon by MichaelTheunissen (Begriff und Realitt [op. cit.], 32630 and note 5) and by Kenley R. Dove (Phenomenology andSystematic Philosophy, in: M. Westphal, ed.; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982; 2740], 30).However, Dove does not notice that there are two different dative objects in Hegels analysis, he does not noticethe ambiguity of the phrase in itself, and he does not develop these distinctions into an analysis of the structure

of Hegels notion of a form of consciousness. (See the next note.) For sake of simplicity I have suppressed the


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second dative object here; it concerns how initially implicit conceptions become explicit for consciousness (seeHER, ch. 8).

31. This four-fold distinction of aspects of consciousness (and its subsequent elaboration below) has beendeveloped independently. However, the analysis I offer is similar to that offered by Michael Theunissen in thefirst section of Begriff und Realitt (op. cit.). He notes an ambiguity in Hegels use of Ansich and distinguishesbetween the object itself and the object for consciousness (326). Furthermore, Theunissen stresses Hegels pointthat the object is also an object to consciousness (327f.) and he emphasizes that according to Hegel consciousnessdeclares something from within itself as the in-itself or truth (330). Thus he notices each of the four aspects thatI have isolated and analyzed above, although he does not, in the confines of one short section of his essay,attempt to systematize them. Theunissen also does not analyze this declaration as the adoption of a conception,and he does not develop the double list of elements of knowledge that I present below.

32. Twice in the Introduction Hegel mentions that the fact that consciousness is reflexive, that it is self-aware,is important for his project: But since consciousness is for itself its own concept, it immediately transcends whatis limited, and, because this limitedness is its own, it transcends itse lf (G 57.2526/H69/M51); [C]onsciousnessis on the one hand consciousness of the object, on the other hand it is consciousness of itself ... (G59.3132/H72/M54). Cf. Philosophische Propdeutik, Bewutseinslehre fr die Mittelklasse (1809ff.), 1 (Werkein 20 Bnden[Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1968], Bd. IV, 111); trans. by A. V. Miller, The Philosohical Propaedeutic(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 55.

33. This is one point Hegel makes in claiming that consciousness is for itself its own concept (G57.2526/H69/M51).

34. See HER, chs. 69.

35. Ernst Tugendhat rejects the attempt to understand conscious or intentional relations with unclarifiednotions of positing and subject/object relations and he faults Hegel for doing so (Kehraus mit Hegel I,in Selbstbewutsein und Selbstbestimmung[Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979], 13. Vorlesung, 303). Tugendhat missesthe fact that Hegel agreeswith him on these points. What I have argued shows that Hegel does not leave thesenotions undeveloped and indeed that what Hegel presents when all is told covers what Tugendhat suggests as analternative (Kehraus mit Hegel II [ibid., 14. Vorlesung], 325)and then some!

36. Hegels criterial inference may suggest Donald Davidsons view of how coherence generates correspondencein A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, Kant oder Hegel?, D. Henrich, ed. [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984],

423438), except that Hegels project has both externalist elements (see note 38) and a meta-level, categorialconcern with the truth of theories of knowledge, neither of which play a role in Davidsons argument. Hegelscriterial inference is closer to Susan Haacks foundherentist view that joint experiential anchoring and coherentintegration within a comprehensive set of beliefs provides truth-conducive justification (Evidence and Inquiry;Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). Hegels criterial inference is designed to ratify (as Haack says) principles ofjustification as being truth-conducive. However, Hegel has higher aspirations for such ratification, in part becausehe thinks he can give an informative critique of all relevantly human kinds of theories of knowledge. (For a goodcritique of Davidson, see Haack, 6072.)

37. For example, our abilities to use tokens of demonstrative terms is directly related to our ability to applyconceptions of individuation, space, and time (this point is crucial to Hegels refutation of sense certainty); theoccurrant properties of things are directly related to their dispositional properties (this point is crucial to Hegelstransition from perception to force and understanding). See HER, ch. 11. I reconstruct Hegels critique of

concept-empiricism in Hegel, Hume und die Identitt wahrnehmbarer Dinge(Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1997); Isummarize Hegels critique in Hegel and Hume on Perception and Concept Empiricism,Journal of the Historyof Philosophy(forthcoming).

38. In this connection it is important to note that Hegels criterial inference rests on several logically contingentdoctrines. I have suppressed these tenets here in order to focus on the logic of his criterion. The further doctrinespresupposed by his criterion need onlybetrue in order for the criterion to work. If self-criticism is possible, then

we can ultimately determine whether these further doctrines are true . (In a word, this is how Hegel discharges hisinitial assumptions.) Among the doctrines presupposed by his criterion is that memory is generally reliable, thatthe K-K thesis (knowing that xentails knowing that one knows that x) is false, and most importantly , tha talthough there is no knowledge of objects without applying conceptions to them, our experience of those objectsneednt be restricted to just those features of an object captured by the content of ones general conception ofobjects, where that content would be parsed by a description. In the Introduction, Hegels recommendation forhis criterion is programatic: Accepting his criterion allows for the possibility of self-criticism and so for thepossibility of responding to Sextus; rejecting his criterion is to succumb to Sextus skepticism at the second level


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