Knockdown and Capsizing of theSail Training Yacht Concordia

off the coast of Brazil

17 February 2010

Jonathan Seymour, Member of the Board

Paulo Ekkebus, Investigator-in-Charge

Abigail Fyfe, Naval Architect & Senior Investigator

Pierre Murray, Manager of Marine Investigations, Atlantic Region

Sail Training Yacht Concordia

Occurrence Voyage

• Cold front forecast• 300 nm SSE off Rio de

Janeiro

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Sail Plan

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Handover of the Watch

• Sail plan good to 40 knots

• Bear off and run before any squalls

• Call master if weather posed a risk

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Animation

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Difficulties During Abandon Ship

• Launching liferafts• Exiting vessel on its side• Unable to transmit distress alert• Accounting for complement

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Post abandonment

• Emergency beacon located and verified• Difficult conditions in raft:

– seasickness– high winds and waves overnight– water in the bottom of the rafts

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Search and Rescue

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Time Time after knockdown Event

1525:54 17 Feb +1 hour Beacon’s position confirmed

0806 18 Feb +17 hours JRCC Halifax receives fax from

MRCC Brazil

090018 Feb +18 hours

JRCC Halifax contacts Class Afloat and attempts beacon’s contact number

193018 Feb +29 hours Rafts spotted by SAR plane

Search and Rescue

• All survivors were rescued some 41 hours following knockdown

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Weather Analysis

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Squall Defined

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Probable Wind Speed

• No observed wind speeds in excess of 50 knots

• No observed air temperature change• Weather system weaker than a microburst

(Environment Canada)

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Stability Assessment

• Initially – no obvious cause for knockdown• Required – detailed stability assessment• Good data available – ship’s plans,

stability book and a video• Assessment – computer model,

calculations performed & validated• Details of assessment in occurrence report

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Vessel Stability Limits

• All vessels have stability limits– Examples:

• Too much cargo• Cargo stowed too high

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Sailing Vessel Limitations

Wind 27-37 knotsHeel 70 degrees

Guidance Information

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• “Stability book” provides guidance for crew• Sailing vessels require safe operating

limits while under sail

Concordia’s Stability Limits

• Concordia had guidance information on board

• Maximum safe heel angle in gusting conditions 24 degrees

• Minutes prior to knockdown Concordia was sailing at 23 degrees

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Squall Curves-Margin of Safety

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• Concordia’s “squall curves” provide safe wind speed information

• Concordia’s margin of safety decreased as squall approached

• Vessel was at risk and action was required• Officer of the watch not aware of this

information

Findings as to Cause

• Concordia was vulnerable to a knockdown• The officer of the watch was unaware,

unfamiliar, and untrained with squall curves• Risk not recognized and no timely mitigating

action taken to:– Reduce sail and/or change course– Make the vessel watertight

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Findings as to Risk

• Knockdown preparedness• Equipment familiarization• EPIRB registration• Search and rescue issues• Safety management systems

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Safety Issues Identified

• Many flag states do not require squall curves (or equivalent) on sail training vessels

• Officers are not required to be knowledgeable in the use of squall curves

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Recommendation 1 - Canada

• The Department of Transport ensure those officers to whom it issues sailing vessel endorsements are trained to use the stability guidance information that it requires to be on board sailing vessels.

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Recommendation 2 - International

• The Department of Transport undertake initiatives leading to the adoption of international standards for sail training vessels on the provision of stability guidance to assist officers in assessing the risk of a knockdown and capsize, and for the training of officers in the use of this information.

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Action Required

• Squall curves (or equivalent) should be available on all sail training vessels

• All officers should be trained in their use

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Knockdown and Capsizing of theSail Training Yacht Concordia

Off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

17 February 2010