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VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER "#$%&' () *++#& ,) -&./&$%&' 0((1 KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 Korea was not the largest, costliest or longest war Australia has fought , but it was among the hardest. It was a bitter war, in its ideological intensity and its extremes of terrain and weather. The war saw the loss of 339 Australian lives. It confirmed for Australia acknowledgement as a reliable ally, an opponent of aggression and a supporter of nations pledged to resist it. "#$%& '%()) "#$ %& $'( )*+, *+, -... /012 ",3456789*:6 #&;<=%&2 ",3456789*:6 > .? *&%&@A&# -..B -"./01 20. 3456758 C -&& 234 56 786& 9:;8%8/8<6 !"# %& #'( )*+, =>?

KOREAN WAR - Australian War Memorial Korean War.pdf · ISSUE # 2( JUNE 2003) KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY (Selected extract from the DVA Website 28 May 1998) 1950 25 June North Korean People's

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!!!VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER

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KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

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Korea was not the largest, costliest or longest war Australia has fought , but it was among the hardest. It

was a bitter war, in its ideological intensity and its extremes of terrain and weather. The war saw the loss of

339 Australian lives. It confirmed for Australia acknowledgement as a reliable ally, an opponent of

aggression and a supporter of nations pledged to resist it.

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BACKGROUNDER # 04!

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KOREAN WAR 1950-1953!

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In the aftermath of the Second World War (1939-1945), communities were still coming to!

terms with the devastation which that conflict had caused, and the millions it had killed. Yet!

only five years after the end of this war, another was to break out, and again Australia would!

commit its forces. It was the Korean War. Korea was a place that few Australians knew much!

about, until 1950. From 1950-53, 17,000 Australians in the Army, Navy and Air Force fought!

as part of the United Nations (UN) multinational force, defending South Korea from the!

Communist force of North Korea. After the war ended, Australians remained in Korea for!

four years as military observers. Since then, Australia has maintained a presence, discharged!

by the Australian Military Attache. Australia's involvement in the Korean War won much!

praise from other nations. Awards and decorations given to Australians during the war!

totalled 615, while awards given to Australians by other countries numbered 173. Australia!

also gained many political and security benefits, the most important being the signing of the!

ANZUS Treaty with the United States and New Zealand. The cost of the war in Korea was!

immense, particularly for its people. The attempt by the Communist North to unite Korea!

under its rule had been stopped, but it had killed more than two million people, and turned!

many Korean civilians into homeless refugees. Today, Korea is still divided into North and!

South.!

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)$*+$,-$.%/001%

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

BACKGROUNDER # 04!

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KOREAN WAR 1950-1953!%

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CONTENTS

SECTION 1 TIMELINE

SECTION 2 MAPS

SECTION 3 ORIGINS

SECTION 4 KAPYPOG AND MARYANG SAN

SECTION 5 THE HOOK

SECTION 6 TRENCH WARFARE ON THE JAMESTOWN LINE

SECTION 7 AIR WAR OVER KOREA

SECTION 8 KOREAN WAR AT SEA

SECTION 9 AUSTRALIAN NURSES IN THE KOREAN WAR

SECTION 10 AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

SECTION 11 DEMILITARISED ZONE

SECTION 12 “STATISTICS”

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 %

Section 1

TIMELINE

CONTENTS

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34.$56%75.%89.464:4;<=>?@7$-"A+$%/BC0DC0EF%

SOUTH KOREAN FLAG

The flag, called "Tae Kuk," symbolizes the thought, philosophy, and mysticism of the Far East.

The circle in the center, red upper half and blue lower half, represents absolute, or the essential unity of all being. The Yang

(positive) and the Yin (negative) divisions within the circle represent duality. Examples of duality are heaven and hell, fire and

water, life and death, good and evil, or night and day

The four trigrams also indicate the duality of opposites and balances. In the upper left trigram, three unbroken lines symbolize

Heaven; opposite them in the lower right, three broken lines represent Earth. In the upper right trigram, two broken lines separated

by an unbroken line is the symbol of Fire; opposite them is water, symbolized by two unbroken lines separated by a broken line.

)<,-4:AG%4H%+9$%65+A46%A"%+9$%I9A+$%-5GJ;.4#6K%(+9$%:56K2L%+9$%GA.G:$%(*$4*:$2L%56K%+9$%H4#.%+.A;.5,"%(+9$%;4M$.6,$6+2C%@::%+9.$$%

,5J$%#*%+9$%$""$6+A5:%$:$,$6+"%4H%+9$%65+A46

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

ISSUE # 2( JUNE 2003)

KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY

(Selected extract from the DVA Website 28 May 1998)

1950

25 June North Korean People's Army (NKPA) crosses the 38th parallel.

26 June Australian Government announces commitment of RAAF bomber squadron to Malaya.

29 June HMA Ships Shoalhaven and Bataan, at the disposal of the Security Council

2 July No. 77 Squadron, RAAF, flies first combat mission over Korea.

7 July General MacArthur is appointed Commander-in-Chief, UN Command.

17 September Australian Army advance party arrives in Korea.Second broadcast by Menzies in 'Defence Call to the Nation'

series.

27 September US Joint Chiefs of Staff authorise MacArthur to conduct operations north of 38th parallel.

28 September UN Command forces recapture Seoul. The 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) brought to full

strength by special enlistments from Australia, arrives at Pusan and joins the 27th Brigade.

2 October Chou En-lai warns Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, that if the Americans cross the 38th parallel China will

enter the war.

7 October UNGA resolves to authorise the UN Command forces to pursue the North Koreans across the 38th parallel and to

establish the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). American forward patrols

cross the 38th parallel.

14 October Nine Chinese armies, totalling over 300000 men, begin to cross the Yalu River.

29 October Australian battalion reaches Chongju, the most northerly point of its advance.

5 November MacArthur orders a heavy air offensive over North Korea, including the Yalu River bridges at Sinuiju. This

direction violates Joint Chiefs of Staff directive which forbade bombing within 8 kilometres of the Yalu River. Truman lifts

prohibition and attacks are made on 8 November.

26 November Over 200,000 Chinese attack the Eighth US Army north of the Chongchon River and inflict heavy casualties.

30 November Truman refers publicly to possible use of atomic bomb in Korea.

15 December UN Command forces withdraw south of 38th

1951

19 February Truman asks Australia to provide reinforcements for Korea.

2 March Menzies announces the Three Year Defence Program by which Australia is to prepare for world war by the end of 1953.

16 March US State Department renews pressure for increased Australian force commitments to Korea.

19 March Governor-General Sir William McKell grants a double dissolution of Parliament

11 April Truman relieves MacArthur and appoints Ridgway in his place.

23-24 April Battle of Kapyong, for which Australian battalion wins US Presidential Citation.

28 April Menzies Government returned to office in general election, with control of the Senate.

14 May Menzies informs Truman of Australia's limited defence resources and inability to provide more forces for Korea.

10 July Negotiations between UN Command and Communists begin at Kaesong.

28 July The 1st Commonwealth Division is formed.

23 August Communists suspend armistice negotiations.

1 September Signature of ANZUS Treaty at San Francisco.

8 September Signature of Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco.

5 October Lieutenant General W Bridgeford replaces Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson as Commander-in-Chief, BCOF,

Japan.Australian Government announces commitment of a second

battalion to Korea.

25 October After two weeks of discussion between liaison officers, truce talks resume at a new site, Panmunjom.

1952

3 April Second Australian battalion arrives in Korea.

28 April Entry into effect of Japanese Peace Treaty. After extensive diplomatic negotiations the BCOF becomes the British

Commonwealth Forces, Korea (BCFK).

29 April Entry into effect of ANZUS Treaty.

7 May Negotiations at Panmunjom deadlocked on prisoner repatriation issue

ISSUE # 2( JUNE 2003)

4 July No 78 Fighter Wing, RAAF, departs Australia aboard SS Asturius for Malta.

2-10 August First meeting of ANZUS Council, Honolulu.

4 November Eisenhower elected President of the US.

I953

2 February Eisenhower announces that US Seventh Fleet would no longer prevent Chiang Kai-shek's forces from attacking the

Chinese mainland.

5 March Stalin dies.

26 April Armistice negotiations resume at Panmunjom.

18 June Rhee releases 25,000 anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war.

13 July Final Communist offensive begins.

16 July UN Command counter-offensive begins.

19 July Negotiators at Panmunjom reach final agreement on all aspects of armistice.

27 July Armistice signed (10am) and comes into effect (10pm). Australia signs China-warning statement.

19-22 October Chiefs of Staff Conference, Melbourne, recommends formation of Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve in

Malaya.

1954

25 January-18 February Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, the USSR and the US meet February in Berlin and on 18 February

agree that a peace conference will be held at Geneva, commencing on 26 April, to settle the Korean and Indo-China conflicts.

26 April The Geneva conference begins.

15 June The allies announce failure of the Geneva conference to settle the Korean issue.

Roll of Honour

Dates for Korea

27 June 1950 - 27 July 1953

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 %

Section 2

MAPS

CONTENTS

%

34567.8#9:%

MAPS : THE COURSE OF THE WAR-OUTBREAK OF WAR

MAPS : THE COUSE OF THE WAR-STAGE ONE : 25 JUNE –1AUGUST 1950

MAPS : THE COURSE OF THE WAR-STAGE 2: 1 AUGUST 1950-25 NOVEMBER 1950

MAPS : THE COURSE OF THE WAR-STAGE 3: 25 NOVEMBER 1950-22 APRIL 1951

MAPS : THE COURSE OF THE WAR-STAGE 4:22 APRIL1951-27 JULY 1953

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Korea Exhibition Australian operations maps

Korea Exhibition Australian Operations Maps

| | | | home online exhibition about this site feedback further exploration

Korea Exhibition Australian operations maps

Korea Exhibition Australian Operations Maps

| | | | home online exhibition about this site feedback further exploration

Korea Exhibition Australian operations maps

Korea Exhibition Australian Operations Maps

| | | | home online exhibition about this site feedback further exploration

Korea Exhibition Australian operations maps

Korea Exhibition Australian Operations Maps

| | | | home online exhibition about this site feedback further exploration

Korea Exhibition Australian operations maps

Korea Exhibition Australian Operations Maps

| | | | home online exhibition about this site feedback further exploration

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 3

ORIGINS

Contents

Origins of War { AWM : Out in the Cold}

Australian Observers in KOREA{WARTIME Issue # 10} An Exemplary Career Cut Short- Lt Col C.H. Green (1919-1950){WARTIME Issue #12}

See also:

My Korean Adventure. Episodes from the memoirs of Snow Dicker {WARTIME # 9}

Korean War 1950-1953.AWM Encyclopedia

The Korean War 1950-1953-Pictorial Essay {WARTIME # 9}

A Military alliance at work ? Jeffery Grey AWM Journal # 9 October 1986

Words from the Front. Jim Clarke {WARTIME #19}

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

ORIGINS OF WAR { Reference: AWM Out in the Cold }

Korea In 1950 What events led to the Korean War and Australian involvement in this conflict?

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea and for the next 35 years ruled its colony harshly. During this time, various

groups in Korea sought support from external powers, including China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

After the defeat of the Japanese in the Second World War, in order to facilitate the disarming of Korea's

defeated Japanese rulers, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the peninsula into two zones of

control. The Americans controlled Korea south of the 38th parallel, the Soviets the area north of the parallel.

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

While agreeing in principle to the unification of Korea, either as an independent nation or under international

trusteeship, the two superpowers could not agree on how to bring this about. Each assisted the establishment of

a regime to its own liking in its part of the country - communist in the north, and non-communist in the south.

This artificial division of Korea became increasingly bitter. Between 1945-1950, tension between the two

governments of the North and South became more pronounced, and civil war seemed imminent.

Despite their apparent interest in the region, it is clear that both the US and USSR did not want a long-term

involvement in Korea, as postwar Europe was still their most important strategic concern. So what was to be

done to create an independent and unified Korea? The search for a solution was taken up by the United Nations

The United Nations and the outbreak of war

The United Nations (UN) was created in 1945 in an attempt to secure world peace. After the devastation of two

world wars, the major powers sought to prevent the outbreak of conflict by a system of mutual guarantees

between groups of nations. Australia was one of the founders and played a leading role on behalf of the smaller

member nations. Through its UN membership, Australia aimed to raise its profile in world affairs.

In November 1947, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to supervise

government elections in both North and South Korea, with a view to developing a single national government.

The commission soon found that the communist administration in the north would not allow it to operate there.

In August 1948, conservative political factions won the elections in the South, and the US-supported Syngmann

Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea. A month later, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

was proclaimed in the North, under the leadership of the Soviet-backed Kim Il-Sung.

A new permanent UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) was then established to help Korea move towards

unification, as well as to observe the activities of military forces on the peninsula. Australia was a member of

both commissions.

Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. "Doc" Evatt, urged the United States to maintain its forces in

South Korea, to ensure stability in the region. However, the United States wanted to reduce its overseas

commitments outside of Europe, and by the end of 1949, there were only 500 American troops left in Korea.

During 1949, the war of words between the two Koreas escalated, and infiltration and clashes along the border

increased. In March 1950, UNCOK requested additional military observers to monitor the situation.

The Peach-Rankin Report The first observers to arrive were two Australians who had both served during the Second World War: Major

Stuart Peach, who had been a Prisoner of War (POW) of the Japanese, and Squadron Leader Ronald Rankin,

who had served with the RAAF. Between 9 and 23 June 1950, Peach and Rankin undertook a patrol along the

length of the 38th parallel.

They reported that the South Korea forces along the border were "organised entirely for defence", and that there

were unusual levels of military activity in the North.

Another Australian, whose influence in the UN's role in Korea was equally important was James Plimsoll, an

Australian diplomat.

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

James Plimsoll and UNCURK

James Plimsoll had a significant influence during Australia's involvement in the Korean War.

Plimsoll was Australia's delegate to UNCURK (United Nations Committee for the Unification and

Rehabilitation of Korea), in which he played a leading role. UNCURK was formed in October 1950, in

anticipation of a swift conclusion of the war. By late November, when UNCURK had its first meeting in Seoul,

the Chinese had entered the war and it was clear their participation was going to prolong the conflict. The

commission realised that unification and rehabilitation would not be attainable.

Most UNCURK delegates recommended leaving Korea. Only Plimsoll argued to the contrary - that their high-

level civilian presence should remain. UNCURK did stay, evacuating to the southern port of Pusan, along with

the Republic of Korea (ROK) government. The commission played a valuable role over the next few years,

albeit a different one from what was originally intended. UNCURK was in constant touch with the ROK

government and UN Command; it reported to the UN in New York and also observed elections.

Plimsoll's most significant role was as a foreign adviser possessing considerable influence on President

Syngmann Rhee. He explained to Rhee the views of the UN, especially of the member nations contributing

forces to the war, and pointed out to Rhee his tendency to disregard norms of democracy and human rights.

Plimsoll returned to Canberra to take up a senior position. In February 1952, the US State Department officially

requested Australia send him back to Korea, as his participation had been greatly missed. Plimsoll returned and

was to stay there to the end of 1952, continuing to play a central role in the UN in Korea.

Plimsoll's subsequent career was distinguished: he took up a succession of senior appointments over the next 30

years. In addition to serving as Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in Canberra, he was Head of

Mission in several major diplomatic centres: not only at the UN in New York, but also representing Australia in

New Delhi, Washington, Moscow, Brussels, London and Tokyo. Sir James then served as Governor of

Tasmania, dying in office in 1987.

Outbreak of war In mid-1950, tensions along the Korean border increased to a breaking point. In the early hours of 25 June 1950,

the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. When the United Nations Security

Council met the next day to consider its response, Peach and Rankin's report was significant because it clearly

demonstrated that North Korea was the aggressor and that North Korean claims that it was responding to an

attack by South Korea were false.

The poorly equipped and inexperienced South Korean army was forced to retreat. Within a week, it had lost

about half its force.

“Ghostly figures, silhouetted against the sky, were darting furtively from tree to tree. For a long time we

watched the shadows flitting past. They were Southern soldiers in retreat.”

- Father Philip Crosbie, an Australian Catholic priest whose parish centred on Hongchon, east of Seoul, about

30 km from the 38th parallel. The North Koreans unjustly accused Crosbie of spying and took him prisioner of

war .

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

China enters the war October 1950

General Douglas MacArthur's overwhelming strength in late 1950 forced the North Koreans into full-scale

retreat across the 38th parallel. But instead of returning to the pre-war borders, the allies then set out to reunify

Korea under non-communist leadership.

This prospect greatly alarmed the Chinese. Towards the end of October 1950, as the allies approached the

border with China at the Yalu River, the Chinese launched their own massive and unforeseen counter-invasion,

sweeping the United Nations forces south beyond the 38th parallel. The tough and lightly equipped Chinese

soldiers were better adapted to fighting in the mountainous terrain of Korea than the more heavily burdened UN

troops, and their vast numbers allowed them to absorb heavy losses.

Although the Chinese travelled mostly on foot, which ought to have made movement of troops and equipment

difficult, their rapid advance forced the allies to consider abandoning Korea. However, by the time the Chinese

forces had pushed south of Seoul, their supply-lines were stretched and the situation stabilised. In the following

months, the UN forces were able to regain some of the ground lost; the front was re-established near the 38th

parallel and nicknamed "The MacArthur Line".

“Most of our weapons were old fashioned; we had no weapons such as aeroplanes, artillery, and tanks which are

indispensable in modern warfare. Instead we fought only with human wave tactics; great numbers of men have

been sacrificed. It was indescribably miserable.”

From an interview with a private from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, captured in March-April 1951.

China's involvement in Korea affected all three Australian services. The Chinese flew Soviet MiG-15 jet

fighters that significantly affected the power of the air force in Korea. When it became clear that the jets being

used by the RAAF - the Meteor Mark 8 - were inferior to MiGs, the air force was forced to undertake a ground-

attack role. Army troops were suddenly faced with huge numbers of Chinese infantry, and the RAN expanded

its operations to screen for the possibility of Soviet submarines supporting the Chinese.

The entry of China into the war raised several important issues - the expansion of the theatre of war, the

involvement of other forces, the possible use of nuclear weapons, and the fear that this war, until now contained

on the Korean peninsula, would extend into other countries.

Korea and the Cold War

The Cold War is the name given to the conflict that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union

after the Second World War. Simply put, the Cold War was a conflict of opposing ideologies - capitalism and

communism. Although there were no actual battles or physical conflicts, the fear and hostility it produced on

both sides made it a war as dangerous as any other.

The US/USSR antagonism began in postwar Europe, when the Soviet Union brought Eastern Europe under its

control and the United States exerted its influence in Western Europe. Germany had been divided into two

nations; the wall that separated its former capital Berlin, came to symbolise the mutual exclusion of the two

ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War; the breakdown of the Soviet

Union soon followed, in 1991. For more details see the list of significant Cold War events.

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

The fight over Korea in the 1950s was a turning point, when the ideological conflict extended beyond Europe

and broke out in open warfare. It transformed a civil conflict into an armed confrontation between the major

powers of the world.

K Force recruiting poster: "Wanted - More men like these" Australia commits to Korea

Korea's national conflict had rapidly become one of global significance.

Troops of many nations, including Australia, joined the fight against the

North Korean invasion of the South. There were many reasons for

Australia's involvement in Korea, such as concern for the security of the

region, and a desire to strengthen its military relationship with the US

with a commitment of troops. This relationship was to prove a far-

reaching one: it not only led to the ANZUS treaty, but influenced

Australia's later commitment of troops to the war in Vietnam.

The outbreak of war found Australia already involved in fighting a

communist insurgency in Malaya. Australia was the first country

following the US to commit units of all three services to Korea: a naval

frigate on 29 June, 77 Squadron, RAAF, on 30 June, and an infantry

battalion from the Australian component of the British Commonwealth

Occupation Forces in Japan (BCOF) on 26 July.

The commitment had broad support in Australia, with different groups

seeing it as an opportunity to fight communism, cement Australia's

alliance with the United States, or give support to the United Nations

system of collective security.

Recruitment

There were insufficient men in Australia's fledgling regular army to meet Australia's commitment to Korea.

Recruitment offices once again opened and were initially flooded with volunteers for Korea.

Many men joined who had been too young to serve in the Second World War; many others were veterans of

that war. Men volunteered out of patriotism, to fight communism, or for the opportunities of travel overseas and

a bit of adventure along the way.

ANZUS

ANZUS joined the nations of Australia, New Zealand and the United States in a defence security pact for the

Pacific region. Representatives of the governments of the three nations signed the agreement in Canberra on 1

September 1951.

Australia's involvement in the Korean War arose out of concern for the security of the region; the decision was

influenced by the perceived diplomatic and security benefits to be gained by an alliance with the US. The rapid

commitment of troops by Australia - independently of Great Britain - enhanced its standing as an ally.

From Australia and New Zealand's point of view at the time, ANZUS offered a protection against a possible

future threat of Soviet or Chinese aggression. For the US, ANZUS represented a secure stake in the Pacific, as it

sought to strengthen its alliances around the world, in its efforts to contain communist powers. ANZUS did not

guarantee military support from the US, but provided for consultation in the event of an attack on any of the

ISSUE #2 ( JUNE 2003)

three countries. The treaty was also significant in that Australia joined the US in a regional security alliance that

did not include its traditional ally, Britain.

In 1986, New Zealand banned the entry of US Navy ships into their ports in the belief that they were carrying

nuclear weapons or were nuclear-powered. The US responded by suspending relations with New Zealand as a

member of ANZUS. For Australia, this alliance with the US has continued to be a foundation of its defence

policy.

AWM 044320

Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, 1952. The first meeting of

ANZUS military representatives. Seated from the left:

Lieutenant General S.F. Rowell, Admiral A.W. Radford

and Major General W.G. Gentry.

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 4

KAPYONG and MARYANG SAN

Contents

Kapyong Diorama. Al Bridges. Guide Post 2009

Feeling like an ANZAC The BATTLE OF KAPYONG April 1951{WARTIME issue #9}

Presidential citation 3 RAR, 23 June 1951.AWM website October 2007

The battle for Maryang San.AWM website October 2007

See also:

Getting the Measure of KAPYONG. Nigel Steel (WARTIME #39}

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

Presidential citation 3 RAR, 23 June 1951 (345%6$-"7+$%89+:-$.%/00;2%

The 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, was awarded the United States Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation-Kapyong, Korea, 23-24 April 1951: Citation: HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY (KOREA) Office of the Commanding General APO 301 GENERAL ORDER number 453 23rd June 1951 Section 1 AWARD OF DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION BATTLE HONOURS-By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order 9396 (Sec I, WD Bul. 22, 1943) Superceding Executive Order 9075 (SecIII, WD Bul. 16, 1942) and pursuant to authority in AR 260-15, the following units are cited as public evidence of deserved honour and distinction. 3RD BATTALION, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT 2ND BATTALION, PRINCESS PATRICIA'S CANADIAN LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANY A, 72ND HEAVY TANK BATTALION (UNITED STATES) are cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of combat duties in action against the armed enemy near Kapyong, Korea, on the 24 and 25 April 1951. The enemy had broken through the main line of resistance and penetrated to the area north of Kapyong. The units listed above were deployed to stem the assault. The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, moved to the right flank of the sector and took up defensive positions north of the Pukham River. The 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, defended in the vicinity of Hill 677 on the left flank. Company A, 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion, supported all units to the full extent of its capacity and, in addition, kept the main roads open and assisted in evacuating the wounded. Troops from a retreating division passed through the sector which enabled enemy troops to infiltrate with the withdrawing forces. The enemy attacked savagely under the clangor of bugles and trumpets. The forward elements were completely surrounded going through the first day and into the second. Again and again the enemy threw waves of troops at the gallant defenders, and many times succeeded in penetrating the outer defences, but each time the courageous, indomitable, and determined soldiers repulsed the fanatical attacks. Ammunition ran low and there was no time for food. Critical supplies were dropped by air to the encircled troops, and they stood their ground in resolute defiance of the enemy. With serene and indefatigable persistence, the gallant soldiers held their defensive positions and took heavy tolls of the enemy. In some instances when the enemy penetrated the defences, the commanders directed friendly artillery fire on their own positions in repelling the thrusts. Toward the close of 25 April, the enemy break-through had been stopped. The seriousness of the break-through on the central front had been changed from defeat to victory by the gallant stand of these heroic and courageous soldiers. The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; and Company A, 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion, displayed such gallantry, determination, and espirit de corps in accomplishing their missions under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the campaign, and by their achievements they brought distinguished credit on themselves, their homelands, and all freedom-loving nations BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VAN FLEET: Leven C. Allen Major General US Army Chief of Staff

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

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Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 5

THE HOOK

Contents

The Hook - July 1953.Brad Manera {WARTIME #22}

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 6

TRENCH WARFARE

ON

THE JAMESTOWN LINE

Contents

Korea - Fighting Trenches . PJH Guide Post 2009

Samichon Valley 12-13 September 1952. Ron Mc Cridle. {WARTIME #37}

A sub-machine gun for the Collection. Brad Manera {WARTIME #37}

Captain Reg Saunders {AWM Encyclopedia June 2007}

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

TWO UNIDENTIFIED SOLDIERS AT WORK,

COMMUNICATING BY RADIO, IN THE FORWARD

CONTROL BUNKER. THERE ARE WS 62 AND WS 31,

WHICH ARE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF WORKING

FORWARD TO COMPANIES, MORTARS, MEDIUM

MACHINE GUNS (MMGS) AND OBSERVATION

POSTS (OPS). IN THIS BUNKER THERE ARE BUNKS

FOR SIX MEN, HEATING, VENTILATION AND

LIGHTING (FROM BATTERY OR PRESSURE

LAMPS).

KOREA - Fighting Bunkers

During the lengthy,two-year wait for an

armistice after Maryang San, Australian soldiers lived

and fought under conditions reminiscent of those on

the Western Front during World War I. The men lived

in trenches, which became infested with rats and

mice.

The trenches could be as little as 200 metres

apart or as far away as two kilometers, if separated by

a valley Overhead cover for earthworks was essential

and, although Australian fighting positions could have

two metres of earth and logs protecting them, the

Chinese had a reputation for burrowing deep into the

sides of hills.

The Official History of Australia in the

Korean War 1950-53 Volume II : Combat Operations

Appendix N provides the following description of the

Fighting Bunkers :

“ The fighting bunkers are solidly constructed with

approx. 6 feet of overhead cover to withstand heavy

bombardment; e.g. during the 'Battle of the HOOK' in

June '53, one particular bunker received 25 direct hits

from a 76 mm Chinese gun with nil damage.

When a bunker is to be constructed in view of

the enemy the following procedure took place. The

bunker would be sited by day. That night a sandbag

wall would be erected in front of the site, to conceal

any workers digging at the site. The next day or the

following day the hole would be dug, The day that the hole is dug, a prefabricated bunker would be

carried forward under cover of the trench, to a position close to the site. That night the bunker

would be erected and the wall removed.

The bunkers are prefabricated and once the hole is dug to the required depth (13' or over) it

can be erected overnight. The top of the overhead cover would he at ground level. The walls and

often the inside roof arc revetted with sheets of galvanised iron. Boxes are dug into the walls to

hold SAA and grenades. This is cleaned and oiled twice daily at the 'stand to' period and is

inspected once a day.

Quite often the fields or fire have to be dug and cleared manually.The size of the slit from

which the firer fires is approximately 4' X I'.

The entrance to these bunkers is by tunnel through the hill or by a short lead tunnel from the

main trench system. At the trench end of these lead tunnels a block is put across the main trench.

Behind these blocks one or two soldiers can sit and fire along the trench through a small slit

(approx. 2' X 3")' This block is protection against small arms fire. The block is there to safeguard

the soldiers in the bunker from the rear. The slit in front has sandbag curtains which are pulled

closed by day to allow observation without being seen. By night these are opened.

Drainage is a big problem. If drains are put in to allow the water to run away, it also becomes

a hole into which it is quite easy for the enemy to insert charges and destroy the bunker.

E.g. In the HOOK battles of Nov. '52 and June '53 the Chinese made use of the drainage

holes (and the chimneys of living quarters) to place their charges into and to drop grenades down.

The only method of drainage that was found practical in the bunkers themselves was to bail the

water out with bailing tins. “

PJH

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

ISSUE #1 ( JUNE 2003)

Captain Reg Saunders { AWM Encyclopedia}

“Reg Saunders was one of the best company commanders I had

served under and he was admired by the company as an excellent

leader.”

Private Joe Vezgoff

Many Aboriginal Australians have been a part of the Australian

armed forces since the Boer War. Although not permitted to

become Australian citizens until 1968, service in the armed

forces was one area where Aborigines experienced less

discrimination than in the wider Australian society. Captain Reg

Saunders, MBE, is perhaps Australia's best known Aboriginal

soldier, being the first indigenous Australian to be commissioned

as an officer into the Australian Army, in 1945. In Korea, he

served as Officer Commanding, C Company, 3 RAR.

“Saunders quickly established himself and won wide respect for his abilities as a platoon commander,

particularly for his determination when leading patrols far from the battalion's main position.”

Robert O'Neill, Official Historian of Australia in the Korean War

Reg Saunders was born in 1920, in Purnum, Victoria, near the Framlingham Aboriginal Reserve. He came

from a long line of soldiers. Both his father and his uncle served in the First World War. His uncle, Reg

Rawlings, for whom he was named, received a Military Medal for action at Morlancourt Ridge, France.

Rawlings was killed in action at Vauvillers, in 1918.

In the Second World War, Reg Saunders and his brother Harry both served in the army. Harry was killed in

action in New Guinea. Reg was shot in the knee in a separate action, but returned to the 2/7th Infantry

Battalion after his recovery.

When he joined up again for service in Korea, Reg led his company through fierce fighting, including the

battle at Kapyong in April 1951. He was the first Aboriginal serviceman to command a rifle company, and

was respected and popular with his men. His biographer and friend, Harry Gordon, an Australian journalist

in Korea, wrote of him:

“He was accepted unreservedly by the men who served with him because false values do not flourish among

front-line soldiers.”

Reg Saunders commented:

“The Americans had negro officers, but they handled negro troops. Sometimes it was suggested to me that

Australia should have its own Aboriginal battalion. I'm dead against the idea … it would mean a line of

demarcation - a separateness. They would be treated as something apart, and that would be bad.”

After service in Korea, Saunders remained in the regular army for a year before resigning his commission.

Returning to civilian life proved a difficult transition. Having been accustomed to leading others in difficult

and dangerous situations, and to being a respected and admired officer, when he returned to Australian

society he faced discrimination; his qualities as leader went unappreciated. After years of difficulty, he had a

successful career working for the Aboriginal Affairs Office and later at the Department of Aboriginal

Affairs. He died in 1990.

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 7

AIR WAR OVER KOREA

Contents

Meteors & MiG’s

Gloster Meteor F8,A77-368 “ Rosemary”.AWM Rocket Tour Noted & AWM website October 2007

INTERCEPTOR SWAN SONG: Meteors and MIG’s Over North Korea { WARTIME Issue #16}

Air commander( Dick Creswell ). John White {WARTIME #37)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

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ISSUE # 3(December 2007)

Gloster Meteor F.8, A77–368 ‘Rosemary’ {Reference: AWM Rocket Tour Notes and AWM website October 2007}

Manufacturer: Gloster Aircraft Co. Ltd, BritainTheatre of war: Second World War Europe;

Korean War

Wingspan: 11.33 m Length: 13.59 m Powerplant: 2 x Rolls Royce Derwent Mk 8 jet engines

Performance: Maximum speed 962 km/h, Range 1,200 km (with external fuel) Armament: 4 x

20 mm Mk V Hispano cannons and 8 x rocket projectiles

The Meteor first entered service at the end of the Second World War and in 1951 became the first

jet fighter to see operational service with the RAAF. Supplied to No. 77 Squadron RAAF for

service in Korea, the Meteors were outclassed by the MiG–15 aircraft operated by communist

forces in that conflict. A77–368 completed over 485 operational missions in Korea over the period

July 1951-August 1953 and is credited with damaging a MiG-15 while flown by Pilot Officer

Colebrooke, 3 November 1951.

Talking points:

• The Meteor is a Second World War design. It entered service with 616 Squadron (RAF) in

July 1944, and was used to chase German V1 flying bombs, scoring 13 victories. Those few

Meteors serving in Europe before the cessation of hostilities were temporarily painted gloss

white in order to avoid confusion with Luftwaffe Me262s. The implication of this is that by

the time of the Korean conflict, the Meteor was almost entirely obsolescent, in particular as a

result of its straight wing. The advantage the F.8 held over its predecessors was the ejection

seat. Prior to the installation of the ejection seat, only three successful emergency escapes

were made from the type.

• On 30 June 1950, Prime Minister Menzies ordered 77 Squadron from its base at Japan to

Korea, only five days after the invasion of South Korea. The unit was about to return to

Australia. 77 Squadron transferred to Korea with its piston-engines Mustangs, and retained

these for the first 10 months of the conflict. As the Meteors became available, 77 Squadron

moved back to Japan and converted to the new type before returning to Korea and serving for

the duration.

• After two large fights with Mig-15s, the Meteor proved unsuitable for modern air combat and

was turned over to the ground attack role. In this it was relatively successful, although the

large under-fuselage auxiliary fuel tank was vulnerable to ground fire.

• Sergeant R L Gilmore was Mentioned in Dispatches and flew 143 missions with 77 Squadron

of which 69 were flown A77-368. The citation specifically mentions a rocket strike on 15

June 1953 on Sunchon North Korea while flying A77-368. The aircraft was also flown

extensively by Pilot Officer R F Fox DFC USAM who completed 133 missions with 77 Sqn

of which 50 were in A77-368. A total of 104 pilots are known to have flown operationally in

this aircraft of whom 39 were decorated at the end of their tours.

• Pilot Officer M.E. Colebrooke flew 101 combat missions in Korea, and was awarded a

USAM and DFM for his efforts. He was posted missing, presumed killed, on 13 April 1952.

• The name of Sergeant Parker appears on the canopy rail. I.S. Parker (later Air Vice Marshal)

flew this aircraft in Korea in 1952. Perhaps he was the aircraft’s last pilot?

• In October 1954 77 Sqn ceased to be operational and A77-368 was returned to Australia

where it was subsequently transferred to 75 Sqn RAAF, Williamtown, New South Wales

ISSUE # 3(December 2007)

(NSW). In 1958 the aircraft was transferred to 22 Sqn RAAF, Richmond, NSW, and then in

1960 to Base Squadron, Fairbairn, Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The Australian War

Memorial acquired the aircraft on 22 September 1960. After a period of storage at Duntroon

the aircraft was dispatched to RAAF Wagga for restoration by RAAF trainees in 1981. The

aircraft arrived back in Canberra on 30 August 1983.

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 8

KOREAN WAR AT SEA

Contents

RAN IN THE KOREAN WAR{ Official RAN Website and other sources}

Korea - “Operation Han “. July - Sep 1951.PJH Guide Post 2009

HMAS Sydney and Sea Fury operations in the Korean War { WARTIME Issue #11}

Gun Battle on the Han. Lieutenant Commander W.O.C. Roberts DSC RANEM

See also:

The Finest ships in the Fleet .Colin Jones {WARTIME #25}

Firefly down! Peter Vickridge (WARTIME #17}

HEROES OF THE HAN {WARTIME Issue #19}

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

RAN IN THE KOREAN WAR

{Text by J.H. Straczek, Senior Naval Historical Officer from the Official RAN Website and photographs from sources various}

Background

Since 1910 Korea had been an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The people of Korea, however, sought

independence and many influential Koreans agitated for such overseas. Dreams of Korean independence

appeared to have become a reality when the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 made Korean

independence an Allied war aim. This declaration was followed by a decision, between the United States

and America, to divide Korea at the 38th parallel in order that the occupying Japanese could be disarmed.

The decision to divide Korea had one unforseen consequence. The northern half was ultimately closed and a

communist regime established under Kim Il-sung, whilst in the south United Nations sponsored elections

were held. The situation along the 38th parallel remained tense and finally on 25 June 1950 North Korea

invade the South. United Nations reaction to this invasion was swift and on 27 June the United Nations

requested assistance for South Korea.

Navy to Korea

On the 29 June the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies decided to place HMA Ships

SHOALHAVEN and BATAAN at the disposal of United Nations authorities in support of the Republic of

Korea. From this time onwards until the cessation of maritime operations on 27 July 1953, RAN units

played a major role in support of United Nations operations.

Predominantly RAN destroyers and frigates were involved in conducting blockade, escort and bombardment

duties on both sides of the Korean Peninsular.

Escort and blockade duties were generally tedious but none the less essential. The frigate SHOALHAVEN

served as on escort duties until relieved by HMAS WARRAMUNGA. On occasion, with ships carrying out

coastal blockade duties close to shore, enemy shore batteries would open fire. The first such exchange

involving an RAN ship occurred on 1 August 1950 when BATAAN was attacked by shore batteries whilst

patrolling the northern approaches to the Seoul R. BATAAN returned fire and silenced four of the enemy

guns. The cruiser HMS BELFAST soon joined BATAAN and both ships engaged the enemy. BATAAN

was straddled by enemy fire on a number of occasions during the duel.

Tribal Class Duties

On 29 August WARRAMUNGA provided escort support for the first non-American troops to arrive in

Korea. These British troops were landed at Pusan. WARRAMUNGA was also to act as part of the screen for

the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS TRIUMPH when she operated off the east coast near Wusan.

Both WARRAMUNGA and BATAAN were assigned to screening duties for the Allied landings at Inchon

on 15 September. At about this time it was also decided to extend the period of RAN ships to a year. This

was because the RAN was unable to provide relief ships. Five years after World War Two the RAN had

difficulty in sustaining two ships on war service. Both ships were to spend most of their service conducting

patrols and bombardments of enemy positions and facilities. They were operating near the Yalu River when

China intervened on the side of North Korea.

%

%

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

Modified Rivers Despatched

BATAAN was relieved by HMAS MURCHISON in June 1951. During her deployment MURCHISON was

to gain fame, and good fortune, during engagements with enemy shore batteries off the Han River. In

September/October 1951 whilst patrolling near the Han River MURCHISON was engaged by a mixed

group of enemy guns ranging from 75 mm to 50 mm and smaller. In the ensuing gun duel MURCHISON

returned fire with her main armament and 40 mm Bofors guns. Her intense and accurate fire quickly

silenced the enemy guns.

The next day, while patrolling the same area MURCHISON was again engaged by enemy shore batteries. In

this instant MURCHISON received a number of hits, fortunately there were no fatalities. With the arrival of

other ships the Communist batteries were quickly silenced.

Covered in ice, HMAS BATAAN north of the 38 th Parallel

Battle Class

By this stage WARRAMUNGA had been relieved by HMAS ANZAC. During her tour of duty ANZAC

was engaged in conducting the patrols as well as landing intelligence teams and some train hunting.

ANZAC's short deployment came to an end on 30 September 1951 when she escorted HMS GLORY to

Australia for a refit. ANZAC was replaced by HMAS TOBRUK.

Fleet Air Arm

In addition to the operations of the destroyers and frigates the aircraft carrier HMAS SYDNEY and

embarked squadrons were also deployed to the Korean theatre. Her first operations were on 4 October 1951

on the west coast. After transferring to the east coast she commenced operations against enemy troop

concentrations and suspected supply dumps. On 21 October SYDNEY's aircraft attack a large concentration

of junks preparing to launch an assault on Taehwa Do Island. Other operations included support for the

Commonwealth Division and search and rescue patrols.

SYDNEY's aircraft were generally engaged in operations against lines of communication, troop

concentrations and industrial infra-structure. Weather conditions were a major influence on operations at

this stage. During the middle of her deployment SYDNEY was operating off Korea in the northern winter at

time sub-zero temperatures were experienced. Such conditions limited flying operations.

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

SYDNEY's deployment to the Korean theatre resulted in the general introduction of fluorescent panels to

aid rescue aircraft. The system devised by CAPT Harries to aid rescue aircraft in locating downed crews

were so successful that it was recommended for general introduction.

Changes

After a stay of six months SYDNEY departed for Australia accompanied by TOBRUK. MURCHISON also

left the war zone, she had spent a total of 60 days in the Han River region. By this stage WARRAMUNGA

and BATAAN had returned to Korea. On 14 February BATAAN was hit by enemy coastal batteries but no

major was sustained. In March WARRAMUNGA was also the target of enemy shore based fire but was not

hit. Both ships continued to be engaged in patrol and bombardment work throughout this second

deployment.

In the second half of 1952 the ANZAC and HMAS CONDAMINE were deployed to the war zone. In

September and October CONDAMINE defeated an attempt by Communist forces to capture the Island of

Tok Som. Whilst ANZAC, like the hips she relieved, received the unwelcome attention of North Korean

shore batteries. By this stage the war on the peninsular had reached a stalemate and serious attempts were

being made to resolve the situation.

Ceasefire

However, it would not be until July 1953 that naval operations would be halted and by that stage two more

RAN ships had deployed to Korea. These were HMAS CULGOA and TOBRUK. During her deployment

CULGOA aided in the evacuation of Allied troops from Yong Mae do Island. The naval war off Korea

ended on the 27 July 1953. However, RAN units continued to serve in the area for some time to come in

support of the United Nations.

As well as conducting military operations in the Korean theatre of operations members of the RAN provided

assistance to the general populace. Throughout 1950/51 RAN ships regularly mercy runs to off shore islands

carrying rice and other food stuffs. HMAS CONDAMINE, in 1952, discovered about 100 orphaned Korean

children living with the locals on an island off the west coast. The ship's company provided these children

with warm clothing, fruit chocolate and meat. On a subsequent trip the ship delivered a large number of toys

purchased with money collected by the sailors.

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

Statistical data relating to RAN Korean Operations:

HMA Ships Deployed:

SYDNEY A/C 31 August 1951 - 22 February 1952

ANZAC D 6 August - 17 October 1951

6 September 1952 - 26 June 1953

BATAAN D 10 June 1950 - 6 June 1951

17 January - 25 September 1952

TOBRUK D 31 August 1951 - 23 February 1952

3 June 1953 - 12 February 1954

WARRAMUNGA D 14 August 1950 - 29 August 1951

17 January - 8 August 1952

CULGOA F 14 March - 26 June 1953

CONDAMINE F 4 July 1952 - 10 April 1953

MURCHISON F 9 May 1951 - 17 February 1952

SHOALHAVEN F 27 June - 22 September 1950

A/C = Aircraft Carrier

D = Destroyer

F = Frigate

RAN Squadrons Deployed (HMAS SYDNEY):

805 Squadron

808 Squadron

871 Squadron

Operational Sorties Flown: 2,366

Aircraft Lost: 11

Aircraft Damaged: 77

Number of Flying Days: 42.8

Daily Sortie Rate: 55.2

Ammunition Expended:

Squadrons:

Rockets 6,359

1000lb Bombs 18

500lb Bombs 784

20mm Cannon 269,249 rounds

Ships:

Ammunition 4.7" 4.5" 4" 40mm 2 pdr

ANZAC 3,291 15,027

BATAAN 3,462 549 8,891 3,240

TOBRUK 2,285 8,541

WARRAMUNGA6,053 9318 501 6,681

CONDAMINE 2,341 1,001

CULGOA 528 1,650

SHOALHAVEN 176

MURCHISON 5,634 6,630

Totals 9,515 5,576 9,983 50,417 9,921

Casualties:

Killed 1

Missing 2

Wounded 6

Total 9

KOREA -“Operation Han" - July-September 1951

For the Commonwealth ships, the most important consequence of the armistice negotiations that began on

10 July 1951 was Operation Han, a bombardment operation from the Han estuary into the southern part

of the Yonan Peninsula and the area as far east as Kaesong, near where the negotiations were being

conducted.

On 30 September, HMAS Murchison , under the command of Lieutenant Commander A. N. Dollard was

fired on her way up Sickle in the Han estuary and, after turning in Pall Mall passage, Dollard ordered a

bombardment as Murchison proceeded back along the channel. His fire was returned at once from the

shore. Several armour-piercing shells went straight through the ship's hull and a 75 millimetre shell

exploded in the engine-room. The decks were spattered by a hail of bullets 'and shrapnel, and another

shell went through the radar aerials.

As Murchison moved away down the channel the fire slackened, to Dollard's relief, just before a misty

rain squall forced him almost to a halt. The squall passed rapidly and Murchison proceeded further west,

coming under fire from a second group of guns only some 600 yards away. Their fire was returned to

considerable effect and Dollard claimed the destruction of several enemy gun

positions. Although Murchison had been holed by seven shells and scarred

extensively by bullets and shrapnel, she suffered only one man seriously wounded,

two lightly wounded and one Bofors gun put out of action.

The shell which struck the engine. room fortunately did no extensive damage. Had a steam line been

cut, Murchison, at full speed, would have lost one engine and run aground. It was also most fortunate

that Murchison's steering gear was not damaged or else she could have been stuck on the mud, to be

pounded to pieces by the guns on shore…{Official History Australia in the Korean War 1950-53}

SHELL FRAGMENT FROM A CHINESE 75MM PROJECTILE WHICH PENETRATED THE ENGINE

ROOM OF HMAS MURCHISON DURING AN ACTION ON THE 'PALL MALL' PASSAGE OF THE HAN RIVER ESTUARY,

KOREA, ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1951{The brass plate bears the inscription, 'Korean shell - exploded - engine room - HMAS

Murchison - 1950'. The date is incorrect as Murchison only served in Korea from March 1951}

!""#$%&'#()*+,-./012-#3#45#6&&7"#38#1"9":;"<#=44>####################################!"#$

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

!""#$%&%'%()$*+$,-$.%/0012

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Issue # 4 (September 2009)

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 9

AUSTRALIAN NURSES

IN

THE KOREN WAR

Contents

RAAF NURSES. AWM Out in the Cold 2007

Treating casualties of the Conflict -and the Cold. DVA Out in the Cold 2007

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

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!

ISSUE #1 ( December 2007)

Working conditions Australian medical personnel in Korea often worked in very primitive

conditions, where access to running water, electricity and medical equipment was extremely

difficult.

It was also difficult to see first-hand the effects of warfare on men. Dita McCarthy, an Australian

nurse in Kure, recalled one Australian nurse who was determined to continue her work in Korea,

even though her brother had recently been killed in action there.

There were also psychological casualties. Medical personnel were sometimes called upon to help

troops cope with the distress and trauma of what they faced.

Captain Don Beard, Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) of 3 RAR recalled:

“The diggers … wondered how long it would be before they might be replaced by the dwindling

number of replacements. I rapidly found that my role as the RMO was more important as a

counsellor than a dresser of wounds.”

Ill-health after the war was a constant reminder to some men of their time in Korea:

“The liver is never the same after a DDT bath. For all this the Digger received the basic soldier's

wage, a bottle of beer in reserve for which he paid, and a thankless return home.”

Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Colonel ) Maurie Pears, MC

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 10

AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Contents

Pte Horace William Madden GC

Pte T H J Hollis Identity Discs

Chinese uniform and cap worn by Pte G.Brown who was among the 1st POW’s released during

Operation Little Switch

7 ISSUE # 2 (July 2009)

MADDEN Horace William

(Posthumous Award) Rank/Title: Private, 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Date:24 April - 6 November 1951

YES AWM

(on loan)

(Korean

Gallery)

AWM ROH KOREA PANEL 1

Citation: Private Madden was captured by Chinese Communist Forces on 24 April 1951

near Milton. He was a signaller attached to Battalion headquarters at the time and

received concussion prior to being captured.

Private Madden was held prisoner by the enemy until about 6 November 1951, when he

died of malnutrition and the result of ill treatment. During this period he openly resisted all

enemy efforts to force him to collaborate, to such a degree that his name and example were

widely known through the various groups of prisoners. Testimonials have been provided by

officers and men from many units of the Commonwealth and Allied forces which showed

that the heroism he displayed was quite outstanding.

Despite repeated beatings and many forms of ill treatment inflicted because of his defiance

to his captors, Private Madden remained cheerful and optimistic. Although deprived of

food because of his behaviour, resulting in severe malnutrition, he was known to sheer his

meagre supplies, purchased from Koreans, with other prisoners who were sick.

It would have been apparent to Private Madden that to pursue this course must eventually

result in his death. This did not deter him, and for over six months, although becoming

progressively weaker, he remained undaunted in his resistance. He would in no way co-

operate with the enemy.

This gallant soldiers outstanding heroism was an inspiration to all his fellow prisoners.

(London Gazette: 30 December 1955.) MADDEN, HORACE WILLIAM ('SLIM') (1924-1951), soldier, was born on 14 February 1924 at Cronulla, Sydney, son of Australian-born parents Charles Bernard Madden, labourer, and his wife Pearl Ellen, née Clemson. Giving his occupation as fruiterer's assistant, Horace was mobilized in the Militia on 26 May 1942 and posted to the 114th Australian General Hospital, Goulburn. He transferred to the Australian Imperial Force in August 1943, and served in New Guinea with the 8th Field Ambulance and on Bougainville with the 5th Motor Ambulance Convoy Platoon. His next unit, the 253rd Supply Depot Platoon, was stationed on Morotai before being sent to Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. After his discharge in Sydney on 2 June 1947, Madden was employed as a male nurse at Morisset Mental Hospital for about two years and then as a moulder. On 19 August 1950 he enlisted for service in Korea with the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.

Joining 3RAR as a driver in November 1950, Madden volunteered to become a linesman in the Signals Platoon which worked in below-freezing temperatures to maintain communications with forward elements of the battalion. On the evening of 23 April 1951 the Chinese attacked 3RAR's positions near Kapyong. Concussed by enemy fire, Madden was surrounded on the following day and forced to surrender. Corporal Bob Parker and

8 ISSUE # 2 (July 2009)

Private Keith Gwyther were also captured during the battle. For the next few days the three of them were forced to recover wounded Chinese soldiers and were exposed to attacks by United Nations Command aircraft.

'Slim' Madden was 6 ft 0! ins (184 cm) tall and—as his nickname indicated—of slender build. Although suffering the effects of concussion, he recovered quickly and helped Australian and other U.N. prisoners of war on their arduous march to the notorious 'Bean Camp'. He showed defiance and refused to co-operate with the Chinese. They beat him repeatedly and subjected him to other forms of maltreatment, but he remained cheerful and optimistic. His health deteriorated, and his condition was exacerbated by his willingness to share the little food he had with men in a worse state than he. Madden was among the sick and wounded prisoners moved to 'the Caves' at Kangdong. In late October the Chinese forced them to march to Pingchong-Ni, a distance of some 140 miles (225 km). Madden collapsed and had to be transported by cart. Although he survived the journey, he died of malnutrition sometime between late November and early December 1951. After the Korean War had ended, his remains were reburied in the United Nations memorial cemetery, Pusan.

Gwyther said of him: 'Slim was a real hero—and didn't know it. He became a sort of legend. He didn't try to be like that—it was just the way he was made. Nothing could make him co-operate with the enemy'. In 1955 Madden was posthumously awarded the George Cross. Parker and Gwyther had made repeated attempts to escape before their release in August 1953; both of them were mentioned in dispatches. The courage shown by these three Australian soldiers in the face of terrible hardships and threats of death was sustained by their indomitable spirit.

Select Bibliography

A. Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (Lond, 1954); L. Wigmore (ed), They Dared

Mightily (Canb, 1963); P. J. Greville, 'The Australian Prisoners of War', in R. O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, vol 2 (Canb, 1985) and 'The Unfinished Story of Slim Madden, George Cross', Duty First, 2, no 2, Mar 1996. More on the resources

Author: P. J. Greville

Print Publication Details: P. J. Greville, 'Madden, Horace William (Slim) (1924 - 1951)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 15, Melbourne University Press, 2000, p. 280

Issue #4 ( September 2009)

PAIR OF IDENTITY DISCS : PRIVATE T H J

HOLLIS, 3 RAR

Identity discs worn by 2/400311 Private Thomas Henry John

Hollis, of 3RAR, while he was a prisoner of war of the North

Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War. The buttons on the

thong are from Hollis's service dress jacket. He cut them off and

kept them when he removed the uniform and sank it in the Yalu

River to deny its use by the North Koreans.

Hollis served in the Second World War with 2/11 Australian

Cavalry Commando Squadron and 66 Battalion, with the British

Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan, and with 3RAR in

Korea. He was captured in January 1951 and released on 9 August

1953.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION TAGS - "DOG TAGS"

The issue and wearing of non-destructive Personnel Identification Tags (PIT) by members of the

Australian Defence Force (ADF) is required by the Geneva Convention. They are important aids to

the rapid identification and treatment of casualties.

The term "dog tag" is the informal name for the PIT’s because of their resemblance to actual dog

tags. It is an American term which was never used by Australian soldiers, at least up to the Vietnam

war. They were sometimes sardonically called "dead meat tickets".

On the Western Front the “standard” became two fibreboard discs, one round and one octagonal.

The octagonal disc, sometimes coloured green, was to remain with the body of the soldier to aid in

identification should the body need to be exhumed. The circular disc, sometimes coloured red, was

used to identify the belongings of the soldier and be sent home. Folklore has it that these colourings

were to aid soldiers in remembering which tag went where: red meant blood and was to be taken,

since the soldier was dead; green meant grass and was to stay with the body.

Today PIT’s are issued to all personnel on joining the ADF. Army requires the tags to be worn at all

times by members: serving or warned for service; participating in or warned to participate in an

operation or exercise; whose duties require them to operate or travel regularly aboard Service

aircraft or vessels; and directed to do so by commanders for operational or training reasons. RAAF

instructions mirror the Army directions. Navy requires the tags to be worn by all seagoing

personnel and when ordered.

The Number 1 PIT (octagonal) is to be suspended around the neck by the longer chain of the

necklace PIT. The Number 2 PIT (circular) is to be suspended separately from the Number 1 PIT by

the shorter chain and is to hang below it.

In the event of death the Number 2 circular tag is removed from the body and the octagonal tag

should, given time, be placed inside the dead soldier’s mouth, between the teeth and lips.

PJH

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Section 11

DEMILITARISED ZONE

Contents

Korean Demilitarised Zone .Wikipedia September 2009

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

ISSUE #3(December 2007)

Korean Demilitarized Zone From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia -October 2007

Map of the Korean DMZ. The DMZ is given in red. The demarcation line runs in the middle of the

DMZ (black line).

The Korean Demilitarized Zone is a strip of land running across the Korean Peninsula that serves as a buffer zone between North and South Korea. The DMZ cuts the Korean

Peninsula roughly in half, crossing the 38th parallel on an angle, with the west end of the

DMZ lying south of the parallel and the east end lying north of it. It is 155 miles (248 km)

long and approximately 2.5 miles (4 km) wide, and is the most heavily armed border in

the world.[1][2]

History

Panmunjeom, the Joint Security Area in the DMZ. View from the north

ISSUE #3(December 2007)

Joint Security Area, view from the south (1)

Joint Security Area, view from the south (2)

The 38th parallel north — which cuts the Korean Peninsula roughly in half — was the

original boundary between the U.S.-controlled and Soviet-controlled areas of Korea at the end of World War II. Upon the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, it became a de facto international

border and one of the most tense fronts in the Cold War.

Both the North and the South remained heavily dependent on their sponsor states from

1948 through to the outbreak of the Korean War. The conflict, which claimed over three

million lives and divided the Korean Peninsula along ideological lines, commenced on

June 25, 1950, with a Soviet-sponsored DPRK invasion across the DMZ, and ended in

1953 after international intervention pushed the front of the war back to near the 38th

parallel. In the ceasefire of July 27, 1953, the DMZ was created as each side agreed in the

ISSUE #3(December 2007)

armistice to move their troops back 2,000 metres from the front line, creating a buffer

zone four kilometres wide. The Military Demarcation Line (MDL) goes down the center

of the DMZ and indicates exactly where the front was when the agreement was signed.

The armistice agreement was never followed by a peace treaty, and technically the two

Koreas are still at war.

Owing to this theoretical stalemate, and genuine hostility between the North and the

South, large numbers of troops are still stationed along both sides of the line, each side

guarding against potential aggression from the other side. The armistice agreement explains exactly how many military personnel and what kind of weapons are allowed in

the DMZ. Soldiers from both sides may patrol inside the DMZ, but they may not cross the

MDL.

Joint Security Area

Inside the DMZ, near the western coast of the peninsula, is a place called Panmunjeom,

home of the Joint Security Area; it is the only place where North and South connect.

There are several buildings on both the north and the south side of the MDL, and a few

which are built right on top of the MDL. The Joint Security Area is the location where all negotiations since 1953 have been held, including statements of Korean solidarity, which

have generally amounted to little except a slight decline of tensions. The MDL goes

through the conference rooms and down the middle of the conference tables where the

North Koreans and the United Nations Command (primarily South Koreans and

Americans) meet face to face.

Though generally calm, the DMZ has been the scene of much saber-rattling between the

two Koreas over the years. Several small skirmishes have occurred within the Joint

Security Area since 1953. The Axe Murder Incident in August 1976 involved the

attempted trimming of a poplar tree which resulted in two deaths and Operation Paul Bunyan. Before this time, the soldiers of both sides were permitted to go back and forth

across the MDL inside of the JSA, a privilege since revoked as a result of this incident.

Another incident occurred later when a Soviet dignitary, who was part of an official trip to

the JSA (hosted by the North), ran across the MDL yelling that he wanted to defect. North

Korean troops opened fire and chased him across the line. South Korean troops, protecting

the defector, fired back and eventually surrounded the North Koreans. One South Korean

soldier was killed in the incident. The defector expressed joy in his successful attempt but

was saddened by the loss of life. Since this incident, the North Korean soldiers face one

another so [citation needed] defectors cannot come upon them from behind. They are

ordered to shoot anyone who attempts to defect before they reach the line.

Incursion tunnels

Starting on November 15, 1974, the South discovered four tunnels leading under the

DMZ, by use of water-filled pipes dug vertically into the ground near areas of suspected

tunneling activity. The first of the tunnels is believed to be about 45 meters below surface,

with a total length of about 3.5 kilometers, penetrating over 1,000 meters into the DMZ.

When the first tunnel was discovered, it featured electric lines and lamps, and railways

and paths for vehicles. The second was discovered on March 19, 1975, and is of similar

length and between 50 and 160 meters below ground. The third tunnel was discovered on October 17, 1978. Like the previous two, the third tunnel was discovered following a tip

off from a North Korean defector. This tunnel is about 1,600 meters long and about 150

meters below ground. A fourth tunnel was discovered on March 3, 1990. It is almost

ISSUE #3(December 2007)

identical in structure to the second and the third tunnels.

The tunnels were dug by North Korea and are likely for use by the military as an invasion

route. The tunnels are each large enough to permit the passage of an entire division in one

hour. All the tunnels run in a north-south direction and do not branch off. The planning

for the tunnels got progressively more advanced (for example, the third tunnel slopes

upward slightly as it progresses southward, so that water does not stagnate). The

orientation of the blasting lines within each one indicate that North Korea dug the tunnels.

Upon their discovery, the North claimed that they were for coal mining; however, no coal can be found in the tunnels, which are dug through granite, but some of the tunnel walls

were at some point painted black to give the appearance of coal.

Today, it is possible to visit some of the tunnels as part of guided tours from the South.

Some of the famous tunnel tours include the Third Tunnel of Aggression which was

discovered in the 1970s.

Current status Apart from Panmunjom, the Joint Security Area and two model villages, the DMZ is

devoid of humans and their machinery, other than a large number of land mines. Both

Koreas deploy the majority of their military personnel and technology within 100 miles (160 km) of the Military Demarcation Line that runs through the middle of the DMZ. This

represents over one million troops on either side, plus large numbers of tanks, long-range

artillery, and armoured personnel carriers. The DMZ is in many ways the last front of the

Cold War.

Villages Within the DMZ there are two villages: one run by the North and the other by the South.

Daeseong-dong, found on the southern side of the DMZ, is a traditional village and

strictly controlled by the South Korean government. For instance, one must have ancestral

connections to the village in order to live there. These restrictions serve to keep the

population of the village very small. In the North, Gijeong-dong, or as it is called in North Korea, "Peace Village," has only a small caretaker population. Through the armistice

agreement the North felt that it should be allowed a town within the borders of the DMZ

since the South already had one. UN troops call this Propaganda Village because only a

small group of people cleaning and turning on lights reside within the village. Although

from afar it appears to be a modern village, one can tell with binoculars that there is no

glass within the windows of the buildings. In the past, North Korean propaganda was sent

out by loudspeaker across to Daeseong-dong for as much as 20 hours per day, and

reciprocal pop music and South Korean exhortations blasted back. These broadcasts

ceased by mutual agreement in 2004. During the 1980s, the South Korean government built a 98.4 metre (328 ft) tall flagpole in

Daeseong-dong. The North Korean government responded by building a taller one — the

tallest in the world at 160 metres (525 ft) in Gijeong-dong.[3]

ISSUE #3(December 2007)

Propaganda

The tallest flagpole in the world, in Kijong-dong.

The North Korean building facing South Korea in

the Joint Security Area is sometimes said not to be a

real building but, "a façade designed to look large

and impressive, in reality only a frame a few feet (1

m) thick."[citation needed] However, accounts from

tourists having visited the northern side of the JSA have revealed that it is in fact a real building.[4]

Propaganda in the North has stated that the U.S. and

South Korea have built a massive unclimbable wall

across the entire length of the DMZ (the Korean

wall). Upon the collapse of the Berlin Wall,

propagandists in the North seized upon its value and

proclaimed this huge system of fencing and tank

barriers to be a wall equivalent to the one in Berlin,

while failing to mention their version of the wall. The series of fencing, tank traps, and

landmines extends across the peninsula along both sides of the DMZ. Signs on the Northern side describe the ceasefire like this:

“It was here on July 27, 1953 that the American imperialists got down on their

knees before the heroic Chosun people to sign the ceasefire for the war they

had provoked June 25, 1950.”

Transportation Panmunjeom (RR)/P'anmunj!m (MR) is the site of the negotiations that ended the Korean

War and is the main centre of human activity in the DMZ. The village is located on the

main highway and railway line (called the Gyeongui Line before division and today in the South and the P'y!ngbu Line in the north) connecting Seoul and P'y!ngyang. The

highway is used on rare occasions to move people between the two countries, and to bring

supplies to South Korean factories located in North Korea (much like Checkpoint Charlie

in East and West Berlin), and the railway line is currently being reconnected as part of the

general thawing in the relations between North and South. A new road and rail connection

is also being built on the Donghae Bukbu (Tonghae Pukpu) Line.

Wildlife Except in the area around the truce village of Panmunjeom and more recently on the

Donghae Bukbu Line on the east coast, humans for the most part have not entered the DMZ in the last fifty years. This isolation has created as a byproduct one of the most well-

preserved pieces of temperate land in the world. Environmentalists hope that if

reunification occurs the former DMZ will become a wildlife refuge. However, there will

be significant obstacles to maintaining the site because of the high concentration of

landmines across the area.

Issue # 4 (September 2009)

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BACKGROUNDER # 04

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 %

Section 12

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ritish C

om

mo

nw

ealth

Killed

in ac

tion

1,2

63

Wo

un

ded

4,8

17

Oth

er UN

Allie

s Killed

in ac

tion

1,8

00

Wo

un

ded

7,0

00

Ch

ina an

d N

orth

Korea

(est.) Killed

in a

ction

50

0,0

00

+

Wo

un

ded

1,0

00

,00

0+

So

urce

: Air F

orc

e Mag

azin

e, Jun

e 20

00

4.U

.S. A

RM

Y B

AT

TL

E C

AS

UA

LT

IES

IN K

OR

EA

N W

AR

(a) To

tal C

asualties (b

) 10

9,9

58

To

tal D

eath

s(c) 27

,70

4 K

illed in

Actio

n 1

9,3

34

Wo

un

ded

in A

ction

79

,52

6 D

ied 1

,93

0 O

ther 7

7,5

96

Missin

g in

Actio

n 4

,44

2 D

ied 3

,77

8 R

eturn

ed 6

64

Cu

rrent M

issing

0 C

aptu

red o

r Intern

ed 6

,65

6

Died

2,6

62

Retu

rned

3,9

73

Refu

sed R

epatriatio

n 2

1 (a) T

enta

tive fin

al repo

rt inclu

din

g all rev

ision

s pro

cessed

thro

ug

h 3

0 S

eptemb

er 19

54

.(b) T

otal k

illed, w

ou

nd

ed, m

issing

and

captu

red a

s a resu

lt of en

emy

actio

n d

urin

g p

eriod

25

Jun

19

50-2

7 Ju

ly 1

95

3.(c) K

illed in

actio

n, d

ied o

f wo

un

ds an

d d

ied

wh

ile missin

g o

r captu

red

6.U

N K

illed an

d W

ou

nd

ed : 1

5,4

65

.

P

JH