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KnowingKnowledge:15thCenturyTibetMeets20thCenturyAmerica1
JayLGarfieldSmithCollege
HarvardDivinitySchoolCentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudies
UniversityofMelbourne
JanetGyatsohascontributedenormouslytoourunderstandingoftheemergenceand
natureofTibetanmodernity,callingourattentiontotheseedsofmodernthoughtin
classicalTibetanmetaphysics,literarypractice,andmedicine,aswellastotheimportant
interactionsbetweenTibetanandotherscholarsthathavesupportedthemodernizationof
Tibetanthought.ThisessayaddresseshowtounderstandTibetanmodernityinthedomain
ofepistemology.HasBuddhistTibetalwaysbeenmodern,invirtueofitscommitmentto
“innerscience,”astheDalaiLamaXIVsometimessuggests,orhasTibetonlyrecently
emergedintomodernityinvirtueofitsinteractionwiththeWestfollowingtheexileof
1959?TowhatdegreetoTibetanepistemologicalideasandtheirevolutionmaponto
Westernepistemologicalideasandtheirevolution?Iwillapproachthesequestionsina
roundaboutway,beginningwithsomegeneralreflectionsonepistemologyandthe
modern,takingadetourthroughaninstructiveepisodein20thcenturyAmerican
philosophy,andthenturningtothedebatebetweenGelukscholarsandtheirSakyaand
Kagyuinterlocutorsconcerningtheverypossibilityofmakingsenseoftshadma/pramāṇa
inthecontextofPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaasawayofunderstandingthebasisofcurrent
thinkingaboutscienceandknowledgeintheTibetanworld.
1.TwoApproachestoEpistemologyTheYakherds(2021)distinguishtwoapproachestoepistemologytakenbyIndianand
Tibetanphilosophersexploringtheideaofpramāṇa/tshadma,orepistemicwarrant.2The1ThisworkderivesfromacollaborativeprojectaddressingGeluk-Sakya/KagkupolemicsinspiredbyTaktsangLotsawa’scritiqueofTsongkhapa’sapproachtoPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaundertakenbytheYakherds,withthesupportoftheSingaporeMinistryofEducationandtheAustralianResearchCouncil.Ithankthesetwofundingagencies,aswellasYale-NUSCollege,theUniversityofTasmania,DeakinUniversity,SmithCollege,andtheCentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudiesforsupportingthisresearch.TheYakherdsareJoséCabezón,RyanConlon,ThomasDoctor,DouglasDuckworth,JedForman,myself,JohnPowers,GesheYeshesThabkhas,SonamTakchöe,andTashiTsering.ThankstoDanArnoldforcommentsonanearlierdraft.
2
firstiswhatwemightcalltranscendentalepistemology.Thisisthemostfrequentregisterof
epistemologicalreflection,bothintheIndo-TibetanworldandintheWest.Whenwe
pursueepistemologythisway,webeginbythinkinganalyticallyaboutthenatureof
justificationitself,bracketingactualhumanpractices,anddevelopapurelyprescriptive
accountofepistemicwarrantembodyingasetofstandardsthatmightormightnotbemet
byactualhumanpractice.Wemight,forinstance,determinethataclaimcanonlybe
warrantedifitislogicallyderivablefromclaimsthatarethemselvesreportsofourown
cognitivestates,orthataclaimiswarrantedifandonlyifitisdeliveredbyeitherthedirect
perceptionofparticularsorbyinferencefromsuchperceptualjudgments.Itmightthen
turnoutthatsomeornoneofwhatwetakeourselvestoknowisactuallyknown;butwe
wouldknowwhatitis,orwhatitwouldbetoknow.
Thesecondapproachtoepistemologyistheanthropologicalapproach.Onthis
approach,webeginnotwithanalyticalreflectiononthemeaningsofepistemicterms,but
ratherbyaskingwhatactualpeopledowhentheyclaimtobejustifyingstatements,or
whentheycertifystatementsbyothersaswarranted.Inthisapproachtoepistemology,
webracketquestionsaboutwhetherthosepracticesmeetsometranscendentalstandard,
anddevelopapurelydescriptiveaccountofactualepistemicpractices.Onthisapproach,
wetakewhatcountsasknowledgetobeasocialorinstitutionalaffair,likewhatcountsas
currencyorasalegalvote,andthenaskabouttheinstitutionalconditionsonbestowing
thathonorificonacognitiveorlinguisticepisode.Wemight,forinstance,discoverthat
thoseinsomecommunitycountasknowledgeonlythatwhichisendorsedbyscientists,or
thatanothercommunityincludesthedeliverancesofcertainoraclesasknowledge.Ifwe
takethisapproach,wetakeitforgrantedthatthereisknowledge,andaskonlywhatleads
ustoclassifysomestatementsunderthathead.3
2ThesetermsarevariouslytranslatedinEnglish.Populartranslationsincludevalidcognition,meansofknowledge,evidence,instrumentsofknowledge,epistemicinstruments,epistemicwarrant.Iwilluseepistemicwarrantwhenjustificationisatissue,andepistemicinstrumentswhenthemeansofacquiringknowledgeisatissue,followingtheuseoftheYakherds.3Compareanattitudetowardsbaptism.AtranscendentalistmightarguethatsincebaptismmustinvolvetheinvocationoftheHolySpirit,baptismispossibleif,andonlyif,theHolySpiritexistsandcanbeinvokedbyimmersioninwater.Otherwise,whatlookslikeabaptismritualisjustadunking.Ananthropologistwouldarguethatbaptismjustistheappropriatedunkingperformedusingthe
3
Therearebroadreasonsthatmightbeadducedforfavoringeachofthese
approachestoepistemology.Transcendentalepistemologycanbeunderstoodas
conceptualanalysis.Wehaveaconceptofknowledge—perhapscapturedroughlybythe
so-called“JTB+formula”ofjustifiedtruebeliefplussomeyet-to-be-specifiedGettier-
proofingcondition—anditisthejobofphilosophytorevealwhatiscontainedinthat
concept.Moreover,weshouldnotpresumeofanyconceptthatitisinfactsatisfiedbyany
instances,justasthegeometricdefinitionofacircledoesnotentailthatanyperfectcircles
haveeverbeendrawn.So,weshouldbeginbyunderstandingtheconceptitself,andthen
determinethedegreetowhichwemayormaynotsatisfyitinourepistemiclife.Moreover,
onemightargue,sinceknowledgeisanepistemicideal,asgoodnessis,forinstanceinthe
moraldomain,itisquiteappropriatetorepresentitassomethingthatnobodyever
achieves,butyetstandsasaregulativegoalinpractice.Onlyatranscendental
epistemologycanaccomplishthistask.
Ontheotherhand,onemightarguethatinasmuchasepistemicactivityishuman
activity—nodifferentfromspeakingalanguage,playingagame,ordiningwithfriendsin
thatrespect—anyepistemologyshouldcharacterizethatactivity.And,onemightpointout,
sinceknowingiseffectivelylikewinningtheepistemicgame,nottheachievementof
perfection,andsincewedooftenbothclaimtoknowandcreditotherswithknowledge,an
epistemologyshouldtellsusunderwhatcircumstancesweinfactdothat,andwhatthe
normsarethatgovernsuchattributions.Suchanepistemologycanonlybe
anthropological.
Thisisonlyapreliminarysketchofhowonemightmaptheconceptualterrain
definedbythisdebate.Wewillreturntothequestionoftheconsequencesofadoptingeach
ofthesestrategieslaterinthisdiscussion,firstbyexamininganinstanceofeachinrecent
Westernepistemology,andthenbyexamininganinstanceofeachinadebatewithorigins
in15thcenturyTibet.Thesecasestudieswillgiveusmorepurchaseonwhythisdebate
matters.TheywillalsoallowustoaskwhenTibetanepistemologyreallybecomesmodern.
appropriateritualbytheappropriateperson,thatis,thatsocialpractices,notspiritualevents,defineit.
4
Notethatthedistinctionbetweentranscendentalandanthropologicalepistemology
isdifferentfromthatbetweennaturalizedandnon-naturalepistemology,althoughtheyare
relatedtooneanother.Thatlatterdistinctionclassifiesapproachestoepistemologyby
askingwhetherornottheyaregroundedinfactsabouthumanpsychology.Anaturalized
epistemologyisonethattakespsychologyseriously,anddevelopsanaccountofepistemic
warrantthatisspecifictoknowerslikeus,takingintoconsiderationourpowersand
limitationsasknowers.So,forinstance,atranscendentaltheorythatarguesthatsinceeach
ofoursensefacultiesistunedtoaparticularkindofinformation,onlyvisioncanwarrant
colorjudgments,andonlyhearingjudgmentsaboutpitch,wouldstillbenaturalistic.
Anon-naturalepistemologyisonethatabstractsfromourpsychologicalpowersand
limitations,andproposesanaccountofknowledgeforknowersperse,whatevertheir
actualcapacitiesmightbe,basedonreflectionontheverynatureofjustificationandthe
relationofcognitiontoreality.Pursuingsuchanepistemologymightleadustodetermine
thatsome,orall,epistemicsubjectsareincapableofknowledge.Totheextentthatsuchan
epistemologyreveals,forinstance,thathumanbeingsareincapableofknowledge,itcan
leadtoaprofoundformofskepticism.ManyPyrrhonianarguments,suchastheargument
regardingthecriterion,orthetropesofAenesidemus,takeusinthisdirection.
Thesetwodistinctionsarenotthesame,eventhoughitisapparentthatthe
intuitionsthatdriveonetonaturalismmightalsodriveoneintheanthropological
direction,andthatnon-naturalismisalwaystranscendentalinform.Thisisbecausewecan
imaginetwoformsofnaturalizedepistemology.Epistemicnaturalistscouldarguethat
theirnaturalisticaccountofepistemologyshouldproposetranscendentalconditionson
knowledgeforknowerslikeus,takingintoaccountourownbiologicalandpsychological
constitutionandenvironment,butnonethelessestablishingstandardsthatreflectakindof
idealthatmayormaynotbesatisfied.Ortheycouldarguetheappropriateformof
naturalismisananthropologyofourlinguisticpractices.So,naturalismalonedoesnot
determinewhetheronesignsupfortheanthropologicalorthetranscendentalprogram.
Thereisnospace,however,forapositionthatissimultaneouslynon-naturaland
anthropological.Inwhatfollows,itisthedistinctionbetweentheanthropologicalandthe
transcendentalthatwilltakecenterstage.
5
2.ModernityandEpistemology:TheCentralityofScienceBeforewegetdowntocasesandenterthehistoryofphilosophytomakesomeofthese
abstractdistinctionsabitmoreconcrete,wemustaddressonemorebroadquestionabout
therelationofepistemologytomodernityandeventuallytopostmodernity.Doingsowill
helpustogetahandlebothontherespectsinwhichsomeTibetanandWesterndebates
aboutknowledgedifferfromoneanotherdespitedeephomologies,andontherespectsin
whichsomecurrentTibetanapproachestoknowledgemaylookmoreliketheirWestern
counterparts.ThiswillalsohelptousseewhatitisforTibetanepistemologytobecome
modern,orevenpostmodern.
Itiswidelyrecognizedthatamongtheimportantcharacteristicsofmodern
epistemologyasitemergesin17thand18thcenturyEurope(andforbetterorworse,thisis
atleastaparadigmcaseoftheapplicationofthetermmodern)arethese:(1)the
recognitionoftheindividualrationalsubjectastheknower;(2)therecognitionofthe
responsibilityofthatsubjecttocommonstandardsofrationalinquiryinordertocountasa
knower;(3)anunderstandingofthesubjectasimmediatelyawareofherowninnerstates,
providinganepistemicfoundationforaccesstotheexternalworld.Knowledgeofthe
externalworldisthenregardedasmediatedbyoursensoryandcognitivefaculties,
facultieswhichmaybefallible,andwhichmayinterposeakindofveilbetweenusandthe
externalworld.Thesearefeaturesofmodernapproachestoepistemologyregardlessof
whethertheyarerationalistorempiricist,foundationalistorcoherentist.4
Butasecond,andperhapsultimatelymoreimportantcharacteristicofEuropean
modernityinepistemologyderivesfromitsoriginsintheGalileoaffair.Thatisthe
installationofscienceastheparadigmofrationalinquiryandasthefinalarbiteroftruth
regardingthenatureofreality.Thisdisplacementoftradition,ofcollectivewisdom,andof
religiousauthorityiswhatenabledthefaithinprogress,inreason,andinthepowerofthe
individualsubjectoperatinginthepublicspherethatconstitutetheheartofthemodern
sensibility.
4SeeGarfield(1996)foramoredetailedexplorationofthesethemes.
6
Thisfaithinsciencehasseveralmomentousconsequencesforepistemologyasithas
beenunderstoodinEuropesincetheEnlightenment.Thefirstofthesehasbeenthe
introductionofadistinctionbetweenwhatSellarshasfamouslycalledthe“manifest”and
the“scientific”imagesof“manintheworld.”(1963a)Thatis,wedistinguishaworldasit
appearstousineverydayexperiencefromthatrevealedbyscientificinquiry,repletewith
unobservabletheoreticalentities,andwetakeitthatwhilebothimagesoftheworldare
accurate,thescientificimageiscapableofexplainingandevencorrectingthemanifest
image.Ithasakindofepistemicpriority,butonlyakind:whereasthescientificimagemay
haveepistemicprioritywithrespecttothefundamentalnatureofrealityandthecausal
principlesthatgovernphysicalprocesses,themanifestisthesourceofthenormsthat
governscientificinquiry,aswellasthehomeoftheobservationsthatvindicateits
discoveries.5Theimportantpointforourpurposesisthatscienceisnonethelessgranted
authorityoverthebasicstructureofreality,andourowneverydayexperienceanswertoit
inthatdomain.
Thisdichotomyleadstoasecond,surprising,andlittle-remarkedconsequence:a
subtlebutpervasivetransformationinourunderstandingoftruth.Truthandtrustare
cognatenotions.AndaprimarysenseoftruthinEnglishistrustworthy.Atruefriendisone
wecantrust;atruecoinisonewecanuse;tobetruetoapartneristorepayhertrust,etc…
Theapplicationofthetermtosentencesortobeliefswashomologous:atruestatement,or
atruebeliefisoneonwhichanagentcanrelyinreasoning,orasagroundforaction.Tosay
thatastatementistrueistocommitoneselftousingitasabasisforinvestigationorasa
reasonforaction.6
Theriseofscienceasthemeasureofrealityalteredthesemanticbalanceinour
understandingoftruth.Becausescienceisnowtakenasthearbiterofthereal,weendp
adoptingtheattitudethattherealisfullydeterminate,andindependentofourownviews
orknowledge,theattitudewenowcallscientificrealism.Andsincescienceisalsotakenas
thearbiteroftruth,truthcomestobeunderstoodasconnecteddirectlytothereality
5SeeGarfield(1988,2012)formorecompleteexplorationsofthisreciprocalrelation.6NotethatthisisconsistentwithmanyclassicalIndianaccountsoftruthasthatwhichenablesonetoachieveone’sends(puruṣārtha).IdevelopthisnotionfurtherinGarfield(2019).
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sciencedelivers.Itisnolongersimplythepropertyofbeingreliableinoureveryday
practices.Thisinturnintroducestheideathattruesentencesortruebeliefscorrespondto
reality,aviewwenowcallthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth,anotherhallmarkof
modernity.(Andnotethatnobodyhaseverproposedacontentfulaccountofjustinwhat
thatcorrespondencecouldconsist.)
Finally,themanifest-scientificdichotomy,withitsrecognitionofscienceasthe
measure(pramāṇa?)ofrealityleadsinevitablytoakindofreciprocitybetweenthe
manifestandscientificimagethatintroducesadeeptensioninmodernityitselfregarding
self-knowledge,atensionthatarguablycontainstheseedsofthepostmodernattitude.
Sinceourownbodiesandmindsarepresentin,andnotexternaltotherealworld,thefinal
storyabouthowtheyworkisthescientificstory,thestorytobetoldbybiology,
neuroscience,psychology,andeventhesocialsciences.Thatauthorityinturnreinscribes
themanifest-scientificdichotomyinthedomainoftheinner.Wenowmustdistinguishour
minds(andbodies)astheyappeartousfromourmindsandbodiesasscienceunderstands
them,andthisincludesoursensoryandcognitivefaculties,ourbasicmeansofaccesstothe
world(onceagain,pramāṇa).
Thefactofthisdichotomy,andthefactthatourintrospectiveawarenessof
ourselves,likeoureverydayawarenessofeverythingaroundusmeansthatwemust
jettisontheviewthatwehaveimmediateprivilegedaccesstoourowninnerstatesasthey
are.ThisisthefoundationofSellarsattackontheMythoftheGivenin“Empiricismandthe
PhilosophyofMind.”(1963b,henceforthEPM)Althoughthecommitmenttoindubitable
knowledgeofourownmindsasafoundationforpossiblyfallibleaccesstotheexternal
worldisacornerstoneofmodernity,wenowseethatthecommitmenttoscientiamensura
orscienceastheprinciplepramāṇaunderminesthatverycornerstone,atensionthat
issuesinthepostmodernrevolutioninepistemologyinitiatedbyQuineandSellars.7The
authorityofsciencemeansthatthenatureofourminds,ofoursensoryapparatus,andof
ouraccesstoanyobjectsofknowledgeisopaquetointrospection.Wearestrangersto
ourselves.7SeeGarfield(2018)foradetailedconsiderationoftheconnectionsbetweentheSellarsiancritiqueoftheMythoftheGivenandBuddhistepistemologyoftheinner.
8
Wecannowturntoanimportantcasestudyofadebatethatraisesthequestionof
transcendentalvsanthropologicalepistemologyinthecontextofthistransitionfromthe
moderntothepostmodernin20thcenturyepistemology.Thiswillconstitutealensthrough
whichtoexamineamucholderTibetandebateonthesameterrain,adebatewitha
differentrelationtothemodern.
3.RespondingtoCarnap:QuineandSellarsIntheAufbau(TheLogicalStructureoftheWorld1967)firstpublishedin1925,Carnap
(1891-1970)proposesanaccountofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldthattakesasits
foundations“thestreamofexperience,”towhichhealsorefersas“thegiven.”(102)He
emphasizesthathisgoalis“toconstructtheobjectivebystartingwiththestreamof
experience,”amethodhecharacterizesas“methodologicalsolipsism”or“autopsychology.”
(107)Thesetermsemphasizethefirst-person(singular)foundationofallknowledgeon
thismodel.Basicknowledgeisindependentofanyknowledgeoftheexternalworldorof
otherknowers.Theaccountiscomplex,butthedetailsneednotdetainus.Theideaisthis:
Wehaveimmediateknowledgeofthegiven,thestreamofexperience,orwhatwaslaterto
becalledbythelogicalpositivistssensedata.(Ayer1963)Thisknowledgeisachieved
simplyinvirtueoftheirimmediategivenness.
Conceptsandexternalobjectsarethen“logicalconstructions”outofactualor
counterfactualexperiencesorsensedata.Weformtheconceptofrednessonthebasisof
redsensedata;ofanappleasthatkindofthingwhichleadstoredsensedatawhenseenat
adistance,whiteonesandsweetoneswhenbitten;offruitaseitheranapple,anorange,
or…;etc…,logicallyconstructingboththeworldandtheconceptsadequatetoitina
foundationofimmediatelyknownsensation.Meaningisgroundedinreference:words
referultimatelytopatternsofactualorpossiblesenseexperience.So,onthis
understandingofthestructureofknowledge,knowledgehasafoundation;thatfoundation
isinindividualfirstpersonsenseexperience;themostbasicknownobjectsaresensations;
allotherobjectsandjudgmentsarelogicalconstructionstherefrom.
IintroducetheAufbauframeworknotforitsownsake,butbecauseIaminterested
inthetwomostprominentresponsestothisshort-lived(but,duringitsheyday,
overwhelminglypopular)proposal,aproposalthatthoseinBuddhistStudieswillnoteis
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intriguinglyakintoideasfloatedintheIndianBuddhistpramāṇavādatraditionofDigṅāga
andDharmakīrti.ThosearetheresponsesofthetwoAmericanphilosophersWVQuine
(1908-2000)andWilfridSellars(1912-1989),responsesthatechoinfascinatingways
thoseofTsongkhapaandTakstangtoDharmakīrti.SellarsandQuineareeachnaturalists
aboutepistemology,buttheirapproachesdiffersharply.WewillseethatQuine
presupposesatranscendentalunderstandingofepistemology,andthatSellarsadvocates
ananthropologicalaccount.Andthatdifferencegeneratesverydifferentattitudestowards
thepossibilityofknowledgeandofmeaning.
QuineandSellarseachseethatatleastonefundamentaldifficultyofCarnap’s
programliesinitsfoundationalism.Carnaprequiressensations,orbasicexperiences,tobe
nonconceptualandimmediateandatthesametimetoconstitutebothknowledgeand
semanticprimitivesservingasthefoundationsforboththeedificeofknowledgeandthe
edificeofmeaning.(Aswewillsee,SellarspointstoasecondfatalprobleminCarnap’s
program—itsmethodologicalsolipsism—butwewillgettothatinabit.).AlthoughIwant
tobeginwithQuine’sresponsetoCarnap,heagreeswithSellars’diagnosisoftheproblem
here,andgivenitsclarity,itisusefultotaketheSellarsiandiagnosticaccountasourbasis
here.
InEPM,Sellarspointstoaninconsistenttriadthatliesatthebaseofallsense-datum
theories,onethatwewillseeTsongkhapaanticipates.Sensedataaremeanttobegiven,
thatis,tobeimmediateandnonconceptual;allknowledgeisexpressibleinlanguage,and
thereforeconceptual;sensedataaremeanttoconstituteknowledge,indeedthemost
secureofallknowledge.SellarsandQuineeachconcludefromtheinconsistencyofthat
triadthatnothingcouldsatisfythedescriptionthatsensedataaremeanttosatisfy,and
indeedthatitmakesnosensetotalkaboutfoundationsofknowledge,althoughtheirroutes
tothisconclusionandthewaythedeployitgoingforwardaresomewhatdifferent.8
Thisargumentagainstthepossibilityofepistemicfoundations,whichrestsonthe
insightthatnothingcanbeimmediateandfoundationalandatthesametimelieinwhat
8ThereisinsufficientspacetogointothedetailsofthecomplexargumentofEPMhere.ButdeVriesandTriplett(2000)presentanexcellentoverview.
10
Sellarscalls“thespaceofreasons,”thatis,thedomainofjustificationthatconstitutes
knowledge,constitutestheheartoftheepistemologicalattackontheMythoftheGiven.But
thereisasemanticargumentaswell,whichwewillseeisalsorelevanttotheTibetan
debatestowhichwewillsoonturn.ItisimportanttoCarnapthatsensedataarenotonly
epistemicprimitives,knownimmediatelywithoutanyjustificationorconceptualization,
butthattheyarealsosemanticprimitives,thedenotationsofthemostbasictermsinour
language.
Carnaptakesthesetobeobservationterms,correspondingtoimmediatelygiven
sensoryqualities,whichmightberenderedaslooksgreen,looksred,soundslikeC#,etc…
Theseobservationterms,hesupposes,gettheirmeaningsdirectlybyreferringto
immediatesenseexperiences,or,wemightsay,bybeingconnectedaslabelsforthose
experiences.Morecomplexdescriptivepredicates,suchasisgreen,isred,isaC#,etc…are
thenlogicalconstructionsfromtheseprimitivelyreferentialterms,denotingtheproperties
oftendingtoproducetheexperiencesoflookinggreen,lookingred,soundinglikeC#,etc….
Andontotherestoflanguage.Onthisview—justasinthecaseoftheepistemicsideofthe
foundationalistprograminwhichallofknowledgeisgroundedinthesensorygiven—allof
meaningisgroundedintheimmediatereferentialrelationbetweenappearancetermsand
experiences.Thisentailsthattheconstitutionofmeaning,liketheconstitutionof
knowledge,issolipsisticinCarnap’ssense,thatis,thatasingleknowerorreportercouldbe
aknowerandalanguageuser.9
Thisviewalsoentailsthatappearancetalk—predicatesoftheformappearingtobe
F—islogicallyandsemanticallypriortodirectpredication—theuseofpredicatesofthe
formisF.SellarsputpaidtothisideaaswellinEMP,pointingoutthatonecanonlylearn
suchappearancepredicatesifonehasalreadymasteredthecorrespondingdescriptive
predicates,andthatmasteringthoserequiresbeingsocializedintolinguisticnormsand
practices,justaslearningtojustifyone’sclaimsrequiresbeingsocializedintoepistemic
9ItisnoteworthythatthisapproachtosemanticsisakintothatofWittgensteinintheTractatus,andisalsothetargetofthedecisiveattackonprivatelanguageinPhilosophicalInvestigations.IwillleaveasidethecomparisonofCandrakīrti’sandTsongkhapa’spositiononlanguageandmeaningtoWittgenstein’s.Buttherearerichparallelsthere,alsosuggestingapostmodernturninpremodernTibetanphilosophy.SeeThurman(1980).
11
normsandpractices.Thatis,onecannotknowwhatisforsomethingtolookredifonedoes
notalreadyknowwhatitisforsomethingtobered.Onecannotknowsomethingtobeared
sensedatumunlessonealreadyhastheconceptofrednessthatismeanttobederivedfrom
knowledgeofredsensedata.
SomuchforwhatwaswrongwiththeAufbauprogram.Letusnowturntothevery
differentconclusionsthatQuineandSellarsdrawfromitsfailure.Quine,asa
transcendentalist,acceptsCarnap’sclaimsthatmeaningdemandsprimitive,determinate
referentialcontactwithparticularmomentsofexperience,andthatanynormativelyrich
accountofknowledge—onethatgeneratesthepossibilityofepistemicobligation,criticism,
etc—demandsimmediatecontactwithrealitytogroundthosenorms.Heconcludesfrom
thisthatsincethereisnofundamentalmeaning-inducingrelationbetweenlanguageand
theworld,therecanbenosuchthingasmeaning,thattheveryideaoflinguisticmeaningis
incoherent.Healsoconcludesthatsincetherearenobasicepistemicrelationsbetween
mindsandtheworldthatcoulddeterminewhatoneoughttobelieve,thatnormative
epistemologyisimpossible.
Quine’sproposalinthisdomainistonaturalizeepistemologybymakingita
subdisciplineofpsychologyandthesocialsciences,thatis,byadoptingananthropological
approachtoepistemology,eschewinganynormativepretensions.Onhisview,wecanask
whatpeoplesayanddowhentheyclaimtopursueknowledge,butwecannotaskwhether
theyarerighttosayandtodothosethings;wecanaskabouttheregularitiesofusesof
words,andabouttheconditionsunderwhichpeopleapproveordisapproveoftheiruse,
butnotabouttheirmeanings.Thisiswhyheisbothanaturalistandatranscendentalist.10
SellarsdrawsverydifferentconclusionsfromtheincoherenceofCarnap’sprogram.
Heconcludesfromtheimpossibilityofprimitivesemanticandepistemicrelationsof
languageandthoughttotheworldthatneitherlanguagenorknowledgecanhaveany
foundations.ButconvertingQuine’smodustollensintoamodusponens,hearguesthat
neithermeaningnorknowledgerequirefoundations:meaningisconstitutedsimplyinthe
networkofpracticesthatconstitutelanguageuse,practicesthatthemselvesinducethe
10SeeQuine(1960,1981)forthedetailsofthearguments.
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normsthatgovernsyntax,semantics,andpragmatics;knowledgeisthatwhichisachieved
bytheappropriateuseofepistemicconventionsthatthemselvesarejustifiedbythe
knowledgetheyenable.Hethusarguesthatwecanmakeperfectsenseofthenormsthat
inducelinguisticmeaningaswellasthosethatgovernepistemicactivitybyattendingtothe
powerofconventionstoinducenormativity.Indeed,wecanseeSellars’focusonCarnap’s
solipsismasleadinghiminthisdirection.11
Sellarsarguesinsteadthatempiricalknowledgehasnofoundation(oras
Wittgensteinputsasimilarpointsoperfectly:“thefoundationsareheldupbythewallsof
thehouse.”[1972,¶248]).Webecomeknowers,onhisaccount,whenwecometo
participatecompetentlyinthecollectivesocialpracticeofjustificationandcriticism;
knowledgeisjustwhatweasacommunityofknowerstaketobejustifiedbyour
conventionsofjustification;noprimitiveworld-experiencerelationsareneededinorderto
constituteknowledge.Weuselanguagemeaningfully,onthisaccount,whenwecometo
participatecompetentlyincollectivesocialpracticeoflanguageuse;meaningisjusttheuse
thataword,oraphrasebythemembersofthecommunityoflanguageusers;noprimitive
semanticword-worldrelationsarenecessarytoconstitutemeaning.
Sellarsthusdoesnotdenythenormativitythatgovernsmeaningandjudgment.
Insteadheexplainsit.Heexplainsthatitderivesfromconvention,theonlypossiblesource
ofnormativity.SellarshencejoinsQuineinhisnaturalism;butunlikeQuinehisapproachto
epistemologyisnormative,notanthropological,simplybecausehebelievesthatwecan
naturalizenormativityitself.WhereasQuine’snaturalismleadshimtodenythatwecan
makeanysenseofthenormativitypresupposedbymeaningandknowledge,Sellars’
naturalismleadshimtoanexplanationofhowthatnormativityarisesinnature.
11ThispointalsoconnectsSellars’thoughttothatofHumeandWittgenstein,eachofwhomemphasizedconvention,orcustom,asthesourceofnormativity,aswellasthefactthatconventionsareungrounded,constitutedonlybytheimplicitagreementofthosewhoparticipateinthem,openingawideavenuetowardsthenaturalizationofmeaningandepistemology.SeeGarfield(2019)foradiscussionofhowthisworksinHume’sphilosophyandKripke(1982)foradiscussionofhowitworksinWittgenstein’sphilosophy.NotealsothatthisconnectionforcesonetotaketheEmpiricisminthetitleofEPMveryseriously.ManyreadthisessaysimplyasanattackonthelogicalempiricismofCarnapandhisfollowersinthesensedataindustry;butitisalsothedefenseofanolderformofempiricismfoundinHume.
13
4.RespondingtoDharmakīrti:TsongkhapaandTaktsangItishardtomisstheparallelsbetweenthePramaṇavādaaccountofknowledgeand
Carnap’s.DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti(henceforthIwillgenerallyonlyrefertoDharmakīrti,
asitwashewhowasinfluentialinTibet,notsomuchDigṅāga)alsotakeknowledgetohave
afoundationinimmediatesensoryexperience,orpratyakṣa,perceptionthatputsusin
directcontactwithsensibleparticulars(svalakṣana).Ontheiraccountaswell,the
macroscopicphenomenaweencounterindailylifearelogicalconstructsoutofthese
sensoryexperiences,knowninferentially(viaanumāna)throughtheengagementof
universals(samanyalakṣana).AndDharmakīrtialsotakessenseperceptiontobe
immediateandveridical,absentanyconceptualmediation,anddirectlypresentingsensory
experiencesastheyare.Thepossibilityoferrorinexperienceenterswithconceptual
thoughtandtheengagementwithunrealuniversals.Thefoundationalism,thecommitment
tothegiven,themethodologicalsolipsism,andthenonconceptualnatureofperceptionwe
encounteredinCarnap’sprogramareallpresagedinearlyIndianBuddhistepistemology.
ThesemanticsideofCarnap’sprogramalsohasantecedentsinBuddhist
Pramāṇavāda,althoughthehomologiesarenotsotightinthiscase.Thisisbecausethe
Pramāṅavādinsdidnotthinkthatthesenseexperiencesdeliveredbyperceptionare
expressibleatall.Theyarguethatlanguageandconceptualitygohandinhand,andthat
languagealwaysengageswithuniversals,nottheparticularsgiventousinperceptual
experience.Nonetheless,thereisanimportantpointofagreement:Carnap,aswehave
seen,thoughtthatourordinarylanguagedenotesthingsthatarelogicalconstructionsfrom
asensorygiven,andthatwordsgettheirmeaningthroughasemanticrelationtotheworld
mediatedinthefirstinstancebyreferencetothoseobjects,andinthefinalanalysisbythe
particularsintowhichthosemacroscopicobjectsresolveonanalysis.Theonlydifferenceis
thatwhereasCarnaptakesthemeaningsofordinarytermsthemselvestobeanalayzablein
termsoftermsdenotingexperiences,Dhamakīrti,becausehetakesthatmoreprimitive
denotationtobeimpossible,doesnotadoptthisanalyticsemanticfoundationalism.12
12Instead,followingageneralBuddhistsuspicionoftheadequacyoflanguagetotheworldinvirtueofthefalsifyingnatureofconceptuality,Dharmakīrticouldberegardedasakindofsemanticnihilist.Language,onhisview,appearstobemeaningfulandtodenoterealphenomena,butthatismereappearance;intheend,itismeaninglesschatter.
14
BecauseofhisenormousimpactonBuddhist(andforthatmatternon-Buddhist)
epistemologyinIndia,Dharmakīrti,andhiacommentatorsattractedagreatdealof
philosophicalattentioninTibet.Nonetheless,theywerenotwithoutrivals.His
MādhyamikacriticCandrakīrtihadaverydifferentepistemologicalperspective.
CandrakīrtiarguesinClearWords(Prasannapadā)againstlimitingthenumberof
pramāṇastotwo(addingatleasttestimony(śabda)andanalogy(upamāna)tothelist,
suggestingthatitisopen-ended.Healsorejectstheirfoundationalism,following
Nāgārjunaintakingthepramāṇastobevindicatedbytheobjectstheydeliver(prameyas)
andbyoneanotherinacoherentistepistemology.Inthesetworespects,wealsosee
CandrakīrtirejectingthemethodologicalsolipsismsharedbythePramāṅavādinsand
Carnap.
CandrakīrtialsodivergesfromthePramāṇavādatraditioninhisunderstandingof
linguisticmeaning.Inacarefulanalysisoftheideaofconvention(samvṛti/lokavyāvahāra)
hetakesmeaningtobeconstitutednotbydirectreferentialrelationstoextralinguistic
reality,butbyanetworkofcustomsfortheuseofwords.Thisidea,championedinthe20th
centuryinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesbyWittgensteinandSellars,notonlyrunscounter
totheDharmakīrti’sreductionism,butalsotohismethodologicalsolipsism.Foritforces
us,ifwewanttounderstandthecontentoflanguageandthought,tolooktothecommunity
oflanguageusersandthinkers,andnottotheindividualspeakerorsubject.
ThisisparticularlyimportantinthepresentcontextbecauseTsongkhapaandhis
followersintheGeluktradition,aswellasTaktsangandhisfollowersintheSakyaand
KagyutraditionsalltakethemselvestofollowCandrakīrtiandnotthePramāṅavādinsin
theirunderstandingofknowledgeandjustificationinthecontextofPrāsaṅgika
Madhyamaka.Butjusthowtheytakethemselvestodosoisamatterofcontention.They
eachrejecttheDharmakīrti’sfoundationalism,aswellashisindividualism.Butwhile
Tsongkhapaarguesthatthisisconsistentwitharobustnormativeepistemologyandthe
possibilityofexpressingatruePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaposition,Taktsangarguesthatat
mostitleavesuswithananthropologicalaccountofpeople’sdeludedepistemicpractices,
andreducesMadhyamakatoinexpressibility.WehenceseeTsongkhapaasfollowing
15
Sellars’approachtotheCarnapinhisresponsetoDigṅāga,andTakstangfollowingQuine’s
approachinhisverydifferentresponse.
LetusbeginwithTsongkhapa.IntheSpecialInsight(lhagtong)sectionofGreat
ExpositionoftheStagesofthePathtoEnlightenment(Lamrimchenmo,2004),Tsongkhapa
explainshowheinterpretsCandrakīrti’sexpositionofPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakaandhowhe
interpretsCandrakīrti’sepistemologyinthiscontext.Therearefourcentralissuestowhich
weneedtoattend:howhetakesCandrakīrti’saccountofpramāṇatodifferfromthatof
DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti;hisaccountofknowledgeasalwaysconceptual;his
understandingofconventionaltruthastruth;hisargumentthatthePrāsaṅgika
Madhyamakapositionmustbeexpressible.
TsongkhapanotesthataccordingtothoseinthePramāṇavādatradition,perception
isanepistemicwarrantbecauseitputsusindirect,conceptuallyunmediatedcausal
contactwithparticulars,whichitdeliverstoconsciousnessnondeceptively,thatis,witha
modeofappearancecongruentwiththeirmodeofexistence.Thisisbothwhyperception
canserveasafoundationforknowledge,andwhyperceptionisnondeceptive,hence
warranting.Itisfoundationalbecauseitdependsonnothingelse;itiswarrantingbecause
itisalwaysdirectandnondeceptive.Candrakīrti,ontheotherhand,heargues,follows
Nāgārjuna’saccountinReplytoObjections(Vigrahavyāvartanī),arguingthatthepramāṇas
andtheirprameyasaremutuallydependent,andthatthevariouspramāṇasalsoare
mutuallysupportive,likethesheavesinastack.13Welearntotrustourvisionwhenweare
toldthatitisgood;inferenceonlygivesusgeneralknowledgewhenwecandiscern
analogiesbetweencases,etc…TsongkhapaisclearintheSpecialInsight(lhagtong)section
ofGreatExpositionoftheStagesofthePathtoEnlightenment(Lamrimchenmo)thathe
sideswithCandrakīrti,notDharmakīrtiinhisunderstandingofepistemicwarrant.He
writes,“Astoassertionsaboutformsandsuch,wedonotholdthatvalidcognitiondoesnot
establishthem;validcognitiondoesestablishthem.”(2015,v.3,p.163)Andabitlater,
13OneshouldpointoutthatwhileCandrakīrtienumeratesfourpramāṇas,addingtestimony(śabda)andanalogy(upamāna)tothetworecognizedbyPramāṇavādins,withoutclosingthedoortoanyconventionalepistemicinstrumentorwarrant,TsongkhapadoesfollowDharmakīrtiinarguingthatallotherpramāṇasreducetoperceptionandinference.(SeeGarfield2015,c.7formoreonthisissue.)
16
…thelogiciansholdthataperceptionisaconsciousnessthatisfreefrom
conceptualityandisnon-mistaken…Thereforeitisinrelationtothe
intrinsiccharacterofthesefiveobjectsthattheyconsidersuch
perceptionstobevalid.
…Candrakīrtidoesnotacceptevenconventionallythaanythingexists
essentiallyorbywayofitsintrinsiccharacter….Thus,howcouldheaccept
thisclaimthatthesensoryconsciousnessesarevalidwithregardtothe
intrinsiccharacteroftheirobjects?(Ibid.,p.165)
Tsongkhapa’sstudentKhedrupje(1385-1438)putsthepointthisway:
Focusingonthevariousdesignationsofpersonsandphenomena—
labelingthisapot,andthatDevadatta—basedjustonthat,wecanengage
ineffectiveaction.Therefore,theseareconventionallynondeceptive.Butif
itwerefirstnecessarytoinitiallysearchforthereferentofthosenames,
nothingcouldbeaccomplished.(1972,171-172)
Andagain:
InthePrāsaṅgikasystem,onedetermineswhetherornotsomethingisa
mistakencognitionbasedonwhetherornotthereisanepistemicwarrant
thatcontradictshowitapprehendsitsobject,notonwhetherornotthe
conceivedobject(zhenyul)appearserroneously,oronwhetherornot
thereisanepistemicwarrantthatcontradictshowitappears.(Ibid.,458)
Thatis,onthisunderstanding,whatgeneratesepistemicwarrantisnotdirectcontactwith
thingsastheyare,butratheraroleinordinaryactivityandconfirmationbyotherwarrants
andtheyobjectstheydeliver.
Moreover,TsongkhapaandhisGelukfollowersargue,apramāṇamaybeveridical
ortrustworthywithrespecttoanobjectinsomerespects,butnotinothers.Perception,for
instance,maybeawarrantforthesize,shape,orlocationofanexternalobject,butmight
mistakenlydeliverittousasintrinsicallyreal.Thereisthusakindoffallibilismbuiltinto
Tsongkhapa’sunderstandingofepistemicwarrant.Hecashesthisoutbydistinguishing
17
betweenconventionalandultimatepramāṇas,andemphasizingthatconventional
pramāṇasarenondeceptivewithrespecttoconventionaltruth,invirtueofbeingconfirmed
by,andnotbeingunderminedby,otherconventionalpramāṇas,butarenonetheless
deceptivewithregardtoultimatetruth,adomainaccessibleonlybyultimatepramāṇas.
Wethusendupwithanepistemologygroundedininterdependenceandincollective
epistemicactivity.Warrantarisesnotfromdirect,nondeceptiveaccesstorealityasitis,but
fromparticipationinasetofconventionsthataremutuallysupportiveandthatconstitute
conventionaljustification.ThefirstPanchenLama,LosangChökyiGyaltsen(1570-1662)
explainsTsongkhapa’spositionasfollows:
Thevisualconsciousnessthatapprehendsmaterialformisepistemically
reliablewithregardto:(a)form,(b)theappearanceofform,and(c)the
appearanceofform’sexistingessentially;butitisnotepistemically
warrantinginregardto(d)form’sexistingessentially.Therefore,even
thoughanordinaryvisualconsciousnessapprehendingformisan
erroneousconsciousness,thisdoesnotcontradictitsbeingepistemically
warrantedinregardtoform.(Yakherds2020vol.2,pxxx)
GesheYeshesThabkhassummarizesthispointnicely:
Consideravisualcognitionapprehendingablazingobjectsuchasfire.The
visualcognitionapprehendingafireisanepistemicwarrantwithrespect
totheobject’sabilitytoproduceheatandburnthings;butthesamevisual
cognitionisnotanepistemicwarrantwithregardtotheobject’sobjective
existence,becausealthoughtheobjectappearstoexistobjectively,this
appearancedoesnotconstitutetheobject’smodeofexistence.Ifthe
blazingentitythatthecognitionapprehendsasafirecanproduceheatand
burnthings,thecognitionapprehendingthefireisnon-deceptivewith
respecttothefire.(Yakherds2020,pxxx).
Tsongkhapaalsorejectstheideathatknowledgecaneverbenonconceptual.Even
perceptualknowledge,heargues,mustbeassertableandcommunicable.Even
nonconceptualmeditativeequipoiseonlyyieldsactualknowledgeinthepostmeditative
18
statewhenitcanbeverbalized,whenitachievesastructurethatcanbeassessedastrueor
false,andvalidatedbyappealtoappropriatepramāṇas.Hewritesthatthepointofuniting
meditationandanalysisisto“experiencebothserenitywhichobservesanon-discursive
imageandinsightwhichobservesadiscursiveimage.”(2015,v.3,p.358)Ifthisisso,even
perceptualknowledgeisknowledgethat,andisthereforeconceptuallymediated.Ifso,
onceagain,therearenofoundationsforknowledge,andwhatvalidatesknowledgeisnot
directconnectionwithreality,butrathertheuseofconventionallyacceptedepistemic
practices,evenifthosepracticesarenotalwaysveridical.Tsongkhaparelieshereon
Candrakīrti’sanalysisinClearWords:
Sincecyclicexistenceisalsoaconcept(rtog),nirvanatoomustbea
concept,forthebothexistasmundanelinguisticconventions.…[Ultimate
truth]iscalledultimatetruthbymeansofmundanelinguisticconvention
becauseitsnatureisnottodeceivetheworld.[5cd,7b,translatedin
Yakherds2020,vol.1,ppxxx)
Thistakesusstraighttotheissueofthenatureofconventionaltruth.Candrakīrti
famouslynotesthatsamvṛticaneithermeanconventionalinallofitsfamiliarsenses,
indicatingbyagreement,ordinary,nominal,everyday,etc…orconcealing,obscuring.So,we
canglosssamvṛti-satyaaccuratelyeitherasconventionaltruthorasconcealingor
obscurationaltruth.One’sattitudetowardsthestatusofconventionaltruthdependsagood
dealonwhichofthesereadingsonetakestobeprimary.14Tsongkhapatakesthefirstroute,
emphasizingthattobeconventionallytrueisawayofbeingtrue,notashamthatconceals
thetruth.HeleanshardonNāgārjuna’sdoctrineoftwotruths,arguingthattherecanonly14DanArnoldobserves(forthcoming)“thedifferentlyvalencedsensesofthewordsamvṛtihereinplay–thesenseofthisas‘concealing’thenatureofrealityfromus,andthesenseofitasalsodenotingthe“customarytruth”thatisaconditionofthepossibilityofourknowinganythingatall–wouldbeintensiononlyifitisthoughtthatwhatordinaryexperienceconcealsissomethingreal.Ifwhatordinaryexperiencepreventsusfromseeingisthekindof‘intrinsicidentitythatisanexistent’,thenitwouldmakesensetosaythatconventionaltruthhas,relativetothat,abasicallydeficientstatus.Thereisnosuchproblem,however,ifitisrecognizedthatwhatisconcealedfromusisthe‘mereabsence’oftheexistentialstatushabituallyimputedtoentities–thattheradicalcontingencyofdependentlyoriginatedexistentstendstobehiddenfromviewdoesnotchangethefactthatitisonlybecauseallexistentsarecontingentthatthisobscurationcaninthefirstplacebeovercome.Tothatextent,itmakessensethattherealitythat‘conceals’itsowncontingencyisnonethelesstheonlyrealitythereis.
19
betwoofeachofthemisinfactakindoftruth.Andsincetruth,orreality,andvalidation
bypramāṇasarecoextensivetermsinthistradition,conventionaltruthisverymuchaway
ofbeingreal,awayofbeingtrue,ofbeingtrustworthy.ThisiswhyTsongkhapacanargue
thatthebasisofdivisionofthetwotruthsisobjectsofknowledge:conventionaland
ultimateareeachobjectsofknowledge,eachreal.Wethusseeatightconnectionbetween
normativityandreality:whatisrealiswhatiswarrantedbynormativepractices.15
AndthisbringsustotheissueoftheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka
position.Thequestiongainspoignancynotonlybecausethisisacentralboneof
contentionbetweenTsongkhapaandTaktsang,butalsobecauseoftheconsensusthat
emptiness,ortheultimatetruth,isanon-implicativenegation(meddgag)andNāgārjuna’s
insistenceinFundamentalVersesontheMiddleWay(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)that
emptinessisnotaview,(13.8)aswellashisclaiminRepliestoObjectionsnottoassertany
proposition.(29)TheseclaimscanbetakentosuggestthatifwereallytakeMadhyamaka
seriously,noclaimaboutultimatetruth,andsonocomprehensiveassertionofany
Madhyamakaposition,canmakeanysense,thatallwouldbeself-refuting.
Tsongkhaparepliestothissuggestionbyarguingthateventodenyaclaimisto
assertanegation;thatevenifemptinessisanon-implicativenegation,Mādhyamikasassert
thatallphenomenaareempty.Moreover,sinceNāgārjunaarguesfortheequivalenceof
emptinessandependentorigination,andsinceallMādhyamikasassertthatall
phenomena—includingemptiness—aredependentlyoriginated,wecancertainlysay
thingsbothabouttheconventionalandtheultimatetruth,andpositivelyaffirmthetruthof
thePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakavision.ThisisenabledbyCandrakīrti’sunderstandingof
meaningintermsoflinguisticuse.Evenifwesaythatlanguagedoesnotlatchdirectlyonto
theworldandconsideritonlytobeupāya,thefactthatitisupāyaconstitutesitsutilityas
language.Andifusecandeterminemeaning,thenevenintheabsenceofdirectword-world
referentiallinks,thereisnobartomeaning,eveninthecontextofPrāsaṅgikadialectic.
HereisthefirstPurbuchok,NgawangJampa,(1682-1762)defendingTsongkhapa’s
positionagainstTaktsang:15SeeCowherds(2010)foramoredetaileddiscussionofthesensesinwhichCandrakīrtiandTsongkhapatakeconventionaltruthtobebonafidetruth.
20
Again,youclaimthattheprincipleofdoublenegationelimination
(dgagpagnyiskyisrnalmagoba)—thefactthat,forexample,whatever
phenomenondoesnotexistmustbenonexistent—issomethingthatonly
thelowerphilosophicalschoolsaccept,whereastheGreatMadhyamaka
rejectstheviewthatallphenomenaareeitherexistentornonexistent.
Hence,youassertthatMādhyamikashavenothesesandnoclaims
whatsoever,fortohavethesesandclaimsistocommittoreificationor
nihilism.…
[This]isafallacythatcomesfromnotreadingReplytoObjectionsevenina
cursoryfashion,muchlessreadingNāgārjuna’sotherworkssuchasthose
in the collected hymns of praise and in the collection of analytical texts.
ReplytoObjectionssays:
Toopposeessencelessness
Istosupportessentialism.(26cd)
Therefore,consideryourtwotheses—that“therelativetruthisnot
epistemicallywarranted,”andthat“allphenomenaareneitherexistent,
nornonexistent.”ItwouldfollowthatitisafallacyforPrāsaṅgika
Mādhyamikastoacceptthesebecausetheyaretheses.Checkmate!
(Yakherds2020,pxxx)
So,oneachoftheseissues,Tsongkhapaandhisfollowershaveaclearpositive
position:wecanbewarrantedwithregardtotheconventionaleventhoughthereisno
foundationofempiricalknowledge;allknowledgeisconceptuallymediated;conventional
truthisakindoftruth;andthePrāsaṅgikaMadhyamakapositionisassertable.Wenow
turntoTaktsangandhisfollowers,who,wewillsee,willdisagreewitheachofthese
positions.
InthefifthchapterofFreedomfromExtremesAccomplishedthroughComprehensive
KnowledgeofPhilosophy(Grubmtha’kunshesnasmtha’‘bralsgrubpa),TaktsangLotsawa
adduceswhathecalls“the18greatcontradictionsinthethoughtofTsongkhapa.”
(Yakherds2020,vol.2)ThevastmajorityoftheseconcernwhatheseesasTsongkhapa’s
21
illegitimateimportationofthelanguageofpramāṇa,whichheseesasinextricablytiedto
Digṅāga’sandDharmakīrti’sproject,intoPrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka,aswellasTsongkhapa’s
insistenceontheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgikaposition.Hesummarizesthepointnicely
inthisversefromtheroottextofFreedomfromExtremes:
18. Thereasonforthisheavyburdenofcontradictions Istheirharpingonapurelymundaneandnonanalyticperspective Whileimposingrationality,theyanalyzeandjustify Becauseoftheirlogichabit.
The“logichabit”andtheanalysisandjustificationtowhichTaktsangobjectsistheuseof
theconventionalpramāṇasthattheGeluktraditiontakestobeessentialtotheprojectof
understandingthetwotruths,andtobecompletelyconsistentwithCandrakīrti’sproject.
Taktsang,ontheotherhand,takeseachofthesetobeinconsistentwithCandrakīrti’s
articulationofMadhyamaka.
WhiletherearemanywaystounderstandthedisputebetweenTsongkhapaand
Taktsangandtheextensivedebateitengendered,andagreatdealofnuanceinTakstang’s
ownarticulationofPrāsaṅgikaphilosophicalpractice(Yakherds2020,vol.1),muchofthis
isbesidethepresentpoint.Fornow,notethatwhenweseethisdisputeasframedby
distinctresponsestothePramāṇavādaproject,wewillseeTaktsangasplayingQuineto
Tsongkhapa’sSellars.LikeTsongkhapa,TaktsangtakesDharmakīrtiandhisfollowerstobe
committedtoafoundationalistunderstandingofwarrantandofmeaningandto
methodologicalsolipsism;likeTsongkhapa,herejectsbothoftheseideas.Butwhereas
Tsongkhapaarguesthatepistemicwarrantandmeaningcanbereconstructedthrougha
realisticaccountofnormativitygroundedinconvention,Taktsangarguesthatany
commitmenttowarrantortomeaningpresupposesthefoundationalist,solipsistic
frameworkinwhichtheyarearticulated,andhencethatneitherintheendmakesany
sense.
Forpresentpurposes,amongthemoreimportantofthecontradictionsTaktsang
adducesagainstTsongkhapaarethese:
Allobjectsbeingfalsecontradictstheirsubjectsbeingnon-deceptive
[13a]
22
Acceptinginferencecontradictsnotarticulatingprobative
arguments.[13c]
Thingsbeingtrueorfalsecontradictsnothingbeingcorrector
incorrect.[15b]
Thenonexistenceoffloatinghairscontradictstheexistenceofthe
riversofpus.[14c]
Refutingthefoundationconsciousness,reflexiveawarenessand
othersuchdoctrines…
Contradictstherecognitionofepistemicwarrantsinone’sown
framework.[17]
Letusspendamomentsimplyexplainingeachofthese,beforeturningtoTaktsang’s
diagnosisoftheircommonroot.Thefirstoftheseconcernsthetensionbetweenthe
assertionthatallconventionallyrealthingsareultimatelyfalse(rdzunpa)invirtueofthe
discordancebetweentheirmodeofexistence(conventionallyreal)andtheirmodeof
appearance(ultimatelyreal)ontheonehandandtheclaimthattheyarenondeceptive(mi
sluba)conventionally,invirtueofbeingascertainedbyconventionalepistemicwarrants.
Taktsangarguesthatthesamethingcannotbothbedeceptiveandnon-deceptive.
Thesecondinthissamplerconcernstheroleoflogicandreasonedargumentinthe
Prāsaṅgikaproject.TsongkhapaarguesthatPrāsaṅgikaisdistinguishedfromSvātantrika
inpartonthegroundsthatthelatterschooladmitstheuseofIndianprobativearguments
(prayoga)whosetermsareunderstoodincommonbybothdialecticalparties,whereasthe
former—whileitadmitstheuseofreasoning,includingbothreductioadabsurdum
(prāsaṅga)andargumentacceptableonlytothePrāsaṅgikaherselfinwhichthereisno
presuppositionthatanynon-Prāsaṅgikainterlocutorwouldusetermsinthesameway—
rejectstheuseofthoseprobativearguments.Taktsangarguesthatonceoneiscommitted
tothevalidityofinference,itisinconsistenttoadmitsomekindsofinferencewhile
rejectingothers.
23
Thethirdandfourthareeachconnectedtothefirst.Thethirdraisesavery
importantissuerelevanttotheresponsetofoundationalism:ifthereisnoabsolute
standardofcorrectnessorincorrectness—nofoundationforsuchjudgments—howcan
truthorfalsitymeananythingatall?Arethesejudgmentssimplymattersofsubjective
approvalordisapproval?Andthefourthintroducestheproblemofrelativism.Werea
humanbeingtoseefallinghairsinhervisualfield,shewouldbewrong;theywouldbean
illusioncausedbyeyedisease.Andifsheweretoseepusandbloodwherethereisreally
water,shewouldbeequallywrong.Butifapretaweretoseepusandbloodinthesame
location,hewouldbecorrect.Howisitthattheperceptionofwaterbyahumanbeing,and
thatofpusandbloodbyapretaarebothcorrect,whiletheperceptionofhairsbythepeson
withophthalmiaandtheperceptionoftheirabsencebyeveryoneelsearenot?Letusnow
turntothefourissuesweraisedabove,andseehowTaktsangdiffersfromTsongkhapaon
eachofthese.
First,thereistheissueoftherelationshipbetweenpramāṇaandfoundations.Aswe
sawabove,Tsongkhaparespondstotheincoherenceofepistemicfoundationalismby
reconstructingnormativityinacoherentist,conventionalistframework.Taktsangreacts
verydifferently,acceptingtheentailmentbetweenatrulynormativeaccountofwarrant
andfoundationstogroundthatwarrant,heusesmodustollenstoconcludefromthe
incoherenceoffoundationalismthatthereisnopossibilityofanormativeepistemology,
assertingthatwecanonlysayinaneveryday,non-analyticcontext,whatpeoplesayabout
justification,notwhatjustificationis.Hewrites:
Theymightreplythattheydonotacceptfoundations.Butnotbeing
foundational contradicts being epistemically warranted; for to be
epistemically warranted means to be nondeceptive, and being
nondeceptive means nothing more than being foundational.
(Yakherds2020,vol.2,p.xxx)
24
Thatis,headoptswhatwehavecalledananthropologicalaccountofwarrant,anaccount
thatpretendstonothingmorethanadescriptionofdeludedpractice.Whenwemovetoa
moresophisticatedcontext—thatofslightanalysis,inwhichweengagedinPrāsaṅgika
reflection,warranthasnoplaceatall.
Second,thereistheissueofthepossibilityofknowledgegiventhatconceptuality
alwaysissuesinsomekindoffalsification.WehaveseenthatTsongkhapaarguesthateven
ifwhenwecognizeanobjectweareincorrectinsomerespects,wecannonethelessbe
correctinothers,andthatsinceknowledgeisalwaysexpressibleinapropositionasserting
thatanobjecthassomeproperty,itisalwaysconceptual;nonetheless,assumingthatwe
followtheepistemicpracticesappropriatetotheconventionalworld,wecanhave
knowledgeofthatworld.Taktsangonceagaingoestheotherway.Since,heargues,
knowledgemustrelyoninfallibleepistemicfacultiesandsomustalwaysbenon-
conceptual,andsincethereisnosuchaccesstotheconventionalworld,therecanbeno
genuineknowledgeofconventionalreality.Thisisarticulatedinthefirstseveral
contradictionsheadducesagainstTsongkhapa.Here,forexample,isthefirst:
Allobjectsbeingfalsecontradictstheirsubjectsbeingnon-deceptive.
(13a)
Ouropponentsexplainthatunlessonerealizesthattheobjectisfalse,one
willfailtounderstandthemeaningofrelativetruth.Thisisexactlyright.
In the Prāsaṅgika’s own system, one indeed realizes that the relative is
false.Therefore,itiscontradictorytoholdontheonehandthatallrelative
objectsare falseandon theotherhandthat thecognitions thatare their
subjects can be nondeceptive and epistemically warranting.
(Yakherds2020,vol.2,pxxx)
ThisiscloselyrelatedtothethirdissuethatdividesTsongkhapaandTaktsangin
thisdomain:theverystatusofconventionaltruth.WehaveseenthatTsongkhapa,
emphasizingthatitisdeliveredbyconventionalpramāṇas,concludesthatconventional
truthisakindoftruth.Taktsang,ontheotherhand,rejectingthevalidityofany
conventionalpramāṇa,andfocusingontheconcealingnatureofconvention,andthe
25
deceptivecharacterofconventionaltruths,arguesthatitisnottruthatall,andhencethat
totalkaboutknowingitisutternonsense.Heasserts,forinstance,that“Thingsbeingtrue
orfalsecontradictsnothingbeingcorrectorincorrect,”(Yakherds2020,vol.2,p.xxx)
concludingthatsinceallconventionalthingsarefalse,therecanbenostandardof
correctnessintheconventionalworld.
WefinallyarriveatthequestionconcerningtheexpressibilityofthePrāsaṅgika
philosophicalapproach,andsoofthemeaningfulnessofanythingwemightsayabout
reality.Tsongkhapaurgesthatwemustbeabletosaywhatwemeanandtoendorsewhat
wesaywhendoingphilosophy,andthatthemeaningfulnessofthelanguageweusederives
fromtheconventionsthatgovernitsordinaryuse.Taktsang,ontheotherhand,arguesthat
sinceultimaterealitymustbeinexpressible,somustthePrāsaṅgikaposition;thatsince
therearenotruthmakersforourlanguage,andnoconnectionoflanguagetotheworld,itis
ultimatelymeaningless.Allwecandoistotalkaboutwhatpeoplesay;weneversee
throughlanguagetoreality,andwenevertakeourownutterancestobeactualassertions.
Taktsang’sdefenderthe9thKarmapaWangchukDorje(1556-1603)putsthepointthis
way:
In[thePrāsaṅgika]context,unlessapropositionisconsideredfrom
theperspectiveofothers,doublenegationelimination isneveraccepted.
Hence, to deny existence is not to accept nonexistence; to deny
nonexistence is not to accept existence. The law of the excludedmiddle
fails.
Somemight propose the following reductios: “Because others say
that there is aMadhyamakasystem, there is aMadhyamakasystem”;or,
“Because others say that there is karmic causality, there is karmic
causality.” Neither follows. There is no proof of karmic causality, even
thoughothersacceptit.Thisappearstobehowweshouldformulateour
response.
If we grant that karmic causality exists and is a valid principle
accordingtoothers,thenwemayalsosaythatkarmiccausalityaccording
toothersexistsandisavalidprinciple.Doesthekarmiccausalityknown
26
toothersexistornot?Weacceptneither.Doesthekarmiccausalityknown
toothersexistaccordingtoothers?Itdoes.Buttoparsethatproposition
tomeanthatitssubjectistakenas“thekarmiccausalityknowntoothers
accordingtoothers”amountstosophistry.(Yakherds2020,vol,2,p.xxx)
Ihopethatbynowtheextraordinaryparallelsbetweenthesetwophilosophical
debatesregardingtheproperresponsetofoundationalism—despitetheirseparationby
fivecenturiesandamassiveculturaldivide—areapparent.DigṅāgaandDharmakīrti—like
Carnap—proposeanepistemologygroundedindirectperceptualaccesstoparticulars,
individualisticincharacter,andonethatoffersasemantictheorygroundedindirect
referentialrelationsofsingulartermstoindependentlyrealobjects.Knowledgeand
meaningare,ineachcase,vindicatedbyfoundationalism;collectivepracticeisregardedas
thesumofindividualcompetenciesinthisdomain.
TaktsangandTsongkhapa,asQuineandSellarsweretodo,reactedagainstthis
foundationalism.AsQuineandSellarsweretodo,theyeachfocusedonthemerely
conventionalcharacteroflanguageandtheabsenceofanytranscendentontologythat
couldgroundknowledgeandmeaning.AndQuineandSellars,likeTaktsangand
Tsongkhapabeforethem,despitethisbroadagreement,disagreedvehementlyaboutwhat
thisentailed,aboutwhethermodusponensormodustollensrepresentedthecorrect
responsetothispredicament.TaktsangandQuinetookthenegativeroute,concedingthat
anyaccountofknowledgeandmeaningthatisgenuinelynormativemustbetranscendent,
andsorejectingthepossibilityofanormativeepistemologyandoflinguisticmeaning,
settlingforamerelyanthropologicalaccountofepistemicandlinguisticpractice.
TsongkhapaandSellarstookthepositiveroute,arguingthatconventioncould—andindeed
must—groundnormativity,andsoarguingforanaturalisticbutnormativeaccountof
knowledgeandofmeaningthatisconventionalandcoherentist,notfoundationalistin
character.So,whilethereisagreementamongtheprincipalsineachofthesedebatesthat
notranscendentaccountofnormativityispossible,thereissubstantialdisagreementabout
whetherthisdoomsthesearchfornormativitytoutcourt.
27
Reasonablepeoplecandisagreeaboutwhowinstheseparalleldebates.HereIoffer
somewordsindefenseoftheTsongkhapa/Sellarssideoftheargument.Firstofall,we
mustmakesenseoftherolethatnormativityplaysinourlives.Perhapsthemost
significantcharacteristicofoursharedhumanityisourdispositiontoinstitute,to
recognize,toenforce,andtoconformtorules.16Thisistruewhetherthosearerulesforthe
useofwordsthatmakelanguagepossible,rulesforinferencethatmakereasoningpossible,
rulesforconductthatenableustorespectmoralityandthelaw,orrulesoretiquetteand
religiousobservancethatbindusmoretightlyintothecommunitiesthatconstitutethese
rules.Thenormswelivebyarenotsuigeneris,andtheydonotcometousfromany
transcendentalsource.AsCandrakīrtiandHumeeachmakeclear,theyderivefromtheway
thatourbiologicalnatureworksitselfoutinthesocialcontextsforwhichweare
biologicallytuned.Nonetheless,rules,andthenormativitytheyrequireandinduce,are
real,asrealismoney,asrealasgovernments,asrealasthought,thatis,asrealasanything
weencounter.
Anyaccountofourlivesthatdeniestherealityofthenormsthatgovernsthem
thereforedeniesourveryhumanity.Moreover,anyaccountthatdeniestherealityof
meaningortheauthorityoftheargumentsthatestablishthataccountdeniesitsown
cogency.Andanyaccountofexpressibilitythatdeniesthatitisexpressibleisareductioon
itself.Forthesereasons,thepurelyanthropologicalaccountsofournormativelife,andof
languageandepistemologyinparticular,advancedbyTaktsangandQuine,appearsnot
simplywrong,butself-defeating.TsongkhapaandSellars,ontheotherhand,byaffirming
therealityandthebindingcharacterofhumannorms,whilegroundingtheminconvention
managebothtoavoidthefoundationalismthatistheirsharedtarget,togetherwiththe
essentialismthatitentails,whileembracingthenaturalismthatmotivatesit.Theydonot
eliminatenormativity,butshowhowtomakesenseofitasconventionallyreal.Wemight
initiallybalkattheideasthatconventionsthemselvesareonlyconventionallyreal;butthat
regressisvirtuous,notvicious,reflectingthegroundlessrealitythatMadhyamakaaffirms.
Forthesereasons,Tsongkhapa’sandSellars’versionofconventionalismandnaturalism
16SeetheessayscollectedinRoughleyandBayertz(2019)forarangeofdiscussionsoftheroleofnormativityinhumanlifeandofitsbiologicalandsocialbasis.
28
appearstobeamorecogentresponsetoDharmakīrtiandtoCarnapthanthatofTaktsang
andQuine.
5.TibetanModernityRevisited:theDalaiLamaXIVandModernScienceIhavebeenarguingthatthedebateinauguratedbyTaktsang’sattackonTsongkhapa
anticipatesthatbetweenSellarsandQuineinthe20thcentury.But,itisnowtimetoask,is
thisreallyanindicationofmodernityinTibetanphilosophyinthe15thcentury?WasTibet,
indeed,modernavantalettre?Ithinknot,andthereasonsforthisindicateatensionin
Tibetanmodernityeveninthepresent.
Modernity,asInotedabove,comestoEuropeandinfusesphilosophicalthoughtnot
simplythroughtheadvanceoftime,andnotevensimplythroughtheadvanceofideologies
suchasindividualism,rationalism,orsecularity,althoughthesearecriticalcomponentsof
themoderncomplex.Theothercriticalcomponent,Iemphasized,isthedeferenceto
scienceasthearbiterofthefundamentalnatureofreality,astheultimateepistemic
authority.WemightsayfairlythatEuropeanphilosophychosetobemodernwhen
philosopherssidedwithGalileoagainsttheChurchinthecontestforthatepistemic
authority.Therestfollowsfromthat.
ItisnoteworthythatCarnap,Quine,andSellars,despitetheenormousdifferencesin
philosophicaloutlookthatdividethem,sharethiscommitmenttoscientiamensura.Indeed,
eachgroundshisrespectivepositiononanaccountofwhatsciencedemandsordoesnot
demand.ThiscommitmentisnotablyabsentintheworkofDharmakīrti,Tsongkhapa,and
Taktsang.AndnotalkofBuddhist“innerscience,”ofthekindmadepopularbytheworkof
theDalaiLamaXIV(2006,2018)andotherssuchasAllanWallace(2009)canundermine
thisclaim.ForwhileitistruethatBuddhistmeditatorsandadeptsinTibetduringthat
perioddevelopedgreatphilosophicalinsightintothemind,itisnottruethattheydeployed
anythinglikethescientificmethodinthatendeavor.Therearenocontrolledexperiments;
thereisnothird-personstudyofthesephenomena,andnoscientificsuspicionofthe
veridicalityoffirst-personreport.Buddhistphilosophicalapproachestothemind—while
theydoembedadistinctionbetweenatheoreticalandanobservationlanguage,andwhile
theydoappealtotheoreticalentitiestoexplainobservations—donotsubjecttheirtheories
totheteststhatconstitutescience.
29
WecanfairlysaythatmodernityentersTibetanphilosophywiththepresentDalai
Lama’sengagementwithscience,andwithhisexplicitcommitmenttoscientiamensura.He
hasrepeatedlyassertedthatwheresciencecontradictsBuddhistdoctrine,sciencetrumps
Buddhism.Andhispersonalengagementwithandendorsementofsciencehaspercolated
deepintoTibetanacademicculture,asevidencednotonlybytheMindandLifedialogues,
butmoreimportantlybytherecentrevisionsinTibetanmonasticcurriculaspearheadedby
theScienceforMonksprogramjointlyadministeredbyEmoryUniversityandtheLibraryof
TibetanWorksandArchives.Tobesure,theheritageofphilosophicalreflectionhe
inherits,invirtuenotonlyofitssystematicrigor,butalsoinvirtueofitsrecognitionofthe
distinctionbetweenobservationandtheory,anditsattentiontotheimportant
epistemologicalissueswehavescouted,enablesthisventureintomodernity.But
philosophicalmodernityreallyonlyarriveswiththeseriousengagementwithsciencethat
wenowseeintheTibetancommunity.
ThisisnottosaythatTsongkhapaisnotanimportantprecursortothisdeveloping
modernity.Hiscommitmenttoreason,hisinsistenceonthefactthatknowledgeis
discursiveandconceptual,andthatwecanmakesenseoftruth,knowledge,andmeaningin
theordinaryconventionalworld,areallnecessaryingredientsofamodernoutlook,and
indeedarenecessaryprecursorstoscienceitself.Theymakepossibletheengagementwith
sciencethatistransformingTibetanapproachestounderstandingrealitytoday,andthat
usherinagenuineTibetanmodernity.
Butthismodernityisnotyetcomplete.Andparadoxically,itismuchoftherhetoric
about“innerscience”thatstandsinthewayofatruemodernity.Fortoomanyinvolvedin
therapprochementbetweentheTibetanBuddhistworldandthecontemporaryscientific
world—prominentlyincludingtheDalaiLamaXIV—persistintheideathatthemindis
directlyaccessibletoitselfinintrospection,andthevalorizationofwhathasbeencalleda
“firstperson”scienceofconsciousness.Todosoisnotonlyatoddswiththescientific
method,whichdemandsintersubjectivityandwhichtakesseriouslytheideathatall
observationismediatedbypotentialdistortion,butisalso,paradoxically,todisregardthe
adviceofTsongkhapa.FortodosoistosuccumbtotheMythoftheGiventhatheso
astutelyrejectedlongbeforeSellarsnamedit.Itistosuggestthatouraccesstoourinner
30
spaceisconceptuallyunmediated,direct,andpresentsthemindanditspsychological
processestoobservationastheyare,asopposedtoastheyappeartopotentiallyerroneous
introspectiveprocesses.
Toputthepointmostbluntly,ifourgoalistounderstandthenatureofthemind,we
mustpresupposethatwedonotyetdoso.Butifthemindistheveryinstrumentbymeans
ofwhichweinvestigatethemind,wemustconfessthatwehavenoideahowthat
instrumentworks,orhowveridicalitsoutputis:isitthemicroscopethatthosewho
valorizethisapproachclaimittobe,orisitthekaleidoscopeasanyoneconvincedofthe
pervasivenessofcognitiveillusionmustsuspectthatitis?Withoutansweringthis
question,wehavenoreasontobeatallconfidentaboutanyintrospectivemethodologyin
cognitivescience.ThisiswhytheideathatBuddhismhasincorporatedan“innerscience”
formillenniaissoflawed.Asystematicstudyoftheinnerisnotyetascienceoftheinner,
andthattransitionfromphilosophicalreflectiontoscientificstudyisonlyhappeninginthe
lastfewdecades.
PhilosophicalmodernityishenceaworkinprogressintheTibetanworld.Thatis
nottosaythatthereisnoprogress,onlythatmodernityisnotyetfullyhere.Butthe
modernitythatisarriving,wehaveseen,hasveryoldrootsindeed,andemergesinaform
notallthatdifferentfromthatithastakeninWesternphilosophy.
31
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