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Know Your Workplace Rights: A Guide for Charter School Employees
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Know Your
Workplace Rights
______________________________________
A GUIDE FOR CHARTER
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
______________________________________
By the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation
KNOW YOUR
WORKPLACE RIGHTS!
A Guide for Charter School Employees
by
National Right to Work
Legal Defense and Education
Foundation, Inc.
Copyright 2012
National Right to Work Legal Defense
and Education Foundation, Inc.
8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600
Springfield, VA 22160
(800) 336-3600
http://www.nrtw.org
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication in excess of fair use, 17
U.S.C. § 107, may be reproduced, stored in a re-
trieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, re-
cording, or otherwise—without the prior written
permission of the publisher. No copyright is
claimed in the text of statutes, regulations, and ex-
cerpts from court opinions quoted within this work.
i
WHAT THIS MANUAL COVERS
This manual discusses in general terms the rights of
charter school employees when there is a union pre-
sent, or attempting to gain a presence, at their
workplace. Its focus is to educate charter school
employees about their rights so they can make in-
formed decisions about union membership and rep-
resentation, and not become victims of compulsory
unionism abuses.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court
has set out specific rights for employees when they
face compulsory unionism. These rights find their
protection in the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Other employee rights in this
area may also be found in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (“NLRA”) and state statutes. For a sum-
mary of Supreme Court cases concerning these em-
ployee rights, see Appendix A, page 35.
The National Right to Work Legal Defense Founda-
tion has the single purpose of defending employees
against compulsory unionism abuses.
If, after reading this guide, you have questions
about your rights when there is a union present or
attempting to gain representation status with your
employer, you may contact the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation at (800) 336-3600
or [email protected]. You may also contact the Foun-
dation at http://www.nrtw.org/legal.htm.
ii
ABOUT THE RIGHT TO WORK
PRINCIPLE, THE FOUNDATION,
AND THIS MANUAL
The Right to Work principle—the guiding concept
of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foun-
dation—affirms the right of every American to
work for a living without being compelled to belong
to a union. Compulsory unionism in any form—
“union,” “closed,” or “agency” shop—is a contra-
diction of the Right to Work principle and the fun-
damental human right that the principle represents.
The National Right to Work Legal Defense Founda-
tion, established in 1968, is a nonprofit, charitable
organization. Its mission is to eliminate coercive
union power and compulsory unionism abuses
through strategic litigation, public information, and
education programs.
The Foundation’s legal aid program is designed to
fulfill two objectives: to enforce employees’ exist-
ing legal rights against forced unionism abuses and
to win new legal precedents expanding these rights
and protections. These objectives are fulfilled
through the litigation of cases involving: misuse of
forced union dues for political purposes; union co-
ercion violating employees’ constitutional and civil
rights; injustices of compulsory union “hiring
halls”; union violations of the merit principle in
public employment and academic freedom in educa-
tion; union violence against workers; injustices of
iii
union organizing; and violations of other existing
legal protections against union coercion.
All contributions to the National Right to Work Le-
gal Defense Foundation are tax deductible. Individ-
uals, corporations, companies, associations, and
foundations are eligible to support the work of the
Foundation through tax deductible gifts. In addition
to cash donations, the Foundation accepts contribu-
tions for gift annuities, bequests, stocks, bonds, ap-
preciated real estate, life insurance policies, and the
dividends paid on those policies.
This guide is intended to provide accurate and au-
thoritative information, at the time it is published,
for general educational purposes only and is not in-
tended to provide legal advice or services. Facts and
legal principles applicable to specific situations may
vary. Any person with a legal problem should con-
sult competent legal counsel and should not rely on
this guide in making any legal decisions.
iv
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
What This Manual Covers i
About the Right to Work Principle,
the Foundation, and This Manual ii
An Introduction to Charter School
Employee Rights When There Is a
Union In, or Trying to Get Into,
Your Charter School Workplace 1
Charter School Employee Rights
in Three Minutes 5
What Are My Rights if the Union Is
Conducting a “Card Check” or
Organizing Drive at My Charter
School Workplace? 8
If There Is a Union in My Charter
School Workplace, Can I Be Required
to Be a Union Member or Pay Dues to
a Union? 12
When Can I Resign My Union
Membership? 15
How Do I Cut Off the Use of My Dues
for Politics and Other Non-bargaining
Activities if I Am Forced to Pay Fees to
a Union? 18
What if I Want to Work During a Strike? 20
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
What if I Am a Victim of
Union Violence? 28
What Is a Decertification Election? 28
What if I Have a Religious
Objection to Joining or Financially
Supporting a Union? 32
If I Believe My Rights Have Been
Violated by Compulsory Unionism
Abuses, Can I File My Own Unfair
Labor Practice Charges Against the
Union or Employer with the NLRB
or a State Agency? 33
Appendix A: A Brief Outline of
U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Concerning Compulsory Unionism 35
Appendix B: Map of Right to
Work States 49
Appendix C: Sample Card Check
Revocation Letter 50
Appendix D: Petition Against
Union “Representation” 54
Appendix E: Sample Resignation/
Objection Letter 56
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Appendix F: Sample Letter of
Union Resignation and Dues
Revocation in Right to Work States 62
Appendix G: List of Nonchargeable
Expenses 66
Appendix H: Sample Letter
Objecting to Payment of Full
Union Dues 68
Appendix I: State Law on
Decertification Elections for Public
Sector Employees 74
Appendix J: How to Start a
Decertification Election under
the NLRA 92
viii
1
AN INTRODUCTION TO CHARTER
SCHOOL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
WHEN THERE IS A UNION IN, OR
TRYING TO GET INTO, YOUR
CHARTER SCHOOL WORKPLACE
The unionization of charter schools is increasing at
a rapid rate, having increased 444% from the previ-
ous decade (1992-2000) to the last decade (2001-
10). However, the actual number or percentage of
unionized charter schools varies greatly from state
to state. During the 2009-10 school year, 24 of the
40 states with charter schools had a least one charter
school that had a bargaining agreement with a un-
ion. All of the charter schools in Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, and Maryland were unionized, along with 171
in Wisconsin, 122 in California, and 42 in Ohio.
These unionized schools constitute 72% of the un-
ionized charter schools in the country. National Al-
liance for Public Charter Schools, “Unionized Char-
ter Schools: Data from 2009-10.”
However, most employees prefer a workplace
where they are free to discuss their terms and condi-
tions of employment directly with the employer,
without intervention by a third party. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, “Union Mem-
bers - 2011” News Release (Jan. 27, 2012).
2
The problem with the Soviet Union
was not its leaders or its employees;
it was the closed, uncompetitive eco-
nomic system that stifled its innova-
tion. We have the Soviet equivalent
in our schools; it’s a system that
shuns competition and thwarts
change. But in America, it’s the [un-
ion] collective bargaining agree-
ments that are the glue keeping the
monopoly together.
Eva Moskowitz, “Breakdown,” Education Next,
summer 2006 (Dr. Moskowitz is the former chair of
the New York City Council Education Committee
and founder & current CEO of Success Academy
Charter Schools, which operates 12 charter schools
in Harlem, the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan).
Even if there is union involvement, most employees
also prefer a workplace in which union membership
and the payment of dues is voluntary, as this forces
the union hierarchy to be more accountable to the
rank-and-file workers. It also forces union officials
to sell the benefits of union representation and
membership to the individual employees, instead of
relying on threats, intimidation, and even firings to
gain financial support. “Public Opinion on Right to
Work,” http://www.nrtwc.org/pdfs/RTWpoll.pdf
(last visited April 10, 2012); Stan Greer, “Voluntary
Unionism Serves Workers, Not Bosses,” The Wash-
ington Times (Mar. 1, 2012).
3
When there is a union in, or trying to get into, the
workplace, the rights of charter school employees
are covered by labor and constitutional law. These
laws generally provide the same rights and protec-
tions to employees in the public and private sectors.
However, the details are somewhat different be-
tween the public and private sectors. Therefore, to
know the exact rights in this situation, the charter
school employee must first determine if he or she is
a public sector or private sector employee.
If the employees are hired directly by a public char-
ter school, and their paycheck is issued by the char-
ter school, they most likely are considered a public
sector employee.1
However, if the employees work at a public charter
school but were hired directly by a private man-
agement company that provides educational ser-
vices to the public charter school, and the private
company issues their paycheck, then they most like
1 On January 10, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board,
which administers the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the basic law governing labor relations
for most private sector employees, invited briefs from interest-
ed parties on whether the Board has jurisdiction over charter
schools, specifically in Illinois. The Board’s pending decision
in Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School,
Inc. (13-RM-1768) could result in all charter school employ-
ees being considered private sector employees, instead of pub-
lic sector. Please contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800)
336-3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to determine the current
status of this case and said charter school employees.
4
ly are considered a private sector employee.2 Such
private companies that contract with charter schools
to provide educational services and employees,
which occur in less than 30% of charter schools, go
by different names: Charter Management Organiza-
tion (“CMO”); Education Management Organiza-
tion (“EMO”); etc.
Whether employed directly by the charter school or
at a charter school by a CMO/EMO, this guide will
refer to both types of employees as charter school
employees.
Public sector employees are governed by state labor
laws, and depending upon state law, may file a
charge with a state labor board or a claim in state
court. Private sector employees are governed by the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and may
file unfair labor practice charges before the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). For further legal
advice, contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800)
336-3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
2 In 2008, the NLRB declared that a private entity like a
CMO/EMO providing educational services to a public charter
school is a private employer within the Board’s jurisdiction.
See Charter Sch. Admin. Serv., 353 N.L.R.B. 394 (2008).
However, some regional directors have taken the opposite
view and the Board is again reviewing its 2008 decision.
Please contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600,
[email protected], or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to
determine the current status of such charter school employees.
5
CHARTER SCHOOL EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS IN THREE MINUTES
No employee in the United States can legal-
ly be required to be a full-dues-paying, for-
mal union member. But under the NLRA,
and in many states, a charter school employ-
ee can be forced to pay the union fees or be
fired from his or her job if the charter school
or CMO/EMO has agreed to a compulsory
unionism requirement in the bargaining
agreement that requires the employee to ei-
ther join the union or pay it a fee as a condi-
tion of employment.
Under the NLRA, union members have the
right to resign from formal union member-
ship at any time. However, if they were pay-
ing their dues through payroll deductions,
the deduction authorizations they previously
signed may limit when those authorizations
can be revoked.
Charter school employees in the 23 states
covered by Right to Work laws3 cannot law-
fully be required to pay any union fees to
keep their jobs.
Because unions enjoy “exclusive representa-
tion,” they have a legal duty to fairly repre-
3 For a map of the 23 Right to Work States, see Appendix B,
page 49.
6
sent all charter school employees in their
bargaining units.4 Unions are legally re-
quired to represent non-member charter
school employees the same as members, but
unfortunately this duty is often breached.
If a law or bargaining agreement permits it,
charter school employees can be forced to
pay certain union fees. In such cases, a char-
ter school employee does not join the union
or resigns from union membership, and the
charter school employee notifies the union
in writing he or she does not want to pay full
dues, the required fee must be limited to the
union’s proven costs of collective bargain-
ing activities. This fee may not lawfully in-
clude things like political and ideological ac-
tivities, lobbying, public relations, illegal
strikes, etc.
Non-members with religious objections to
supporting a union have the right to ask the
union to redirect the forced fees amount to
charity. Religious objectors do not have to
belong to a specific church to claim this
right.
A union member who wants to work during
a strike should resign from union member-
ship before going to work. If the resignation
4 “Exclusive representation” is when a union has the right to
represent and collectively bargain for all employees in a bar-
gaining unit. In other words, it is a monopoly bargaining privi-
lege.
7
is mailed, the charter school employee
should not work until the day after the resig-
nation is postmarked. Otherwise, the charter
school employee could be fined by the un-
ion. If a charter school employee is already a
non-member, then he or she can work at will
during a strike and not be lawfully fined.
Union members who work during a strike
may be fined.
Many charter school employees have a legal
right to petition for an election to oust an
unwanted union from their workplace or to
eliminate the union’s ability to collect forced
fees. If you want to do this, you should con-
tact a Foundation staff attorney at
(800) 336-3600, [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
Foundation attorneys have represented many
employees like you, and have even taken fif-
teen cases to the United States Supreme
Court to protect workers’ rights. If, after re-
viewing the information in this guide, you
are still unclear about your rights, or believe
that you need legal aid because union offi-
cials have violated these rights (as they fre-
quently do), contact a Foundation staff at-
torney at (800) 336-3600, [email protected],
or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
8
WHAT ARE MY RIGHTS IF THE
UNION IS CONDUCTING A
“CARD CHECK” OR ORGANIZING
DRIVE AT MY CHARTER
SCHOOL WORKPLACE?
If a union collects signed “authorization cards”
from 50% plus 1 of the charter school employees at
your workplace, your employer could, or may be
required to, recognize the union as the monopoly
bargaining representative of all charter school em-
ployees without a secret ballot election.
You have the legal right to: (1) not sign a union au-
thorization card; (2) revoke any authorization card
you may have signed; and (3) sign and circulate a
petition against union representation. You may be
denied the right to decertify, or remove, an unwant-
ed union for anywhere from six months to one year
after the employer’s recognition of it, and up to
three years if the employer and union sign a con-
tract. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72
(2011).
(1) You have a legal right to refrain from signing a
union authorization card. Whether you wish to sign
a union authorization card is completely up to you.
It is unlawful for an employer or a union to threaten
or coerce any employee to sign a union authoriza-
tion card or to misrepresent the purpose of the card.
9
For example, it is unlawful for a union or employer
to tell you that if you do not sign a card, you will be
fired when the union becomes the monopoly bar-
gaining representative. You should also be wary of
union propaganda that claims, “We already have a
majority of signed cards, and we want you to sign in
order to show the employer that we really have a
unanimous workforce.” If the union truly had a ma-
jority of signed cards, it likely would have already
demanded “exclusive representation” status from
the employer, and not waste time collecting more
signatures.
(2) You have a legal right to revoke any union au-
thorization card that you have signed. It is illegal for
a union to restrict your right to revoke such a card.
You may revoke it by signing a letter, card, petition,
or other document stating that you do not support
the union, or that you support another union. To
possess proof of delivery, you should send the letter
by certified mail, return receipt. For a sample letter
to revoke an authorization card, see Appendix C,
page 50.
Under the NLRB’s “dual card” doctrine, when a
charter school employee signs two documents with
conflicting statements of union support—for exam-
ple, signing a card in favor of union representation
and then signing another card against representa-
tion—then neither document establishes valid proof
of the employee’s preference for union representa-
tion. See Parkwood Developmental Center. Inc.,
347 N.L.R.B. 974 (2006); Le Marquis Hotel, LLC,
340 N.L.R.B. 485 (2003). Basically, a charter
10
school employee’s signature on a card or petition
against union representation invalidates any union
authorization card he or she signed earlier, or signs
in the future, for up to one year. Therefore, if 50%
or more of charter school employees in a bargaining
unit sign a card or petition against union representa-
tion, it is mathematically impossible for the union to
organize your school or CMO/EMO via a “card
check” for one year.
There is no requirement to inform the union or em-
ployer of your opposition to union representation
for your prior union authorization card to be consid-
ered invalid as a matter of law. However, if you fail
to inform the union or employer that you revoked
the union authorization card you signed, they may
count you as a union supporter during any card
count. Therefore, you should contact a Foundation
staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, [email protected], or
go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, to decide
whether you should notify, in writing, the union or
your employer, or both, of your revocation to ensure
that they know your union representational prefer-
ence.
(3) You have a legal right to sign and circulate cards
or petitions against union representation. You have
the legal right to campaign against union represen-
tation if you choose, provided that it is done on non-
work time (such as during work breaks) and in non-
work locations (such as in break or lunch rooms).
An employer cannot discriminate against you or
other charter school employees based on your oppo-
sition to or support of union representation, if done
11
on non-work time in non-work areas. If you oppose
union representation, signing and circulating such a
petition may be the most important way to exercise
your legal right to refrain from union representation.
For a sample petition, see Appendix D, page 54.
Every charter school employee has a protected legal
right to decide whether to sign a union authorization
card, free from threats, restraint, harassment, coer-
cion, or misrepresentation. The Foundation takes no
position about how you should exercise your right
to join or refrain from joining a union. The Founda-
tion simply wants all charter school employees to
make this choice in an atmosphere free of restraint,
threats, and coercion.
If you have questions about your rights when a un-
ion is conducting a “card check” campaign or at-
tempting to organize your charter school workplace,
you should contact a Foundation staff attorney at
(800) 336-3600, or by email at [email protected], or
go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, to get an-
swers or assistance in dealing with the appropriate
state agency, court, or NLRB in taking action
against the individuals or entities that are interfering
with your rights.
12
IF THERE IS A UNION IN MY
CHARTER SCHOOL WORKPLACE,
CAN I BE REQUIRED TO BE A UNION
MEMBER OR PAY DUES TO A UNION?
No. You cannot be required to be a union member
in any state. But, depending upon in which state
you work, you may be required to pay monies to a
union.
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in the Foundation-supported cases of Abood v. De-
troit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1998), you cannot be required to be a union mem-
ber or pay full union dues to keep your job in any
state. If you work in a Right to Work state, you can-
not be required to join the union as a member or be
required to pay anything to the union unless you
choose to become a voluntary union member. For a
map of the 23 Right to Work States, see Appendix
B, page 49.
However, in a non-Right to Work state, as a condi-
tion of employment (keeping your job), you can be
required to pay a fee equal to the union’s proven
expenses related to collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment. This
forced fee cannot lawfully include the union’s ex-
13
penses for things such as political and ideological
activities, lobbying, public relations, illegal strikes,
etc. Therefore, if the collective bargaining agree-
ment says you must be a union member or pay full
union dues to keep your job, it is unenforceable as
written. As an objecting non-member of the union,
you can only be required to pay the reduced fee
amount that represents the union’s bargaining costs.
Except in extraordinary cases, the union’s costs of
collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment do not equal the amount of
full union dues.
In the Foundation-supported case of Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986),
the United States Supreme Court held that a public
employer and union that agree to a compulsory un-
ionism requirement must establish procedural safe-
guards to protect your right as a non-member to on-
ly pay a reduced fee that covers the union’s bargain-
ing costs.
The mandatory safeguards provided in Hudson in-
clude all of the following:
notice of independently audited financial in-
formation explaining how the agency fee
was calculated, and providing an opportuni-
ty to object and pay less than full dues;
an opportunity to challenge the reduced
agency fee amount before an impartial deci-
sion-maker; and
14
the right to place the contested agency fee
amount in escrow to prevent the union from
illegally using your money while a decision
in the proper agency fee amount is pending.5
5 As ruled by California Saw and Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B.
224 (1995), enforced, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), the fol-
lowing procedural safeguards must be provided to private sec-
tor employees:
the union must inform all employees that they have a
right to be non-members;
the union must inform employees that non-members
have the right to object to paying for union activities
unrelated to the union’s duty as a collective bargain-
ing agent; and that objectors have a right have their
fees reduced to exclude those activities;
the union must provide non-members with sufficient
information to enable them to make an intelligent de-
cision on whether to object;
the union must inform non-members about its proce-
dures for filing objections; and
if non-members object, the union must inform them
of the percentage of the reduction, how the reduction
was calculated, and that the objectors have a right to
challenge those figures.
If the union does not provide such procedural safeguards, or
you want to challenge the forced fee amount, you may either
bring a lawsuit in federal court for the union’s breach of duty
of its fair representation or file an unfair labor practice charge
at the nearest NLRB regional office. Either action must be
filed within six months of the offending conduct. Contact a
Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, [email protected],
or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you are interest-
ed in pursuing these remedies.
15
As a non-member, you are still fully covered by all
of the provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the union and your
employer. The union is obligated to represent you
fairly. You are still entitled to receive all benefits
provided in the collective bargaining agreement,
which the employer must offer to all employees
(e.g., wages, seniority, vacations, pensions, health
insurance).6
Under the NLRA and most state labor laws, as a
union non-member, you can be kept from participat-
ing in internal union elections or meetings, voting in
collective bargaining ratification elections,7 or par-
ticipating in other “internal” union activities. How-
ever, the union cannot discipline you for any of
your conduct as a non-member.
WHEN CAN I RESIGN MY UNION
MEMBERSHIP?
Sometimes unions, in their constitution and bylaws
or in collective bargaining agreements, attempt to
impose limits on the right of members to resign.
6 If the union offers “members-only” benefits, as a non-
member you will most likely not receive those benefits. You
also cannot be compelled to pay for members-only benefits for
which you are not eligible.
7 This does not include decertification elections. As a non-
member, you are still entitled to vote in a decertification elec-
tion.
16
However, under Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), it necessarily follows
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that public
sector employees cannot constitutionally be pre-
vented from resigning from their union at any time.
In addition, the NLRA and some state laws guaran-
tee employees the right to resign. If you are unsure
about whether you can resign or if a union is pre-
venting you from resigning, contact a Foundation
staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, [email protected], or
go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
The decision whether to resign is yours alone. As a
non-member you are not subject to union rules and
discipline. However, the union must continue to
represent you and all union non-members fairly,
without discrimination, in all collective bargaining
matters. If you are a non-member, you cannot be
denied any benefits under the collective bargaining
agreement with the employer because of non-
membership.
In addition, as a non-member you have the right to
object to paying a forced fee equal to membership
dues. After objecting, you should only pay a re-
duced fee that is the portion of union dues covering
collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment. As an objecting non-member,
you cannot be required to pay for members-only
benefits.
If you work in a non-Right to Work state, and state
law or the collective bargaining agreement includes
a provision that requires charter school employees
17
to join the union or pay union fees, after you have
resigned union membership, you only are legally
required to pay the reduced fee. For a sample union
resignation and objection letter that can be used in a
non-Right to Work state where state law or the con-
tract does require you to join the union or pay union
fees, see Appendix E, page 56.
If you work in a Right to Work state or where state
law or the collective bargaining agreement does not
contain a forced unionism clause, once you resign
you have no financial or other obligations to the un-
ion.8 For a sample resignation letter in these two
scenarios, see Appendix F, page 62.
Whichever letter you use, verify whether there are
instructions in the union’s constitution and bylaws
about to whom to send the resignation letter. More-
over, although the sample resignation/objection let-
ter says that your objection is continuing and per-
manent, some unions do not honor this provision
and require you to annually renew your objection.
The courts are inconsistent on whether this annual
objection requirement is legal. Contact a Founda-
tion staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, or by email at
[email protected], or go to
8 However, if you have signed a dues deduction authorization
card, the card may limit when you can revoke authorization of
payroll deduction of union dues. Therefore, even though you
submit a valid resignation letter, it may not automatically re-
voke your dues deduction authorization. You may have to wait
and resubmit a separate revocation letter during the actual time
frame for revocation listed on the authorization card.
18
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, to determine
whether you need to annually renew your objection.
HOW DO I CUT OFF THE USE OF MY
DUES FOR POLITICS AND OTHER
NON-BARGAINING ACTIVITIES
IF I AM FORCED TO PAY FEES
TO A UNION?
NOTE: You must be a non-member to possess the
rights discussed in this section. If you are currently
a union member, you must first become a non-
member, and then object in order to receive the dues
rebate or reduction. To learn how to resign your
membership, see the previous section, “WHEN CAN
I RESIGN MY UNION MEMBERSHIP?” page 15.
In non-Right to Work states, see Appendix B, page
49, you have the right to cut off the portion of union
dues used for political and non-bargaining activities
by filing a written objection with the union.9 This is
true even if the employer, the union, or the collec-
tive bargaining agreement says otherwise. Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977),
held that a reduced fee, reflecting only the union’s
expenses for collective bargaining, contract admin-
istration, and grievance adjustment, is the only fee
you, as a union non-member, can be required to pay
9 In Right to Work states, non-member employees have the
right to stop paying all dues and fees to the union.
19
as a condition of employment in non-Right to Work
states.10
To ensure that your right to pay the reduced union
fee is adequately protected, the United States Su-
preme Court, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hud-
son, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), established mandatory
procedures the employer and union must have in
place.
The safeguards provided in Hudson include all of
the following:
an independent audit of the union’s financial
information notice explaining how the
forced fee was calculated, and providing an
opportunity to object and pay the reduced
amount rather than full dues;
an opportunity to challenge the forced fee
amount before an impartial decision-maker;
and
the right to place the contested forced fee
amount in escrow to prevent the union from
illegally using the money while a decision
on the proper amount is pending.11
10
For charter school employees that are hired by a private
CMO/EMO employer, the United States Supreme Court held
that this right was protected by the NLRA in Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1998), another Foundation
supported lawsuit.
11
If you are a private sector charter school employee, see note
5, supra.
20
In the Foundation-supported case Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court provided guidelines for the
types of expenses that are or are not chargeable to
union non-members. For a list of union expenses
that are not chargeable to union non-members, see
Appendix G, page 66.
If you are a non-member employed in a non-Right
to Work state where state law or the collective bar-
gaining agreement requires you to pay union fees,
see Appendix H, page 68, for a sample objection
letter allowing you to pay only the reduced forced
fee. Contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800)
336-3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you need assis-
tance in drafting or sending your objection letter.
WHAT IF I WANT TO WORK
DURING A STRIKE?
In many states, strikes by public sector employees
are illegal. If that is true in your state, then you
may have to work during a strike to avoid possible
penalties for violating the law. However, many
strikes under the NLRA, which applies to private
sector employees, are legal.
If you want to work during a strike, you must con-
firm you are not a union member to avoid union
discipline. Many courts hold that unions have the
power to discipline their members for crossing a
picket line. Such discipline can include imposing a
21
significant fine that the union can collect by suing
the employee in state court. To avoid such conse-
quences, you should not cross the picket line while
remaining a union member. If a strike is illegal,
however, the courts probably will rule that the un-
ion cannot lawfully fine members who obey the law
and work.
Should you work during the strike? This is a per-
sonal decision and the Foundation takes no position.
“Whether you have a right to strike depends either
upon your state’s law, if you are considered a public
sector employee, or upon the NLRA, if you are con-
sidered a private sector employee. If your employer
operates during a strike, you must decide what to do
based upon your own needs and the law. Do not let
anyone force you one way or the other. Contact a
Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, or by
email at [email protected] or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you need assis-
tance in determining whether a particular strike is
legal or not.
Can the union fine you if you work during the
strike? This depends on state law or whether you
are covered under the NLRA. If your state law per-
mits charter school employees to legally strike or
you are covered by the NLRA, then the union may
lawfully fine you for returning to work during a
strike before resigning from union membership. Un-
ion members are bound by their union’s constitution
and bylaws. In those documents, most unions pro-
vide that members who work during a lawfully-
called strike can be fined.
22
However, if you are considered a public sector em-
ployee due to your charter school employment and
your state law makes public sector employee strikes
illegal by way of prohibition, then in the event that
you fail to resign your union membership before
returning to work during an illegal strike, a court
most likely will not choose to enforce the relevant
penalty provision(s) of your union’s constitution
and bylaws.
Should you resign from union membership if you
work during a strike? Yes. Non-members are not
subject to a union’s constitution and bylaws. Non-
members cannot be fined or disciplined for working
during a strike. If you have not yet crossed the pick-
et line and desire to otherwise avoid all fines, then
do not cross the picket line until after midnight of
the day you mailed your resignation letter to the un-
ion via certified mail, return receipt. See the section,
“WHEN CAN I RESIGN UNION MEMBERSHIP?” page
15, for more details and a sample resignation letter.
Unions cannot lawfully discipline you for post-
resignation conduct once they receive notice of your
membership resignation. Attempts to bring internal
union charges against you for post-resignation con-
duct will be unsuccessful. If strikes by charter
school employees who are considered public sector
employees are illegal in your state, you may not
have to resign to avoid union fines for working.
However, resignation would strengthen your posi-
tion that you cannot lawfully be fined.
23
If you worked during a strike before resigning
your union membership, are you protected from
all fines? Not when strikes by charter school em-
ployees are legal. Under the NLRA, and in those
states where public sector strikes are legal, even if
you are now a non-member, the union can fine you
for pre-resignation conduct, but not post-resignation
acts. Fines are usually based on the number of days
you worked as a member during the strike. The
courts generally hold that fines cannot be excessive.
“Excessive” is not defined, but arguably, if the un-
ion’s fine exceeds the amount of money you earned
before resigning, it is excessive. If strikes by charter
school employees who are considered public sector
employees are illegal in your state, you probably
cannot lawfully be fined for working even before
you resign.
Can the union constitution prohibit you from
resigning during a strike? No. It necessarily fol-
lows from the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977), that public sector employees cannot
constitutionally be prevented from resigning from a
union. The NLRA and some state laws also guaran-
tee the right to resign.
What about the collective bargaining agree-
ment? Doesn’t it require you to be a member to
keep your job? No. Under Abood and Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1998), you are
not required to be an actual union member to keep
your job, regardless of what the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the employer, or the union says. You
24
are only required to do one of two things. One, you
must only pay the union dues amount. Two, if you
are a non-member and object to the union using
your money for non-collective bargaining purposes
and notify the union in writing, then you only must
pay the reduced fee reflecting union expenses for
collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.
In Right to Work states, and in a few other states,
any agreement requiring a public sector employee
to join or pay money to a union is illegal. For a map
of the 23 Right to Work states, see Appendix B,
page 49.
If you resign your union membership, what
rights will you lose? You will not lose any rights
under the collective bargaining agreement, for ex-
ample, seniority. The union must represent you fair-
ly in bargaining and grievance handling regardless
of whether you are a union member. You will lose
only those rights that are available to members un-
der the union’s constitution, such as voting in union
elections, and you may lose the right to vote on the
collective bargaining agreement’s ratification. You
may also lose your right to continue in any union
pension plans that are based on union membership
rather than service with your employer as an em-
ployee benefit.
25
If you resign your union membership, can you
rejoin the union after the strike is over? That de-
pends upon the union and its constitution and by-
laws. The law does not require a union to permit a
non-member who has crossed a picket line to rejoin.
Often unions refuse to allow so-called “strikebreak-
ers” to rejoin. There are some instances where un-
ions require strikebreakers to pay large fines to re-
join. You should assume that, if you resign and
cross the picket line, you will not be allowed to re-
join the union. However, even if you do not rejoin,
the union must continue to represent you fairly in
collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment. You also have the same
rights as union members under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
How do you resign? See Appendix E, page 56, for
a sample union resignation/objection letter. You
may eventually have to prove when your resigna-
tion letter was received. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that you send the letter by certified mail,
return receipt; by fax and retain the confirmation
slip the facsimile machine produces; or by hand-
delivery to a union officer with a friendly witness
present.
What rules apply if the union attempts to fine
you? Under the law that generally applies to union
disciplinary proceedings, you may not be fined or
otherwise disciplined as a member, unless you are
served with specific written charges, given a rea-
sonable time to prepare your defense, and afforded
a full and fair hearing. Within these limitations, a
26
union’s constitution and bylaws determine the rules
for disciplinary action.
What should you do if specific charges are
served on you by the union, if you resigned be-
fore you went back to work? If you have clear
proof that you resigned before returning to work,
immediately show the evidence to the union and ask
it to dismiss the charges before the hearing. If the
union persists under those circumstances, it will
violate the law, and you should contact Foundation
staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, [email protected],
or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to get
advice on how to proceed.
What should you do if specific charges are
served on you by the union, if you did not resign
before you went back to work? If you went back
to work during a strike before resigning, or worked
and never resigned, you should attend the union-
scheduled hearing and raise any potential defenses.
It is also best to exhaust any appeals process availa-
ble under the union’s constitution and bylaws. Pos-
sible defenses include that the proposed fines are
excessive or you were told that you could not resign
during the strike. If your state makes public sector
employee strikes illegal by way of prohibition, and
due to your charter school employment you are con-
sidered a public sector employee, then that defense
should be raised. It is highly recommended to con-
tact either Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-
3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, or other experi-
enced attorneys to determine possible defenses.
27
How can the union collect its fines if it finds you
guilty for working during a strike while still a
member? The union cannot have you fired for re-
fusing to pay fines. The union’s only recourse is to
sue you for the fine in state court. The union may
lawfully do this if strikes by charter school employ-
ees are legal in your state or you are considered a
private sector employee under the NLRA. In these
types of lawsuits, you have the right to raise any
defenses brought up in the union’s internal proceed-
ings, provided that you exhausted internal union
appeals.
What should you do to protect yourself from
harassment and violence? Whatever you decide
about resigning and working during a strike, you
should keep as low a profile as possible. You should
also attempt to maintain existing cordial relation-
ships with fellow workers on both sides of the pick-
et line. Avoid the zealots! Should you return to
work, keep in close touch with other charter school
employees who are working during the strike,
providing each other support and sharing infor-
mation. Also, if you work during a strike, it is rec-
ommended that you get an unlisted telephone num-
ber; keep a diary of all strike-related threats and in-
cidents of harassment and violence (who, where,
what, when, names of witnesses, etc.); and take
photographs of your private property, such as home
and car, to document any damage if you become a
victim of union violence. If you begin to receive
harassing phone calls, consider installing Caller-ID
on the home phone. You should report all threats
and incidents of harassment and violence to your
28
employer and the local police. If you are the victim
of union violence, contact Foundation staff attor-
neys at (800) 336-3600, [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
WHAT IF I AM A VICTIM
OF UNION VIOLENCE?
If you or someone in your family is or was a victim
of union violence within the past three years, please
contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-
3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
WHAT IS A DECERTIFICATION
ELECTION?
Most employees prefer a workplace where they are
free to discuss their terms and conditions of em-
ployment directly with their employer, without in-
tervention by a third-party. They also prefer a
workplace in which union membership and the
payment of dues is voluntary, as this forces the un-
ion hierarchy to be more accountable to the rank-
and-file workers. Instead of relying on threats, in-
timidation, and even firings to gain financial sup-
port, union officials have to sell the benefits of un-
ion representation and membership to the individual
employees.
29
“Exclusive representation” refers to a union’s right
to represent and collectively bargain for all employ-
ees in a bargaining unit. It is actually a government-
granted monopoly bargaining privilege giving union
officials the power to negotiate contracts that you
and other charter school employees may not like
while barring you from negotiating your own terms
of employment. Except in Right to Work states, col-
lective bargaining agreements almost always in-
clude a provision mandating that employees be fired
for not paying fees to a union they do not want to
support, or mandating automatic deduction of union
fees.
A decertification election is an election in which
employees vote to revoke the union’s certification
as the monopoly bargaining representative with
their employer. In effect, the union is voted out of
the workplace and any requirement that non-
members must pay fees to the union is revoked.
State law varies as to the rules for conducting a de-
certification election for charter school employees
who are considered public sector employees. To see
a particular state’s laws regarding such elections,
see Appendix I, page 74. If you do not see your
state listed, your state most likely has no decertifi-
cation law for charter school employees. The NLRA
governs decertification elections for private sector
employees.
According to the NLRA, as interpreted by the
NLRB, and most state bargaining laws, there are
several requirements as to when you may file for a
30
decertification election. The first rule is the “certifi-
cation bar,” which states that decertification elec-
tion petitions cannot be filed for at least one year
after a union either wins a certification election or is
voluntarily recognized by the employer.
Another rule is the “contract bar,” under which de-
certification election petitions cannot be filed during
the first three years of a bargaining agreement, ex-
cept during a specific 30-day “window period.” In
most workplaces, the 30-day “window period” is 60
to 90 days prior to the collective bargaining agree-
ment’s expiration date or three-year anniversary,
whichever is first. In other words, decertification
petitions may be filed any time after a contract ex-
pires or is more than three years old.12
However, if
the employer and union enter into a new collective
bargaining agreement, then another three-year “con-
tract bar” begins and prevents the filing of any de-
certification petitions. Therefore, if the “window
period” comes and goes with no petition filed, char-
ter school employees may have to wait another
three years before requesting a decertification elec-
tion.
Under the NLRA and most state laws, if 30% or
more of employees in a bargaining unit sign a de-
12
If a new employer takes over near the expiration of the bar-
gaining agreement or after the contract has expired, the union
has a “reasonable time” to bargain with the new employer,
even if the contract had expired months ago. Contact Founda-
tion staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, [email protected], or go
to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm if you are unsure when
you can collect signatures on a decertification petition or file
the petition.
31
certification petition, the NLRB or state labor board
will conduct a secret-ballot election to determine if
a majority of charter school employees in the unit
wish to decertify the union and stop it from any fur-
ther “exclusive representation.” If the petitioning
employees win that election, then the employer be-
comes non-union. As a result, all charter school
employees are free to bargain on their own, and ne-
gotiate their own terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Under the NLRB, if 50% or more of the em-
ployees in a bargaining unit sign a petition that they
no longer want to be represented by the union, the
employer can withdraw recognition without an elec-
tion if it wishes to do so, and neither the certifica-
tion nor contract bars applies.
The petition must be an employee-only effort. Em-
ployer assistance is unlawful and, if there is any, the
union will nullify the effort by filing an unfair labor
practice charge. For information on how to start a
petition for a decertification election under the
NLRA, see Appendix J, page 92. For all questions
about decertification, please contact Foundation
staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, [email protected],
or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
32
WHAT IF I HAVE A RELIGIOUS
OBJECTION TO JOINING
OR FINANCIALLY
SUPPORTING A UNION?
If you work in a Right to Work state, you have the
right not to join and not to financially support un-
ions for any reason, including religious reasons. For
a map of the 23 Right to Work States, see Appen-
dix B, page 49.
In non-Right to Work states, sincere religious objec-
tors may have the right to redirect the entire union
fee to a non-union, non-religious charity.
To determine whether you have a sincere religious
objection to joining or supporting a union, and to
understand the steps you must take for accommoda-
tion of your religious beliefs in this area, call (800)
336-3600 or email [email protected] and request a
copy of “An Employee’s Guide—To Union Dues
and Religious Do Nots,” or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/ro1.htm.
33
IF I BELIEVE MY RIGHTS HAVE
BEEN VIOLATED BY COMPULSORY
UNIONISM ABUSES, CAN I FILE
MY OWN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
CHARGES AGAINST THE UNION
OR EMPLOYER WITH THE NLRB
OR A STATE AGENCY?
Choosing to file charges against the union or against
your employer is a personal decision that the Foun-
dation neither recommends nor opposes.
However, if you want to file charges with the
NLRB or a state labor board against a union or your
employer concerning abuses of compulsory union
representation or forced membership or union fees,
please contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800)
336-3600, or by email at [email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm for free legal ad-
vice regarding the correct procedures to use and the
best circumstances under which charges may be
filed.
34
35
Appendix A
A Brief Outline of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent Concerning
Compulsory Unionism
1937—Virginian Railway v. System
Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515; and
National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
The Court held that compulsory collective bargain-
ing is constitutional, but declined to address the
constitutionality of exclusive representation because
these cases were brought by employers, not em-
ployees forced to accept a union as their exclusive
bargaining representative.
1944—J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332; and
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
The Court interpreted the National Labor Relations
and Railway Labor Acts as prohibiting individual
employees from negotiating their own terms and
conditions of employment where an exclusive bar-
gaining representative has been recognized. Consti-
tutional questions were not raised.
36
Appendix A (continued)
1944—Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad, 323 U.S. 192
The Court recognized that exclusive representation
presents constitutional problems, but again ducked
the issue by holding that exclusive representatives
have a duty of representing non-members “fairly.”
1949—Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525; and American Federation of Labor v.
American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538
The Court ruled that state Right to Work laws are
constitutional.
1949—Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin
Board, 336 U.S. 301
The Court held that the National Labor Relations
(“Wagner”) Act permitted state Right to Work laws
even before Congress passed the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Act amendments.
37
Appendix A (continued)
1954—Radio Officers’ Union v. National
Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 17
The Court ruled that compulsory unionism agree-
ments may not be used “for any purpose other than
to compel payment of union dues and fees,” that is,
that employees may not be required to be formal
union members and abide by internal union rules to
keep their jobs.
1956—Railway Employes’ Department v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
The Court held that “union shop” agreements au-
thorized by the Railway Labor Act are constitution-
al, because the only condition of employment that
the Act authorizes is “financial support” of “the
work of the union in the realm of collective bargain-
ing.” The Court suggested that if compulsory dues
are used “for purposes not germane to collective
bargaining, a different problem would be presented”
under the First Amendment.
1961—Machinists v. Street, 376 U.S. 740
Again ducking constitutional questions, the Court
ruled that the Railway Labor Act prohibits unions
from using objecting non-members’ compulsory
38
Appendix A (continued)
dues for political purposes. The Court did not clear-
ly define political purposes, nor did it address
whether unions could lawfully use objectors’ mon-
ies for non-political activities unrelated to collective
bargaining. Justice Black dissented and predicted
that the Court’s rebate remedy would be ineffective.
He would have held the statute unconstitutional.
1963—Railway Clerks v. Allen,
373 U.S. 113
The Court found that, since unions hold all pertinent
facts and records, they must prove the proportions
of their expenses that are lawfully chargeable to ob-
jecting non-members. However, the Court reaf-
firmed Street’s rulings that only non-members who
notify their union that they object are entitled to re-
lief and that the appropriate remedies are refunds
and reductions in future exactions.
1963—National Labor Relations Board v.
General Motors, 373 U.S. 734
The Court reiterated that the “union shop” is “whit-
tled down to its financial core,” that is, unions may
require payment of initiation fees and dues as a
condition of employment, but may not require for-
mal membership.
39
Appendix A (continued)
1963—Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 & 375 U.S. 96
The Court held that state Right to Work laws may
prohibit “agency shop” agreements under which
employees are required to pay fees to unions to de-
fray the costs of collective bargaining. In a second
decision in the same case, the Court ruled that the
state courts, not just the National Labor Relations
Board, can enforce state Right to Work laws. (The
National Right to Work Committee financed this
case in the Supreme Court for the non-member
plaintiffs.)
In 1968 the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation was established. (Un-
less otherwise noted, all subsequent cases
listed were brought by Foundation attor-
neys.)
1976—City of Charlotte v. Firefighters
Local 660, 426 U.S. 283
The Court ruled that a public employer is not con-
stitutionally obligated to provide payroll deductions
for union dues. The Foundation was not involved in
this case.
40
Appendix A (continued)
1976—Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407
The Court held that the employees’ “predominant
job situs” determines whether a state Right to Work
law applies, and that seamen employed primarily on
the high seas are not protected by the Right to Work
law of the state in which they were hired. The
Foundation filed an amicus brief urging that Texas’
Right to Work law protected the seaman.
1976—City of Madison Joint School
District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167
The Court ruled that a state may not constitutionally
require school boards to prohibit non-union teachers
from speaking against agency shop agreements at
public meetings. The Foundation filed an amicus
brief supporting the non-union teachers’ free speech
rights.
1977—Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 U.S. 209
A six-member majority of the Court rejected argu-
ments that requiring public employees to pay agen-
cy fees to keep their jobs violates the First Amend-
ment. The Court ruled that the agency shop as such
41
Appendix A (continued)
is constitutionally valid, but only “insofar as the
service charges are applied to collective-bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance-adjustment
purposes.” The Court unanimously agreed that “a
union cannot constitutionally spend [objectors’]
funds for the expression of political views, on be-
half of political candidates, or toward the advance-
ment of other ideological causes not germane to its
duties as collective-bargaining representative.”
1979—Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (per curiam)
The Court held that the “First Amendment does not
impose any affirmative obligation on the govern-
ment . . . to recognize [a labor] association and bar-
gain with it.” The Foundation was not involved in
this case.
1983—Knight v. Minnesota Community
College Faculty Association, 460 U.S. 1048
Without an opinion giving its reasons, the Court
affirmed a lower court decision rejecting arguments
that exclusive representation of public employees
by a union such as the National Education Associa-
tion is unconstitutional because it forces association
with a political action organization.
42
Appendix A (continued)
1984—Minnesota State Board for
Community Colleges v. Knight,
465 U.S. 271
The Court ruled that a state may constitutionally bar
non-members from participating in their public em-
ployers’ “meet and confer” sessions with the em-
ployees’ exclusive bargaining representative on pol-
icy questions relating to employment, but outside
the scope of mandatory collective bargaining.
1984—Ellis v. Railway Clerks,
466 U.S. 435
The Court held that the Railway Labor Act not only
prohibits coerced financial support of union politics
and ideological activities, but also coerced support
of other activities unrelated to collective bargaining
and contract administration, such as organizing, liti-
gation not concerning objecting employees’ bar-
gaining unit, and the parts of union publications re-
porting on non-chargeable activities. The Court also
ruled that a “union cannot be allowed to commit
dissenters’ funds to improper uses even temporari-
ly,” prohibiting “rebate” schemes under which un-
ions collect full dues, use part for improper purpos-
es, and only later refund that part to the employees.
43
Appendix A (continued)
1985—Pattern Makers v. National Labor
Relations Board, 473 U.S. 95
The Court recognized that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act guarantees workers the right to resign un-
ion membership at any time. The Foundation filed
an amicus brief urging this ruling.
1986—Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
The Court unanimously held that First Amendment
due process requires that certain procedural safe-
guards be established before compulsory union fees
can be collected from public employees: adequate
advance notice of the fee’s basis (including an inde-
pendent audit), reasonably prompt impartial review
of non-members’ challenges, and escrow of
“amounts reasonably in dispute” while challenges
are pending. Because the Court had earlier ruled in
Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson that con-
stitutional limitations apply to the Railway Labor
Act, these procedural safeguards also must be estab-
lished by railway and airline unions.
44
Appendix A (continued)
1988—Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
The Court determined that Congress intended the
substantially “identical” authorizations of compul-
sory unionism arrangements in the National Labor
Relations and Railway Labor Acts “to have the
same meaning.” The Court, therefore, held that the
former statute, like the latter, “authorizes the exac-
tion of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘per-
forming the duties of an exclusive representative of
the employees in dealing with the employer on la-
bor-management issues.’” As a result, private sector
employees have the same right not to subsidize un-
ion non-bargaining activities as railway, airline, and
public employees, and are entitled to the procedural
protections outlined in Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson.
1991— Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Association, 500 U.S. 507
Summarizing its earlier decisions from Hanson
through Ellis, the Court concluded that union activi-
ties are not lawfully chargeable to objecting non-
members unless they both are “‘germane’ to collec-
tive-bargaining activity” and do “not significantly
add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent
in allowance of an agency or union shop.” Applying
45
Appendix A (continued)
this test, the Court ruled that objecting public em-
ployees may not be charged for litigation not direct-
ly concerning their bargaining unit, lobbying (ex-
cept for ratification or implementation of their col-
lective bargaining agreement), public relations ac-
tivities, and illegal strikes. However, the Court also
held that the First Amendment does not limit law-
fully chargeable bargaining-related costs to the ob-
jecting employees’ bargaining unit.
1998—Air Line Pilots Association v.
Miller, 523 U.S. 866
The Court ruled that non-members who do not
agree to union-established arbitration procedures
cannot be required to use those procedures before
bringing a federal court action challenging the
amount of their compulsory fees for collective bar-
gaining.
1998—Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild,
523 U.S. 866
The Court held that a union does not breach its duty
of fair representation “merely by negotiating” a
compulsory unionism provision that says that em-
ployees must be union “members in good standing”
as condition of employment without expressly ex-
plaining, in the agreement, that the National Labor
46
Appendix A (continued)
Relations Act does not permit unions and employers
to require that employees become formal union
members. Importantly, for the first time, the Court
declared that, if a union negotiates a compulsory
unionism provision, it must notify workers that they
may satisfy the provision’s requirement merely by
paying fees to support the union’s “representational
activities” in collective bargaining and contract ad-
ministration, without actually becoming members.
2007—Davenport v. Washington
Education Association, 551 U.S. 177
The Court unanimously ruled that, because unions
have no constitutional right to collect fees from
non-members, a state may require unions to obtain
affirmative consent before spending non-member
public employees’ forced fees on political activities.
The Court’s decision also reiterated that, as the
Court had decided in 1949, Right to Work laws are
constitutional.
2008—Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,
554 U.S. 60
The Court ruled that the National Labor Relations
Act preempts a state statute prohibiting companies
that receive state grants or program funds from us-
ing those monies to deter union organizing. Signifi-
47
Appendix A (continued)
cantly, the Court emphasized that the 1947 amend-
ment to the Act that guarantees the right to refrain
from union activities “calls attention to the right of
employees to refuse to join unions, which implies
an underlying right to receive information opposing
unionization.” The Foundation filed an amicus brief
that made this very point.
2009—Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207
The Court held that the First Amendment permits a
local union to charge non-member public employ-
ees for national litigation expenses for other bar-
gaining units if the litigation is related to collective
bargaining or contract administration and the charge
is reciprocal in nature, i.e., if the national union and
other locals would similarly contribute to the cost of
litigation for the non-members’ unit should the need
arise. A concurring opinion by three Justices noted
that the Court’s decision did not decide what “reci-
procity” means or what burden a union has to estab-
lish true reciprocity, because in this case the parties
assumed that reciprocity existed.
48
Appendix A (continued)
2009—Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association, 555 U.S. 353
The Court held that a state may constitutionally
prohibit payroll deduction of contributions to union
political action committees by state and local gov-
ernment employees, because the First Amendment
“does not confer an affirmative right [for unions] to
use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose
of obtaining funds for expression.” The Foundation
joined an amicus brief urging that result.
49
Appendix B
Map of Right to Work States
A Right to Work law secures the right of employees
to decide for themselves whether to join or finan-
cially support a union. However, employees who
work in the railway or airline industries are not pro-
tected by Right to Work laws, and employees who
work on federal property may also not be protected,
depending on whether federal jurisdiction as to la-
bor relations is exclusive on that property.
50
Appendix C
Sample Card Check Revocation Letter
SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[You may want to send copies of this letter to offi-
cials of both the local union and the international
union.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate union officer]
[insert Name of union]
[insert Address of union]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]:
I write to inform you that I do not want to be “rep-
resented” by your union, do not wish to be a mem-
ber of your union, and do not support your union in
any manner. Please consider my opposition to rep-
resentation by your union to be permanent and con-
tinuing in nature.
51
Appendix C (continued)
I hereby revoke and rescind any union “authoriza-
tion” card, or any other indication of support for
your union, that I may have signed in the past. Any
such card or indication of support for your union is
null and void, effective immediately.
Please return to me any union authorization card
that I may have signed. Alternatively, please inform
me in writing that you are honoring this revocation
and rescission of support for your union.
Please be aware that refusing to honor my revoca-
tion and rescission will violate my rights under the
National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, represent-
ing to my employer (or any third party or “arbitra-
tor”) that I support representation by your union
will similarly violate my legal rights.
Sincerely,
[Name]
52
Appendix C (continued)
Sample Card Check Revocation Letter
SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate payroll department
management employee]
[insert Name of department responsible for pay-
roll deductions]
[insert Address of department responsible for
payroll deductions]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll de-
partment management employee]:
Included in this letter is a copy of the letter I sent to
[insert Name of union involved] revoking and re-
scinding any union “authorization” card, or any oth-
er indication of support for this union that I may
have signed in the past. In addition, any such card
or indication of support for this union is null and
53
Appendix C (continued)
void, effective immediately. I want you to be fully
aware of my revocation.
Please contact me if there are any problems or con-
cerns with this request.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
[Name]
54
Appendix D
Petition Against Union
“Representation”
The undersigned employees do NOT want to be
represented by the _____________________ [FILL
IN NAME] Union, do NOT want to join the Union,
and do NOT support the Union in any manner.
To the extent that any of the undersigned employees
have ever previously signed a Union “authorization
card” or other indication of support for union repre-
sentation, the undersigned employees hereby
REVOKE that card, effective immediately. More
specifically, our employer, the Union, and all third
parties or arbitrators must take NOTICE that any
such card signed by an undersigned employee is
NULL and VOID.
Should our employer ever voluntarily recognize the
Union as the bargaining representative of employ-
ees, the undersigned employees hereby petition the
National Labor Relations Board13
to hold a
DECERTIFICATION ELECTION to determine
13
The NLRB covers private sector employees. If you are a
charter school employee that is considered a public sector em-
ployee, you would follow your state law as to where to file
this petition, and replace the name of the NLRB with the name
of the appropriate state labor board.
55
Appendix D (continued)
whether the majority of employees truly wish to be
represented by the Union.
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date*
*You may add more lines for names, signatures, and dates.
56
Appendix E
Sample Resignation/Objection Letter
SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[You must determine whether the union’s constitu-
tion and bylaws specify to whom a resignation must
be sent.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate union officer]
[insert Name of union]
[insert Address of union]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]:
I hereby resign as a member of [Name of union].
My resignation is effective immediately. I will con-
tinue to meet my lawful obligation of paying a rep-
resentation fee to the union under its “union securi-
ty” agreement with [Name of employer].
57
Appendix E (continued)
Furthermore, I object to the collection and expendi-
ture of a fee for any purpose other than my pro rata
share of the union’s costs of collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment,
as is my constitutional right under Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if
applicable, my statutory right under Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you provide me
with my First Amendment and duty of fair represen-
tation procedural rights, including: reduction of my
fees to an amount that includes only constitutionally
chargeable costs; notice of the calculation of that
amount, verified by an independent certified public
accountant; and notice of the procedure that you
have adopted to hold my fees in an interest-bearing
escrow account and give me an opportunity to chal-
lenge your calculation and have it reviewed by an
impartial decision-maker.
[If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include
the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify
you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from
my wages of representation fees limited to those
costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I
am required to sign a form to make that change,
please provide me with the necessary form.]
58
Appendix E (continued)
Please reply promptly to my request. Any further
collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me
made without the procedural safeguards required by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion will violate my civil rights under the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. Code § 1983, or if
applicable, under the National Labor Relations Act,
and the U.S. Constitution.
Finally, this objection is permanent and continuing
in nature.
Sincerely,
[Name]
59
Appendix E (continued)
Sample Notice of Union
Resignation/Objection Letter
SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate payroll department
management employee] [insert Name of department responsible for pay-
roll deductions]
[insert Address of department responsible for
payroll deductions]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll de-
partment management employee]:
Today I submitted my resignation from [Name of
the union]. A copy of my letter to the union is en-
closed. I will continue to meet my lawful obligation
of paying a representation fee to the union under its
60
Appendix E (continued)
“union shop” or “agency shop” agreement with
[Name of employer].
Furthermore, I object to the collection and expendi-
ture by the union of a fee for any purpose other than
my pro rata share of the union’s costs of collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment, as is my right under Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and/or
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988).
Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you ensure that
the union provides me with my procedural rights, as
outlined in my letter to the union. If it does not, I
ask that [Name of employer] provide them.
[If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include
the following: Accordingly, I also hereby notify
you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from
my wages of representation fees limited to those
costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I
am required to sign a form to make that change,
please provide me with the necessary form.]
61
Appendix E (continued)
Please reply promptly to my request. Any further
collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me
made without the procedural safeguards required by
law will violate my rights under the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. Code § 1983, or if ap-
plicable, under the National Labor Relations Act
and/or U.S. Constitution.
Sincerely,
[Name]
62
Appendix F
Sample Letter of Union Resignation
and Dues Revocation in
Right to Work States
SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[At the same time that you resign from the union,
you should also notify your employer.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate union officer]
[insert Name of union]
[insert Address of union]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]:
I am employed by [Name of employer] in the Right
to Work state of [insert state’s name]. Effective
immediately, I resign from membership in the local
union and all of its affiliated unions.
63
Appendix F (continued)
Because I have resigned my membership in the un-
ion, you must now immediately cease enforcing the
dues check-off authorization agreement that I
signed. That dues check-off authorization was
signed solely in conjunction with, and in contempla-
tion of, my becoming a member of the union and, as
such, is no longer valid. See IBEW (Lockheed Space
Operations Co.), 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991); Wash-
ington Gas Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991)
(employer in Right to Work state must cease dues
deduction upon receipt of resignation/revocation).
If you refuse to accept this letter as both an effective
resignation and an immediately effective dues
check-off revocation, I ask that you promptly in-
form me, in writing, of exactly what steps I must
take to effectuate my revocation of the dues check-
off authorization. More specifically, if you contend
that I must meet a “window period” in order to re-
voke my dues check-off authorization, I ask that you
promptly send me a copy of the actual dues deduc-
tion authorization form that I signed, and also tell
me specifically what “window period” dates I must
meet in order to revoke the dues check-off authori-
zation.
Sincerely,
[Name]
64
Appendix F (continued)
Sample Letter to Employer of Union
Resignation and Dues Revocation in
Right to Work States
SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send the letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate payroll department
management employee]
[insert Name of department responsible for pay-
roll deductions]
[insert Address of department responsible for
payroll deductions]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll de-
partment management employee]:
I am employed by [Name of employer] in the Right
to Work state of [insert state’s name]. Effectively
immediately, I resign from membership in the local
union and all of its affiliated unions.
65
Appendix F (continued)
Because I have resigned my membership in the un-
ion, you must now immediately cease enforcing the
dues check-off authorization agreement that I
signed. That dues check-off authorization was
signed solely in conjunction with, and in contempla-
tion of, my becoming a member of the union and, as
such, is no longer valid. See IBEW (Lockheed Space
Operations Co.), 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991); Wash-
ington Gas Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991)
(employer in Right to Work state must cease dues
deduction upon receipt of resignation/revocation).
If you refuse to accept this letter as both an effective
resignation and an immediately effective dues
check-off revocation, I ask that you promptly in-
form me, in writing, of exactly what steps I must
take to effectuate my revocation of the dues check-
off authorization. More specifically, if you contend
that I must meet a “window period” in order to re-
voke my dues check-off authorization, I ask that you
promptly send me a copy of the actual dues deduc-
tion authorization form that I signed, and also tell
me specifically what “window period” dates I must
meet in order to revoke the dues check-off authori-
zation.
Sincerely,
[Name]
66
Appendix G
List of Nonchargeable Expenses
Courts continue to sort out union expenses that are
chargeable and not chargeable to union non-
members. No union expense is chargeable to an ob-
jecting non-member unless the union proves it con-
cerns collective bargaining, contract administration,
and grievance adjustment before a neutral decision-
maker.
EXAMPLES OF NONCHARGEABLE EXPENSES
Political activities, including activities relat-
ed to ballot and bond issues.
Ideological activities.
Lobbying, unless necessary to ratify or fund
the collective bargaining agreement in a
non-member public employee’s bargaining
unit.
Public relations activities.
Litigation unrelated to collective bargaining
and bargaining-related litigation solely for
other bargaining units where the union does
not show a reasonable expectation that other
union affiliates will similarly fund litigation
for the non-member’s bargaining unit.
Engaging in illegal strikes.
67
Appendix G (continued)
All or most organizing and member recruit-
ment, depending on whether you are a pub-
lic or private sector employee.
Union “members only” benefits.
Portions of union publications reporting on
the foregoing activities.
SOURCES FOR THE EXAMPLES OF
NONCHARGEABLE EXPENSES
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431
U.S. 209 (1977).
Ellis v. BRAC, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500
U.S. 507 (1991).
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009).
Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 423 (D.C. Cir.
2008). [Private sector organizing]
68
Appendix H
Sample Letter Objecting to
Payment of Full Union Dues
SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate union officer]
[insert Name of union]
[insert Address of union]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]:
I object to the collection and expenditure by the un-
ion of a fee for any purpose other than my pro rata
share of the union’s costs of collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment,
as is my right under Abood v. Detroit Board. of Ed-
ucation, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if applicable, my
statutory right under Communications Workers v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
69
Appendix H (continued)
Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you provide me
with my First Amendment and duty of fair represen-
tation procedural rights, including: reduction of my
fees to an amount that includes only lawfully
chargeable costs; notice of the calculation of that
amount, verified by an independent certified public
accountant; and notice of the procedure that you
have adopted to hold my fees in an interest-bearing
escrow account and give me an opportunity to chal-
lenge your calculation and have it reviewed by an
impartial decision-maker.
[If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include
the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify
you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from
my wages of representation fees limited to those
costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I
am required to sign a form to make that change,
please provide me with the necessary form.]
Please reply promptly to my request. Any further
collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me
made without the procedural safeguards required by
70
Appendix H (continued)
law will violate my rights under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or if applicable, un-
der the National Labor Relations Act.
Finally, this objection is permanent and continuing
in nature.
Sincerely,
[Name]
71
Appendix H (continued)
Sample Notice of Letter Objecting to
Payment of Full Union Dues
SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by
certified mail, return receipt.]
[insert your Name]
[insert your Mailing address]
[insert Date]
[insert Name of appropriate payroll department
management employee]
[insert Name of department responsible for pay-
roll deductions]
[insert Address of department responsible for
payroll deductions]
Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll de-
partment management employee]:
Today I submitted my objection to [Name of the
union] regarding the collection and expenditure by
the union of a fee for any purpose other than my pro
rata share of the union’s costs of collective bargain-
ing, contract administration, and grievance adjust-
72
Appendix H (continued)
ment, as is my right under Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if applica-
ble, my statutory right under Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
A copy of my letter to the union is enclosed. I will
continue to meet my lawful obligation of paying a
representation fee to the union under its “union
shop” or “agency shop” agreement with [Name of
employer].
Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you ensure that
the union provides me with my procedural rights,
including those outlined in my letter to the union. If
it does not, I ask that [Name of employer] provide
them.
[If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include
the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify
you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from
my wages of representation fees limited to those
costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I
am required to sign a form to make that change,
please provide me with the necessary form.]
73
Appendix H (continued)
Please reply promptly to my request. Any further
collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me
made without the procedural safeguards required by
law will violate my rights under the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. Code § 1983, or if ap-
plicable, the National Labor Relations Act, and/or
U.S. Constitution.
Sincerely,
[Name]
74
Appendix I
State Law on Decertification Elections
for Public Sector Employees
The state laws mentioned below were last verified
in August 2010. These laws may have changed
since the verification date. For questions regarding
decertification laws in your state, contact Founda-
tion staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600,
[email protected], or go to
http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.
Alaska
Alaska law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative if “an employee or group of employees or
an organization acting in their behalf alleg[es] that
30 percent of the employees of a proposed bargain-
ing unit . . . assert that the organization which has
been certified or is currently being recognized by
the public employer as bargaining representative is
no longer the representative of the majority of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.” Alaska Statutes
§ 23.40.100. A petition for a decertification election
must be presented to the Alaska Labor Relations
Agency on a form prescribed by the Agency, ac-
companied by a 30% showing of interest. See Alas-
ka Statutes § 23.40.100(c) & (e) for rules covering
when a decertification election can be held.
75
Appendix I (continued)
California
Public school (including charter school) employees
are covered by the Educational Employee Relations
Act (“EERA”) which outlines the procedures for
decertification. EERA requires the decertification
petition to be filed with the California Public Em-
ployment Relations Commission (“PERB”).
Persons must file a decertification petition with the
appropriate PERB regional office per PERB Regu-
lation 32075, and must accompany said petition
with proof of support of at least 30% of the employ-
ees in the established bargaining unit.
Connecticut
Connecticut law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative if a petition has been filed by an em-
ployee or group of employees alleging that a “sub-
stantial number of employees” assert that the em-
ployee organization which has been certified or is
currently being recognized by their employer as the
bargaining representative is no longer the repre-
sentative of a majority of employees in the unit.
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated § 7-
471(1)(ii). A petition for decertification must be
presented to the Connecticut State Board of Labor
Relations on a form prescribed by the Board.
76
Appendix I (continued)
Delaware
Delaware law permits public school employees to
obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargain-
ing representative. According to state law:
A group of employees within the
bargaining unit may file a petition
with the Board for decertification of
the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive. The petition must contain the
uncoerced signatures of at least 30
percent of the employees within the
bargaining unit and allege that the
employee organization presently cer-
tified is no longer the choice of the
majority of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. If a lawful collective
bargaining agreement of no more
than 3 years duration is in effect, no
petition shall be entertained unless
filed not more than 180 days nor less
than 120 days prior to the expiration
of such agreement. A decertification
petition also may be filed if more
than 1 year has elapsed from the date
of certification of an exclusive bar-
gaining representative and no collec-
tive bargaining agreement has been
executed.
Delaware Statutes Title 19, § 1311(b).
77
Appendix I (continued)
Employees may obtain a petition for a decertifica-
tion election from the Delaware Public Employment
Relations Board.
District of Columbia District of Columbia law permits public employees
to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bar-
gaining representative: “The Board shall issue rules
and regulations which provide procedures for decer-
tification of exclusive representatives upon the re-
quest of 30 percent of the employees.” District of
Columbia Code § 1-617.10. A petition for decertifi-
cation filed by an employee shall be accompanied
by a showing that at least thirty percent (30%) of
the employees in the bargaining unit no longer de-
sire to be represented by the exclusive representa-
tive. Such petitions must be presented to the District
of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board
(“PERB”). The rules explaining the procedures and
petition contents required for filing include PERB
Rules 505.1 through 505.3 and 505.8.
Florida
Florida law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. “Any employee or group of employees
which no longer desires to be represented by the
certified bargaining agent may file with the com-
mission a petition to revoke certification. The peti-
tion shall be accompanied by dated statements
signed by at least 30 percent of the employees in the
unit, indicating that such employees no longer de-
78
Appendix I (continued)
sire to be represented for purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the certified bargaining agent. The time
of filing said petition shall be governed by the pro-
visions of s[ection] 447.307(3)(d) relating to peti-
tions for certification.” Florida Statutes Annotated
§ 447.308(1).
A petition for a decertification election must be pre-
sented to the Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission (“PERC”) on a form prescribed by
PERC, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.
Hawaii
Hawaii law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative stating “[a] petition to decertify or to
change the exclusive bargaining representative must
be supported by fifty percent of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, through verifiable writ-
ten proof of the names and signatures of employees.
Signatures of employees supporting such a petition
must be obtained within two months of the date of
the petition to be valid with the Board.” Hawaii Re-
vised Statutes Annotated § 89-7(a). A petition for
decertification must be filed with the Hawaii Labor
Relations Board, on a form prescribed by the Board.
Idaho
Note: The following statute uses the word “Deau-
thorization” but establishes a decertification proce-
dure. A petition in a union shop for an election to
79
Appendix I (continued)
determine whether there should be any union repre-
sentation must show at least thirty percent (30%) or
more of the employees in the unit covered by the
agreement desire such deauthorization. This petition
must be filed with the Idaho Department of Com-
merce and Labor and Industrial Services. Idaho
Administrative Code § 09.05.03.014.12.
Illinois
Illinois law has a separate statute which permits ed-
ucational employees to obtain an election to decerti-
fy an exclusive bargaining representative if “an em-
ployee or group of employees or any labor organi-
zations acting on their behalf alleging and present-
ing evidence that 30% or more of the employees in
a bargaining unit wish to be represented for collec-
tive bargaining or that the labor organization which
has been acting as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative is no longer representative of a majority of
the employees in the unit.” Illinois Statutes Chapter
115, § 5/7.
Unless a specific bar applies, decertification peti-
tions may be filed between January 15 and March 1
the year that the collective bargaining agreement
expires, or in the third year of an agreement that is
in effect for more than three years. For further in-
formation on decertification rules, see Illinois Ad-
ministrative Code § 1110.60 and § 1110.70.
80
Appendix I (continued)
A petition for a decertification election must be pre-
sented to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board (“IELRB”) on a form prescribed by the
IELRB.
Indiana
Indiana law permits certified school employees to
obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargain-
ing representative. “A petition may be filed by
twenty percent (20%) of the school employees in
any unit asserting that the designated exclusive rep-
resentative is no longer the representative of the ma-
jority of school employees in the unit.” Indiana
Code Annotated § 20-7.5-1-10(c)(3). A petition for
decertification must be filed with the Indiana Edu-
cational Employee Relations Board at the Indiana
Government Center, accompanied by a 20% show-
ing of interest.
Iowa
Iowa law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. “The petition of a public employee shall
allege that an employee organization which has
been certified as the bargaining representative does
not represent a majority of such public employees
and that the petitioners do not want to be represent-
ed by an employee organization or seek certification
of an employee organization.” Iowa Code Annotat-
ed §§ 20.14.3 and 20.14.5(a). A petition for decerti-
fication election must be obtained and filed at the
Iowa Public Employment Relations Board, accom-
81
Appendix I (continued)
panied by a 30% showing of interest. Rules cover-
ing decertification, including when such a petition
may be filed are available at Iowa Code Annotated
§ 20.15.6.
Kansas Kansas law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. The Kansas Public Employment Relations
Board “is authorized to hold elections to determine
whether . . . a recognized employee organization
should be decertified” when 30% or more of the
employees in a bargaining unit petition for a decer-
tification election. However, any petition calling for
such an election “shall be dismissed by the board
without determining the questions raised therein if
such petition is filed more than 150 days or less
than 90 days prior to the expiration date of an exist-
ing memorandum of agreement which governs the
terms and conditions of employment of the employ-
ees within the appropriate unit.” Kansas Statutes
Annotated § 75-4327(d).
A petition for decertification can be obtained and
filed at the Kansas Public Employee Relations
Board (“PERB”). See Kansas Administrative Regu-
lations § 84-2-7 for PERB’s rule covering decertifi-
cation of a public employee organization.
82
Appendix I (continued)
Maine Maine law states that municipal employees have a
right to not join a union. Maine Revised Statutes
Annotated Title 26, § 963. Maine law permits pub-
lic employees to obtain an election to decertify an
exclusive bargaining representative if 30% of the
employees in a bargaining unit petition for decerti-
fication. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated Title
26, § 967 (municipal employees). A petition for a
decertification election may be obtained and filed at
the Maine Labor Relations Board on a form provid-
ed by the Board.
Massachusetts Massachusetts law permits public employees to ob-
tain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining
representative when “a petition filed by or on behalf
of a substantial number of the employees in a unit
alleg[es] that the exclusive representative therefore
no longer represents a majority of the employees
therein, shall investigate, and if it has reasonable
cause to believe that a substantial question of repre-
sentation exists, shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice.” General Laws of Massa-
chusetts, Chapter 150E, § 4. A petition for a decerti-
fication election must be presented to the Massa-
chusetts Labor Relations Commission on a form
prescribed by the Commission.
83
Appendix I (continued)
Michigan Michigan law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative if “a public employee or group of public
employees . . . alleg[es] that 30% or more of the
public employees within a unit . . . assert that the
individual or labor organization, which is certified
or is being currently recognized by their public em-
ployer as the bargaining representative, is no longer
a [majority] representative.” Michigan Compiled
Laws Annotated § 423.212. A petition for a decerti-
fication election must be presented to the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission (“MERC”) on
a form prescribed by the Commission, accompanied
by a 30% showing of interest.
If a collective bargaining agreement applies to em-
ployees of a public school district or a public educa-
tional institution, and the agreement expires be-
tween June 1 and September 30, the petition cover-
ing those employees may be filed between January
2 and March 31 of the year the collective bargaining
agreement expires or the third year of collective
bargaining agreements that last longer than three
years. See MERC Rule 423.141(c); Michigan Com-
piled Laws § 423.214. For further rules covering
decertification, including when such a petition may
be filed, see MERC Rules 423.141 and 423.145.
The petition or cards signed by bargaining unit em-
ployees to establish the 30% must state that they
“no longer consider the certified bargaining unit,
84
Appendix I (continued)
representative as their representative,” not just that
they request an election. Hepler v. State Department
of Labor, 235 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
Minnesota Minnesota law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative: “An individual employee or group of
employees in a unit may obtain a decertification
election upon petition to the commissioner stating
the certified representative no longer represents the
majority of the employees in an established unit and
that at least 30 percent of the employees wish to be
unrepresented.” Minnesota Statutes Annotated
§ 179A.12.3.
A petition for a decertification election must be pre-
sented to the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Ser-
vices on a form prescribed by the Bureau, and ac-
companied by valid “deauthorization” (decertifica-
tion) cards signed and dated by at least 30% of the
employees included within the appropriate unit.
Missouri Missouri law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative: “A petition for decertification of public
employee representative may be filed by any em-
ployee or group of employees or any individual act-
ing on their behalf alleging that the certified or cur-
rently voluntarily recognized employee representa-
tive is no longer the majority representative of such
85
Appendix I (continued)
employees.” 8 Missouri Code of State Regulations
§ 40-2.020. A petition for decertification election
must be presented to the Missouri State Board of
Mediation on a form prescribed by the Board, and
accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.
Nevada
Nevada law permits local government employees to
obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargain-
ing representative. If “the board in good faith
doubts whether any employee organization is sup-
ported by a majority of the local government em-
ployees in a particular bargaining unit, it may con-
duct an election by secret ballot upon the question.”
Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 288.160, sub-
division 4.
New Hampshire New Hampshire law permits public employees to
obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargain-
ing representative if “a petition is filed by [a]t least
30 percent of the employees in the bargaining
unit . . . asserting that the employee organization
which has been certified by the board is no longer
the representative of the majority of employees in
the bargaining unit.” New Hampshire Revised Stat-
utes Annotated § 273-C:10. The petition for a de-
certification election must be presented to the New
Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board
on a form prescribed by the Board, accompanied by
a 30% showing of interest by employees who have
signed a decertification signature card.
86
Appendix I (continued)
New Jersey New Jersey law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative if there is “a showing of interest of not
less than 30 per cent of the employees in the unit in
which an exclusive representative has been recog-
nized or certified. A showing of interest shall indi-
cate that the employees no longer desire to be repre-
sented for purposes of collective negotiations by the
recognized or certified employee representative or
by any other employee representative.” New Jersey
Administrative Code § 19:11-1.3. A petition for de-
certification must be presented to the New Jersey
Public Employment Relations Commission on a
form prescribed by the Commission, accompanied
by a 30% showing of interest.
Note, however, that for one year after certification
of a majority representative, its majority status is
conclusively presumed so as to bar the filing of any
petition . . . seeking decertification of the present
one. Galloway Township Board of Education v.
Galloway Township Association of Educational
Secretaries, 78 N.J. 1 (1978).
New Mexico New Mexico law permits public employees to ob-
tain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining
representative if “thirty percent of the public em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit make a
written request to the board or local board.” New
Mexico Statutes Annotated § 10-7E-16(A).
87
Appendix I (continued)
A decertification election will be valid if forty per-
cent of the eligible employees in the bargaining unit
vote in the election. New Mexico Statutes Annotat-
ed § 10-7E-16 (A). A written request for a decertifi-
cation election must be presented to either a local
board if it exists or the New Mexico Public Em-
ployee Labor Relations Board.
New York New York law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative: “A petition alleging that an employee
organization which has been certified or is being
currently recognized should be deprived of repre-
sentation status as to all or part of a unit (hereinafter
called a “petition for decertification”), may be filed
by one or more public employees.” New York Civil
Service Rules & Regulations § 201.2. Petitions for
decertification elections must be presented to the
New York Public Employment Relations Board on
a form prescribed by the Board, and accompanied
by a 30% showing of interest.
Ohio Ohio law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative if “a petition is filed, in accordance with
rules prescribed by the state employment relations
board . . . [by] any employee or group of employ-
ees, or any individual or employee organization act-
ing in their behalf, alleging that at least thirty per
cent of the employees in an appropriate
88
Appendix I (continued)
unit . . . assert that the designated exclusive repre-
sentative is no longer the representative of the ma-
jority of employees in the unit.” “[T]he board shall
investigate the petition, and if it has reasonable
cause to believe that a question of representation
exists, provide for an appropriate hearing upon due
notice to the parties.” Ohio Revised Code Annotat-
ed § 4117.07(A)(1).
A petition for a decertification election must be pre-
sented to the Ohio State Employment Relations
Board on a form prescribed by the Board, accompa-
nied by at least a 50% showing of interest.
Oklahoma Oklahoma law permits school employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative. If “[i]n any February more than two (2)
years after recognition of an organization pursuant
to the provisions of this section and upon the receipt
of a petition calling for discontinuation of represen-
tation signed by thirty-five percent (35%) of the
employees eligible to be included in the unit, [then]
a local board shall call an election to determine
whether the members of a unit wish to discontinue
being represented for bargaining.” Oklahoma Stat-
utes Annotated Title 70, § 509.2.C.7. A petition for
a decertification election must be presented to the
local board of education.
89
Appendix I (continued)
Oregon
Oregon law permits public employees to obtain an
election to decertify an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, if “[a]n employee or group of employees
alleging that 30 percent of the employees assert that
the designated exclusive representative is no longer
the representative of the majority of employees in
the unit.” Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated
§ 243.682. A petition for a decertification election
must be presented to the Oregon Employment Rela-
tions Board, on a form prescribed by the Board, ac-
companied by a 30% showing of interest.
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania law permits public employees to ob-
tain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining
representative. “[A] public employe [sic] or a group
of public employes [sic] may file a petition for de-
certification provided it is supported by a thirty per
cent showing of interest.” Pennsylvania Statutes
Annotated Title 43 § 1101.607. A petition for a de-
certification election must be presented to the Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Board on a form for public
employees, available from the Board.
Rhode Island Rhode Island law permits public employees to ob-
tain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining
representative. “[W]henever it is alleged by an em-
ployee or his or her representative that there is a
question or controversy concerning the representa-
90
Appendix I (continued)
tion of employees, the board shall investigate the
question or controversy . . . .” General Laws of
Rhode Island Annotated § 28-7-16. The Rhode Is-
land Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations
§ 8.06.1(a), Petition for Decertification, states: “A
petition may be filed by either employees, an em-
ployer, or a rival labor organization to displace or
decertify a certified or recognized labor organiza-
tion.”
A petition for decertification election must be pre-
sented to the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board
on a form prescribed by the Board and must be ac-
companied by a 30% showing of interest. The
Board Rules and Regulations § 8.06.1(e) states:
“[w]hen thirty (30) percent or more of the employ-
ees in a bargaining unit covered by an agreement
between their employer and a labor organization
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment file a petition alleging that
they desire that the authority of the labor organiza-
tion to make such an agreement be rescinded, the
Board’s Agent shall conduct a secret ballot of the
employees in such unit and certify the results . . . .”
Wisconsin Wisconsin law permits public employees to obtain
an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative. “If a petition is filed . . . for the discon-
tinuance of existing representation indicating a
showing of interest by 30% of the total number of
employees . . . , the commission should hold an
91
Appendix I (continued)
election . . . .” Wisconsin Statutes Annotated
§ 111.83(5)(h). A petition for a decertification elec-
tion must be presented to the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commissions on a form prescribed
by the Commission, accompanied by a 30% show-
ing of interest.
92
Appendix J
How to Start a Decertification
Election under the NLRA
First, you should assess the strength of your fellow
employees’ support for decertification within your
specific bargaining unit. Usually, it is not worth
calling for such an election unless you believe you
can gather support from a majority of co-
employees. To win, you will need a majority vote
from charter school employees who vote on the
election day. Remember, no employer involvement
is allowed.
To proceed, you and other charter school employees
should collect signatures on a petition that is similar
to the following sample petition.
PETITION TO REMOVE UNION AS
REPRESENTATIVE
The undersigned employees of
________________________ (employer name) do
not want to be represented by
________________________ (union name), hereaf-
ter referred to as “union.”
Should the undersigned employees constitute 30%
or more, but less than 50%, of the bargaining unit
93
Appendix J (continued)
represented by the union, the undersigned employ-
ees hereby petition the National Labor Relations
Board to hold a decertification election to determine
whether the majority of employees also no longer
wish to be represented by the union.
In addition, should the undersigned employees con-
stitute 50% or more of the bargaining unit repre-
sented by the union, the undersigned employees
hereby request that our employer immediately with-
draw recognition from the union, as it does not en-
joy the support of a majority of employees in the
bargaining unit.
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
_____________ _______________ _________
Name (Print) Signature Date
94
Appendix J (continued)
These signatures should be collected when the
employees are on non-work time, and in non-
work areas! You must fill in the names of the un-
ion and employer in the blank spaces above be-
fore you collect signatures. There should be no
employer help, and employer resources should
not be used.
Once employees have collected the appropriate
number of signatures, they also need to fill out a
separate NLRB “Petition” cover sheet, NLRB
Form 502. This single sheet of paper is easy to fill
out, and is available from any Regional Office of
the NLRB. The NLRB’s website contains copies of
the Petition Form (requires Adobe Acrobat Read-
er), as well as a directory of the regional NLRB of-
fices in your area.
Finally, Foundation staff attorneys may be contact-
ed with questions on how to proceed, about assis-
tance getting through to the NLRB, or concerning
legal difficulties interfering with your efforts at
(800) 336-3600, by email at [email protected], or go
to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.