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24.09 F11 24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI Kripke’s objection to the identity theory Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. 1

Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

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Page 1: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

24.09 Minds and Machines Fall 11 HASS-D CI

Kripke’s objection to the identity theory

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

1

Page 2: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

the necessity of identity

consider any object o

o is identical to itself

further, o couldn’t possibly have been identical to something else

in other words, necessarily o is identical to itself (in every possible world, o is identical to itself)*

do not confuse this thesis with the claim that names or other expressions in natural languages are ‘rigid designators’—the necessity of identity is not a thesis about language at all

24.09 F11

*don’t worry about worlds in which o does not exist

2

Page 3: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

rigid designators

take a term ‘T’ and imagine some possible world w

consider the questions: ‘who (or what) is T in w?’, and ‘who/what is T in the actual world?’ (or, simply, ‘who/what is T?’)

if, for every world w, these questions have the same answer—namely, ‘a certain object o’—then ‘T’ is rigid (is a rigid designator)*

if the questions can be read so that the answer to one is ‘a certain object o’, and the answer to the other is ‘a certain object o#’, and o ≠ o#, then ‘T’ is not rigid

24.09 F11*again, we are ignoring worlds in which o does not exist

3

Page 4: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

some possible worlds

@, the actual world

w1

w2A B

the husband of Trudie Styler

B

B

C

A

the lead vocalist of The Police

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

4

Page 5: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

who is Trudie’s husband in @?

@, the actual world24.09 F11

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

answer: B

the lead vocalist of The Police

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

5

Page 6: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

who is Trudie’s husband in w1?

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

answer: B

the lead vocalist of The Police

@, the actual world

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

6

Page 7: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

who is Trudie’s husband (the husband of Trudie) in w2?

answer: C (a person other than B)

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

the lead vocalist of The Police

@, the actual world24.09 F11

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

7

Page 8: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

so ‘the husband of Trudie Styler’ is not rigid

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

the lead vocalist of The Police

@, the actual world24.09 F11

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

8

Page 9: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

who is Gordon Sumner in @ (w1, w2,...)?

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

the lead vocalist of The Police

@, the actual world24.09 F11

answer: B (ditto w1, w2,...)

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

9

Page 10: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

so ‘Gordon Sumner’ is rigid

w1

w2A B

B

B

C

A

the lead vocalist of The Police

@, the actual world

the husband of Trudie Styler

Images by MIT OpenCourseWare.

10

Page 11: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

rigidity and necessity

‘the husband of Trudie Styler = the lead vocalist of The Police’ is contingent

that is, expresses a contingent proposition

‘the husband of Trudie Styler = Sting’ is contingent

‘Sting = Gordon Sumner’ is necessary

if ‘A’ and ‘B’ are rigid, then ‘A = B’ is, if true, necessarily true

11

Page 12: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

according to Kripke, these expressions are rigid

proper names like ‘Benjamin Franklin’, ‘Boston’, ‘Lady Gaga’

nouns for ‘natural kinds’, like ‘heat’, ‘tiger’, ‘water’, ‘H2O’, ‘c-fibers’ (and ‘the firing of c-fibers’)

nouns for sensations like ‘pain’

12

Page 13: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

an important consequence

theoretical identities like:

heat=molecular kinetic energy

water=H20

and:

pain=c-fibers firing

are, if true, necessarily true

Water Molecule

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

13

Page 14: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

argument D revisited

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible. (‘[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it’ (p. 16))

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that I am not my body (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am is not my body), therefore:

C. I am not my bodyremember we left

24.09 F11 this step unexplainedremember we left this step unexplained

14

Page 15: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

see Kripke, 329

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible. (‘[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it’ (p. 16))

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to B (where ‘B’ is a rigid designator of my body) is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that I am not B (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am is not B), therefore:

C. I am not B goes through because

15

‘B’ (and ‘I’) are rigid15

Page 16: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

heat is not mke?

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible.

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that there is heat without mke (or vice versa) is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that heat is not mke (there is a ‘possible world’ in which heat is not mke)

4. if it is true that heat = mke, it is necessarily true, hence:

C. heat ≠ mke

24.09 F11 16

Page 17: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

objection

(2) is false

what you are really imagining clearly and distinctly is a situation in which someone senses a phenomenon in the same way we sense heat, that is, feels it by means of its production of the sensation we call ‘the sensation of heat’, even though that phenomenon was not molecular motion…and that the person does not get the sensation of heat when in the presence of molecular motion (see Kripke, 331)

24.09 F11 17

Page 18: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

‘heat without mke’

absence of mke, felt as heat

this situation is possible

but: it’s not a situation in which there’s heat but no mke

it’s a situation in which there’s the sensation of heat but no mke

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

18

Page 19: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

24.09 F11

‘mke without heat’

mke, not felt as heat

this situation is possible

but: it’s not a situation in which there’s mke with no heat

it’s a situation in which there’s mke but no sensation of heat

19

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare. Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Page 20: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

argument D+

1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition p to be true, then p is possible.

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that there is pain without c-fibers firing (or vice versa) is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that pain is not c-fibers firing (there is a ‘possible world’ in which pain is not c-fibers firing)

4. if it is true that pain = c-fibers firing, it is necessarily true, hence:

C. pain ≠ c-fibers firing

24.09 F1120

Page 21: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

a similar reply to the heat argument?

I do not see that such a reply is possible

in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible is that molecular motion should have existed without being felt as heat

but, a situation in which c-fiber firing exists without being felt as pain is a situation in which it exists without there being any pain

(see Kripke, 331)

24.09 F11 21

Page 22: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

the disanalogy with heat

absence of c-fibers firing, felt as pain

c-fibers firing, but not felt as pain

i.e. pain!i.e. no pain!

A B

situations A and B are possible (apparently)

B is a situation in which there’s c-fiber firing but no sensation of pain

but: this is a situation in which there’s c-fiber firing 24.09 F11 without pain

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

22

Page 23: Kripke’s objection to the identity theory · in the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible

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24.09 Minds and MachinesFall 2011

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