OTHER WORKS ON THE HOLOCAUST PUBLISHED BY BEATE AND SERGE KLARSFELD

Le Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France by Serge KLARSFELD

ts of all the Jews deported from France and history of each transport) 656 p., 1978.

La Solution Finale de la Question Juive; ssai sur ses principes dans Ie Reich et en France sous I'Occupation,

208 p., 1978, by Dr. Joseph BILLIG.

Die EndlOsung der Judenfrage in Frankreich, Deutsche Dokumente (136), 244 p., 1978,

by Serge KLARSFELD.

Works edited by Serge Klarsfeld in 1978 and intended for the Centers of Historical Research on the Holocaust:

election of two thousand documents from the German authorities in France concerning the "Final Solution" in France (1940-1944).

Presented in chronological order with detailed index and tables.

ection of several hundred documents from the Service for Jewish Affairs, the /1-112, of the Sichereitsdienst-SD (1937-1939).

Documentary files concerning the Nazi criminals (Kurst Lischka, Herbert Hagen, Ernst Heinrichshon)

responsible for the deportation of the Jews from France. They have been indicted and will be tried in 1979 in Cologne.

The autobiography of Beate Klarsfeld, Wherever They May Be. Was published in 1975 by The Vanguard Press, New York (344 p.).

singer. A Documentation, by Beate Klarsfeld, was published in 1969 by Melzer Verlag, Darmstadt, with a foreword by Heinrich BOll.

II

THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NEO-NAZI

MYTHOMANIA

The Launching of the "Final Solution"

by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

The Existence of Gas Chambers

The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report

by Georges WELLERS

Edited by Serge KLARSFELD

Translated from the Original French by Barbara Rucci

The BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION - New York 1978

The Public Committee for the Support of BeateKlarsfeld, Jerusalem

Association pour Ie Jugement des Criminels Nazis qui ont opere en France, Paris

"'~~ LIBRARy OJt-

This book is dedicated to the memory of HENRI MICMACHER

(June 29, 1925-August 24, 1978)

of

Founder and President-General Director of PRONUPTIA He was a good, generous and creative Man,

who lost his mother, father and brother at Auschwitz. e helped us to publish "The Memorial of the Depol1ation of the Jews from France."

He was killed in a tragic automobile accident, which also took the lives of his son, Marc, and his daughter in law, Colette.

v~

-'1 t

.<

J,\ t., ~ \} .;

\\1~k l--' dJ

\ \)\J.\;~~ 1~;

Copyright © 1978 by Klarsfeld All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce

this book or portions thereof in any form. FIRST PRINTING

IV

CONTENTS

Foreword ...................................... IX Acknowledgments ............................... XV

The Launching of the "Final Solution" by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

Part I: The Jewish Question until 1941.

1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action, 1933-1938 ................................. .

2. Jewish Emigration during the Incubation Period of the "Final Solution" ............................ .

3. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated from Mass Movements

4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and in the SD before the War ............................. .

5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution": the SS Destined to Inspire the Gestapo ............... .

6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within the SD, the II-112, under the Sign of "Zionism" (1935-1938) ... .

7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration ............. . 8. The Anticipation of the "Final Solution":

Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna ................ . 9. The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration

in Various Countries ......................... . 10. The Men of the II-112 Confronted with the Jews ... . 11. The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich

(1938-1939) ............................... . 12. The Integration of the Men of the II-112 into the

Reichssichereitshauptamt (September 1939) ....... . 13. Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941

V

1

3

4

8

12 17

19

22 24

26

30 30

.... , .... ~ Itt;; VIU!;;/;} Jur lne --r Inat ~·olutlon".

1. The Order of the Fiihrer (Der Fiihrerbefehl) in General 2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by the

Fiihrer and Chancellor of the Reich ............. . 3. The Announcements of the "Final Solution" by Hitler

before his Dining Companions at the Fiihrer's Head-quarters .................................. .

4. The Orders of Hitler to Himmler ............... . 5. The "Final Solution" by a Jewish Colonial Reserve

(Summer 1940-Spring 1941) ................... . 6. The Order of the Fiihrer for the "Final Solution" in the

Occupied Soviet Regions (Spring 1941-Summer 1941) The Principle of the "Final Solution" by Exterminatory Deportation to the Occupied Regions ("East of the East") (Autumn 1941) ....................... . Hitler's Approval of the Generalized "Final Solution" and the Conference of Wannsee (January 1942) .... The "Final Solution" by Gas Chambers in the Concen­trationary System (Summer 1942-0ctober 1944) .... The "Final Solution", "Page of Glory" Which Will Have Neither to be Written Nor to be Forgotten ... .

'bliography ................................... . otes

The Existence of Gas Chambers by Georges WELLERS

The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz '" ............. . l. A few Documents from Archives ............... . ~. Declarations of Members of the SS ............. . I. Statements of Former Prisoners at Auschwitz ...... .

The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein ................................ . Kurt Gerstein and His Report .................. .

, "Proofs" that the Gerstein Testimony is a "Forgery" . ~. Irrefutable Documents ....................... . f. The Gerstein Report at Nuremberg ............. . ;. Stockholm Confirms ......................... .

VI

35

39

41 44

45

47

50

57

59

61

74

109 111 113 116

120 120 122 124 126 127

6. The Gerstein Testimony and the Insincerity of its Detractors ................................ ..

7. The Gas Chambers at Belzec ................... . 8. A Mysterious Visitor and His "Testimony" (?) ..... .

9. "Witness X" and the Legend of the Mad SS ....... .

The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report by Georges WELLERS

1. Convergence of Diverse Estimates .............. . 2. Rassinier's Figures ¥d His Methods ............. . 3. The Hungarian ·Chapter ....................... . 4. The Korherr Report (December 31, 1942) ....... . 5. The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943) .. 6. Genocide in the U.S.S.R., in the Baltic Countries and

in Bessarabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Results of the Census by Nationality of the Population

of the U.S.S.R .............................. . 8. Number of Victims Recorded ................. . 9. Number of Dead and of Survivors ............. .

Bibliography

Appendices

The First Unabridged Publication of the two Korherr Reports ................................... .

Appendix A: The First Korherr Report (December 31, 1942), the German Text ...................... .

Appendix B: The First Korherr Report (December 31, 1942), the English Translation ................. .

Appendix C: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943), the German Text ..................... .

Appendix D: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943), the English Translation ................. .

Appendix E: Korherr: His Past and Present Activities, His Photograph in 1978 ......................... .

INDEX ...................................... .

The BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION

VII

128 131 133 136

139 140 143 145 149

150

151 154 158

162

163

165

177

195

202

211

212

214

Foreword

We have taken the initiative not only for the conception of this book, its edition and publication, but also for its distribution. Our objective is to provide people of good faith with the precise facts which incontestably refute the lies of the Neo-Nazi propaganda relevant to the Holocaust.

Those propagandists who seek to rehabilitate Nazism are perfectly aware that what marks it indelibly is the infamous genocide of the Jewish people. They take advantage of the credibility of the public and the more or less unconscious desire of the latter that this nightmarish mass murder had never take place. That is why the Neo-Nazis have during recent years launched an offensive which has had a certain success. Their principal themes are the following: that Hitler was not responsible for the "final solution", that the gas chambers as a mean of exterminating the Jews never existed, that the number of Jewish victims has been very considerably exaggerated.

This propaganda is internationally co-ordinated, and the most virulent of these Neo-Nazi publications appear in the major languages. In the following pages, we shall give striking examples of this propaganda which seeks to weaken the cause of the Jews in general as well as that of Israel.

At our own risk, we have been leading the combat throughout the world and on the spot to challenge the impunity of the Nazi criminals and the development of Neo-Nazism. We have also decided to make publicly known the unequivocal refutations of this propaganda and to bridge certain obvious gaps regarding the history of the Holocaust. In addition our publications are distributed free of charges to research centers on the Holo­caust and to sources of information every-where: major university and public libraries, the mass media.

We may cite as an example our "Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France", in which we reproduced official Nazi data (last names, first names, places and dates of birth, nationalities) concerning the 80,000 Jews who were victims of the "final solution" in France, as well as the description of each convoy. This work has put an end to the propagande which claimed that the Jews in France have been spared.

As for the collections of documents that we have published and our documentary files, their importance as aids to research is evident. They have also just permitted the indictment in Cologne of the former SS Chiefs, Kurst Lischka and Herbert Hagen, who before operating in France were in Berlin respectively Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the Gestapo and Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the SD.

"The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania" is based on irrefutable German documents. Of particular interest is the report drawn up for Himmler by the Inspector of Statistics of the SS, Richard Korherr. The latted added up with great precision the Jewish losses (as of December 31, 1942 and as of March 31, 1943). An appendix contains the totality of the reports in German accompanied by an English translation. They are publicly printed for the first time in an unabridged version. Moreover, Y/e have succeeded in locating the infinitely valuable Korherr himself in 'Lower Saxony, where we were able to speak with him and take his photograph. The Neo-Nazis will therefore be unable to claim that Korherr

IX

4 ~--- - _ •• 4UU UUU5"IaLlUU eUlU {nat tne documents in question were falsified or even invented.

The notes contain the original text of the quotations concerning the "final solution". The English translation can thus be easily compared to the German by those who have any doubts.

We hope that our endeavours to provide documentation as well as our direct action will receive effective support, and we launch an appeal to our readers for help so that our foundation may continue to undertake similar projects which are just as necessary.

Beate and Serge KLARSFELD.

Note: the classification numbers in parenthesis COnSIsting of a Roman numeral )IIowed by an Arabic one are the numbers of documents conserved at the Center f Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris; for example (XXXVII-l 22). The assification numbers consisting of capital letters followed by an Arabic numeral re those of documents from the Archives of the International Military Tribunal; lr example (PS-446).

x

FOREWORD

The Neo-Nazi weekly, "National-Zeitung," circulation 110,000, propaganda organ denying the Holocaust, circulates freely in the country where the genocide was

organized and perpetrated

N!!~i'tl!@l!~ty' .. g Arg. 75,. p_, Auatr.·,sot, Berg. 2OFN' DIn.3,!I !Cr. 1 FlnnL 2,-Fmk. J GrIoch.20 Dr. I HoD. ,,shll./lrak200OI./lllL UOL I KaR,·,40SI Kuw.200nl.1 Ub.1.5P11 Port.15!M1./ SeudIlt.2,S RI/SDdatr.-,3CI R./TOr1t..8 t I US ... ..,40 S IVar • .,1.'

Israel billel wieder zur Kasse Erpressung mit 6-Millionen-Liige - .-

Israel once again demands money; blackmail with the lie of the 6 million

Klarsfeld-Ban,de contra Oberst Rudel Dilrfen -Juden sich alles erlauben? I s. 2

.N@~iOll@l!~@.ttg~g Arg.1S,..P_' A ... tt.-,SO I IBolg.20FnI Dan.3,51C •• 1 f!nlll.2,-ftftk,/Gr,-cn.20D •• /HoIL1,5hll/lm .200fiIo/lTa!.350L/J[OI\..,4lI$/l(uw,:ZOO 11111 Ub. 1,5'1 fPorl. 15Esc,. I So<HIh".2,5 II I Stidqlr •• ,30 R. IflI.k.8£fUSA.,AO.'V .... ·.14f.

Neuer Gaskammer-Schwindel aufgedeckt

New fraud on gas chambers discovered

XI

N~ti01!@I.!~ty~g At;. 71,-"-I AuW.·.so,/s.lg.2G FAIl DIII.:s,s !Cr. I FInnl.2,.FtU./GMch.20Dr./ HoI!. 1,ShlLltnUot ... ' .... I5OL/ItM. ..... /ICuIr.ZOCI ... '1.h1,1F1/Pott.1$bc.' ....... 2,SRI/8IIda!r.-,3CIR./TGIt. a £/USA-AO./V ..... 14.

Die LUgen g!gen Hitler Neue Erpressungen gegen Deutschland

S.il.S/Nr.8/18.hbrvarI9n

The lies against Hitler

Der Schwindel des 20. Jahrhunderts

Das Ende der 6-Millionen-Liige Von Prof. Dr, Arthur R. Bulz

UNBEYn(LTIGTE VEAGANGENHEIT

l:~w"llsam~n T<>d~. _ al. 'Qlge die ...... nuI!3crwo.lhnlld1cnVorMch,," •.

Den Pro""""n von 11145 bb 19-19, die OuuUdlland. Krocg.~egncr durchfUhrten, ,., nkhl. Verglc!chbn,,,, gccenUoomJ.tcl. Jen,lUIdder.,Ugeohat eo ZUvOtnudlnle 8oseb<:n. Dor Fall JcnnM d'Arc komml "lnemlndenSlnn.Abcrlndl~ml'aHbe­Ir~f "f !lure]ne ,,In..,1,,c PC'$OII. 1I1<h1 le. d<>cl1clnen game" Sinai. CembB den ncue· .1,_nl'orodlung$ct scbnl .. .,"worEnc1.nd lurdleOurmhlh.run8dl" ...... P'o ........ Ver­onlworilich. E. ]01 doher nile •. urn den S"chv~rh.1t Db c,ne A.t Kolle,.", oder H"xcrej dnnuSI~lIen. DI~ Bclrellendcn .cien!>"rch,vonvoml1erelngrund.nl%Il<:h odluldlg und vcrdDmmcn.wcrt, - VCrur­toll! gcmllll lfingol vo.hand.ner RegeJn IUr )'..cul1"ndnvcm.hmen undVerf.hrcndurch clncunpulell.cheundunlvcrsDleKlrchc.

.Ind. Ole NATIONAL_ZEITUNG hal dem_ KrleRC nn&cbllch fur .<=huldll! Ix:tundcn welle. Wenn dn .GclehrIN'· test.lellt. dna Wie Meinung gemacht g~~cn~::~,6~~~:~~~~'~~~ :~~Ir:;;~: :~~~"~·,a~~: ;;u;~r:'" '~~CI,~r;ue~~Rne,~ ~~~;~~I~~I~rl~~d-&"C~~I~I"f~I~:~: wird Ruluncn dn .. gJel<=hen R<'d!l. fur aUe In dcr lcl<=ht <ul:ongllthen .rcvl.lonlaU_ <=hem Grundo nu<=h Immor - .Ich m!t clnor In den USA. dcm 'Dtstichllchcn Vorrell ••

~Ovie! ~lellt rest: Der amerikanische ;~~~;:~~~f::~~y~~~~~;~;E£:::::: ~~~~~~~::~ll~;i1~f~~:~7!~~yn;t€~ ~~:~~:~~~~;t:~~J·ul~~~n_gt;~~~.~~r~ ~~~I~~~:U~~;Bd1~"';~:~:~I~ill'I~~;~

The hoax of the 20th century; the end of the lie of the 6 million

6 Millionen vergaste Juden als Schwindel entlarvt!

Neue Dokumentation aus Amerika IS. 5

-

fl@~ioJ!@l!~J!lty~~g "6 million Jews gassed" discovered a hoax

XII

l"'UKbWUKLJ

IPlIllB lfI8AZ 8. IPlfllB

fPWBlfJlPltBlPlfI •• lfJlPfJIJa.Tf

by A.R.BUTZ

THIES CHRISTOPHERSEN

LE MENSONGE D' AUSCHWITZ

Preface de Manfred Roeder

La pone du camp de concentration d'Auschwitz

The lie of Auschwitz

PLEASE help us expose

THE BIGGEST

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from:

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XIII

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Die Wahrheit iiber die Judenmorde Wie lange noch Erpressung der Deutschen?

. N!!tioJ!@l!~tg'pg The truth on death of the Jews '

How much longer will the blackmail of Germans last?

Wer erfand den Schwindel von 6 Millionen vergasten Jude"? / s, 6

.B@.~iOJ!@l!.~tgpg h;.75,.,_, Aull •• ..sa S I 8.1,.20 F,., Dii1l.3,5 Ie., 1 Finn!.2,.flllk. I G,i.ch.200 •• 1 Hall 1.5 hR I r .... k 200 III, I 1'01. 3SO L I "gno_AI i 11( .... 20(1 All/lib. 1,5 Pi I 'orl. 15 £.c.1 SaucIi"., 2,S III SOdaf, • .,lO 1.1 Tan., 8 £IUSA -.90S/Vo •• -.14.£

So lust das Fernsehen lie das deutsche Volk belrogen wird

Dos Unbehagen der br.l~n Ilffenl-

Ilthk~1 an den Sendungen deT Rund· S KI f ld lunk·undfernsehqnsI"l!enlnderBun- erge ars e desrepubllkwlrdvonJllhrluJohrgrll·

Ber. Es bell.hl slch sowohl oul dl. k' d' t 't re ~~!. o~n:~;:~rt~:~nno~tem~~~I~n:~ un 19 weI e las pOIlt/5th' Programm. Zwor haben Anschla"ge an ",he Gerlchl, mehrlach und mil Nach· lruck ousge,proehen, daB derRund-unk ~unllbhanglg~ und selnll Sendun- Reuter, Miinchen ~~~:~;:e~~gll~eS:ln ::'~~~:~k:::~:~~ Der franzQsische Rechtsanwalt Serge thelen slth wenig darum, Ole Wltk- Klarsfeld hat weitere "Vorfalle" nach :~~~::II:~:I~:::~:nd~:~:~e:g:~~ dem Muster des Bom~ena12schlags auf .lldjeRedeseln kann. Es bl$lehl line das Verlagshaus der In Munchen her-qllllgbcrr. UnlerwDrllgkell gegenDber ausgegebenen rechtsextremen utJaro-:k~~~:ntllpaS!~:u:~e; D~;:n~s:~ ~lzeitungll angekii~digt ... Bei dem aut lnen, uml IS bntehl ebenso .Int oft rarsieId VOn Juden verubten Attentat :haml!)u lInkslasllgkelt der Pro- war Angaben der Polizei zufolge ein timme, die .51th stlwohl In der Aus· Sachschaden von 10000 bis 15000 Mark ~h~I:::nT::~::d~!~:~C:f1~"ri.h~~~I~~; entstanden. Die ein Kilo schwere Bom-Ind~poliusche~Nogazlnenundln- I be. war am Samstalt im Archivr~um des

Sonderrechte fOr Bandenchef Klarsfeld

Who invented the hoax of the 6 million gassed Jews? Special right for the head of the Klarsfeld gang

The T. V. lies in this way; how the German people are slandered

lie Wahrheit Hber Hitlers Kls tne truth on Hitler's concentration camps, by Prof. Dr. Butz

XIV

Editor's acknowledgments

We should like to express our gratitude to the two authors of these most valuable studies. Those or Mr. Wellers appeared in "Le Monde Juif" (No. 86-1977 and 89-1978) and that of Dr. Billig in "La Solution Finale de la Question Juive", a work which our Foundation published in 1978 .

JOSEPH BILLIG

Born in Saint-Petersbourg, Russia, in 1900, Joseph Billig received his Ph. D. from the University of Berlin in 1929, In 1939, Dr. Billig enlisted in the French Army, was wounded in combat and from 1940 to 1945 was a prisoner of war in Germany. In Nuremberg, he participated in the work of the American prosecution, particularly in the case of A. Rosenberg. Until 1976, he was historian at the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris.

Dr. Billig has published numerous articles as well as the following works, the titles of which we translate here from the original French:

-Germany and Genocide (Nazi Plans and Realizations). Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1950. .

-The General Commission for Jewish Affairs. Three volumes, Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1955.

-Alfred Rosenberg in the Ideological, Political and Administrative Operations of the Hitlerian Reich. Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1963.

-Hitlerism and the Concentrationary System. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1967.

-Kiesinger or a Subtle Fascism, Extra-Dienst Verlag, West-Berlin, 1969. -The Concentration Camps in the Economy of the Third Reich.

Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973. -The Institute for Studies of Jewish Affairs. Ed. du Centre, Paris,

1975. -The Final Solution of the Jewish Question. Ed. Klarsfeld, Paris,

1978.

GEORGES WELLERS

Born in Russia in 1905, Georges Wellers studied at the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Moscow. From 1932 to 1975, he carried on research in physiology in Paris, where he was named director of a research laboratory at the Faculty of Medicine. From 1968 to 1974, he was also an adviser to the Dean of the Faculty. Laureate of the Academy of Science and of the National Academy of Medicine, he is the author of more than 150 articles published by the scientific press in France and abroad. He is a member of various learned societies and is Honorary Research Lecturer at the National Center of Scientific Research. Mr. Wellers holds the decorations of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, Chevalier of the National Order of Merit.

XV

~ _______ ~ •• ~vVVUIU"1 .lL-, i::f'ti, oy tne Gestapo and deported to Auschwitz. He was liberated from Buchenwald by the American Army on April 11, 1945.

Georges Weller is the author of numerous works relative to the Nazi concentrationary system and the deportation of the Jews. From them we may cite the following titles which we have translated for the English-speaking reader: '

-From Draney to Auschwitz. Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1946. -The Mass Arrests of December 12, 1941. "Le Monde Juif" , 1949,

No. 14-15. -The French Population Confronted with the Persecution of the Jews.

"Le Monde Juif" , 1949, No. 16. -The Raid of July 16 and 17, 1942, in the Paris Area. "Le Monde

Juif" , 1949, No. 21, 22, 23. -Collective Resistance in the Camps and the Ghettos. "Le Monde

Juif" , 1949, No. 18. -An Historical Account of the Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. "Le

Monde Juif" , 1957, No. 78. -The Nazi Concentrationary System. Ed. de I'UNADIF, Paris, 1965

and 1978. -The Hunt for the Jews. "Historia", Paris 1972, No. 26. -The Yellow Star at the Time of Vichy. Ed. Fayard; Paris 1973. -The Final Solution of the Jewish Question and the Neo-Nazi Mytho-

mania. "Le Monde Juif" , 1978, No. 86. -Reply to the Falsification of Historical Facts. "Le Monde Juif" ,

1978, No. 89.

Georges Wellers is a member of the Executive Committee of the Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation and the editor of the review, "Le Monde Juif". He was the only French witness at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem.

We should also like to thank Mr. Phillip Portugal of Quality Photo Engraving, New York, and the Harbour Foundation, London, without whose generous assistance the publication of this work would not have been possible.

Serge Klarsfeld.

XVI

THE. LAUNCHING OF THE

"FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE

JEWISH Q!IESTION by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

XVII

Part I The Jewish Question uotil1941

1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action (1933-1938)

Hitler was as prudent in the launching of his anti-Jewish action as he was in demonstrating that the Third Reich was destined, by expansion, to become Great Germany.

In February and March 1933, anti-Jewish exactions took place in several localities. (1) The terms "J udeo-Bolshevism" and "J udeo­plutocracy" also continued to form part of the Nazi vocabulary, which was henceforth endowed with the dignity of being a governmental one. This alarming news arrived abroad and set off protests in the interna­tional press. Hitler attributed these anti-Nazi reactions to Jewish emigration from the Reich and retorted immediately by officially order­ing, at the end of March, the boycott of Jewish businesses, doctors anG lawyers. (2) This boycott lasted but one day, the first of April. Grebbels noted on April third: "The propaganda of atrocities has diminished very considerably. That is why the Cabinet has decided to not resume the boycott for the moment." He added that this means of pres­sure would be maintained as a menace without actually being applied. Until November 1938, Hitler carefully endeavored to avoid all public demonstrations against the Jews.

Until November 1938 (with the exception of Austria, annexed to the Reich), the exclusion of Jews from the professions was effected with caution and a certain hesitation. The first legislative act against the social position of the Jews of Germany was taken some days after the boycott. In the law of April 7, 1933, on the reform of the Civil Service, the prohibition of Jews in public office was implied. A law of April 25 introduced a quota for Jews in the schools and universities. The law of September 29, 1933, creat.ed the Chamber of Culture of the Reich, to which writers, journalists and artists were obliged to be10ng. This law excluded non-Aryans but allowed for exceptions. It was only in January 1939 that Grebbels insistantly ordered the "dejudaiZing of the Chambers." (3)

1

THE JEWISB QUESTION UNTIL 1941

To these measures were added ini tiatives which were more or less local and occasionally private. Exclusions were decreed from various occupations having to do with public service (for example, that of doctor employed by the Social Security); certain employers laid off their Jewish employees, (4) sometimes under pressure from the Party. Jewish schoolchildren and students were prevented from sitting for cer­tain examinations. As for Jews in the economy, no general rules restrained their economic activity. But the anti-Jewish policy of the regime created worry and uncertainty among the Jewish people, an insecurity which sometime~ encouraged them to sell their belongings at a loss. Certain non-Jews took advantage of this. (S)

Finally, the psychological climate of scornful hatred with regard to the Jew was marked by vexing prohibitions (6) decreed locally to close public places and prohibit use of public equipment "to Jews and dogs". The Nazi authorities played down this point in anticipation of the Olym­pic Games which were to be held in Berlin in the summer of 1936. But his attenuation was temporary (CDXXXVII-4S).

Thus Hitler's regime humiliated the Jews, but (except for uncontro­lable incidents) without violence. As Hitler proclaimed on March 27, 1933, on calling for the boycott: "Not one hair of the Jews will be twisted." The Jewish population, transformed into a body foreign to the nation, could still live by collaborating with it: the Jews were not excluded from the economy and in addition even a man such as Greb­bets tolerated a few of them in cultural affairs. A number of the most distinguished professions remained open to them. The prohibition to practice medicine dates from July 1938 and that to practice law from September of the same year.

The most striking blow cast against the German Jews between 1933 and 1938 was the promulgation of the two laws adopted in Nuremberg by the Reichstag meeting during the Congress of the Party in September 1935. It is a question of the legal and dishonoring alienation of the German Jew from his non-Jewish fellow citizens. The law on citizen­ship enacted on September IS, 1935, established the differenc.e be­tween the German citizen, endowed with civil rights, and the dependent of the Reich, who did not possess these rights. A second law of the same date forbade marriage and sexual relations between a Jew and a person of Germain or related blood. The law transformed the Jews into a group of outcasts in the midst of the German people since it was entitled "Defense of the German Blood and Honour."

Before November 1938, the Jews (aside from those of Austria annex­ed to the Reich in March 1938) were not reduced by the regulations to a miserable life of inactivity. Nevertheless, their condition of pariahs little by little weakened the foundation of their existence and plunged them progressively into misery and disarray. We may cite the report presented in July 1938 by the Jewish communities of Vienna and of the Reich at the Conference of Evian. This conference was attended by reprensentatives of thirty-two states meeting to discuss the possibilities

2

The Incubation Period

of organizing the emigration of Jews from the Third Reich. The report

concluded that "One uas the right to hope that the problem of emigration, which has become a question of life or death for the German Jews, can be resolved. We hope tllat the Conference of Evian will achieve its worthy goal at a moment when a fourth of tIle Jewish population of Germany cannot assure its means of existence and is dependent on public charity, when thousands expect iastir'b unemployment, when tens of thousands of young people wanting to work have l6st their jobs ... " (7)

It is thus that the Nazi authorities from 1933 to 1938 prepared the ground for Hitler to launch his solution to the Jewish question, at the time that the Third Reich was taking its first steps towards the creation of Great Germany. This solution could consist in nothing other tha;, the total elimination of the Jews from the German vital espace. Tht decisive step was to be taken in winter 1938 by the dispossession of tnr

Jews: economic Aryanisation. Grering, as Chairman of the Four-Year Plan, presided over the spoliation.

Towards the end of 1938, the detenoration of the quality of jewish life was such that the Minister of the Economy announced on December 20, 1938, a decree (CXLV-SSO) especially conceived to combat ,un­employment among the Jews. It instituted their obligatory hiring fm

manual work. From January 1939 on, the situation was ripe for direct action in the

sense of Hitler's solution to the Jewish question, in the sense of the liquidation of their presence from the Reich. It is at that time that Grering was to be given the reponsibility for turning the Jewish question over to the Gestapo. The first form of the solution was forced emigra­tion, already applied in Austria since spring 1938. It was convulsively inaugurated in the Reich in November 1938 by a brutal operation of internment rapidly organized with the promise of liberation to those who demonstrated their willingness to emigrate.

2. Jewish Emigration during the Incubdtion Period of the" Final Solution"

The Nazi authorities as of 1933 were interested in the development of the emigration of the Jews. They envisaged Palestine as the principal destination, and it was therefore Zionist emigration which was favou­rized. The principle was to keep the greater part of the emigrant's possessions: a fraction of them was destined to finance the emigration of Jews who were poor and the rest, while respecting the interests of the Reich's policy on foreign currencies, was destined to assure the Jews the means of settlement required of the immigrants by the countries receiving them. In August 1933, the Ministry of the Economy of the Reich concluded an agreement named Hahvara (which in Hebrew means "transfer") with Zionist organizations. According to this agreement,

3

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

the emigrant was to pay in marks the sum to be transferred; this was to cover a part of the price of German exports to Palestine (the other part was to be paid to the Germans in cash) whereas the emigrant upon arrival was to receive in Palestinian money the equivalent of the sum he had paid in marks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then Ribbentrop himself were opposed to this agreement. (8) A procedure which favourized the birth of a Jewish state, and yet in Palestine, to them seemed inacceptable. Rosenberg and his collaborators professed the same point of view hostile to Zionist emigration. But Hitler and with him Himmler and Heydrich, thus the Gestapo and the SD as well, insisted until the end of 1939 on the emigration to Palestine: the Zionist emigration was by its very nature the strongest current in the movement of Jewish emigration.

It would manifestly be absurd to infer the existence of a sort of sym­pathy between the Nazis and Zionism. This curious attitude of the Hitlerian authorities may be compared to the attitude of Hitler himself with regard to the Soviet Union at the time of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact in September 1939. This agreement was favour­able to the immediate interests of the Soviet Union, a sworn enemy in the eyes of the Third Reich; but Hitler concluded it even so. He was certain that at a given moment he would surprise the enemy by his attack. The leaders of the Soviet Union were conscious of this as were the representatives of the Zionist organizations in what concerned their own case: they received at the same time immigrants and German exports, whereas the Reich emptied its territory of the Jews and gained currency for its exports to Palestine.

The Nazi authorities gave evidence of their primordial interest in the emigration of Jews to Palestine, but they neglected no. possibility of emigration to another destination, being always understood that the greater part of the Jewish patrimony remain to profit the Reich and that the regulations concerning. foreign currencies be respected. At the end of the Conference of Evian, an international commission presided over by the American Rublee was formed. It reached an agreement with the Ministry of Finance and that of the Economy of the Reich and was founded on the same principle as that of Hahvara and valid for diverse countries of immigration. Only 25 % of the Jewish fortune could be affected by the new agreement, the rest remained at the disposition of the Reich. (9) The Rublee agreement was concluded in January 1939 on behalf of the Germans, thanks to the efforts of Schacht, opposed by Ribbentrop, who wanted po collaboration of foreign states in resolving the Jewish question in Germany. However, foreign countries opened their borders but parcimoniously to the driven-out emigrants.

3. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated from M ass Movements

The propaganda directed by Grebbels, Rosenberg and Streicher accli­matized the anti-Jewish spirit among the German masses. It was

4

The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action

necessary to obtain the consent or at least the toleration of the people for what the central authority would do to the Jews. On the other hand, all participation of the masses, except at two particular moments (the boycott of 1933 and the "Kristallnacht" of November 1938) was forbidden. The anti-Jewish movement was to be strictly hermetic, thus centralized; but in spite of that it was to be known as one of the "great actions" of the regime. The Party, a mass movement, occasionally went beyond these principles. Severe instructions coming from the top were then addressed to the diverse Nazi authorities. In March 1934, the Nazi professional organization for commerce and artisanry mani­fested its intention to provoke a boycott of Jewish stores. Rudolf Hess sent it a severe warning (CXLV-519) condemning every anti-Jewish action undertaken without an order from the FUhrer, given the reper­cussions of such comportment abroad. In April 1935, Hess sent a circular to all members of the Party to warn them that all personal contact with a Jew and, on the other hand, all spontaneous anti-Jewish activity would be sanctioned by exclusion from the Party. In August of the same year, R. Ley, chief of organization of the Party, pronounced in a circular the same prohibition to the Party and its ramifications (the SA, the SS, etc.). At the same time, Himmler addressed the following order to the members of the SS:

"1) I strictly forbid any individual action on the part of any member whatsoever of the SS against the Jews; 2) The solution of the Jewish question is a matter in the competence of the Fuhrer as it has been until now for the solution of all questions, and not of no matter what individual; 3) Violations, even slight, will be penalized by exclusion from the SS." (10)

In February 1936, Frick, Minister of the Interior, and R. Hess addressed a strictly confidential order (CXLV-531) to the civil and police administrations and to the directors of Party districts forbidding all anti-Jewish demonstrations at the time of the assassination of Gustloff, chief of the Swiss Nazis, by a Jew.

In a circular of April 21, 1936 (CDXXXVII-46), the Ministry of the Interior clearly emphasized to all regional administrations that in the Jewish question, which was developing by stages, there was no reason to go ahead of the government, whose activity had not yet exceeded the regulation of citizenship and had not yet touched upon economic questions. This circular reveals that Hitler was still waiting for the moment when he would inaugurate the solution of the Jewish question. But neither during this waiting period nor during the future activity was the German citizen to be excited. It 'was sufficient that he be comprehen­sive about the rude measures that the FUhrer would take or approve against the Jews. This detachment as to Jewish affairs is underscored in a work which analyzes the reports edited by the SD on the internal situation of the Reich: (11)

"In the echo that Hitler and his conception of the world provoked among the German people, anti-Semitism scarcely played the central role which it no doubt held in the ideology of Hitler."

5

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

--'---

It seems to us that it would be inaccurate to suppose that this indif­ference covered a tacit opposition. The citizen participates in an event as something inevitable because the one in whom he has confidence energetically proclaims it necessary.

This state of mind characterizes, too, with slight differences, the per­sonalities profoundly engaged in the Hitlerian movement. Speer, Minister of the War Economy, and one of the principal figures of the Third Reich, wrote in his memoirs:

"I have always been surprised by the slight trace which Hitler's anti-Semitic remarks have left on me... The hatred which Hitler professed for the Jews seemed so natural to me at the time that it did not make much of an impression on me."

In another passage he wrote that he did not feel

"personally concerned by the hunt for Jews, Free-Masons, Social-Demo­crats and Jehovah's Witnesses about whom I heard in my entourage."

He thought that it was sufficient for him "not to get mixed up in that." (12)

Such an attitude explains that those who executed the Hitlerian action against the Jews had not to feel marked by the horror of their task. They were attached with the other artisans of the Third Reich to a single and unique work, albeit strictly compartmentalized, a work which the Reich created. An Eichmann would certainly not have succeeded in the gigantic task of Speer. Speer would probably have been neither able nor willing to support the vision of horror with which Eichmann's activity was impregnated. But both of them knew that the person who commanded the ensemble and in whom they had confidence saw the necessity for the work of each of them. There was no passion for the object of the mission, but only for its accomplishment. Speer expressed this in his memoirs:

"I have the impression that this desperate race that I was running with time, this look of a madman that I kept perpetually fixed on the figures of production and on efficiency curves, had smothered all consideration and all human sentiments in me... What bothers me much more is rather that I did not see in the faces of the internees (in the concentration camps) the reflection of the physionomy of the regime, whose existence I was striving with the rage of a maniac to prolong during these weeks and these months." (13)

In contrast to the case of Speer, master of Hitler's war economy, the passion of zeal was in the case of the chiefs. of the "final solution" inseparably from the direct and constant vision of this physionomy of the regime, given that it was in themselves that the expression of the atrocity of Hitlerism culminated.

6

In the Gestapo and the SD

4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and the SD before the War

The Jewish question did not immediately occupy an important place in the two police bureaus of Himmler and Heydrich, that is to say in the SD for what concerns the SS and in the Gestapo for what concerns the State.

Let us first sketch the situation in the Gestapo. Political police units were developed in all the German countries immediately after Hitler's rise to power. The two most important centers were those of Bavaria and Prussia. In Bavaria the political police was presided over by Himmler and directed by Heydrich. Gcering presided over that of Prussia, which he baptized "Geheime Staatspolizei": Gestapo. Its direction was confided to Diels. As of April 1933 its judicial section was endowed with a service for matters concerning Jews, Free-Masons and anti-Nazi emigration. This service was directed by Hasselbacher.

Between 1933 and 1934, Himmler managed progressively to obtain the direction of the political police for all the regions of Germany. In April 1934, he first of all received froin Gcering, as his assistant, res­ponsibility for the Gestapo, the direction of which he entrusted to Heydrich. Under Heydrich, the service of Hasselbacher was transferr­ed from the judicial section to that of "Enemies", main section of the Gestapo, which had already distinguished itself under Diels by the hunt for Communists and other representatives of the left. But Hassel­bacher's activity in the Jewish question remained rather unimportant. However, Himmler and Heydrich rapidly transformed the Gestapo (Prussia) into a central authority which surveyed the political police of all the regions of Germany. We shall note that the Service for Jewish Questions in the Gestapo was attributed the index IIB4.

Although directed by the Reichsfiihrer-SS and by his close collabo­rator, Heydrich, the Gestapo was not confounded with the SD. When Heydrich moved into the Gestapo in Berlin, he brought with him pro­fessional policemen from Munich all while keeping on certain men, such as Hasselbacher, who had worked for Diels. The men of the SS were integrated into the Gestapo, but it was the profession-al policemen who were to organize the work.

The section which contained Hasselbacher's office was at first directed by Flesch, who in addition personally handled Jewish matters (CDXXXVII-20). He was replaced in September 1937 for Jewish matters by Freytag. The latter remained in this post until June 1938, to be finally replaced by Kurt Lischka (CDXXXVII-23,2S). (14)

The SD, intelligence service of the SS, was created by Heydrich on Himmler's orders in 1931. It developed a very considerable activity before Hitler's rise to power (intelligence concerning political parties,

7

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

but also concerning the diverse tendencies which were being formed within the Nazi Party itself. (15) It was, however, relatively inactive between 1933 and 1937. Its chief, Heydrich, concentrated his efforts on the Gestapo. The two principal sections of the SD were Section II, "Internal Affairs" (Inland), and Section III, "'Foreign." In Section II an "Adversaries" service was formed; it covered in particular "ideolo­gical adversaries," which included the service concerning Free-Masons (Ill). Within this service a SUb-section for Jewish affairs (figure II 112) was to be created. The first chief of II 112 was von Mildynstein, replaced (16) by Schroeder who kept the position until April 1937. Beydrich had just ordered a more dynamic activity of II 1, and Schroe­der was removed in favour of Wisliceny. But the real impetus was ;not to be given until the second half of 1937. Wisliceny was replaced in November 1937 by Herbert Hagen (CXXXVII-18) (17) whereas all of II 1 received for chief a young and brilliant professor, F.A. Six. The latter, in addition to his activities in the SD, was at the same time to be director of the' Foreign Policy Institute. He had already previously worked with Hagen. The II 112 was divided into three parts: "Assi­milated Jews," "Orthodox Jews "-a part which was to remain embryo­nic-and "Zionism." The first subject was at the beginning treated by Schroeder and as of March 1937 by Dannecker (CDXXXVII-18); the third was confided to Eichmann.

Himmler destined the SD to become the intelligence service inspiring the Gestapo, while at the same time remaining independent and retain­ing its statute from the SS and not from the State. He required of the SD a freedom of mind which the functionaries of the police lacked. Those of the SD lent themselves to a careful study of the problems they explored and reached objective points of view from which they drew what were to them well-founded conclusions. The independence of the SD did not always dispose the Gestapo to collaborate. But this colla­boration was established on good terms in the Jewish question, at least until 1937.

5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution": The SS Destined to Inspire the Gestapo

Hitler waited for more than five years before undertaking the liquida­tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space. He did not, however, leave the world ignorant of his intentions for so long a period. It was known that the intended to proceed with this liquidation at a certain time and to entrust this governmental action to the non-govern­mental organization of the SS, the only one capable of executing this solution in a radical manner. In September 1935, he presented to the Reichstag meeting at Nuremberg the three laws of Hitlerism: that of the flag of the Third Reich (flag with the swastika), that of citizenship in the Reich, and finally that concerning the protection of the German blood and honour.

8

-

The Preparation of the Final Solution

The Congress during which Hitler proclaimed the three laws was called the Congress of Liberty to underscore that the Reich had re­assumed its military sovereignty (March 1935) by proclaiming obligatory ,military service. On the other hand, the naval agreement with England implied the expansion of its rearmament. As for the domestic situation, the opposition forces were practically mastered by 1935. Far from appeasing him, this situation incited Hitler at the Congress to parti­cularly emphasize his resolution to strike out harshly at the slightest sign of opposition. He declared ~uring the opening speech:

"This spirit of decision to stamp out certain aangers in all circumstances, and even those still in the bud, will not hesitate either, should the situation arise, to transfer functions which are not fitting to the State because they are foreign to its very essence to organizations better adapted to the execution of this task." (18)

Here Hitler denounced the weakness of the professional police, who were still too influenced by considerations of a careful respect of legality to act with full efficiency in a field such as that of the Jewish question. Nevertheless, when the time for the anti-Jewish action arrived, it was the Gestapo which detained the central responsibility. But Heydrich had by that time integrated members of the SD with his executives. As for the "organizations better adapted" evoked by Hitler to rigorously apply a policy of repression, he gave at this same congress a further detail, but a fundamental one, precisely on the subject of the anti-Jewish policy.

We know that at this Congress of the Party he convoked the Reichstag at Nuremberg in order to submit the laws already mentioned. In the speech presenting them, Hitler let loose against the anti-Nazi influence of Jews abroad, but also against the agitation which, according to him, they maintained inside the Reich. He proclaimed:

"The third (law) is the attempt at a legislative regulation of a problem which, in case of a new failure, must be entrusted to the National-Socialist Party for the definitive solution. Behind the three laws stands the National Socialist Party and with it and behind it the Nation. I ask that you accept these laws." (19)

Hitler spoke in the opening discourse of adequate "organizations" which would act in place of the State. Now he spoke of the Party. But within the Party, among the organizations of repression, the SA was already emasculated. What was left was the SS with its SD. As for the Party as such, in 1938 it attempted to take in hand the economic Aryanization in Austria. At a meeting on October 14, 1938, concern­ing the Four-Year Plan, Grering denounced (PS-1301) the savage acts of members of the Party designated administrators of temporary enter­prises. He also rejected the thesis according to which Aryanization was a Party affair, it being exclusively an affair of the State. It was precisely during this period that the process of integration into the Gestapo of specialists of the Jewish question of the SD began in Austria, annexed to the Reich.

9

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

Heydrich in an article of 1936 (20) explained the task of the SO as indispensable to the Gestapo:

"The prerequisite to the struggle of the police against the adversaries is the "ideological struggle" against the principles of the adversary which can only be led by the National-Socialist movement. That is why the Police of the State must work in the closest liaison with the SD of the Reischs­fUhrer -SS, to which the direction of the NSDAP has entrusted, in its position as an organization of the SS as a whole, the intelligence work for the investigation and surveillance of the adversaries on the level of ideas."

Much later (May 1944), Himmler defined the role of men trained in the SO in the exterminatory deportations of Jews to the East. In a speech pronounced during a course on political ideology (21) he said:

"Measures taken within the Reich could not be taken by a police composed only of a civil servants. A corporation which would be bound only by the oath of a civil servant would not have the necessary strength. These measures could be adopted and applied only by an organization composed of National-Socialists moved by a fanatic conviction. The SS is one and affirms itself as apt and has taken the responsibility for this task."

These words of Himmler express retrospectively what Hitler indicated at the congress of the Party in 1935: the vocation of the SS to execute the solution of the Jewish question.

In 1944, Himmler spoke of the "final solution" in its definitive sense; the direction of it could only be assumed by men trained in the spirit of the SO. If he considered that these men in particular were prepared to undertake such an action, it is not because he believed them to be especially brutal. On the contrary, in this instance it was rather their flexibility and their intellectual discipline that he judged to be a favour­able condition. Having once established an absolute goal, a flexible nature is necessary if one is to pursue it not blindly, but in adapting the action to fluctuating circumstances. The goal was the total elimination of the Jew from the German vital space. The intellectuals of the SO worked first on planning the emigration, then on the "territorial solu­tion" (attribution of a "reserve" to the Jews); and finally they agreed to the process of extermination. The years of study of the Jewish condi­tion in the world, years spent within the SO, made them proficient at this task. They knew the structures of Judaism and were able to set up a system of administrative collaboration with the Jewish organizations, which in most countries facilitated the deportations.

We have quoted the words of Heydrich in an article dating from January 1936 concerning the role of the SO. During the same month and year, the principal Nazi daily, the "Voelkischer Beobachter," explained the SO to the general public:

"Given that the Secret Police of the State, taken up primarily by tasks of the executive branch, is unable to fulfill that task of observation of enemies

10

¢

The Preparation of the Final Solution '

of the State to the extent required, it is the security service of the Reichs­fUhrer-SS, named by the deputy of the FUhrer, whis as a comple­ment to it will assist it as the intelligence service of the Nazi mouvement and will thus put a great part of the forces of the movement which it has mobilized at the disposition of the security of the Reich." (22)

We insist upon these 'official explanations of what constituted the SO because, considered by itself, its activities remained in the background of those of the Gestapo, which represented the terrifying face of the regime. However, the greater part of the men who accomplished the most complex and most horrifying task of the "final solution" within the Gestapo came from the SO.

In June 1936, Himmler obtained the creation of a unified police for all of the Reich. As of that time his official title was: Reichsfiihrer-SS and Chief of the German Police attached to the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich. He thus disposed not only of the Gestapo but also of the civil police and the criminal police. But the criminal police and the Gestapo became a single office, that of the security police, where H. MUller was Chief of the Gestapo and Nebe that of the criminal police. Thus Heydrich presented himself henceforth as Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) on behalf of the State, and as Chief of the SO on behalf of the SS.

The SO possessed within the Reich a whole network of regional and local services which were to gather intelligence on the activities of the opponents of Nazism. This information was then centralized in the main bureau (Hauptamt) of the SO in Berlin.

Until the second half of 1935, that is to say before the "Nuremberg Laws," the activity of the SO was insignificant, at least in what concern­ed the service for Jewish affairs. Nor was the Gestapo at the center of the anti-Jewish policy of the first period. Neither the exclusion of the Jews from the public sector as a whole, nor from cultural activities nor from certain professions necessitated by definition the intervention of the Gestapo. It did intervene, however, in case of violation of the regulations and was consulted by other authorities. The role of the Gestapo began to become important for the Jews only in 1938. Adler, historian of the "final solution" in the Reich, wrote (23):

"Already in 1938, the greater part of the important procedures and many of the less important ones concerning the Jews were equally within the jurisdiction of the Gestapo which was either working on the matter or kept informed."

As for Jewish affairs in the SO, as early as the end of 1935, that is to say, following the legislation proclaimed at Nuremberg in September of the same year, Heydrich gave the order to develop the service of Jewish affairs of the SO, which was still embryonic. Let us recall that the service in question bore in the whole of the SO the index II-1l2.

11

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within theSD, the /l-112, under the Sign of "Zionism." (1935-1938)

We have indicated above that before 1935 the SD did not handle Jewish affairs. Eichmann, posted in the SS to the SD in 1934, was em­pioyed in the Free-Mason service, where he found the work fastidious. At his trial in Jerusalem he described how he accepted with joy his trans­fer to the sub-service" Judaism," which had just been created. (24)

"One fine day at the beginning of 1935... the SS-Untersturmflihrer von Mildenstein came in... He told me that he had organized a new sub-ser­vice (Referat) "Judentum" ... and asked me if I didn't feel like being appointed to it. Happy to get rid of coins and seals, I answered: yes."

Eichmann was to take charge of Zionism whereas a certain Schroeder was then working on matters concerning the assimilated Jews. Eichmann added that von Mildenstein did not delay in giving him the book by A. Boehm, "Judaism," which he was later to sum up in a "Leitheft" (Notebook of Guidelines for Work). Eichmann indicated the subjects of stUdy (25):

"Structure of world Zionist organization, the goals of Zionism; the sources which assisted it and its difficulties, and also the possibilities of supporting it (Foederung) given that it sought a political solution to the Jewish question."

In brief, the first task of the II-112 consisted in studying and, by means of" men of confidence" and informers, keeping aware of the activities of Jewish organizations both Zionist and wassimilating." Under examination, Eichmann gave the characteristics of the successive chiefs of the II-112 and accorded the place of honour to Hagen. It is interesting to compare these characteristics.

We are already familiar with the structure of the II-112. Let us now consider it in its presentation by Eichmann. He very much appreciated von Mildenstein who rejected the vulgar anti-Jewish propaganda launched by Streicher and "sought unconditionally a political solution in such a way that I considered Mr. von Mildenstein my master." But Heydrich judged that von Mildenstein's anti-Jewish behaviour was too clement," (26) and the latter was replaced at the beginning of 1936 (27) by the very young Schroeder, his protege, whose name we have pre­viously cited. According to Eichmann, Schroeder, whom he despised for his lack of maturity and his arrogance, was to keep this post only a few weeks. Nevertheless, the reports of the II-112 still bore his name in April 1937. He was, however, only temporarily named chief of the II-112 (CDXXXVII-16).

He was replaced on the first of April, 1937 (CDXXXVII-18), by Wisliceny, who until that time had been the collaborator of one of the people responsible for the "Free-Mason" service. "Wisliceny was a

12

The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112

benevolent chief. His obesity predisposed him to tranquillity. He was well-read in history, one could converse admirably with him." After the departure of Schroeder, the post "Assimilated Jews" remained vacant. But the replacement was promptly appointed. It was Danne­cker, transferred from one of the regional offices of the SD in the pro­vinces where he also took care of Jewish affairs (CDXXXVII-18),

In the meantime, the' work intensified:

"Now things began slowly to move... That is what one calIed the daily entries (Tageseinlauf). The reports of the sections (regional, local) of the SD, the shipments of materials from the archives seized by the Gestapo and 'ffom which reports were to be addressed to it, reports of Nazi organi­zations and of the police services."

Towards the end of 1936, (28) all of the section II-1 received a new head which was to give it all its impetus. This was F.A. Six, employed until then as chief of the "Press" section, 1-3. It is Six who in Novem­ber 1937 was to replace Wisliceny by Hagen, the former being trans­ferred to Dantzig to direct the regional section of the SD, "Ideological Adversaries." Eichmann related that Hagen "tried to set up the affair otherwise and to animate it ... " Thus Six replaced the fiegmatic Wislice­ny by Hagen, who was his protege and former collaborator in the "Press" section. Eichmann testified:

"Hagen was an intelIigent and broad-minded person. He disposed of a fine general culture and was highly capable of rapidly assimilating matters of which he had previously no knowledge, of recognizing what was essen­tial, of extracting it and immediately writing an article on it... And it is thus that Dr. Six used him as the author of numerous articles in his monthly, published at the time by the Institute of Foreign Policy under his editorship ... " "At that time he had no idea of Jewish organizations, of their aspirations, of their goals. The first thing he did on arriving was to question me... He interrogated me, in fact, in such an exhaustive manner and wanted to know everything with such precision that it was difficult for me to come out with everything I knew: more exactly, he pumped out my knowledge until there was nothing left, the organizations that I named. And the astounding thing was that he retained alI that... I should add that he was assisted in this by the tables that I have evoked previously, those which were hung on the walls and which generally indicated at least the names."

Hagen had in Eichmann a serious and extremely zealous collaborator. Eichmann declared under examination:

"I must say that I procured the Jewish Encyclopedia and other works in great quantity... At that time I read enormously in this field and, its goes without saying, all of the Jewish papers."

He said that he studied the Jewish organizations first-hand and that having no executive power and therefore being unable to convoke Jewish personalities to interrogate them, he obtained these contacts by means of convocations delivered by the Gestapo.

13

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

Judging from the cited characteristic of Hagen, the latter developed his activities of chief on the basis of material assembled by Eichmann.

Eichmann declared in Jerusalem: "As I have already told you, Hagen arrived after WisIiceny. And accord­ing to the old saying, "New brooms sweep clean," one began here with a renewed activity under the authority of Hagen's superior, Dr. Six... Since the end of 1935, one had only dragged ... (Hagen) submitted to his chief a new division of labor. In principle, it was a question of pulling the SD out of the insignificance of its activity and pulling it up to the level of the Gestapo, in direct contact with it, Gestapo-executive authority, SD-intel­ligence authority. This intensification took place not only in the II-lI2 but in the whole of II... and had to result from an order of the chief of the Sipo and the SD ... " (29)

In this passage, Eichmann answered questions concerning the report submitted by Hagen to Six in December 1937 (CDXXXVII-21) on the "reorganization of the section," thus from the time of Hagen's nomina­tion as head of the II-112.

Hagen declared that the "real work on the adversary Judaism by the section II-112 began roughly near the end of 1935," but that the awk­ward tactic of the direction (of the II-112) prevented the establishment that the II-112 did not bring out its initiative in the Gestapo and that, of "all practical contact" with the Jews in Germany. Hagen deplored when the latter took an interest in Jewish organizations and proceeded to the interrogation of a personality repreCS'entative of these organizations, "the questioning was conducted exclusively by officials of the Gestapo." Hagen added that one did not exercise any "political orientation of Jewish organizations ... according to the Gestapo's point of view," nor the surveillance of" Jewish political officials." In contrast, we learn that the representatives of the II-112 henceforth entered into direct contact with the representatives of Jewish organizations convoked by the Gestapo and that one spoke not only of Judaism in Germany but in the world as a whole. "By means of regular convocations of officials direct­ing Jewish organizations, we are trying to direct the policy in the Jewish question in such a manner as to favourize and intensify the emigration especially of indigent Jews." At the same time, visits to the headquar­ters of Jewish organizations permitted the checking-up on them and the correction of certains "faults" such as the employment of foreign Jews. On the other hand, the II-112 established a liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior" to obtain an immediate influence upon the practical execution of the emigration. The final objective is to centralize all of the Jewish question in Germany in the SD and the Gestapo. A report to the Chief (Heydrich) on this subject is being drawn up." (30)

Eichmann under examination (31) emphasized the contradiction be­tween the firm resolution of the government to have the Jews emigrate and the difficulties raised on this subject by the German administration. The development of the Jewish affairs section of the SD, with the Ges­tapo as executive authority, had the task of overcoming the difficulties and taking charge of the solution of the Jewish question, which at that time amounted to emigration.

14

The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112

The central role that the II-112 was destined to play for the Gestapo was emphasized in the report quoted from Hagen which referred to a decree of execution (Funktionsbefehl) promulgated by the Reichsfiihrer on July 1, 1937. It stipulated that the SD was to be responsible "for all general and fundamental questions" which did not include executive measures and that it was to take its decisions "in strictest agreement with the section II B4," the section of Jewish affairs of the Gestapo.

An examination of the trimestrial reports of the SD II-1l2 demons­trates the role played by this section in the activities of the II B4 of the Gestapo. The report edited in October 1937 (CDXXXVII-20) qualified as "sufficiently good" the collaboration with Flesch in whose section the II B4 was situated. It adds:

"Since September 15, 1937, Assessor Flesch has been transferred to the Gestapo of Berlin. A personal contact has been made with his successor, Assessor Freytag. Given that Assessor Freytag has not yet any familiarity with the field of Judaism, he (Flesch) has asked to help him to a large extent and especially to advise him also on executive measures." (32)

,.

In its semestrial report of July 1938 (CDXXXVII-23) it is under­scored that the II-1l2 interrogated the leaders of Jewish organizations,

and it is explained that:

"The necessity to engage itself personally in this sort of manceuvres or action stems from the fact that the civil servants in charge of external affairs of the Gestapo are not qualified, due to their lack of knowledge in this field, to find out from the Jews the information necessary to determine

the general tendency." (33)

This report nevertheless indicated a few regional centers of the SD and the Gestapo. March 1, 1939 (CDXXXVII-25) declared:

difficulties between the The trimestrial report of

"The relations with the section corresponding to the Gestapo, the II B4 (Governmental Advisor Lischka and Governmental Advisor HUlf), are very good. Collaboration: All questions relevant to Judaism are discussed to­gether on the basis of the fundamental attitudes of the section II-1l2. All of the correspondance is countersigned by the main office of the SD and by the Gestapo when it is addressed to a third party ... " (34)

The semestrial report of January 1938 (CDXXXVI-22), from which date the II-1l2 was directed by Hagen, brought out the good relations with the Gestapo and added: "The initiative in the work belongs essen­tially to the II-1l2." (35) As for the surveillance of Jewish organi­zations, the reports specify that not only were Jewish leaders convoked by the SD to be questioned by the Gestapo, but also that the SD commonly made unannounced visits to these organizations and at the same time searched their headquarters (CDXXXVII-22-23).

These quotations demonstrate that the development of the SD and of the Gestapo exactly correspond to the views of Hitler and Himmler, according to which the governmental authority of the Gestapo in hand-

15

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

ling the Jewish question needed the inspiration of the non-governmental authority of the SS of which the SD was an emanation. In the trimes­trial report of March 1, 1939, Hagen, writing of the" Action of Novem­ber against Jewry (Judenschaft)" (a reference to the "Night of Crystal": reprisals for the attack committed by Grinzpan in Paris against the person of the German diplomat Von Rath), specified that "the prin­cipal bureau (of the SD) and all its main and regional branches partici­pated in part in the execution of the action and in part in the putting under safe cover of the material of Jewish archives and libraries." (36) At that time Eichmann was occupied in Vienna, and it was Hagen and Dannecker who had to cope with all this activity directed by Lischka. The last part of it saw the brutal internment of 30,000 Jews as a means of pressure to stimulate the wiIIingness of the Jews to emigrate from the Reich.

A few weeks after having received the responsibility for the II-112, Hagen drew up the regulations for his section which were summed up in a note of December 21, 1937 (37). The accent was put on the necessity to study works devoted to Judaism, to make resumes of them and to discuss them. These regulations formed a supplement to those given by the II-I, that is to say by Six. They were thus due to Hagen personally. It is true that on this subject the reports note that due to lack of time, the cultural work never got off the ground. Let us re8all, however, that Eichmann affirmed that he had read enormously on the question. In addition, a thick report on French Judaism made by Oannecker at the time of his activity in Paris (XXVI-I) shows that he was very familiar with the structures of Jewish organizations in general. It is certain that the education which Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker acquired by assiduous study made them competent specialists of the Jewish question.

The work which was being accomplished in the II-112 carried the obligation of letting at least a chosen public outside of the SO take advantage of it. Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker gave lectures on the Jewish question for the preparatory courses of the SO but also for classes organized by the Police, by the "People's Tribunals" and above all by the Party. This teaching activity was very intense from January to June 1938. During this period when, precisely, the solution to the Jewish question was suddenly brought up . before public opinion as having to be resolved without delay, the princi,?al activity was due above all to Hagen and Dannecker and very little to Eichmann, who was occupied in Vienna forcing the Austrian Jews to emigrate. One notes in the report of October 1936 to February 1937 (COXXXVII-16) four lectures; in that concerning July to December 1937 six lectures of which there were delivered by Hagen, (CDXXXVII-22), two by Eichmann, one by Dannecker. But from January to June 1938 twenty-nine lec­tures were given, including eighteen by Hagen, four by Dannecker and one by Eichmann. Afterwards, in the report covering July to December 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), one notes two lectures by Hagen, in August. In the report of January to June 1938, Hagen wrote:

16

,...

The Service For Jewish Affair, the II-112

"Given that the involvement of the service 11-112 in the field of education (Schuling) remains very intense, it appears necessary ... to name a scientific assistant to prepare the documentation." (38)

But no follow-up was given. Let us note that in August 1938 Hagen prepared two lectures for the Foreign Policy School of the Party, but that the text was presented by Knochen in Hagen's absence. Knochen was the assistant of Six. It is evident that the collaboration between

the sections of the II-I was close. It is instructive to point out that the SO's manner of bringing up and

treating the Jewish problem was in clear and violent contrast to the vulgar and pornographic anti-Jewish propaganda of Streicher and his monthly, "Der StUrmer" ("the Assaillant"). The team which was educating and cultivating itself to later assume a central role in the "final solution" developed its capabilities by the imposition of a certain scientific discipline. This divergence between Heydrich and Streicher came to light in May 1938 concerning a foul anti-Jewish illustrated which Streicher destined for young people: "Der Giftpilz" ("The Poi­sonouS Mushroom") (CDXXXVII-8, 9, 10). Streicher gave Heimer, the editor of the "stUrmer", the reponsibility of taking the necessary steps to obtain a favourable report on the publication from the SD. Hagen, Six and Heydrich decided that a favourable opinion on their behalf was inadmissible. But they consented to receive Heimer to show him the work that Eichmann was accomplishing within the Jewish community in Vienna. In a letter which Hagen wrote to Eichmann on June 28, 1938, he pointed out the ineptitudes of the editor of the "Sturmer." Writing to his "Dear Adolph," Hagen laughed at the horrified indignation of Heimer confronted with the revival of Jewish

religiOUS sentiment.

"When I hear such a thing, I hold onto my head: but what do they have to do then! Perhaps the "Stlirmer" will contribute in bringing about the radical solution of shortening them by a head to prevent their having the joyful thought of recognizing themselves as Jews again." (39)

7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration

The Gestapo and the SD imagined that the best way to develop the massive emigration of the Jews was to favourize Zionist emigration. According to the statistics furnished in March 1943 to Himmler, only 15 % of the 353,000 emigrants from the Reich went to Palestine. But it was anticipated that the Zionist movement would be able to encou-

rage the wave of emigration. We may cite on this subject a characteristic note of the Gestapo.

This note dating from February 20, 1935 (CDXXXVII-5), informed all branches of the Gestapo that the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, was

17

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

to be forbidden to speak in pUblic. It was formulated in the following manner: "It is true that he is a Zionist. It has, however, been esta­blished that he prefers the leftist movements of Judaism." (39a) This care to maintain Zionist feeling among the Jews xas also shown by certain details. For example, a note of April 4, 1936, from Heydrich to all of the Gestapos (COXXXVII-3) announced that the use of Hebrew was forbidden in public assemblies, but that it was authorized in meetings the intention of which was the practice of that language to facilitate emigration to Palestine.

Given this tendency, it is evident that the work of Eichmann, respon­sible for Jewish affairs, was the most important in the anti-Jewish section of the SO. With this in mind, he made in company of Hagen a study trip to Palestine in 1937. He read Yiddish fluently, which allow­ed him to study the Zionist press. He thus learned that a para-military organization ("The Hagana") had been formed to prepare the creation of the Jewish state. It was consequently necessary to make contact with this organization to learn in what spirit and what manner the Jews were acting to obtain the majority in Palestine by intensifying immigra­tion. Eichmann succeeded in establishing contact with one of the leaders of the "Hagana" who came to Berlin, entered into connivence with him and invited him to come visit the Jewish colonies in Palestine.,?

Hagen on June 17, 1937 (COXXXVII-1), drew up a report signed by Six and intended for Heydrich. Let us note that at that time the II-112 stilI had Wisliceny for chief. But apparently the nonchalance of the person excluded him from dynamic actions. The report edited by Hagen stated that Eichmann was the obvious man to follow up the invitation, but that for greater security it was better that he be accom­panied. Hagen commented:

"The Jewish work of colonization must be studied thoroughly. It is im­portant to know these works in particular because after the proclamation of a Jewish state or a Palestine administered by the Jews, Germany would have a new adversary in foreign policy which could decisively influence the political line in the Near East. In addition to that, the establishment of a State will accentuate the question of a statute for the Jews, as a minority residing in Germany." (40)

This argumentation, common among the Nazi doctrinarians, opposed them to Zionism. But this was not the case for Hagen. In fact, in this same report he proposed to offer the following compensation to Polkes (representative of the Hagana):

"to put pressure on the committee representing Jews in Germany so that it would oblige Jewish emigrants to go to Palestine exclusively and to no other country. SUch a measure is clearly in the German interest and has already been prepared by measures of the Gestapo. The plans of Polkes to obtain the Jewish majority in Palestine will thus at the same time be favourized." (41)

18

The SO and the Zionist Emigration

Hagen thus weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the Zionist emigration and decided that the advantages were greater. The voyage took place between September 26 and October 2, 1937. Eichmann was accompanied by Hagen himself. At his trial he spoke of Hagen as his superior here. This is not quite true because Hagen took over the II-112 only in November 1937. He nevertheless occupied, directly next to Six, a position superior to that of Eichmann, albeit in a different service of the II-I. Although their position of emissaries of the SO was camouflaged, the English authorities prevented Hagen and Eichmann from entering Palestine from Egypt. The two envoys of the SO suc­ceeded even so in meeting Polkes in Egypt and in informing themselves of the situation there and in a Palestine. The report (COLXXX-8) dated 4 and 27 November, 1937 (Hagen already being chief of the II-112), was drawn up for the greater part by Hagen. Eichmann related only his discussions with Polkes in Cairo. As for relations between the Jews and the Arabs, Hagen judged that the Arabs had no racial hatred towards the Jews, but that they were against them only if their own interests were threatened by them. Counting on Zionism, Hagen did not however neglect anti-Judaism. In conclusion he proclaimed "the total incompetence of the Jews to direct the economy of their country" and declared

"the habit the Jews have of deceiving each other is evidently not the most minor reason for the economic chaos of Palestine, even more so because the absence of Aryans does not allow the Jews to trade with them ... " (41a)

As for Eichmann, he declared himself opposed to Polkes's proposition!:) (without having admitted this to him) which risked making Palestine too powerful and were inspired by the Havara agreement to which, accord­ing to Eichmann, the SO was opposed. He agreed with the point of view of Wisliceny who in July 1937, in an "Orientation Notebook" which he wrote for the SS Office on Race and Implantation, argued against the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The reason advanced was that this state would serve as a cover for all the Jewish minorities in the countries that they would continue to exploit (point of view also defend­ed by A. Rosenberg). The Nazi support of Zionism was evidently a great paradox. The fact remains, however, that the SO acct;pted this paradox. It was ·sufficient that the propensity to massive emigration which was inherent to Zionism be able to immediately serve the liquida­tion of the Jewish presence from the Reich.

8. The Anticipation of the Final Solution: Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

Until March 1938 the solution to the Jewish question was, so to speak, in incubation in the Third Reich. The signal that brought it suddenly to the foreground was the annexation of Austria. Beginning imme-

19

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

diately after the annexation, the action was still limited to Austrian territory. The "solution" was not in evidence in all of the Reich until November 1938.

The operation in Austria was both carefully and feverishly prepared by the S.D. (42) An immense and technically perfected file was com­piled to cover all persons whose activities classified them as opponents of Nazism, obviously including the Jews. As of March 1938, the Hitlerian power lashed out against the Austrian Jews. Expropriation was immediately decreed and applied. The Jewish organizations as a whole were forbidden, and personalities representative of Jewish commu­nity life were arrested and interned. (43)

In the semestrial report on the activity of the II-112 between Janua­ry 1 and June 30, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen summed up the politi­cal action in Austria which was the essential part of the activity of the II-112 at the time:

"Results of the investigations: the accomplishment of the entire operation against Jewish organizations in Austria, with the participation of civil servants of the foreign section of the Gestapo: reconstitution of Jewish orga­nizations for the country of Austria; discovery of internal processes concerning the foundation of a Jewish State; financing of the Jewish emi­gration form Austria to the extent that it is admissible from the point of view of the situation of the Reich regarding foreign currencies." (44) '7

As for the direction of this action, the report states:

"The SS U'stuf Hagen was detached to Vienna from March 3 to April 11, 1938, to participate in the actions in Austria. SS U'stuf Eichmann was on March 16, 1938, designated for the same mission and was later entrusted with the direction of the II-112 of the Office there." (45)

At his trial Eichmann gave no account of the presence of Hagen in Vienna. He related that he arrived alone in Vienna and that, having no contact apart from the address of the Sipo-SD in that city, he under­took the reorganization of Jewish life, subordinating it to the imperative of emigration. He told of the liberation of Jewi<>h personalities, the choice he made of an administrator of the Jewish community and the intuition which led him to create a central office for Jewish emigration (Zentralstelle fUr judische Auswanderung). He was quick to unite in the same section representatives of all the government authorities on whom the delivery of emigration permits depended. This centralization did in fact remarkably accelerate the process of preparation for emigra­tion. According to the testimony of Wisliceny (LXXXVII-67), Heydrich engaged his authority for the creation of this office.

We have noted, however, that Eichmann soent the first three weeks in Vienna with Hagen, entrusted with the same mission as the latter. In addition, the idea of a Zentralstelle may be derived from Hagen's report of December 7, 1937 (CDXXXVII-21), on the reorganization of the II-Il2 involving it in practical work and not just theoretical. It is in short a question of the principle of subordination of everything concerning the Jewish question to the SD and the Gestapo. The Zen-

20

,...

Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

tralstelle that Eichmann was to organize in Vienna was nothing other than the instrument of this centralization recommended by Hagen as soon as he was nominated to head the II-112. It was, as Hagen expressed it on December 7, 1937, the instrument of the "establishment of relations with the competent sections of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." But Eichmann perfected this principle by addressing himself to all the authoritie<; on whom the per­mission to emigrate depended: the Prefecture of Police, Ministries of the Economy and Finance, the Gestapo, etc. The representatives of all the authorities were gathered together in one bureau, and the preparation of all the documents necessary for emigration took place as on an assembly line. (46) According to this testimony of Eichmann, the Jewish personalities with whom he then worked in Vienna had also asked him to centralize the procedures; for, as he recognized himself, the diverse administrations sometimes created obstacles, which exaspe­rated the Jewish emigrants.

In the impetus that the II-112 gave to the Jewi5h emigration from Austria, it continued to give preference to Zionist organizations. The semestrial report of Hagen for the period of July to December 1938 (CDXXXVII-25) informs us that after the closing up of all the Jewish organizations in Vienna, immediately following the annexation to the Reich, all of the Zionist organizations were Ie-opened (and religious organizations as well, except for those exercising educational activities). In contrast, the organizations of assimilated Jews remained prohibited.

On May 3, 1938, Eichmann (47) wrote to Hagen:

"Dear Herbert... the "Zionist Review" publishes its first issue next Friday. I had the manuscripts sent to me and am currently in the midst of the bothersome work of censoring. It goes without saying that the paper will be sent to you. It will in a way become "my" paper ... I have required that the cultural community and the Zionist union reach a figure of 20,000 indigent Jews emigrating between April 1, 1938 and May 1, 1938, which they have accepted as having to be executed."

Eichmann in this letter summed up the situation as follows:

"Aryanization, Jews still in the economy to be treated according to the decree of Gauleiter Burkel. By far the most difficult chapter, that of getting the Jews to emigrate, is the task of the SD ... "

The Zentralstelle was a dependancy of the "Sipo-SD of the Danube." Eichmann was named direc;tor of the Zentralstelle. But he still belonged to the SD II-Il2, of which he directed the Austrian branch. At the same time he exercised an executive function, for on the one hand he organized the administrative work in view of emigration; and on the other hand he led the Jews to emigrate by making their life in Austria intolerable. Subordinate to Stahlecker, chief of the Sipo-SD for the region of the "Danube", Eichmann was divided between the SD, to which he still belonged, and the Gestapo. It nevertheless remains that the SD II-Il2, in other words Hagen, finally arranged matters concern-

21

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

ing the emigration from Austria; and this is proven by Hagen's report of October 31, 1938 (CDLXXX-18). He went to Vienna to organize with representatives of the Ministry of the Economy the attribution of currency which was to permit the emigration of the Jews first from Austria and later also from the Reich. Hagen emphasized that he strongly insisted that the Zentralstelle be the sole agent handling these sums. This was to avoid the creation for this purpose of a Jewish economic organization.

The Zentralstelle turned over to the II-lI2 the documentary material confiscated from Jewish organizations. This material was immediately and carefully studied, as prove the reports of the "Kommando" formed for this purpose in the II-l12. The collaborators of the II-lI2 sought among other things any traces of anti-Nazi activities on the part of the functionaries of the Jewish organizations. One of the people assigned to this work put in his report of June 17, 1938 (CDXXXVII-26), that he had discovered in a letter of 1936 from a member of the "Union of Austrian Jews" that the latter had been very active in the fight against National-Socialism in Austria. The coI1aborator of the II-l12 added:

"The original of the letter and copies of it were immediately sent off to U'Stuf. Hagen to see if the Krisshaber case was already known. If it was, an investigation was to be conducted at once by the section "Austria" or else an arrest was te be made." (48)

But the II-l12 was more and more involved in matters of,an executive nature. It acted in company with agents of the Gestapo. Thus Himmler gave an order which Heydrich apparently transferred to Six and Six to Hagen. Hagen stated in a note of November 2, 1938 (CDLXXX-22), that Eichmann had established contact with the Gau­leiter "Lower Danube," Globocnik (he who was later to direct the extermination of the Polish Jews), concerning the execution of Himmler's order to concentrate aU of the Austrian Jews in Vienna. It was under­stood that these Jews (approximately 10,000 people) would be invited by representatives of the SD, accompanied by members of the Gestapo, either to emigrate before December 15, 1938, the ZentralsteI1e furnish­ing them both papers and financial means, or to transfer before Octo­ber 31 their residence to Vienna, where housing would be provided.

9. The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration in Various Countries

Paranel to this activity of the II-l12 in the executive field, the intelli­gence activity also continued. The local and regional headquarters of the SD stiU had their confidence men and their informers and communi­cated information to the main office of the II-l12. But Hagen personal­ly took care of this work when it concerned confidence men and infor­mers abroad. (49) He wrote in his report of December 7, 1937 (CDXXXVII-21):

22

'7

,..

Jewish Emigration in Various Countries

"Outside of this work, we have begun to study world Judaism in a system­atic manner (partly by direct contacts) given that the decisions for the con­tinuation of the solution to the Jewish question in Germany imply an exact knowledge of the leading Jewish organizations on a universal scale." (SO)

He insisted in his semestrial report for "June to December 1939 (CDXXXVII-25) on the.importance of intensifying work abroad; for the emigration of the Jews, which was taking place under constantly increas­ing pressure, displaced the field of action of the Jews to foreign countries.

Among the few confidence men and informers ,of whom he disposed abroad, the central role was played by people in the Near East. In the report for January to June, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen indicated one man in New York, another in Paris, one in Bucharest. But these names were crossed out. There remain in a stable manner three or four persons for the Near East and three persons through whom the II-l12 tried to organize clandestine transportation of Jewish emigrants or ways to transfer money for the emigrants. These were the essential subjects of Hagen's correspondence with his men of confidence or informers (CCXXXIV). It happened that the SD and the Gestapo together disposed of the same informer. Occasionally, Hagen's correspondants also provided political information aside from the Jewish question. Hagen welcomed it gladly but as less important complementary infor­mation and transmitted it to the appropriate sections of the SD. All of the activity of intelligence-gathering seems not to have amounted to much. The II-l12 learned a great deal about the structures of Judaism all over the world, but the documentation gives the impression that it sought its knowledge primarily in non-secret sources.

The essential preoccupation of the II-1l2 was the intensification of Jewish emigration. On June 20, 1938, (51) Hagen informed Eichmann of the success of his talks with the Ministry of the Economy on the use of funds coming from contributions granted to the Reich by Jewish organizations abroad to aid emigration.

In a note of November 7, 1938, Hagen proposed to develop propa­ganda which would incite England to grant additional possibilities for this emigration. In the course of that year, Hagen emphasized several times in his notes to Six the necessity of obtaining from foreign countries greater possibilities for the Jewish emigration. The II-1l2 also involved itself in the organization of an illegal emigration.

On February 6, 1939, Hagen wrote to one of his confidence men, director of an important travel agency, about the failure of the transport of Jews that the latter had organized to Paraguay. He communicated to him the rumours according to which the government of that country would accept the illegal immigration on the condition that it be remu­nerated at a certain rate per head. In May and June, 1939, the director of the travel agency corresponded intensely with the II-l12 (Hagen put him in contact with Eichmann and Dannecker) to execute the project of buying old Greek boats for clandestine transportation of Jews, the

23

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

payment for which was to consist in the delivery of arms. Hagen contacted the Ministry of the Economy on this subject (CDXXIV-8, p. 16). In July he noticed that the Greeks were avoiding the issue, probably following English intervention (May 19; June 2, 12, 17 and 29; July 5, 6, 8). This correspondance reveals that the Greek fleet often participated in the clandestine transport of Jews.

In the course of 1939, the emigration became increasingly difficult. Hagen noted on June 15, 1939 (52):

"Promote" emigration to the maximum possible. The emigrations are be­coming more and more difficult... Promote all plans for emigration no matter where."

In March 1939, Hagen gave Eichmann the responsibility (53) of assembling a documentation for a report to Heydrich on a plan for the installation of Jews in Madagascar. He presented it as having already been debated between France and Poland. This report was to be compiled in collaboration with the section for Jewish affairs of the Gestapo (II B4), and it revealed that

"the Jewish question cannot be resolved on the basis admitted until present (financial difficulties, etc.) and that it is necessary to put a foreign policy solution on the agenda ... (Madagascar Plan)."

A reference to this non-dated note was made in another of March 24, 'i 1938 (CDXXXVII-28), from Dannecker, It was drafted in Vienna, apparently in Eichmann's presence, to recall among other projects the one in question.

10. The Men of the I/-112 Confronted with the Jews

In 1939 Six and Hagen, employing the pseudonym of "Dieter Schwartz," put out (testimony of Wisliceny, LXXXVIII-67) a brochure entitled "World Judaism," which appeared in the series of treatises published by the SS. Beginning with the thesis of the Jewish will to dominate the world, they analyzed the system of Jewish political, social, financial, national and international organizations. They finished up with Zionism which they considered incapable of bringing about a real solution, given the number of Jews in the world and the small territory of Palestine. "Dieter Schwartz" revealed in this context that the Jews themselves desired a Jewish State only as the center of a Jewish govern­ment power which would protect them in the activities that dispersed they would continue to develop. "Dieter Schwartz" thus denounced Zionism. The brochure concluded, nevertheless, by emphasizing that the only thing that interested Germany was to remove the Jews from its territory at any price. Thus the authors did not exclude, without how­ever saying so explicitly (they did not bring up the question of anti­Jewish measures), that if Palestine could not contain the entire popula­tion of Jews in the world, it would suffice to absorb that of the Reich.

24

The Men of the II-112 and the Jews

It is known that in the report on his trip with Eichmann to the Near East, Hagen represented the Jew in Palestine as a crook who, for lack of activity in a non-Jewish milieu to rob it, took advantage of the Jews with whom he was surrounded. Hagen formulated the classic anti­Jewish image of the Jew moved by a depraved desire for world power. In this brochure the condition of Jew is considered a racial characte­ristic, indelible: the Jew remains Jewish no matter what his religious beliefs nor his integration with another people. Hagen wrote on June 3.0, 1939, to a Czech editor to advise him on the anti-Jewish propaganda to be developed in his paper, "Znova:"

"Given that the law concerning Jews has not yet appeared in the Protec­torate-the reason for this is probably that the Germans do not agree with the religious conception advanced by your Government-you thus have the most favourable occasion to continue your propaganda activity of your racial conception in the Jewish question." (54)

And Hagen gave much advice to his correspond ant.

In the anti-Jewish propaganda, Six, Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker condemned the hysterical outbursts of Streicher and his paper, "Der Stiirmer" (" The Assaillant "). They limited themselves to a cold and laconic refusal of the Jewish presence in their country. This refusal was to be thus even more efficacious in its results.

Hagen was not obliged to enter into contact with those Jews for whose removal he was working. We have no direct information permitting us to imagine the attitude that he assumed if he happened to communicate personally with them. But we do know how, according to the SD II-112, a man of the SD was to approach the Jews. Hagen wrote in a note of February 9, 1938 (CDLXXXIX-9) on the activity of the SD in the region of Fulda-Werra, which counted a numerous Jewish population (according to Hagen, 23,000 Jews resided in Francfort), that the man assigned to the Jewish question in the SD of that region was unfit for the job. His chief wrote that" although demonstrating both willingness and zeal, he is not suited to fulfill his function given his age (twenty-two years old) and his lack of tcughness." (55) Hagen thereby agreed with the opinion of the chief of the branch of the SD.

An account on Eichmann and the atmosphere of the emigration offices that he organized allows one to conceive the comportment of a person of the II-112 when confronted with Jews. B. Loesener, Chief of the Section on Racial Questions at the Ministry of the Interior, described Eichmann as he appeared to the Jews in the offices of the Zentralstelle and those of the Jewish community. (56)

"The corridors along which the emigrants had to pass were enormously overcrowded with Jewish persons who had to or wanted to leave. I had not the courage to speak to one of these people, for I felt that I was being watched by Eichmann, although he was polite and even very attentive to me; but one always sensed his glacial determination. In the corridors overflow­ing with people, frightened women seized their children as soon as they saw Eichmann, whereas he, without being troubled by this, advanced as if the

25

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

way were clear and pushed aside all that recalled human misery. I follow­ed in his tracks ... Eichmann also took me into the office of the community of the synagogue, in the Leopoldstrasse, where he had previously spoken of me as reporting on racial questions to the Ministry of the Interior. Upon my arrival there, I saw a certain number of Jews seated on chairs on which they had obviously already been waiting for hours. When we arrived, they immediately stood up; they were persons in charge of various questions in the community of the synagogues of Vienna. In a curt manner, Eichmann called them by their names, indicated to me just as briefly the subjects of their reports, and they at once, like trained animals, delivered what they had to say. On each face, one could read the expression of a mortal fear which was well-founded ... "

Neither the letters exchanged by Hagen ("Dear Herbert") and Eichmann ("Dear Adolf") nor their relations as chief and subordinate reveal the slightest disagreement concerning their way of acting. One may suppose that Eichmann's comportment was virtually approved by Hagen.

11. The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich (1938-1939) .

The final solution had been launched in Austria as of spring 1938.,/ Geering, in charge of the Jewish question, declared at a meeting of the Four-Year Plan (PS-l301) on October 14, 1938, that it was time to exclude Jews from the economy. He meant by the same occasion that the incubation period of the Jewish question was over. The action precipitated in Austria was like an anticipation of what was to be done everywhere in the Reich. But Geering at this meeting severely criti­cized the manner in which confiscations had been effected in Austria. The Gauleiter in charge of the operation considered that it should profit Austria!). members of the Party who had suffered before the annexation to the Reich. Because of this, Aryanization had taken place in scan­dalous disorder and with abuses. Geering underscored that in the entire territory of the Reich, the dispossession of the Jews was to be strictly the affair of the State and not of the Party.

In April and in June 1938, the economic Aryanization in the Reich was already noticeable in decrees ordering the Jews to register their businesses and their fortunes. But on December 3, 1938, a decree proclaimed the Aryanization of possessions. This decisive step in the launching of the solution to the Jewish question was taken during the storm raised by the attack committed by the Polish Jew Grynzspan at the German Embassy in Paris. He killed, apparently by chance, the German diplomat Von Rath in a protest against the brutal expulsion of Polish Jews from German territory. Geebbels seemingly encouraged by Hitler, incited troops of the SA and the Party to proceed with progroms in the night .of November 9-10. This measure was severely disapproved by nearly alI of the ranking Nazi dignitaries. The burning down of synagogues and the wrecking of stores were accompanied by looting.

26

The Passage to the Final Solution

On November 10, 1938, Heydrich gave orders (PS-3S01) to the Sipo-SD to not prevent the pogroms as long as the directives against exactions were respected by the crowd. On the other hand, he ordered the arrest of the greatest possible number of Jews and their internment in concen­tration camps. In the report to Geering (PS-30S8) dated November 11, Heydrich gave him very incomplete information on the enormous amount of destruction' and looting and on the arrest of Jews to be interned. The next day Geering, on Hitler's orders, met with the most important leaders of nearly all branches of the Government (PS-1816) to decide upon preparatory measures for the solution of the Jewish question. He began as follows, speaking as the man responsible for the Four-Year Plan (note that the essential work in the preparation of the "final solution" was economic: the dispossession of the Jews, called economic Aryanization):

"Gentlemen, today's session is of prime importance. I have received a letter from Bormann, Chief of Staff of the Representative of the FUhrer, in which he writes to me on behalf of the FUhrer that the Jewish question must now be considered as a whole in order to be brought in one way or another to its solution. Yesterday the FUhrer once again reminded me by telephone to take all of the decisive measures in a centralized manner. Given that the problem is principally a vast economic problem, that is where one must apply the pressure ... " (57)

For hours Geering and the participants at this conference made an effort to uncover and define the necessary measures to assure that in the space of a few weeks, the Jews of the Reich would be separated from their possessions. Their fortune was to be blocked by the State which was to grant them a pension of 3 112 % of this fortune; their businesses were to be sold or officially liquidated.

Heydrich intervened nearly at the end of the conference to give another turn to the deliberations and one which went to the heart of the question:

"Whatever may be the elimination of the Jews from economic activity, the fundamental problem finally still remains that of the departure of the Jew from Germany." (57)

He set forth the manner in which the Sipo-SD proceeded in Austria by creating and using the Zentralstelle. He pointed out that in the same period of time, only 19,000 Jews had left the Old Reich, but 50,000 had left Austria. He explained that the Jewish emigration would not cost the Reich any foreign exchange and asked that Geering create an office for the totality of the Reich similar to that of the Zentralstelle in Vienna. Geering accepted this request. Heydrich sketched out the future: the emigration of all the Jewish population was to take eight to ten years during which a total segregation of the Jews was to be applied. Finally, Geering evoked an even more shady aspect of the question:

27

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

"If the German Reich were to find itself involved in the foreseeable future in an external conflict, it goes without saying that we, too, would think in Germany in the first place to settle our account with the Jews. Aside from that, the Fiihrer will finally undertake-beginning with the powers that have put the Jewish problem on the agenda-a foreign policy action to thus effectively attain the solution of the problem of Madagascar. That is what he exposed to me on November 9 ... " (57)

Thus, on November 9, the news of the death of Von Rath having reached the Chancellery, Hitler evoked as an immediate objective the project of the Jewish reserve in Madagascar and, as a possibility in the future, a "settlement of accounts" with the Jews in case of war. In what concerns Madagascar, we know that in March 1939 Hagen had reminded Eichmann of the necessity of a report on this subject to Heydrich.

But what marks with an· indelible stamp Grering's personal style of treating the Jews at this time when he was in charge of the Jewish question, is his exclamation to the famous conference of November 12, in respect to the enormity of the sum that the insurance companies would have to spend to cover damages caused by the progroms:

"I should have preferred that you slaughter two hundred Jews rather than annihilate such worth."

The feverish activity of expropriation, first in Austria and afterwards 'i in the totality of the Reich, was not in the competence of the II-112. The economic administration of the country, at the head of which was the Four-Year Plan, took care of it. The section of Eichmann in Austria and, since spring 1939, also in the Protectorate, took care of economic questions only in relation to the Jewish emigration.

The expropriation of the Austrian, German and Czech Jews was a wide­sweeping action. It was also the preliminary action necessary to the solution of the Jewish question. But the solution itself, or the liquida­tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space, was represented at this time by emigration. And it was prepared by the SD, by its studies and by the influence it held on Jewish organizations. It was the SD which trained Eichmann, still acting in Vienna as editor for the II-U2, although placed at the disposal of the Sipo-SD of Vienna. It was Hagen in Berlin who could consider himself at the head of the action which Eichmann had just launched in Vienna.

Honouring a promise made to Heydrich at the meeting of November 12, 1938, Grering ordered the creation of the "Reichzentralstelle flir jiidische Auswanderung (The Central Office of the Reich for Jewish Emigration)." He added in his decree of January 24, 1939, on this subject (NG-2586A) that he subordinated this office to Heydrich as Chief of the Sipo, that i,s of the Gestapo and the Criminal Police. By the same occasion, the SD was in a way removed from the action. Eichmann's precedent showed the path to be followed: the men trained by the SD were put at the disposal of the Gestapo. Grering's decree contained an important clause which clearly stemmed from the doctrine of the SD cultivated by Hagen, Dannecker and Eichmann:

28

The Passage to the Final Solution

" ... Take all measures for the preparation of an intensified Jewish emigra­tion: among others, create an appropriate Jewish organization to assure the uniform preparation of requests to emigrate ... " (58)

We know with what care the II-112 inspected and developed its contacts with Jewish institutions, work which Eichmann prolonged in Austria by reanimating the activity of the Jewish community in Vienna, which collaborated with the Zentralstelle to organize the emigration. In Germany, the institution of this nature was to be the "Reichsver­einigung der deutschen J uden" of which the creation was decided (on the basis of a decree of Grering) in July 1939. But the Reichsvereinigung was to be obliged to participate in administrative work, not for the emigration but for the deportation of the Jews. Alder, a knowledgeable historian of the deportation of the German Jews, and who himself lived during this period in the Reich, pronounced in his work on the depor-tation the following judgment:

"The connection between the SO and the Reichsvereinigung... worked remarkably in anticipation, at the development of the process of deportation

without snags." (59)

The same thing took place in most of the occupied territories. The Gestapo owed to the SD this fruitful doctrine of the utilization of Jewish organizations. But it was the Gestapo which applied the method elabo-

rated by the SD. The internment of 30,000 Jews during the "Crystal Night"

(Heydrich stipulated in his order (PS-3051) that it was necessary to arrest wealthy Jews in particular), was also an operation of the Gestapo to incite this mass to hasten its emigration. These internees were quickly liberated on condition that they prove their willingness to emi­grate. However, the SD collaborated in the action, as Hagen stated in his semestrial report for July-December 1938. It nevertheless remains that the essential part of the operation no longer belonged to the SD.

Hagen wrote in the semestrial report for July to December 1938 (CDXXXVII-25) (the report dates from March 1, 1939, thus after

Grering's decree): "At the time of the preparation of the Reichszentralstelle fiir jiidische Auswanderung und der Reichsvereinigung der luden Deutschlands, the SO at first led the tal ks. The situation changed only after the Reichszentrale fUr jiidische Auswanderung was subordinated to the Security Police." (60)

This by itself indicates that the essential work of the II-112, that with the Jewish organizations, had passed in 1939 into the hands of the II-B4 of the Gestapo (section directed by Lischka). A note of Hagen (CCXXXIV-18) of May 25, 1939, on the reception of two regional chiefs of the SD to whom Hagen, aided by Dannecker, explained the new situation, emphasized that because of "the giving of the direction of the Reichszentrale flir Jiidische Auswanderung to an official of the Gestapo", the SD had not to take the initiative for the creation of new centers for emigration and that all questions of assistance to the Jews were to be settled with the consent of the offices of the Gestapo.

29

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

He stressed several times that he had brought Lischka up to date. Hagen added a general remark to his explanations:

"Given the intention of dropping as much as possible the treatment of judaism inside Germany by the SD, a plan is being drawn up to involve Judaism abroad in the work of the section II-112 to a greater extent than presently. For this reason, the two (visitors) were invited as of now to seek out all of the facts concerning Judaism in Poland." (61)

We may wonder if Hagen was getting ready in May 1939 to prepare the materials for a future activity of the Gestapo in Poland. We ignore if these new projects were in fact initiated.

12. The Integration of the Men of the l/-112 into the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (September 1939)

The breaking out of the war very rapidly brought about a radical transformation of the structure of the SD and of the Sipo. The Sipo and the SD were both capped by a single unit, the "Reichssicherheits­hauptamt (Principal Security Office of the Reich: RSHA)." The RSHA was split into six and later seven departments. The former Depart­ment II of the SD, where Six and Hagen were, became Department III, that for intelligence activities for the interior of the Reich. But there( was no longer an anti-Jewish section. On the other hand, Depart­ment III of the SD, which became Department VI of the RHSA and took care of foreign intelligence under the direction of Jost and later of Schellenberg, had an anti-Jewish section. It was called "Judaism and Anti-Semitism "and was directed by Hagen.

Hagen's section was a sub-section of that entitled "Ideological Enemies Abroad," which was headed by Knochen. The latter had previously been the assistant of Six in the press section, where he had held the responsibility for the analysis of the press of emigrants from the Reich. As for Six, under whose direction Knochen, Hagen, Wisliceny, Eichmann and Dannecker had until then worked, he received a special responsibi­lity in the RSHA: that of the direction of the scientific department, "Ideological Studies and Applications." The Gestapo delivered to it all of the material (archives, libraries) seized from "ideological enemies." The Gestapo itself (as of March 1, 1941) was to be Department IV of the RSHA. The section for Jewish affairs which under Lischka was the II B4 became the IV B4. Subordinated to Eichmann, it had no longer to be guided by the SD, as in the time of the II-l12.

13. Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941

The task of the IV B4 was at once considerable. It was to assure that the harsh laws of exception conceived to totally uproot the Jewish population bring about total segregation. For that purpose it was to set up and control the Union of Jews in Germany. Because the

30

Eichmann's Task 1939-1941

possibilities of emigration had become infinitesimal, the IV B4 was reduced to working by itself while waiting for a solution to be found. In the Austrian and Czech territories, the two ZentralsteIlen, that of Vienna created by Eichmann and that of Prague (for the Protectorate: Bohemia, Moravia) created in 1939 also by Eichmann, continued to function. During the early months of the war, Eichmann devoted himself to these two bureaux. They were dependent on the Sipo-SD of their region but in fact acted on their own initiative without interference from Lischka, Chief of the IV B4.

During these first months, the IV B4 in a way remained outside of the principal circuit of the anti-Jewish activity, which began to develop in a new direction. The conquest of the vast Polish territories and the fall of Polish Judaism into the hands of the Hitlerian power opened up new perspectives for the manipulation of the Jewish populations in general. The objective was to liquidate their presence from the German vital space.

The division of Poland into a part annexed to the Reich (Wartegau, Upper Silesia) and a region placed under the regime of the General Government coincided with the intention to evacuate the Jews from the first part and also from the Reich and the Protectorate into the General Government, a region of the latter to be used as a temporary reserve for Jews. That is what Heydrich on September 21, 1939, explained to the mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) of the Sipo-SD in invaded Poland (PS-3363) at a time when the General Government was not yet proclaimed as such (62). Heydrich added that it was a question of the "final goal" kept secret and which would be attained after a rather long period by the "totality of the measures" (Gesamtmassnahmen). He stated that these measures themselves were to be soon announced. A certain zone in the region of Lublin seems to have been planned for the concentration of the Jews, who were first brought by stages into the cities of the General Government.

One wonders what Heydrich was thinking as he evoked "the final goal" about which he refused to say anything whatever. It was certain­ly not a question of the very principle of the creation of a Jewish reserve in the General Government. This project was not in fact hidden from public opinion nor was that of a Jewish reserve in Mada­gascar. Thus a direct evocation of the Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin and a rather allusive evocation of a reserve in Madagascar are to be found in a short treatise which the publishing house of the NSDAP put out in 1941 (63):

"For a certain period of time, a region of settlement in the districts of Lublin was considered a sort of reStorve for the Jews ... But it was also unthinkable that the Jewish reserve near Lublin be a definitive solution. This solution can only be obtained on the basis of the recognition of the principle that the Jew has not to be part of the world and territories where white men are settled, but rather those of colour. It is therefore in the region of the latter that the future territory for Jewish settlement must be sought."

31

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

But the author ends his treatise with <l p;ognost;c Yihich lc:'::',·C3 [2 C::lUDt in the air as to the very principle of a Jewish reserve:

"In the meantime, the war imposes its own problems on us and the victory will confront the German people with new tasks, still greater, most of which will be more important than the problem of a Jewish reserve. The last word has not yet been pronounced, but it will be at the appropriate time and by an authoritative source in order to definitively liberate the people and the Reich from the malediction of Europe: the Jew on the eastern border."

One has the impression that the author wanted to lead public opinion to believe that the German people would have neither time nor energy to lose in taking care of the settlement of the Jews and that Hitler would know how to pronounce the word which would assure their disappearance in the most radical of manners. Isn't this how we must interpret the unutterable "final goal" that Heydrich announced on Sep­tember 21, 1939? The following observation is in fact found in the report on the inspection trip that Seyss Inquart, deputy of Governor General Frank, made to the General Government in November 1940. It concerns the eventuality of a Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin:

"This region, with its swampy character, could quite possibly, according to the reflections of District Governor Schmidt, be used as a Jewish reserve, a measure which would probably greatly decimate the Jews." (64).

Relating to this it is to be noted that Heydrich, in his memorandum of September 21, 1939, to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, insinuated that the mysterious final goal would be attrained by the living conditions that these measures would bring about for the Jews.

The plan for a Jewish reserve in the General Government was given up as of 1940 (LXXXVIII-67).

Between summer 1940, after the brilliant victory in the West, and autumn 1941, the ideas concerning "the final solution" to be given to the Jewish question were not fixed. It was hoped that the power repre­sented by the victorious Reich would oblige the other nations to grant the Reich space for a Jewish reserve. The plan for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar included Jews from Poland as well as from Western Europe.

That did not prevent the continued concentration of Jews in the General Government until March 1941. Eichmann was able to tell of an order from Hitler to evacuate 300,000 of them, a figure which was far from being attained at the time. (65) As the deportations of Jews concern­ed mainly the Austrian territories and the Protectorate, Eichmann with his two Zentralstellen in these two countries was greatly involved in this operation. In addition to the Jews, Poles were massively deported from Poland annexed to the General Government. All of this movement of populations provoked the furor of the Governor General, H. Frank. To counter these reproaches against the chaotic action of the Sipo-SD, Heydrich created within the Gestapo (the RSHA IV) a section IV D4 to organize this action. He named Eichmann its chief. Dannecker was

32

'(

,...

Eichmann's Task 1939-1941

at Eichmann's side during an important conference which met on January 30, 1940: it concerned the transfer of populations in the regions i:J. question (66). Thus Eichmann and Dannecker were integrated with the RSHA-IV. In contrast, Hagen, as we have seen, remained in the SD, in the RSHA-VI (SD for foreign intelligence), where he directed the section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism."

It is not clear how the functions of Eichmann as Chief of the IV D4 and Chief of the IV B4, were combined. He was named head of the latter in place of Kurt Lischka, who had been transferred in December 1939 (Postdam film 1174A2592 (603)) to Cologne to direct the Sipo-SD there.

According to his own testimony, Eichmann in the spring of 1940 became Chief of the IV B4, the section for Jewish affairs, with Rolf Gunther as his assistant. As for the functions of Eichmann in the IV D4, they ended in March 1941 with the prohibition to transfer popu­lations to the General Government. It is only after this date that the documents designate Eichmann's section as IV B4 and no longer IV D4.

Eichmann related that upon taking possession of Lischka's former section, the IV B4, he found there

"in addition to the furniture, the civil servants who until then had served Lischka. They continued, as was normal, their work of secret police of the State, an activity which was then foreign to myself and to Gunther. But they were very well-trained civil servants, who were perfectly familiar with their regulations, in which we then had to plunge ourselves and study them." (67)

The situation is here in a way the reverse of that of the SD 11-112 in 1938 in relation to the II B4 of the Gestapo. At that time Hagen, Dannecker and Eichmann impregnated, so to speak, the anti-Jewish work of the Gestapo with their knowledge of the Jewish question acquir­ed in the SD. Now Eichmann and his assistant, Gunther, applied them­selves to combining their capabilities acquired in the SD with those demanded by the executive work of the police.

This situation was soon to be also that of Hagen, Knochen and Dannecker. Let us recall that Knochen and Hagen were in Depar­ment VI of the RSHA, the foreign intelligence section of the SD, where Knochen directed the section "Ideological Adversaries" and Hagen had within this section the sub-section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism." As for Dannecker, we know that at the beginning of 1940 he was with Eichmann in the IV D4. In the second half of 1940, all three were to be designated for Jewish affairs in the Sipo-SD in occupied France.

In the summer of 1940, Heydrich sent a small commando to Paris. It was to form the branch of the Sipo-SD in occupied France. The anti-Jewish movement in France apparently had a privileged position in the solution of the Jewish question as a whole. Luther, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in a memo­randum of August 1942 (NG-2586): "The regulations in Paris served

33

THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941

as a model for the regulations in Holland and in Belgium." (68) The elite of the anti-Judaism unit of the SD was transferred to Paris. Knochen, specialist of the affairs of emigrants from the Third Reich, was to direct the Sipo-SD in occupied France; Hagen was to direct it in the Atlantic region of France;Dannecker, specialist of "assimilating" Judaism, was to be entrusted under Knochen with the anti-Jewish section of the Sipo-SD. Lischka, specialist of Jewish affairs in the' pre-war Gestapo, was to join this group.

In the same way that Eichmann in the IV B4 depended on his spe­cialized subordinates under Lischka for the real police work, Knochen received an assistant for his work in France, the experienced Gestapo man, Lischka. A post in Paris was a distinction which had to be merited.

The men who inaugurated the Hitlerian anti-Jewish action under the sign of the SS and the Gestapo were to continue it in France under the occupation. But it was then to be already in the sense of the "final solution" by extermination.

Eichmann declared under questioning (69): !(

"The final solution of the Jewish question as such, that is to say, relative to that special mission received by Heydrich, for example, or to express it for once without circumlocutions, murder, was not a law of the Reich but an Order of the FUhrer... It was understood, according to the conception of the law at that time, that "the words of the FUhrer" amounted to law ... "

It is thus that the judicial basis of the "final solution" was presented in the Third Reich and in the countries fallen under its yoke. The action in France under the occupation is the example the richest in subtleties of the functioning of the "final solution" directed by the Order of the Fuhrer in question.

We shall now try to realize what constituted an Order of the Fuhrer in general and its functioning in the launching and the development of the extermination of the Jews.

34 ~

Part II The Orders for the "Final Solution" of the Jewish Question

1. The Order of the Fuhrer (der Fuhrerbefehl) in General

A mISSIOn announced as an Order of the Fuhrer imposed on those to whom it was entrusted an unconditional fervour in its execution. According to the testimony of Eichmann, it was as an "Order of the Fuhrer" that Heydrich presented to him the task of the extermination of the Jews, a task for which Heydrich gave him the responsibility.

The Order of the Fuhrer gave the force of law to the measure ordered. Such was the foundation of the regime based on the "Fuhrer­prinzip. " But this principle set up a complex system which was rami­fied by a multitude of chiefs in a hierarchy engaging the personal responsibility of each one in the accomplishment of his task. They had to use their initiative not only with their subordinates but also with their superiors to develop as well as possible the action under the sign of the Order of the Fuhrer. In this hierarchy of responsibilities, the highest level was that of Orders of the Fuhrer, by definition in confor­mity with the doctrine and therefore right. Next came the level of governmental orders, which applied the supreme orders in terms of one of the spheres constituting the life of the people (Ministries, Party, SS) and often acted in contradictory interdependence. Beneath the governmental level was that of the administration, which arranged by its orders the execution of those of a higher level. But, given the Fuhrerprinzip, these less important acts were to be accomplished with the same conviction as the governmental acts, the whole being animat­ed by the conscience of the direct and total responsibility of each member of the people to the Fuhrer.

It may be argued that the efficiency shown in the accomplishment of the evil acts of the Hitlerian regime was not due to blind obedience but rather to a very lucid zeal developed by subordinates who some­times gave a stimulus to their superiors in the execution of the order that the latter had received.

35

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

In two fields, that of foreign policy and that of military affairs, Hitler after consultation and reflection decided for himself. It is less certain that he was as decisive in other fields, such as the maintenance of order and "purge" operations.

High-ranking personalities of the Hitlerian regime have left accounts in their memoirs of the way in which measures referring to an Order of the Fuhrer were often taken.

Hans Frank, who from the time of the creation of the Party was active at Hitler's side, and who was finally named Chief of the General Government (Polish territories not annexed to the Reich), wrote in his memoirs: (70)

"Himmler and Bormann transformed the remarks that the Fuhrer some­times dropped at table into "great secret missions" or else obtained on this occasion authorizations for their action. The history of the Third Reich is in its later period full of such procurations of the Fuhrer. How­ever, he was himself, in these cases, generally too weak to revoke (zuruck­pfeifen) these exaggerations ... "

(1 Diels, Chief of the Gestapo under Geering until April 1934, gave the

same impression on the formation of decisions at Hitler's level: (71)

"All these initiators and executants acted as a medium by which the out­growths (Ausartungen) of the Hitlerian vitality were intensified to the maximum. In their milieu were born the grotesque ideas (skurille Ideen) which transformed themselves in his head into totalitarian final solutions ... Bormann with Himmler raised the inoffensive proposals (harmlose Aeusser­ungen) of Hitler, as in a CUlt, to the level of "Orders of the Fuhrer" endowed Wilh the strictest legal force. When the circle was closed, they soon exceeded the wishes and even the dreams of the demi-god."

O. Dietrich, Press Chief of the Government, President of the Chamber of the Press of the Reich, wrote: (72)

"Hitler almost never gave his orders in wntmg ... Sometimes, orders that Hitler had given casually, during a discussion, had not been recognized as such by his interlocutor and so had not been executed; whence conflicts between different military offices and others. Rather often, people that he received for reasons that had nothing to do with politics, simply because it pleased him to see them, took advantage of the occasion to attain their ends; Hitler then made them promises privately or approved what they proposed; after, they acted as if what Hitler had told them was an "Order of the Fuhrer" and that did not fail to produce great confusion, for there already existed an "Order of the Fuhrer" diametrically opposed ... "

An attentive observer like H. Picker, at the time a young jurist attach­ed from March to July 1942 by the Ministry of the Interior to the Head­quarters of the Fuhrer, noted for M. Bormann the remarks that Hitler made in the circle of his guests. Picker wrote in the foreword of the published version of these notes: (73)

36

The Order of the Fuhrer

"The goal which attracted me was to clearly show this veritable Hitler in his soundings of the future, in his hesitations before the uncertain and in his inhibitions before "the ultimate consequences a la Stalin"."

The taking of ordinary decisions at Hitler's level was described by B. v. Schirach, Fuhrer ·of the Young People of the Reich and, as of 1940, Gauleiter of Vienna: (74)

"Soon Bormann assured that stenographers registered each of Hitler's words, even at table. Bormann piled up these notes in enormous armour­ed closets, arranged according to subjects, names, dates... All letters, re­quests, complaints addressed to Hitler finally landed on Bormann's desk. Hitler saw but a small part of them. Bormann has himself brought from these armoured closets the comments of Hitler concerning the subject treated and afterwards edited the answers in the style and name of his master. Hitler during the year had often expressed the most contradictory opinions on the same subject: Bormann always chose the most extreme, the most brutal. And Hitler always covered for Bormann."

This role of active intermediary that Martin Bormann played in the development of the political and public life of the Third Reich did not concern the special relations of Hitler with Himmler, Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner, successor of Heydrich. But the way in which M. Bor­mann established decisions in Hitler's name characterized the attitude of Hitler in general: Hitler taught and his collaborators deduced the extreme decisions to be taken, except in foreign policy and in the conduct of the war where Hitler acted personally.

We may cite, too, F. Hossbach, liaison officer of the Wehrmacht with Hitler, who observed Hitler's influencable character when confronted with accomplished facts: (75)

"The'e is no doubt that following arbitrary initiatives, taken on their own account by sections of the Party, things often followed an orientation which, in the beginning, was not a agreement with Hitlers own intentions. In these cases, he was more the party led than leading; and, when they were over, he attributed to himself events which previously he had wanted other­wise or had not wanted at all. However, he seized with passion many accomplished facts with which he was confronted and assimilated them."

It is curious that it occurred to Hitler to personally and publicly make known before the Reichstag his reputation of being indecisive. On July

. i3, 1934, in an important speech, he commented on the murderous action of June 30 and the following days against the SA (Rahm) and against the politicians that he associated with the tendencies of the latter. At a given moment of his speech, he formulated the argument that the SA had advanced to incite people to revolt against the established Hitlerian regime: (76)

"The necessity of a separate intervention of the SA has been explained by the evocation of my inability to take decisions, which would be overcome only if faits accomplis occurred."

37

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

R. Olden, a militant anti-Nazi, explained in his work on Hitler, which appeared in 1936, the brutal decision against the SA. (77)

"There is but a single explanation possible of the reason for which the deci­sion was put off so long, to the point where it degenerated into a catas­trophe because Hitler, the FUhrer, is very far from being able to be counted among the strong ... H;s weakness led him to make simultaneous and incom­patible prom;ses to Blomberg and to Roehm."

One cannot call into question the force of Hitler's personality as Fuhrer of the Third Reich. He created by speech a spiritual force which stirred the masses and engendered in the conscience of his colla­borators conclusions which they drew as "Orders of the Fuhrer." To treat a subject, Hitler had to present it in its derivation from all of his political and ideological work which he exposed with this in mind. This is how his speeches were constructed. The accounts that we have cited indicate that face to face with a collaborator, Hitler explained to him the complex development of his thinking on a subject, leaving him the care to find a precise decision in it, to present it after to his Fuhrer and, ifr\ necessary, to convince him of the close agreement of this decision or even the action already accomplished as a result of it, with the intentions exposed by Hitler.

Gilbert, the American psychologist on special mission to the Interna­tional Tribunal of Nuremberg for the purposes of psychological study of the defendants at the Main Trial, related the reaction of Grering to the hypothesis that he presented to the latter on the role of Hitler in the taking of decisions concerning the" final solution":

"I shall suggest the following tableau: H.itler, obsessed by anti-Semitism and incapable of tolerating opposition or advice advocating moderation, saying finally to Himmler: "Get rid of them-it little matters how-I don't want to hear about them anymore!" Grering reflected a moment, seeming to visualize the scene; then he declared that it was probably like that that it happened."

. The essential for Hitler was acquired i'n advance: the measures pro­voked by the development of his thinking were to be carried through by the spirit of extreme harshness with which he impregnated the Party that he created by gathering about him persons adequate for this spirit This spirit was guaranteed by the training the Party gave to its members. It was perhaps this dialectical manner of expressing his wiII by the explana­tion starting from principles or origins which acquired for Hitler the reputation that he evoked himself regarding the operation against Roehm.

A significant parallel was drawn by Himmler between this last action and the "final solution." In fact, in his important speech of October 1943 at Posen to the high-ranking officials ot the SS, Himmler, before exposing in brutal terms the extermination of the Jews as the goal of the deportations (he said: "evacuation "), warned that he would speak of a matter of which the men of the SS should be aware as of a necessity, but with regard to which they were to observe the same discretion which was the rule in respect to the recollection of the Roehm affair.

38

Public Announcements by the Fuhrer

2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich

January 30, 1939 was the last anniversary in peace-time of Hitler's rise to power. In his speech before the Reichstag on domestic and foreign policy, Hitler pronounced his famous "prophecy": (78)

"Today I want to be a prophet once again: if financial international Judaism in Europe and beyond Europe were to succeed once again in pushing the peoples into a world war, then the result of it would not be the Bolshevi­zation of the earth, thus the victory of Judaism, but the destruction (Vern­ichtung) of the Jewish race in Europe."

What was the meaning of this shattering declaration? As of the end of 1938, the Jewish population of the Reich had been driven to the alternative of misery or emigration, but there had been no question at all of extermination.

The term "Vernichtung" (annihilation, destruction) marked the abso­lutely negative will concerning the Jewish presence in the Reich. Since it was absolute, this will announced itself as ready if necessary for all extremities. The term in question did not mean that the stage of extermination· had already been reached, nor even the deliberate inten­tion to do so.

A few days before the speech quoted, Hitler received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia. He reproached his guest with the lack of energy of the government of Prague in its efforts at entente with the Reich and recommended, in particular, an energetic action against the Jews. He declared, to show an example: "In our country, we des­troy them (bei uns werden sie vernichtet)." One might conclude that Hitler in the course of a diplomatic conversation recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (79) confided the fact of a massacre in the Third Reich, which, in addition, was not true at the time.

Two years later, January 30, 1941, Hitler recalled his "prophecy" of 1939. But this time he specified its meaning as follows: (80)

"and [ do not want to forget the indication that I have already given once before the Reichstag, that is that if the rest of the world (andere Welt) is cast into a war, Judaism will completely end its role in Europe ... "

In his conversation with the Czechoslovak minister, Hitler evoked England and the United States as being able, according to him, to offer regions for the installation of Jews. In January 1941, he indicated that the role of the Jews in Europe was to be completely ended; and he added that this prospect would be realized, for the other peoples would under­stand the necessity of it in their own countries. At that time, there was a belief in the creation of a Jewish reserve. But for Hitler it was admis sible only outside of Europe.

We have just pointed out that on January 30, 1941, Hitler simply announced the termination of the role of the Jews in Europe. Two years earlier, the word "Vernichtung" had been pronounced. At that time, the Nazi authorities proclaimed that the problem of the Jewish

39

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

question was being resolved by emigration. During the war, the solution by emigration became practically impossible. One was reduced to contenting oneself with vague projects (a Jewish reserve in Madagascar). But in the second half of 1941 the extermination of Jews in the occupied regions of the Soviet Union was begun. This method soon began to be applied to the Jews of the Reich deported to the East and to the Jews of the Polish territories. This "final solution" was not openly admitted. Hitler considered it necessary even so to publicly' resume the use of the word "Vernichtung" in this new situation where it was no longer ques­tion neither of emigration nor of a Jewish reserve. He announced in his speech of January 30, 1942, (81) that

"the war can end in but two ways, either by the extermination (ausgerottet) of the Aryan peoples, or by the disappearance of Judaism from Europe."

Recalling his "prophecy" of 1939, he specified that it would not be a question of the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but that the result of this war would be "the destruction (Vernichtung) of ~ Judaism." He added: l ,

"The time will come when the most harmful universal enemy will have finished its roie for a least a milknium."

Hitler thus afforded himself the satisfaction of proclaiming "the final solution" to the world, but by using terms sufficiently confused that it be perceived in the mysterious obscurity of an oracle.

The proclamation that he sent on February 24, 1942, from his head­quarters to celebrate the foundation of the Party announced that

"the war will not exterminate Aryan humanity but the Jew." (82)

He recalled on September 30, 1942, in a major speech at the Sports Palace in Berlin that

"not Aryan humanity will be exterminated (ausgerottet) but Judaism." (83)

On February 24, 1943, Hitler repeated in his proclamation similar to that of a year before that the war would result in

"the extermination (Ausrottung) not of Aryan humanity, but of Judaism In Europe" (84)

and added that the German people, having become aware of the role of the Jews,

"has struggled with success against the Jewish domestic enemy and is now about to definitely finish it off."

It is perhaps useful to point out a particularity of terminology in these oracles of Hitler. On January 30, 1939, he foretold the extermi­nation of the" Jewish race." After, he referred to this "prophecy;" but

40

Public Announcements by the Fuhrer

by presenting it sometimes as directed toward "Judaism." But "J udaism" ordinarily means the spiritual and cultural entity of the Jews. Such was not the sense of this word for Hitler. The series of his decla­rations from 1939 to 1943 prove that by Judaism he meant the physical reality of the Jewish population. This is brought out by his reference to the first expression, that of 1939, where the Jews to be destroyed were designated as "Jewish race." Hitler felt entity "Judaism" in such a profoundly biological way that for him it was identified with the "J ewish race" or "Jewish person." Hitler's terminology obviously was followed. The accepted meaning given in Nazi circles to the word "J udentum" is clearly revealed by the manner in which Six, chief of the cultural section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evoked in April 1944 (PS-3319) before German diplomatic representatives abroad, the exter­mination of the Jews of the East: (85)

"The veritable source of energy in Europe and in America is the Judaism of the East... The physical suppression of Judaism of the East withdraws from Judaism its biological reserves."

3. The Announcements of the "Final Solution" by Hitler before his Dining Companions in the Fiihrer's Headquarters

Since January 1942, Hitler affirmed in his speeches that the "final solu­tion," such as it was then being applied under Himmler, constituted a cardinal point of the war of the Third Reich. He gave no further details. He left public opinion free to not take literally the meaning of his sinister declarations and to int~rpret them metaphorically as an expression of the violent oratory which relieved his hatred and were only intended to intimidate the adversary.

In the lengthy remarks that Hitler was used to making after meals to his dining companions (a small group of about twenty people attached to the Headquarters of the Fuhrer, plus a few guests invited to military conferences), one sees how he presented the "final solution" to those who, while belonging to his entourage, did not in the majority belong to the circle of personalities initiated into the secrets of Himmler's activities. Let us recall that these comments were gathered in part by H. Picker, the jurist attached by the Ministry of the Interior to the Headquarters of the Fuhrer from March 21 to July 29, 1942. He noted Hitler's remarks for M. Bormann, chief of the Chancellery of the Party and Hitler's secretary. The notes taken previously by Mr. Picker's predecessor, for the period of july 21, 1941 to March 29, 1942, were put at Picker's disposition. After the war he published the collection of notes. H. Picker characterized Hitler's comments in the following manner: (86)

"Following a dispatch or no matter what remark pronounced during the meal or else because of the interest that he attached to a problem, Hitler began to expose his conceptions in order to fix his ideas for himself or to speak to his guests or to influence them in a determined way."

41

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTrON

In five of his conversations, from December 1941 to the end of July 1942, Hitler made declarations concerning the liquidation of the Jew­ish presence in Europe. These were open remarks which were not made as "State Secrets."

On December 1,1941, Hitler declared (86):

"There were many Jews who were not aware of the uestructive nature of their existence. !:lut he who uestroys life exposes himself to death anu as far ,'s they are concerned, that is all that is happening to them, too."

In November 1941, the Jews of the Reich were already being de­ported for extermination into the occupied Soviet regions, and Heydrich had obtained all of the approvals necessary from Hitler. At that date he had, in addition, already sent out invitations to the Con­ference of Wannsee. Hitler did not conceal from his guests that depor­tation imperilled Jewish lives.

We shall see that in 1942 German public opinion was swarming with news on the horror of the treatments to which the Jews deported to the East were submitted. On May 15,1942, Hitler spoke at table of these reactions (86). After having accused the German Jews of having given Germany "a knife in the back" at the end of the First World War, Hitler declared:

"What one calls the bOdrgeoisie lament" this same Jew, who was then res­ponsible for the knifing, when he is deporteu to the East. What shoulu be pointeu out in this respect is that at one time this same bourgeoisie was not concerned by the fact that every year 250,000 to 300,000 Germans emigrated from Germany anu that about 75 Ofo of the German refugees going to Aus­tralia uieu uuring the voyage."

Thus Hitler called on the people to lament the "75%" mortality rate (a whimsical figure) among certain groups of German emigrants of former times rather than the current situation of the Jewish deportees. This was despite the fact that he had already announced on December I, 1941, that the Jews risked death.

Two weeks later, on May 29,1941, Hitler approached the Jewish question in another manner. He left aside the extermination process which was being carried on. The process was not reconsidered and the guests were already informed of it. One might say that Hitler brought up the subject as Heydrich did at the Conference of Wannsee, when he declared that what was done during the war was only a temporary measure which would allow the acquisition of the experience necessary to execute the action, the final goal being the liquidation of the Jewish presence in Europe. Hitler declared (86):

" .. .That is why within a certain time all of Western Europe must be totally emptied of the lews... But one must not deport the lews to Siberia for, given their capacity of adaptation to climates, they will become still much more haruened ... It is much better (to deport them) to Africa to expose them to a climate which harms any man having our force of resistance."

42

C'-

Informal Announcements by the Fuhrer

Two months afterward, on July 21,1942, Hitler took up (86) the Jewish question again in its totality and from the point of view of the Jew considered as bearer of Communism:

"When this war is finisheu, a lightened Europe will be able to catch its breath. For, given that at the end of this war ([ shall have) thrown all of the Jews, up to the very last one, out of Europe, the Communist uanger com­ing from the East will be extirpated from top to bottom."

Some days after these remarks, Hitler broke out in fury at the thought that the war ended, the Jewish presence would perhaps not be eliminated from aU of the European cities. To this prospect he opposed the action of the liquidation of the Jews already in progress. On July 24,1942, he stated (86):

"Judaism is seeking out EUIOpe for its business. Europe should refuse it, if only by sacro-sanct egoism, for J uuaism is racially tougher. When the war is over, (l shall maintain) rigourously the following point of view: (1) shall break up (zusammenschlagen) one city after the other if the dirty Jews do not come out and emigrate to Madagascar or another lewish national state. The removal of the Jews from Vienna is of prime urgency... Also, from Munich ... (I am delighted) that Linz is already touay freed of the Jewish presence. When they tell me that today Lithuania is freeu of the Jewish presence (judenfrei), I find that significant... The lews who, as the popular refrain put it, wanted to "hang their linen on the Siegfried line," will lose their impuuence after the war... For, secretly, the anti-Semitism of the Anglo-Americans is essentially stronger than that of the German, who, in spite of all the negative experiences, is unable in his sentimentality to free himself of the expression concerning the "decent Jew."

A close examination of these words reveals that all while evoking Madagascar or a Jewish reserve in general, Hitler joyously emphasized that the Jews were disappearing in the East, being on the other hand well-understood that the evacuations from the Reich were directed precisely to the East, a fact which was publicly known. If Hitler evoked the establishment of a Jewish reserve, it is because he was not yet certain to manage the deportation of the Jews from all the European coun­tries before the conclusion of the peace. In July 1942 the deportations from these countries to the regions of the East had already brutally started but were sti1I only at their beginning. It was impossible for Hitler to know to what extent the Sipo-SD would succeed in emptying these countries of their Jews. To parry against what was to him the terrifying eventuality of finding after the victory a Europe not purified of the Jewish presence, he played with the idea that with the conclusion of the armistice the Jews who in one country or another had not been reached by the action of Eichmann, would, under the pressure of generalized anti-Semitism, be relegated to an unhealthful reserve in Africa. Those in charge of the physical destruction of Judaism realized that organized killing would not be possible in peacetime. That is why Himmler demanded that the extermination be practised at an accelerated pace (NO-20S). After the victory, it would be neces­sary to proceed by conventions between States, all of which would have become (according to Hitler's previsions) anti-Semitic, that is by the concentration of the Jews in a reserve. That is what Hitler indicated

43

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

in his remarks at table. He let his imagination wander and chose his expressions by chance. In fact, he spoke of a "National Jewish State". But the propaganda of the Party, directed by Alfred Rosenberg and by such units as the "World Section" (center of Nazi propaganda abroad), totally rejected the idea of a Jewish State and admitted only a Jewish reserve. Let us underscore once again that in evoking Siberia (territory to which the Reich, extending to the Urals, intended to push Russia), Africa, Madagascar, Hitler did not in his fantasy exclude the mention of the "final solution" in progress. He informed his guest of it by declar­ing that the Jews risked death and that in his action against them, they were deported "far to the East" where one made them disappear, as for example from Lithuania.

4. The Orders of Hitler to Himmler

High-ranking personalities of the Hitlerian regime have provided us with indications of the confused manner in which what were afterwards called Orders of the Fuhrer were formed. We may add to this tableau still another nuance concerning the anti-Jewish action. It is found in a memorandum from Grering on December 28,1938, to the Ministers of the Reich (CXXXIX-28). The text contains a little used but expressive term as to the role of Hitler's will in the taking of anti-Jewish measures. Grering, in charge of the Jewish question as of July 1938, formulated a series of special restrictive measures for the Jews. He ended his letter by declaring (87):

.. I went to get the opinIOn of the lVill of the Flihrer (Willensmeinung) on these matters so that henceforth they alone would be exclusively valid as directives. "

Thus, in the Jewish question one asked the Fuhrer the "opinion of his will. " This opinion placed a measure under the sign of the Order of the Fuhrer.

How did Himmler receive the Orders of the Fuhrer? We may cite the account of Schellenberg, Chief of the Department of "Foreign Intelli­gence" in the RSHA. He wrote about Himmler coming back from his audiences with Hitler (88):

"To certain whom he considered worthy 02 s~:ch an honour, he then com­mented on the sacred words (sakrale Worte) that he had just gathered with devotion in the monologues of his FUhrer going on for hours. One of the rare persons to Whom he spoke of them was Reinhard Heydrich, who quickly rid these messages of all fantasy and transformed them into the sober prac­tice of the secret services."

One can imagine Hitler pouring out reasonings and Himmler gather­ing from them what struck him and transforming it, in his conscience, into an Order of the Fuhrer which, transmitted to Heydrich, became a definitive decision, unless Heydrich did the same thing directly with Hitler.

44

C"

The Orders of Hitler to Himmler

Eichmann gave the following suggestive description of the manner in which orders were given by Himmler (89):

"One must not believe, however, that Himmler constantly and abundantly took care of Jewish affairs. But the subject was by itself a burning one in Party circles. A brief phrase pronounced by Himmler, an instruction given to his aide de camp (R. Brandt), to his personal staff (K. Wolff), to C.d.S. (Heydrich) to a Haherer SS-und Polizeiflihrer during a visit to his command post or, in time of peace, to his office, sufficed; and this brief instruction, this brief order then unleashed, on the part of the authorities concerned, a flood of work, discussions, requests for declarations of approval from autho­rities other than the Sipo-SD, but which had to be heard or consulted so as to not feel neglected. That is what gave, for example, the most work to the IV B4."

Let us try to indicate the succession of decisions which from 1940 to 1942 led to the" final solution of the Jewish question."

5. The "Final Solution" by a Jewish Colonial Reserve (Summer 1940-Spring 1941)

From the very first stage of the war-the invasion of Poland - the Hit­lerian regime had to decide the fate of the greater part of East European Judaism. The meaning of this question was later (April 1944) summed up by Six, who was at the time Chief of the Cultural Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a meeting of German diplomatic re­presentatives abroad, a meeting organized to brief them on the anti­Jewish action (PS-3319), he explained that the

"physical elimination of Eastern Judaism deprives Judaism of its biological reserves" .

On September 12,1939, deliberations took place in Hitler's train, in Poland, among the chiefs of the Wehrmacht. Ribbentrop (91) attended them with the military men. The question of the extermination of diverse categories of the population in Poland was brought up in the sense that Hitler wanted. Lahousen, present at these conversations, testified before the Nuremberg Tribunal that the general directive was to exterminate in Poland "the intellectuals, the nobility, the clergy and, naturally, the Jews." This vague glimpse of Hitler's conceptions at that moment was to be sufficient for Himmler and Heydrich to isolate the most evident point which could be begun in its totality, that is, the treatment of the Jews. Heydrich prepared a long-term plan of action which he communicated on September 22,1939 (PS-3363), to the chiefs of his mobile killing units in Polish territory. Let us recall that he exposed to them a series of measures which were in the long range to end in the accomplishment of a "final goal" which he declared to be secret. Given that the plan for the creation of a Jewish reserve in the General Government ("Nisko") was not kept se­cret, it was a question of something else, something to be treated as unacknowledgeable. The project of a transfer of the Polish Jewish popu­lation to another continent was not kept secret, either. In these con­ditions, the secret of the "final goal" appears in rather a macabre light.

45

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

But in March 1940 the "firal solution" was presented in a new sense, marked by the euphoric consciousness of a victory which seemed immi­nent. It was a question of creating a Jewish reserve outside of Europe, where the Jews of the Reich and the countries under its domination' would live in a system of self-administration strictly held in check by the Sipo-SD.

Himmler drafted a note in May 1940 on the treatment of the indi­genous populations of the East (that is, in the Polish territories). He wrote in this note (92), regarding the Jews in the General Government and in the Polish provinces annexed to the Reich:

"I hope that the conception "Jews" will be totally eradicated by the pos­sibility of a great emigration of all the Jews to A.frica or to no matter what other colony."

In a note of May 28,1940, Himmler announced that this memorandum had been approved by Hitler. As far as the Jews were concerned, Himmler limited himself to this brief indication. But we know that in March 1939 Hagen and Eichmann had been concerned with the project for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar. In summer 1940, France being defeated, the project was treated as current by Heydrich and Eichmann in collaboration with the section for Jewish affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NG-5764). The principle was established that in the peace treaty the victorious Reich would demand a mandate over Mada­gascar. This was the "territorial solution" of the Jewish question as Heydrich designated it to Ribbentrop (93). It was to be applied to all of the Jews under Hitlerian domination, including the Polish Jews.

At the end of June 1940, Abetz was about to leave for Paris to assume the post of Ambassador of Germany. Hitler stated explicitly his will to evacuate the totality of the Jews from Europe (NG-2586, memo­randum of Luther). This declaration of intention was tantamount to an Order of the Fuhrer for the Nazi occupation forces in Europe. According to the testimony of Abetz (LXXXI-123), (94) Hitler did not mention Madagascar, but he spoke only of the unpeopled areas of America. Let us recall that in his speech of January 1941 Hitler evoked his prophecy as to the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe in case of war, but this time without employing the term "vernichtet". He declared only that the Jews would have lost their role in Europe

The Jewish populations in France, Belgium and Holland were sub­jected to a regime intended to bring about their segregation. This would facilitate their deportation to a reserve. In March 1941, the Military Commander in France declared to Vallat (95), who had just been named Commissionner General for Jewish Affairs, that he, Vallat, was invited to

"set up herewith the plan and the preliminary measures for the future evacua­tion of the Iews."(XXIV-15a.)

It is highly probable that at that time one hoped that the victorious Reich would manage to have itself granted a territory outside of Europe in which to concentrate the Jews of the Reich and the territories under its control.

46

The Final Solution by a Jewish Colonial Reserve

However, during this same period, in March 1941, the dream of Madagascar evaporated (96). A. Rosenberg, chief ideologist of the Nazi Party, in a speech broadcast on March 28,1941 (PS-2889,CXLVI-23), spoke of the state of the anti-Jewish question in Europe. The text appeared in the newspaper of the Party, "Der Volkische Beobachter." Rosenberg spoke on the occasion of the inauguration of the Institute of Studies of the Jewish Question, in Frankfurt. He had previously asked Hitler in writing if in his speech he could speak of the project for the Jewish reserve in Madagascar (CXLVI-210) (97). The answer was cer­tainly negative. In his lengthy discourse, Rosenberg only proclaimed (98):

"This dream" (here Rosenberg is speaking of the eventuality of a Zionist state, which he does not accept)" is liquidated. It is we, on the contrary, who have to reflect on where and how we are to place the Jews. As it has just been said, this cannot be in a Iewish State, but will be done under a form that [ want to call Jewish reserve."

Rosenberg left open the question of knowing where such a reserve would be installed. But he set the unchangeable principle:

"For us, the Jewish question will be resolved only when the last Jew has left the Great German space."

In his speech of March 26,1941, (99), at the opening of the inaugura­tion (CXLVI-22, p.23), he declared as an argument in favour of the Nazi solution of the Jewish question that the reproaches one could make him were comparable to those one would make to a surgeon who "re­moves by a surgical operation a mortal tumor."

But in the spring of 1941 another "definitive solution" to the Jewish question, altough still limited in space, was to be conceived and elabo­rated. A few months later, this solution was to take the place of the "final solution of the Jewish question" in its over-all meaning.

6. The Order of the Fuhrer for the "Final Solution" in the Occupied Soviet Regions (Spring - Summer 1941)

Neither an Order of the Fuhrer decreeing in writing the general ex­termination of the Jews, nor the valid indication of the existence of such a written order, have been found in the archives of the Third Reich. But the absence of something does not, evidently, prove its non-existence; and it is therefore impossible to pronounce an opinion with certainty on this question. We have gathered together, systematized and analysed the information found on the basic decisions for the launching of the "final solution" by extermination; and we have contented ourselves with drawing up some suggestions on this problem. The first act in this sense aimed at the Jews in the occupied Soviet regions.

In March 1941, Hitler prepared the attack on the Soviet Union accor­ding to the "Barbarossa Plan," which had been established in December 1940 (PS-446). A complementary text of March 13,1941 (PS-447), formulated special directives, among which figured Hitler's decision authorizing Himmler in the Soviet territories to act independently and on

47

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

his own responsibility in measures required for "the final and definitive struggle between two opposed political systems." By Order of the Fuhrer four mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) of the Sipo-SD were created. These groups, progressing immediately behind the Wehrmacht, were to break down all resistance in the Soviet population. The agreement between the High Command of the Army (OKH) and the Sipo-SD was concluded in March-April 1941 (100).

The order to exterminate all of the Jews in the occupied Soviet regions is not explicitly mentioned in the officials texts defining the missions of the Einsatzgruppen. In contrast, the reports on their action carefully enumerate the quantities of Jews massacred and refer on this subject to a superior order that they are carrying out (101). According to the testimony of Blum, chief of a sub-group in one of the four Ein­satzgruppen (NO-4145), the officers of these formations were convoked to an information meeting in May 1941 under the presidency of Hey­drich. It was explained to them that "according to the Fuhrer's opinion, eastern Judaism was the intellectual reservoir of Bolshevism" (102) and that because of this it had to be exterminated. Ohlendorf, Commander of the Einsatzgruppe D, testified in the same way (NO-2890) (103).

The Wehrmacht engaged in the East was informed of the necessity of drastic military actions against the Jews. The order of the day of June 4,1941, of the General Staff of the Army (104) began its "Directives for the behaviour of soldiers in Russia" as follows:

"Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National-Socialist German People. It is against this corrosive ideology and those who bear it that Germany is engaging the struggle. This struggle requires ruthless and energetic interven­tion against Bolshevik instigators, partisans, saboteurs and the Jews; and the total elimination of all resistance, active or passive (restlose Beseitigung jedes passiven oder aktiven Widerstandes)."

The massacre of the Jews began in July 1941. The principal instru­ments of it were the Einsatzgruppen of the Sipo-SD. But the men of the Wehrmacht were witnesses of these massacres, and it happened that they took part. In October 1941, the Generalfeldmarschall v. Reichenau, Commander in Chief of the Sixth Army, addressed the following order of the day to the soldiers, an appeal which one may consider as emana­ting from Hitler, for the latter approved it warmly (D-411) (105):

"In the regions of the East, the soldier is not only a combattant in confor­mity with the rules of the art of war, but also the bearer of the intransigent populist idea (voelkische) and the avenger of all of the beastialities inflicted on the German popular entity or on a related species. That is why the soldier must have a full understanding of the necessity of a tough but just expiation inflicted on the Jewish sub-humanity. Another goal is to nip in the bud revolts behind the back of the Wehrmacht which, as experience proves, are always fomented by Jews."

It was foreseeable that the Soviet power would engage in guerrilla warfare against the Nazi invader. Hitler commented on the Soviet decision in a conference of July 16,1941 (L-221), with Grering, Keitel, Lammers and Rosenberg (106):

48

The Final Solution in the Occupied Soviet Regions

" .. .The Russians have given the order now for a guerrilla war behind our front. This guerrilla warfare also presents an advantage for us: it gives us the possibility to exterminate (auszurotten) what rises against us."

The next day the order was taken which made Himmler responsible for security in the Soviet Union (PS-1922), in conformity with the directive of March 13,1941. The fact that the guerrilla war in the Soviet Union was part of the action of war of this state against the Reich gave Hitler an appearance of justification for taking himself, as Supreme Chief of the Wehrmacht, the decision of extermination the Jews as part of the Soviet population declared as a whole to be engaged in the guerrilla war. Bolshevism was proclaimed the male­diction of humanity and the Jew its creator and bearer. In these conditions, the order that every Jew present in the occupied Soviet territories was to be Iiquitated was claimed to be militarily justifiable. It was an act of war of the German State against the Soviet State.

A report made in December 1941 by an inspector of armaments in the Ukraine, addressed to General Thomas, Chief of the Economic Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (PS-3257), con­tains the following description of the anti-Jewish action in this part of the Soviet Union (107):

" ... This action ... took place absolutely publicly with the involvement of the Ukrainian militia and unfortunately also with the benevolent participation of members of the Wehrmacht. The manner in which the operations were executed, directed at men, old people, women and children of all ages, was frightful. By the quantity of executions, the operation is the most gigantic of all the analogous measures taken in the Soviet Union ... "

One may also quote the report of January 25,1942, of the General Commission for the region of Slonim (in Bielorussia) (CXLV a-8) (108):

"The operation accomplished by the SD on November 13 rid me of vora­cious, useless mouths. During a certain time the Wehrmacht proceeded generously to a clean-up (Saiibering) in the open country, unfortunately only in localities of fewer than ten thousand inhabitants... Given that the Wehr­macht no longer accepts undertaking operations in the open country, I shall concentrate all of the Jews in two or three principal towns... The best specialists among the Jews will have to communicate their art to intelligent apprentices, so as to make the Jews useless in artisanry, too, and eliminate (ausschalten) them."

An Order of the Fuhrer given personally by Hitler, Supreme Chief of the Wehrmacht, must be the basis for the massacre of the Soviet Jews. It was in fact a measure considered as belonging to the military opera­tion. The orders of the military command bear witness to this. So does the fact that the reports which the Einsatzgruppen established regularly, with details on the quantity of Jews killed, were distributed to a multitude of authorities of the Reich, ministries and offices of the Party. Himmler himself presented the extermination of these Jewish populations as a task entrusted to him by Hitler personally. He wrote on July 28,1942, to Berger, Chief of the Principal Office of the Central Direction of the SS and responsible for liaison with the Ministry of Regions Occupied in the East (NO-626) (Himmler in this letter rejected certain limitations in the definition of the Jew that this Ministry wanted to have adopted) (109):

49

THE ORDERS FOR THI: FINAL SOLUTION

'The occupied regions in the East will be emptied of the Jews. The execu­tion of this very painful order has been loaded on my shoulders by the FUhrer. In any case, no one can relieve me of this responsibility. There­fore, I forbid no matter whom any interference (Mitreden)."

We shall see that Heydrich was to otherwise present the Order of the Fuhrer as to the "final solution" aiming at the totality of European Judaism. He was then to speak of an agreement, an approval of the Fuhrer.

7. The Principle of the" FinaL Solution" by Exterminatory Deportation to the Occupied Regions (' East of the East") (Autumn 1941)

The decision to massacre the Soviet Jews does not presuppose that of the massacre of all the European Jews. As late as spring 1941, Hitler could mean by "final solution" to come something otiter than what he already foresaw for the occupied Soviet territories. It is from this angle that a decree of the RSHA of May 20,1941 (NG-3104), which it is sometimes tempting to interpret in the sense of the "final solution" by massacre, must be considered. This decree forbade the emigration of Jews from the occupied zones in France and in Belgium and twice added that in this decision the "final solution which will not fail to arrive" had been taken into account. At first sight, one may believe that Heydrich thus gave the order to prevent the Jews from escaping the "final solution" by emigration. The reason indicated is totally different: one wanted all possibilities of' emigration to be reserved for the Jews of the Reich. It was only on January 19,1942, that the prohibition of Jewish emigration from the Reich, authorized until then (XXVb-5), was pointed out in France. Heydrich was to proclaim it the next day at the Conference of Wannsee. On the other hand, in May 1941, emigra­tion was not yet excluded or one dreamt of some sort of "Jewish reserve" which the Reich promised itself to obtain. .

It is the application of the "final solution" to the Soviet Jews which was to open the way to the conception of the global extermination of the Jews in the German vital space and to the total rejection of the solution by emigration.

Since January 24,1939, Heydrich, on Hitler's order, had been entrusted by Grering with the emigration of the Jews, emigration then considered as the radical solution to the Jewish question. Two and one half years later, the activity of the Einsatzgruppen was to familiarize the conscience of Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich with the physical suppression of the Jews. The predominance of a hostile attitude towards Hitlerism in the public opinion of the principal world powers, the alliance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and the policy of the United States, acquired during the second half of 1941 from these allied powers, multiplied Hitler's fury against the Jews whom he saw at the origin of such a situation. He was to make up his mind to chastize Judaism by destroying the part of it which had fallen into the hands of the Third

50

The Final Solution by Exterminatory Deportation

Reich. Hitler was to publicly follow up this resolution in his speech of January 30, 1942. Public opinion was free to take his declarations literally or to interpret them as exaggerations due to his oratory style. As for the decision, it was, so to speak, already being tested as of autumn 1941.

On January 31, 1941, Heydrich on Hitler's order received a new mission from Grering. It extended that of January 24, 1939, in two ways (110):

"to obtain the best possible solution by emigration or evacuation, in confor­mity with the situation at a given time" and this for "the global solution of the Jewish question in all the regions under German influence in Europe ... "

(PS-71 0). The principle of emigration was still applicable and even mentioned first of all, but "the situation at a given time" was to eliminate it in practice in favour of only the "evacuation" which Hey­drich intended to direct towards the occupied Soviet territories, where the Jews deported would automatically fall under the Order of the Fuhrer to suppress all Jews present in these regions.

In November 1941, Heydrich was ready to inform the representatives of all the authorities of the Reich concerned by the anti-Jewish operation of Hitler's agreement that the Jewish populations of the German vital space be deported "far to the East," in order to there disappear from the face of the earth. He was to make this announcement before these high-ranking civil servants at the Conference of Wannsee planned for December 7, 1941, but which had to be postponed until January 20, 1942.

We shall see that "far to the East" meant" occupied Soviet territories" (officially designated as "territories occupied in the East") where the Einsatzgruppen operated. Such was to be the official presentation of the "final solution" by extermination. In reality the process imagined in the summer of 1941 to arrive at it was double; and the variant which was to be the most important as of the summer of 1942, the extermina­tion by gassing in the internment camps in Polish territory, was not to be that which Heydrich explicitly announced: deportation "far to the East." Because of this, the massacre perfected by the means of gas chambers has remained a foot-note of the consecration that Heydrich in the name of the Fuhrer was to bring to the "final solution" by extermi­nation.

Yet Hitler was kept perfectly informed of the means employed for the liquidation of the Jews in the concentration camps. This fact appears in the political testament that he drew up a few hours before his suicide. He alluded to this means which he considered "more humanitarian" than the death of civilians caused by the bombings (111).

At his trial, Eichmann testified concerning Heydrich's order (112):

" ... let us suppose that the war began in July; it was probably two or three months later,. It was certainly towards the end of the summer ... when Hey­drich called me in. I introduced myself, and he said to me: "The FUhrer has ordered the physical extermination of the Jews. Eichmann, go there­fore to see Globocnik in Lublin. The Reichsfiihrer has already given

51

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

Globocnik the corresponding instructions and go see how far he has gotten in this task (Vorhaben). I believe he is using the anti-tank trenches of the Russians to destroy Jews in them."

Globocnik, Gauleiter of Vienna until the beginning of the war, was then named SS und Polizeifiihrer of the district of Lublin, region where Eichmann was to imagine in 1939-40 the Jewish reserve of "Nisko". Eichmann thus went to Globocnik's and remarked that not far from Lublin a work crew was building and fitting out a shack destined for the extermination of the Jews by gassing due to the exhaust fumes of an engine. This installation was to become the extermination camp of Belzec. It was to be operative only as of March 1942. Globocnik was also to install the extermination camps of Sobibor and Treblinka. He was to exterminate the Jewish population of Poland almost entirely and thousands of Jews deported from various countries.

During the same period, Hoess, commander of the concentration camp of Auschwitz, was to receive an order from Himmler similar to that given to Globocnik and which Himmler was to present to him also as a "decision of the FUhrer." According to the rather unclear recollections of Hoess, the first extermination took place in the autumn of 1941 or rather, as Hoess corrected himself, in January 1942 (113). It concerned about a thousand Jews from Upper Silesia who were killed by the gas Zyklon B. It is known that as of summer 1942 Ausc.:;h­witz was principally used for the extermination of deported Jews from the occupied countries of Central, Western and Southern Europe.

These two orders given by Himmler (exermination in the Polish territories entrusted: 1) to Globocnik, in the General Government, and 2) to Hoess in Upper Silesia) diverged from the official language pre­sented by Heydrich in January 1942. Let us now examine the relation of all these orders to an Order of the FUhrer.

Eichmann at his trial was to reveal a curious fact. One might say, according to his testimony, that Globocnik wanted to have a validation of the order which Himmler had, however, given him in the name of Hitler in the summer of 1941 and which he had been applying since March 1942. Eichmann declared (114) that in the summer or at the end of the summer of 1942 (by that date Globocnik had, according to Eichmann, already killed a very great number of Jews), Globocnik asked him for a written confirmation of the order to kill, a confirmation to be formulated in such a way as to justify the executions to come as well as those already practised. Given that it was Eichmann who was charg­ed with personally bringing him the document, it is evident that Globoc­nik considered necessary a confirmation by the Sipo-SD. We know, in addition, that it was the Chief of the Sipo-SD, Heydrich, who was on Hitler's order entrusted by Geering with finding and applying the adequate method for the "final solution of the Jewish question." Eichmann roughly quoted the text of the authorization: "I authorize you to deliver up another 150,000 (or 250,000) Jews to the final solution (Endloesung)."

52

The Final Solution by Exterminatory Deportation

Eichmann at his trial hesitated between these two figures. Under questioning, he believed that it was Heydrich who had signed the docu­ment. But having explicitly stated that it was a question of the summer or even the end of the summer of 1942, he rectified his testimony at the hearing. He admitted that Heydrich not being alive at that time, Himmler (who then personally directed the Sipo-SD) had been the signa­tory. Eichmann related that the Chief of the Gestapo MUlIer remarked that Globocnik was the only one to make a request of this nature.

In fact, Hoe§s had contented himself with the verbal order from Himmler. The task which the latter entrusted to him was, however, gigantic. But by his functions and by his rank, he was a minor SS official., The word of the Reichsfiihrer was sufficient for him. Let us note that there was still another center of extermination, outside of the field of action of Globocnik and that of Hoess. This was in the province of Lodz (Polish territory annexed to the Reich), where the extermination camp of Chelmno had been in operation since December 1941. Greiser, the Gauleiter of that region, in July 1941 addressed a letter to Himmler wherein he asked the latter's agreement for the extermination of the Jews unfit to work who encumbered the ghetto of Lodz. The consent was given, following which the camp of Chelmno was created. Its equipment for extermination by gassing (mobile gas chambers) began to function in December 1941. Greiser was satisfied with the written consent given by Himmler, without raising the question of an Order of the FUhrer. Until 1943 hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews were exterminated there. But, as far as Globocnik is concerned, it must be taken into account that it was he who was by far the principal exterminator of about two million Polish Jews. In addition, his operation took place in the region under the authority, all the more sensitive as it was tottering, of the Governor General Frank. This situation may explain the care he took to have an entirely sufficient justification for his mission. But at the same time his attitude under­scored his uncertainty concerning the instructions of Himmler given in the name of Hitler, but not confirmed by Heydrich, who in Hitler's name was responsible for the "final solution."

The other aspect of the "final solution," the deportation "far to the East" in the "zones of operation" of the Einsatzgruppen, also knew a period of uncertainty as to it ratification by an Order of the FUhrer.

The deportation of the Jews of the Reich was certainly proposed by Heydrich to Hitler in August 1941, but it was not to be fully accepted by the latter. The question was brought up on August 15, 1941, in the course of an important conference convoked at the Ministry of Propa­ganda. Loesener, chairman for racial questions at the Ministry of the Interior, was present at the conference and drew up a report on the debates for the Secretary of State of his ministry. (115) Let us point out the following passage:

53

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

"So far as the evacuation of the Jews from the Old Reich (Altreich) is concerned, the SturmbannfUhrer Eichmann made known that in answer to a request made in this direction by the Obergruppenfiihrer Heydrich, the FUhrer has forbidden the evacuations during the war; following which (Hey­drich) had a proposition drawn up which has partial evacuations from big cities as its goal."

Loesener did not specify that it was a question of deportation to the occupied Soviet regions.

Himmler wrote to Greiser (116) on September 18, 1941, to ask that he temporarily lodge (in the ghetto of Lodz) the Jews of the Reich, before sending them farther on:

"The FUhrer desires that the Old Reich and the Protectorate be emptied and freed of the Jews, progressing from the West to the East. I am there­fore making the effort first of all to transfer the Jews of the Old Reich, as a first step, into the regions which have been annexed to the Reich for two years to send them farther east next spring."

The operation took place in October 1941: some twenty thousand Jews were deported from the big German cities, as well as from Vienna and Prague, to the ghetto of Lodz. It has been stated above that the extermination camp of Chelmno had begun to operate in December 1941. The contingent of German Jews remained intact until May 1942. The intention to send it"farther east" was then abandoned, and 50% of this group of deportees were exterminated on the spot at Chelmno. Those able to work were temporarily kept alive. (117)

But one month after Himmler's letter to Greiser, Heydrich even so obtained the possibility and thus, evidently, the consent of Hitler, to deport the Jews from the cities of the Reich and from the Protectorate directly into the "zones of operation" of the Einsatzgruppen. On Oc­tober 24, 1941, a memorandum (PS-3921) of the Security Police ordered is bureaux in sixteen cities (including Vienna and Prague) to accompany the transports of Jews that the Sipo-SD was to form for the destination of the regions of Riga and Minsk and to hand them over on their arrival to the representatives of the Sipo-SD there.

The operation extended from November 1 to December 4 and con­cerned 50,000 Jews. The contact with the Einsatzgruppen had already been established. At a meeting over which Heydrich presided on October 19, 1941(118), Eichmann announced that the commanders of two of the four Einsatzgruppen (Nebe and Rasch) operating in these regions had confirmed that the Jewish deportees "can be interned in the zones of operation with the Communist internees." At Eichmann's trial, the judge asked him the meaning of the term "zone of operation" (119): "Is that where the Einsatzgruppen operated?" and received the answer: "Certainly, that is how it must be understood, it is natural." Note that with time the Einsatzgruppen, which were mobile units, were relieved by the local services of the Sipo-SD. (120)

54

The Final Solution by Exterminatory Deportation

Witnesses returning to Germany from the "zones of operation" told what they had seen. Loesener reported: (121)

"Just before Christmas, the Government Adviser Feldscher came to see me in my office and related to me what had been told him the evening before by a person worthy of confidence, an eye witness, on the massacre near Riga of German Jews, primarily Berliners. It was so frightful that I shall omit the details here. It is the first time that I learnt that my worst fears concerning the fate of the deportees had been confirmed or, more exactly, exceeded... I reported to Stuckart (Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior) what I had learnt... Stuckart began by retorting: "Don't you know that these things are done by supreme order?"

There were convoys which were immediately liquidated in their enti­rety. For others, the deportees were in part packed into ghettos whose populations were sporadically subjected to liquidation operations. The number of Jews of the Reich and the Protectorate who survived this regime was minimal.

The uncertainty which until October 1941 characterized the orders of Hitler for the" final solution" suggests that Himmler and Heydrich, announcing the Order of the Fuhrer to Globocnik, Eichmann and Hoess in the summer of 1941, went beyond the explicit determination of Hitler's will (it was still only the order to prepare, not to already execute the operation). In ·his diatribes against the Jews, Hitler made known that he wished to give them over to extermination. He did this in public as well as in private or during work sessions. Himmler and Heydrich drew their own conclusions and prepared measures which they considered justified on the basis of what they heard from "their Fuhrer. " Before proceeding with the operation, they had Hitler adopt the measures envisaged. He expressed his agreement and stood by it.

It has been stated above that according to Globocnik, his special mission (extermination of the Polish Jews) required a written authoriza­tion from Heydrich or, if not from the latter, from Himmler or Miiller, several months after the beginning of the extermination. The operation concerning the euthanasia of the incurably ill, which was ordered in September 1939, was something else again. A written order of Septem­ber 1, 1939, signed by Hitler (PS-630) gave Bouhler of the Party Chan­cellery, and Doctor Brandt, the responsibility of organizing and directing this action. Nothing of this nature appears in the "final solution."

However, a consideration of the mission of Globocnik in the execution of the latter reveals that the Chancellery of the Party did indeed colla­borate ,with him in this mission: it provided him with the specialists in gas chambers trained during the operation "Euthanasia." Brack, to whom Bouhler had entrusted the gassing of the incurables (operation stopped in August 1941), wrote on June 23, 1942 (NO-205), to Himmler: (122)

"Following the order of the Reichsleiter Bouhler, I have already, since some time ago, put my men at the disposition of the Brigadefiihrer Globoc­nik for the accomplishment of his special mission. Following a new request from him, I have given him still more personnel..."

There was thus an agreement of principle granted by Hitler.

55

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

But whereas for the "Euthanasia" Hitler had given the responsibility in writing to Bouhler and Doctor Brandt for a precisely defined operation, for the "final solution" Hitler entrusted Grering with giving Heydrich the responsibility in writing for finding the "solution" according to the changing situation and for executing it. The operation to be ac­complished by Globocnik, Hoess and Eichmann was confided to the zealous creator of the Nazi administration. Its correct functioning was assured by the initiatives of diverse sections of the administrative apparatus of the Reich grouped for the "final solution" around the Sipo-SD.

The deportation of the Jews ,from the Reich and from the Protecto­rate to the "zones of operation" in the East was the first form of the "final solution" by extermination aside from the Jews of the Soviet regions. At the same time and in conformity with the order of Himmler, the method by gassing being prepared by Globocnik and Hoess was taking form. But the Governor General Frank appears not to have been informed of Globocnik's mission in the General Govern­ment and considered himself called upon to promote, in the territories under his jurisdiction, measures whirh were to resolve the Jewish ques­tion. He nevertheless knew that Heydrich, responsible for the Jewish question as a' whole, had laid down the principle of deportation "farther east" for the Jews of the General Government as well. This meant, at least for the General Government, deportation to the occupied Soviet territories. But Frank considered it necessary to complete this measure by murderous local operations on his own authority. He made the following declaration on December 16, 1941, at the session of his Government (PS-2233) (123):

"They (the Jews) must be put out. With this goal in mind, [ have begun talks for their deportation to the East. In January, an important conference, to which I shall delegate the Secretary of State Bouhler, will take place in Berlin", But what is to happen with the Jews? Do you believe that they are going to be lodged in the Ostland (Baltic countries and White Russia) in settlement villages? We, too, can undertake nothing with them in the Ostland or the Commission of the Reich. Liquidate them yourselves,"

And Frank declared that it would be necessary to "proceed to interventions which, in one way or another, will assure that the destruction succeeds (Vernichtungserfolg)."

Eichmann's bureau, the l\1 B4 of the RSHA, noted on December 1, 1941 (124), that the Hoehere SS und Polizeiflihrer Kuger, the repre­sentative of Himmler in the General Government, had been complain­ning for a long time about Frank's efforts to personally treat the Jewish question. The note added that to prevent these attempts, Frank and his Secretary of State, Buhler, would both be invited to the conference which was to gather together all the authorities of the Reich concerned by the Jewish question. It has been seen that Frank clearly remarked the invitation. But according to his declarations it appears that he ignored or wanted to ignore the mission entrusted to Globocnik and that the latter was not to be able to put into practice before March 1942.

56

The Generalized Final Solution

8. Hitler's Approval of the Generalized "Final Solution" and the Conference of Wannsee (January 1942)

At the important conference commonly known as the Conference of Wannsee (from the name of the suburb of Berlin where it was held), Heydrich presented all of the "final solution" as deportation still farther east. The Gauleiter Meyer, representing the "Ministry of the Territories Occupied in the East" (where, according to this program, the massacre of about two million Jews of the General Government should have taken place), and Buhler, Secretary of State in the General Government, recom­mended, on the subject of this deportation to the East from the General Government, that "certain preparatory work in the process of the "final solution" should be done on the spot, but whilst taking care not to disquiet the population." (125) The allusion to the uncamouflaged killings which were taking place in the "zones of operation" of the Einsatzgruppen, and which should have been avoided, is clear. It does not at all appear in the protocol that Heydrich had revealed the mission that Globocnik was preparing. However, Buhler expressly recognized at this conference that the operation was in the competence of the Sipo-SD, provided that this work be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

The Conference of Wannsee by presenting the "final solution" to all of the authorities of the Reich who were to collaborate in it consecrated its acceptance by Hitler. The connection between the orders, beginning with that of January 24, 1939, to which that of July 31, 1941, referred, was scrupulously brought to light and confirmed that the operation was highly official. In fact, Heydrich referred to Grering's decree of July 31, 1941 which entrusted him with organizing "the final solution of the Jewish question by emigration or by evacuation." He added:

"In the meantime, the Reichsflihrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has forbidden the emigration of the Jews because of the dangers of emigration in war-time, and taking into consideration the possibilities offered by the East. [n place of emigration has now come, after the FUhrer's preliminary acceptance to this effect, the evacuation of Jews to the East, as a new pos­sibility of a solution,"

The "solution" by the deportation of Jews from the Reich and from the Protectorate to the "zones of operation" in the East had already been practiced since the autumn of 1941, but had not yet the firm consent of Hitler. Now Heydrich could announce this consent. He spoke of it as relating to the deportation directed to the East even from the General Government, as proven by the positions taken by Buhler and Meyer that we have cited. Luther, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was present at the conference and specified in his report of August 1942 to Ribbentrop (NG-2586, Memo­randum, p. 12) (126):

"The transport to the General Government is a temporary measure. The Jews will be transported farther, to the occupied,zones in the East, as soon as the technical conditions allow it."

57

THE ORDERS FOR THE F1NAL SOLUTION

This manner of speaking was but a convention of language, as nearly all of the extermination was being carried on from this time in the areas under the jurisdiction of Globocnik and Hoess.

Heydrich in his expose envisaged the application of the "final solu­tion" to eleven million (according to his statistics) European Jews. He added, however, that the

"solution adopted was only a temporary solution (Ausweichmoeglichkeit), but in the course of which would already be gathered practical experience of great imporlance in view of the final solution of the Jewish questio l '.

Whatever the means, the goal indicated by Heydrich, despite its nebulous presentation, already remained fixed: physical suppression of the existence of the Jews. Heydrich resumed the itinerary of the deportation as follows:

"The Jews evacuated will be first of all transported without interruption (Zug urn Zug) into what one calls transit ghettos, to be transported from there farther east."

He had first indicate<;i that the Jews fit to work (the fate ot those un­suited is not evoked) were to be be led into the regions of the East, with separation of the sexes, and working at the building of roads, a process during which most them would be eliminated "by natural diminution." As for those who remained, they would constitute the dangerous part as' the most biologically resistant and who, liberated, would constitute the embryo of a Jewish renaissance. It would therefore be necessary to "treat them in an appropriate manner."

Two stages were imagined: first, deportation to the regions of the East close to the Reich, displacement accompanied by work ("construc­tion of roads"); after, for the survivors, suppression "farther east" in the "zones of operation.".

Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee treated at length the question of persons of mixed Jewish blood or those involved in mixed marriages. He specified that the Chief of the Chancellery of the Reich (Lammers) had written to him in respect to this subject. In the measures to be applied to this category of Jews (Germans), the effect that these measures would produce on the German kinship of the parties to the mixed marriage would have to be taken into account.

Heydrich added that the beginning of the great evacuations would depend on the "military evolution" (militaerische Entwicklung). The Secretary of State for the Four-Year Plan (Neumann) declared that it was not possible to evacuate from the Reich the Jews employed in enterprises important for war production. Heydrich had to respect this directive coming from the Four-Year Plan. It is possible that the restriction thus imposed by Neumann on the deportation from the Reich of Jews fit to work stimulated Himmler in the summer of 1942 to undertake, without excessive delay, the deportation to the East of Jews from the countries subjugated in the West. The deportation of the Jews was to serve for the "final solution" and for their exploitation as labour.

58

The Generalized Final Solution

Heydrich had indeed said in his vague description of the deportation that the latter was "for use at work" (zum arbeitseinsatz). But to him this element of the operation appeared completely secondary. He contented himself with evoking the employment for the building of roads during the march towards the East ("transit ghettos"). Himmler drew up a completely different plan. He conceived the system of internment camps which officially bore the denomination "concentra­tion camps." The only camps classed in this category were those subor­dinated to the Principal Office of Economic Administration of the SS and where Gliicks was chief of the department "Concentration Camps." Himmler was preparing to offer all of his concentrationary labour to the important weapons industry. He intended to integrate the Jews into it and to keep them there as long as the German economy needed them during the war. That was his conception of the phase Heydrich described as the "building of roads."

9. The "Final Solution" by Gas Chambers in the Concentrationary System (Summer 1942-0ctober 1944)

January 25, 1942, four days after the Conference of Wannsee over which Heydrich presided, Himmler telegraphed the Inspector of the Con­centration Camps, Gliicks (NO-500) (127):

"I shall send to the camps a great number of Jews and lewesses who are going to be evacuated from Germany... Important orders and economic tasks will be given out in the coming weeks to the concentration camps ... "

This message from Himmler to Gliicks does not resemble Heydrich's expose at the Conference of Wannsee. Whereas Himmler saw the Jewish labor force at the center of his economic projects based on the concentration camps, Heydrich appreciated the high mortality rate among the deportees in the first halting-places in the East. A flagrant contradiction may be seen in the fact that the decision to exploit the Jewish labour force did not prevent Himmler from being as attached as Heydrich to the imperative of the extermination of the Jews. Hoess, who was commander of the camp at Auschwitz, indeed declared that as of the summer of 1941 Himmler had given him the responsibility of preparing the camp for extermination on a very large scale. Ausch­witz was the destination of the deportations of Jews for concentrationary work. But Himmler, in contrast to Heydrich, attached great importance to the productive phase of the detention of deportees fit to work. A fraction of the mass of Jewish deportees was to be conserved as labor and was in fact employed in the essential branches of the production of armaments.

At the end of March 1942, Himmler effected the first deportation of Jews for the war economy. He was to draw his contingents not from the Reich, but from friendly countries or occupied ones. To begin with, it was a question of Slovakia, but also of a convoy from France

59

THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

in March 1942. It was on June 11 that Eichmann met in Berlin with his representatives in France (Dannecker), in Belgium and in Holland to inform them (XXVI-29) that Himmler had given the order to deport for the work at Auschwitz important quantities of Jews from these three countries (128). This operation was curiously explained by the impos­sibility for military reasons of deporting the Jews of the Reich to the "zones of operation" during the summer. One would say that it was necessary to justify the decision to begin the deportation from the countries occupied in the West, while the deportation of the Jews from the Reich and from the Protectorate was not yet ended. Let us add that in spite of Eichmann's explanation, the deportation from the Reich continued during the summer and the autumn of 1942, more precisely to the regions of Riga and Minsk.

In the instructions given by Eichmann on June 11, 1942, on the deportations from the western countries, the rigour with which the age limits for deportable Jews were set-sixteen to forty-five-seems astonish­hing. It was in addition rather rapidly annulled. This limitation which Eichmann designated as essential underscored that the deportation was to be undertaken for the strictly economic reasons of labour. One would say that Eichmann in the RSHA had received the order from Principal Office of Economic Administration of the SS, to which the Inspection of the Concentration Camps belonged, and which was primarily interested in the economic exploitation of the internees. Eichmann apparently transmitted the order such as he had received it. But the age limits were soon extended again, even before the series of deportations from the countries in question had really begun. In parti­cular, the deportation of children of all ages was accepted by the RSHA, this in response to steps taken by Dannecker from his post in Paris.

Eichmann had indicated at the meeting held on June 11, 1942, in Berlin that 10% of persons unfit for work could be accepted in the transports of deportees. When the convoys began to reach Auschwitz, the people arriving were in their very large majority considered as unfit for work; and they were killed in the gas chambers that Hoess had prepared in conformity with the order received from Himmler in 1941.

At Auschwitz an average of 80% of the Jewish deportees were thus immediately liquidated. The rest represented the Jewish concentra­tionary labour strongly desired by Himmler; it largely disappeared, more or less rapidly by the mortality due to the living and working conditions in the camps and the work commandos. The employment of this rest was nevertheless an important factor in the economic plans of the SS, the realization of which was being pursued by Himmler with Pohl, Chief of the Principal Office of the Economic Administration of the SS. But the weight of the 80% immediately liquidated showed that the deportation of the Jews was being effected primarily for their extermination.

60

The Final Solution by Gas Chambers

In his important public speeches, Hitler announced and, from 1942 to 1943, co.nfirmed the destruction (Vernichtung, Ausrottung) of the Jews. But the expose of Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee indi­cated that the launching of the massacre came in practice from Himmler or Heydrich. In fact, Heydrich did not speak of an initiative, but of the agreement given by Hitler for "the deportations to the East." Let us repeat once again what seems to us to be the position of Hitler. He expressed publicly and with violence the will that the role of the Jews in European society be radically liquidated. Himmler and Hey­drich gave the orders which fulfilled Hitler's will, no matter what the atrocity of the conditions necessary to the rapid accomplishment of this resolution. The operation being accomplished, Hitler adopted it in all its atrocity.

Himmler in the autumn of 1942 referred to the will of Hitler to accomplish to the very limit the liquidation of the Jews in Poland. It was a question of the skilled labour temporarily conserved while wait­ing for a valid Polish labour force to be formed to replace the J ewsih. Himmler ended as follows his note of October 9, 1942 on the subject (NO-1611), a note addressed to Pohl, Chief of the Administrative and Economic Department of the SS, to Kruger, representing the power of Himmler in the General Government, to Globocnik, responsible for the "final solution" there, to the RSHA and to Wolff, chief of the personal staff of the Reichsfiihrer-SS (129):

"We shall have to force ourselves to replace this Jewish labour by the Poles and to englobe the greater part of these Jewish concentrationary enterprises in the East of the General Government. However, in the latter, too, the Jews must one day disappear in conformity with the will of the FUhrer (ent­sprechend dem Wunsche des FUhrers)."

Thus Himmler did not fail to found his instructions on the will of the Fuhrer. But he took care to evoke the Order of the Fuhrer under the form of a "will."

10. The "Final Solution," "Page of Glory" which will have neither to be Written nor to be Forgotten

Himmler noted on June 19, 1943, after having made his "report to the Fuhrer at the Obersalzberg": (130) "Following my report on the Jewish question, the Fuhrer declared that the evacuation of the Jews must be executed in a radical manner and conducted to the very limit (durchgestanden) in spite of the unrest (Unruhe) that it will provoke for another three or four months." This meant that Hitler approved the propositions of Himmler. Here is how Himmler presented the "final solution" in his speech of October 6, 1943, at Poznan, before the Reichsleiter and the Gauleiter of the Party (131):

"I ask you only to listen to what I say in this circle, but really not to speak of it. The question was raised to us: What is to be done with the women and children? I took the decision to find in this case, too, a perfectly clear solution. That is that I did not consider myself authorized to exterminate

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(ausrotten), that is to say, assassinate (umbrigen) or to have assassinated the men and let their children grow up, avengers in face of our sons and our grandsons. It was necessary to take the difficult decision to make this people disappear from the face of the earth."

Himmler concluded:

"You are now informed and you will keep it to yourselves. Perhaps, much, much later, one will reflect on whether there is a reason to say a little more to the German people. I believe that it is preferable that we all bear it for our people and take the responsibility upon ourselves ... and that we carry the secret to the grave."

Nevertheless, Himmler did not wish the secret to be tightly guarded. Two days previously, he delivered a speech (PS-1919) before ranking dignitaries of the SS in which he told analagous secrets. He concluded with the exclamation: "It is a page of glory, but which never will be written." It was thus even so a page of glory. The fact of the liquidation of the Jewish presence in the German vital space had not to be forgotten. Only one had not to take pleasure in trying to find out how this performance had been realized. The memory of it was to be perpetuated but in the haze of consciences only.

One might say that in this speech of October 4, 1943, addressed to the high-ranking officers of the SS gath~red together in Poznan, Himm­ler evoked the exterminations of the Jews as something obvious in the eyes of each member of the Party. (132) He presented in the follow­ing manner the radical interpretation that the latter had to give, accor­ding to him, to the anti-Jewish paragraph, still so mild, of the program of the Nazi Party established twenty years before and conserved intact like a relic in conformity with the wish of Hitler. All while deploring the tendency of each German who, condemning globally the Jews, asked that an exception be made for his "good Jew" who was not like the others, Himmler declared in respect to members of the Party:

"The Jewish people will be exterminated (ausgerottet)," says each member of the Party, it is clearly indicated in our program, we are proceeding with the elimination (A usc halt un g) of the Jews, with the extermination (Aus­rottung) " ... Among all those who speak in this manner, no one has been a spectator of it, no one has seen it. Most of you must know very well what a hundred corpses laid out together is or when five hundred or a thousand are. To have endured it and to have remained decent, aside from some exceptions of human weakness, is what has toughened us ... " (PS-1919)

Himmler had no doubts that the physical liquidation of the Jews which was in progress was known by every German conscious of what· . Nazism was. But no one was to seek information about the process of this liquidation. Himmler added that it was a natural question of tact to not speak of the horrors one was committing because they were necessary for the good of the Nazi Reich.

Three other speeches on the same subject were found in the Chancel­lery of the Reichsfiihrer-SS. Himmler gave himself up to the same confidences on December 16, 1943, in Weimar before an audience of naval commanders and on May 5 and 24, 1944, when he addressed the generals of the Wehrmacht in Sonthofen. In exactly the same way as in

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the speech of October 6 in Poznan, he insisted upon explaining the extermination of Jewish women and children. These texts lead one to think that the extermination of Jewish men was supposed to be already known and did not 'necessitate any justification; and that it was a question at the time of Himmler's providing a "justification" only of the ordered murder of the mass of Jewish women and children The memoirs of von Schirach contain the following quotation from a speech that Himmler allegedly made on May 29, 1944, in Poznan at the City Hall "before the national and. regional leaders" :

"I ask that you listen to what I am going to tell you in this circle and to keep it strictly to yourselves... The annihilation of the Jews is a harsh and painful task. We found ourselves faced with the following question: What was to be done with the wonien and children? There, too, I endeavoured to find a radical solution. I did not in fact have the right to exterminate men-I mean to kill (them) or have (them) killed-and to afterwards allow the proliferation of their breed, which would take vengeance on our sons and grandsons... It was thus necessary to take the decision fraught with consequences to act in such a way that this people disappear from the sur­face of the earth... We are carrying out this task without-at least I believe I may say it - our men's suffering in their minds and souls ... "

Himmler insisted on this last affirmation. We have cited it in his ora­tion of October 4, 1943, in Poznan; and we have also found it in that of May 5, 1944, before the generals.

Two documents inform us of the manner in which the" final solution" was to appear to public opinion. One of them was intended at that moment for an ultra-secret use. The other, on the contrary, regulated the information to be given to the public, preoccupied by the turn taken by the anti-Jewish movement.

The Inspector of Statistics Korherr in March-April 1943 (NO-5193-5198) drew up for Himmler a detailed 'report and an abridged report (the latter destined to be presented to Hitler) on the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question." Himmler wrote on April 9, 1943 (NO-5197), to the Chief of the Sipo-SD (Kaltenbrunner) (133):

"I have received from the Inspector of Statistics the statistical report on the final solution of the Jewish question. I consider this report as very good as eventual documentation for future times, that is, for the purpose of camouflage. Presently it must neither be published nor communicated. The most important thing for me, now as previously, is that this time one transport as many Jews as humanly possible to the East. I want to be informed in the brief monthly reports only of how many of them have been sent each month and how many Jews still remain at the given time."

It was during a period of great military upheaval that Himmler had Korherr draw up this statistical balance sheet of the "final solution." At the beginning of 1943, Hitler was caught up in the whirlwind of the defeats of the Wehrmacht. His proclamation of February 24, 1943, on the celebration of the foundation of the Party, was a manifestation of his will to compensate himself and his followers for the military disasters by the certainty that the Reich was in the process of liquida­ting, and would succeed in liquidating, the adversary par excellence, the

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Jew, to a great extent fallen into his hands. We have already indicated that this proclamation was overloaded with imprecations against the Judeo-Anglo-Saxons and the Judeo-Bolsheviks, culminating in the announcement that the Jews within the interior of the Reich were about to be definitively finished off.

lt is thus apparently to reply to an intense interest on the part of Hitler that Himmler ordered the report from Korherr. It remains never­theless that Himmler took on his own conscience the responsibility of the massacre of the deported Jewish masses, except in what concerned the Soviet Jews, whose extermination was spontaneously ordered by Hitler under the pretext of an essential measure of military security.

On reading the report of Korherr, Himmler thought that it could eventually serve as evidence of the liquidation of the Jewish presence, all while leaving the means employed to achieve this objective in the shadows. These shadows, such as were cast by the report over its own details, were not, however, opaque. They were just sufficient to warn the future historian that if the work of purification of the German vital space had been pitiless and radical, there would be no reason to ask how one had gone about it.

Let us recall the hypothesis that the American psychologist Gilbert presented to the defendant Grering in the prison of Nuremberg and with which the latter agreed. It concerned the attitude of Hitler himself, namely that Hitler desired the disappearance of the Jews by no matter what means and that he did not want to hear about them any more.

In a first draft of the report, Korherr employed the expression "spe­cial treatment" (Sonderbehandlung). He used it in regard to the 1,449,692 Jews who "were sent through" the extermination camps of the General Government (operation of Globocnik) and of Wartegau (the extermination camp of Chelmno). The expression "special treat­ment" was not accepted by Himmler. His aide de camp communicated to Korherr that Himmler wanted this term to be replaced by that of "transportation" (Transportierung). "Transportation" is a variant of "evacuation. "

The entire" final solution" was presented in the report (p. 15) as the result of four factors: the emigration, the ex cedent of deaths over births and, finally, the evacuation. These factors evoked nothing macabre. But the future historian studying the reports of Korherr might decide even so to raise the question as to the meaning of the evacuations. The "final solution of the Jewish question" consisted in the disappearance of the Jews from the German vital space. This principle was loudly proclaimed. Besides, Korherr specified that he counted the evacuations as "departures" (Abgange). Given that the destination of these evacua­tions did not go beyond the German vital space (all while being beyond the limits of the Reich proper), and that in conformity with the principle no Jewish reserve was evoked in that space, the" departures" in question could only be departures from earthly life.

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The report stopped at December 31, 1942. The evacuations with the "transportations" were composed of nearly a million and a half people for the latter and of 330,000 persons evacuated to the East from the Reich and from the countries of Western and Central Europe. A curious detail figured in the chapter on the" Jews in the Concentration Camps (p. 11)". Korherr wrote that the Jews "lodged during the course of the evacuation in the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Lublin" were not included in these figures. Therefore, the camps of Auschwitz and Lublin were considered as transit stops where the Jews were only "lodged" and where there was no need to count them. The sketch-plan established by Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee may here be recognized: deportation to the East (here it is a question of Auschwitz and Maj­danek-Lublin) and then continuation "farther east" where the rest were to disappear. "Farther east" meant, in reality, the gas chambers on the spot.

The condensed report drawn up for Hitler ended with a significant conclusion: since 1933, European Judaism had lost nearly half of its effectives; and half of this lost half had been transplanted (zugeflossen) to other continents. One may conclude from this that the other half of the half lost by European Judaism had been deported without leaving Europe on arrival. In conformity with the objective of the elimination of the Jews from the German vital space, it thus evaporated form the face of the earth.

The Korherr Report was an ultra-secret document. It was only for future times that Himmler imagined its eventual use as documentation on the work of "purification" accomplished by the Third Reich. But another document reveals that the information on the "final solution" that the Chancellery of he Party intended to communicate without delay to the "compatriots" (Volksgenossen) fundamentally expressed the same thing, although in a manner even more vague. ,

lt is an ordinance of October 9, 1942, of the Party Chancellery and found in the collection "Ordinances, Decrees, Opinions," which was published by the Chancellery in 1943 as a confidential work. We may note that another ordinance reproduced in this volume (on the obliga­tion for the Jews to wear a distinctive sign) specifies that it was intended only for ranking dignitaries (Hoheitstraeger) of the Party and "their closest collaborators." We may conclude from this fact that the volume in question was accessible to a restricted circle of Nazi leaders. But the text which interests us bears no restriction as to its communica­tion. It would have failed in its objective were it not communicated to all those reponsible for the propaganda of the Party. It made known what was to be explained to no matter what German among those who were troubled by the rumours about the treatment inflicted on the Jews deported to the East.

Here are the essential passages of the ordinance (134): ''In relation to the development of projects for the final solution of the Jewish question, the population of diverse regions of the territory of the Reich has of late been engaging in discussions on "the very severe mea­sures" taken against the Jews, particularly in the regions of the East. It was established that such exposes-deformed and exaggerated in most

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cases-came from those home on leave from diverse units engaged in the East and who had themselves had the occasion to observe such measures.

In order to be able to combat all formation of rumours on this subject, rumours which often assume a tendentious nature, the following commenta­ries are given for information on the present situation ... "

After having recalled the anti-Jewish movement between 1933 and 1939 (1. "Exclusion of the Jews from diverse sectors of the life of the German people... 2. The effort to totally expulse the adversary from the territories of the Reich "), the ordinance brings out that on the one hand the war had blocked emigration and on the other that the vital space, and thus the economic space, of the German people contained at that time such a quantity of Jews that their expulsion by emigration was no longer possible. Finally, the ordinance declares, before formu­lating what was the current "final solution:"

"The problem as a whole must be resolved by the present generation, given that even the following generation will no longer feel the question so keenly and on the basis of personal experiences, and that once launched, the affair urgently requires its resolution."

By this last detail the ordinance apparently means that the measures of segregation applied to the Jews by the present generation would end up by distracting the attention of the following generation from the actions of the Jews in segregation. This would create a dangerous situation because taking advantage of the careless somnolence of their Aryan entourage, the Jews would finally succeed in infiltrating non­Jewish life again. In brief, the operation 'begun had to be accelerated, having as objective the disappearance of this human group; for other­wise the regeneration of the dissolving power of the Jew would be fatally repeated.

The" final solution" is exposed as follows:

"That is why the total driving out (Verdraengung), respectively the elimina­tion of millions of Jews established in the European economic space, is an imperative in the struggle that the German people are leading to assure their existence. Beginning with the territories of the Reich and then going on to other European countries implicated in the final solution, the Jews are commonly transported to the East to large camps, in part still to be built, where they are either set to work or brought still farthcr east. Old Jews, as well as the Jews bearing important military decorations ... are com­monly transplanted (umgesiedelt) in the city of Theresienstadt, in the Pro­tectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. It is in the nature of things that these problems, which are in part very different, can only be resolved in the inte­rest of the definitive security (Sicherung) of our people by an unmitigated harshness. "

We know today in detail of what the "final solution" consisted, and it is thus easy to interpret this text in its mUltiple shades of meaning. Many things which it touched upon by getting around them were probably to go unnoticed by an ordinary member of the Party who became aware of the ordinance. But to that member of the Party who wanted to have an idea of the solution that the Hitlerian power had finally found to one of the cardinal problems of its ideology, the following traits should normally have been evident: the "final

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The Final Solution, "Page of Glory"

solution" was to be rapidly and brutally led to the very end, the Jewish masses transported to special camps in the East were, according to criteria which remained inexpressed, either kept in these regions to work or transported farther east to be submitted to a treatment the nature of which was not at all mentioned. A close examination of the text reveals that an alternative defining the fate of the deported Jews had already been presented in a preceding paragraph: the Jews were either to be put out (Verdraengung) or eliminated (Ausscheidung). In addition, the principle had already been established in the ordinance that the exclusion of the Jews from the new "economic space" of the German people, that is to say, the "European economic space," was to be total (voellige Verdraengung). In these conditions, the deportation "still farther east" for a purpose apparently inexpressable, but which was to be attained by means of an "unmitigated harshness," could only appear in the sense of the disappearance of that part of the deportees brought "still farther east." The "unmitigated harshness" was applicable for this part as well as for the other, kept only for work; and to both was applied the imperative of the elimination of the Jews from the "European economic space. "

The plan of the "final solution" exposed by Heydrich at the Confe­rence of Wannsee was faithfully reproduced in these directives. There were the two stations of deportation: first of all, "in the East" for work, after "farther east." On January 20, 1942, Heydrich evoked "transit ghettos" for the first station; the ordinance spoke of "big camps. " As for the final liquidation intimated by Heydrich, there is no evocation of it but only an enigmatic silence as to the fate of those deported "far to the East." Thus the ordinance proposed nothing to combat the sordid news spread by those on leave from the East who told what they had seen. It added, however, that a part of the deportees were kept for work. But the German who wondered alJout those brought farther away was to learn nothing directly. He reflected, however, on the "unmitigated harshness" of the treatment of the Jews and the racial purification of the "European economic space" that the ordinance forbade to evoke. These indications were disquieting for the Jews who, despite their deportation "far to the East," remained in this space and concerning whose fate the ordinance was silent. But a person who was not informed must have probably hesitated to draw the conclusion that these Jews were eliminated by their physical liqui­dation. But in this case it was not a question of people not informed. The ordinance spoke of the information to be given to people already troubled by the stories of what had been seen in the East. The infor­mation given to them by members of the Party could only confirm their suspicions of a collective massacre. The ordinance of October 9, 1942, indicated that the conviction was spreading in Germany that the deportation of the Jews to the East had the "final solution" by extermination for its objective. But it was not said for as much that the technique of this operation was known by many people.

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Let us point out another subtlety of expression in the text of the ordinance. Just as in the expose of Heydrich, one finds there the evocation of Theresienstadt intended for the old people and the privi­leged ones (which, incidentally, did not at all prevent the deportation of these Jews to Auschwitz where at first they were settled to be after­wards exterminated). But in principle the camp of Theresienstadt was not designated for the extermination. To stress the exceptional position of Theresienstadt, it was a question not simply of the transportation of the Jews, but of their "transplantation."

Aside from that, there was no longer any question of any sort of Jewish reserve. If the Jews were to be treated in such a way as to have them disappear from the "European economic space," it was necessary in those conditions to make them disappear from the face of the earth.

The ordinance of October 9, 1942, was faithful to the conventional vocabulary introduced by Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee: the stage of work "in the East" and the stage of disappearance "farther east." The fiction which replaced the transport to the gas chambers by the transport into "zones of operation" farther east was respected.

This terminology was respected by the heads of the regime even among themselves. On March 27, 1942, Grebbels wrote in his personal diary (135):

"[n the General Government, the Jews, beginnin6 with those of Lublin, are going to be evacuated to the East. To accomplish this, one is employing rather barbaric methods, on which no further explanation is necessary; not much is left of the Jews. Generally speaking, one may say that sixty per­cent of them must be liquidated, whereas only forty percent can be put to work. The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is directing this operation, is accomplishing it with sufficient discretion, and by employing procedures which do not attract the attention too much... No other government and no other regime would have enough strength to resolve this question once and for all. Here again, the FLihrer is the determined champion of a radical solution which the circumstances require and which thus seems inevitable. The ghettos which become free in the cities of the General Government will be filled with Jews evacuated from the Reich; then the operation will be renewed from time to time ... "

Thus Grebbels, even in his diary, observed the convention of calling "evacuation to the East" what he at once explained as extermination on the spot by "procedures which do not attract the attention too much," that is to say, by gas chambers. Another fiction was observed: in the secrets to be revealed concerning the "final solution," there was no question of Auschwitz. Grebbels spoke of the General Government and of the operation of Globocnik. In the autumn of 1942, General Oberg, Himmler's representative in occupied France, indicated to Laval that to questions on the deportation of the Jews it was necessary to an­swer that they were transported to the General Government to work. However, the Sipo-SD in Paris sent one convoy after the other not to the General Government, but to Auschwitz, located in Upper Silesia.

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The ordinance of October 9, 1942, vividly revealed the frame of mind in which a German citizen, were he to think about what the HitIerian regime was doing with the Jews, could see the "final solution." The German citizen had to reflect not on the deportation to a Jewish reserve, be it in Africa, Madagascar or Siberia, but rather on the meaning of the immediate or imminent deportation very far east, in the German vital space, from which at the same time all the Jews were to disappear. The direction of the Party had not the intention of making the German citizen believe that it was simply a transfer of a labour force. The ordinance of October 9, 1942, stated precisely that it was necessary to specify that only a part of the deported Jews remained for the work, that is in the first stages of its deportation; whereas another part was transported "far­ther east." Nothing was said of the objective for this other part, were it not the general objective of the disappearance of the Jews.

The question may be raised as to whether the officials of the Sipo-SD in the Reich and in its branches abroad could reasonably claim to have had less information on the "final solution" than that contained in the ordinance conceived with the worried German citizens in mind. The same question must be asked to the German diplomats who worked closely with the Sipo-SD. The only reasonable supposition is that, given their functions, the extent of their knowledge of this matter large­ly exceeded the minimum of information contained in the ordinance of October 9, 1942.

It is to be noted that the ordinance of October 9, 1942, of the Chancel­lery of the Party contented itself with defining what was to be revealed to those troubled by news of the killing of Jews in the occupied Soviet regions. But the Hitlerian propaganda also manifested its intention of going ahead of the curiosity of the citizens. This intention is found in the directives given by O. Dietrich, Pressechef of the Reich and of the Party. He worked directly with Hitler, all while belonging to the Ministry of Propaganda of Grebbels as a Secretary of State.

In the beginning of 1943, O. Dietrich gave instructions to the daily press and to the periodicals for the intensification of their anti-Jewish propaganda. A directive of February 5, 1943, stated (136):

"The anti-Jewish propaganda is on the same level as the anti-Bolshevik propaganda. The treatment of this theme is part of the campaign lately designated as necessary to provoke feelings of hatred... The accent must be put on the work for which the "German Weekly Service" gives ample suggestions and proposals of themes, that in contrast with what goes on among other peoples, there are in Judaism not just some isolated crimes; Judaism entirely stems from a criminal root and it is criminal in its pre­disposition (Anlage)... The extermination (Vernichtung) of Judaism is not a loss for humanity, it is useful for the peoples of the earth in the same way as the death penalty or the detention for security (Sicherheitsverwahr­ung) is for the criminal delinquant (kriminelle Verbrecher)."

This directive indicated that it was necessary to make public opinion understand that Judaism was delivered over to the death penalty or to internment, the death penalty occupying the first place in this perspec­tive.

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The word "Vernichtung" was employed in another directive to desig­nate that time what the Jews were planning against all nations. One may quote the judgment pronounced at Nuremberg against O. Dietrich: "The Information Service" observed on April 22, 1943, that the Jews were responsible for the mass massacre of the Polish officers at Katyn; "the Jews would have the intention of assassinating the peoples of Eu­rope ... " Other directives designated by the word "Vernichtung" the goal pursued by the Jews with regard to the non-Jews. In the general directive, one reads:

one can refer to the word of the FUhrer, that is, that at the end of this war, there will only be survivors and those exterminated (Vernichtete). By pointing out the firm intention of Judaism to exterminate (Vernichtung) all the Germans, one will fortify the will to self-affirmation."

Thus, the anti-Jewish propaganda had to suggest that the "Vernich­tung" of the Jews by the Germans was the answer to give to the "Vernichtung" that the Jews were preparing to apply to the non-Jewish peoples; and the meaning of this "Vernichtung" was extermination.

Let us finally point out in regard to "Vernichtung" the propositions advanced by Ribbentrop and Hitler during their conversation of April 17,1943, with Horthy, Regent of Hungary (D-736) (137):

"In answer to the question asked in retort by Horthy to know what he was to do with the Jews after he had deprived them of practically all means of existence-he could not even so finish them off-the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich depiored that the Jews had to b:: either exterminated (Vernichtet) or interned in concentration camps... There are no other solu­tions ... Continuing on, the FUhrer came to speak of the city of Nuremberg ... It is a fact that the Jews are parasites. In Poland, this situation has been entirely liquidated. There, if the Jews do not want to work, they are shot. If they are unable to work, they must perish... It is not cruel. It suffices to consider that even the innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or goats, are killed to prevent their harmfulness. Why should it be necessary to spare brutes who wanted to bring us Bolshevism?"

The process of the extermination of the Jews was nevertheless one of the most important State Secrets. Neither Hitler nor the competent authorities intended to officially make known that on the average about 80% of the Jewish deportees were done away with by gas upon arrival at their destination. This State Secret forbade any revelation which allowed people to imagine the procedure of the killing off of millions of Jewish persons. But at the summit of the Third Reich (Hitler, Himmler, Grebbels, Bormann), one was thinking of the necessity of preparing public opinion for knowledge of the fact that these millions of people had disappeared. It was necessary that public opinion have a sort of premonition that by means which would never have. to be detailed, the Jews were disappearing from the face of the earth. The thing was not entirely said, it was even expected that the violent terms in the anti-Jewish propaganda would provoke the impression of exagger­ation; but it was known that the word "Vernichtung" would provoke an uneasy foreboding of horror.

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It is certain that the ordinance of the Party of October 9, 1942, and the directives of O. Dietrich intended to present the "final solution" to the public in a sinister and macabre light.·

In the winter of 1943, anyone at all had only to buy the November 4, 1943, edition of the weekly "Der StUrmer", published by Streicher, Gauleiter of Franconia, to be informed of the real meaning of the "final solution." "Der StUrmer" was scorned by the very great majority of Germans. We have already seen that before the war, the SS (Hagen and Eichmann) severely criticized this obscene and outrageously vulgar organ of anti-Jewish propaganda. Hitler nevertheless insisted that it continue to appear, and the "StUrmer" was ostentatiously exposed in the streets of all the cities of the Reich.

But far from limiting itself to the propaganda calling for the murder of the Jews, it gave the information that this murder was being accomplished.

Streicher, who was judged in Nuremberg at the trial of the major Nazi war criminals, explained the working habits of the editor of the "StUr­mer. " He emphasized the important role played by the analysis of the paper "The Jewish Weekly," published by the Swiss Jewish commu­nity, in the preparation of the issues. This paper contained news on the extermination of the Jews of the East or of those deported to the East. The November 4, 1943, issue of the "StUrmer" (PS-1965) con­tains an article entitled "The New Jewish Order. What the Jews Demand for Themselves." (138) Therein is found this quotation from the Swiss weekly:

"The Jews have, so to speak, disappeared from Europe, except with respect to England and also the small Jewish communities in the few neutral countries. The Jewish reservoir in the East, which was capable of equi­librating the phenomena of assimilation in the West, no longer exists."

The "StUrmer" made the following comment on this quotation:

"It is not a question of a Jewish fraud (Judenschwindel). It is in fact true that the Jews have "so to speak" disappeared from Europe and that "the Jewish reservoir in the East," from which the Jewish epidemic (1udenseuche) had spread for hundreds of years onto the European peoples, has ceased to exist. If the Jewish publication wants to claim that the Jews did not envi­sage such a development when they thrust the peoples into the Second World War, they are not to be believed. But the FUhrer of the German people, from the very beginning of the war, foretold what has now hap­pened. He said that the Second World War would swallow up those who had wanted it... One thus annihilates the cause, the Jew; and the world is freed of the Jewish animosity. One understands that the Jews do not wish such a solution. They demand rather the extermination of all the non­Jews, who necessarily become enemies of the Jews, because,'(jf the presence of the Jews." .

Thus the editorial staff of the" StUrmer" declared itself to be informed of the event reported by the Swiss publication. Given that Streicher, a scandalous personality, had already for several years been put aside from the real political life of the country, his news did not have the cre­dibility of being official. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was publish­ed and that this paper was especially exposed in the stands, took on

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THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION

the meaning of a confirmation of the rumours which circulated in the public opinion. It is to be noted in addition that in this article Strei­cher faithfully followed O. Dietrich's directives.

It is often tempting to think that since the time that the decision was taken to obtain the "final solution" of the Jewish question by the exter­mination of the Jews, the Hitlerian power intended to distract public opinion from this unsupportable aspect of the operation. This point of view is erroneous. The anti-Jewish propaganda of the Nazis, beginning with that of Hitler in his major public speeches, addressed itself to the German people in the intention of obtaining its grateful acceptance of the operation which, by measures not to be elaborated except perhaps in a distant future, were making the Jews disappear from the German vital space, that means from the Urals to the Atlantic. In the given circumstances, this meant their physical disappearance. These macabre visions were combined with assurances that the "final solution" consisted first of all in segregation with confiscation (Aryanization), then in depor­tation to the East for the exploitation of Jewish manpower in the war economy. One may recall that the deportations to the East did in fact take place as work "assignments" (Arbeitseinsatz); this was in practice translated by the extermination of about 80% of the deportees, pro­claimed "unfit for work," and by the temporary conservation of the rest, a labour force exposed to the excessively harsh regime of life in a concentration camp. Both aspects, the disappearance of the Jewish masses deported to the East to vanish there and this same deportation as a furnisher of labour appear in the propaganda as valid. But when faced with the slightest curiosity concerning the process by which this disappearance was obtained, the initiates and their multiple agents did their utmost to assure that it was a matter of nothing other than econo­mic exploitation in the war industry which lacked workers. These in­dignant denegations of the "lies of the Jewish terror propaganda" (ju­dische Greuelpropaganda) were proferred without the slightest care of coherence with the revelations that Hitler repeated publicly. Eich­mann was questioned in Jerusalem on the answers he gave to the cu­rious and the anguished in regard to the "final solution." He answered (139): "The directives were so numerous, and to such a degree diverse, that at that time already one had to choose them oneself. " He also declared (140) that as for the extermination of the Jews, "the birds were singing it on the roof-tops" since the end of 1943.

It is natural that these macabre and unclear indications were not easily assimilated by public opinion. One might advance that a German citizen who did not revolt against his Government at the news of the extermination of the Jews thus became an accomplice of the Nazi power. It was preferable not to believe in the possibility of the horror which this power boasted of perpetrating.

But this rejection became impossible for the categories of Germans who, at diverse levels of the hierarchy, assured the functioning of the

72

The Final Solution, "Page of Glory"

apparatus of the "final solution." Such was clearly the case of the Gestapo and the SD, but also of a large number of German diplomats, particularly those who had to deal with the questions of the deportations of the Jews of the Reich and of the countries under~its yoke. The activity of all these agents of, the Hitlerian power pointed uniquely towards the goal that the propaganda mysteriously desig­nated by proclaiming the disappearance of the Jewish masses from the German vital space. This nebulous vision forced the attention of these agents. At the very most, they could endeavour to distract themselves with it, to the extent that their functions did not directly confront them with the procedure of extermination. But no matter how great was their effort to not think of it, they must always have had in mind that their task aimed at making all of the Jews, German or foreign, disappear from the German vital space before the end of the war.

73

DlOlwgrapny

AHKJ'Z O. - Das offene Problem, eiri Rlickblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreich po­litik. Greven Verlag, Koeln, 1951. Cite « Abetz 1 ».

ABETZ O. - Histoire d'une politique franco-allemande 1930-1950. Memoires d'un Ambassadeur. Librairie Stock, Paris, 1953. Cite « Abetz 2 ».

ABETZ O. - D'une prison a I'autre. Amiot-Dumont, Paris 1949. Cite « Abetz 3 ». ADLER H.G. - Der verwaltete Mensch. Studien zur deportation der Juden aus Deutschland.

J.C.B. Mohr, TUbingen, 1974. Akten zur deutschen auswaertigen politik 1918-1945, Serie D. (Band IV). Imprimerie Nationale,

Baden-Baden, 1956. AUONSON S. - Reinhard Heydrich und die FrUhgeschichle von Gestapo und SD. Deutsche

Veriags-Anslatt, Stuttgart, 1971. BEDNARZ L. - Le camp d'extermination de Chelmno sur Ie Ner. Traduit du Polonais.

Editions de I'Amitie Franco-Polonaise, 1955. BILLIG J. - Le Commisariat General aux Questions Juives (1941-1944). 3 volumes. Editions

du Centre, Paris, 1955-1960. Cite « Billig 1». BILLIG J. - L'Institut d'Etude des Questions Juives : Officine fran~aise des auto rites nazies

en France. Edition du Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris, 1974, Cite «Billig 2».

BRINON F., de. - Memoires. Editions L.L.C., 1949. BROSZAT M. - Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933-1945. Dans: Anatomie des SS­

States. Gutachten des Instituts fUr Zeitgeschichte. 2 volumes. T. II. Walter Verlag, Olten und Freiburg im Breigau, 1965.

BUCHHEIM H. - Die SS als Herrschaffsinstrument. Befehl und Geshorsam. Dans : Anatomie des SS Staates (voir sous Broszat). T. I. Cite « Buchheim 1 ».

BUCHHEIM H. - Die mitgliedschaft von Juden und Mischlingen in der Reichskulturkammer. Dans Gutachten des Instituts fUr Zeitgeschichte. 1m Selbstverlag des Instituts, MUnchen, 1958. Cite «Buchheim 2 ».

Bulletin de la Commission Centrale d'Enquete sur les Crimes Hit\eriens en Pologne. T. XII. Editions juridiques, Varsovie, 1960 (en polonais).

UII<:LS R. - Lucifer ante Portas. Zwischen Severing und Heydrich. lntervelag. ZUrich ·(sans date).

UIKI'RIt.:H O. - 12 Jahre mit Hitler. Isar Verlag. MUnchen 1955. DOMARUS M. - Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945, kommentiert von einem

deutschen Zeitgenossen. 2 volumes. WUrzburg. 1962 et 1963. EICHMANN A. - Archives du proces d'Eichmann a Jerusalem.

I) Interrogatoire d'Eichmann. Cite « Eichmann 1 ». 2) Documents presentes au proces. Cite «Eichmann 2 ». 3) Proces-verbal des audiences. Cite « Eichmann 3 ».

« Eichmann par Eichmann ». Editions Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1970. Cite « Eichmann 4 ». GILBERT G.M. - Le Journal de Nuremberg. Fiammarion, Paris 1947. Traduit de i'anglais. GOEBBELS J. - Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 3ge edition. Zentralverlag der NSDAP.

F. Eher, MUnchen, 1942. Cite « Gcebbels I ». GOEBBELS J. - « Le Journal du Dr. Gcebbels. Texte integral» Ed. « A l'Enseigne du Cheval

Aile », Paris, 1949. Cite «Gcebbels 2 ». GOEBBELS J. - Gcebbels tagebucher (Aus den Jahren 1942-43) Atlantis Verlag. ZUrich 1948. HIMMLER H. Discours secrets. Gallimard, Paris 1978. Traduit de i'allemand. HITLER A. - Reden ... (voir sous « Domarus »). HITLER A. - Die Reden des FUhrers am Parteitag. 1935. Zentralverlag des NSDAP, F.

Eher, MUnchen. HOENE H. - Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS. Sigbert Mohn Verlag.

GUtersloh, 1967. HOESS R. - Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen von Rudolf

Hoess. Eingeleitet und kommentiert von M. Broszat. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1958.

HOSSBACH F. - Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934-1938. WolfenbUtteler Verlagsanstalt. WolfenbUttel und Hannover, 1949.

JACOBSEN M.A. - Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowietischer Kriegsgefangener. Dans : Anatomie des SS Staates (voir sous Broszat(. T. II.

KEMPNER R. - Eichmann und Komplizen. Europa-Verlag, ZUrich, Stuttgart, Wien, 1961. KLARS.FELU H. - Partout oil ils seront. Editions J-C Lattes, Paris 1972. Wherever they may

be. The Vanguard Press, New York, 1975. KLARSl<'ELU S. - Die EndlOsung des Judenfrage in Frankreich. Ed Klarsfeld, Paris 1978. KRAUSNICK M. - Judenverfolgung. Dans: Anatomie des SS Staates (voir sous Broszat). LOESENER B. - Ais Rassenreferent im Reichministerium des Inneren. Dans : Das Reichs-

ministerium des Inneren und die Judengesetzgebung. Vierteljahrshefte fUr Zeitgschichte, no 3, 1961. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

MOULIN DE LABARTHETE H., du - Le temps des illusions. Souvenir (Juilet 1940--Avril lY42). « A l'Enseigne du Cheval Aile », Paris, Bruxelles, 1946.

OLDEN R. - Hitler. 2e edition. Querido Verlag N.V., Amsterdam, 1936. PICKER H. - Hitlers Tischgespraeche im FUhrer hauptquartier 1941-1942. Neuherausgegebw

von E. Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit A. Hilgruber und M. Vogt. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1963.

Proces des grands crimi nels de guerre devant Ie Tribunal Militalre International, Niiremllerg. XLVII volumes. Editions fran~aise par Ie Tribunal Militaire International.

SCHELLENBERG W. - Memoiren, Verlag fUr Politik und Wirtschaf, Koeln, 1959. SCHIRACH B. -von. - Ich glaubte an Hitler. Mosaik Verlag. Hambourg 1967. SEIFERT H.E. - Der Jude an der Ostgrenze. Zentraverlag der NSDAP, F. Eher, Berlin 1941. SPEER A. - Erinnerungen. Propylaen Verlag. Berlin 1969. STEINBERT M.G. - Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und HaUung der deutschen

Bevoelkerung im zweiten Weltkrieg. Eeon Verlag, DUsseldorf, 1970. URTEIL. (Das) 1m Wllhelmstrasse-Proze5s. Alfons Burger Verlag-Schwaebisch, GmUnd, 1950. VARENNES t.:. - Le Destin de Marcel Deat. Ed. Janmaray, 1948. Vierteljahrshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte. Deutsche Veflags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. WELLERS G. - L'Etoile jaune ~ l'heure de Vichy. Editions Fayard. Paris 1973.

74

NOT E S

PART ONE

I. THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1942

7. The I,!uubatioiZ FeY'iod of HitleY"s Anti-Jew-ish Action (19.';:5-1968)

I. Krausnick, pp. 311-312

2. Hitler's appeal of March 28,1933, to all of the organizations of the NSDAP for the boycotting of Jewish firms: "Die Aktionskomitees sind dafUr verantwortlich, dall sich dieser gesamte Kampf in vollster Ruhe und grollter Disziplin vollzieht. KrUmmt auch weiterhin keinem Juden auch nur ein Haar!"

3. Krausnick, p.317

4. Krausnick, p.311

5. Adler, p. 658

6. Krausnick, p. 321

7. Adler, p. 10, Memorandum of the delegations of the Jewish communities of Berlin and Vienna at the conference of Evian: "In dem Augenblick, da ein Viertel der jUdischen Bevolkerung Deutsch­lands sich nicht mehr seIber erhalten kann und durch offentliche Wohl­titigkeit unterstUtzt wird, da Tausende einer dauernden Arbeitslosigkeit entgegenblicken, ja Zehntausende Junger und arbeitswilliger Menschen ihre Stelle eingebUllt haben und mit ihrer Auswanderung die Moglichkeit zum Aufbau einer neuen Existenz ... suchen, erfUllt uns die Hoffnung, dall die KONFERENZ IN EVIAN ihr hohes Ziel erreichen und die GrUndung einer neuen Existenz fUr jene Menschen ermaglichen wird, denen die Geschichte die Auswanderung als ihre Sendung zubestimmt hat."

? Jewish Em-igY'ation dUY'ing the Ineubation Per'iod of the "Vinal Solution"

8. Krausnick, pp. 343-344

9. Adler, p. 8

:5. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Aetion Isolated fY'om Mass MOvements

10. Buchheim I,pp. 318-319, Order of Himmler to the SS on August 16,1935: "I) Ich verbiete aufs schirfste jede Einzelaktion irgend eines SS-Ange­harigen gegen Juden. 2) Die Lasung der Judenfrage ist, wie auch bisher die Lasung aller Fragen, eine Sorge des FUhrers und nicht eine Sorge von Einzelnen. 3) Zuwiderhandlungen, auch in der leisesten Form, werden mit Ausstollung aus der SS bestraft".

II. Steinbert, p. 263

12. Speer, pp. 126, 45 "Es hat mich immer wieder Uberrascht, dall mir antisemitische Bemerkungen Hitlers kaum haften geblieben sind ... - der Judenhall Hitlers schien mir damals so selbstverstindlich, dall er mich nicht beeindruckte ... Dagegen mull ich die Empfindung gehabt haben, dall es mich persanlich

75

Notes pp. 6-7

nichts angehe, wenn ich harte, wie Juden, Freimaurer, Sozialdemokraten oder Zeugen Jehovas von meinex Umgebung wie Freiwild: beurteilt wurden. Ich meinte, es genUge, wenn ich selber mich daran nicht beteiligte".

13. Speer, pp. 384-385 : "So kommt es mir vor, als habe der verzweifelte Wettlauf mit der Zeit, dieses besessene Starren auf Produktions- und AusstoBzahlen, alle Er­wagungen und GefUhle der Menschlichkeit zugedeckt ..... Mich beunruhigt vielmehr, daB ich in den Gesichtern der Haftlinge nicht die Physiognomie des Regimes gespiegelt sah, des sen Existenz ich in diesen Wochen und ~lonaten so manisch zu verlangern trachtete".

4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and in the SD before the War

14. LISCHKA, Kurt Werner Paul

Born August 16, 1909, in Breslau. Law studies in Breslau and Berlin. SS NO 195590, June I, 1933. In April 1935 Lischka became a judge in training; and on September 2, 1935, he entered the Gestapo of Berlin. He joined the Nazi Party on May I, 1937 (NO 4583185).

SS-UntersturmfUhrer January 30, 1938. SS-ObersturmfUhrer April 20, 1938. SS-SturmbannfUhrer in April 1942.

Lischka was also rapidly promoted in his functions of civil administrator:

Gerichtsassessor September 2, 1935. Regierungsassessor in July 1936. Regierungsrat in April 1938. Oberregierungsrat in September 1941.

Chief of the service of Jewish affairs of the Ge.stapo for the entire Reich, Lischka directed the first mass arrest of the German Jews on June 13, 1938. In November 1938 Lischka led the operation of the arrest of the Jews which immediately followed the pogrom of the "Crystal Night". In 1939 Lischka was chief of the head office of the Reich for Jewish emigration, an emanation of the Gestapo. From January to November 1940, Lischka was chief of the Gestapo of Cologne.

From November 1940 to November 1943, Lischka was active in France, where he occupied the following posts of the highest responsibility in the political police:

I) Permanent substitute for the head of the security services (Knochen) and of the criminal investigation department of the Nazi police, the Sipo-SD, in occupied France;

2) Kommandeur, which means chief, of the Nazi police, the Sipo-SD, of all the Paris area with antennae in Melun and Versailles;

3) Chief of Department II of the Sipo-SD on the national level, in charge of the internment camps, the execution of hostages, the surveillance of the French police;

4) Given the responsibility quite especially to cap the Gestapo and the Kripo, because of his experience in the police, (Knochen was by training an intelligence man).

76

Notes pp. 7-8

Declaration of Knochen:"Sections IV (Gestapo) and V (Kripo) were placed under the direct authority of my assistant who was always a member of the Amt IV (Gestapo)"; " At the request of General MUller, the executive questions of my services were known only by my assis­tants, Lischka then Hens·chke. I did not meddle in their business". "Lischka was my permanent representative for Sections IV and V, by virtue of the detective force and the criminel investigation department". "Lischka handled the matters of Sections IV and V referring himself to General Oberg. Although the fact may appear strange, it is my re­presentative Lischka who particularly took charge of matters concerning Section IV (Gestapo)."

From November 1943 to May 1945 Lischka, back in Berlin at the Headquarters of the Principal Office of Security of the Reich, which had been placed after the death of Heydrich under the direction of Kaltenbrunner , became one of the closest collaborators of the Chief of the Gestapo of the Reich, Heinrich MUller. Lischka directed Depart­ment IV B of the Gestapo of the Reich, the IV A being directed by MUller himself. Under Lischka's orders, there were civil servants of a higher rank than his.

After the attack against Hitler of July 20, 1944, Lischka be­longed to the special commission in charge of investigating those officers suspected. MUller, Chief of the Gestapo, directed the commission which was composed of fifteen members. Lischka investigated the following cases: Generaloberst Hopner, who was hanged at the end of the inquiry, Oberstleutnant Sadroczinski (hanged), Hauptmann Klausing, Oberst Jager (hanged), Heusinger, Oberst Hahn (hanged), Oberst Hassel, Generalleutnant Thiele (hanged), Generalstabrichter Sack (hanged).

Lischka was tried by the Permanent Tribunal of the Armed Forces in Paris. On September 18, 1950, he was sentenced in absentia to perpetual hard labour.

He lives in Cologne at 554 Bergisch Gladbacher Str. Lischka officially retired in 1975 as agent (Prokurist) of the import-export company "Krlicken".

Lischka still remains unpunished. He held the prime responsibili­ty for the deportations of the Jews from France. In 1971 Beate and Serge Klarsfeld attempted to kidnap him and bring him back to France. In 1974 the trial of Beate Klarsfeld which excited world-wide interest brought to light the scandal of this impunity. In 1975 the Bundestag was obliged to ratify the Franco-German judiciary agreement, and Lischka is to be tried.

15. Hohne, p. 195

16. Aronson, p. 293

77

Note p. 8

17. HAGEN, Herbert-Martin

Born September 20, 1913, in Neumlinster(Holstein) SS NO 123273, October I, 1933. NSDAP NO 4583139

Hagen worked in the SS from May 25, 1934, onwards. He became SS-Hauptsturmflihrer in 1939, SS-Sturmbannflihrer in 1941, SS-Obersturm­bannflihrer in 1945.

In May 1934 Hagen entered the SD of the SS-Reichsflihrer in Munich. In September 1934 he was named to the SD-Hauptamt in Berlin.

A graduate of the Auslandwissenschaftliche Institut, where he attended the lectures of Professor F.A.Six, who directed the 11-1 of the SD, Hagen became the collaborator of Six in the SD and head of the section 11-112 in charge of Jewish affairs. Hagen, chief of the 11-112, struck up a friendship with his collaborator Adolf Eichmann; and the two men went to Egypt and PalestiOne together in October 1937. Hagen also travelled a great deal in Central Europe in order to intensify anti-Semitism and to watch over the strict application of the anti­Jewish measures in Germany.

On June 22, 1940, Hagen belonged to the first commando of the SD in France. He became Kommandeur of the Sipo-SD of Bordeaux and from there controlled all of the Atlantic coast as far as Brittany. He arrested the Jews of the region and selected the fifty hostages shot in Bordeaux on October 24, 1941.

In May 1942 Hagen became the political adviser (Politischer Referent) and the sole direct collaborator of General Oberg, Chief of the SS and of the German Police in France, for whom he did the real brain-work. He was also chief of Department VI of the Sipo-SD.

Very active against the Jews in France, Hagen also played an important role in all of the reprisals by executions from 1942 to 1944.

On July 9, 1943, Hagen married the secretary of the anti-Jewish section of the Gestapo in Paris.

burg. March

In 1945 the SS-Obersturmbannflihrer directed the Sipo-SD of He was to be imprisoned in the British zone. In France on 18, 1955, Hagen was sentenced in absentia to perpetuel hard

Salz-

labour.

Herbert Hagen resides at WilhelmstraBe 34, Warstein (Rhineland­Westphalia) .

He is commercial manager of an important industriel enterprise: the "Industrie- und Apparatebau".

Hagen has still not been punished. He was the second most im­portant of the Nazi criminals who deported the Jews from France. In 1972 Beate and Serge Klarsfeld demonstrated against him in Warstein.

78

Notes pp. 8-11

5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution" Inspire the Gestapo

the SS Destined to

18. Hitler, p. 17, Proclamation of Hitler for the opening of the Congress of the Party, September II, 1935 in Nuremberg: "Diese Entschlossenheit, bestimmte Gefahren unter allen Umstanden und schon im Keime zu ersticken, wird, wenn es einmal natig sein sollte, auch davor nicht zurlickscheuen, Funktionen flir die ersichtlich der Staat - weil seinem innersten Wesen fremd - nicht geeignet ist, auf dem Wege der Gesetzgebung den Einrichtungen zu libertragen, die flir odie Lasung einer solchen Aufgabe besser geeignet erscheinen."

19. Domarus, p. 537 or Hitler p. 65, Speech of Hitler of September 15,1935 before the Reichstag convoked in Nuremberg(proclamation of the racial laws) : "(Das dritte) Gesetz ist der Versuch einer gesetzlichen Regelung eines Problems, das im FaIle des abermaligen Scheiterns dann durch Gesetz zur endgliltigen Lasung der nationalsozialistischen Partei libertragen werden mliBte. Hinter allen drei Gesetzen steht die nationalsozialistische Partei und mit ihr und hinter ihr die Deutsche Nation".

20. Article of Heydrich, "Die Bekampfung der Staatsfeinde" in the periodical "Deutsches Recht", 1936 (summarized by M.Broszat in "Anatomie des SS-Staates" pp. 51-52) : "Voraussetzung der polizeilichen Gegnerbekampfung sei"der weltan­schauliche Ideenkampf gegen die Grundlagen des Gegeners", der "nur durch die nationalsozialistische Bewegung geflihrt werden" kanne. Deshalb mlisse die "Staatspolizei in engster Flihrung mit dem Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsflihrers-SS" arbeiten, dem als "Zweig der Gesamt-SS von der Reichsleitung der NSDAP die nachrichtenmaBige Erforschung und Uber­wachung der ideenmaBigen Gegner des Nationalsozialismus libertragen ist".

21. Buchheim, p. 339, Lecture of Himmler in Sonthofen, May 26, 1944, during a course on political ideology: "Nun werden Sie eines begreifen. Diese MaBnahmen im Innern des Reiches kannen nicht von einer Polizei, die nur aus Beamten besteht, durchge­flihrt werden. Dazu hatte ein Korps, das nur seinen Beamteneid geleistet hat, nicht die Kraft. Diese MaGnahmen konnten nur getragen und durchge­flihrt werden von einer in sich bis zum auBersten gefestigten Organisat­ion, von fanatischen und zutiefst liberzeugten Nationalsozialisten. Die SS rechnet sich dazu und behauptet von sich, daflir geeignet zu sein und hat die Aufgabe libernommen."

22. Zipfel, p. 6, "Valki.scher Beobachter", Janvier 1936 : "Da die geheime Staatspolizei neb en den ihr in erster Linie obliegenden Vollzugsaufgaben diese Beobachtung der Staatsfeinde nicht in dem not­wendigen MaBe durchflihren kann, tritt ihr erganzend der Sicherheits­dienst des Reichsflihrers-SS, der vom Stellvertreter des Flihrers als der politische Nachrichtendienst der Bewegung eingesetzt wurde, zur Seite und stellt damit einen groBen Teil der von ihm mobilisierten Krafte der Bewegung in den Dienst der Staatssicherheit". °

79

Notes PP. 11-13

6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within the SD, the II-112 under the Sl:gn of "Zionism". U935-1938)

23. H.G. Adler, "Der verwaltete Mensch", p. 662 : "Schon im Jahre 1938 waren die meisten wichtigen und viele minder belangvolle amtliche Vorgange, die einen Juden betrafen, auBerdem auch Angelegenheiten der Gestapo, die jederzeit eingeschaltet oder zumindest benachrichtigt wurde".

24. Eichmann 2, nO 1492

25. Eichmann I, p. 66, Interrogatory of Eichmann during the preliminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage on his beginnings in the anti-Jewish Service of the SD) : " ... Nach einigen Tagen war dieser Entwurf fertig und er wurde auch tat­sachlich dann gedruckt ... In diesem Bericht habe ich sachlich darge­stellt einmal den Aufbau der zionistischen Weltorganisation, die Ziele des Zionismus, seine Hilfsquellen und seine Schwierigkeiten und auch die Forderung wurde unterstrichen, weil der Zionismus ja den eigenen WUnschen ja insofern entgegenkam ... , eine Losung suchte und wollte, eine politische Losung anstrebte ... Insofern gab es da gar nicht viel zu andern im Hinblick auf, sagen wir mal, 'nationalsozialistisches Wollen' ."

26. Aronson, p. 203

27. Eichmann I, pp. 70-71

28. Eichmann I, pp.75-81, Interrogatory of Eichmann during the prelimi­nary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage on the replace­ment of Wisliceny by Hagen at the head of the anti-Jewish service of the SD) : "Also 36, es war 36, nun hatte Six eine Animositat gegen den an sich etwas phlegmatischen und die Sachen dahin gleiten lassenden Wisliceny der uns arbeiten lieB, selber aber gerne irgendwelche historischen BUcher oder ahnliches las und sicK damit die Zeit vertrieb ... Eines Tages kam's zur Ablosung Wisliceny's und ein Vertreter von Six namens ... weiB ich leider nicht ... wie heiBt er bloB ... Hagen, Hagen hieB der Mann, OberscharfUhrer Hagen ... Hagen war ein kluger Mann mit doch recht wei tern Horizont, verfUgte Uber gesundes Allgemeinwissen und hatte eine gute Gabe, ihm auch bis dahin fremd gewesene Angelegenheiten binnem kurzem in sich aufzunehmen, das Wesentliche zu erkennen, herauszu­schalen und so fort darliber einen Artikel zu schreiben. - Und so benutzte ihn Dr.Six auch als Schreiber, Schreiber mancher Artikel in einer Monatszeitschrift, die das Auslandswissenschaftliche Institut unter Leitung von Dr. Six urn jene Zeit herausgab, urn hier zu den verschieden­sten Fragen, nicht nur jUdischen Angelegenheiten Stellung zu nehmen. _ Von jlidischen Angelegenheiten, jlidischen Organisationen, deren Wollen, deren Ziele hatte er bis dahin noch keine Ahnung. Sein erstes als er kam, war daher, daB er sich von mir einmal liber mein Sachgebiet er­schopfend Auskunft geben lieB. Er frug tatsachlich so umfassend und wollte es so genau wissen, daB ich Mlihe hatte wirklich alles, was ich wuBte, heraus zukramen, besser gesagt, er pympte mir mein Wissen, diese Organisationen die ich nannte betreffend, jedenfalls heraus. Und das Erstaunliche, er behielt es ... (es) kam(en) dabei zur Hilfe die Tafeln, die ich schon erwahnen durfte, die an den Wanden hingen und hier im wesentlichen die Namen zumindestens ja aufzeichneten ... Nun hatte ich mir zwar die Enzyklopadia Judalka und andere Literatur

80

Notes pp. 13-14

in groBen Hengen besorgt. Ich las damals unendlich viel nur in dieser Sparte und selbstverstandlich fast alle jlidischen Zeitungen, die ich auftreiben konnte."

29. Eichmann I, pp. 75-81

30. Report of Hagen, December 1937, on the reorganization of the anti­Jewish Service of the SD ( the II 112) under the sign of the Jewish emigration and of the centralization of the action in the SD and the Gestapo : "Die eigentliche Bearbeitung des Gegners Judentum durch die Abteilung II 112 begann etwa Ende 1935. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die vor­bereitenden Arbeiten soweit fortgeschritten, daB an eine organisa­torische Erfassung der Juden in Deutschland herangegangen werden konnte. Diese Arbeit, die sich liber ein Jahr hinzog, hatte im wesentlichen bereits in einigen Monaten abgeschlossen sein konnen, wenn die Arbeits­verteilung innerhalb der Abteilung von Anfang an besser gewesen ware. Die Folge der damals getroffenen Verteilung der Arbeit war, daB einige Manner der Abteilung mit laufenden Arbeiten liberlastet waren, weil es den librigen an einer umfassenden Sachkenntnis mangelte. - Eine prak­tische FUhlungnahme mit den Juden in Deutschland war infolge der ung­geschickten Taktik der Abteilungsleitung urn diese Zeit fast ausge­schlossen. Man hielt sich mit der Gesamtbearbeitung lediglich an die Staatspolizeistelle Berlin, die selbstverstandlich lediglich liber die ortlichen Gegnerformen unterrichtet war. Bei den wenigen Verhandlungen, die auf der Staatspolizeistelle gefUhrt wurden, haben die Manner der Abteilung II 112 keine Gelegenheit gehabt, sich praktisch zu betatigen. Die Verhore wurden lediglich von den Staapobeamten geflihrt. Die poli­tische Ausrichtung der in Deutschland ansassigen jlidischen Organisatio­nen nach staatspolizeilichen Gesichtspunkten war unter diesen Umstanden natlirlich nicht moglich; zudem bestand nicht einmal eine Kontrolle liber die Tatigkeit der leitenden jlidischen politischen Funktionare. - Dieser Zustand dauerte bis etwa Marz, April 1937. (Bericht von SS-UntersturmfUhrer Eichmann) ... - Einen grundsatzlichen Wandel in der Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 flihrte der Funktionsbefehl des Reichsflihrers vom 1.7.37 herbei, demzufolge der Abteilung II 112 alle allgemeinen und grundsatzlichen Fragen, in denen staatspolizei-liche VollzugsmaBnahmen nicht in Betracht kommen, zur Bearbeitung liber­lassen wurden. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an werden samtliche zu treffende Entscheidungen in engstem Einvernehmen mit dem Referat II B 4 auf dem Gebiet des Judentums gefallt. Durch regelmaBige Vorladungen der leitend­en Funktionare der jUdischen Organisationen wird versucht die gesamte Judenpolitik so auszurichten, daB die Auswanderung besonders unbe­mittelter Juden laufend gefordert und verstarkt wird ... Darliber hinaus wurde angefangen, durch die Verbindungsaufnahme mit den zustandigen Stellen im Innenministerium und im Auswartigen Amt, direkten EinfluB auf die praktische Durchflihrung der Auswanderung zu bekommen. Das End­ziel, wie das noch naher in einem in Arbeit befindlichen Bericht an C (C : Chef Heydrich) dargelegt werden soll, ist die Zentralisierung der gesamten Bearbeitung der Judenfrage in Deutschland bei SD und Gestapa. - Darliber hinaus wurde mit der systematischen Erfassung des Weltjudentums begonnen (zum Teil durch direkte Flihlungnahme),weil die Ent­scheidungen liber die weitere Losung der Judenfrage in Deutschland eine genaue Kenntnis der leitenden jlidischen Weltorganisationen voraus­setzen."

81

Notes pp. 15-17

31. Eichmann I, pp. 3416-3.418-

32. Report of the anti-Jewish section of the SO on October 5, 1937 (passage concerning the collaboration with the Gestapo - II B 4 -) " Die Zusammenarbeit mit der Geheimen Staatspolizei war bisher eine recht gute. Dies war besonders in der Person des bisherigen Leiters des Judenreferats im Gestapa, Ass. Flesch, begrundet. Seit 15.9.37 ist der Ass.Flesch zur Staatspolizeistelle Berlin versetzt. Mit seinem Nachfolger, Ass.Freytag, wurde personlich Fuhlung genommen. Da Ass. Freytag noch keine Kenntnisse auf dem Gebiet des Judentums besitzt, hat er gebeten, ihn weitgehend zu unterstutzen und vor allem auch bei MaB­nahmen executiver Art ihn zu beraten."

33. Report of Hagen on July 2, 1938, concerning the anti-Jewish section of the SD (passage on "Aktive Beteiligung an Stapoaktionen") : "1m Einvernehmen mit dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt, II B 4 J., kon­trolliert II 112 von Zeit zu Zeit die Arbeit der judischen Organisationen und fuhrt laufend Besprechungen mit den Leitern der judischen Organ­isationen durch. Die Notwendigkeit zur eigenen Durchfuhrung derartiger Verhandlungen bzw. Aktionen ergab sich aus der Tatsache, daB die AuBen­beamten des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes infolge ungenUgender sachlicher Kenntnisse nicht in der Lage sind, die fUr die Bestimmung der grund­satzlichen Linie notwendigen Informationen von den Juden einzuholen.-... Das gute Einvernehmen zwischen dem Hauptamt (SD) und dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt hat sich auch fordernd auf die Zusammenarbeit zwischen O.A. und Stapoleit- bzw. Stapostellen ausgewirkt, wenn auch nicht Uber­sehen werden darf, daB sich hier verschiedentlich noch Schwierigkeiten ergeben. Bei groBeren Fallen konnten diese durch Interventionen beim Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt bereinigt werden."

34. Report of Hagen on the activity of the anti-Jewish section of the SD (II 112) of March I, 1939 (passage on Collaboration with the Gestapo (II B 4) : " ... Die Beziehungen zum korrespondierenden Sachreferat beim Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt II B 4 (Regierungsrat Lischka, Regierungsassessor Hulf) sind sehr gut. Samtliche Fragen des Sachgebietes Judentum werden auf Grund der grundsatzlichen Stellungnahmen der Abteilung II 112 gemeinsam erortert. Alle Vorgange, soweit sie fur Stellen bestimmt sind, die auBerhalb des SD-Hauptamtes und des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes liegen, werden gegengezeichnet. Anweisungen allgemeiner Art werden durch wechsel­seitige Anregung und wechselseitigen Entwurf gefertigt. - Diese Art von Zusammenarbeit hat sich insbesondere wahrend der November-Aktion gegen die Judenschaft bewahrt ... ".

35. See note 34 '~ie bereits bestehenden guten Beziehungen zwischen dem Referat II B 4 des Gestapa und der Abteilungen II 112 konnten durch den Funktions­befehl vom 1.7.37 noch verbessert werden. Die Arbeitsinitiative liegt im wesentlichen bei der Abteilung II 112."

36. See note 34 : "An der November-Aktion gegen die Judenschaft haben sich das Hauptamt, samtliche O.A. und U.A. (Oberabschnitt und Unterabschnitt), teils in der Exekutive, teils bei der Sicherung des judischen Archiv- und Bibliothek­materials beteiligt".

37. Eichmann 2, nO 1510

82

Notes pp. 17-18

38. Report of Hagen on the activity of the anti-Jewish section of the SD of July 2, 1938 (passage on the ideologial activity of that section) : "Da die Heranziehung der Abteilung II 112 zur Schulungsarbeit ... nach wie vor sehr stark ist, e':weist es sich - wie schon im ersten Tatigkeits­bericht dargelegt - als notwendig einen wissenschaftlichen Referenten ... einzusetzen" .

39. Letter of June 28, 1938, from Hagen to Eichmann in which the former ridicules the representative of Streicher who had come to visit Eichmann in Vienna and concludes that Eichmann must not accept the invitation of Streicher to visit him in Nuremberg : "Lieber Adolf! Wie Du es gewunscht hast, habe ich die Nummer 25 des 'StUrmer' vom Juni 1938, in der Hiemer in einem zwei Seiten langen vollig leeren Bericht uber seinen Wiener Besuch schreibt, mir genauestens zu Gemute gefuhrt. Ich mochte nur eines feststellen: daB es Dir trotz Deiner gewiss nicht abzuleugnenden gr'oBen Beredsamkeit nicht im ent­ferntesten gelungen ist, dem 'StUrmer' durch Deine sachlichen Mitteilung­en eine andere Note aufzudrucken ... das wichtigste bleibt Hiemer nach wie vor der Gestank in den judischen Geschaftsstellen, den er nur mit einem Taschentuch beheben kann ..... Das tollste StUck scheint mir aber zu sein, wenn er zu der durchaus erfreulichen Tatsache, daB sehr viele Juden in Wien wieder zu ihrem Judentum zuruckkehren, folgende Klammerbemerkung beifUgt :' Zu einer Religion, die die Lehren des Talmuds als oberstes Gesetz anerkennt! Des Talmuds, der alle Verbrechen an Nichtjuden ge­stattet!' - wenn ich so etwas hare, fasse ich mich an den Kopf: was denn die noch eigentlich sollen! Vielleicht tragt der 'Sturmer' zu der radi­kalen Losung bei, sie urn einen Kopf kurzer zu machen, damit sie gar nicht erst auf den erfreulichen Gedanken verfallen konnen, sich wieder als Juden zu bekennen ... Ich werde Dir damit kaum Neues gesagt haben. Du wirst Dich aber auch nach diesem kleinen Exkurs durch etwas niedere Geistigkeit daruber zu trosten wissen, daB aus einem Besuch nach Nuren­berg vorerst nichts werden kann."

7. The SD and the Zionist Emigpation

39.a The prohibition to speak in public which was addressed by the Gestapo an February 21, 1935 to Professor Martin Buber, signed "Flesch" and the information that it addressed in this respect "An alle Staats­polizeistellen" : " ... Dr. Martin Buber ist zwar Zionist, es wurde jedoch erst jetzt fest­gestellt, daB er der 'Internationalen Hilfsvereinigung' angehort hat, die eine Unterorganisation der Roten Hilfe war. Buber ist in letzter Zeit oft als Redner in judischen Organisationen aufgetreten und hat dabei insbesondere die linksgerichteten Gruppen in der Judenheit bevorzugt".

40. Report of June 17, 1937, to Heydrich, drawn up by Hagen and signed by Six, regarding the organization of a fact-finding trip of Eichmann accompanied by Hagen to Palestine : "Die judische Kolonisationsarbeit in Palastina soll eingehend studiert werden. Die Kenntnis von diesen Arbeiten erscheint insbesondere deshalb wichtig, als nach Proklamation eines Judenstaates oder eines judisch verwalteten Palastinas Deutschland ein neuer auBenpolitischer Gegner erwachsen wurde, der die politische Linie des vorderen Ostens entscheidend beeinfluBen konnte. Zudem wlirde durch die staatliche Konstituierung fur die in Deutschland ansassigen Juden die Minderheitenfrage akut werden ... ".

83

Notes pp. 18-20

41. See note 40 : " Als Gegenleistungen konnten Polkes folgende Zusicherungen gemacht werden: I) Auf die Reichsvertretung der Juden wird ein Druck dahingehend ausgeUbt, daB sie die aus Deutschland auswandernden Juden verpflichte-t, ausschlieBlich nach Palastina, nicht aber in irgend ein anderes Land zu gehen. - Eine solche MaBnahme liegt durchaus im deutschen Interesse und wird bereits durch MaBnahmen des Gestapa vorbereitet. - Polkes Plane zur HerbeifUhrung der jUdischen Majoritat in Palastina wlirden hierdurch gleichzeitig gefordert werden ... "

41.a Report (November 1937) of Hagen on his fact-finding trip with Eichmann to Palestine (anti-Jewish passage on the economic activity of the Jews in Palestine and the adopting of a definite position against the emigration of the Jews to Palestine) : "Ein Problem von sehr aktueller Bedeutung ist auch in Agypten die Juden­frage. Es herrscht bei uns sehr oft die irrtUmliche Ansicht daB es sich bei der von den Arabern - besonders im Kampf urn die Freiheit des Landes in Palastina - gezeigten Gegnerschaft gegen die Juden urn einen Rassen­haB handle. Das ist falsch; vielmehr ist es eine soziale Frage, die Angst urn das eigene Geschaft. Die Judenfrage hort also in dem Augenblick auf, ein Problem fUr Agypter zu sein, in dem sich der Jude aus dem Geschaft heraushalt, das der einheimische Araber fUr sich beansprucht ... /p.28/ ., (Das) wirtschaftliche Chaos in Palastina wird nicht zuletzt darauf zurUckgefUhrt, daB die Juden sich gegenseitig betrUgen, weil sie aus Mangel an Ariern ihre Geschafte nicht mit diesen tatigen konnen. Bezeichnend fUr die absolute Ungeeignetheit der Juden zur FUhrung einer geordneten Wirtschaft im eigenen Staat ist die Tatsache daB allein in Jerusalem 40 jUdische Banken bestehen sollen, die von dem Betrug ihrer eigenen Rassegenossen leben! /p.41/ ...... ; Da die erwahnte Auswanderung von 50 000 Juden pro Jahr in der Hauptsache das Judentum in Palastina starken wUrde, ist dieser Plan unter BerUcksichtigung der Tatsache, daB von Reichs wegen eine selbststandige Staatsbildung der Juden in Palastina verhindert werden solI, undiskutabel."

8. The Anticipation of the "Final Solution" Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

42. Eichmann I, p. 94

43. Eichmann I, pp.96-97

44. Hagen's report of July 2, 1938, on the activity of the anti-Jewish section of the SD (passage on the action in Austria) : "Ermittlungserfolge: Als wichtigste sind zu nennen: DurchfUhrung der gesamten Aktion gegen die jUdischen Organisationen im Lande Osterreich unter Beteiligung der AuBenbeamten des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes. Neuaufbau der jUdischen Organisationen fUr das Land Osterreich. Feststellung der internen Vorgange urn die GrUndung des Judenstaates. Finanzierung der jUdischen Auswanderung aus Osterreich, soweit es die Devisenverhaltnisse des Reiches zulassen."

45. See note 44 : "Der SS-U'Stuf. Hagen war in der Zeit vom 10.3. bis 11.4.38 zur Teil­nahme an den Aktionen in Osterreich nach Wien abkommandiert. SS-U'Stuf. Eichmann wurde am 16.3.38 zur gleichen Dienstleistung befohlen und wurde spaterhin mit der FUhrung des dortigen Referates II 112 beauftragt."

84

Note p. 21

46.-Eichmann I, pp. 101-102, Examination of Eichmann during his trial in Jerusalem (passage on the creation of the 'Zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung' in Vienna) : "Die Schwierigkeiten .. , der Auswanderung wurden in dem MaBe groBer, je nervoser .. das Streben der einzelnen auswandern-wollenden Juden war, dem Druck der Parteien und auch in gewissem Sinne der Staatsdienststell­en zu entgehen, in dieser Nervositat \,lUrden viele Hege unnUtz gemacht, es wurden andererseits den auswandern-wollenden Juden die Wege aus einer vielleicht sadistischen Regung heraus von den einzelnen Beamten oder nicht-beamteten Personal mutwillig erschwert ... Kurz und gut, die Sache war kontra-produzent und eines Tages sprachen mich Dr.Lowenherz (Pra­sident der jUdischen Gemeinde in Wien) .. , Dr. Rottenberg .. an und sagten mir ... : HauptsturmfUhrer so geht es nicht weiter ... ich mochte doch irgendwie die Sache zentralisieren ... Und ich ging mir zu Rate und noch am selben Nachmittag hatte ich die Idee geboren, von der ich glaubte, daB es wiederum beiden Stellen recht ware. Und zwar stellte ich mir ein laufendes Band vor, vorne kommen das erste Dokument drauf und die ande­ren Papiere und rUckwarts mUBte dann der Reisepass abfallen. Das Wie war natUrlich noch vollig unklar ... Als ich das hatte, habe ich ... vor­geschlagen daB eine Zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung in Wien eingerichtet wird, zu der die und die und die behordlichen Instanzen, die ich namentlich nannte, .... ihrerseits ihre Vertreter, ihre Beamten entsenden muBten, die saBen nun nebeneinander an diesem langen laufenden Band, unter Aufsicht eines Angehorigen des SD-Oberabschnittes Hien, der ich war".

-Hagen's report of January IS, 1938, on the activity of the anti­Jewish section of the SD (passage on the administrative obstacles to the Jewish emigration and the necessity of co-ordination between the diverse ministries) : "Es wurde bereits in einem groBeren Bericht an C (Chef:Heydrich) darge­legt, daB die DurchfUhrung der Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der Forderung der Auswanderung in erheblichem MaBe durch die falsche personelle Besetzung derjenigen Stellen beeintrachtigt wird, die sich, zum Teil befugt, zum Teil unbefugt, mit der Judenfrage im Reiche befassen. Es war bereits bei C gebeten worden, eine Besprechung mit den Ministerien herbeizufUhren urn hierin eine Klarung zu treffen. Insbesondere ist die starke Gegenarbeit des Reichswirtschaftsminister­iums zu erwahnen".

-Hagen's report of January 17, 1939, on the activity of the anti­Jewish section of the SD (passage concerning the unification of all the Jewish social organizations and of the administration of the emi­gration) : '~uf Grund der Vorarbeiten der Abteilung II 112 im alten Reichsgebiet und in Osterreich wurde im AnschluB an die November-Aktion gegen die Judenschaft - wah rend der laufend Ermittlungserfolge erzielt wurden -der Vorschlag zur Vereinigung samtlicher jUdischer Organisationen sowie zur Errichtung von Zentralstellen fUr die jUdische Auswanderung gemacht. -Die Vorschlage sind vom Feldmarschall Goring und allen beteiligten Ministerien ohne Anderung angenommen worden .... Ais gut und erfolgreich hat sich der Eingriff der Abteilung II 112 in die endgUltige Bereinigung der Vorbereitung der jUdischen Auswanderung erwiesen. Durch die aus­schlieBlich vom SD errichtete Zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung in Wien wurde die Moglichkeit zur Erwagung des Plans zur Errichtung gleicher Stellen im Reichsgebiet geschaffen ... "

85

Notes pp. 21-24

47. Letter from Eichmann to Hagen, l(or 3) May 1938 : "Lieber Herbert! ... Am Freitag n. Woche erscheint die erste Nummer der 'Zionistischen Rundschau'. Ich habe mir die Hanuskripte einsenden lassen und bin gerade bei der langweiligen Arbeit der Zensur. Die Zeitung geht Euch selbstverstandlich auch zu. Es wird gewisserma~en 'meine' Zeitung werden ... Ieh habe von der Kultusgemeinde und dem zion. Landes­verband eine Auswanderungszahl von 20 000 mittel loser Juden fUr die Zeit vom 1.4.38 - 1.5.39 verlangt, ~-re mir auch zusagten, einhalten zu wollen ... In ganz gro~en ZUgen ist die Lage der Dinge jetzt folgende: Arisierung, Juden in der Wirtschaft noch (7) behandelt It. (laut 7) Erla~ Gauleiter BUrkel. - Das wei taus sehwierigere Kapitel, diese Juden zur Auswanderung zu bringen ist Aufgabe des SD."

48. Report of June 17, 1938, of the Kommando taking inventory of the Jewish archives seized in Vienna : "Ferner wurde in den Akten der 'Union' das Schreiben eines Theodor Krisshaber an Siegmund Freund, ein Mitglied der 'Union', aus dem Juni 1936 entdeckt, in dem er mitteilt, da~ er seit mehr als 4 Jahren eine geheime, erfolgreiche Abwehraktion gegen den Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus leitet und mit allen Beharden in laufender Verbindung steht ... - Der Originalbrief mit Abschriften wurde sofort U'stuf. Hagen zugeleitet, urn feststellen zu lassen, ob der Fall Krisshaber bekannt ist. Gegebenenfalls mU~ten sofort durch den O.A. Osterreich Ermittlungen angestellt bzw. die Verhaftung durchgefUhrt werden ... "

9. The Effopts of Hagen to Pop~e Jewish Emigpation in Vapious Countpies

49. Eichmann I, pp. 3418-3419

50. Hagen's report of December 12, 1937, on the anti-Jewish activity of the II 112 (passage on the internationalizing of the Jewish Question): "DarUber hinaus wurde mit der systematischen Erfassung des Weltjudentums begonnen (zum Teil durch direkte FUhlungnahme), weil die Entscheidungen Uber die weitere Lasung der Judenfrage in Deutschland eine genaue Kenntnis der leitenden jUdischen Weltorganisationen voraussetzen."

51. Eichmann 2, nO 1171

52. Hahne, p. 319, Notice of Hagen of June 15, 1939 : "Mit allen Kraften Auswanderungen fordern. Einwanderung der Juden immer schwieriger. Alle Auswanderungsplane, wohin auch, fardern."

53. Eichmann 2, nO 1508 - Hagen's notice to his section of the SD (undated) on the

"Madagascar" project: "Ich bitte in der nachsten Zeit Material zusammenzustellen fUr eine Denkschrift an C (Chef Heydrich), die gemeinsam mit II B 4 zusammenge­stellt werden soll. Es soll darin klar gelegt werden, da~ die Judenfrage auf der augenblicklichen Basis nicht zu lasen ist (finanzielle Schwierig­keiten usw.) und da~ man daran herantreten mu~, eine au~enpolitische Lasung zu finden, wie sie bereits zwischen Polen und Frankreich ver­hanelt wurde (Madagaskar-Projek~.(Handschriftliche Notiz von Nov.38 (7): 'Uberholt')."

- Note from Dannecker from Vienna, March 24,1938,To the SD II 112 for Hagen :

" ... Bei den Wiedervorlagen findet sich eine Notiz an II 1123, die II 1123 anweist, Material fUr eine Denkschrift an C zusammenzustellen. Diese Denkschrift soll darstellen, da~ die Judenfrage auf der augenblicklichen Basis nicht gelost werden kann.(Au~enpolitische Lasung)."

86

"~"-

Notes pp. 25-26

10. The Men of the II-ii? Confponted "'ith the Jews

54. Letter from Hagen to the Czech journalist Jelinek, editor of the review "Znova", concerning the propaganda to be developed in Czecho­slovakia in the Jewish question : '~ieber Herr Jelinek! Da das Judengesetz im Protektorat ja noch nicht veraffentlicht ist - die GrUnde liegen wohl darin, da~ man auf deutscher Seite mit der vorliegenden religiasen Fassung Ihrer Regierung nicht ein­verstanden ist - , ist Ihnen die beste Gelegenheit gegeben, weiterhin propagandistisch fUr ihre rassische Auffassung der Judenfrage zu wirken. Ich machte Ihnen nachfolgend einige Vorschlage dafUr geben, wie die Propaganda weiterzufUhren ware: ... "

55. Hagen's report of February 9, 1938 on the activity of the SD in the area of Fulda-Werra : "BezUglich der personellen Besetzung brachte er zum Ausdruck, da~ das Referat gemeinsam mit dem Referat II I I I durch einen Referenten, SS O'Scharf. Henrich, bearbeitet werde, dem keine Hilfskraft zur Ver­fUgung stUnde. Henrich wurde von Hoffmann als Referent dargestellt, der zwar einen guten Willen und Arbeitseifer zeigte, infolge seiner Jugend (22 Jahre) und seiner mangelnden Harte bei den notwendigen Ver­handlungen mit den Juden fUr den Posten aber nicht geeignet sei."

56. The recollections of B. Lasener, responsible for reports of racial questions at the Ministery of Interior of the Reich (p.292) : "Die Korridore von den unterschiedlichen BUros in den alten Prunkzimmern, die die Auswanderer zu durchlaufen hatten, waren gedrangt voll von jUd­ischen Menschen, die fort muBten oder wollten. Einen von ihnen anzu­sprechen hatte ieh nicht den Mut, denn auch ich fUhlte mich unter der Aufsicht Eichmanns, der zwar haflich, sogar betont aufmerksam war, dessen elslge Entschlossenheit man aber in jedem Augenblick spUrte. Frauen rissen in den UberfUllten Korridoren ihre Kinder erschreckt beiseite, sobald sie Eichmann sahen, der unbekUmmert wie auf leerer Stra~e dahin­ging und alles beiseite stieB, was da an menschliehem UnglUck harrte. Ich folgte in seinem Kielwasser, bekam dieselben Blicke wie er, und mir war elend genug zu I·lute ... Eichmann fiihrte mich auch in das BUro der Synagogengemeinde in der Leopoldstadt, wo er mich als Referenten des lnnenministeriums aus Berlin vorher angesagt hatte. Als ich ankam, sah ich eine Anzahl von Juden dort auf mehreren StUhlen, auf denen sie offensichtlich schon stundenlang auf mich gewartet hatten. Sie sprangen sofort hoch, als wir eintraten; es waren die Bearbeiter der verschieden­en Angelegenheiten der Synagogengemeinde Wien. Eichmann rief sie kurz bei Namen auf, sagte mir ebenso kurz, worUber sie Vortrag zu halten hatten, und sofort schnurrten sie wie dressierte Tiere ihre Angaben her­unter. Der Ausdruck berechtigter Todesangst war auf jedem Gesicht zu lesen."

87

Notes pp. 27-28

1.7. The Passage to the Final solution in the Re1:ch (J 938-193.9)

57. A few extracts from the deliberations of the authorities of the Third Reich involved in the solution of the Jewish question who met at the Ministery of Aviation under Goring's presidency on Nov. 12, 1938 (af ter the pogrom of Nov. 10) : "Goring: Heine Herren, die heutige Sitzung ist von entscheidender Be­deutung. Ich habe einen Brief bekornrnen, den mir der Stabs leiter des Stellvertreters des FUhrers Bormann im Auf trag des FUhrers geschrieben hat, wonach die Judenfrage jetzt einheitlich zusarnrnengefaBt werden soll und so oder so zur Erledigung zu bringen ist. Durch telephonischen Anruf bin ich gestern vom FUhrer noch einmal dar auf hingewiesen worden, jetzt die entscheidenden Schritte zentral zusammenzufaBen. - Da das Problem in der Hauptsache ein umfangreiches wirtschaftliches Problem ist, wird hier der Hebel angesetzt werden mUssen. Selbstverstandlich ergeben sich daraus auch eine Reihe rechtlicher MaBnahmen, die sowohl in das Gebiet des Justizministers wie des Innenministers fallen, dann die daraus zu folgernden PropagandamaBnahmen, die in das Gebiet des Herrn Propagandaministers fall~n, selbstverstandlich auch HaBnahmen des Finanzministers und des Wirtschaftsministers . ... - Bei der Arisierung der Wirtschaft ist der Grundgedanke folgender: Der Jude wird aus der Wirtschaft ausgeschieden und tritt seine WirtschaftsgUter an den Staat abo Er wird dafUr entschadigt. Die Entschadigung wird im Schuldbuch ver­merkt und wird ihm zu einem bestirnrnten Prozentsatz verzinst. Davon hat er zu leben ... - Der Treuhander des Staates schatzt das Geschaft ab und bestirnrnt welchen Betrag der Jude bekornrnt. Dieser Betrag ist selbstver­standlich an sich schon moglichst niedrig zu halten. Das Geschaft wird dann von der Treuhand in arischen Besitz UberfUhrt, und hierbei ist der Aufschlag zu erzielen d.h. das Geschaft ist entsprechend seinem norm­alen tatsachlichen Verkehrswert und Bilanzwert an den Mann zu bringen. -Hier setzen Schwierigkeiten ein. Es ist menschlich verstandlich, daB in starkem MaBe versucht wird, in diese Geschafte Parteigenossen hineinzu­bringen und ihnen so gewisse Entschadigungen zu geben. Ich habe da ent­setzliche Dinge in der Vergangenheit gesehen: daB sich kleine Chauffeure von Gauleitern derart bereichert haben, daB sie auf diese Weise schlieB­lich eine halbe Million Vermogen an sich gebracht haben .... - Das sind natUrlich Dinge, die unmoglich sind ... Heydrich: Sachschaden, Inventar- und Warenschaden schatzen wir auf mehrere hundert Millionen .... 7 500 zerstorte Geschaft~ im Reich ..... Goring: Mir ware lieber gewesen, ihr hattet 200 Juden erschlagen und hattet nicht solche Werte vernichtet. Heydrich: 35 Tote sind es. ... - Heydrich:Bei allem herausnehmen des Juden aus dem Wirtschaftsleben bleibt das Grundproblem letzten Endes doch irnrner, daB der Jude aus Deutschland herauskornrnt ... Wir haben in Wien auf Weisung des Reichs­kornrnissars eine Judenauswanderungszentrale eingerichtet, durch die wir in Osterreich irnrnerhin 50 000 Juden herausgebracht haben, wahrend im Altreich in der gleichen Zeit nur 19 000 Juden herausgebracht werden konnten ... Wir haben das in der Form gemacht, daB wir den' reichen Juden, die auswandern wollten, bei der jUdischen Kultusgemeinde eine gewisse Surnrne abgefordert haben. Hit dieser Summe und Devisenauszahlungen konnte eine Anzahl der arrnen Juden herausgebracht werden. Das Problem war ja nicht, die reichen Juden herauszukriegen, sondern das jUdische Mob ... Darf ich vorschlagen, daB wir eine ahnliche Zentrale im Reich unter Beteiligung der zustandigen Reichsbehorden einrichten und daB wir auf Grund dieser Erfahrungen unter Abstellung der mit Recht vom Herrn

88

Notes pp. 27-29

Generalmarschall kritisierten Fehler eine Losung fUr das Reich finden? -Das zweite, urn die Juden herauszubekornrnen, mUBte eine Auswanderungsaktion fUr das Judentum im Ubrigen Reich sein, die sich auf mindestens 8 bis 10 Jahre erstreckt. Wir kriegen im Jahr nicht mehr als hochstens 8 bis 10 000 Juden heraus. Es bleibt also eine Unzahl Juden drin. Durch die Arisierungen und die sonstigen Beschrankungen wird natUrlich das Judentum arbeitslos. Wirerleben eine Verproletarisierung des zurUck­bleibenden Judentums. Ich muB also in Deutschland solche MaBnahmen treffen, daB sie auf der einen Seite ~nJuden isolieren, damit er nicht in den normalen Lebenskreis des Deutschen eintritt. Ich muB aber auf der anderen Seite Moglichkeiten schaffen, die den Juden auf einen engsten Kundenkreis beschranken, aber eine bestirnrnte Betatigung zulassen, in der Rechtsanwaltfrage, Arztfrage, Friseurfrage usw ... Jeder Jude im Sinne der NUrenberger Gesetze muB ein bestirnrntes Abzeichen tragen ... Das Ghetto in der Form vollkornrnen abgesonderter Stadtteile, wo nur Juden sind, halte ich polizeilich nicht fUr durchfUhrbar .... Als MaBnahme wUrde ich ferner vorschlagen, daB man aile personlichen Berechtigungen wie Zulassungs­scheine und FUhrerscheine den Juden entzieht ... ihn weiterhin in seiner FreizUgigkeit durch Aufenthaltsverbote beschrankt ... Des weiteren was Minister Dr. Goebbels vorhin sagte: AusschlieBung der Juden von offent­lichen Theatern, Kinos, usw ... Goring: lch werde den Wortlaut wahlen, daB die deutschen Juden in ihrer Gesamtheit als Strafe fUr die ruchlosen Verbrechen usw. usw. eine Kon­tribution von I Milliarde auferlegt bekornrnen ... - Das zweite ist folgen­des: wenn das Deutsche Reich in irgend einer absehbaren Zeit in au Ben­politischen Konflikt kornrnt, so ist es selbstverstandlich, daB auch wir in Deutschland in aller erster Linie daran denken werden, eine groBe Abrechnung an den Juden zu vollziehen. DarUber hinaus wird der FUh~er jetzt endlich einen auBenpolitischen VorstoB machen zunachst bei den Machten, die die Judenfrage aufgeworfen haben, urn dann tatsachlich zur Losung der Madagaskar-Frage zu kornrnen. Das hat er mir am 9. November auseinandergesetzt. Es geht nicht mehr anders. Er will auch den anderen Staaten sagen: 'Was redet ihr irnrner von den Juden? - Nehmt sie!' Dann kann man noch einen Vorschlag machen: die reichen Juden konnen in Nordamerika, Kanada oder sonstwo ein groBes Territorium fUr ihre Glau­bensgenossen kaufen."

58. Decree of January 24, 1939, from Goring, the responsibility for the emigration of the (passage defining this mission):

in which he gives Heydrich Jews from Germany

"Die Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland ist mit allen Mitteln zu fordern. - 1m Reichministerium des Innern wird aus Vertretern der Be­teiligten Dienststellen eine Reichszentrale fUr die jUdische Auswanderung gebildet ... - Die Leitund der Reichszentrale Ubernirnrnt der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei. Er bestirnrnt den GeschaftsfUhrer und regelt die Ge­schaftsfUhrung der Reichszentrale. - tiber die Arbeit der Reichszentrale ist mir laufend zu berichten. Vor grundsatzlichen MaBnahmen ist meine Entscheidung einzuholen ... "

89

Notes pp. 29-30

59. H.G. Adler, p. 20, his opinion on the role of the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland (RVJD) : "Die noch notigen Agenda wurden von einer neuen Organi ation ~bernommen, die aber gleichfalls 'Reichsvereinigung der Juden Deutschlands' hieB ... Typisch fUr die Einrichtung der Befehlswege im nationalsozialistischen Regime, entstanden 'gleichgeschaltete Bahnen' : das Referat IV B 4 erteilte seine 'Weisungen' a) der RVJD, b) durch Vermittlung der RVJD deren Zweigstellen, c) an die lokalen Stapostellen, d) Uber die Stapo­stellen an die Zweigstellen der RVJD oder direkt an die jUdischen Ge­meinden. - Der klaglosen Abwicklung der Deportation war durch diese Einrichtung hervorragend vorgearbeitet, ja es bedurfte kaum noch einer weiteren Entwicklung, urn mit den jetzt hergestellten und bald einge­spiel ten Befehlsverhaltnissen mUhelos fUr das Verderben zu operieren, wahrend der Auswanderung ... damit nur wenig gedient wurde, wenn wir es auch gelten lassen, daB es in dem GestrUpp schwierig zu erfUllender und oft einander widersprechender Vorschriften fUr die Auswanderung das Zentralamt doch als eine gelegentlich klarende Koordinationsstelle wirkte, die das fast unmogliche zu einem gUnstigen AbschluB bringen konnte." ~

60. Hagen's report of March I, 1939, on the anti-Jewish activity of the II 112 (SD) (passage on the role of the Gestapo and the SD) : "Bei der Vorbereitung der Reichszentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung und der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland hat II 112, da die Vorschlage von der Sachabteilung gemacht worden waren, ursprUnglich die Verhandlungen gefUhrt. Eine Veranderung hierin hat erst stattgefunden, nachdem die Reichszentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung dem Chef der Sicherheitspolizei unterstellt wurde."

61. Note of Hagen, May 25, 1939, on the information given to two regional Chiefs (O.A.:Oberabschnitt) on the reorganization of the anti-Jewish action : "In Gegenwart von SS-O'Scharf. Dannecker wurde ihnen ein Uberblick Uber die Situation auf dem Gebiet des Judentums gegeben, insbesondere nach Veranderung der Sachlage durch die Ubergabe der Leitung der Reichs­zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung an einen Beamten der Geheimen Staatspolizei ... Bolte betonte, daB die Stapostellen die Bildung von Ortsstellen begrUBen wUrden. Er wurde angewiesen, sofort nach AbschluB der Verhandlungen Uber die Errichtung der Ortsstellen nach hier zu be­richten. - RR Lischka wurde von dieser Vereinbarung unterrichtet mit dem besonderen Hinweis darauf, daB auch die Stapostellen dies begrUBen wUr­den ... AbschlieBend wurden sie Uber die Lage des Judentums und die Be­handlung der Juden im Protektoratsgebiet unterrichtet. Da beabsichtigt sei, die Behandlung des innerdeutschen Judentums, soweit es moglich sei, durch den SD fallen zu lassen, sei geplant, das Judentum des Auslands ... in die Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 einzubeziehen. Aus diesem Grunde wur­den beide gebeten, sich heute schon intensiv urn aile Vorgange Uber das Judentum in Polen zu bemUhen."

90

Note p. 31

13. Eichmann's Task from Septembmo 1939 to Mar'ch J941

62. Express letter of September 21, 1939, from Heydrich to the chiefs of all the combat units of the Sipo (combat units in action in the Polish territories) on the Jewish question in the region occupied : "rch nehme Bezug auf die ,heute in Berlin stattgefundene Besprechung und weise noch einmal darauf hin, daB die geplanten GesamtmaBnahmen (also das Endziel) streng geheim zu halten sind. - Es ist zu unterscheiden zwischen I) dem Endziel (welches langere Fristen beansprucht) und 2) den Abschnitten der ErfUllung dieses Endzieles (welche kurzfristig durchgefUhrt werden). - Die geplanten MaBnahmen erfordern grUndliche , Vorbereitung sowohl in technischer, als auch in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht. I Ais erste Voraussetzung fUr das Endziel gilt zunachst die Konzentrier­ung der Juden vom Land in die groBeren Stadte. Sie ist mit Beschleunig­ung durchzufUhren. - Es ist dabei zu unterscheiden: I) zwischen den Ge­bieten Danzig und WestpreuBen, Posen Ostoberschlesien und 2) den Ubrigen besetzten Gebieten. - Nach Moglichkeit soli das unter Ziffer I) erwahnte Gebiet von Juden freigemacht werden ... - Dieser EriaB gilt nicht fUr das Gebiet der Einsatzgruppe welche etwa, ostlich von Krakau liegend, um­grenzt wird von Polanice, Jaroslaw, der neuen Demarkationslinie und der bisher slowakisch polnischen Grenze. Innerhalb dieses Gebietes ist led­iglich eine befehlsmaBige Judenzahlung durchzufUhren. -II JUdische Altestenrate ..... - ... AIs BegrUndung fUr die Konzentrier­ung der Juden in die Stadte hat zu gel ten, daB sich die Juden maBgeblich an den FranktireurUberfallen und PIUnderungsaktionen beteiligt haben ... Die Konzentrierung der Juden in den Stadten wird wahrscheinlich aus allgemein sicherheitspolizeilichen GrUnden Anordnungen in diesen Stadten bedingen, daB den Juden bestimmte Stadtviertel Uberhaupt verboten werden, daB sie stets jedoch unter BerUcksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Not­wendigkeiten - z.B. das Ghetto nicht verlassen, zu einer bestimmten Zeit nicht mehr ausgehen durfen usw ... -III Aile erforderlichen MaBnahmen sind grundsatzlich stets im engsten Benehmen und Zusammenwirken mit den deutschen Zivilverwaltungs und ort­lich zustandigen Militarbehorden zu'treffen. Bei der DurchfUhrung ist Zu berUcksichtigen, daB die wirtschaftliche Sicherung der besetzten Gebiete keinen Schaden leidet ....

63. Seifert, p. 88 , "Der Jude an der Ostgrenze" put out by the publish­ing house of the NSDAP in 1941 (passage on the project of a Juden­reservat) "Das sind natUrlich alles nur Vorbereitungen zur Losung der Judenfrage. Wie diese endgUltig aussehen wird, darUber heute zu sprechen, ware ver­frUht. Man sprach eine zeitlang von einem jUdischen Siedlungsgebiet im Lubliner Bezirk, einer Art Reservat fUr die Juden. Dort waren sie unter sich und mUBten ausnahmsweise einmal ihr Leben und die Notwendigkeiten dieses Lebens in jeder Beziehung selbst organisieren. - Es ist kein Zweifel, daB dieses jUdische Siedlungsgebiet zumindestens eine Losung ware, die das Reich vor den Juden, das deutsche Volk vor ihrem Parasiten­tum und ihrer Zersetzungsarbeit schUtzen wlirde. Das deutsche Volk konnte aufatmen, wenn es auf diese Weise die 330 000 Volljuden, die im Mai 1933 bei der Volkszahlung festgestellt wurden, aus dem Reich loswerden wUrde. Doch auch das Judenreservat bei Lublin ware keine endgultige Lasung. Die kann nur erreicht werden auf der Grundlage der Erkenntnis, daB der Jude nicht in die Welt und in den Siedlungsraum der weiBen Menschen gehort, sondern in die der farbigen. In ihrem Lebensgebiet wird also auch am besten das kUnftige Siedlungsland der Juden Zu suchen sein. Aber wir brauchen uns mit dieser Frage heute noch nicht weiter Zu beschaftigen.

91

Notes pp. 31-34

Vorlaufig gibt uns der Krieg seine Aufgaben, und der Sieg wird das deutsche Volk vor neue, noch groBere Aufgaben stellen, von denen die meisten wichtiger sein werden als das Problem des Judenreservats. Noch ist das letzte Wort nicht gesprochen, aber es wird gesprochen werden zur rechten Stunde aus maBgeblichem Mund, urn Volk und Reich endgUltig zu befreien vom Fluch Europas, vom JUDEN AN DER OSTGRENZE!

64. Adler, pp. 125-126 and PS-2278 p.14, Report on the inspection trip of Seyss-Inquart, as substitute for the Governor General, in the terri­tories of the General Government in November 1939 (passage concerning the efficacity of the project for a Jewish reserve not far from Lublin) "Dieses Gebiet mit seinem stark sumpfigen Charakter konnte nach den Erwagungen des Distriktgouverneurs Schmidt als Judenreservat dienen, welche MaBnahme wohlmoglich eine starke Dezimierung der Juden herbei­fUhren konnte."

65. Adler, p. 129

66. Bulletin-Document nO 22

67. Eichmann 2 , nO 1492 , Hand-written autobiography of Eichmann (passage on his beginnings as chief of the service of Jewish affairs of the RSHA) pp.87-88

~

"Es mag etwa FrUhjahr 1940 gewesen sein, da wurde mir das Referat IV B 4 des Amtes IV, das bis dahin ein SS-Stubf. Reg.Rat Lischka innehatte durch eine VerfUgung des Amtschefs IV Ubertragen mit SS-HptStuf.GUnther als standigen Vertreter. Aus GrUnden, die ihre Ursache im Raummangel hatten, wurde das Referat, wie einige andere Referate des Amtes IV auch, auBerhalb untergebracht 'und zwar in der KurfUrstenstraBe 116. - Nebst Mobilar kamen die bis dahin unter Lischka diensttuenden Beamten ... Spater kamen noch hinzu: SS-Stbf. Reg.Rat Suhr, Reg.Ass. Huntsche (er kam von der Justiz) und Reg.Ass. Boshammer. - Sie fUhrten, wie ge­wohnlich staatspolizeiliche Arbeiten wie bisher weiter. Eine Tatigkeit, die sowohl GUnther als auch mir bis dahin fremd war. Aber es waren alles eingearbeitete Beamte, die ihre Vorschriften genau kannten, Vorschriften (Weisungen, Befehle, Gesetze, Verordnungen, Erlasse), in die GUnther und ich mich nun auch 'hineinknien' muBten und studierten. -Dr. Rajakowitsch, der sich beim Ausbruch des Krieges 1939 freiwillig meldete, kam auch nach Berlin; er war wie stets ein auBerordentlich gemaBigter und kluger Jurist, auf des sen Hilfe ich deswegen nicht gerne verzichtete , weil er die lebendige praktische Juristik und nicht die trockene Behordenjuristerei verkorperte."

68. Statement of M.Luther (Auswartiges Amt) on the Jewish question, August 1942 : "Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich sah sich als erster genotigt, am 27.9.40 eine Verordnung Uber die Behandlung der Juden im besetzten Frankreich zu erlassen ... Nach dem Muster der Pariser Verordnung sind gleiche Verordnungen in den Niederlanden und in Belgien erlassen "orden".

92

Notes pp. 34-36

Eichmann I, p. 716 , Passage from the interrogatory of Eichmann for the preliminary investigation of the trial in Jerusalem: "Die Endlosung der Judenfrage selbst - also ieh meine jetzt mal diesen Sonderauftrag z.B., den Heydrieh bekommen hat - urn es mal ganz krass zu sagen -die Totung - war kein Reichsgesetz gewesen - das war ein FUhrerbefehl gewesen, ein sogenannter FUhrerbefehl. Und Himmler und Heydrich und der Chef des Verwaltungs- und Wirtsehaftshauptamtes haben sich als Chefs nun in diesen Fiihrerbefehl geteilt. Naeh der da­mal igen Rechtsauffassllng, die allgemein war, hieB es 'FUhrerworte haben Gesetzeskraft'. Das ist eine bekannte Sache, die nicht nur in diesem Fall, sondern in allen Fallen - auch von allen Zentralinstanzen -entsprechend gewertet werden muBte. FUhrerworte haben Gesetzeskraft -so hieB es immer und allenthalben ... "

PART TWO

THE ORDERS FOR THE "FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE JEl-JISH QUESTION

7. The Order of the FUhrer (del' FUhrer-bej'eM) 'in General

70, H, Frank, "1m Angesicht des Galgens", pp. 322-323 : "Die Gefolgschaftshybris fUhrte Gedanken und Plane des FUhrers selbst­tatig, in sieh stets Ubernehmender Weise und dessen ursprUngliche Worte oder Grundsatze oder Auftrage verklarend-steigernd, weit Uber jene Grenzen aus, die Hitler sich selbst oft gezogen hatte. Es war also eine Hybris der Ubersteigerten Dienstwilligkeit. Himmler und Bormann zum Beispiel maehten oft aus Tischbemerkungen des FUhrers, die dieser gelegentlich fallen lieB, 'groBe konkrete Auftrage' , oder holten sieh dabei Vollmachten fUr ihr Handeln. Die Gesehiehte des ganzen spateren Dritten Reiches ist vall von solehen Ubersteigert vollzogenen FUhrer­vollmachten. Doch er selbst war dann in der Regel in seiner Angst, fUr 'nieht radikal genug' angesehen werden zu konnen, zu schwach, diese Ubertreibungen zurUckzupfeifen."

71. R. Diels, "Lucifer antePortas", pp. 91 and 255 : "Alle diese Initiatoren und Exekutoren wirkten als ein ~ledium, durch das die Ausartungen der Hitlerschen Vitalitat auf das AuBerste gesteigert wurden. In ihrer Mitte wurden die skurilen Ideen geboren, die sieh in seinem Kopf in totalitare Endlosungen verwandelten. - ... Mit Himmler hat Bormann die kultisehe Erhebung harmloser AuBerungen Hitlers zu 'FUhrerbefehlen' mit rigorosester Gesetzeskraft betrieben. Ais der Kreis geschlossen war, eilten sie bald den WUnschen, ja den Traumen des Halbgottes voraus."

72. Otto Dietrich, p. 153 : "Hitler gab seine dienstlichen Befehle nicht schriftlieh formuliert und bUromaBig registriert, sondern mUndlieh-impulsiv aus dem Stegreif an diejenigen, die gerade in seiner Nahe standen, mit dem Auftrag,sie mUndlich oder telefoniseh an die zustandigen Stellen weiterzuleiten ... Militarische und sonstige Dienststellen, die gewohnt waren, unter­sehriebene Befehle zu erhalten, kamen in Konflikte, als von Hitler beilaufig in der Unterhaltung gegebene Anrodnungen nicht als solche erkannt und deshalb nicht ausgefUhrt worden waren. Es kam haufiger vor, daB Hitler Besuehern, die unter unpolitischem, fUr Hitler angenehmen

93

Notes pr. 36-38

Vorwand gekommen waren, aber eine gute Laune oder gute Gelegenheit fur ihre Zwecke ausnutzten, unter vier Augen etwas zusagte oder vielleicht auch nicht abschlagen konnte, was dann von diesen selbstandig als 'Fuhrerbefehl' in Umlauf gesetzt wurde und Verwirrung ausloste, da es einem anderen 'Fuhrerbefehl' diametral entgegenstand."

73. H. Picker, "Hitlers Tischgesprache", p. 511 "Diesen wirklichen Hitler, der bei allem Fanatismus so bedurfnislos­schlicht und zuruckhaltend auftrat, ohne Tendenz und Pose zu Uherliefern ... in seinem Abtasten des ZukUnftigen, in seinem Zogern bei Ungewissem und in seinen Hemrnungen vor 'letzten Konsequenzen a 1a Stalin' ... von ihm im Sinne einer historisch-psychologischen Studie gerade auch die intimen, unauffalligen, ja eventuell sagar lacherlichen Charakteristika festzuhalten, das war das Ziel, das mich reizte."

74. B. v. Schirach, p. 282 : "Reichsleiter Bormann hatte bei Hitler durchgesetzt, dall er bei jeder ~

politischen und militarischen Besprechung in den Hauptquartieren zugegen war. Er machte sich unablassig Notizen und sorgte bald dafur, daB Steno­grafen jedes Wort Hitlers festhielten, auch bei Tisch. Die Niederschrif-ten sammelte Bormann in riesigen Panzerschranken, geordnet nach Sach­gebieten, Namen und Daten. So wurde Bormann zum Gedachtnis Hitlers ... Auf Bormanns Schreibtisch landeten schlieBlich aIle Briefe, Eingaben und Beschwerden, die an Hitler gerichtet waren. Die meisten davon bekam Hitler gar nicht zu sehen. Bormann lieB sich aus seinen Panzerschranken die Xullerungen Hitlers zu dem jeweiligen Themengebiet heraussuchen und fallte dann im Sinne und im Namen seines Herrn die Antworten abo Oft hatte Hitler im Laufe der Jahre zu ein und demselben Thema die widersprUchlich­sten Meinungen geauBert - Bormann wahlte stets die radikalste, brutalste. Und Hitler deckte Bormann immer."

75. F. Hossbach, "Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler", p.35 : "Es ist gar kein Zweifel, daB die Dinge auf eigenmachtiges Betreiben von Parteistellen haufig eine Entwicklung nahmen, die mit Hitlers eigenen Absichten ursprunglich nicht im Einklang stand. Er war in solchen Fallen mehr der getriebene als der treihende Teil und identifizierte sich nach­traglich aus RUcksicht auf seine Anhangerschaft mit den Vorgangen, die er anfangs nicht oder anders gewollt hatte. Doch griff er auch manche vollendete Tatsache, vor die er gestellt wurde, mit Leidenschaft auf und machte sie sich innerlich zu eigen."

76. Domarus, p. 418 , Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on July 13, 1934, after the operation against Rohm and the SA : "Die Notwendigkeit des eigenen Vorgehens der SA wurde begrundet mit dem Hinweis auf meine EntschluBunfahigkeit, die erst dann behoben sein wlirde, wenn Tatsachen geschaffen werden."

7.7. R. Olden, "Hitler", p. 316 (passage concerning the action against Rohm and the SA) : "Warum die Entscheidung so hinausgezogert wurde, daB sie zur Katastrophe ausartete, dafUr gibt es nur eine plausible Erklarung: weil Hitler, der FUhrer, selbst weit entfernt davon ist, zu den Starken zu zahlen. Ware er sonst der weibischen Anbetung der Starkeren verfallen? Seine Schwache hat ihn verhindert, rechtzeitig die Entwicklung der SA zu bestimmen. Seine Schwache hat ihn Blomberg und Rohm zugleich Versprechungen geben lassen, die unvereinbar sind. lI

94

Notes pp. 38-40

2. Publi" AmlOlu:ements of the "Final Sotution" by the FUhrer and Chancellor of the Reich

78. Domarus, p. 1058, Hitler's speech of January 30, 1939, to the Reichstag : "Ich will heute wieder ein Prophet sein: Wenn es dem internationalen Finanzjudentum in und aullerhalb Europas gelingen sollte, die Volker noch einmal in einen Weltkrieg zu sturzen, dann wird das Ergebnis nicht die Bolschewisierung der Erde und damit der Sieg des Judentums sein, sondern die Vernichtung der jUdischen Rasse in Europa."

79. Minutes of the reception of the Czeck Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chalkovsky, by Hitler, January 21, 1939, Akten p. 170 "Der Fuhrer: Bei uns wUrden die Juden vernichtet. Den 9.November 1918 hat ten die Juden nicht umsonst gemacht, dieser Tag wUrde geracht werden. Aber in der Tschechoslowakei vergiften die Juden heute noch das Volk."

80. Domarus, p. 1663, Hitler's speech of January 30, 1941 to the Reichstag : "Und nicht vergessen mochte ich den Hinweis, den ich schon einmal, am I. September 1939, im Deutschen Reichstag gegeben habe. Den Hinweis darauf namlich, daB wenn die andere Welt von dem Judentum in einen all­gemeinen Krieg gestUrzt wlirde, das gesamte Judentum seine Rolle in Europa ausgespielt haben wird!"

81. Domarus, p. 1829, Speech of Hitler on January 30, 1942 to the Reichstag: "Wir sind uns dabei im klaren darliber, daB der Krieg nur damit enden kann, daB entweder die arischen Volker ausgerottet werden oder daB das Judentum aus Europa verschwindet. Ich habe am I. September 1939 im Deutschen Reichstag es schon ausgesprochen - und ich hUte mich vor voreiligen Prophezeiungen - daB dieser Krieg nicht so ausgehen wird, wie es sich die Juden vorstellen, namlich daB die europaisch-arischen Volker ausgerottet werden, sondern daB das Ergebnis dieses Krieges die Vernichtung des Judentums sein wird ... Und es wird die Stunde kommen, da der boseste Weltfeind aller Zeiten wenigstens auf ein Jahrtausend seine Rolle ausgespielt haben wird."

82. Domarus, p. 1844, Hitler's proclamation of February 24, 1942 for the anniversary of the founding of the NSDAP : "Dieser Kampf wird deshalb auch nicht, wie man es beahsichtigt, mit der Vernichtung der arischen Menschheit, sondern mit der Ausrottung des Judentums in Europa sein Ende findcn .... Genauso, wie aher das deutsche Volk im Zuge dieser Erkenntnis den jUdischen inneren Feind erfolgreich bekampft hat und endgUltig zu erledigen im Begriffe ist, so werden sich die anderen Volker im Laufe dieses Krieges immer mehr auf sieh selbst besinnen und endlich gemeinsam gegen jene Rasse Front machen, die sie aIle gemeinsam zu vernichten traehtet."

83. Domarus, p. 1920, Speech of Hitler at the Sports Palace in Berlin on September 30, 1942 : "Ich habe den I.September 1939 in der damaligen Reichstagssitzung zwei Dinge ausgesprochen: Erstens, daB nachdem man uns diesen Krieg aufge­zwungen hat, keine Macht der Waffen und auch nicht die Zeit uns jemals niederzwingen werden, und zweitens, daB wenn das Judentum einen inter­nationalen Weltkrieg zur Ausrottung etwa der arischen Volker Europas anzettelt, dann nicht die arischen Volker ausgerottet werden, sondern das Judentum."

95

Notes pp. 40-41

84. Domarus, p. 1992, Hitler's proclamation of February 24, 1943 for the anniversary of the founding of the NSDAP : "Heute haben die Gedanken unserer nationalsozialistischen und die der faschistischen Revolution groBe und gewaltige Staaten erohert, und meine Prophezeiung wird ihre ErfUllung finden, daB durch diesen Krieg nicht die arische Menschheit vernichtet, sondern der Jude ausgerottet werden wird."

85. Meeting the 3 and 4 April 1944 in KrummhUbel of the reporters on Jewish questions in the (diplomatc) missions in Europe (passage on the action of extermination) : "Gesandter Six spricht sodann Uber die politische Struktur des Weltjuden­turns, die er weltanschaulich und historisch als Folge der soziologischen Entwicklung seit der Franzoischen Revolution erlautert. Die Zahlen, die im Jahre 1933 vorlagen, ergaben etwa 17 tlillionen Konfessionsjuden. Der eigentliche Kraftquell des Judentums in Europa und Amerika sei das Ost­judentum. Es stelle den Ausgangspunkt der Wanderbewegungen aus dem europaischen in den amerikanischen Raum dar ... Das Judentum in Europa habe seine biologische und gleichzeitig seine politische Rolle ausge- ~

spielt ... - Die physische Beseitigung des Ostjudentums entziehe dem Judentum die biologischen Reserven. Seine heutige Struktur sei durch seine Vereinigung mit den drei GroBmachten gekennzeichnet ... Nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch international mUsse die Judenfrage zu einer Losung gebracht werden. Leg.Rat v. Thadden spricht Uber die judenpoli­tische Lage in Europa und Uber den Stand der antijUdischen Exekutiv­MaBnahmen. Der Redner gab einen Uberblick, aus welchem Grunde die zionis­tische Palastina-Losung oder ahnliche Ersatzlosungen abgelehnt und die Aussiedlung der Juden in die Ostgebiete durchgefUhrt werden mUsse. Er umriss sodann den derzeitigen Stand der antijlidischen MaBnahmen in samt­lichen europaischen Landern ... (Da die von dem Redner vorgetragenen Einzelheiten liber den Stand der Exekutiv-MaBnahmen in den einzelnen Landern geheim zu halten sind, ist von der Aufnahme ins Protokoll abge­sehen worden)."

,j. 1'hp. W'Ii/f.J/'!"'emarzts of the "Vinol SO[UU:OIl" by Hitlel' befol'e his !h:ning Com[)(vlior!s in the [.'ilhY'efl' s lleadquClptpps

86. H. Picker, "Hitlers Tischgesprache" : "(p.126) Aufgrund einer der Depeschen oder eines wahrend des Essens ge­fallenen Stichwortes oder auch eines ihn zur Zeit beschaftigenden Problems begann Hitler seine Auffassungen darzulegen, urn sich selbst schlUssig zu werden oder urn seine Gaste zu unterhalten, zu interessieren oder in einer bestimmten Richtung zu beeinflussen. (p.152) Viele Juden sind sich auch des destruktiven Charakters ihres Daseins nicht bewuBt gewesen. Aber wer Leben zerstort, setzt sich dem Tode aus, und etwas anderes geschieht auch Ihnen nicht! (words of Hitler pronounced on December I, 194 I) . (pp.347-348) Beim Mittagessen bemerkte der Chef, daB das deutsche Volk heute den Kampfern an der Front ganz anders gegenUberstehe als im (Ersten) Weltkrieg ... Urn eben denselben Juden, der damals diesen Dolch­stoB gefUhrt habe, lamentiere heute unser sogenanntes Blirgertum, wenn er nach dem Osten abgeschoben werde. Das Bemerkenswerte daran sei, daB dieses BUrgertum sich seinerzeit aber nicht darum geklimmert habe, daB jahrlich 250 000 bis 300 000 deutsche Menschen auswanderten und ca. 75 Prozent der deutschen Auswanderer nach Australien bereits auf der Reise starben. (Note of Picker: 'ganz falsche Zahlen') (Words of Hitler pronounced on May 15, 1942).

96

Notes pp. 41-44

(p.378) Ganz Westeuropa mlisse deshalb nach einer bestimmten Zeit vollig judenfrei sein. Das sei allein schon deshalb erforderlich, alB es unter den Juden immer einen gewissen Prozentsatz von Fanatikern gebe, der das Judentum wieder hochzubringen suche. Es empfehle sich deshalb auch nicht die Juden nach Sibirien abzuschieben, da sie bei ihrer Klimafestigkeit dort nur gesundheitlich noch besonders gehartet wiirden. Viel richtiger se i es, sie - da die Araber sie in Palastina nicht haben wollten -nach Afrika zu transportieren und sie damit einem Klima auszusetzen, das jeden Menschen un serer Widerstandsfahigkeit beeintrachtige ... (Words of Hitler pronounced on May 29, 1942). (p.465) Wenn dieser Krieg zu Ende sei, konne Europa erleichtert auf­atmen. Denn - da er (Hitler) mit Beendigung dieses Krieges auch den letzten Juden Europas hinausgeworfen haben werde - ware dann die kommun­istische Gefahr aus dem Osten mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet. (Words of Hitler pronounced on July 21, 1942). (p. 471-472) Geschaftlich suche das Judentum Europa, Europa mUsse es aber schon aus dem Sacroegoismus ablehnen, da das Judentum rassisch harter sei. Nach Beendigung des Krieges werde er (Hitler) sieh rigoros auf den Standpunkt stellen, daB er Stadt fUr Stadt zusammenschlage, wenn nicht die Drecksjuden rauskamen und nach Madagaskar oder einem sonstigen jUdischen Nationalstaat abwanderten. - Die Beseitigung der Juden auS Wien sei am vordringlichsten, da in Wien am leichtesten gemeckert werde. Auch aus MUnchen mUBten die letzten anderthalbtausend baldmoglichst verschwinden. Er (Hitler) freue sich, daB wenigstens Linz bereits heute schon judenfrei sei, so sei das bezeichnend ... Jenen Juden, die nach dem Schlager 'ihre Wasche an der Siegfriedlinie' hatten aufhangen wollen, werde nach dem Krieg die Frechheit vergehen .... Denn unter der Decke sei der Antisemitismus bei den Anglo-Amerikanern wesentlieh starker als' beim Deutschen, der sich trotz aller negativen Erfahrungen in seiner GefUhls­duselei von d~r Phrase yom 'anstandigen Juden' nicht frei machen konne. (Words of Hitler pronounced on July 24, 1942)."

1. The Ol'ciel'B of lhUe)' to lhmrnlel'

87. Memorandum of December 28,1938, from Goring to all the Ministers defining restrictive measures in daily living for the Jews - concentrat­ion of Jewish tenants in certain houses, prohibition to use sleeping cars, etc., application of anti-Jewish measures to Jewish half-breeds -(passage on Hitler's approval of the measures) : "lch habe die Willensmeinung des FUhrers in diesen Fragen klar eingeholt, damit sie nunmehr als einzige Richtlinie fUr das Verfahren zu gelten hat. leh ersuche aIle Reichs- und Landesbehorden, sieh strikte an diese Willensmeinung zu halten. - leh verlange, daB die Richtlinien, die vor­stehend festgelegt worden sind, bis zu den untersten Staatsstellen be­kanntgegeben werden. - lch habe Abschrift an den Stellvertreter des FUhrers mit der Bitte gesandt, dieses Schreiben auch den Parteistellen zuzusenden."

88. W. Schellenberg, "Memoiren", p. 73 : "Den wenigen, die er dieser Ehre wUrdig hielt, kommentierte er (Himmler) dann die sakralen Worte, die er kurz davor aUs den stundenlangen Mono­logen seines FUhrers andachtig mitgenommen hatte. Einer von den wenigen, zu denen er sich darUber auBerte, war Reinhard Heydrich, der solche Bot­schaften jedoch schnell von aller Phantasie reinigte und sie in die nuchterne Sprache des Geheimdienstes umsetzte."

97

Notes pp. 45-46

89. Eichmann 2, nO 1491, Deposition of Eichmann for his trial in Jerusalem (on the orders of Himmler) : "Es war nun nicht so, dalO Himmler sich etwa stets ausgiebig mit jUdischen Fragen beschaftigte, aber das Thema war an sich in Parteikreisen stets ein akutes. Es genUgte ein knapper von Himmler ausgesprochener Satz, eine knappe Anweisung, die er seinem Adjudanten, seinem personlichen Stab, dem C.d.S. einem hoheren S5 und Pol. FUhrer bei dessen Besuch in seiner Feldkommandostelle, oder in Frieden in seinem Amt, und diese eine knappe Weisung, solch ein knapper Befehl loste dann bei den daran beteiligten Instanzen (Zentralinstanzen) eine Flut an Arbeiten, Be­sprechungen, Einholung von Bedenkenlosigkeitserklarungen seitens anderer, sicherheitspolizeifremder Instanzen, die aber aIle gehort und befragt, kurz nicht Ubergangen werden durften, aus. Dies machte z.B. dem Referat IV B 4 mit die meiste Arbeit.

fi. ri'he "Fiil.al DO/ttr/rYI" by u Jpi~}£sh CO/()Jdal RpueFOC (Surf/mer' 1940 -;;przii(1 1!J11)

90. See note 85

91. Proces, Vol. II, pp. 445-446

~

92. Note of Himmler, May 1940, entitled "A few considerations on the treatment of Fremd Volkischen in the East", in Vierteljahreshefte 1967, nO 2, p. 197 : "Den Begriff Juden hoffe ich, durch die Moglichkeit einer groBen Aus­wanderung samtlicher Juden nach Afrika oder sonst in eine Kolonie vollig ausloschen zu sehen. Es muB in' einer etwas langeren Zeit auch moglich sein, in unserem Gebiet die Volksbegriffe der Ukrainer, Goralen und Lemken verschwinden zu lassen. Dasselbe, was fUr diese Splitter­volker gesagt ist, gilt in dem entsprechend groBeren Rahmen fUr die Polen."

93. Letter from Heydrich to von Ribbentrop June 24, 1940 (in Kempner, pp. 106-107) : "Das Gesamtproblem - es handelt sich bereits urn rund 3 1/4 Millionen Juden in den heute deutscher Hoheitsgewalt unterstehenden Gebieten -kann aber durch Auswanderung nicht mehr gelost werden. Eine territoriale End!osung wird daher notwendig."

94. Deposition of Abetz of May 30, 19 /,7, for his trial in Paris (passage on his conversation with Hitler on the Jewish question) "Mit dem FUhrer habe ieh nur einma! und zwar am 3.August 1940 Uber die Judenfrage gesprochen. Er sagte mir, er w011e die Judenfrage fUr Europa generell losen und zwar dur~h eine Klausel im Friedensvertrag, in dem er den besiegten Landern zur 8edingung stellte, daB sie ihre jUdischen Staatsangehorigen aulOerhalb Europa verhringen. Ebenso wolle er auf die ihm verbUndeten Staaten einwirken. Er erwahnte in diesem Zusammenhang die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als ein Land, das lange nicht so Ubervolkert sei wie Europa und daher in der Lage sei, noch mehrere Millionen Juden aufzunehmen."

98

Notes pp. 46-47

95. Account of Best, chief of the administration attached to the Military Commander in France, of April 4, 1940, in view of a conversation with Vallat, Commissioner General [or Jewish questions (passage on the departure of all the Jews from France) : "Das deutsche Interesse besteht in einer progressiven Entlastung aller Uinder Europas vom Judentum mit dem Ziele der vollstiindigen Entjudung Europas: a) Ausweisung der Juden nichtfranzosischer Staatsangehorigkeit .. b) Internierung einer gewissen Zahl - 3000 bis 5000 - von Juden aller Staatsangehorigkeiten... Auf Grund der Erfahrung des deutschen Reiches in den zur Losung des Judenproblems vor dem gegenwarigen Kriege ge­troffenen MaBnahmen wird dem franzosischen Generalkommissar fUr Juden­fragen empfohlen, frUhzeitig mit der Planung und Vorbereitung einer spater~n Auswa~derung auch der Juden franzosischer Staatsangehorigkeit zu beglnnen ...

96. After 1940 there exists no trace of any work at all on this project (Madagascar) by the official services. In May and July 1942 Hitler in the course of dinner conversations (Picker, pp. 278, 471-472-see note 86) evoked the idea of a Jewish reserve for Jews of the West "in Madagascar or in another national Jewish state". He spoke in this respect of "dirty Jews" who after the war possibly would not have yet evacuated the European cities. He added that he would smash these cities to pieces. In such a context, his words were not intended to be taken seriously. The Nazi propaganda energetically rejected the idea of a "Jewish state", admitting only a "reserve". As for the idea of "smashing the European cities to pieces" if the Jews where still in them after the war, it only brings out the fact that the remarks were made without thinking.

97. Letter of March 6, 1941, from A. Rosenberg to M. Bormann regarding the inauguration of the Institute for Studies of the Jewish Question (passage on the "~ladagascar project") : "Da ich auf einer Massenversammlung Uber das Judenproblem sprechen werde, muB ich wissen, wie weit der FUhrer die Behandlung dieses Problems genehmigt: Abgesehen von der allgemeinen historischen Darstellung der Entwicklung unseres Kampfes und der grundsatzlichen Notwendigkeit der Losung des Judenproblems fUr Deutschland und fUr ganz Europa stehen zwei Fragen im Vordergrund : 1) Kann bei Andeutung einer territorialen Ubersiedlung die Insel Madagaskar genannt werden in dem Sinne, wie ich sie einmal in einem Aufsatz, der Ihnen bekannt ist, getan habe? Dieser Aufsatz war vom FUhrer im Prinzip genehmigt, aber damals noch auf eine Anzahl von Monaten hinausgeschoben worden. 2) 1st es moglich, die Stellung des Judentums und seine Macht in den Vereinigten Staaten zu behandeln, sowohl unter Wilson als auch in der neueren Entwicklung?"

98. Broadcast speech delivered by A. Rosenberg on March 28, 1941, in Frankfurt-on-the-Main on the occasion of the inauguration of the Institute for Studies of the Jewish Question (passage regarding the definitive solution to the Jewish Question) : "Es ist in diesen Jahrzehnten sehr viel von einem Judenstaat als Losung gesprochen worden ... Dieser Traum ist nun ausgetraumt! Jetzt haben wir, umgekehrt, zu Uberlegen, wo und wie wir die Juden unterzubringen haben. Das kann, wie gesagt, nicht in einem Judenstaat geschehen, sondern nur in einer Form, die ich jUdisches Reservat ~n will. Es ist zu hoffen, daB sich kommende Staatsmanner zusammenfinden, urn eine Ansiedlung der Juden nach und nach einzuleiten, die unter erfahrener Polizeiaufsicht nunmehr jene nUtzlichen Arbeiten verrichten sollen, die sie bisher von Nichtjuden verrichtet sehen wollten. - Uber die praktische DurchfUhrung und den Ort einer Um- und Aussiedlung ist in diesen Jahren naturgemaB

97 a

Notes pp. 47-48

vie I gesprochen worden. Es ist nicht notwendig, diese Frage jetzt zu be­handeln. Ihre LHsung wird einer kUnftigen Abmachung vorbehalten bleiben ... Wir als Nationalsozialisten aber haben auf aIle Fragen hier nur eine ein­deutige Antwort zu geben: FUr Deutschland ist die Judenfrage nur dann gelHst, wenn der letzte Jude den groBdeutschen Raum verlassen hat."

99. Address delivered by A. Rosenberg on March 26, 1941, at the inaugu­ration of the Institue for Studies of the Jewish Question in Frankfurt­on-the-Main (passage comparing Judaism to a tumor) : "Der Vorwurf gegen uns ware, urn ein Bild zu gebrauchen, genau der gleiehe, den man einem Chirurgen machen wollte, der nach langer Erforschung einer inneren Erkrankung durch einen operativen Eingriff eine lebensgefahrdende Gesch",,,lst entfernt."

G. The Oru..ier of tne PUhrer Jap tne "Firir;l/ ,(.:OllJ.t-iOd" ir~

SOV7.:r?t H?!g1:0ilS

100. Jacobsen, pp. 202-205

101. Krausnick, pp. 363-368

Ow O,·':Uljl>d

102. Sworn statement of June 29, 1947 to the Nuremberg Tribunal by W.Blume, chief of a commando in the Einsatzgruppe B (mobile killing unit B); passage on the directives received in respect to the mission of the Einsatzgruppe : "Wahrend der Aufstellung der Einsatzgruppen und -Kommandos in den Monaten Mai/Juni 1941 war ieh in DUben anwesend. 1m Laufe des Monats Juni hielten Heydrich, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, und Streckenbach, Amtschef I des RSHA, Vortrage Uber die Aufgaben der Einsatzgruppen und -Kommandos. Zu dieser Zeit wurden wir bereits Uber die Aufgaben der Judenvernichtung unterrichtet. Es wurde ausgefUhrt, daB das Ostjudentum das intellektuelle Reservoir des Bolschewismus sei und deshalb nach Ansicht des FUhrers, vernichtet werden mulL Diese Rede wurde in kleinem Kreise gehalten. Obwohl ich mich an die einzelnen Herrn nicht erinnern kann, nehme ich an, daB viele (a word crossed out) und die Chefs der Einsatz- und Sonderkommandos anwesend waren. Ich hHrte eine weitere Rede Heydrichs im Prinz-Albrecht-Palais in Berlin, wo er nochmals diese Punkte unterstrich."

103. Sworn statement of O. Ohlendorf, chief of the Einsatzgruppe D,to the Tribunal of Nuremberg, April 24, 1947 (passage on the directives received for the mission of the Einsatzgruppen) : "Der Chef der Sipo und des SD stellte eigene motorisierte, militante Einheiten in Form von Einsatzgruppen auf, die in Einsatzkommandos lind Sonderkommandos untergeteilt waren und in ihrer Gesamtheit den HCl'r.'s­gruppen beziehungsweise Armeen zugeteilt werden sollten ... Die E;ns~tz­gruppen hatten folgende Aufgaben: Sie waren verantwortlich fUr aIle politischen Sicherheitsaufgaben innerhalb des Operationsgebietes der Heeresverbande, zu denen sie zugeteilt waren und der rUckwartigen Heeresgebiete, sofern die letzteren nicht der Zivilverwaltung unter­standen. Ferner hat ten sie die Aufgaben , die eroberten Gebiete von Juden, kommunistischen Funktionaren und Agenten zu reinigen. Die letzt­genannte Aufgabe sollte durch die THtung aller erfaBten, rassisch und politisch unerwUnschten Elemente gelHst werden, die als die Sicherheit gef§hrdend bezeichnet waren ... Befehle in Bezug auf Bereinigung von un­erwUnschten Elementen gingen an die Einsatzkommandos unmittelbar und kamen vom ReiehsfUhrer-SS selbst oder Uber Weitergabe durch Heydrich.

~

Die Oberbefehlshaber waren durch Hitler angewiesen, die DurchfUhrung dieser Befehle zu unterstUtzen."

98 a

Notes pp. t,8-49

104. "Richtlinien fUr das Verhalten der Truppen in RuBland"(June 6,1941) " 1) Der Boischewismus ist der Todfeind des nationalsozialistischen deutschen Volkes. Dieser zersetzenden Weltanschauung und ihren Tragern gilt Deutschlands Kampf. 2) Dieser Kampf verlangt rUcksichtsloses und energisches Durchgreifen gegen bolschewistische Hetzer, Freischarler, Saboteure, Juden und rest lose Beseitigung jeden aktiven und passiven Widerstandes."

105. Order of the day of the Army from Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau, October 10, 1941 (passage on the implacable expiation to be imposed on the Jews in occupied USSR); Jacobsen, p. 223 : "Der Soldat ist im Ostraum nicht nur ein Kampfer nach den Regeln der Kriegskunst, sondern auch Trager einer unerbittlichen vHlkischen Idee und der Racher fUr aIle Bestialitaten, die deutschem und artverwandtem Volkstum zugefUgt wurden. - Deshalb muss der Soldat fUr die Notwendigkeit der harten, aber gerechten SUhne am jUdischen Untermenschentum voIles Verstandnis haben. Sie hat den weiteren Zweck, Erhebungen im RUcken der Wehrmacht, die erfahrungsgemaB stets von Juden angezettelt wurden, im Keime zu ersticken. - Der Kampf hinter der Front wird noch nicht ernst genug genommen. Immer noch werden heimtUckische grausame Partisanen und entartete Weiber zu Kriegsgefangenen gemacht, immer noch werden halb uniformierte oder in Zivil gekleidete HeckenschUtzen und Herumtreiber wie anstandige Soldaten behandelt und in Gefangenenlager abgefUhrt ... Ein solches Verhalten der Truppe ist nur noch durch vHllige Gedanken­losigkeit zu erklaren. Dann ist es aber fUr die Vorgesetzten Zeit, den Sinn fUr den gegenwartigen Kampf wachzurufen."

106. Memorandum for the dossier on a conference of July 16, 1941, of Hitler with Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel and GHring (passage on Hitler's determination to absorb the USSR and on the pretext that he put forward as a "justification" for the exterminations in the zones occupied in the East) : "Auf Anordnung des FUhrers fand heute bei ihm urn 15 Uhr eine Besprechung mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reichsminister Lammers, Feldmarschall Keitel mit dem Reichsmarschall und mir statt. - Grundsatzlich kommt es also darauf an, den riesenhaften Kuchen handgerecht zu zerlegen, damit wir ihn - erstens beherrschen - zweitens verwalten und - drittens ausbeuten -kHnnen. - Die Russen haben jetzt den Befehl zum Partisanen-Krieg hinter unserer Front gegeben. Dieser Partisanenkrieg hat auch wieder seinen Vorteil: er gibt uns die MHglichkeit auszurotten was sich gegen uns stellt~

107. Report of December 2, 1941, from an armaments inspector in the Ukraine to General Thomas, chief of the economic department for armaments of the Wehrmacht (passage on the extermination of Jews in the Ukraine) "Die jUdische BevHlkerung ist im unmittelbaren AnschluB an die Kampf­handlungen zunachst unbehelligt geblieben. Erst Wochen, z.T. Monate spater wurde eine planmaBige Erschiessung der Juden durch dazu eigens abgestellte Formationen der Ordnungspolizei durchgefUhrt. Diese Aktion ging im wesentlichen von Osten naeh Westen. Sie erfolgte durch Hffentliche Hinzuziehung ukrainischer Miliz, vielfach leider auch unter freiwilliger Beteiligung von Wehrmachtsangehorigen. Die Art der DurchfUhrung der Aktionen, die sich auf Manner und Greise, Frauen und Kinclerjeden Alters erstreckte, war grauenhaft. Die Aktion ist in der Massenhaftigkeit der Hinrichtungen so gigantisch wie bisher keine in der Sowjetunion vor­genommene gleichartige MaBnahme."

99

Notes pp. 49-51

108. Report of the Regional Commissioner in Slonim on the situation (passage concerning the Jews) : "Bei meiner Ankunft zahlte das Gebiet Slonim ca. 25 000 Juden, davon allein in der Stadt Slonim ca. 16 000 ... Ein Ghetto einzurichten war unmoglich, da weder Stacheldraht noch Bewachungsmoglichkeiten vor-hand en waren. Daher traf ich von vornherein Vorbereitungen fUr eine kUnftige groBere Aktion. Zunachst wurde die Enteignung durchgefUhrt ... Dann erfolgte eine genaue Erfassung der Juden nach Zahl, Alter und Beruf, eine Herausziehung aller Handwerker und Facharbeiter, ihre Kenntlichmachung durch Ausweise und gesonderte Unterbringung. Die yom SD am 13. I I. durchgefUhrte Aktion befreite mich von unnotigen Fressern und die jetzt vorhandenen ca. 7 000 Juden in der Stadt Slonim sind samt­lich in den ArbeitsprozeB eingespannt, arbeiten willig aufgrund standiger Todesangst und werden im FrUhjahr genauestens fUr eine weitere Ver­minderung UberprUft und aussortiert. Das Flache Land wurde eine Zeit­lang groBzUgig von der Wehrmacht gesaubert; leider nur in Orten unter I 000 Einwohnern. In den Rayonstadten wird nach der DurchfUhrung der Hilfsarbeiten fUr die West-Ost Bewegung das Judentum bis auf die not­wendigsten Handwerker und Facharbeiter ausgemerzt werden ... Die besten Fachkrafte unter den Juden mUssen unter Aufsicht in meinen Handwerker­schulen ihre Kunst intelligenten Lehrlingen w~itergeben, urn einmal den Juden auch im Handwerk entbehrlich zu machen und auszuschalten."

109. Letter of July 28, 1942, from Himmler to G. Berger, chief of the central administration of the SS and at that period delegated by Himmler to the Ministery of the East (passage on the mission with which Hitler entrusted Himmler in the occupied USSR) : "Lieber Berger! Ieh lasse dringend bitten, daB keine Verordnung Uber den Begriff 'Jude' herauskommt. ~Iit allen diesen torichten Festlegungen binden wir uns ja seIher die Hande. - Die besetzten Ostgebiete werden judenfrei. Die DurcbfUhrung dieses sehr schweren Befehls hat der FUhrer auf meine Schultern gelegt. Die Verantwortung kann mir ohne dies niem­and ahnehmen. Also verbiete ich mir alles ~litreden. Aktennotiz Lammers erhalten Sie demnachst."

'riu (}J' lh' "i,I/'lll.l ~:()/U!l:uj'" ifY 1'::rt(JY'!ni;;cztoY'Y !J('I}()Y'L·)'~./i)}! i.(} {he ;"c(!il)}';"; ("j·,'/l.:3L of I./zr-' /:::)[;1,") (Aul-Im]!! J9,11)

110. Decree of Goring, July 31,1941, entrusting Heydrich with the pre­paration of the final solution of the Jewish question in the occupied territories as well as in the Reich, adapting his actions according to the circumstances : "In Erganzung der Ihnen bereits mit Erlass Yom 24.1.39 Ubertragenen Aufgabe, die Judenfrage in Form der Auswanderung oder Evakuierung einer den Zeitverhaltnissen entsprechend moglichst gUnstigen Lasung zuzufUhren, beauftrage ich Sie hiermit, aIle erforderlichen Vorhereitungen in organ­isatorischer, sachlicher und materieller Hinsicht zu treffen fUr ~ine Gesamtlasung der Judenfrage im deutschen Einflussgebiet in Europa. ~ So fern dabei die Zustandigkeiten anderer Zentralinstanzen berUhrt werden, sind diese zu heteiligen. - Ieh heauftrage Sie weiter, mir in Balde einen Gesamtentwurf tiber die organisatorischen, sachlichen und materiellen VorausmaBnahmen zur ])urchfUhrung der angestrehten Endlosung der Judenfrage vorzulegen."

I I I. Kempner, p. 98

100

;J

Notes pp. 51-54

112. Eichmann I, pp. 169-170, Interrogatory of Eichmann for the pre­liminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem : "1m Juni glaube ich war der Kriegsbeginn, Juni oder Juli, war der Kriegs­beginn. Und glaub ich zwei Monate spater mag es wohl gewesen sein, es kann auch drei Monate spater gewesen sein. Es war jedenfalls Spatsommer. Ieh werde gleich sagen, warum ich weiB, daB es Spatsommer war, als Heydrich mich zu sich befahl. Meldete mich und der sagte mir: Der FUhrer, also das mit der Auswanderung usw. usw. mit einem kleinen speech vorher: 'Der FUhrer hat die physische Vernichtung der Juden befohlen'. Diesen Satz sagte er mir. Und als ob er jetzt nun die Wirkung seiner Worte prUfen wollte, machte er, ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit, lange Pause ... Und dann sagte er zu mir: 'Eichmann, fahren Sie zu Globocnik, Lublin ... Der ReichsfUhrer hat Globocnik bereits entsprechende Weisung-en gegeben und sehen Sie sich an, wie weit er mit seinem Vorhaben ge­kommen ist. Er benUtzt,glaube ich, die russischen Tankgraben hier zum Vernichten der Juden."

113. Hoss, p. 155

114. Eichmann I, pp. 239-240 and Eichmann 3, audience 96, Deposition of Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem on the authorization given retrospectively to Globoenik to exterminate the Jews : "Gen. Staatsanwalt: ' ... WarlO sagte Ihnen Glohocnik und verlangte von Ihnen eine nachtragliche Bestatigung der Ermordung von so und so vielen Tausenden Juden ... ?' Angeklagter: 'Die verlangte Globocnik nicht von mir, sondern die hatte er entweder von MUller oder Heydrich oder Himmler verlangt, aber ich habe sie hinbringen mlissen. Die hab ich auch hingehracht ... 'Gen.Staatsanwalt: 'Was stand in diesem Brief?' Angeklagter:'Ich entsinne mich ungefahr, daB er ermachtigt ist weitere 150 000 oder 250 000 Juden der "End Wsung" zuzufUhren.' Angeklagter: ' ... es muB etwa im Sommer oder Spatsommer 1942 gewesen Bein ... ' Gen.Staatsanwalt: ' War das der einzige Befehl zur Judenermordung,den Sie Glohocnik hrachten?' Angeklagter: 'Ich sagte ein oder zwei Mal ... ' Gen. Staatsanwalt: 'Globoenik war der Einzige. der solche Sac hen schrift­lich verlangte, nicht wahr?' Angeklagter: 'Ja, er war der Einzige und ich entsinne mich noch, daB MUller ... sagte, daB es ein merkwUrdiger Mensch ist, er verlangt diese Bestatigung ... ' "

115. Memoirs of B. Lasener, responsible for reports on racial matters at the Ministery of the Interior of the Reich; in Vierteljahreshefte, 1961, nO 3, p. 303 : "Zur Frage der Evakuierung der Juden aus dem Altreich gab SturmbannfUhrer Eichmann noch bekannt, der FUhrer habe auf einen dahingehenden Antrag des ObergruppenfUhrers Heydrich Evakuierungen wahrend des Krieges ab­gelehnt; darUber lie8e dieser jetzt einen Vorschlag ausarbeiten, der auf Teilevakuierung der groBeren Stadte ziele."

116. Himmler's letter to Creiser (GAuleiter and Reichsstatthalter of the Warthegau -Lodz-), September 18, 194 I; Krausnick, p. 374 : "Der FUhrer wUnscht, daB moglichst bald das Altreich und das Protektorat yom Westen nach dem Osten von Juden geleert und befreit werden. Ich bin daher bestrebt, maglichst noch in diesem Jahr die Juden des Altreichs und des Protektorats zunachst einmal als erste Stufe in die vor zwei Jahren neu zum Reich gekommenen Ostgebiete zu transportieren, urn sie im nachsten FrUhjahr noch weiter nach dem Osten ahzuschieben."

I 17. Bednarz, p. 33

99 a

Notes pp. 54-55

118. Accounts of the meeting on October 19, 1941, of Heydrich with Eichmann and the officials of the administration and the police in the Protectorate on the deportation of Jews from Prague (passage on the destination of the deportations in relation with Einsatzgruppen) Eichmann 2, nO 1193 : "In den nachsten Wochen sollen die 5 000 Juden aus Prag nun evakuiert werden. - SS-Brif. Nebe und Rasch konnten in die Lager fUr kommunistische Haftlinge im Operationsgebiet Juden mit hineinnehmen. Dies ist berei~s nach Angabe von SS-Stubf. Eichmann eingeleitet."

I 19. Eichmann I, pp. 3424-3444, Interrogatory of Eichmann for the pre­liminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem on the meaning of the term "Operationsgebiet" employed in the preceding document : "Examining magistrate: 'Was heiBt aber Operationsgebiet? 1st das wo die Einsatzgruppen operieren?' Eichmann: 'Sicherlich ist das so zu ver­stehen, natlirlich ... ' II

120. Krausnick, pp. 377-378

121. Memoirs of B. Losener, responsible for reports on racial matters at the Ministery of the Interior of the Reich; in Vierteljahreshefte, 1961, pp. 310-31 "Kurz vor Weihnachten 1941 kam Reg.Rat Feldscher auf mein Dienstzimmer und berichtete mir, was ein zuverlassiger Bekannter von ihm tags zuvor als Augenzeuge Uber Massenermordungen deutscher, vor allem Berliner Juden bei Riga erzahlt hatte. Es war so grauenhaft, daB ich hier von Einzelheiten absehe. Zum erstenmal erfuhr ich, daB meine schlimmsten BefUrchtungen Uber das Schicksal der Deportierten eingetroffen, oder richtiger, noch weit Ubertroffen worden waren ... Ich trug Stuckart (Staatssekretar im Innenministerium) vor, was mir zu Ohren gekommen war ... Ich bat Stuckart, mich mit sofortiger Wirkung von meinem Referat zu entbinden ... Stuckart entgegnete zunachst: 'Wissen Sie nicht, daB diese Dinge auf hochsten Befehl geschehen?' "

122. Letter from Brack (who until August 1941 was in charge of the euthanasia of the mentally deranged and other sick people) to Himmler

c J

on June 23, 1942, proposing to keep alive 2 to 3 million Jews fit to work out of the 10 million European Jews, this on the condition that they be sterilized (passage on the extermination of the Jews by gassing) "Sehr geehrter ReichsfUhrer! - Ich habe dem BrigadefUhrer Globocnik auf Anweisung von Reichsleiter Bouhler fUr die DurchfUhrung seiner Sonderaufgabe schon vor langerer Zeit einen Teil meiner Manner zur Ver­fUgung gestellt. Bei dieser Gelegenheit vertrat BrigadefUhrer Globocnik die Auffassung, die ganze Judenaktion so schnell wie nur irgend moglich durchzufUhren, damit man nicht eines Tages mitten drin steckenbliebe, wenn irgendwelche Schwierigkeiten ein Abstoppen der Aktion notwendig machen. Sie selbst, ReichsfUhrer, haben mir gegenUber seinerzeit schon die Meinung geauBert, daB man schon aus GrUnden der Tarnung so schnell wie moglich arbeiten mUsse. Beide Auffassungen, die ja im Prinzip das gleiche Ergebnis zeitigen, sind nach meinen eigenen Erfahrungen mehr als berechtigt; trotzdem mochte ich Sie bitten, in diesem Zusammenhang folgende Uberlegungen von mir vortragen zu dUrfen." (Brack afterwards exposed his 'plan' for the sterilization of the Jews to be kept for work).

100 a

Note p. 56

123. Address of H. Frank to the council of his government on December 16, 1941, in Cracow (passages concerning the extermination of the Jews) "Mit den Juden - das will ich Ihnen auch ganz offen sagen - muB so oder so Schluss gemacht werden. Der FUhrer sprach einmal das Wort aus: wenn es der vereinigten Judenschaft wieder gelingen wird, einen Weltkrieg zu entfesseln, dann werden die Blutopfer nicht nur von den in den Krieg gehetzten Volkern gebracht werden, sondern dann wird der Jude in Europa sein Ende gefunden haben. Ich weiB, es wird anvi~en MaBnahmen, die jetzt im Reich gegenUber den Juden getroffen werden, Kritik geUbt. - BewuBt wird - das geht aus den Stimmungsberichten hervor - immer wieder versucht, von Grausamkeit, von Harte usw. zu sprechen. Ich mochte Sie bitten: einigen Sie sich mit mir zunachst, bevor ich jetzt weiterspreche, auf die Formel: Mitleid wollen wir grundsatzlich nur mit dem deutschen Volke haben, sonst mit niemanden auf der Welt. Die anderen haben auch kein Mitleid mit uns gehabt. Ieh muB auch als alter Nationalsozialist sagen: wenn die Judensippschaft in Europa den Krieg Uberleben wUrde, wir aber unser bestes Blut fUr die Erhaltung Europas geopfert hatten, dann wUrde dieser Krieg doch nur einen Teilerfolg darstellen. Ich werde daher den Juden gegenUber grundsatzlich nur von der Erwartung ausgehen, daB sie verschwinden. Sie mUssen weg. Ich habe Verhandlungen zu dem Zwecke an­geknUpft, sie nach dem Osten abzuschieben. 1m Januar findet Uber diese Frage eine groBe Besprechung in Berlin statt, zu der ich Herrn Staats­sekretar Dr.BUhler entsenden werde. Diese Besprechung soIl im Reichs­sicherheitshauptamt bei SS-ObergruppenfUhrer Heydrich gehalten werden. Jedenfalls wird eine groBe jUdisehe Wanderung einsetzen. - Aber was solI mit den Juden geschehen? Glauben Sie, man wird sie im Ostland in Sied­lungsdorfern unterbringen? Man hat uns in Berlin gesagt: weshalb macht man diese Scherereien; wir konnen im Ostland oder im Reichskommissariat auch nichts mit ihnen anfangen, liquidiert sie seIber! Meine Herren, ich muB Sie bitten, sich gegen Mitleidserwagungen zu wappnen. Wir mUssen die Juden vernichten, wo immer wir sie treffen und wo es irgend moglich ist, urn das GesamtgefUge des Reiches hier aufrecht zu erhalten. Das wird selbstverstandlich mit Methoden geschehen, die anders sind als diejenigen, von denen Amtschef Dr.Hummel(l) gesprochen hat.Auch die Richter der Sonder­gerichte konnen nicht dafUr verantworlich gemacht werden, denn das liegt eben im Rahmen des Rechtsverfahrens. Man kann bisherige Anschauungen nicht auf solche gigantischen einmaligen Ereignisse Ubertragen. Jedenfalls mUssen wir aber einen Weg finden, der zum Ziele fUhrt, und ich mache mir darUber meine Gedanken. - Die Juden sind auch fUr uns auBergewohnlich schadliche Fresser. Wir haben im Generalgouvernement schatzungsweise 2,5 , vielleicht mit den jUdisch Versippten und dem, was alles daran hangt, jetzt 3,5 Millionen Juden. Diese 3,5 Millionen Juden konnen wir nicht erschieBen, wir konnen sie nicht vergiften, werden aber doch Ein­griffe vornehmen konnen, die irgendwie zu einem Vernichtunserfolg fuhren und zwar im Zusammenhang mit den vom Reich her zu besprechenden groBen MaBnahmen. Das Generalgouvernemnt muB genau so judenfrei werden, wie es das Reich ist. Wo und wie das geschieht, ist eine Sache der Instanzen, die wir hier einsetzen und schaffen mUssen und deren Wirksamkeit ich Ihnen rechtzeitig bekanntgeben werde." (I) Dr. Hummel in fuis session of the government made his report on the activity of the special courts which pronounced the death penalty against Jews found outside of the aera of the ghetto.

101

Notes pp. 56-57

124. Note (Vermerk) dated December I, 1941, of the Sipo-SD,section IV B 4, concerning the invitation of a representative of the General Government to the conference of Wannsee (suburb of Berlin) planned at that time for December 9, 1941, later set for January 20, 1942; Eichmann 2, nO 1101 : " I) Am 28. I. dieses Jahres sprach SS-ObergruppenfUhrer KrUger beim Chef der Sipo-SD vor, urn u.a. die Frage einer zentralen Bearbeitung der Judenangelegenheiten im Gerneralgouvernement zu besprechen. - Aus den im Generalgouvernement in letzter Zeit auf diesem Gebiet getroffenen MaB­nahmen sei in@er starker zu ersehen, daB der Generalgouverneur bestrebt ist, die Behandlung des Judenproblems vollig an sich zu ziehen. -2) Bei der sich anschlieBenden RUcksprache wurde Referent IV B 4 ange­wiesen, zu der fUr den 9.12.41 in Berlin angeraumten Besprechung neben den bisher eingeladenen Zentralinstanzen im Interesse einer Bereinigung und Klarung dieser Angelegenheiten dem Staatssekretar BUhler und dem ObergruppenfUhrer KrUger Einladungen zugehen zu lassen."

R. fHUpy"s Appy'oval of (he (J(!nr:pc;l/:;",j "FiNal :;ui.?(t1:UIl" and the CmIeN'I!('!' of Wamwr:e (Januupy J .91::)

125. The conference on the final solution of the Jewish question called by Heydrich in Wannsee on January 20, 1942, to co-ordinate all of the authorities, represented at this conference by the Secretaries of State and other leaders (fundamental passage of Heydrich's report) :

?

"Die FederfUhrung bei der Bearbeitung der Endlosung der Judenfrage liege ohne RUcksicht auf geographische Grenzen zentral beim ReichsfUhrer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei (Chef der Sicherheitspolzei und des SD). -Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD gab sodann einen kurzen RUck­blick Uber den bisher gefUhrten Kampf gegen den Gegner. Die wesentlichs­ten Momente bilden a) die ZurUckdrangung der Juden aus den einzelnen Le­bensgebieten des deutschen Volkes, b) die ZurUckdrangung der Juden aus dem Lebensraum des deutschen Volkes. - 1m Vollzug dieser Bestrebungen wurde als einzige, vorlaufige Losungsmoglichkeit die Beschleunigung der Auswanderung der Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet verstarkt und planmaBig in Angriff genommen. - ... Inzwischen hat der ReichsfUhrer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Hinblick auf die Gefahren einer Auswanderung im Kriege und im Hinblick auf die Moglichkeiten des Os tens die Auswanderung der Juden verboten. - Anstelle der Auswanderung ist nunmehr als weitere Losungsmoglichkeit nach entsprechender vorheriger Genehmigung durch den FUhrer die Evakuierung der Juden nach dem Osten getreten. - Diese Aktion­en sind jedoch lediglich als Ausweichmoglichkeiten anzusprechen, doch werden hier bereits jene praktischen Erfahrungen gesammelt, die im Hin­blick auf die kommende Endlosung der Judenfrage von wichtiger Bedeutung sind. - 1m Zuge dieser Endlosung der europaischen Judenfrage kommen rund II Millionen Juden in Betracht, die sich wie folgt auf die einzelnen Lander verteilen: ' ... (Heydrich gives statistical figures) ... Unter entsprechender Leitung sollen nun im Zuge der Endlosung die Juden in geeigneter Weise im Osten zum Arbeitseinsatz kommen. In groBen Arbeits­kolonnen, unter Trennung der Geschlechter, werden die arbeitsfahigen Juden straBenbauend in diese Gebiete gefUhrt, wobei zweifellos ein GroB­teil durch natUrliche Verminderung ausfallen wird. - Der allfallig end­lich verbleibende Restbestand wird, da es sich bei diesen zweifellos urn den widerstandsfahigsten Teil handelt, entsprechend behandelt werden mUssen, da dieser, eine natUrliche Auslese darstellend, bei Freilassung als Keimzelle eines neuen jUdischen Aufbaues anzusprechen ist. (Siehe die Erfahrung der Geschichte.) - '" Die evakuierten Juden werden zu-

102

Notes pp. 58-60

nachst Zug urn Zug in sogenannte Durchgangsghettos verbracht, urn von dort aus weiter nach dem Osten transportiert zu werden. - ... Staatssekretar Dr. BUhler stellte fest, daB das Generalgouvernement es begrUBen wUrde, wenn mit der Endlosung dieser Frage im Generalgouvernement begonnen wUrde, weil einmal hier das Transportproblem keine Ubergeordente Rolle spielt und arbeitseinsatzmaBige GrUnde den Lauf dieser Aktion nicht verhindern wUrde ... Von den in Frage kon@enden etwa 2 1/2 Millionen Juden sei Uber­dies die Mehrzahl der FaIle arbeitsunfahig. - Staatssekretar Dr.BUhler stellte weiterhin fest, daB die Lasung der Judenfrage im Generalgouverne­ment federfUhrend beim Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD liegt und seine Arbeiten durch die Behorden des Generalgouvernements unterstUtzt wUrden. Er hatte nur eine Bitte, die Judenfrage in diesem Gebiet so schnell wie maglich zu losen. - AnschlieBend wurden die verschiedenen Arten der Losungsmoglichkeiten besprochen, wobei sowohl der Gauleiter Dr. Meyer als auch seitens des Staatssekretars Dr. BUhler der Standpunkt vertreten wurde, gewisse vorbereitende Arbeiten im Zuge der Endlosung gleich in den betreffenden Gebieten selbst durchzufUhren, wobei jedoch eine Beunruhigung der Bevolkerung vermieden werden mUsse ... "

126. Statement of M. Luther (Auswartiges Amt) on the Jewish question, August 1942 :

"Die vorgesehenen Abschiebungen stellen einen weiteren Schritt vorwarts auf dem Wege der Gesamtlosung dar und sind im Hinblick auf andere Staaten (Ungarn)' sehr wichtig. Der Abtransport nach dem Generalgouvernement ist eine vorlaufige MaBnahme. Die Juden werden nach den besetzten Ostgebieten weiterbefordert, sobald die technischen Voraussetzungen gegeben sind."

D. 'Ph·' "F[',Ld :";()/i/li()}:" by (;(~n ('hlJ.llh('y':·-; £;1 tiJr~ {',)}!('r-:)!LputiolIUr'!f :;ynt.em (c:unnei' J.Y'7:. - (ie,tob"p ID·N)

127. Himmler's letter of January 25, 1942, to CHicks, inspector of the concentration camps (on the decision to develop the labour force thereby represented by the deportation of the Jews) : "Nachdem russische Kriegsgefangene in der nachsten Zeit zu erwarten sind, werde ich von den Juden und JUdinnen, die aus Deutschland ausgewandert werden, eine groBe Anzahl in die Lager schicken. Richten Sie sich darauf ein, in den nachsten 4 Wochen 100 000 mannliche Juden und bis zu 50 000 JUdinnen in die KL aufzunehmen. GroBe wirtschaftliche Auftrage und Aufgaben werden in den nachsten Wochen an die Konzentrationslager herantreten. SS-GruppenfUhrer Pohl wird Sie im einzelnen unterrichten."

128. Note of June 15, 1942, drawn up by Dannecker for Knochen and Lischka on the decision to beg inn the massive deportations to the East of the Jews of Holland, Belgium and France : "Am 11.6.42 fand im Reichssicherheitshauptamt - IV B 4 - eine Besprechung statt, an der neben dem Unterzeichnenden (SS-HauptsturmfUhrer Dannecker) auch die Judenreferenten aus BrUssel und Den Haag teilnahmen. a)Gegenstand: Aus militarischen GrUnden kann wahrend des Sommers ein Ab­schub von Juden aus Deutschland in das ostliche Operationsgebiet nicht mehr erfolgen. - RFSS hat daher angeordnet, da~ entweder aus dem SUd­osten (Rumanien) oder aus den besetzten Westgebieten groBere Judenmengen dem K.Z. Auschwitz zwecks Arbeitsleistung Uberstellt werden. - Grundbe­dingung ist, daB die Juden (beiderlei Geschlechts) zwischen 16 und 40 Jahre alt sind. 10% nicht arbeitsfahige Juden konnen mitgeschickt werden. b)Vereinbarung: Es wurde vereinbart, daB aus den Niederlartden 15 000, aus Belgien 10 000 und aus Frankreich einschlieBlich unbesetztes Gebiet insgesamt 100 000 Juden abgeschoben werden ...

101 a

Notes pp. 60-63

c) Technische AusfUhrung: 1. Wegen der Gestellung des Transportmaterials soli auf Anweisung des RSHA durch den Unterzeichnenden mit ETRA, Paris (Generalleutnant Kohl) Verbindung aufgenommen werden. Dabei solI auch die Frage der fUr Belgien erforderlichen 10 TransportzUge geklart werden .. "

129. Administrative memorandum of Himmler, October 9, 1942, KrUger and Globocnik, to the RSHA and to Wolff on the re-organization of the Jewish labour force in the General Government and on the short-comings in this connection (passage on the total extermination of this labour force desired by Hitler) : "Es wird dann unser Bestreben sein, diese jUdische Arbeitskraft durch Polen zu ersetzen und die groBere Anzahl dieser jUdischen KL-Betriebe tunlichst im Osten des Generalvouvernements zusammenzufassen. Jedoch auch dort sollen eines Tages dem Wunsche des FUhrers entsprechend die Juden verschwinden."

l(). The "Pinal Solution", "Page of Glory", whieh will have neither' to be !,ipitten nor to be For'gotten

7 130. Krausnick, p.447, Account of Himmler of his report to Hitler June 19, 1943, in Obersalzberg : "Der FUhrer sprach auf meinen Vortrag in der Judenfrage hin aus, daB die Evakuierung der Juden trotz der dadurch in den nachsten 3 bis 4 Monaten noch entstehenden Unruhe radikal durchzufUhren sei und durchgestanden \verden mUs se. 'I

131. Krausnick, pp. 446-447 ; Buchheim 1, p. 329; Speech of Himmler, October 6, 1943, before the Reichsleiter and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP in Poznan :

"lch bitte Sie, das, was ich in diesem Kreis sage, wirklich nur zu horen und nicht darUber zu sprechen. Es trat an uns die Frage heran: Wie ist es mit den Frauen und den Kindern? - lch habe mich entschlossen, auch hier eine ganz klare Lasung zu finden. lch hielt mich namlich nicht fUr be­rechtigt, die Manner auszurotten - sprich also: umzubringen oder umbringen zu lassen - und die Racher in Gestalt der Kinder fUr unsere Sahne und Enkel groB werden Zu lassen. Es muBte der schwere EntschluB gefaBt werden, dieses Yolk von der Erde verschwinden zu lassen ... Damit mochte ich die Judenfrage abschlieBen. Sie wissen nun bescheid, und Sie behalten es fUr sich. Man wird vielleicht in ganz spater Zeit sich einmal Uberlegen konnen, ob man dem deutschen Yolk etwas mehr darUber sagt. lch glaube, es ist besser, wir - wir insgesamt - haben das fUr unser Yolk getragen, haben die Verantwortung auf uns genommen (die Verantwortung fUr eine Tat, nicht fUr eine Idee) und' nehmen dann das Geheimnis mit in unser Grab."

132. Himmler's address in Poznan, October 4, 1943, to the GruppenfUhrer of the SS (passage on the extermination of the Jews) : "lch will hier in aller Offenheit auch ein ganz schweres Kapitel er­wahnen. Unter uns solI es einmal ganz offen ausgesprochen sein, und trotzdem werden wir in der Offentlichkeit nie darUber reden. Genauso wenig, wie wir am 30.Juni 1934 gezogert haben, die befohlene Pflicht zu tun und Kameraden, die sich verfehlt hatten, an die Wand zu stellen und zu erschieBen, genauso wenig haben wir darUber jemals gesprochen und werden je darUber sprechen. Es war eine, Gottseidank, in uns wohnende Selbstverstandlichkeit des Taktes, daB wir uns untereinander nie da­rUber unterhalten haben, nie darUber sprachen. Es hat jeden geschaudert und doch war sich jeder klar darUber, daB er es das nachste Mal wieder tun wUrde, wenn es befohlen wird und wenn es notwendig ist. - lch meine jetzt die Judenevakuierungen, die Ausrottung des jUdischen Volkes. Es

102 a

Notes pp. 63-66

gehort zu den Dingen, die man leicht ausspricht. - 'Das jUdische Yolk wird ausgerottet', sagt ein jeder Parteigenosse, 'ganz klar, steht in unserem Programm, Ausschaltung der Juden, Ausrottung, machen wir'. Und da kommen sie aIle an, die braven 80 Millionenen Deutschen, und jeder hat seinen anstandigen Juden. Es ist ja klar, die anderen sind Schweine, aber dies~eine ist ein prima Jude. Von allen, die so reden, hat keiner zugesehen, keiner hat es· durchgestanden. Von Euch werden die meisten wissen was es heiBt, wenn 100 Leichen beisammen liegen, wenn 500 daliegen oder wenn I 000 daliegen. Dies durchgehalten zu haben, und dabei - abge­sehen von AuBnahmen menschlicher Schwachen - anstandig geblieben zu sein, das hat uns hart gemacht. Dies ist ein niemals geschriebenes und nie­mals zu schreibendes Ruhmesblatt unserer Geschichte, denn wir wissen, wie schwer wir uns taten, wenn wir heute noch in jeder Stadt - bei den Bombenangriffen, bei den Lasten und bei den Entbehrungen des Krieges -noch die Juden als Geheimsaboteure, Agitatoren und Hetzer hatten. wir wUrden wahrscheinlich jetzt in das Stadium des Jahres 1916/1917 ge­kommen sein, wenn die Juden noch im deutschen Volkskorper saBen."

133. Himmler's letter, April 9, 1943 to the Chief of the Sipo-SD, Kal­tenbrunner, about the Korherr report on the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" : "lch habe den statistischen Bericht des Inspekteurs fUr Statistik Uber die Endlosung der Judenfrage erhalten. Ich halte diesen Bericht als allenfallsiges ~laterial fUr spatere Zeiten, und zwar zu Tarnungszwecken fUr recht gut. 1m Augenblick darf er weder veroffentlicht noch weitergegeben werden. Das Wichtigste ist mir nach wie vor, daB jetzt an Juden nach dem Osten abgefahren wird, was Uberhaupt nur menschenmaglich ist. In den kurzen Monatsmeldungen der Sicherheitspolizei will ich lediglich mitgeteilt bekommen, was monatlich abgefahren worden ist und was zu diesem Zeit­punkt noch an Juden Ubrig blieb."

134. Ordonance of October 9, 1942; in "VerfUgungen/Anordnungen/Bekannt­gaben", 1. Band - Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz.Eher Nachf. ,MUnchen, pp. 131-132 : "Vorbereitende MaBnahmen zur Endlosung der europaischen Judenfrage -GerUchte Uber die Lage der Juden im Osten. 1m Zuge der Arbeiten an der Endlosung der Judenfrage werden neuerdings innerhalb der Bevalkerung in verschiedenen Teilen des Reichsgebiets Erarterungen Uber 'sehr scharfe MaBnahmen' gegen die Juden besonders in den Ostgebieten angestellt. Die Feststellungen ergaben, daB solche Aus­fUhrugen - meist in entstellter und Ubertriebener Form - von Urlaubern der verschiedenen im Osten eingesetzten Verbande weitergegeben werden, die selbst Gelegenheit hatten, solche MaBnahmen zu beobachten. Es ist denkbar, daB nicht aIle Volksgenossen fUr die Notwendigkeit sol­cher MaBnahmen das genUgende Verstaridnis aufzubringen vermogen, besonders nicht die Teile der Bevolkerung, die keine Gelegenheit haben,sich aus eigener Anschauung ein Bild von dem bolschewistischen Greuel zu machen. Urn jeder GerUchtebildung in diesem Zusammmenhang, die oftmals bewuBt tendenziosen Charakter tragt, entgegentreten zu konnen, werden die nach­stehenden AusfUhrungen zur Unterrichtung Uber den derzeitigen Sachstand wiedergegeben. Seit rund 2000 Jahren wurde ein bisher vergeblicher Kampf gegen das Juden­tum gefUhrt. Erst seit 1933 sind wir darangegangen, nunmehr Mittel und Wege zu suchen, die eine vollige Trennung des Judentums vom deutschen Volkskorper ermaglichen. Die bisher durchgefUhrten Losungsarbeiten lassen sich im wesentlichen wie folgt unterteilen:

103

Notes pp. 1;6-68

I) ZurDckdrangung der Juden aus den einzelnen Lebensgebieten des deutschen Volkes.

Hier sollen die durch den Gesetzgeber erlassenen Gesetze das Fundament bilden, das die Gewahr dafUr bietet, aueh die kUnftigen Generationen vor einem etwaigen neuerlichen Uherfluten durch den Gegner zu schUtze. 2) Das Bestreben, den Gegner aus dem Reichsgbiet vOllig hinauszudrangen. In Anbetracht des dem deutschen Yolk zur VerfUgung stehenden, nur eng begrenzten Lebensraumes hoffte man, dieses Problem im wesentlichen durch Beschleunigung der Auswanderung der Juden zu losen. Seit Beginn des Krieges 1939 wurden diese Auswanderungsmoglichkeiten in zunehmendem MaBe geringer, zum anderen wuchs neben dem Lebensraum des deutschen Volkes sein Wirtschaftsraum stetig an, so daB heute in Anbe­tracht der groBen Zahl der in diesen Gebieten ansassigen Juden eine rest­lose ZurUckdrangung durch Auswanderung nicht mehr moglich ist. Da schon unsere nachste Generation diese Frage nicht mehr so lebensnah und auf Grund dec ergangenen Erfahrungen nicht mehr klar genug sehen wird und die nun einmal ins Rollen gekommene Angelegenheit nach Bereinigung drangt, muB das Gesamtproblem noch von der heutigen Generation gelost ? werden.

Es ist daher die vollige Verdrangung bzw. Ausscheidung der im europaischen Wirtschaftsraum ansassigen Millionen von Juden ein zwingendes Gebot im Kampf urn die Existenzsicherung des deutschen Volkes. Beginnend mit dem Reichsgebiet und Uberleitend auf die Ubrigen in die Endlosung einbezogenen europaischen Lander werden die Juden laufend nach dem Osten in groBe, zum Teil vorhandene, zum Teil noch zu errichten­de Lager transportiert, von wo aus sie entweder zur Arbeit eingesetzt oder noch weiter nach dem Osten verbracht werden. Die alten Juden sowie Juden mit hohen Kriegsauszeichnungen (E.K.I., Goldene Tapferkeits­medaille usw.) werden laufend nach der im Protektorat Bohmen und Mahren gelegenen Stadt Theresienstadt umgesiedelt. Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, daB diese teilweise sehr schwierigen Probleme im Interesse der endgUltigen Sicherung unseres Volkes nur mit rUcksichtsloser Harte geliist werden kiinnen."

135. Goebbels, "TagebUcher" , p. 142 ; (March 27, 1942) "Aus dem Generalgouvernement werden jetzt, bei Lublin beginnend, die Juden nach dem Osten abgeschoben. Es wird hier ein ziemlich barbarisches und nicht naher zu beschreibendes Verfahren angewandt, und von den Juden selbst bleibt nicht mehr viel Ubrig. 1m groBen kann man wohl feststellen, daB 60% davon liquidiert werden mUssen, wahrend nur noch 40% in die Arbeit eingesetzt werden konnen. Der ehemalige Gauleiter VOn Wien, der diese Aktion durchfUhrt, tut das mit ziemlicher Umsicht und auch mit einem Ver­fahren, das nicht allzu auffallig wirkt ... Keine andere Regierung und kein anderes Regime konnte die Kraft aufbringen, diese Frage generell zu losen. Auch hier ist der FUhrer der unentwegte Vorkampfer und WortfDhrer einer radikalen Losung, die nach der Lage der Dinge geboten ist und des­halb unausweichlich scheint. .. Die in den Stadten des Generalgouvernements frei werdenden Ghettos werden jetzt mit den aus dem Reich abgeschobenen Juden gefUllt, und hier solI sich dann nach einer gewissen Zeit der ProzeB erneuern."

104

Notes pp. 69-70

136. In the WilhelmstraBe-Trial in Nuremberg (see "Urteil"), passages on the directives given for the press (p.133) in respect to the anti Jewish operation, by the Reichspresseehef O. Dietrich in 1943 : "Am 5. Februar 1943 hieB es: 'Gleichwertig neben unserer anti-bolsche­wistischen Propaganda steht diejenige gegen das Judentum. Jedem Volks­genossen muB es zu unumstoBlichen Gewissheit werden, daB die Juden die unerbittlichten Feinde unseres Volkes sind und sowohl hinter dem Bolschewismus als aueh hinter den Plutokratien stehen. Die Behandlung dieses Themas gehort in den Rahmen der kDrzlich hier als notwendig bezeichneten Weckung von HaBgefUhlen ... In den Arbeiten, fUr die der 'Deutsche Wochendienst' umfangreiehe Anregungen und Themenvorschlage bringt, ist zu betonen, daB es im Judentum nicht, wie das in anderen WHkern der Fall ist, einzelne Verbrechen gibt, sondern daB das Judentum als Ganzes aus verbrecheriseher Wurzel stammt und seiner Anlage nach verbrecherisch ist. Die Juden sind kein Yolk wie andere Volker, sondern Trager einer zum Scheinvolk zusammengeschlossenen Erbkriminalitat .... Die Vernichtung des Judentums ist kein Verlust fUr die Menschheit, sondern fUr die Volker der Erde ebenso nUtzlich wie die Todesstrafe oder Sicher­ungsverwahrung fUr kriminelle Verbrecher'. Am 22. April 1943 stellte der Nachrichtendienst fest, daB die Juden fUr den Massenmord polnischer Offiziere in Katyn verantworlich seien; die Juden hitten die Absicht, die Volker Europas zu ermnrden und bei dem Katyn-Zwischenfall handle es sich nicht nur urn einen einzelnen HaBausbruch der Juden gegen Polen, sondern urn eine HaBpolitik der Juden gegen aIle Nicht-Juden ... Uber die Not­wendigkeit, aIle Widerstandskrafte des deutschen Volkes wachzurufen, ist im 'Zeitschriften-Dienst' schon mehrfach gesprochen worden. Der 'Deutsche Wochendienst' zeigt, wie es den Volkern gegangen ist, die das Judentum in seine Macht hekommen hat. Es kann dabei an das Wort des FUhrers geknUpft werden, daB es am Ende dieses Krieges nur Uberlebende und Vernichtete geben wird. Indem auf die feste Absicht des Judentums zur Vernichtung aller Deutschen hingewiesen wird, ist der Wille zur Selbsthehauptung zu starken."

137. Conversation of Hitler and Ribbentrob with Horthy, April 17, 1943 (passage on the solution of the Jewish problem) : "Der FUhrer beschrieh sod ann Horthy die deutschen RationierungsmaBnahmen, die in voller Ordnung durchgefUhrt wUrden ... Horthy bemerkte dazu, daB diese Probleme fUr Ungarn sehr schwierig seien. - Der FUhrer erwiderte, daB daran die Juden schuld seien ... - Auf die Gegenfrage Horthys, was er denn mit den Juden machen solIe, nachdem er Ihnen so ziemlich aIle Lebensmoglichkeiten entzogen habe - erschlagen konne er sie doch nicht erklarte der RAM (ReichsauBenminister), da~ die Juden entweder vernichtet oder in Konzentrationslager gebracht werden mUBten. Eine andere Moglich­keit gehe es nieht ... 1m AnschluB hieran kam der FUhrer auf di~ Stadt NUrnberg zu sprechen, die 400 Jahre lang keine Juden bei sich geduldet hatte, wahrend FUrth die Juden bei sich aufgenommen hatte. Das Ergebnis sei eine groBe BIDte NUrnbergs und ein volliger Niedergang FUrths ge­wesen ... Wo die Juden sich selhst Uherlassen waren, wie z.B. in Polen, herrsche grausamstes Elend und Verkommenheit. Sie seien eben reine Para­siten. Mit diesen Zustanden habe man in Polen grUndlich aufgeraumt. Wenn die Juden dort nicht arbeiten wollten, wUrden sie erschossen. Wenn sie nicht arbeiten kiinnten, miiBten sie verkommen. Sie waren wie Tuberkel­bazillen zu behandeln, an denen sich ein gesunder Karper anstecken konne. Das ware nicht grausam, wenn man bedenke, daB sogar unschuldige Natur­geschopfe wie Hasen und Rehe getotet werden mUBten, damit kein Schaden entstehe. Weshalh sollte man die Bestien, die uns den Bolschewismus bringen wollen, mehr schonen?"

103 a

Notes pp. 71-72

138. Article of Streicher in "Der Stlirmer" of November 4, 1943 ,entitled "Jlidische Neuordnung" (passage on the affirmation of the extermination of the Jews by the Reich) : "Auch die Juden nahmen den Hinlibergang in das flinfte Kriegsjahr zum AnlaB einer besinnlichen Betrachtung ... In der Schweiz ist es das 'Israelitische Wochenblatt', das in seiner Ausgabe vom 27.8.1943 am Ende des vierten Kriegsjahres eine Betrachtung vom Stapel lieB ... -... Das Schweizer Judenblatt schreibt weiter: 'Sozusagen verschwunden sind die Juden Europas, mit Ausnahme von England und den unbedeutenden Gemeinden in den wenigen neutral en Landern. Das jlidische Reservoir des Ostens, das imstande war die Assimilationserscheinungen des Westens auszugleichen besteht nicht m~hr.' - Das ist kein Judenschwindel. Es ist wirklich Wahrheit, daB die Juden'sozusagen' aus Europa verschunden sind und daB das jlidische 'Reservoir des Ostens', aus dem die Judenseuche seit Jahrhunderten liber die europaischen Volker gekommen ist, aufgehort hat zu bestehen. Wenn das Schweizer Judenblatt hehuupten will, daB die Juden eine solche Entwicklung nicht in Rechnung gestellt hatten, als sie die Volker in den zweiten Weltkrieg stlirzten, so ist dies ihnen zu ? glauben. Aber der Flihrer des deutschen Volkes hat schon zu Beginn des Krieges das nun gekommene pr'Ophezeit. Er sagte, daB der zweite Weltkrieg die verschlingenwerde, die ihn haben wollten. - ... Man vernichte als~ die Ursache, den Juden, und die Welt ist von Judenfeindschaft befreit. Es ist begreiflich, daB die Juden eine solche Losung nicht wlinschen. Sie verlangen vielmehr die Ausrottung jender Nichtjuden, die durch das Vorhandensein der Juden zwangslaufig zu Judengegnern geworden sind ... - So nun wissen wir es, was man im Volk Juda von der Neuordnung der Welt erwartet: die Entrechtung der nichtjlidischen Volker und Aufzwingung einer radikalen Judenherrsehaft. Wer angesiehts solchen jlidisehen Be­kennens noeh nicht begreifen sollte, daB es bei dem Kampf, den wir als Deutsche in diesem zweiten Weltkrieg zu bestehen haben, wirklich urn unser Letztes, urn unser ~acktes Leben geht, dem ist wahrlich nicht mehr zu helfen."

139. Interrogatory of Eichmann during the preliminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage concerning Himmler's directives for the operation of the deportation of the Jews from Hungary) Eichmann I, p. 3230 : " ... Die Richtlinien waren so mannigfaltig gewesen und so verschieden gewesen, daB man sie damals schon immer sich eigens heraussuchen muBte; und heute bin ich nicht mehr in der Lage, die einzelnen Richtlinien zu unterscheiden. 1I

140. Interrogatory of Eichmann for the preliminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage on the full significance of the real meaning of the "final solution to the Jewish question") Eichmann I, pp. 3185-3187 "Eichmann: Wie das zum SchluB dann gewesen ist, Herr Hauptmann, das weiB ich nicht. lch weiB nur so viel, das zum SchluB - unter dem SchluB mochte ich verstehen gegen Ende 43-44, 45, da - es ist zwar libertrieben, wenn ich das - wenn ich mich so ausdrlicke, - sangen's ja aIle Vogel vom Dach bereits."

104 a

REPLY TO THE NEO-NAZI FALSIFICATION

OF HISTORICAL FACT'S CONCERNING

THE HOLOCAUST by Georges WELLERS

?

In the long series of crimes and atrocities of which the National­Socialist regime is guilty, the fate reserved for the Jews and the Gypsies occupies a totally exceptional place. In fact, no other category of vic­tims of this regime was collectively and intentionally condemned to an extermination in which neither age nor physical nor intellectual weakness of the individuals saved them from a violent death. In addition, at no other epoch and in no other place was an undertaking of this nature so deliberately conceived and so systematically executed as in Nazi Germany in the twentieth century. It is this crime which made the Hitlerian regime particularly odious; and those nostalgic of the latter, powerless to justify the crime, are reduced to denying it. It is essentially a question of two aspects of the problem which shed a stark and insup­portable light on the Nazi regime: on the one hand, the invention of a means such as the gas chambers of putting to death an unprecedented number of human beings, and on the other hand the exploitation of the latter on a gigantic scale which brought about several million deaths in the course of but three years.

There is a whole literature (28) the task of which is to disparage the unbearable reality. With the years, its volume increases, its diffusion widens and its agents express themselves in French, German, English, Spanish or Arabic.

The general "philosophy" of this campaign is exceedingly simple: the existence of the gas chambers and the six million victims are declared to be lies entirely invented by world Judaism after the war. The prin­cipal motive of this colossal fraud would be the desire to extract from conquered Germany a monetary compensation which would be greater in proportion to the gravity of the wrongs attributed to Germany. This world-wide plot would be inspired and supported by the Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris, the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem, the Jewish Historical Institute of Warsaw, the State Mu­seum of Auschwitz, the Institute of Contemporary History of Munich, (4) etc. The means employed by the conspirers would consist of false accusations proferred by European Jews who survived the Second World War, of declarations just as false extracted under torture and martyri­zation from the elite of the SS of the Nazi regime (the very essence of the Aryan race) and, finally, in the falsification of documents of the Nazi regime the purpose of which would be to wrongly condemn it.

Paradoxically, the foundations for the justification of Nazism through the refutation of its crimes were laid down not by a former Nazi nor even by a German, but by a Frenchman and, what is particularly curious, by a former resistant arrested in France by the Gestapo and deported to the camp of Buchenwald and then to that of Dora. The person in question is Paul Rassinier, author of a series of works (38 to 42) dedi­cated to the rehabilitation of the SS and to a lively and astute polemic the purpose of which is to demonstrate on the one hand the absence of valid proofs of the existence of gas chambers intended to exterminate people and, on the other hand, that the number of dead among the Jewish victims had been infinitely inferior to what was said.

107

The paths marked out by Rassinier are faithfully followed by his imitators who constantly refer to the master, citing him as a "classic" who has "definitively" demonstrated this or that. More and more often, the pupils go beyond the master. For example, if Rassinier ends up by admitting that there perhaps existed gas chambers for industrial purposes in certain concentration camps, and that perhaps some rare mad SS had used them to kill Jews, a certain F.J. Scheidel (47), J.G. Burg (7), E. Aretz (3), Thies Christophersen (9), R. Harwood (23), A.R. Butz (8) affirm quite simply that the gas chambers are a calumny. In the same way, whereas Rassinier claims that the number of Jewish victims of the "final solution" was a minimum of 500,000 and a maximum of 1,500,000, Butz (8) affirms that it did not exceed a million; and Harwood (23) writes that it must "be in the order of size of thousands and not millions. " Schlegel (48) finds" at the maximum" three to four hundred thousand, M. Roeder (44) two hundred thousand including natural deaths. Finally, for a certain R. Faurisson, everything is crystal clear:. "The time is ripe," it is the "imposture of genocide" (21). ~

My remarks are not at all addressed to the fanatical authors and propagandists of the pro-Nazi campaign, for there is no hope of persuad­ing them of anything whatever. Their unique concern is to rehabilitate the Nazi regime at all costs and to cleanse of all smears the "German honourj" identified with that of National-Socialism and its worst ser­vants. Their production does not stem from an historical school but from a vulgar political propaganda from the school of Grebbels where all the means of attaining the purpose designated in advance are good and recommended.

On the contrary, my observations are addressed to men and women who are quite sincere but who ignore the real facts and who, for. this reason, risk lending an ear to the disparagements and unfounded affirma­tions of the apologists of Nazism.

My account will be limited to the two essential problems designated above: the use of gas chambers with a view to the massacre of the Jews, and the nwnber of victims.

108

Part I The Existence of Gas Chambers

Our knowledge concerning the gas chambers is based on three sources of information: 1) the archives of the Nazi administrations; 2) the statements of particularly qualified members of the SS and 3) the numer­ous declarations of former prisoners of camps such as Auschwitz Belzec or Treblinka.

Naturally, the part of personal accounts in this information is consider-able. Among them, a particular attention must be accorded to those given before the end of the war or during the first years of the post-war period, when memories were still keen and precise and when the absur­dity of the fable of the Jewish plot to obtain German reparations is obvious. At that time, neither the State of Israel nor the Federal Republic of Germany, the two parties to the future agreements (1), had yet come into existence.

However, an exception to this rule must be made for what concerns the "evidence" of Thies Christophersen. This is not because the docu­ment is especially serious or convincing, but rather because the author is the sale "witness" among the apologists of Nazism who even so knew the camp of Auschwitz a little and, above all, because the exploitation of his story for the last five years has become the immutable rule for all of the other neo-Nazi polemists. This account dates from 1973, or twenty-eight years after the war.

A: The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz

It is perhaps not useless for the clarity of this expose to briefly recall the essential part of our current knowledge on the subject of the gas ·chambers at Auschwitz and which is denied as a whole.

The camp of Auschwitz was originally and for the first two years of its existence (May 1940-spring 1942) a camp which resembled many

109

THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

others, and its population was exclusively Polish. In 1942 this camp, later called "Auschwitz I," was divided in two parts by the construction of a new center three kilometers from the first and which soon took on size, becoming Birkenau or "Auschwitz II." In 1943 a third camp was built eight kilometers away from the first and took the name of "Buna­Monowitz or Auschwitz III." Parallel to this, thirty-nine smaller camps or" commandos" swarmed out in the region occupying a territory of a radius of nearly thirty-five kilometers.

Beginning in the spring of 1942, the convoys of Jewish deportee~ coming from all of the occupied countries and disembarking at Birkenau resulted in the fact that among the internees the number of Jews soon became heavily dominant.

From the first period on, the mother camp, "Auschwitz I," was provided with a crematorium, whereas until the spring of 1943 no other camp nor commando had one. In autumn 1941, during the first exper­iments of gassing, a cellar of Block 11 at Auschwitz I was fitted out mp a temporary gas chamber and the bodies of the victims of these experi­ments were burnt in the crematory oven. Following these tests, in 1942 two houses abandoned by peasants and situated in a wood at Birkenau were transformed by the camp's own means into gas chambers and known as "bunkers." A dependency of the crematorium of Auschwitz I was. also occasionally used as a gas chamber. There was still no crema­torium at Birkenau, and the bodies of the gassed were at first buried in the vicinity of the gas chambers and later burnt in vast open trenches. In the spring of 1943, on the territory of Birkenau, the construction of four modern and perfected plants designated by the vague terms of "Crematoriums I, II, III and IV", was completed. they were built by industrial enterprises exterior to the camp, and each was composed of three parts: an area for the crematory ovens, an area for the undressing

of the victims and a gas chamber. Henceforth, the "bunkers" were used only in case of necessity, as were the trenches for incinerating bodies. Neither the camp of Buna-Monowitz nor any of the thirty-nine commandos of Auschwitz ever possessed crematory ovens or gas cham­bers.

The "selection "of the victims was effected in two manners: on the one hand, upon arrival of the trains and without even enrolment and on the other hand following periodical selections among the registered internees of the camps and the commandos brought to Birkenau for execution.

On October 7, 1944, Crematory III was out of order following a bloody revolt of the prisoners of the "Sonderkommando" responsible for its cleaning and maintenance. In January 1945, with the approach of the Russian army, the four plants were dynamited by the SS.

Further on, we shall see the foundations of our knowledge, but let us say immediately that since 1973 it is denied by constant reference to the "testimony" of Christophersen who speculates on the fact that he had personally known the "camp of Auschwitz" where, he says, he

110

The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz

never saw a gas chamber (9). As a matter of fact, arriving at Auschwitz in January 1944 and attached to a small commando, "Ralsko," located a few kilometers distant from Auschwitz I and where certain phantas­magoric "research" in botany was carried on, he had the occasion to visit another commando, "Bielitz," as well as the camp of Auschwitz I; and he went once to Birkenau to take charge of a hundred prisoners attached to Ralsko.

We concede without the slightest difficulty that there were no gas chambers at Bielitz, nor at Auschwitz I (in January 1944). As for Birkenau, a few documents from German archives are amply sufficient to judge the value of Christophersen's declarations.

1. A Few Documents from Archives

If the easy transformation of a cellar of Block 11 of Auschwitz I or of two cottages in the middle of a wood at Birkenau into a gas chamber could be accomplished by the artisanry of the camp itself, the construc­tion of a large complex of industrial nature, one part of which consisted of a crematory oven destined to burn up human corpses, could not be effected without the collaboration of specialists taken from outside of the camp personnel. The construction of the crematoriums I, II, III and IV at Birkenau was in fact entrusted to the firm Topf and Sons of Erfurt, long-time specialists in the construction of crematoriums. Moreover, the fitting out of gas chambers of extraordinary dimensions and conceived for operating at an accelerated rate of speed necessitated ventilation equipment which was not at all common and for which the opinion of the chemists and technicians producing "Zyklon B" was important. The specialists of the company "Degesch," supplier of the Wehrmacht in "Zyklon B," those of the firm "Testa," their concession­ary, and those of "Heerdtlinger," their sub-contractor, were consulted. An abundant correspondance was exchanged between these companies. It exists and was gathered together at the time of the trial of the industrialists before the American Military Tribunal which took place at Nuremberg between October 1947 and April 1949.

Here, as an example, is what one reads about gas chambers at Ausch­witz in the following three letters: on December 24, 1942, Heerdtlingler wrote Testa a letter which mentions "the installation of a gas chamber" (" ... die Erstellung einer Begasungskammer") (8), following which the Degesch wrote on December 31, 1942, to Testa that it was a question of "the making up of chambers using cyanhydric acid" (" ... die Bearbeitung der Blausaurekammern") (in the plural, GW) (17) and on January 2, 1943, the Testa answered Degesch concerning the "disinfection in the plants for gassing by cyanhydric acid" (" ... Entwesung mit Blausaure dienende Begansungsanlagen") (17).

111

THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

And here is a letter the contents of which are ve.ry eloquent: (2, p.336; 49, p.145).

SS-Vstuf (F) Kirschneck B.V.3 Copy January 29, 1943 Bftgb. No: 2250/43/BIIL (Order) Objet: Crematorium II, Condition of the Building Reference: Telegram of SS-WVHA, No: 2648 of 1-28-43 Enclosure: 1 report of extermination To the Chief of the Amtsgruppe C, SS-Brigadeftihrer and Major-General of the Waffen-SS Dr. Engineer KAMMLER Berlin-Liechterfelde-West. Vnter dem Eichen 126-135.

Crematorium II has, with the exception of a few details of construction, been completed thanks to the use of all available people, despite immense difficulties and freezing weather, by day and night shifts. The ovens were lighted in the presence of the chief engineer, M. Prtifer of the firm Topf u. S6hne, Erfurt, which was in charge of their construction; and they function perfectly. One has not yet been able to plaster the concrete ceiling of the body cellar (Leichenkeller) because of the action of the frost. That is, however, without importance given that the gassing cellar (Verga- ? sungskeller) can be used for this purpose. Because of the unavailability of railway carriages, the company of Topf u. S6hne was not able to deliver on time the ventilating apparatus ordered by the central management for buildings. After the arrival of this equip­ment, the incorporation of it will be begun at once so that one may foresee that it' will be completely in service by 2-20-43. Enclosed is a report of the engineer-inspector of the firm Topf u. S6hne.

The Chief of the Group for Constructions of the Waffen-SS and of the

SS-Hauptsturmftihrer Distribution: 1 SS-Ustuf Janish v. Kirschneck

Police at Auschwitz

1 File (Crematorium dossier) Certified copy Pousth (?) SS-Ustuf (F.)

It is thus grotesque to claim, like the "witness," Christophersen, that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz. And it is his "testimony" that is henceforth considered as decisive by the neo-Nazi literature.

It is true that the correspondance between the industrialists speaks of gas chambers in view of "disinfection," and the letter of the Chief of the Group for Constructions at Auschwitz does not stipulate the destina­tion of these gas chambers where, however, the "Krematorium" is situated in the vicinity of a "Leichenkeller" and a "Vergasungskeller." This is not at all surprising, forit is a question of a hermetically sealed State Secret where euphemisms are obligatory in the entire Nazi administration. The accused industrialists claimed that for them it was the "disinfection" which was in question. The Tribunal did not agree with their version of the matter. But what is important to us is that Christophersen does not say that at Birkenau he saw gas chambers destined for disinfection. He says that he did not discover any gas chambers at all.

This permits an evaluation of his account, of his intelligence, the faith­fulness of his memory ofter twenty-eight years or ... his dishonesty.

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2. Declarations of Members of the SS

On the subject of the camp at Auschwitz we are in possession of two fundamental testimonies of two particularly qualified members of the SS.

A certain ex-SS-Unterscharfiihrer Pery Broad was captured on May 6, 1945, in the British zone of occupation. A citizen' of Brazil and who spoke English very well, he became an interpreter for the British authorities. In 1945 he drew up a lengthy memoir 'concerning the camp of Auschwitz which he entered in 1942 and where he was attached to the "Political Section" ("Politische Abteilung") until the liberation of the camp in January 1945 (6). On July 13, 1945, he gave this memoir to the authorities of the British Intelligence Service. On December 14, 1945, at Minden, he made a declaration under oath which is a sort of abridged versio:o. of his memoir (1S). These documents were not render­ed public and remained unknown to the International Court which judged Grering and his consorts in 1945-46. During the last trimester of 1947, when the American Military Tribunal opened proceedings against the German industrialists implicated in the deliveries of large quantities of "Zyklon B" to the camp of Auschwitz, these documents were produced. It is thus that the declaration of Broad of December 14, 1945, was translated into English only on September 29, 1947, nearly two years later. On October 20, 1947, at Nuremberg, Broad deposed new testi­mony which was translated into English on November 20 of that year (20). In all of these testimonies and declarations, Broad relates the procedures of mass murders in the gas chambers of Auschwitz with some details when compared to his memoir of July 13.

In 1947, Broad was released by the English and worked in diverse private companies without being bothered until April 30, 1959, the date at which he was accused in the trial of the former SS of Auschwitz which was held in Frankfurt from December 20, 1963, to August 20, 1965 (29, p.537; 30 p. 372). In the course of this trial, the memoir of 1945 was presented to Broad, who acknowledged being its author. He was clearly surprised and embarrassed, for in his memoir he very cle­verly represented himself as innocent if not a victim of fate; whereas he accused his former colleagues, presently his co-defendants, of atroci­ties. Discussing certain details concerning the latter, he retracted nothing of his account of the events and evoked neither torture nor pres­sure from the British in 1945. It is from this time on that his memoir finally became really known to the public and to historians.

In his memoir Broad described the first temporary arrangement of a place for experimenting with murder by means of the gas "Zyklon B" in the cellars of Block 11 of Auschwitz (6, pp. 61-S), the first permanent and "home-made" gas chambers installed in the two abandoned farms at Birkenau (Auschwitz II) and designated in the jargon of the camp as "Bunkers I and II," (6, pp. 69-7S) and finally, the construction at Birkenau of four enormous complexes with undressing room, gas cham­ber and crematorium, designated by the numbers I, II, III and IV. He precisely described their characteristics and their functioning (6, pp.SO-

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THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

4) as well as the procedure of the "selection" of Jewish victims upon arrival of the convoys, the memorable extermination of the Gypsies in the gas chambers and the revolt of the "Sonderkommando" in 1944 (6, pp. 86-91).

The other essential SS witness is of the highest rank. On March 11, 1946 (ten months after Broad), Rudolf Hoess was

arrested in Schleswig-Holstein, in the British zone of occupation, where he had been employed under a false name as an agricultural worker. Hoess, SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer (Lieutenant-Colonel), was the founder of the camp of Auschwitz and its first Commandant (May 20, 1940 to November 11, 1943), the inventor in 1941 of the utilization of the insecticide "Zy klon B" as a means of mass extermination, builder of all the gas chambers, temporary or permanent, at Auschwitz I and at Auschwitz II (Birkenau). After his arrest, he was brought to Minden, near Hanover, still in the British zone, where he made a sworn statement on March 14, 1946 (32, p. 152). Then he was transferred to Nurem­berg, where the International Tribunal jUdging Geering and his associate~ was in session, and he there made a second sworn statement on Apnl 5, 1946 (32, p. 159). While drafting them, Hoess was completely ignorant of the memoir and the declarations of his ex-subordinate Broad which had been written several months earlier. The International Tribunal was equally unaware of them and, in addition, cited the testi­mony of Hoess in its verdict. It is therefore evident that the two witnesses were independent from each other. However, with regard to the gas chambers at Auschwitz, their testimonies coincide.

Throughout his two statements of 1946, Hoess indeed related the genesis of the camp of Auschwitz and his visit to Treblinka, where the killing was done in gas chambers filled with the exhaust fumes from a Diesel engine. Hoess did not find the latter adequate to the task, which is why he decided to use "Zyklon B." He considered that it had important advantages and enumerated them. This said, he mentioned the temporary premises for gassing at Auschwitz I, the two farms at Birkenau transformed into "Bunkers," then the construction of four big" modern" plants, also at Birkenau, which each consisted of an un­dressing room, a gas chamber and a crematorium. He gave the descrip­tion of the functioning of these plants after the" selection" of victims upon arrival of the convoys. In short, his declarations contain all of the elements that the account of Broad dedicated to the operation of the gas chambers: their number, their topographical position, their charac­teristics, their functioning.

From Nuremberg, Hoess was transferred to Poland at the disposal of the Supreme Tribunal sitting in Warsaw. He was judged between March 11 and April 2, 1947, and condemned to death. He was executed on April 16 on the very territory of the former camp of Auschwitz I. Dur­ing the proceedings of his trial in Poland, he wrote a copious autobiogra­phy. The French translation contains nearly 250 pages (24).

This long account consists of a great quantity of personal information, considerations of all kinds, opinions on a wide variety of subjects and,

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above all, a very important amount of information concerning the camp of Auschwitz. Among the latter, that relating to the gas chambers interests us essentially. This autobiography contains all of the essential elements of the previous declarations made on this subject by Hoess to the English, and those of the account and the declarations of Broad: the fitting out of the "experimental" gas chambers at Auschwitz I (24, p. 222), the fitting out of the abandoned farms in Birkenau as "bunkers" (24, pp. 174, 229), the construction of four "modern" and perfected plants at Birkenau (24, pp. 235, 240, 245), their characteristics, their fl..'Iflctioning on "Zyklon B," the "selections" of the victims (24, pp. 178, 233, 237), the work of the" Sonderkommandos," etc. Written entirely from memory, this autobiography contains certain obvious and inevitable errors; and, of course, there is some information which is not to be found in the account of Broad and vice versa. That is a supplemen­tary proof of the absence of all connivence between the two men. In fact, the contrary would be highly suspicious, particularly when one of the men was a simple SS-Unterscharfiihrer responsible for a single bureau, even such an important one as the "Political Section," and the other was an SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer, commandant and creator of the largest Nazi concentrationary complex.

It remains to be added that it seems probable that the statements m~de by Broad in 1945 were equally unknown to the Supreme Tribunal of Warsaw, and thus to Hoess at the time of his detention in Poland and his trial. As for the statements of Broad in 1947, they were made several months after the trial and execution of Hoess.

Finally, much later, at the time of the trials of Auschwitz, for example, that of Frankfurt in 1963-65, eight former members of the SS examined as witnesses recognized having seen with their own eyes the gas cham­bers at Birkenau in operation. (These witnesses were R. Bock, G. Hess, K. Hoblinger, Dr. K. Morgen, H. Stroch, F. Hofmann and Dr. G. Wiebeck). None of the defendants denied their existence, but only his personal participation in their use (29).

But the Neo-Nazi propagandists, from Paul Rassinier to those of the present day, still repeat one after the other that the statements of Hoess concerning the gas chambers are false or absurd and without value. It is claimed that their content was obtained by horrible tortures to which the unfortunate person would have been subjected. No one ever men­tions Pery Broad, who confirms the statements of Hoess in their entirety, and whose memoir of 1945 had already been made public in 1947 at the time of the trial of the German industrialists by the American Military Tribunal, in 1949 at the Assize Court of Frankfurt and in 1963-65 at the time of the trial of Auschwitz. As to the tortures to which Hoess was submitted, there is no serious indication concerning them. It is to pre­sent that tough old SS, that "glorious" representative of the elite of the "race of Lords," a man of unshakable courage, as a cowardly individual who had collapsed under the ordeal and was ready to betray the regime to which he had sworn eternal fidelity with neither breach nor compro­mise.

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THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

3. Statements of Former Prisoners at Auschwitz

We are currently in possession of at least nine declarations written prior to the end of the war. They were therefore made before even the maddest minds could have conceived of the so-called "Jewish world conspiracy," the objective of which was to extort fabulous sums of money from Germany.

These statements are those of five persons who escaped from the camp of Auschwitz and of four others who died there before its libera­tion in January 1945.

The escapees are two Slovak Jews who got away from Birkenau on April 7, 1944, two others escaped on May 27, 1944, and a non-Jewish Polish officer who had arrived at Auschwitz on March 2S, 1942, and remained there for nearly two years. After having left Auschwitz, these five former prisoners were able to transmit to the United States accounts of what they had seen and personally experienced. In ~oven1-ber 1944 (five months before the end of the war), the Executive Office of the War Refugee Board of the President of the United States published them, adding that their "names will not momentarily be revealed in the interest of their own security" and that "the Office has every reason to believe that these reports provide an exact picture of the horrible things which are going on in these camps" (S).

It is known today that the first two escapees are Rudolf Vrba and Fred Wetzler. The former now lives in Canada and related the details of his escape and the story of his report, published anonymously in 1944, in a book which appeared in 1963 (S1). The latter now lives in Slo­vakia. The two escapees of May 1944 are Czeslaw Mordowiz and Ernst Rosin. On the other hand, I ignore the name of the Polish commandant. Wetzler was deported on April 13, 1942, from Sered in Slovakia directly to Auschwitz. Vrba was deported from Novaky in Slovakia to Maidanek and was then transferred on June 27, 1942, to Auschwitz. They thus were familiar with Auschwitz-Birkenau for nearly two years, as was the Polish officer. The date of the arrival at Auschwitz of the two escapees of May 27 is not given, but it is certainly prior to April 7, 1944. Their report was received in Switzerland via Slovakia. then sent to the USA.

These fiv~ reports are very rich in information of all kinds. We shall, however, retain from this mass of particulars only what is directly rele­vant to the problem of the gas chambers. Each report speaks of them.

Wetzler, who knew Birkenau at its beginnings, described the first systematic selections upon arrival of the convoys, after which those selected were sent without other formality from the siding directly to the birch-wood forest (at Birkenau, G.W.) where they were administered the gas and where they were incinerated" (S, p. 14). He spoke of the first "Sonderkommando" (S, p. 1S). "At the end of February 1943, a new modern establishment of crematory ovens and gas chambers was inaugurated at Birkenau," he wrote. "The administration of the gas

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The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz

and the burning of the bodies in the birch-wood forest was stopped, and everything now took place in the four crematory ovens specially built." ( ... ) "At present," he continued, "there are four crematory ovens in operation at Birkenau, two large ones, I and II, and two small ones, III and IV. Those of type I and II are composed of three parts: (A) the room with the ovens, (B) the big hall, (C) the gas chamber." (S, p. 17). He then gave the description of the procedure of gassing which may thus be summarized: the victims were brought into the hall (B) where they undressed, then went into the gas chamber (C) where they were killed with "Zyklon B". Finally, their corpses were trans­ported to the ovens (A) and incinerated. He added: "The crematory ovens I and IV operate on nearly the same principles ... " (S, p. 17).

Vrba devoted a third of his short report to the camp of Mai'danek and the rest to Birkenau. He simply spoke several times of those who were "executed by gas." (5, p. 29-30).

The report of the two Jews who had escaped on May 27, 1944, related the effect produced at Birkenau by the escape of Vrba and Wetzler seven weeks before, emphasized the "selections" (S, p. 34), the "executions by gas" (S , p.34) and the "incinerations." They added, concerning the very numerous convoys of Hungarian Jews who arrived at Auschwitz in the spring of 1944:

"It was necessary to increase the size of the "Special Commando" to 600 men and, after two or three days, it was enlarged to 800... Three crematory ovens operated day and night (at this time the fourth was being repaired), and as the capacity of the ovens was not sufficient, large pits thirty meters long by fifteen meters wide were dug out ... in the "Birchenwald" where bodies were burned night and day" (5, p. 34).

Three-quarters of the report of the Polish Commander was devoted to the fate of the non-Jewish Poles who during the first two years of the existence of Auschwitz were the only prisoners. However, a special chapter of it described the destiny of the Jews: "selections" (S, pp. 46-48) after which "all those who were not fit to work were brought to the Birch Forest (Trzinski) and executed by means of hydrocyanic gas (S, p. 48) in "shanties with special gases" after having been obliged to "entirely undress" and go into "the building until it was completely full. " Then, when "all the exits were hermetically sealed ... " specially trained units of the SS cast hydrocyanic bombs through the ventilation shafts ... " (S, p. 48-49). Later "the crematory ovens had been finished" ( ... ) and "the execution by gas and the incineration took place at record speed. The arrivals of corpses became so great that one was occasion­ally obliged to resort to the old method of incineration in the open air" (S, p. 49) ..

Before proceeding farther in our study, it is perhaps useful to recall that all of these reports were edited at the time when the outcome of the war was uncertain, the landing in Normandy had not yet taken place, when in the East there was stiII fighting on the Russian soil and in all Europe Jews were dying en masse or hiding to escape death. The future reparations on the part of the future and unforeseeable Federal Germany negociated by the inexistant and unimaginable State of Israel

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THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

certainly did not enter the imagination of even the mad among the Jews. The four following accounts were uncovered in the course of the

excavations effected on the territory of Birkenau where, before dying, their authors, all members of the Sonderkommandos, buried them at different periods. AlI of these missives from beyond the tomb present a very great documentary interest, but as sources of information concern­ing our subject-the gas chambers- their importance, as we shall see, is uneven.

The oldest find was made in February 1945, shortly after the libera­tion of the camps of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945. It is a letter in French dated November 6, 1944, that a certain Chaim Herman wrote for his wife and his daughter (22). This letter was found buried in a bottle near a crematorium at Birkenau. The author, of Polish origin, indicated that he was deported from Drancy on Marcq. 2, 1943; and his name does in fact appear on the deportation list n° 49 of March 2, 1943. This husband and father was worried about the dangers whiCll. menaced his family who remained in France and wrote that he himself could only count on a miracle to survive. Nevertheless, he obviously avoided unduly traumatizing his wife and his daughter by the description of his misfortunes and limited himself only to saying that upon the arrival of his convoy a hundred persons were selected to remain in the camp and the rest went sent "to the gases and then to the ovens" (" ... der Rest kam ins Gas und dann in die Of en "). The author was attached to the Sonderkommando as a bearer of corpses.

A little later, March 5, 1945, an aluminum bottle was dug up on the grounds of Crematorium II at Birkenau. It contained a letter dated September 6, 1944, signed by a certain Salmen Gradowski and a note­book the pages of which were covered with the same writing as the letter and the text of which stops in the middle of a sentence (22). Gradowski was a Jew of Polish origin who was deported to Birkenau in the beginning of January 1943 with six members of his family, all of whom were dead after the selection upon arrival. He described with precision and details the extreme difficulty of the conditions of the long journey as well as the selection, the meaning of which completely escaped those concerned. He himself was part of the Sonderkommando, and he mentioned the four modern crematoriums.

Much richer in information concerning the gas chambers at Birkenau is the text dug up in the summer of 1952 on the grounds of Crematory II. It is a notebook twenty-one pages of which are covered with text. The first four are devoted to events of the camp of Belzec, whereas the seventeen others relate to Auschwitz. The whole was written in 1943-44 at Birkenau. The last date figuring in the text is November 26, 1944. The author of this highly readable account is unknown, but it is evident that he had been at Auschwitz for a long time and that he was part of a Sonderkommando (22). The author described not without

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The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz

talent several moving scenes which took place at different periods in the "undressing room" (Auskleideraum" or "Entkleidungsraum") and in the "Bunker" or the "Gasbunker" or the "Gaskammer" and which reveal the courageous attitudes of the victims confronted with death. These scenes recall certain descriptions which appear in the autobiogra­phy of Hoess and in the memoir of Broad in 1945. The author specified, moreover, that the walls of Crematory III (damaged at the time of the revolt of the Sonderkommando on October 7, 1944, G.W.) were knocked down on October 14; that on October 20 the documents, the collections of maps, the death certificates, etc., were taken away in two little taxis and a camp vehicule to be burnt; that "today," November 25, the dismantlement of Crematory I was begun, followed by that of Crematory II carefully conserving the material used "zum Vergas en von Menschen;" he mentioned the two other crematories and said that he had buried other manuscripts on the grounds of Crematories I and II. He ended by saying that one hundred and seventy last men of his Sonder­kommando were to leave their quarters, and he added that "we are sure that they will lead us to death."

Finally, on October 17, 1962, a glass jar was found in the vicinity of Crematorium II of Birkenau. It contained sixty-five sheets of paper covered with writing, a part of which was more or less damaged and thus difficult to read.

The author of this text is a certain Salme Lewental, of Polish origin, who arrived at Auschwitz on December 10, 1942, and was immediately attached to the Sonderkommando taking care of Bunkers I and nand the pits for incineration of the bodies, as that was done before the construction of perfected crematoriums (22). The author spoke numer­ous times of the "Bunkers," where the men, women and children "vergast wurden" or "kommen im Gas" or "in der Todesbunker flihren und si mit Gas ersticken" or "ins Gas kam" or "Alle Menschen aus dem Gasbunker waren herausgeschleppt," "vergasene Menschen," etc.; of the manner in which" Zyklon B" was introduced into the gas cham­bers, the state of mind of the members of the'Sonderkommandos and of the bloody revolt of October 7, 1944. Concerning the latter, he gave the names of his comrades among whom was Salmen Gradowski, the author of the manuscript of which we have spoken above.

After the end of the war, a few rare survivors among the members of the Sonderkommandos testified confirming the written documents known following the excavations. They were Janowski as of April 13, 1945; Bacon, Buki, Filip and Don Paisikovic, Filip Mueller, the bro­thers Shlomo and Avram Dragon, Rosemblum, Silbergerg, Drs. S. Bendel, M. Nyiszli and A. Lettich. Each of them gave numerous supplementary and precious details. There probably is not a single account of a former prisoner of Auschwitz which does not speak of the gas chambers of Birkenau, for their existence was notorious.

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THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

B: The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

Birkenau (Auschwitz II) was not the only camp where there were gas chambers for the extermination of the Jews. The same installations existed, still in Poland, at Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor and Maldnek as well.

Let us consider the case of Belzec. '7

The declarations of Gerstein gave a good deal of anxiety to Rassinier who spent himself in mental gymnastics in an attempt to discredit them. His destructive passion is easily understood: it is a testimony of cardinal importance from an eye-witness of the gas chambers of Belzec, the functioning of which is described in detail; and it affords precious indications concerning those of Treblinka, Sobibor and Maldanek.

This account is particularly important due to the fact that its author is not a chance spectator, -but rather an SS officer specialized in the matter who was on official mission to SS-Gruppenftihrer Globocnik; and because this author told his staggering experience to trustworthy third parties as of the month of August 1942, in the middle of the war, far from the defeat, in complete liberty, spontaneously. It is this account that-he was to set down in black and white in April 1945, still spontane­ously, in conditions that we shall soon see; and it is an account which ~ was to be authenticated by his confidants of 1942. (10, 45, 25 p. 283-290.)

That is what the "Gerstein report" is. Here, in a few words, is its history.

1. Kurt Gerstein and his report

Kurt Gerstein was an SS-Obersturmftihrer who belonged to the Medico-technical Service of the Central Office of the SS Administration. On November 9, 1941, he was entrusted with the perfecting and the construction of establishments of the Waffen-SS for disinfection and extermination of lice and which also included the sections of highly poisonous gases.

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The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

The eighth of June, 1942, the SS-Sturmbannftihrer Hans Gi.inther of the RSHA ordered him to procure a hundred kilograms of prussic acid and to transport it to a place known only to the driver of the lorry. On August 17, Gerstein, accompanied by Professor Pfannenstiel, arrived in Lublin (Poland) where they were received by the SS-Gruppenftihrer Globocnik, Chief of the SS and of the Police of the District of Lublin. They had a conversation with him in presence of a certain Dr. Herbert Linden, director at the Ministry of the Interior. Two days later, they left for Belzec where Gerstein, escorted by the SS-Hauptsturmftihrer Obermeyer, of Pirmasens, was able to visit the gas chambers. He returned there the next day and was present at the arrival of a convoy. Its forty-five railway cars contained 6,700 persons of whom 1,450 were already dead upon arrival. Remaining where he was, Gerstein followed everything that went on afterwards under the command of a certain Captain Wirth: brutal unloading of the cars of their live cargo, undres­sing of everyone, the column conducted towards the gas chambers where men, women and children were forced to crowd together and, finally, their atrocious and interminable agony of three hours and twenty-one minutes by the clock, for the Diesel engine of which the exhaust fumes were intended to kill the unfortunate people did not work; and two hours and forty-nine minutes were necessary to repair it, then thirty-two minutes to finish the killing. Gerstein was present at the opening of the gas chambers, at the evacuation of the bodies and their quick burial "in big pits of about 100x20x12 meters, located' near the death cham­bers. " Professor Pfannenstiel was present at all that with him.

The next day Gerstein and Pfannenstiel went in Captain Wirth's car to Treblinka, where they visited installations identical to those of Belzec, but bigger.

Leaving Poland, Gerstein in the train from Warsaw met the Secretary of the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Baron Goran von Otter. For lack of sleepers, the two men remained in the corridor where Gerstein, over­whelmed by what he had seen at Belzec, recounted his terrible visit to the diplomat, asking that the latter transmit his account to the Swedish Government and, through its intermediary, to the Allies at war. Follow­ing this, he again met the diplomat on two occasions and was told that the latter had sent a report to his government. Moreover, Gerstein presented himself to the Papal Nuncio in Berlin who, learning that Gerstein was an SS, refused to receive him. He was, however, able to relate his ,journey to Poland to the Secretary of the Episcopate of Berlin, Dr. Winter.

Here is a very succinct resume of his "report." What is known is that in April 1945, in the midst of the Nazi defeat,

Gerstein was in Bade-Wurtemberg. He crossed without difficulty the front line near Reutlingen, occupied by French troops, then proceeded to Rottweil, also occupied by the French. He was arrested, freed the next morning, but assigned to house arrest in a room of the Hotel Mohren, which had been requisitioned. It was in this room that he wrote of his visits to the extermination camps in Poland in 1942. Two

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copies of the this report were written in German and the third, abridged, directly in "a chaotic French" (25, p. 236) which was however, com­prehensible. There was also a note in English.

At the beginning of the month of May, Gerstein met two officers, one American and the other English, to whom he relat~d his journey to Poland and his visit to Belzec and to Treblinka. He gave them the note in English and his account in French, as well as a certain number of bills which he had in his possession concerning the delivery of important quantities of "Zyklon B" to the SS.

Shortly thereafter he was transferred by the French from Rottweil to Paris and incarcerated in the prison of Cherche-Midi, where he hanged himself.

Upon leaving Rottweil, Gerstein was to leave a copy of his report in the German language to the proprietress of the Hotel Mohren, who was to send it to his wife (25, p. 238), whereas the other was to be found later at the hotel and published with a few cuts through the gpod offices of Professor H. Rothfelds in the German historical periodIcal, "Vierteljahreshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte" (1953, number 2, p. 185) under the title" Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen" (45).

The report in French as well as the bills for "Zyklon B" were to be discovered in the archives of the American delegation on January 30, 1946, by the French prosecutor, M. Charles Dubost, at the time of the first major trial at Nuremberg. The report in German was to be used in 1947, at the time of the trial of the Nazi doctors in Nuremberg, and in January 1949 at Frankfurt during the trial of the directors of the LG. Farbenindustrie, which produced "Zyklon B. ,\ It is thus that the "Gerstein report" became public. It is impossible to read the report without being profoundly upset, for the description of the scenes wit­nessed by Gerstein is eloquent... and atrocious. Naturally, the interna­tional press gave it abundant coverage.

2. Proofs that the Gerstein testimony is a "forgery"

Rassinier endeavoured to demonstrate that this report was a forgery. His first attempt, which appeared in 1961 in his book "Ulysses Betrayed by His Own People," on pages 30 and 112 in identical terms, follows -a passage declaring that the writings of David Rousset, of Eugene Kogon and of the

"Hungarian Communist Niyzli Miklos" are historical forgeries" fabricated in "work-shops" where Russians "correct history all day long." It must, in addition, be recognized that they are improving, especially if one takes into account that in January 1946 they had succeeded in having accepted as authentic by the Tribunal of Nuremberg jUdging the doctors the document PS 1553-R.F.350 (39, pp. 30,112) according to which the Jews were asphy­xiated "by groups of 750 to 800" in gas chambers which measured "25 meters at the base and were 1.80 meters high." This flood of insults and sarcasms typical of the manner of Rassinier

was, however, manifestly insufficient to discredit the "report," and the problem was taken up again a year later in the new work, "The Real

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The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

Eichmann Trial," on pages 80, 116 and 223-228, then in "The Drama of the European Jews" on pages 58, 65, 67-71, 78, 106, 107, 108. This time, Rassinier accumulated all of the "proofs" of the evident machina­tion concerning Gerstein and his report. These" proofs" are of diverse nature.

First of all, there is the heavy mystery regarding a series of circum­stances, a mystery which is extremely eloquent, according to Rassinier; for it hides disquieting enigmas. It is thus, Rassinier tells us, that neither the date on which the French troops entered Rottweil, nor the conditions in which Gerstein found himself in relation with the two Anglo-American officers, nor the prison in which he was incarcerated in Paris, nor the date of his suicide, nor the means by which he took his life, nor what became of his corpse are known. Rassinier attaches a very great importance to the knowledge of the details enumerated, information which he does not find in the diverse authors who have written on the Gerstein report, which "seems to me to explain many things," he insinuates in his usual manner. And he began to write a real thriller in five pages by advancing four possible hypotheses to ex­plain the guilty silences concerning the death of Gerstein. Among them "the most likely" would be the following: "Suppose, for example, that the two minus habens armed to the teeth and of whom it is said that they proceeded to the interrogation of Kurt Gerstein" forced him to say what is contained in this document ( ... ), they would have then, themselves, proceeded to the drawing-up of the French text which they would have then submitted to Kurt Gerstein for signature and inviting him to write a few lines himself at the bottom of the last page to make the authenticity indisputable." To obtain this result, "the two instruc­tors of the affair would have submitted him to the treatment usual in those cases. Exaggerating, however, which is again very likely ... " Then in the same way -the German text was obtained; it did not, however, bear the signature of Gerstein, and this leads to Rassinier's conviction: "Suppose, finally, that Kurt Gerstein was so properly interrogated that he fell unconscious or in a coma then died before having gotten to the formula and signing ... " (41, pp. 67-68).

The reader will find the account of Rassinier's other hypotheses in the next part of the analyzed text, but all are of the same inspiration.

And all of this incredible story because, claims Rassinier,the obviously unacknowledgable circumstances of the meeting between Gerstein and the two officers and those of his death are not given by any writer. Beyond any doubt it is an outrageous contrivance by ace forgers and which is easily brought to light by the perspicacious Rassinier.

It does not dawn on this intrepid hunter of historical truth that it is necessary to seek out the information to which one attaches importance not in the writings of authors who perhaps do not find the same interest in them, but rather in applying to the source, for example to the French Military Justice, the first competent in the case of Gerstein. Rassinier did not do this, and this "seems to me to explain many things," to use his own expression.

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3. Irrefutable documents

It so happens that others than he have had that idea and, how ironic, these are the notorious "forgers" of the Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation (CDJC) in Paris, first of all M. Leon Poliakov and execrated by the not at all curious" scholar," Rassinier.

As a matter of fact, in the review of the CDJC, "Le Monde Juif," (36, pp. 4-20; 37, pp. 4-16), M. Leon Poliakov published a series of documents relating to the "Kurt Gerstein Dossier." From them we here reproduce extracts solving the majority of the enigmas which trouble Rassinier and his likes, all of whom burn with a sacred love of historical truth: "Military Justice. Central Depository of Archives. 1 and 3, Noefort Street, Meaux (Seine and Marne).

Meaux, October 26,1960 Officer ( ... ), Clerk of Court ( ... ) ? to Mr. the Minister of the Armies ( ... ) Reference: today's telephone call from Colonel Lequette Object: Concerning a man of the name of Kurt Gerstein Following the instructions cited in the reference, I am pleased to inform you that owing to his activity in France ( ... ), he was the subject of the inquiry No. 1171 of July 10, 1945, of the General Military Governor of Paris for murder and complicity, for the Second Military Tribunal. That finding himself incarcerated at the military prison of Cherche-Midi since July 5, 1945, in accordance with imprisonment order No. 12560/JM of the said day of the general officer cited above, he voluntarily took his own life by hanging, in his cell, on July 25, 1945, at five o'clock in the afternoon ( ... ). That the commandant of the military prison indeed sent on July 26, 1945, to the Commissioner of the Government attached to the Second Permanent Military Tribunal of Paris a report relating to the suicide of the person in question accompanied by a letter of the last­mentioned (in all likelihood written shortly before killing himself in view of justifying his act). ( ... ) on the prison calendar of the military prison of Cherche-Midi appears the hand-written notation: "I established this day, July 25, 1945, at 5:25 P.M., the decease of the prisoner Gerstein, Kurt; the cause of death is obvious as attested by the visible furrow on the neck of the subject and the position in which the body was found. It results from this that death is due to hanging. This manner of taking one's own life can absolutely not be avoided in a prison." This regi­stration is signed "J. Trouillet," doctor of the military prison of Paris. The body was given over to the Police Superintendant of the ward of Notre­Dame-des-Champs on July 26, 1945, to be transported to the Medico­Legal Institute for autopsy (enclosed is the copy of this attestation found in the archives of the military prison of Cherche-Midi). Following up this information, I asked the Prefecture of Police to let me known where the victim was buried. By the letter No. 1716/CAB/SD dated May 2, 1958, the Prefect of Police informed me that in consequence of the verifications which he had ordered, notably at the Medico-Legal Institute, it had been established that the body of Gerstein had been buried on August 3, 1945, in the cemetery of Thiais."

To complete the grotesque "dossier of enigmas" of Rassinier, here is first of all a short document:

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"Prefecture of Police, Police Station of the Ward of Notre-Dame-des­Champs.

Paris, July 26,1945 Received from the Prison of Cherche-Midi the corpse of Kurt Gerstein for transport to the Medico-Legal Institute for autopsy.

The Police Superintendant, Signed: (illegible)

(Stamp of the Police Station, City of Paris, Ward of Notre-Dame-des­Champs). Certified true copy by the Officer-Clerk of Court, Chief of the Central Depository of Archives of the Military Justice. Moreover, Pierre Joffroy reproduces the report of the colonel command­

ing the military prison of Paris to the Ministry of War on page 290 of his fine book "The Spy of God" (25) devoted to Gerstein and written after a thorough investigation made with a seriousness and talent which are completely lacking in the compiler, Rassinier:

"At 2:15 P.M. on July 25 the sergeant major and guard Dubois-Dandien advised me that the chief sergeant Entz, working on the second floor, had just found, hanged in his cell, the prisoner Kurt Gerstein, German subject locked up since July 5, 1945, charged with "war crimes, murder and com­plicity." Sergeant Entz, assisted by sergeant-major Andre Ucci, cut the rope and began artificial respiration. The firemen of the barracks of Vieux-Colombier, who had been alerted, went to the establishment and pronounced death. The prisoner hanged himself with the help of a small rope made up from a piece of blanket which he had afterwards hung on the window of his cell; his head was turned towards the wall and his feet touched the floor. The prisoner had first of all occupied a cell with three other Germans, indicted on the same charge. At the request of Colonel Sauzey, Gerstein had been placed on July 20, 1945, in an individual cell in order not to be able to repeat the facts of his interrogation to his fellow-citizens. It is to be feared ,that the three other Germans seek to take their own lives in the same fashion, and it is materially impossible to avoid that such events recur unless one strips them naked and takes away all of the bedclothes. " Here are the extracts from another document concerning the meeting

of Gerstein with the two allied officers (36, pp. 12-13), the American John W. Haught, employed by the company du Pont-de-Nemours, and the Englishman Derek Curtis Evans, major in the British scientific service, who are the "minus habens armed to the teeth" born of Rassinier's imagination:

"The present assessors met Dr. Gerstein by chance in a requisitioned hotel in Rottweil. He told us that we were the first Americans or English that he had seen and that he wanted to speak to us of what he knew about the German concentration camps. ( ... ) He obtained a responsible position in the Nazi Party. In this capacity, he attended meetings in the course of which the fate of the prisoners of the concentration camps was discussed. Asked whether he was aware of the utilization of gas chambers for the killing of prisoners, he answered that as an engineer he had often had to give advice on the functioning of these chambers. He said that the two gases utilized were cyanhydric acid and the exhaust fumes of internal combustion engines. ( ... ) He said ... that in the case of HCN, death was nearly instanta­neous, whereas a period of fifteen to twenty minutes was necessary in the case of the exhaust fumes. Dr. Gerstein escaped from the Nazis only about three weeks ago: it is very obvious that he is still affected by his experiences and he speaks of them with difficulty. But he ardently

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InSiSts that those guilty be judged for their crimes and says that he is fully ready to serve as a witness. He hopes that the information furnished by him will be transmitted as rapidly as possible to the competent autho­rities in London. He handed over to the preSent assessors a note in English, an account of seven typewritten pages, and a few bills of the firm Degesch for the furnishing of "Zyklon B" (cyanhydric acid) to the concentration camps. He also showed a religious pamphlet that he had written in 1938 in order to bear witness as to his past activities. There is reason to wonder if Dr. Gerstein should not be protected against the local Nazis.

May 5, 1945 Signed: Major D.C. Evans, l.W. Haught

In another connection, the reader of the book of P. Joffroy will know (16, p. 234) that the city of Reutlingen where Gerstein passed the front line on April 22, 1945, had been occupied the day before by the 5th Armoured Division under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Gambiez and that the services of the First French Army under the command of Captain Bessy were located at Rottweil (25, p. 235).

So the "troubling enigmas" to which Rassinier consacrates pages an~ pages of a sterile gossip, instead of looking into the "Gerstein dossier'" of the French Military Justice, are hereby solved.

4. The Gerstein report at Nuremberg

There is another circumstance which, according to Rassinier, shows that the Gerstein report is a "visible forgery" and upon which he greatly insists in these two works, "The Real Eichmann Trial" (48, pp. 80, 224, 227) and "The Drama of the European Jews" (41, pp. 59, 60, 64, 93): the Nuremberg Tribunal, before which M. Dubost, the French Prosecutor, had produced the French text of Gerstein's account, "refus­ed to listen to the reading of it," which proves "that the Gerstein document was an historical forgery so false that the Tribunal of Nurem­berg itself had cast it aside as not conclusive, January 30, 1946." This "argument" is a model of hypocrisy and outrageous deceit typical of the procedures currently employed by Rassinier. It is a model of~ hypocrisy, for God knows how much spleen Rassinier vented on the Tribunal of Nuremberg and its decisions, how many documents admitted by the Tribunal were declared by him to be "forged," "apocryphal," "falsified," "worthless," "not conclusive," etc. to not take seriously his sudden and virtuous indignation before the fact that the Gerstein document is still considered authentic and essential. Outrageous deceit, for in reality the Tribunal, during its morning session on January 30 did in fact "refuse to hear the reading" of the Gerstein report, but not at all because it considered it "inconclusive," but rather for a purely technical reason: a certificate establishing its origin, obligatorily required by the Tribunal for every paper produced, was lacking. In the after­noon of the same day, the British Assistant Prosecutor General declared: (25, pp. 267-268).

"All of the documents PS belong to a series of seized documents of which the origin and the filing were authenticated on November 22 by Comman-

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The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

dant Coogan... The series of PS has been verified and when it is read to the Tribunal, it can be accepted." To this declaration, the President of the Tribunal replied: "( ... ) I should like to say, on behalf of the Tribunal, that we apologize to the French public ministry, for we have just now discovered that the marginal note is found on the copy. M. Dubost, please accept my apologies"

Is that sufficiently dear? The incident is closed for everyone ... except for Rassinier, naturally: He fearlessly maintains his positions for, says he, the Gerstein document "was not retained as a charge against the defendants" (40, p. 80). This is true in what regards the defendants of the trial of Grering and associates; but that is rather a problem which may interest jurists and not historians, for it has nothing to do with the authenticity of the document. If the "argument" is nevertheless advan­ced by Rassinier, it is evidently in the hope of spreading confusion and perhaps even so leaving a certain doubt in the mind of the scatter-brained or unthinking reader. The process is typical of Rassinier.

5. Stockholm confirms

There is, in addition, another obvious means of knowing if the account of Gerstein is veracious. that is to address oneself to the Swedish Government.

Gerstein indeed said that in the course of his journey from Warsaw to Berlin in 1942, he related what he had seen two days earlier at Belzec to the Swedish diplomat Otter and that, later, the latter told him that he had informed his government of it. There is perhaps nothing more important, especially for the person who has doubts on the authenticity of the Gerstein report written in 1945 in semi-captivity, than to know if the Swedish Government had in fact received the report of the diplo­mat in 1942. That goes without saying for the person who doubts sincerely. And this verification was made. Naturally, it was not done by Rassinier, but by the "falsifier," by the "forger," by the "head of the gang" of the Center of Jewish Contemporary Documentation in Paris, Poliakov.

Here is the correspondance that M. Leon Poliakov exchanged with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, a correspondance which is briefly summarized on page 220 of his classic work, "The Breviary of Hatred," which appeared in 1951 and was published in its entirety in the article of "Le Monde Juif" of 1964 (36, p. 13-14).

"Stockholm, November 10, 1949. Annex I. Dear Sir, ~n reference to your letter of October 19, 1949, relative to the former member of the Waffen SS, Gerstein, I have the honour to inform you that the documents which are in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden confirm the declaration that Gerstein made. It is therefore true that Gerstein, in the course of a journey from Warsaw to Berlin, according to information received one of the last days of August 1942, was in contact with an official of the Swedish legation of that time in Berlin. Baron von Otter, who was travelling in the same train. What occurred on this occasion appears from the enclosed memorandum, which was written in London on August 7, 1945, and which the Swedish legation in

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that city put at the disposal of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs for any measures which would be judged useful. .

M. Leon Poliakov, Chief of Research, Center Documentation, Paris." Memorandum. Kung!. Utrikes Department.

Sincerely yours (Signature: illegible)

of Jewish Contemporary

Concerns: the engineer Kurt Gerstein, member of the SS sanitary section, Siesebrechstr. Probably born in 1907 in Brunswick (?). Address in 1943: Berlin BUlow­strasse 49. In August 1942, Gerstein established contact with an official of a neutral embassy in Berlin and related to him the following story: He had just come back from a brief mission to the extermination camp of Belzec near Lublin, and he gave a detailed description of its set-up (gas chambers, role of the personnel, the collecting of deposits in gold, etc.) He showed diverse papers, his identification cards and instructions from the commandant of the camp for the supplying of prussic acid. Gerstein declared that he endeavoured to inform neutral observers of this state of affairs and that he was firmly convinced that as soon as large masses of the German population learnt the fact of this extermination and '7 that it was confirmed to them by unbiassed foreigners, the German people would not tolerate the Nazis a single day longer. Gerstein declared in addition that he had already spoken with a high­ranking religious authority, the Superintendant General Dibelius, of this matter (That was later confirmed by Dibelius himself, who vouched for the seriousness and the veracity of Gerstein.) ( ... ) Six months later, Gerstein again paid a visit to this same foreign diplomat of a neutral country and asked if the latter had been able to undertake anything in the meantime. Following this, no further news of him was had. The sorrow and the shame of Gerstein in regard to the extermination camps appeared to be as real as they were profound; and his desire to inform the outside world of these things, in order to put an end to the atrocities, was no doubt sincere." Let us add, finally, that after the end of the war, Kurt Gerstein was

classified among the criminals; that on August 17, 1950, his case was posthumously reexamined by the denazification Chamber of Wurtem­berg-Hohenzollern which classed him as a "minor Nazi," and that this verdict was confirmed on November 16, 1950; that his "report" and his case were evoked at length in March 1949 at the Assizes Court ot Frankfurt-on-the-Main, at the time of the trial of the directors of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, the producer of "Zyklon B," which heard numerous witnesses. It is thus that the ministers Niem611er and Ehlers, the bishop Dibelius, the canon Buchholz, the priests Michalski and Rehrig confirmed that at different periods, but still during the war, Gerstein had told them of his visit to Belzec, as he had told it to Otter, and that Dr. Dibelius had transmitted this information to the Archbishop of Upsala in Sweden.

6. The Gerstein testimony and the insincerity of its detractors

One must therefore be both terribly insincere and possessed of he blind passion of the apologist of Nazism in its most cruel and most cynical aspect to continue to affirm that the "Gerstein report" is not an account of an atrocious experience lived in 1942, but rather a text forged in 1945 under the effects of torture or fear; that it is a "story which is

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macabre, phantasmagoric" (41, p. 58) or "macabrely fantastic" (40, p. 227) or a "story absolutely incredible ... " (41. pp. 64-65).

In his will to discredit the terrible, "Gerstein report" at all costs, Rassinier also affirms that a part of his (Gerstein's) text or "the one attributed to him" (40, p. 255), is only a text which is "apocryphal," "falsified," "traffiked," "re-arranged" by "forgers" seeking to heap abuse on the Nazis and that, moreover, it is full of unlikelihoods.

What is scarcely credible is that the man who so often vaunts his position of professor of history, his training' as a historian,and who writes pages and pages of "analyses" of the text of the "Gerstein report" has never had either the curiosity or the professional honesty to procure it. Nevertheless, this text, at least in photostat, is easy to find. It may be procured, for example, in the archives of the Center of Contem­porary Jewish Documentation, which are accessible to everyone. It may also be found elsewhere. This is typical of Rassinier and of his "working habits." What he does is to judge the text of the "report" through the reading of the works of different authors who cite it more or less abundantly according to what they themselves esteem to be particulary interesting, significant or important and therefore worthy of citation. Proceeding in this way,· these authors are doing what all historians from antiquity to the present day have done, and without which it is not possible to write a book of history without rendering it incredibly long and without making its reading indigestible. This is true unless, of course, one is dealing with a "collection of com­plete texts" of documents, which is quite a different problem. It is natural that, comparing the pieces of the "report" cited by some with those cited by others, Rassinier often "discovers" that such and such sentences are missing or, what amounts to the same, that there are sen­tences "added on" from one author to another. The stupidity of this "method" can give no other results than to everywhere find "frauds" and" falsifications" imaginary and" evident." It is curious to note that Rassinier and his likes do not at all seem troubled by the strangeness of the fact that the "falsifiers" and the "forgers" who have the same goal in mind-falsely condemn the Nazis-do not manage to agree and act together, as would a gang of ill-doers, to avoid the evident "contra­dictions. "

Rassinier's ignorance of the Gerstein text is often anecdotal. For example, he states: "As far as one can deduce from the writings of these brilliant historians (it is a question of a series of authors), Kurt Gerstein was a chemical engineer" (40, p.225). Now then, the "Gerstein report" begins by a few details of his biography where he says himself: Gerstein, Kurt, mining engineer ( ... ), graduate engineer." No one needs. "brilliant historians" to learn it first-hand and to notice by the same occasion that Rassinier sticks onto a "mining engineer" the degree of "chemical engineer" ... in which he makes himself guilty of "falsifica­tion ", "fraud ", "re-arrangement", in conformity with the terminology which he applies to others.

The objective of Rassinier is to overwhelm the reader with a flood

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of comparaison of texts and to heap abuse upon their authors by means of sarcasms, insinuations, injurious words and mockeries, a detestable art in which he excells.

Knowing the "Gerstein report" by bits and pieces, Rassinier finds a quantity of unlikelihoods in its content. It is thus ihat summing up in his own manner the conversation between Gerstein ana 'G!obocnik, Chief of the SS and of the Police of the District of Lublin, Rassiliier writes on an ironic tone which is to provoke in his reader the idea of the evident absurdity of the account: "The same day, one meets the Grup­penfiihrer (General) Globocnik in charge of the extermination of the Jews in the Warthegau and who had not yet found another means of carrying out his task than ... the exhaust fumes of Diesel engines (!) which he caused to arrive in chambers especially fitted out for this." (40, p. 225). Now then, the subject of this conversation is very normal and very likely when it is known that it is precisely this means of massive extermi­nation which was practised in Germany itself, since October 1939, in the framework of the "euthanasia" operation and that one of tIfe specialists of the procedure was the police commissioner Wirth ("Haupt­mann Wirth" of the "report") put at the disposal of Globocnik and, at the period of the visit of Gerstein, commandant of the camp of Belzec and his guide.

On June 23, 1942, Victor Brack, SS-Oberfiihrer, Superior Chief of the Service of the Chancellery of the Fuhrer, whom Reichsleiter Bouhler in 1939 made responsible for the organization of the suppression of "use­less mouths " (euthanasia), wrote to Himmler: (32, p. 126).

"Some time ago already, I put at the disposal of BrigadefUhrer Globocnik a certain number of my men for the accomplishment of his special mission, in conformity with the orders of Reichsleiter Bouhler. Following a new request from him, I again sent him personnel. On this occasion, Brigade­fUhrer Globocnik supported the thesis that it is fitting to carry out '-the anti-Jewish action as rapidly as possible to avoid that unforeseen obstaCles oblige us to stop the operation in the middle of its execution." This sheds a light of sharp truth on Gerstein's sentence: "The Haupt­

mann of Police Wirth asked me not to propose to Berlin any other mode( whatsoever of gas chambers and to leave everything as it was."

Continuing the account of this conversation in which Globocnik in­forms Gerstein of the existence, under his authority, of four extermina­tion camps-Belzec, Tteblinka, Sobibor and Mai'danek, which was being constructed-Rassinier still writes in a mocking tone destined to demon­strate the unlikelihood of the confidence: "Naturally, the Gruppenfiihrer who is logical begins by telling... In his region, three establishments exist to exterminate the Jews by Diesel exhaust fumes ... " (40, p. 226). This confidence is not only likely but appears inevitable. In fact, for what reason would Globocnik not inform SS-Obersturmfiihrer Gerstein of the RSHA of the situation in his (Globocnik's) district? Gerstein was sent to him from Berlin as chief of the section of poisonous gases of the Waffen-SS, precisely in order to help him improve the procedure of killing in use at his establishments.

In the same way, Rassinier, citing the works of two well-known

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historians, writes that "one further deduces (from these two works, G.W.) that the Fuhrer was in Lublin two days before, August 15 (one apparent­ly shrinks before nothing in the factories for the manufacture of histo­rical forgeries!) with Himmler and they gave the order to "accelerate all the action." This visit appears to Rassinier an obvious "historical forgery" and, by the ambiguous construction of his sentence, his reader is led to impute it to Gerstein or to the two historians. But a reading of the report itself brings out that it is a question of a declaration of Globocnik in the course of the conversation with Gerstein, Professor Pfannenstiel and Dr. Herbert Lindner (in reality Linden): "( ... ) the Fuhrer and Himmler, who were here on August IS-that is two days ago-have obliged me to personally accompany all those who must see the establish­ments ... , "says Globocnik (25,p.284). It is thus neither Gerstein nor the two historians who in this case fabricate an "historical forgery" (if there is an "historical forgery"!), but Globocnik. There is nothing astonishing nor unlikely in that, for whether the visit is real or false, in any event Globocnik thus makes his interlocutor sense his very great intimacy with the two all-powerful personalities of the regime. This is just his way of doing things and, besides, is very close to the truth. But Rassinier deceives his reader with the help of insinuations, ambiguities and willful deformations.

It is easy to multiply similar examples of Rassinier's dishonesty.

7. The Gas Chambers at Belzec

His objections concerning certain details contained in the "Gerstein report" seem, however, more serious; and they deserve a more attentive examination.

Gerstein, speaking of his first visit to Belzec, writes: "Before us a house as a bathing establishment ( ... ). After climbing a little staircase, on the right and on the left, three and three rooms like garages 4 by 5 meters, 1.90 meters high. ( ... ) Moreover, this afternoon-I didn't notice" (25, p. 285). Further on, describing the functioning of the gas chambers which he observed the next day, he says: "In the chambers, the SS squeeze the men (in). "Fill up well "... Hauptmann Worth has ordered it. The naked men are standing up at the feet of the others, 700 to 800 for 25 square meters and 45 cubic meters! ( ... ) After two hours and forty-nine minutes-the stop-watch recorded it all-the Diesel began. Until this moment, the men in the four chambers already filled up (were) living, living, four times 750 persons to four times 45 cubic meters!" (25, p. 285).

It has been seen that Gerstein once speaks of six chambers ("three and three") of 4 meters by 5 meters and of 1.90 meters high, then of four chambers of 25 square meters and 45 cubic meters, therefore of 1.80 meters in height.

And here is how Rassinier reports Gerstein's account: " ( ... ) in the course of this visit, he saw the gas chambers which used Diesel exhaust fumes and he measured them: 5x5 = 25m2 in surface, 1.90 in height

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= 45 m3, he calculates." (41, p. 63). This manner of presenting Gerstein's account necessitates a few observations.

First of all, Rassinier is inventing when he says that Gerstein" measur­ed" the dimensions of the gas chambers that he had seen; for Gerstein, he who in another connection gave the detail that he had measured the

. duration of the gassing with a stop watch, says nothing like that. It is perfectly obvious that it is a question of an estimate by "the naked eye ", with all of the approximation which it implies, particularly on behalf of a man who was profoundly and violently struck by what he saw in 1942 and who still remained at the height of his emotion in 1945, in the middle of the defeat, while writing his "report." This explains the fact that one time he indicates an area of 4x5 meters and another time 5x5. As for the number of gas chambers that he mentions-at one time 6 and at another time 4 (never ten as Rassinier abusively indicates), the contradiction is only apparent: an attentive reading of Gerstein's text reveals only that at the time of the first visit he saw six empty cham­bers (" Moreover, this afternoon I did not notice," he underscores) an~ the next day four in operation without one's knowing whether it was a question of the same and how many there were in all at Belzec. Based on his declarations, it is possible only to say that there were at least six, but there is no contradiction. Gerstein says twice that 700-800 or 750 persons had been piled into each of the chambers. It is evident that here, too, he gives not a precise figure which, besides, he had no means of establishing, but rather an estimate expressing an extreme piling up, underscored in the context: "In the chambers, the SS push the men. "Fill up well "-Hauptmann Wirth has ordered (it). The naked men are standing at each other's feet... " And further on he adds again:" At Belzec and Treblinka the trouble was not taken to count in any exact manner the number of Jews killed."

Finally, Gerstein speaks of a train containing 6,700 persons, which Rassinier finds unlikely, writing in the usual tone of mockery "( ... ) it is certain that with its mere 6,700 ( ... ) persons, this train of forty-five carriages was the most nightmarish of all the trains transporting depor-'" tees ( ... ). Thus Kurt Gerstein decidedly"has not an accurate eye, and for an engineer that is not very flattering" (41, p. 64). Rassinier is wrong to exercise in this matter his ironic and acid verve; Gerstein indicates sufficiently clearly that it was in fact a question of a "night­marish" train, since he says that upon arrival out of 6,700 persons there were already 1,450 dead. As for the accuracy of engineer Gerstein's eye, there is every chance that no one had ever taught him nor given him the opportunity before his journey to calculate with precision the area of the chambers of a slaughter-house for men, nor the number of persons that could be piled in there by force to exterminate them. It is perhaps more exact to say that confronted with the sight this engineer lost his calmness to the point of forgetting all of the compasses in the world, which is rather "flattering" for him.

It is undeniable that there are some flagrant contradictions in the "report" and that certain of them are real, for example the area of the

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The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

gas chambers; whereas others are only apparent, such as the number of the latter. Rassinier here sees the "proof" that it is a document that has been coldly "forged," "falsified," etc. It is necessary, on the con­trary, to see there the spontaneity of the writing, the author being in a hurry to deliver up the memories which oppress him without checking himself nor even re-reading himself attentively. Interviewed by Pierre Joffroy in 1967, Madame Bek, the owner of the Hotel Mohren at Rottweil where Gerstein was lodged in April-May 1945 and where he wrote his accounts, related (25, pp. 235-236):

.. I remember. The man was overwhelmed. He spoke to us of the concentration camps, of his past experience. Alone, without news of his family ... we sometimes invited him to have coffee with us. ( ... ) Having made the acquaintance of the minister Hecklinger, he had borrowed his (Hecklinger's typewriter to type up his report. He was always at the stationery shop to supply himself with paper, but (paper) there was less and less of it at that time." No "falsifier" or "forger" would ever have let such obvious contra-

dictions appear in his work. There is also the affirmation that 700 or 800 people were piled up in

premises of an area of 20 or 25 m2. This is very difficult to believe if one takes literally both the number of persons indicated and the area given. That is what Rassinier did naturally and triumphantly, without taking into account the real circumstances described in the "report" and which exclude the possibility of Gerstein's having determined with precision the area of the chambers and the exact number of persons. What the text of the "report" does allow one to conclude is that the chambers were not very vast and that the number of persons who filled them up to the very maximum attained the hundreds.

It seems useless to continue the analysis of Rassinier's work on the "Gerstein report," his obsession which he desperately sought to dis­credit with the assistance of the most detestable processes: deceit, deformation of the texts and the facts, insinuation, ambiguity. All in vain.

We have seen that none of his" arguments" withstands a serious exa-mination. None of his wiles to create false mysteries and false pro­blems to obscure the real ones stands up: Gerstein did in fact see the gas chambers of Belzec in operation in 1942; he did in fact see how an industrial enterprise for the extermination of men and women and children worked, and he did in fact relate all of this several times before the end of the war to thoroughly reliable persons. It was in fact he himself, in his own hand, spontaneously and freely, who drew up his declaration of 1945. It is in reality a terrible act of accusation.

8. A Mysterious Visitor and his "Testimony" (?)

But it is impossible to conclude this chapter without giving a place to the strange story that Rassinier told in his work "The Drama of the European Jews" (pp. 79-91). It is the sole and unique attempt at a positive contribution to our knowledge on the Nazi extermination

133

THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

camps which we owe to the compiler Rassinier, who did nothing other than relentlessly distort the patient work of others without ever succeeding.

Rassinier wrote that one day in the month of June 1963, "I received a strange visit: a tall German of a fine presence, appearing to be about sixty (in the conversation I learnt that he was in reality very much older), something military in his bearing, of an extreme distinction and an exquisite politeness ( ... ). First of all, he introduced himself and told me the purpose of his visit; and he insisted that it be kept confidential. I promised him that, and it is the reason for which the presentation of the character as well as the circumstances of this meeting are found here only in terms which absolutely cannot allow his identification, the content of the conversation which we had being the only thing rigourously authentic."

The very distinguished person related to Rassinier that he had been a "senior officer of very high rank in a very important department," that after the war he had been denazified, which had created "endless trouble" for him, and excused himself for the "cowardice which had ordered him" to remain silent until that time. That specified, the persq? declared to Rassinier,

"You assure ( ... ) that none of the witnesses who claimed to have been present at exterminations by gassing have until now ever been able to affirm that in your presence ( ... J. Well then, I have come to tell you that I myself was present at an extermination by gassing."

And he explained himself: "( ... ) I was on mission to Lublin, and 1 had just gone into Globocnik's when Gerstein had himself announced; ( ... ) I found myself again with him in Belzec the next day."

A resume follows of the conversation, Rassinier drafted this sum­mary "to retain only what was essential in it":

"( ... ) Globocnik had spoken only of Belzec, but absolutely not of the other camps cited. He had not, moreover, begun by speaking of extermination but only of the disinfection of clothing ( ... ) deploring the scanty possibilities of disinfection at the camp of Belzec, he said that he himself had found a very expeditious means which at the same time radically resolved the Jewish question: his Diesel engine in Belzec. But, Globocnik added, I should have to dispose of a more powerful gas ( ... ) and that is why I have sent GUnter to Gerstein with the objective of obtaining from him (Gerstein) what his department had that was best adapted to this task, for then one could proceed on a large-scale to the solution of the Jewish question in this manner."

At that moment the mysterious personage asked Globocnik a question; "( ... ) that is a crime, and you are sure that is what the FUhrer means by definitive solution?" Globocnik limited himself to answering, "Yes, I am sure of it" ( ... ) and, with a very knowing look, without stating precisely from whom he had his mission but in such a way that one could believe that it was from the FUhrer himself, he insisted upon its secret, ultra-secret nature. In contrast to what is said in the Gerstein document, he did not state precisely that Himmler and Hitler were in Lublin two days previously: pure invention." ( ... ) "In Belzec he saw the camp: a very small camp, a few shanties which could contain four or five hundred persons. He saw them walking about in this camp, fat, in good health, all Jews. ( ... ) A very small station at which arrived from time to time, by the sole track, a train of a few cars full

134

The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

of their co-religionists: they told him that they were charged with exter­minating the latter with the exhaust fumes of a Diesel engine in a little house ( ... ) upon which a placard announced ( ... ) the "Heckenholt Founda­tion"-from the name of the Jew in charge of operating and servicing the engine." .. ( ... ) Police Captain Wirth... commandant of this camp... and an SS officer, his assistant, ( ... ) were persuaded that in Berlin nothing was known of what went on here ( ... ). They said that here only a train of a few cars arrived from time to time, two ore three up to the present day (August 18, 1942). Accompanied by Wirth and his SS assistant, he (the mysterious personage) also visited the small house appropriated for the exterminations ( ... ). A heightened ground-floor, a corridor, with on each side, three small rooms which he did not measure but the area of which was surely less than 5 x 5 (meters- perhaps 4 x 5 at the most. At the end of the corridor, the room in which the Diesel was located ( ... )."

In reply to a question from Rassinier, the mysterious personage specified that the duration of the gassing was a quarter of an hour; but Rassinier thought that it must have been between one hour and a half and two hours.

"The next morning, between seven and eight o'clock, the convoy of Jews which had been announced arrived: a train of four or five cars, about 250 to 300 people-men, women, children, old people-and not 6,000 to 6,700 piled into 45 cars, as is claimed by the Cerstein Document ( ... J. No brutality, no doors ripped off, no bludgeoning ( ... ) Then one had them enter the building of the crime; in a haphazard manner, they divided up in the six rooms-40 to 50 per room, .. The doors were closed up, the lights turned off; and, at that moment, the unfortunate people were heard beginning to pray. Cries of fright, also, of the women and children ... "

On his return to Berlin, the mysterious witness "went... directly to Dr. Grawitz, who was his friend and a direct collaborator of Himmler. At the account he gave him, Grawitz jumped up, horrified, and without waiting, rushed to Himmler's ( ... ) ... about ten days afterwards, Dr. Grawitz came himself to tell me,"

said the personage. " ... that an investigation was in progress on the facts I had brought him, and a few weeks after. .. that the camp was closed and Globocnik once again transferred."

And farther on: ..... what interests me ... is the problem of the extermination by gassing, the only one by which the honour of Germany is really at stake... in 1950 you gave a most correct interpretation of it when... you concluded that there were very few exterminations of this type, and that only one or two madmen among the SS ( ... J were responsible for them."

Rassinier himself wrote, "If I have insisted on concluding this chapter with this account, it is on the one hand because an historian worthy of the name must not hide anything that he knows; and on the other because I could not seriously challenge it ... and that rightly or wrongly, the good faith and the sincerity o( its author had seemed evident to me. ( ... ) All this ... does not mean that I guarantee this account ( ... )." The whole story is hard to believe: the deep mystery which hides the

name of the personage as well as the date, the country and the place where the conversation was held justifies all doubts and all suspicions. Had any other historian, especially Jewish, presented an account dis­turbing to Rassinier in such non-verifiable similar conditions, one senses

135

THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

immediately that Rassinier would have showered him with a flood of mockeries, sarcasms and insults.

Furthermore, the mystery is perhaps less dense than Rassinier thought. Numerous details lead us to believe that the man "of extreme distinction and exquisite politeness, senior officer of a very high rank in a very im­portant department," denazified after the war, who speaks with Globoc­nik and asks him "what the Fiihrer thinks of the definitive solution," who the next day visits the camp of Belzec with Gerstein, two days later is with him during the gassing operation where he notes "the pray­ers and the cries of the unfortunate victims" and who speaks to Dr. Grawitz "to denounce the scandal" to Himmler, could be Professor Dr. Wilhelm Pfannenstiel. Pfannenstiel was titular of the Chair of Hygiene at the University of Marburg. He held the rank of SS-Obersturmbann­fiihrer (lieutenant colonel). Arrested by the English, he was freed for lack of evidence but lost his chair. He was the protege of Dr. Grawitz, SS-Gruppenfiihrer, Chief of the Health Service of the SS and the Police, the man who, according to Gerstein, asks Globocnik "but what doe;s the Fiihrer say?", puts his ear against the door of the gas chamber and exclaims, "You can hear them crying as at the synagogue ... "

Be that as it may, this" testimony," which we know only in Rassinier's wording, claims that Gerstein's account "is as false as can be from one end to the other." In reality, he confirms it almost entirely. The de­scription of the places, the number and the dimensions of the gas cham­bers, their functioning by means of the exhaust fumes of a Diesel engine are indeed identical in both. So is the description of the hasty burial of the corpses of the men, women and children killed in the "Heckenholt Foundation. " Even the references of Globocnik to Hitler are identical in both.

That is the real crux of the problem of the gas chambers in the extermination camps.

9. "Witness X" and the Legend of the Mad 55

Nevertheless, the version of "X" is made to measure to justify the legend of "accidents" due to some rare, mad SS. This legend was dear to Rassinier: there were scarcely two or three small convoys of four or five cars of fifty people each which arrived in Belzec up to August 18, 1942, that is to say, in the five months of the existence of this camp. All of that must illustrate the initiative of "rare madmen." In the same way, the affirmation that Wirth and his assistant implored the important visitor X to intervene in high places so that "this scandal" would cease, which happened quickly owing to the intervention of Dr. Grawitz, illustrates the thesis according to which those in high places were ignorant of everything, that when they were informed of it the whole enterprise of madmen was rapidly liquidated and the madmen punished. It was also a thesis of Rassinier.

These two elements of "testimony X" for Rassinier justified its pUblication. Moreover, this "testimony" very opportunely illustrates

136

The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein

the accusation which attributes the total responsibility for the worst horrors of the camps to the "Haftlingsfiihrung" and not at all to the SS. This is because it is a question of Jews (" fat, healthy") taking the respon­sibility for the extermination of their co-religionists in the "Heckenholt Foundation," named after the Jew' in charge of running and servicing the Diesel engine!

Now then, in their zeal and in their ignorance of the facts, the "very distinguished" witness X and his "confessor", Rassinier, did not conjecture that certain affirmations of the "testimony" are easy to verify. This verification shows their absurdity: '

1) At the beginning of February 1943, a railway car containing 3,000 kilos of uniquely female hair was sent from the camp of Belzec to the Minstry of the Economy of the Reich. It was intended for the spinning-mills (Doc. NO-1257 and USSR-51l). The weight corresponds to the hair of about 200,000 women. This documentation should suffice to discredit the affirmation of "witness X", according to which "only a train of few cars arrived from time to time, two or three until the present writing".

2) The camp in Belzec was closed in spring 1943, more than six months after the so-called intervention of "witness X" and of Dr. Grawitz (the latter of whom saw Himmler). "Witness X" thus invented Dr. Grawitz's intervention or, at the very least, its consequences.

3) Globocnik left his post in Poland only on September 13, 1943. He received a new and equivalent post on the Adriatic coast, as well as a fine letter from Himmler. This letter, dated November 30,1943, expressed Himmler's thanks and gratefulness to "lieber Globus" for the latter's services in Poland. "Witness X" thus invented the fact that Globocnik was penalized because of the camps placed under his autho­rity.

4) In autumn 1942, Wirth was named, under Globocnik's orders, "Inspector" of three extermination camps in the district of Lublin­Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka-with headquarters in Lublin. It was a promotion and not at all a punitive sanction.

5) On April 13, 1943, Globocnik sent the RSHA a recommendation for promotion in which is read: "The Reichsfiihrer, after his visit to the camp of Sobibor, had formally approved a promotion in favour of the most deserving chiefs and men. The enclosed list contains the names of the best in the three camps. Police Major Christian Wirth (SS No 345.464) is the inspector in charge: (he was) promoted commandant on January 30, 1943, I earnestly request a simultaneous promotion for him to the rank of SS-Sturmbannfiihrer. ( ... ). Propositions: Waffen SS­Hauptscharfiihrer Josef Oberhauser (Obermeyer of Gerstein) to the rank of SS-Untersturmfiihrer, Waffen SS-Oberscharfiihrer Lorenz Hecken­holt to the, rank of SS-Hauptscharfiihrer ( ... )" (25, pp. 164-165). "Witness X" thus invented the punitive sanctions which supposedly struck the" mad" SS.

The reader has no doubt noticed on this list the name of SS-Ober­scharfiihrer Lorenz Heckenholt of the "Heckenholt Foundation" of Belzec. It is therefore Gerstein who was right when he said that "the

137

THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

operator of the Diesel the exhaust fumes of which are intended to kill the poor people" is the SS-Unterscharfiihrer Heckenholt. It was "Witness X" and, in back of him, Rassinier who invented that it was a Jew for the needs of the cause and by hatred for the Jews ..

The cause is that of "the honour of Germany" confounded with that of the worst torturers and murderers No German having a care for his honour and that of his native land should admit such a shameful assimila­tion.

The Gerstein Report should no longer allow it.

t(

138

Part II The Number of Victims of the "Final Solution" and the J{orherr Report

As soon as the war had ended, the question was raised as to the number of victims of the "final solution to the Jewish question."

It is evident that this macabre accountancy had to be kept by the administration of the Third Reich, so that the precise and total evaluation of the exterminations had to exist somewhere. Unfortunately, at the current writing, the archives of the Gestapo have yielded only incomplete data of this aC9ountancy. They do, however, attest its existence.

The first summary indication concerning the problem was given at the time of the first important Nuremberg trial (1945-46), that of Grering and his associates, during the depositions of two witnesses, Wilhelm Hoettl, SS- Sturmbannfiihrer of the Central Security Office of the Reich, and Dieter Wisliceny, SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer. They were both friends of Eichmann and the second his close collaborator. On November 6, 1945, Hoettl declared that in April 1944 in Budapest, Eichmann had told him under the seal of secrecy that "in different exterminatien camps four million Jews had been killed, whereas two million more had met their deaths in another manner" (32, pp. 100-101). For his part, Wis­liceny, under interrogation on January 3, 1946, related that at the end of February 1945, in Berlin, Eichmann had spoken to him of the murder of five million Jews (32, pp. 99-100).

1. Convergence of Diverse Estimates

Later a report due to Korherr, the "Inspekteur flir Statistik" of the SS, was found. We shall refer to this below. Let us say immediately, however, that this report stopped at the date of March 31, 1943, so that it appears interesting only for the first year of the execution of the program of the "final solution," a program which was continued for another year and a half after that date. It nevertheless presents the inestimable advantage of a direct "accountancy" of the number of victims, drawn up by the executors of the "final solution" themselves.

In the course of the year 1945, an American specialist of statistics and demography, Jacob Lestchinsky, accomplished an important piece of work by attacking the problem of the number of Jewish victims according to statistical methods: he thus calculated the "balance sheet"

139

THE NUM BER OF VICTIMS

from the number of Jews in different European countries before the war and immediately following it. He came to the conclusion that there was a loss in lives of 5,978,000 (31), a figure which coincides with that advanced by Hoett! and Wisliceny according to the confidences of Eichmann. This study was published in 1946. The indirect method employed by Lestchinsky has been used again by many other authors, the majority of whom have reached the same result of about six million victims. Only the Englishman Gerald Reit!inger (43), who imposes upon himself systematically and deliberately the adoption in each hypothesis of the lowest figures, gives an estimate which even so varies between a mini­mum of 4,194,200 and a maximum of 4.581,200. All of the authors, with­out exception, who utilize this indirect method underscore the multiple objective difficulties that it presents. One must take into consideration the uncertainties as to the number of the Jewish population in many countrIes, the multiple border changes between States which took place especially in"Eastern Europe between 1939 and 1945, and the important movements of human masses before the advances of the armies i(and the perils of all kinds due to events of the war. It is therefore always a question of approximations.

In 1951, Leon Poliakov (34, p.10) employed another procedure of direct estimation: the adding up of the number of victims of the principal extermination camps (Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno and Ausch­witz) as well as those of the "Einsatzgruppen." He thus reached a total of 5,300,000 without "taking into account innumerable deaths by famine, by sickness, etc., in the vast ghettos of Poland, in numerous work camps scattered across all of Europe." The idea of this procedure of direct calculation is right: nevertheless, the number of victims of the camps and of the Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units) are known only approximatively, so that uncertainties are not always avoided. In addi­tion, as the author underscored, a no doubt considerable number of deaths outside of the camps and the operations of the Einsatzgruppen escape it completely.

What is nonetheless striking is the fact that whatever the method em­ployed, the figure obtained is always about six million; and on the basis of a calculation deliberately limited to the lowest data, such as that of G. Reitlinger, ones arrives even so at more than four million.

2. Rassinier's figures and his methods

Rassinier, conscious of the crushing weight which similar massacres cast on the reputation of the Third Reich, its chiefs, its elite SS, sought by all possible means to demonstrate that the six million victims were but a scandalous invention of omnipotent world Judaism.

He consacrated more than two hundred pages to this demonstration in his works. He came back to it constantly and poured out quantities of astute arguments, cleverly constructed mistakes and false, unfounded affirmations to reach the following conclusion: there were not six million

140

Rassinier's Figures and his Methods

people massacred, but only 500,000 to 1,000,000 (39, pp. 64-65), or rather 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 (40, p. 94) or 896,892 to 1,485,292 (41, p. 210-211).

He reached these figures by astutely mixing reasonings and false information with semblances of demographic calculations. The lines of argument are often completely absurd; the information was taken from highly debatable sources when not notoriously false. The demo­graphic data were gleaned without any discernment at one time in this work, at another time more simply in a newspaper article presenting no guarantee of seriousness. Sometimes they were taken from an improvised speech not claiming to be an exact piece of reasoning, or even from a chance declaration having but a very distant connection with the problem of the victims of the "final solution." All of this hotch-potch was put together by Rassinier to stupefy the reader and lead him to blindly accept the former's "conclusions."

A few examples will clearly illustrate Rassinier's methods. The sole difficulty lies in the fact that there are only too many of these examples to choose from.

Here is the first, very simple specimen: Rassinier approached (41, p. 114) the problem of the number of Jews living in Russia, and he cited the total of two to three million in 1962 according to the estimate of the "Institute of Jewish Affairs" in London. But that did not seem serious to him, "if one believes M. N ahoum Goldmann," who himself mentioned the figure of three million in 1963. According to Rassinier, this proved that the "statistics of Jewish origin" were falsified. It is to be pointed out that M. Goldmann did not at all discuss the problem of the number of Jews in Russia, but rather that of their position in that country; and the statistics remain in this context without importance. If Rassinier had not sought to confuse one of the most simple problems and to create doubt for his reader, it would have been very easy for him to satisfy his curiosity by examining the results of the official census of the population of the USSR by "nationality." He would have thus learnt that in 1959 there were 2,268,000 Jews in that country.

Since we are considering the problem of the Jews in Russia, another example comes to mind of the "seriousness" of Rassinier's work. On numerous occasions, he quoted an article by a Soviet Jewish journalist, David Bergelson. The latter had written on December 5, 1942, in the Yiddish paper published in Moscow and known to Rassinier thanks to the newspaper, "Der Weg," of Buenos Aires (January 1953) that "due to the evacuation (inside Russia, G. W.) the majority (80%) of the Jews from the Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania and Latavia were saved." Rassinier unreservedly accepted this information. It allowed him to figure up that in the Baltic countries alone there were" 196,000 certain survivors" and "49,000 missing in 1945" (41, pp. 177-178). The reader should be informed that Bergelson was a journalist who belonged to an ad hoc Jewish "Committee" in the USSR at the end of 1941. It

141

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

was entrusted by the government with obtaining the instinctive attraction and the financial support of American Jews for Russia at war. The C.om­mittee was liquidated after the war; and its leaders, including Bergelson, were shot.

Rassinier did not ask what credit could be given to a pwpaganda article in favour of a country living through dark hours of its history, nor how a simple journalist could have obtained the information in question during the chaos of the battle of Stalingrad. He did not ask how the Rus­sians could evacuate 80% of the Jews from the Baltic countries which had. been cut off from Russia by the lightning advance of the German armies during the first days of the "Blitzkrieg," when the Soviet troops themselves had not the time to save themselves from being encircled, nor to avoid being captured. Instead of taking his information without any discrimination, Rassinier could have read the secret report dated January 31, 1942, of the SS-Obergruppenfiihrer commanding the "Ein­satzgruppe A." Important extracts from it were published in French as of 1949 through the good offices of the Center of Contemportary Jewish Documentation (32, pp. 286-287). He would have thus learnt that on the date of October 25, 1941, the number of Jews that had been executed was 123, 930 among whom: .

In Lithuania In Latvia

80,311. ~ t 5.500 liquidated in the pogroms 30,025 5

In Estonia 474 In White Ruthenia 7,620

TOTAL 118,430 + 5,500 123,930

~

Moreover, in Latvia, for example, there were still 28,000 persons in Riga, 24,000 of whom were already shut up in the ghetto. Other ghettos existed "in other cities still peopled by a sufficient number of Jews ... " (32, p. 285). And seven months later, in the report dated June 12, 1942, one may read (32, pp. 308-309):

" ... After the entry of the German troops, there were still 70,000 .Jews in Latvia, whereas the others had fled with the Bolshevik armies that were retreating. ( ... ) Presently, but few Jews, who are employed as specialists, are still in the ghettos. It is a question here of the following figures: in Riga about 2,500; in Dunabourg about 950; in Libau about 300. Leaving these Jews out of account, Latvia has in the meantime been freed of its Jews."

142

Rassinier's Figures and his Methods

According to the 1935 census, there were 93,479 Jews in Latvia; so that the 70,000 persons that the German troops found upon their arri­val in Latvia in June 1941 represent 75% of the total population who were surely not "saved," instead of the 80 % "of certain survivors" discovered by Rassinier. Moreover, the comparison between the 123,930 people killed as of October 1941 in the Baltic countries and the "49,000 missing in 1945" according to Rassinier, provides a new occasion to judge his self-conceit and his frivolity. That is how he wrote history.

3. The Hungarian Chapter

The last example exposing Rassinier's methods concerns the deporta­tion of the Hungarian Jews in 1944. Rassinier came back to the problem innumerable times for two reasons: the first is that he was desperately seeking to discredit a book by a Jew deported from Hungary, Myklos Nyiszli, who described the operation of the gas chambers at Auschwitz and indicated the frequency of the arrival of the convoys; the second is that he had his own ideas on the subject. The least in­coherent of these ideas takes up ten pages in his book, "The Drama of the European Jews" (41, pp. 150-190). It may be summed up in the following manner: different Jewish sources, including the Tribunal of Jerusalem which judged Eichmann in 1961, fix the number of Jews de­ported from Hungary in 1944 at more than 400,000 persons transferred in two months by 147 trains of 3,000 people each following each other at a rhythm of two to three per day. Rassinier revolted against such inventions and showed that it was materially "impossible" and therefore completely false. He advanced two reasons to explain why it was impossible. First of all, according to Kasztner (one of the leaders of the Jewish community of Budapest), the "Eichmann Kommando" dis­posed of but 1,000 railway cars of which "only two-thirds could be affected to the deportation, hardly more. Let's say 700," conceded Rassinier. The three hundred remaining cars, according to Rassinier, were used to bring the future deportees to the assembly point. Further­more, personal experience of the deportation showed Rassinier that the gathering together, the setting them on their way from the assembly-point to the train, the embarking of only 3,000 persons in the train required "a good half-day," whereas the single voyage from Hungary to Ausch­witz, by his calculations, required four days plus an a additional four days for the return of the empty cars. The consequence was that in few days "the system was blocked." Finally, Rassinier's personal exper­ience allowed him to affirm that to guard 147 trains at the rate of two to three per day during two months, Eichmann had to dispose of 22,050 policemen; whereas he (Rassinier) could affirm that it was impossiple to transport 3,000 persons in a convoy. For all of these reasons and for many others of the same nature, Rassinier reached the conclusion that there were really 77 trains instead of 147, transporting

143

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

"at the maximum" 2,400 persons in 30 cars instead of 3,000 at 80 per car. All of this gives a total of 200,000 deportees instead of 434,351 retained by the Tribunal of Jerusalem or of 500,000 mentioned by th~ Kasztner report.

All of these highly developed divagations were intended to impress the reader with the competence of a "specialist on the deportations," whose opinions were to be accepted without discussion.

Here is the reality such as it appears from a series of telex and secret reports ("Nur als Verschlussache zu behandeln") sent to Berlin by the German Ambassador to Budapest and SS-Brigadefiihrer Veesen­mayer. Anyone may consult them freely in the archives of the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris (11).

This series begins with the telegram dated April 28, 1944 (No 1108), which is thus drafted. "Today the first transport of 1,800 Jews between sixteen and fifty years of age and fit to work has left Budapest. To~ morrow a new train of 2,000 Jews fit. to work will leave Topolya." The series g<?es up to July 9, 1944; and the ensemble of the operations (tS summed up in a telegram of October 28, 1944, which reads: "Total number of Jews in Hungary on March 19 of this year, about 800,000. Already transported into the territory of the Reich, about 430,000. Jewish work force of the Hungarian Army about 150,000. In the region of Budapest about 200,000."

And here are the details: Deportations of the Hungarian Jews

(Accordmg to the secret reports of Veesenmayer, German Ambassador to BUdapest). (Archives of the C.D.J.e. of Paris, classification numbers CLXXXIX-22, 25~28, 33. 37, 39 40 et 46)

Interval Total number Number of Average Dates between of deportees deportees number

af the reports two succes- on the dates between two of deportees. sive reports indicated successive each day

renarts

I 4,28 and i9- 2 days 3,1\00 1.800 1944 2.000

I 5-18-1944 19 days 23,363 19.563 1.030 6-7-1944 20 days 273,949 250.586 12.529

6-13-1944 6 days 303,499 29.550 4.925 6-14-1944 1 day 316,803 13.304 13.304 6-15-1944 1 dav 324,005 7.202 7.202 6-25-1944 10 day~ 351,850 27.845 2.784 7-1-1944 6 days 377,601 25.751 4.292 7c6-1944 5 days 381,661 4.060 801 7-9-1944 3 days 429,028 47.367 15.789

73 days 5.877

144

The Hungarian Chapter

These data merit a brief observation. It can be seen that by calcu­lating the average number of deportees per day, one establishes .that it is nearly 6,000 and that several times it exceeds 10,000. Once it even reached 15,789. This gives a particularly grotesque meanil1~ to Rassinier's comments concerning Dr. Nyiszli's account. The former wrote: "it is clearly obvious that the five trains per day, of 4,000 persons each at one point in his testimony and of 5,000 at another, were an imbecility ... (41, p. 189). However, Veesenmayer wrote in the secret telegram of May 4, 1944, that "the transfer of 310,000 Jews ( ... ) is to begin in the middle of May: four transports of 3,000 Jews each are plan­ned each day" (32, p. 235). We thus have all of the elements necessary to decide where the imbecility was to be found.

4. The Korherr Report

It is not conceivable that the administration of the Third Reich could not realize the number of victims of the "final solution." This obvious fact has been fully confirmed by the Korherr report which was found in the mass of documents assembled at the time of the preparation of the first important trial of Nuremberg.

Its history is the following. On January 18, 1943, Himmler ordered Korherr, "Inspekteur fUr

Statistik" of the SS, to draw up a report on "The Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe" ("Die Endlosung der europaischen Juden­frage") (12). The latter complied and on March 23, 1943, sent a sixteen-page report to the SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer Dr. R. Brandt, of the personal staff of the Reichsfiihrer SS Himmler. The statistics ended at the date of December 31, 1942 (12). On April 9, 1943, Himmler wrote to the Chief of the Sipo and of the SD that he found Korherr's report to be excellent because it could later serve as camouflage but that for the moment he forbade its diffusion. In the future he wanted to receive short monthly reports concerning the number of Jews evacuated and how many still remained (13).

(" Ich halte diesen Bericht als allenfallsiges Material fUr spatere Zeiten, und zwar zu Tarnungszwecken filr recht ~ut. 1m Augenblick darf er werder Veroffentlicht noch weitergegeben werden ( ... ). In den kurzen Monatsmel­dungen des Sicherheitspolizei will ich ledeglich mitgeteilt bekommen, was monatlich abgefahren worden ist und was zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch an Juden ubrig blieb.")

See Appendix A for the first unabridged publication of the two Korherr reports. The original German text is followed by an Engish translation. Information is also provided concerning Korherr's past and present activities (Editor'S note).

145

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

The next day, April 10, R. Brandt informed Korherr that his report had been received by Himmler who wished that "nowhere it be spoken of the "special action applied to the Jews." ("Er wunscht, dass an keiner Stelle von "Sonderbehandung des Juden" gesprochen wird") (14). In fact, the following sentence is found on page 10 of the Korherr Report: "Total of the evacuations (including Theresienstadt and also the Special Action... 1,873,539." ("Evakuierungen insgesamt einschl. Theresienstadt und einschl. Sonderbehandlung") (14). In the mean­time, on April 1, 1943, Himmler ordered Korherr to draft a summary of his report "to be presented to Hitler" ("zur Vorlage an den Fuhrer"). The result was a report of six and one-half pages addressed to Dr. Brandt on April 19, 1943. The statistical data are completed until March 31, 1943 (15,35).

All of this correspondance, which is stamped "Geheime Reichssache" (" State Secret "), is very edifying. It shows in fact that the results of the "final solution" interested Hitler himself as much as Himmler, that 'I is to say, the summit of the regime. On the other hand, thanks to the gaffe of Korherr, one has, were it necessary, a confirmation coming from the top that the "Sonderbehandlung der J uden" was an operation so un acknowledgeable that it was to be carefully camouflaged under the term still more innocent of "evacuation" even in a report for internal internal use of the SS. By the same occasion we henceforth know that the heading "evacuations" of the Korherr Report covered the .. Sonderbehandlung. "

It is so clear that the Korherr Report does not permit knowledge of the total number of victims of the "final solution" that it is hardly neces­sary to underscore it: the report stops at March 31, 1943. At the .#

present time, it is however possible to complete it on some points, which are precise and limited, due to documents coming from the Nazi admi­nistration which Korherr would surely have used had he continued his work after March 31, 1943. But the sole data of this report are already very largely sufficient to realize the folly of the Rassinier of all sorts, when they attack the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust and oppose to the figure of six million their grotesque lucubrations.

Let us examine first of all what the abridged report of six and one­half pages reveals on the subject of "evacuations."

146

I I

I

I

The Korherr Report

" EVACUA TrONS "

I Number of Period Number of I

Territory from .•. evacuees evacuees up to first

to 12-31-1942 12-31-1942 trimester 1943

Old Reich (region of 1-30-1933

100,516

I~ Slldetenland

I included) (9-29-1938)

Austria 3-13-1938 47,555 I

Bohemia and 3-16-1939 69,677 113,015 Moravia

I I Regions 0 f the

Sept. 1939 ~ I East (with

(june 1940) 222,117 I

Bialystok)

General Sept. 1939

I Government 1,274,166 (with Lemberg)

(june 1940)

France (occupied before 41,911 7,995

zone) 11-10-1942

Holland " 38,571 13,832

Belgium " 16,886 1,616

Norway " 532 158

Greece " - 13,435

Slovakia " 56,691 854 I I

Croatia " 4,927 I

- I Bulgaria " - I 11,364

Regions of Russia, i including the Baltic

countries, since 633,000

the beginning of the campaign in the East

TOTAL = 2,506,849 + 162,269

GENERAL TOTAL = 2,669,118

147

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

This table calls for a few remarks. 1) Korherr wrote on the subject of the statIstIcs of his report that

were included "but partially the deaths of Jews in the occupied regions of the East, whereas the deaths which occurred in the rest of Russia and in the zone of the front are not at all included in it." Thus one is warned that the total of 2,669,118 "evacuees" is incomplete, that it is notoriously too low. The expression "deaths which occurred ... in the zone of the front" seems to exclude from this accountancy the operations of the "Einsatzgruppen" which acted precisely "in the zone of the front," immediately following the front-line troops of the Wehrmacht to whose authority this zone was subordinated. It is a gap and no doubt a con­siderable one. We shall come back to it shortly.

2) It may be asked what value may be attributed to Korherr's work. His great responsibilities within the SS, his indiscutable competence in statistics, the fact that the addressees of his report are Hitler and Himmler, whose brutality in case of sanctions is well-known, are already serious guarantees. But one may go still farther. In fact, in the casy', of at least two countries it is possible to verify the accuracy of Korherr's( data and at the same time to realize that he drew them from authentic reports of the "competent services." The countries are France and Belgium where, for the periods up to 12-31-42 and from 1-1 to 3-31-43, the number of deportees, as well as the dates and the place of deporta­tion are known with certainty owing to the nominative lists of the per-50ns of each convoy. These were established in several copies which were found after the liberation in the files of the "J udenreferat" of Paris and are conserved in the archives of the C.D.J.C. At the depar-t ure of the train, the "J udenreferat" confided two lists to the chief of the escort and communicated the others:

a) to the Inspectorship of the Concentration Camps in Oranienburg. b) to the Service IV B4 of Eichmann in Berlin and to c) the camp of destination.

This permits us to know the exact number of ,Jews deported from ... France at the date of 12-31-42 and between this date and 3-31-43 (27,46,50). An analogous situation is found in Belgium (26).

Insofar as France is concerned, on 12-31-42 the number of persons marked on the nominative lists is 41,951, instead of 41,911, the figure given by Korherr (27). Between 12-31-42 and 3-31-43 the number of persons accordings to the name lists is equal to 8,001 (7,995 indicated by Korherr). Thus, out of almost 50,000 persons, the difference is of 46 people or of 0.09%. That means that in the case of France the sta­tistics of Korherr are remarkably verified.

In the case of Belgium, the count according to the name lists is of 16,861 until 12-31-42 and between this date and 3-31-43 of 1,604. Korherr indicated 16,886 and 1,616 respectively. The discrepancy is of 37 persons out of 18,500 or 0.20%. One may therefore consider Korherr's work as worthy of confidence. It is obvious that it is based on first-hand information coming from either the "Inspectorship of the

148

The Korherr Report

Concentration Camps" at Oranienburg and/or from Eichmann's service in Berlin.

5. The KOTherr Report Completed

As we have seen, Korherr's statistics stop at the date of 3-31-43, at the end of the first year of the deportations of the Jews which had begun in March 1942, but continued for another year and a half. His data are thus very partial; and we know that even for the periods chosen by Korherr they are incomplete, at the very least in respect to the occupied regions of Russia. Yet at the current time it is possible to complete them, notably for the following four countries-France, Belgium, Holland and Hungary- always taking as a basis the incontestable sources of the Nazi administration. There is no doubt that if Korherr had continued his work as Himmler ordered, he would have utilized these sources. It is plausible that the rest of the report that we know today will even­tually be discovered in the mass of documents of the SS which still remain unstudied.

In fact, in France and in Belgium the number of convoys of Jews deported and the number of persons that they carried away are known; and this is true up to the liberation of these two countries in the same way that we know them until 3-31-43 (26,27,46,50,52). As far as Hol­land is concerned, the archives of the Gestapo have been found, notably' those of 106,000 persons interned at the camp of Westerbork and deported in 98 convoys, with the exclusion of 918 people liberated in 1945 as well as those of 5 convoys set out from Apeldoorn, Amsterdam and Vught (3 convoys). Among these 103 convoys, 67 were directed to Auschwitz, 19 to Sobibor, 6 to Theresienstadt, 9 to Bergen-Belsen and 2 to Ravensbruck. The total number of deportees is 105,000. This data was published through the good offices of the Dutch Red Cross in four parts published in 1947, 48, 52 and 53 under the general title of "Auschwitz." Finally, the statistics concerning the deportations of Jews from Hungary are known from the reports of the Ambassador of the Third Reich to Budapest.

If one takes into account the figures thus known, the Korherr report is completed in the following manner:

Number of Difference to be Country Total number deportees added to the

of deportees appearing in the Korherr report Korherr report

France .75,721 (a) 49,906 25,815

Belgium 25,437 (b) 18,502 6,935

Holland 105,000 (c) 52,403 52,597

Hungary 429,028 (d) - 429,028

Total 514,375 Total of the Korherr report, more than 2,669,118 New total, more than 3,183,493

149

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

(a) 27, p. 13. (b) 28, pp. 108-9. (c) "Auschwitz", Het Nederlansche Rood Kruis, Gravenhage, vol. I,

pp. 4-5, 1947. (d) 11. Before continuing farther in our investigation, it is interesting to

underscore that the some 3,000,000 victims of the" final solution" found while using as a basis the incomplete accountancy of the Nazi admini­station itself, already exceed two to six times the whimsical figures advanced by Rassinier (500,000 to 1,500,000).

6. Genocide in the USSR, in the Baltic Countries and in Bessarabia

The great unknown in the Korherr Report concerns the number of Soviet Jews victims of the "final solution." A conjunction of circum­stances allows one to bridge this gap if not with complete certainty, at ( least with a great probability of coming close to the real facts. The ( USSR is one of those countries where the "nationality" of the citizens is obligatorily part of the civil status. In this way, the exact number of "Jews" of the USSR has been known for a long time, just as the number of "Russians," "Ukrainians," "Armenians," etc. One is thus not reduced to "estimates." On the other hand, the USSR is a coun­try where emigration and immigration are very slight, so that the results of the census of the population at different epochs are comparable and sure. Finally, luck has it that the last census before the war dates from 1939, or just before the hostilities. The conditions are therefore very favourable for following the fluctuations in the number of Soviet citizens, notably those of the Jewish population, between periods suffi­ciently long to cancel out the effects of accidental causes.

Nevertheless, to make valid comparisons, the border changes of the USSR before and after the war must be taken into account. This problem is well-known and does not raise insurmountable difficulties. In fact, ~ on September 28, 1939, a part of eastern Poland was occupied by Soviet troops, but without annexation. On August 16, 1945, a part of these territories was ceded by restored Poland to the USSR, but with the right for these populations to leave Russia and rejoin Poland. It is obvious that a certain number of those concerned did not take advantage of this right, remained definitively in the USSR and became Soviet citi­zens of Polish nationality. The number of these latter did in fact more than double between the censuses of 1939 and 1959, as one can see below. To our knowledge, it is unknown at the time of the present writing if Jews originally from the same ex-Polish territories which had become Soviet, and who could have found themselves following the events of the war in USSR, all went back to Poland or, rather, if a least a part of them stayed in Russia becoming Soviet citizens and thereby increasing the effectives of the Jews recorded in 1959 without having been deducted in 1939. This unknown can be a source of errors in

150

The Korherr Report

our attempt to calculate the Jewish losses in Russia. It does not, however, seem that this eventual error would change the data of the problem considerably. In any case, if there is an error, it goes in the direction of the diminution of the calculated number of Jewish victims in Russia.

In August 1940, the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became Soviet Republics; and Lithuania acquired the region of Vilno to the detriment of Poland. After the war, this allocation of territories was confirmed. Finally, in June 1940, Rumania had to cede Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the USSR, into which they were incorporated. This situation was confirmed in 1944.

Thus the annexation of the Baltic countries and of Bessarabia had brought definitively to the USSR in 1940 a Jewish population whose importance was the following (the number of Jews in Estonia ar....d in Finnish Carelia was negligible):

Lithuania (census of 1939), with Viloo ................. ·269,600 Memel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,000 Latvia (census of 1935) .............................. 93,479 Bessarabia (census of 1941) .......................... 290,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 562,079

This said, let us look at the results (abridged) of three censuses of the population of the USSR, among which that of 1959-twenty years after the beginning of the war-when the return of the ex-Polish populations to Poland was definitively ended and the situation after the war stabilized. Let us add that the emigration of the Soviet Jews to Israel began on a discern able scale only in 1971, twelve years later.

7. Results of the Census by Nationality of the Population of the USSR

Population 1926 (54) 1939 (54) 1959 (55) 1959/1939

Total 147.028.000 170.467.000 208.826.000 1,22 Russians 77.791.000 99.020.000 114.588.000 1,16 Ukrainians 31.195.000 28.070.000 36.981.000 1,32 Bielorussians 4.739.000 5.267.000 7.829.000 1,49 Poles 792.000 627.000 1.380.000 2,20 Rumanians 279.000 260.000 2.214.000 8,51 Estonians 156.000 142.000 1.400.000 6,82 Latvians 154.000 127.000 969.000 11,02 Lithuanians 43.000 32.000 2.326.000 72,69 Georgians 1.821.000 2.240.000 2.650.000 1,18 Armenians 1.568.000 2.152.000 2.787.000 1,29 Germans 1.247.000 1.424.000 1.619.000 1,14 Jews 2.672.000 3.020.000 2.268.000 0,75

151

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

What is striking is to see that of all the nationalities the Jews are the only people whose population in 1959 is less than in 1939 and even in 1926, and this despite a contribution of nearly 700,000 persons in 1940 coming from the Baltic countries and from Bessarabia. The effectives of all the other nationalities increased between 1939 and 1959. In the case of the Russians, the Georgians, the Armenians and the Germans, it is certainly due to natural growth. In other cases­Ukrainians, Bielorussians-to an increase somewhat exaggerated, no doubt, following the annexations of regions in which these nationalities were relatively numerous. In the case of the Poles and especially that of the Rumanians, the Estonians, the Lithuanians and the Latvians, there is a fantastic leap forward which is evidently explained by annexa­tion. No less evident is the explanation of the considerable and speci­fic decreases in the Jewish population after 1939: they are consequences of the" final solution."

This analysis can be improved and it allows one to figure up these consequences with a good approximation. In fact, one may consider /l the years from 1926 to 1939 as a reference period for the growth l

of the population of the USSR: it begins five years after the end of the civil war, with the recovery due to the "new economic policy;" and despite the very numerous upheavals which characterize the history of Russia during the Thirties, it remains relatively stable from the demographic point of view. In any event, it is much more stable than the period which succeeds it with the war from 1941 to 1945, the invasion of vast territories, the heavy military and civilian human losses, and the long absence from their homes of young people at the age of procreation. By calculating the annual growth rate in the conditions of the USSR during the period, 1926-39, it is possible afterwards to extrapolate for the following twenty years by thus determining what its numerical value should "normally" have been in 1959. A comparison of the value thus calculated with the one really ascertained by the census allows one to figure up, with good probability, the consequences in human losses of the war years.

The problem of highest priority for us is that of the Jewish population. However, it is instructive to compare the results of the calculation obtained in the case of other nationalities numerically comparable to the Jewish population and for whom the effects of the war were not specifically grave. Such are the cases of the Georgians, the Armenians and the Germans. In fact, the Georgian and Armenian Republics suffered a short-lived occupation, without particular violence on the part of the occupier. As for the Germans in the USSR, thei were in large part deported to Siberia in 1941, where they lived in material conditions which were certainly difficult, but less dramatic than those, for example, of the Ukrainians or the Bielorussians. Also, the s~paration of the sexes did not take place because they were not mobilized into the army. Finally, after the war, there was a small immigration of 50,000 Armenians, which is numerically negligible, who came to USSR from eastern Asia and from Europe. As for the Germans of the

152

The Korherr Report

Baltic countries and the region of Konigsberg, all of which had been annexed, they immigrated massively to Germany progressively with· the retreat of the Wehrmacht. The number of those among them who could have augmented the number of Soviet Germans is thus very minor.

Let us therefore sum up the results of the censuses for the four natio­nalities mentioned:

Nationality 1926 1939 1959 Increase in

13 years (1926-39) 1 year

Georgians 1.821.000 2.240.000 2.650.000 + 419.000 + 32.230 = 1.77 "/n Armenians 1.568.000 2.152.000 2.787.000 + 584.000 + 44.920 = 2.86 "/0 Germans 1.247.000 1.424.000 1.619.000 + 177.000 + 13.610 = 1.09 "/0 Jews .2,672.000 3.020.000 2.268.000 + 348.000 + 26.770 = 1.00 "/0

As of 1939 + 662.079 3.682.079

Extrapolation 1926-1959 == 33 years

Population :

Nationality 1920 1959 real

calculated

Georgians : 1.821.100+ (1.77 % X 33 = 58,41 %) = 1.821.100 +1.063.646 91.9 0J0 = 2,884,646

Armenians: 1.568.000+ (2,86% X 33 = 94,38"/0) = l.5()8.000 + 1.479.878 91.4 0J0 = 3,047,878

Germans : 1.247.000+ (1.09"/0 X 33 = 35,97%) = 1.247.000 + 448.546 95.4 "/0 = 1,695,546

By calculation, the numerical values of the Georgian and Armenian porulations of 1959 are found again save 8% and those of the Germans save 4.5%, which would be a highly satisfactory rate of precision. In reality, the deficits thus discovered in these three cases are certainly not due to the imprecision of the method of calculation employed, but rather to the destructive effects of the war: loss in lives and separation of the sexes. As one could expect, for the reasons exposed. above, these effects are distinctly less grave in the case of the Germans than in those of the two other populations.

The case of the Jewish population of the USSR within its borders of 1939 is different from that of the Georgians, the Armenians and the Germans in that one must consider that between 1942 and 1945 its natural growth was not only slowed down, but reduced to a very low level. Korherr indicates, for example, that during the first trimester of 1943, in Germany itself, 22 births were registered as opposed to 1,113 deaths among the Jewish population still at liberty. So therefore if one leaves completely out of account the natural growth of the Jewish

153

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

population of the USSR from 1942 and until 1945 (extremely rigourous hypothesis and probably excessive), it is necessary to calculate on the one hand the numerical value of this population in 1942 and on the othe hand in 1945. To obtain the first datum, it suffices to add to the number of Jews in 1939 the rate of growth still normal for the three following years. To obtain their number in 1945, to deduct from the number of Jews in 1959 the rate of growth for the fourteen preceding years.

Here are the results of this calculation:

1) Jewish population in 1942: 3,682,079 + (1 % x 3 = 3 %) = 3,682,079 + 110,462 = 3,792,541 2) Jewish population in 1945: 2,268,000-(1 % x 14 = 14 %) = 2,268,000-317,520 = 1,950,480

Deficit: 1,842,061 (3,792,541 - 1,950,480).

Jewish population in 1945 =-= 51.4 %

Jewish population in 1942

Thus, in the case of the Jews, the enormous deficit is 48.6 %: nearly half of the Soviet Jews (the only ones indicated in the censuses) within the borders of the USSR enlarged in 1939 and restored since 1945 are missing at the roll-call; and among all the nationalities composing the USSR they are the only ones in this situation. It is not a question of "evacuees" nor of deportees, nor of emigrants because there were no even slightly perceptible possibilities of emigration for the Soviet

. Jews until 1959. They were even excluded from the mass of Soviet civilians brought by force to Europe during the war as "workers." It is a question of deaths, of more than 1,800,000 deaths. It is the "final solution of the Jewish question" in all its horror.

8. Number of Victims Recorded

A Part of this deficit of 1,842,061 is marked in the Korherr Report under the heading "evacuees" from "regions of Russia, includ­ing the Baltic countries" (see above) )Vhere it is numbered at 633,300. The difference between these two figures is 1,208,761 which must be added to the preceding total of 3,183,493 to complete the Korherr Report concerning the USSR in its boundaries of 1945. One thus reaches a new total of 4,392,257 "evacuees."

The new total is from three to nine times superior to the one "deter­mined" by Rassinier. This once again shows the delirious nature of the "works" of this "historian."

But that is not yet the end of the information which Korherr delivers to us in his report. On the subject of deaths, he mentions two categories:

154

(I

The Korherr Report

a) Excess of mortality in the Old Reich + Sudetenland + Austria +Bohemia and Moravia from 1933 to March 31,1943 ., 83,889

b) Deaths in the concentration camps from 1933 to December 31, 1942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,347

On the subject of captives on December 31, 1942, the four following categories are presented:

c) The ghettos .................................... 297,914 d) The work camps ................................ 185,776 e) The concentration camps ............................ 9,127 f) The prisons ........ '................................ 458

Total .................. 604,511 , Preceding total ......... 4,392,254 New total .............. 4,996,765

. These data merit a few precise details.

In the first place, it is necessary to underscore that out of a total of 4,996,765 direct victims of the anti-Jewish persecution enumerated until present, there are 4,392,254 "evacuees," that is to say, 87.9%. Among the latter 1,953,297 (44.5%) are in reality dead: on the one hand, the 1,842,016 missing at the census in Russia and, on the other hand, those accounted for by Korherr under the heading "excess of mortality" (83,889) and "deaths in the concentration camps" (27,347).

"Excess of mortality" is commented upon by Korherr in the abridged report in the following manner: "The extraordinary excess of mor­tality of the Jews of the Old Reich stems from the senility and vital weakness of Judaism as well as from it great mortality: in the first trimester of 1943, 22 births were recorded and 1,113 deaths."

In the text of the detailed report of sixteen pages, very numerous suicides are mentioned. That means that in 1942, in Germany itself, births are practically inexistant and the "extraordinary" "natural" mor­tality is explained by suicides.

The "deaths in the concentration camps" obviously relate to the persons arrested in Germany since the "rise to power"; among them 27,347 are dead and 9,127 are still alive on December 31,1942 (the latter are found under our heading "captives in the concentration camps "). To be accounted for apart, it is obvious that these dead and these captives were arrested for other motives than the measures of "evacuation." Are they persons arrested for political motives or those of common law? The same question may be raised as to the 458 persons incarcerated in the prisons.

Insofar as the ghettos are, concerned, in the detailed report seven large ones in Poland appear, with their effectives on 12-31-42. The

155

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

size of the ghetto of Warsaw is indicated as equal to 50,000 persons, which is perhaps inferior to the actual number. In fact, in his report concerning the liquidation of this ghetto in May 1943, following the second uprising, the SS-Brigadefiihrer Stroop boasts of having captured and exterminated 56,065 people. Let us add that the systematic and total destruction of the ghettos in Poland began in the second half of 1942 with numerous murders and the transfer of the survivors to the concentration camps.

The work camps enumerated in the Korherr Report, with their effectives at the beginning of 1943, are those which were found in Germany in the regions of Konigsberg, of Breslau and in Posnania. In the actual state of our knowledge, it is impossible for us to complete the data of Korherr on this subject beyond the beginning of 1943. What is known is that the conditions of existence in these camps were as harsh as those which prevailed in the concentration camps, less the gas chambers and ·)he selections. Their liquidation by the sending of the survivors to the concentration camps began in the middle of 1944.

The next to the last category of persons of which mention is made in the Korherr Report is that of emigrants. Their census is given as of 12-31-42, and, according to countries, their numbers are the following:

Regions Period from .... '1 to 12-31-42 Number

Old Reich (region of Sudetenland 1-30-33 382,534 included) 9-29-38

Austria

I 3-13-38 149,124

Bohemia and Moravia 3-16-39 25,699 - 6

Regions of the East (with Bialystok) I Sept. 1939 334,673* .

Government General (with Lemberg) (June 1940) 427,no*

Total: 1,319,950 * Emigration and excess of mortality combined.

Of course the "emigrants" are a category of which the iqterest is relatively secondary when compared to other victims of the anti-Semitic persecution. But it is not useless to point out that progressive­ly, according to the conquests of the Wehrmacht, a certain number of "emigrants" were taken back from the countries which had received them and deported. For example, in the statistics concerning 75,721 Jewish deportees of the camp at Drancy classed by nationality, one finds 7,000 Germans, 4,500 Russians, 3,300 Rumanians, 2;500 Austrians, 26,300 Poles and a thousand Danzigers, Latvians, Lithuanians and

156

The Korherr Report

Czechoslovaks (27, p. 23). That means that the passage. from the category of "emigrant" to that of "evacuee" had taken place, and this underscores the relativity of the position of "emigrant" for a Jew in Europe during the Nazi era.

In general, the following citation from the Korherr Report well summarizes the finally limited and short-lived role that was played by emigration in the program of the "final solution": "From before the war, the Old Reich and Austria had gotten rid of more than half of their Jews especially by way of emigration, whereas in the East a rapid decrease vf the Jewish masses, dangerous because of their fecundity, began only after the outbreak of the war and above all since the mea­sure of evacuation of 1942."

Finally, the last category recorded by Korherr is that of the Jews still at liberty on December 31, 1942:

Regions Number

Old Reich .................. } 51,327 Sudetenland ................ Austria ......................... 8,102 Bohemia and Moravia ........ 15,550 Regions of the East .......... about 233,210

Total ....... '1 308,189

A recapitulation of the effectives of the different categories explored by Korherr until December 31, 1942 yields the table below:

Excess of mortality .....

At liberty ............ .

Emigrants ........... .

Ghettos ............. . Concentration camps ... . Work camps .......... , Prisons .............. . Evacuees ............ .

Total

83,8891

308 189 ~ Old Reich + Sudetenland , + Austria + Bohemia and

1,319,950 Moravia + Regions of the East + General Government

297,914 36,474

185,776 458

2,506,849

4,739,499

Poland

Greater Reich

Looking at this table one sees that at the date of 12-31-42 alone, in the total of all of the categories united, the "evacuees" represent more than half (52.9 %). One remarks that they are counted neither among the dead by natural death, which, nevertheless, includes the

157

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

suicides, nor among those who are not yet captives, nor among the emigrants, nor in the ghettos, nor in the concentration camps, nor in the work camps, nor in the prisons; and one then wonders where they could have been evacuated. Where were they hidden so that they could nowhere be found? The question is logical. Moreover, the Neo-Nazis affirm that the "evacuation" or the "Sonderbehandlung" meant nothing distressing, as the Jewish calumniators claim. So a second question: why are the "evacuations" designated by Korherr, with Himmler's approval, as the principal cause of the "rapid decrease of the Jewish masses?"

As long as the Rassinier of all kinds give no clear answer to these two legitimate questions, any man of common sense and sincer­ity will remain convinced that they were "evacuated" to extermination places such at Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno, etc ... where they were killed and their bodies destroyed.

9. Number of Dead and Survivors r!

This sini.ster fate is evident in the case of the 1,842,061 "missing" in Russia, to whom are related the 83,889 of the "excess of mortality" and the 27,347 "dead in the concentration camps" recorded by Korrherr; in all, 1,953,297 deaths.

It thus remains to detremine the destiny of still 3,043,468 persons: the" evacuees" (2,550,193 according to the completed Korherr Report and not including Russia), the captives of the ghettos (297,914), those detained in the work camps (185,776), in the concentration camps (9,127) and in the prisons (458).

We shall begin with the category which is the most important numer­ically, that of the "evacuee," according to the terminology imposed on Korherr by Himmler, and which, as we know, means the "Sonderbe­handlung. "

It is a question of persons arrested in different countries and trans­ported towards the extermination camps in Poland. It is necessary to distinguish two categories among these camps:

a) those where a part of the "evacuees" is immediately assassinated in the gas chambers, at the very arrival of the train, without being registered, and the other part admitted inside the camp to work in the factories, the mines, the work-shops, etc ... and which is enrolled. Such are the camps of Auschwitz and of Majdanek;

b) the extermination camps properly speaking where only a very sn;tall proportion of the" evacuees" are kept alive, just what is necessary to as­sure the functioning of the camp itself and where the overwhelming ma­jority of the "evacuees" are led directly to the gas chambers. Such are the camps of Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor, Treblinka.

Thus the essential difference between these two categories of camps lies in the fact that the "selection at the arrival of the convoy" leaves a certain number of "workers" alive in the first type; whereas in the second this number is minimal, if not negligible.

158

The Korherr Report

Among these camps, that of Auschwitz is by far the most gigantic (three large camps and thirty-nine auxiliaries scattered about a vast territory) and the most studied. It is possible to have a rather precise idea of the proportion of "gassed" on arrival and of "workers" enrolled at the camp of Auschwitz. In fact, the number of deportees to Ausch­witz from France, for example, is known from the archives of the Gestapo and the number of" enrolled" among them is known from the archives of Auschwitz. The difference between these two numbers corresponds to the number of "gassed" upon arrival. Here are a few results of this calculation: out of 61,953 deportees from France between August 3, 1942 (beginning of the systematic selections) and August 11, 1944 (last convoy), 41,696 persons, or 67.3 %, were sent to the gas chambers on arrival of the train (27, p. 13). The same calculation made in respect to the Belgian deportees demonstrates that out of 25,437 deportees be­tween August 4,1942, and July 31,1944,17,543 were gassed on arrival, or 68.9 % (26). In the case of the Jews deported from Greece, the same method shows that 76.6 % were gassed immediately. On the other hand, on December 16, 1942, the SS-Gruppenfiihrer Mliller, Chief of the Gestapo in the RSHA, wrote to Himmler that in the month of January 1943 Auschwitz would receive 45,000 Jews coming from the region of Bialystok, from the ghetto of Theresienstadt, from Holland and from Berlin among whom, "once the sorting out has been done, at least 10 to 15,000 workers (underlined) will be available after the assignment of the Jews arrived at Auschwitz" (32, p. 117). The proportion of "non-workers" is thus from 66.7 to 77.8 % of the totality of deportees. The average of all these percentages is 71.2 %, and it varies between 69.9 and 72.6 according to whether one takes into account one or the other figures appearing in Muller's letter. So much for the camp of Auschwitz.

In the case of the extermination camps properly speaking, of the type Treblinka or Belzec, similar calculations do not seem possible at the current moment because of the lack of precise data. What is neverthe­less certain is that the number of those selected for the gas chambers was surely much greater in these camps than at Auschwitz or Majdanek. If one thus admits for the entirety of the extermination camps of both categories the figures of 80 % of persons selected for the gas chambers and 20 % of "enrolled," one is very probably below the true figures for the "gassed." Nevertheless, that means that out of 2,550;193 "eva­cuees," 2,040,154 were killed in the gas chambers as soon as they arrived and 510,059 were enrolled as "workers."

An analagous fate was that of 297,914 persons counted by Korherr on December 31, 1942, in the ghettos: all of them sooner or later ended up by being "evacuated" to the extermination camps of one or the other category. It is therefore realistic in their case to admit the same rate of selection upon arrival: 80 % for the gas chambers and 20 % ad­mitted to the camps. That means 238,331 "gassed" without being enrolled and 59,583 "enrolled workers."

159

THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS

Added to the two preceding, figures, the total obtained is 2,278,485 gassed and 569,642 "workers."

To the latter are added the 185,776 persons who, according to Korherr, were already in the work camps as of December 31, 1942, the 9,127 others designated by Korherr as detained '-in the concentration camps" and 458 in the prisons. In all, 195,361 "workers" to add to the 569,642 identified above. One reaches a total of 765,003 persons "enrolled" and submitted to the murderous regime of the camps and whose fate must be determined.

Here we possess a certain number of precise points of reference. Thus Korherr in his report indicates that out of 36,474 Jews detained in the concentration camps in Germany, 27,347 were dead in December 31, 1942. This corresponds to a mortality rate of 75 %. In addition, the nominative list of deaths among the men of the convoy which left France on March 27, 1942, is preserved in the archives of Auschwitz. Out of 1,112 deportees of this convoy integrally admitted to the camp c:J

without selection on arrival, 70 % were dead in the course of the two first months and 83 % during the three first (52, p. 119). In the same way, out of 999 persons deported from France on June 22, 1942, and "enrolled" as a whole, at the end of 7 112 weeks, 747 had died, or 80 %. So its appears reasonable to admit that for the Jewish workers the mortality rate in the camps was about 80 % at the end of a few months. Nevertheless, it must be underscored that the statistics mentioned con­cern the French convoys of the second half of 1942, a period which was particularly murderous; and that the mortality rate in the camps, at all periods, naturally depended on the length of detention. The chances of survival were greater for the deportees in 1944 than for those admitted in 1943 and evidently more so than for those deported in 1942. Because of all this, it is more prudent to admit rather a morta-lity rate of 75 % than of 80 %.

By applying this last mortality rate to the 765,003 "workers" enume­rated by Korherr, the figures reached are of 574,752 dead and 191,251 definitive survivors.

At the end of this study and before concluding, it is essential to make a final remark which concerns the number of Soviet victims of the "final solution." In fact, we have been able to determine the number of dead among them at 1,842,061. But in all the categories of victims the number of dead is always inferior to the number of captives, for there are survivors. It is thus, for example, that among the 2,550,.193 "evacuees" of all the countries of Europe (without Russia), there are 2,422,683 dead and 127,510 survivors. There is no doubt that there were also survivors among the Soviet Jews, and there is every reason to believe that the proportion of dead and survivors in their case was the same as among other nationalities. If such is the case, to 1,842,061 dead must correspond 96,940 survivors; and thus the total number of Soviet Jews who were direct victims of the Nazi persecution was 1 ,939,001.

160

The Korherr Report

The entirety of our current knowledge on the number of victims of the "final solution" may be summed up in the following manner:

-,-

Categories Total Dead Survivors

"Evacuees" (with-out Russia) 2,550,193 2,422,683 127,510 "Excess Mortality" 83,889 83,889 Concentration Camps 36,474 34,192 2,282 Work Camps 185,776 139,332 46,444 Prisons 458 343 115 Ghettos (without Russia) 297,914 283,0115 14,896

Russia 1 ,939,001 1,842,061 96,940

TOTAL 5,093,673 4,805,518 288.17U

In conclusion, it may be affirmed at the current wntmg that out of 5,093,673 persons, 4,805,518 died (94.3%) and 288,170 survived (5.7%).

But once again it must be strongly underscored that these figures do not at all correspond to the total number of victims. This is because, on the one hand, for most of the countries Korherr's data s~op at March 31, 1943, and that in the current state of our knowledge, it seems im­possible to validly complete them. Such are the cases of Poland in its frontiers since 1945, of Norway, Greece, Slovakia, Croatia and Bulgaria. On the other hand, and for the same reasons, we have left aside from our preoccupations countries such as Italy, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

No doubt a day will come when the progress of our knowledge of Nazi sources will allow us to bridge these gaps. In the meantime, we have renounced trying to do so. This was all the more easily done because our objective was not to try to establish the total number of victims of the" final solution." It was rather only to demonstrate to the sincere reader all of the absurdity of the figures advanced by Rassinier and his pupils, who go far beyond the "master" in outrageousness.

It has been done thanks to Mr. "Inspekteur flir Statistik" of the SS and with the august approval of Mr. "SS-Reichsflihrer." More competent authority on the matter cannot be found.

] 61

Bibliography

1. Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, dem Staat Israel und den jUdischen Organisatoinen - Ed. Verlag « Allgem. Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland», Dusseldorf-Beneath, 1952.

H.G. ALDER, H. LANGBEIN et E. LING ENS-REINER : « Auschwitz, Zeugnisse und Breich­te». - Europ. Verlag, Francfort-sur-Main, 1962.

3. E. ARETZ : « Hexeneinrnaleins einer LUge,> - Ed. Franz v. Bebenburg, Phal, ] 970. 4. ARNDT 1. et SCHEFFLER W. - « Organi,ierter Massenmord an Juden in natif)nal

soialistischen Vernichtungslagern» - Vierteljahrshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte, 1976, No 2. 5. Auschwitz et Birkenau - Office fran,ais d'Edition, Paris 1945, 6. PERY BROAD: « Memoires du S.S. Pery Broad» - Ed. Pansl. Mus. Oswiencim. 7. J.G. BURG: « Sundenbocke», Ed. G. Fisher, Stuttgart, 1967. ~. A.R. BUTZ : « The Hoax of the Twentieth Century)', Noontide Press. Los Angeles, u.S.A.,

1977. 9. CHRISTOPHERSEN. - «Die Auschwitz LUge» - Cahier No 2, et!. Kritik-Verlag, Monskirch.

1~3. ' 10. Document CCXII-32 du C.D.J.C. (PS 1553), 11. Document CLXXXIX-22, 25-28, 33, 37, 39, 40, 46 du e.D.J.e. 12. Document CXXXVIII a-74 (NO 5195) du C.D.J.C. 13. Document CXXXVIII a-76 (NO 5197) du C.D.J.C. 14. Document CXXXVIII a-75 (NO 5196) du C.D.J.C. 15. Document CXXXVIII a-72 (NO 5193) du C.D.J.C, 16. Document CXXXVIII a-73 (NO 5194) du C.D.J.C. 17. Document CLXIII-2 (NI 11087) du C.D.J.C. 18. Document CLXIV-47 (NI 11397) du C.D.J.C. 19. Document CLXVU-12 (]\jl J2207) du C.D.J.e. 20. Document CLXVI-37 (NI 11984) du C.D.J.C. 21. R. FAURISSON : «Historia» no 369, aoat 1977, p. 132. 22. Hanuschritten von Miegliedern des Sonderkommandos. - Ed. Musee d'Auschwitz, 1972 23. R .. E. HARWOOD: « Did six Million Really Die?» - Histor. Rev. Presse Richmond, sans

date. 24. R. HOESS : « Le Commandant d'Auschwitz parle», Ed. Julliard, Paris, 1959. 25. JOFFROY P. - « L'Espion de Dieu» - Ed. Grasset, Paris, 1969. 26. Kl.ARSFELD S. - «Le Monde Juif », N° 83, 1976, ed. du C.D.J.C. 27. KLARSFELD S. - « Le Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France» - Ed. Klarsfeld

- 656 p. Paris 1978. 28. LANGBEIN H. - « Coup d'reil sur la litterature neo-nazie» - « Le Monde Juif », N" 78, 29. H. LANGBEIN: « Der Auschwitz Process. Eine Dokumentation», Europa VerI. Wien, 1965,

I. 1. 30. H. LANGBEIN: « Hommes et Femmes iI Auschwitz», Ed. Fayard, Paris, 1975. 31. LESTSCHINSKY J. - Congres Juif Mondial, 1946. 32. MONNERA Y H. - « La persecution des Juifs dans les pays de l'Est» presente iI Nuremberg

- Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1949. 33. POLIAKOV L. - « Le Breviaire de la haine» - Ed. Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1951. 34. POLIAKOV L. - « Six millions», « Evidences» - Nov. 1951, N° 21, p. 10. 35. POLIAKOV L. - « Note sur Ie chiffre total des victimes juives des persecutions raciales

pendant la derniere guerre» - Rev. d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, Paris, N" 24, 1956, p. 88.

36. POLIAKOV L. - « Le dossier Kurt Gerstein», « Le Monde Juif» - N° 36, 1964, ed. C.D.J.e. 37. POLIAKOV L. - « Nouveaux documents sur Kurt Gerstein», « Le Monde Juif» - N" 37,

1964, ed. e.D.J.C. 38. RASSINIER P. - « Le Mensonge d'Ulysse» - Ed. La Librairie fran,aise, Paris 4' edition,

1955. 39. RASSINIER P. - « Ulysse trahi par les siens» - Ed. La Librairie fran,aise, Paris, 1959. 40. RASSINIER P. - « Le veritable proces d'Eichmann» - Ed. Les Sept Couleurs, Paris, 1962. 42. RASSINIER P. - « Les responsables de la seconde guerre mondiale » - Ed. Nouvelles Editions, Paris, '1967. 43. REITLINGER G. - « The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 41. RASSINIER P. - « Le Drame Juif europeen» - Ed. Les Sept Couleurs, Paris, 1964.

1939-1945» - Ed. Beechhurst Press, New York, 1955. 44. ROEDER M. - « Die Auschwitz LUge» - Cahier N° 2, ed. Kritik-Verlag, Mohrkirch, 1973. 45. ROTHFELS H. - « Augenzeugenbericht zu -den Massenvergasungen» - Vierteljahrshefte fUr

Zeitgeschichte, 1953, N° 2. 46. RUTKOWSKI A. - « Les deportations des Juifs de France vers Auschwitz-Birkenau et

Sobibor» - « Le Monde Juif», N° 57-58, 1970, ed. C.D.J.C. 47. SCHEIDL F.J. - « Geschichte der Verfehmung Deutschlands. Die Warheit Uber die Million-

envergasung von Juden» - Vienne, vol. IV, p. 1967. 48. SCHLEGEL F. - « Wir werden niemals schweigen» - Ed. Heusenstamm, 1971. 49. J. SEHN : "Auschwitz-Birkenau», Ed. Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa, ]957. 50. STEINBERG L. - « Statistiques de la deportation des Juifs de France d'apres les dossi~rs

de la Gestapo», « Le Monde Juif» - N° 41, 1966. 51. R. VRBA et A. BESTIC. « I cannot Forgive», Ed. Sedgwick a. Jackson, 1963. 52. WELLERS G. - « L'Etoile jaune iI I'heure de Vichy» - Ed. Fayard, Paris 1973. 53. WELLERS G. - « Vichy et les Juifs», « Le Monde Juif» - N° 81, Paris 1976. 54. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 1962, vol. 19, p. 724. 55. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, World Atlas, 1961, p. 196.

162

Appendices

THE FIRST UNABRIDGED PUBLICATION OF THE TWO

KORHERR REPORTS

163

The First Korherr Report

Der Inspekteur fUr Statistik beim ReichsfUhrer SS

Geheime Reichssache

DIE ENDLOSUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN JUDENFRAGE

I II III IV V

VI VII VIII IX X

Statistischer Bericht

I n hal t

Vorbemerkung Die Judenbilanz in Deutschland JUdische Volksschwache Die Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland Die Evakuierung der Juden Die Juden in den Ghettos Die Juden in den Kon7.entrationslagern Juden in Justizvollzugsanstalten Der Arbeitseinsatz der Juden Europaische Judenbilanz

I. VORBEMERKUNG

Zur Anfstellung einer Bilanz Uber die Ergebnisse auf dem Wege zur Los­ung der Judenfrage bedarf es der zahlenmaBigen Erfassung des Juden-turns undseiner Entwicklung. Die WidersprUche in den Zahlenangaben Uber das Judentum machen jedoch eine Vorbemerkung dahingehend notig, daB Zahlen Uber das Judentum stets mit besonderem Vorbehalt aufzunehmen sind und ohne Kenntnis ihrer Quelle und Entstehung oft zu FehlschlUssen fUhren. Die Fehlerquellen liegen vor allem im Wesen des Judentums und seiner historischen Entwicklung, in seiner tausendjahrigen ruhelosen Wanderschaft, den zahllosen Aufnahmen und Austritten, den Angleichungs­bestrebungen, der Vermischung mit den Wirtvolkern, in dem BemUhen des Juden, sich unbemerkt der Erfassung zu entziehen, und schlieBlich in falschen oder falsch ausgelegten Statistiken Uber das Judentum.

DarUber hinaus hat die Statistik - teils als statistischer Notbehelf, teils wegen der weitgehenden tibereinstimmung zwischen jUdischem Glauben und jUdischer Rasse, teils in Unkenntnis des Rassegedankens, teils im reiigiosen Denken der jeweiligen Zeit befangen - bis zuletzt die Juden fast nie nach ihrer Rasse, sondern nach ihrem religiosen Bekenntnis er­faBt. Die Erfassung der Rasse setzt eine vieljahrige Schulung und auch Ahnenforschung voraus. Auch gestaltet sie sich schwierig, vor allem in sUdlichen und ostlichen Landern, weil trotz aller Vbereinstimmung eine einheitliche jUdische Rasse sich statistisch schwer abgrenzen lieB. Das Bekenntnis zum mosaischen oder israelitischen Glauben ist wieder kein vollgUltiges Beweismittel, weil es infolge der einstigen jUdischen Missionsbewegung mit ihrer Aufnahme von Nassen von Heiden und Christen, auch durch die Ubertritte zum Judentum in neuer Zeit durch Mischehen und "Bekehrung" nicht wenige Glaubensjuden nichtjUdischer Rasse gibt,wahrend

165

Appendix A

umgekehrt das Zwangschristentum und die im letzten Jahihundertwieder stark angestiegene Zahl der getauften Juden und daneben der Gemein­schaftslosen mit jUdischer Rasse die Judenzahl drUckten. So schatzte Leroy-Beaulieu 1893 den Verlust des Judentums durch das Christentum auf das Vier- bis Zehnfache seiner heutigen Anhanger, nach Maurice Fishberg und Mathias Mieses ist das Dreifache der heutigen Judenzahl im arischen Europa aufgegangen. Sogar Hans GUnther schatzt die Zahl der Juden in Deutschland auf das Doppelte der Zahl der Juden mosaischen Glaubens, die deutsche Staatsangehorige sind. SchlieBlich geht der litauische Jude Brutzkus so weit, die Berliner Juden nach ihrer Blut­zusammensetzung als reinere Europaer zu bezeichnen als die Deutschen in Berlin.

Entsprechend diesen Meinungen hat man die Anteile der Rassejuden samt Mischlinge in Europa vielfach dreimal so hoch als die der Glaubensjuden angenommen (in Osteuropa zweimal, in Mitteleuropa viermal, im Ubrigen Europa gar achtmal so hoch) und mit etwa 6vH mehr oder weniger jUdischem Blut in der europaischen Bevolkerung gerechnet. DemgegenUber fUhrte Burgdorfer die Judenzahlen fUr das Deutschland von 1933 auf 850 000 Voll-,Halb- und Vierteljuden (bei 502 799 Glaubensjuden) in seinen Schatzungen zurUck, fUr Osterreich von 1934 auf 300-400 OOO(bei 191 481 Glaubensjuden). Die Erhebung der Rassejuden bei der deutschen Volks­zahlung von 1939 hat bei 307 614 Glaubensjuden nur die etwas hohere Zahl von 330 892 Volljuden, 72 738 Halbjuden und 42 81 I Vierteljuden er­geben, die vor allem bezUglich der Halb- und Vierteljuden keinesfalls als zuverlassig angesehen werden kann. Die gewonnenen Zahlen lassen sich nur als Mindestzahlen werten. Sie kamen durch die in einer "Erganzungs­karte"zur Haushaltungsliste der Volkszahlung 1939 enthaltene Frage "War oder ist einer der 4 GroBelternteile Volljude?" zustande, die fUr jeden GroBelternteil mit "ja" oder "nein" zu beantworten war. Da diese Erganzungskarte in verschlossenem Umschlag abzugeben und darum der Kon­trolle am Ort entzogen war, wurde sie schlecht ausgefUllt. Vielfach wurden statt einer Antwort nur Striche in die entsprechenden Facher gemacht.

Der erste amtliche Versuch, die Juden nach ihrer Rasse zu erfassen, wurde von den Juden sofort sabotiert. Er geschah bei der osterreichisch-~ en Volkszahlung vom 7. Marz 1923. Vizekanzler Dr. Frank (GroBdeutsche Volkspartei) unterzeichnete kurz vor der Zahlung eine Verordnung, wo­nach zur Frage 7 des Zahlblattes (Sprache) "auch die Volkszugehorigkeit und Rasse" anzugeben war. Da die Zahlblatter bereits 3edruckt waren, wurde darauf nur in einem roten Merkzettel ohne Erlauterung, Anleitung und Musterbeispiel hingewiesen. Die osterreichischen Juden sabotierten diese Frage dadurch, daB die jUdisch-marxistische Presse unmittelbar vor dem Zahlungstag ihre Leser aufforderte, die Frage nach der Rasse mit " wei B " zu beantworten. Das Ergebnis war, daB daraufhin die "weiBe. Rasse in Osterreich etwa so weit verbreitet war, wie die EinfluBspare der jUdisch-marxistischen Presse und Parteien reichte". Nur in Karnten und im Burgenland wurde die Aufbereitung des Materials mit recht zweifel­haftem Erfolg durchgefUhrt, in den anderen Bundeslandern und vor allem in Wien aber als zwecklos eingestellt.

166

The First Korherr Report

II. DIE JUDENBILANZ IN DEUTSCHLAND

Die folgenden Angaben Uber die Zahl und Entwicklung'der Juden in Deutschland fuBen auf den amtlichen Zahlen der Volkszahlungen und sonst­igen Erhebungen des Reiches und auf den Berechnungen und Schatzungen der Wissenschaft, sind aber in der Hauptsache von der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland und von den Kultusgemeinden in wien und Prag erstellt, die mit Zahlungen, Zahlkarten fUr die Bevolkerungsbewegung, Fortschreibung und daneben mit Berechnungen und Schatzungen arbeiten.' Diese jUdischen Dienststellen arbeiten unter der Kontrolle des Reichs­sicherheitshauptamtes und fUr dessen Zwecke. Vom fraglichen Anfangsbe­stand der Juden abgesehen scheint die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland zuverlassig zu arbeiten. Aufgrund der an dieser Stelle ge­fertigten und vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt bislang UberprUften Stat is­tiken kann folgende Bilanz Uber die Entwicklung des Judentums in Deutsch­land von der Machtergreifung (30. I. 1933 im Altreich, Marz 1938 in Oster­reich, Marz 1939 im Protektorat Bohmen-Mahren) bis zum I. I. 1943 ge-

zogen werden:

I. Judenbilanz des Altreichs Zahl der Juden im Altreich --n;nzig) am 30. I. 1933

mit Sudetengau und Danzig (ohne Sudetengau und ---- rund

6 I 193 - 352 534 - 100 516

561 000

Abgang vom 30.1.33 bis 1.1.43 durch --sterbeUberschuB(im Altreich)

Auswanderung Abwanderung(Evakuierung) - 514 243

Zugang vom 30.1.33 bis 1.1.43 durch Eingliederung des Sudeten-landes sonstige Veranderungen(Danzig, Zuzug, Wegzug, genehmigte Aus­tritte, Anerkennung als Misch­ling I.Grades, Neuerfassung, Karteibereinigung)

Zahl der Juden im Altreich (mit Sudetengau ~d Danzig) am I. I. 1943 ---

2. Judenbilanz der Ostmark Zahl der Juden in der Ostmark am 1.3.1938

Abgang vom 1.3.38 bis 1.1.43 durch --sterbeUberschuB

Auswanderung Abwanderung(Evakuierung) sonst.Veranderungen

Zahl der Juden in der Ostmark am I. I. 1943

167

+ 2 649x )

+ I 921 + 4 570

5 I 327

rund 220 000

14 509 - 149 124

47 555 710

- 211 898

8 102

Appendix A

3. Judenbilanz des Protektorats Bohmen-Mahren Zahl der Juden im Protektorat am 15.3.1939

Abgang vom 15.3.39 bis 1.1.43 durch SterbeUberschuB Auswanderung Abwanderung(Evakuierung)

Zahl der Juden im Protektorat am 1.1.1943

7 074 26 009 69 677

118 310

- 102 760

15 550

x) Diese Zahl von 2 649 Juden im Sudetenland wurde bei der Volkszahl­ung 1939 festgestellt. Vor Eingliederung des Sudetenlandes ins Reich betrug die Judenzahl rund 30 000 die aber sehr rasch ohne Uber­schreitung einer Staatsgrenze und ohne Vermogensverluste ~ns Pro­tektorat abstromten.

In der Bilanz sind die neu erworbenen Ostgebiete (mit Ausnahme von Danzig) nicht enthalten. Ihre Bilanz kann noch nicht erstellt werden. Doch gibt es Uber die Juden in diesen Gebieten zur Zeit der Ubernahme ins Reich verschiedene Schatzungen, die auf eine Zahl von etwa 630 000 Juden hinfUhren dUrften. Dazu kommen etwa 160 000 Juden im Bezirk Bialystok und rund 1,3 Millionen Juden im Generalgouvernement zur Zeit seiner ErrichtungX

). Das wUrde zusammen im gesamtdeutschen Raum (ohne die besetzten Ostgebiete) Ende 1939 eine Gesamtzahl der Juden von etwa 2,5 Millionen ergebenx), deren weitaus groBter Teil auf den neuen Osten entfallt. .

Am 1.1.1943 zahlt das Reich ohne die neuen Ostgebiete, ohne das Alters­ghetto Theresienstadt und ohne den Arbeitseinsatz im Rahmen der Organ­isation Schmelt nur mehr 74 979 Juden, davon 51 327 im Altreich, 8 102 in der Ostmark und 15 550 im Protektorat. Im Altreich mit Sudeten­land sind nur mehr 9,2 vH der Zahl der Juden vom Tag der MachtUbernahme vorhanden. Am 30.1.1943 betragt ihre Zahl nur mehr 48 242 oder 8,6 vH, am 28.2.1943 gar nur mehr 44 589 oder 7,9 vH. Berlin, wo schon 1880 ein Achtel, 1910 Uber ein Viertel, 1933 fast ein Drittel der Juden Deutschlands wohnten, zahlt am 1.1.1943 nicht weniger als 32 999 oder 64,3 vH der gesamten Juden des Altreichs, am 30.1.1943 noch 30 121, am 28.2.1943 noch 27 281. In der Ostmark weist nur mehr Wien Uberhaupt noch Juden auf.

Von den 51 327 Juden des Altreichs sind 23 197 Manner und 28 130 Frauen. 40 351 sind Glaubensjuden, 10 976 sind Nichtglaubensjuden. 16 760 leben in Mischehe, in der Ostmark 4 803 (von 8 102), im Protektorat 6 2 1 1 (von 15 550).

III. JUDISCHE VOLKSSCHWACHE

Die Judenbilanz in Deutschland weist einen Uberordentlichen SterbeUber­schu auf, der nicht allein durch die sehr hohe Sterblichkeit der Juden bedingt ist, sondern mehr noch durch die ausgesprochene Geburtenarmut. So hat sich die natUrliche Bevolkerungsbewegung im Altreich mit Sudeten-

x) ohne Distrikt Lemberg mit rund 700 000 Juden

168

The First Korherr Report

land von 1933 bis 1942 folgendermaBen entwickelt (nach den Schatzungen und Unterlagen der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, da die Auszahlungen nach Glaubensjuden vie I komplizierter und unzuverlassiger sind):

Geburten und Sterbefalle der Juden im Altreich (bis 1939 berechnet und geschatzt)

Jahre Geburten Sterbefalle SterbeUberschuB (-)

1933 3 425 8 925 5 500

1934 2 300 8 200 5 900

1935 2 500 8 100 5 600

1936 2 300 8 000 5 700

1937 2 100 8 000 5 900

1938 000 7 448 6 448

1939 610 8 136 7 526

1940 396 6 199 5 803

1941 351 6 249 5 898

1942 239 7 657 7 418

1933-1942 15 221 76 914 - 61 693

Vom Tag der Machtergreifung (30.1.1933) bis 1.1.1943 betragt der Sterbe­UberschuB der Juden im Altreich mit Sud~tenland 61 693; er stellt das Ergebnis aus 14 921 Geburten und 76 114 Sterbefallen dar. Die Wanderung­en einesteils, die in den ersten Jahren fehlende und seitdem mangelhafte Erfassung vor allem der Sterbefalle in den Konzentrationslagern durch die Reichsvereinigung der Juden andernteils geben hier zwar fUr viele Fehlerquellen Raum, doch laBt auch der ungefahre Uberblick die trotz des RUckgangs der Judenzahl etwa gleichbleibende Hohe der Sterbefalle er­kennen. Die jUdische Sterblichkeit wUrde demnach 80-85 (gegen 10 his 15 im europaischen Durchschnitt) auf 1 000 hetragen (im Jahre 1942). DarUber hinaus fallt der RUckgang der Geburten auf, der dem RUckgang der Judenzahl weit vorauseilt. Die Geburtenziffer der Juden im Altreich wUrde danach im Jahre 1942 nur mehr rund 2 1/2 auf 1 000 betragen. Ahnlich treffen in der Ostmark vom 1.3.1938 bis 1.1.1943 auf 15 188 jUdische Sterbefalle nur 679 jUdische Geburten. 1m Altreich wurden schlieBlich im Dezemher 1942 nur mehr 14, im Januar und Februar 1943 nur mehr 7 bzw. 8 jUdische Kinder geboren. Es ist dabei zu berUcksichti­gen, daB das Judentum schon seit Jahrzehnten in den zivilisierten ahend­landischen Staaten in der Kinderarmut voranging, wie sich an Hand der konfessionellen Geburtenstatistik ergab. Der Jude Felix Theilhaber hat schon 1911 auf den daraus folgenden"Untergang der deutschen Juden" hin­gewiesen, der nur durch den dauernden Zustrom ostjUdischen Blutes ver­deckt wurde. Nur zum Teil hing diese Erscheinung mit der Uberalterung des europaischen GroBstadt-Judentums zusammen: In der Hauptsache handel­te es sich urn wirkliche Lebensschwache. Bei der heutigen auBerordentlichen Sterhlichkeit der Juden und ihrem Geburtentiefstand muB jedoch der auBerst ungUnstige Altersaufhau der Juden mitberUcksichtigt werden. Die Juden in Deutschland setzen sich

169

Appendix A

nach der Abwanderung ihrer besten Jahrgange groBtenteils aus alten Le~t­en zusammen, sodaB ihr Altersaufbau bei graphischer Darstellung in Ge­stalt der Alterspyramide nach dem Stichwort der Reichsvereinigung der Juden der Form einer "Keule" gleicht, was objektiv zutrifft. Es mangeln die Kinder und die zeugungsfahigen Jahrgange, wahrend·die Jahrgange der alten Leute nicht nur verhaltnismaBig zu stark sind, sondern auch rein zahlenmaBig viel starker sind als die jlingeren Jahrgange. Daraus entspringt auch z.T. die stark liberhohte Selbstmordziffer der Juden, da der Selbstmord liberwiegend eine Todesart der alten Leute ist.

IV. DIE AUSWANDERUNG DER JUDEN AUS DEUTSCHLAND

Die Wanderung der Juden aus Ost- nach Mittel- und Westeuropa und aus ganz Europa nach Ubersee und hier wieder in erster Linie nach den Ver­einigten Staaten von Nordamerika ist eine seit Jahrzehnten allgemein beobachtete Erscheinung. Aus Deutschland wanderten vor allem von 1840-1870 sehr viele Juden aus, doch nach 1870 horte ihre Auswanderung durch die neuen wirtschaftlichen Hoglichkeiten im Reich fast vollig auf. Daflir wanderten nun die Deutschen aus. Die jlidische Auswanderung aus Deutschland seit 1933, gewissermaBen ein Nachholen der 1870 unterbroch­enen Bewegung, erregte die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der gesamten zivil­isierten Welt, besonders der jlidisch regierten demokratischen Lander. Die Zahl und Struktur der Auswanderer wurde von verschiedensten Seiten und mit verschiedensten Methoden zu erfassen versucht. Doch gelangte man zu keinen einheitlichen Ergebnissen. Die Zahlen der deutschen Auswanderungsstatistik, jene der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutsch­land und der israelitischen Kultusgemeinden in Wien und Prag, die zahlreichen auslandischen Erfassungen, Berechnungen und Schatzungen,die Statistiken des internationalen Judentums und die Zahlen wissenschaft­licher Untersuchungen weichen sehr stark voneinander ab. So rechnete Prof. Zielenziger -Amsterdam- mit einer Zahl von 135 000 Auswanderern von der Machtergreifung bis Ende 1937, die Reichsvereinigung der Juden mit 203 000 Auswanderern. Seit 1938 ist die Auswanderung noch betracht­lich angestiegen, endete aber fast restlos (bis auf einige wenige Ausnahmefalle je Monat) durch das Verbot der jlidischen Auswanderung im Herbst 1941. Die Reichsvereinigung der Juden und die israelitischen Kultusgemeinden in Wien und Prag kamen bis I. I. 1943 zu folgenden hohen~ Auswanderungszahlen (einschl.Doppelzahlungen):

Auswanderer aus Zahl Zeitraum

Altreich mit Sudetenland 352 534 (30.1.33-1.1.43)

Ostmark 149 124 ( 1.3.38-1.1.43)

Protektorat 26 009 (15.2.39-1.1.43)

Die anfangs liberstlirzte Auswanderung machte genaue Angaben liberhaupt un­moglich. Ebenso dlirfte das angegebene Auswanderungsziel, soweit es sich urn europaische Lander handelt, vielfach nur als Zwischenstation zu be­trachten sein. Von den Auswanderern aus dem Altreich gingen rund 144 000 nach anderen europaischen Landern, rund 57 000 nach USA, 54 000 nach SUdamerika, 10 000 nach Mittelamerika, 53 000 nach Palastina, 15 000 nach Afrika (vor allem Slidafrika), 16000 nach Asien (China), 4 000 nach Australien. Von den 144 000 nach europaischen Landern ausge­wanderten Juden gingen allein liber 32 000 nach England, 39 000 nach

170

i

The First Korherr Report

Polen bzw. ins Generalgouvernement, 18 000 nach Frankreich, 8 000 nach Italien, 7 500 nach den Niederlanden, 6 000 nach Belgien.: Es ist anzu­nehmen, daB der groBte Teil dieser Auswanderer von diesen Landern nach Ubersee weiterzogen. Flir die jlidischen Auswanderungen aus der Ostmark werden folgende Ziele angegeben: 65 500 nach europaischen Landern, 50 000 nach Amerika, 20 000 nach Asien, 9 000 nach Palastina, 2 600 nach Afrika, 2 000 nach Australien.

V. DIE EVAKUIERUNG DER JUDEN

Die Evakuierung loste, wenigstens im Reichsgebiet, die Auswanderung der Juden ab. Sie wurde seit dem Verbot der jlidischen Auswanderung ab Herbst 1941 in groBem Stile vorbereitet und im Jahre 1942 im gesamten Reichs­gebiet weitgehend durchgeflihrt. In der Bilanz des Judentums erscheint sie als "Abwanderung". Bis I. I. 1943 wanderten nach den Zusammenstellungen des Reichssicherheits-hauptamtes ab:

aus dem Altreich mit Sudetenland 100 516 Juden

aus der Ostmark 47 555

aUs dem Protektorat 69 677 Zusammen 217 748 Juden

In diesen Zahlen sind auch die ins Altersghetto Theresienstadt evakuiert­en Juden enthalten.

Die und von

gesamten Evakuierungen ergaben im Reichsgebiet einschl. Ostgebieten darliber hinaus im deutschen Macht- und EinfluBbereich in Europa Oktober 1939 oder spater bis zum 31.12.1942 folgende Zahlen:

I. Evakuierung von Juden aus Baden und der Pfalz nach Frankreich ................ .

2. Evakuierung von Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet einschl. Protektorat und Bezirk Bialystok nach Osten ................ ············

3. Evakuierung von Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet und dem Protektorat nach Theresienstadt ........ .

4. Transportierung von Juden aus den Ostprovinzen nach dem russischen Osten: ..................... I

5.

Es wurden durchgeschleust durch die Lager im General-gouvernemen t .............................. I durch die Lager im Warthegau ............. .

Evakuierung von Juden aus andernen Landern, namlich:

Frankreich(soweit vor dem 10. I I. 1942 besetzt) ................................. .

Nieder lande ............................. .

Belgien ................................. .

Norwegen ................ ················ .

171

6 504 Juden

170 642

87 193

449 692

274 166 145 301

4 I. 911

38 571

16 886

532

Appendix A

Slowakei .............................. . 56 691 Juden

Kroatien .............................. . 4 927

Evakuierungen insgesamt (einschl.Theresien-stadt und einschl.Sonderbehandlung) .......... 1 873 549 Juden

ohne Theresienstadt .......................... 1 786 356

6. Dazu kommt noch nach den Angaben des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes die Evakuierung von .............................. 633 300 Juden in den russischen Gebieten einschl. der frUheren baltischen Lander seit Beginn des Ostfeldzuges.

In den obigen Zahlen sind nicht enthalten die Insassen der Ghettos und der Konzentrationslager. Die Evakuierungen aus der Slowakei und aus Kroatien wurden von diesen Staaten selbst in Angriff genommen.

VI. DIE JUDEN IN DEN GHETTOS

Es sind hier zu nennen: 1. Das Altersghetto Theresienstadt, dem insgesamt zugefUhrt wurden:

87 193 Juden, davon aus dem Reichsgebiet

Protektorat 47 471 (Ostmark 14 222) 39 722.

Es zahlt zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 insgesamt an jUdischen Insassen:

davon mit deutsch.Staatsangehorigkeit Protektoratsangehorigkeit

49 392 24 313 25 079.

Die Verminderung trat vor allem durch Sterbefalle ein. AuBer Theresien­stadt gibt es im Reichsgebiet eine Anzahl von jUdischen Alters-und Siech­enheimen mit kleinerem Fassungsvermogen, die aber weder als Ghettos noch als Evakuierungsorte angesehen werden.

2. Das Ghetto Litzmannstadt zahlt Anfang 1943 87 180 Juden, davon 83 133 mit ehem. polnischer Staatsangehorigkeit.

3. Die Uberwiegend in Rest-Ghettos untergebrachten Juden des gouvernements werden fUr 31.12.1942 folgendermaBen angegeben geschatzt:

im Distrikt Zahl der Juden

Krakau 37 000

Radom 29 400

General­bzw.

Lublin 20 000 (geschatzt)

Warschau 50 000

Lemberg 161 514

Generalgouv. zus. 297 914

172

The First Korherr Report

VII. DIE JUDEN IN DEN KONZENTRATIONSLAGERN

In den Konzentrationslagern erfolgten von der Machtergreifung bis zum 31.12.1942

73 417 Einlieferungen von Juden davon wurden entlassen sind durch Tod abgegangen

Restbestand vom 31.12.42:

36 943 27 347

9 127 Juden

Es ist hier zu beachten, daB die Zahl der Einlieferungen von Juden groBer sein wird als die Zahl der in die Konzentrationslager eingelief­erten Juden, da wiederholte Einlieferungen eines Juden wiederholt zahlen. Nicht enthalten sind die im Zug der Evakuierungsaktion in den Kon­zentrationslagern Auschwitz und Lublin untergebrachten Juden. Nach Konzentrationslagern ergeben sich, untergeteilt nach Einlieferungen, Entlassungen, Todesfallen und dem Bestand vom 31.12.1942 folgende Zahlen:

Juden in den Konzentrationslagern

Konzentrations­lager Einlieferungen Entlassungen Todesfalle

Lublin/Manner

Lublin/Frauen

Auschwitz/Manner

Auschwitz/Frauen

Buchenwald

Mauthausen/Gusen

Sachsenhausen

Stut thof /~Janner

Stutthof/Frauen

RavensbrUck/Frauen

RavensbrUck/Manner

Dachau

GroB-Rosen

Lichtenburg

Neuengamme

FloBenbUrg

Sachsenburg

Esterwegen

Niederhagen Natzweiler

K L zusammen

23 409

2 849

4 917

932

16 827

2 064

7 960

28

3

321

273

12 026

231

195

192

80

52

36

12 10

73 417

4 509

59

13 805

6 570

531

44

11 140

195

2

2

52

33

36 943

173

14 217

131

3 716

720

2 795

985

344

13

787

229

886

231

190

78

3

12

10

27 347

Bestand vom 31.12.1942

4 683

2 659

200

212

227

79

46

15

3

3

9 127

Appendix A

VIII. JUDEN IN JUSTIZVOLLZUGSANSTALTEN

Zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 saBen in Justizvollzugsanstalten des Reichsge­bietes 458 Juden ein, die sich auf Manner und Frauen und auf Arten des Strafvollzugs folgendermaBen verteilen:

Strafhaft

Sicherungsverwahrung

Arbeitshaus

Justizvollzugsanstalten insgesamt

Manner

350

29

379

Frauen

78

79

IX. DER ARBEITSEINSATZ DER JUDEN

Zusammen

428

29

458

In kriegswichtigem Arbeitseinsatz waren zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 im Reichsgebiet tatig

185 776 Juden.

Davon waren eingesetzt

I) innerhalb der Inspekteur-Bereiche der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (ohne Posen und ohne sojwet-russische Juden) 21 659 , davon 18 546 mit deutscher Staatsangehorigkeit, 107 mit Protektoratsange­horigkeit, 2 519 Staatenlose und 487 Auslander. Sie verteilen sich nach Inspekteur-Bereichen (ohne Posen) folgendermaBen:

Berlin 15 100 Konigsberg2) 96 Braunschweig I 10 MUnchen 313 Breslau l ) 2 451 NUrnberg 89 Danzig Sal zburg 7 Dresden 485 Stet tin 18 DUsseldorf 673 Stuttgart 178 Hamburg 497 wi en 226 Kassel 259 Wiesbaden 139

I)ohne Organisation Schmelt 2)ohne sowjetruss.Juden

2) im Inspekteur-Bereich Konigsberg auBerdem 18 435 auslandische, d.h. fast ausschlieBlich sowjetrussische Juden.

3) im Inspekteur-Bereich Posen im Ghetto- und Lagereinsatz 95 112 hauptsachlich polnische Jude-n-.---

4) im Rahmen der Organisation Schmelt (Breslau) 50 570 Juden, davon 42 382 Staatenlose und 8 188 Auslander.

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The First Korherr Report

x. EUROPAISCHE JUDENBILANZ

Der Zusammenbruch des europaischen Judentums wurde schon vor Jahrzehn­ten durch den volkischen Verfall des europaischen GroBstadt-Judentums einesteils, durch die jUdische Auswanderung andernteils eingeleitet. Der jUdische Statistiker Lestschinsky hat den RUckgang des Judentums in Europa im Jahre 1927 folgendermaBen verdeutlicht: "Zu Anfang des 19.Jahrhunderts lebten in Europa 85% und allein in RuBland, Osterreich­Ungarn und Deutschland 80% aller Juden, in Amerika gab es zu jener Zeit nur 2 - 3 000 Juden. 1m Jahre 1925 waren 63% aller Juden in Europa ansassig, innerhalb der Grenzen, Deutschlands, Osterreich-Ungarns und RuBlands lebten nur noch 57% des Gesamtjudentums, in Amerika dagegen lebten 30% , in den Ubrigen Weltteilen 7% ". Nach Berechnungen des Statistischen Reichsamts betrug der Judenanteil Europas im Jahre 1880 sogar 88,4 vH, im Jahre 1937 nur mehr 60,4 vH. 1943 dUrfte der euro­paische Anteil noch 1/3 des Weltjudentums betragen.

Urn 1930 und in den letzten Jahren betrug die Zahl der Juden in einigen wichtigen Staaten Europas:

Neuere Zahlung od. Schatzung Volks- Zahl Zahl der vH der Bevolker-

Staat zahlungs- der Jahr Juden ung des Wirts-j ahr Juden in 1000 volkes

Altreich 1933/35 502 799 1943 51 0,07 Osterreich 1934 191 481 1943 8 0, I Tschechoslow. 1930 356 830 -Protektorat 1943 16 0,2 Danzig 1929 10 448 Memelgebiet 1925 2 402 1937 3 2,0

Belgien 1937 80 1,0 Bulgarien 1934 48 398 1937 50 0,8 Finnland 1937 2 0,04 Frankreich 1937 280 0,7 Griechenland 1928 72 791 1937 90 1,1 GroBbritann. 1931/33 234 000 1937 345 0,7 Italien 1930 47 825 1937 52 0, I Irland 1936 4 0, I Jugoslawien 1930 68 405 1937 75 0,3 Lettland 1935 93 479 1937 96 4,9 Li tauen 1923 155 125 1937 175 7,4 Niederlande 1930 III 917 1937 135 1,6 Polen 1930 3113933 1937 3 300 1) 9,6 Rumanien 1930 984 213 1941 302 2,2 Slowakei 1940 89 3,4 Sowj etruBl. 1926 2 570 330 1939 4 600 2) 2,4 Ungarn 1930 444 567 1940 7503) 5,8

I)Neuer Gebietsstand. 2)Neuer Gebietsstand, mit Ostpolen; die Zahl ist geschatzt. 3)Neuer Gebietsstand; die Zahl ist berechnet.

175

Appendix A

Die Gesamtzahl der Juden auf der Erde schatzt man urn das Jahr 1937 im allgemeinen auf rund 17 Millionen, wovon liber 10 Millionen auf Europa entfallen. Sie haufen bzw. hauften sich in Europa vor allem in den von Deutschland besetzten frliheren polnisch-russischen Gebieten zwischen Ostsee und Finnischem Meerbusen und dem Schwarzen und Aso­wschen Meer, daneben in den Handelsmittelpunkten und im Rheingebiet Mittel- und Westeuropas und an den Klisten des Mittelmeers.

Von 1937 bis Anfang 1943 dlirfte die Zahl der Juden in Europa teils durch Auswanderung, teils durch den Sterbeliberschu~ der Juden in Mittel- und Westeuropa, teils durch die Evakuierungen vor allem in den volkisch starkeren Ostgebieten, die hier als Abgang gerechnet werden, urn Schatzungsweise 4 Millionen zurUckgegangen sein. Dabei darf nicht Ubersehen werden, daB von den Todesfallen der sowjetruss­ischen Juden in den besetzten Ostgebieten nur ein Teil erfa~t wurde, wahrend diejenigen im librigen europaischen Ru~land und an der Front liberhaupt nicht enthalten sind. Dazu kommen die uns unbekannten Wander­ungsstrome der Juden innerhalb Ru~lands in den asiatischen Bereich

hinliber. Auch der Wanderungsstrom der Juden aus den europaischen Landern au~erhalb des deutschen Einflusses ist eine weitgehend un­bekannte Gro~e. Insgesamt dlirfte das europaische Judentum seit 1933, also im ersten Jahrzehnt der nationalsozialistischen Machtentfaltung, bald die Halfte seines Bestandes verloren haben.

176

The Firtst Korherr Report

The Inspector of Statistics for the ReichsfUhrer SS

Secret Reich Haterial

THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH PROBLEM

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X

Statistical Report

Con ten t s

Preface Jewish Statistics for Germany The Weakness of the Jewish Race Jewish Emigration from Germany The Evacuation of the Jews The Jews in the Ghettos The Jews in the Concentration Camps The Jews in Penal Institutions The Jews Involved in Work Projects European Jewish Statistics

I. PREFACE

The numerical recording of Jewry and its development are necessary for setting up a statistic representation of the results on the way to the solution of the Jewish problem. The contradictions in Jewish figures make preliminary remarks necessary to the effect that the numerical data of Jewry are always to be accepted only with reservations and that lack of knowledge about the origin and source of these data can lead to false conclusions. The sources of error are above all to be found in the nature of Jewry and its historical developement, the many thousands of years of restless wandering, the numerous conversions to and from Judaism, the efforts of the Jews to integrate, the interbreeding with the native populations, the efforts of the Jews to avoid registration and lastly in erroneous or falsely interpreted statistics of Jewry.

Moreover, up to now, partly due to the large degree of overlap between the Jewish religion and the Jewish race, ignorance cf racial theory, and partly due to being caught up in the religious thought of the times, Jewish statistics have never been compiled on the basis of race but rather on the basis of religion. The classification of the race pre­supposes many years of training and a knowledge of genealogy. It was also difficult, particualarly in southern and eastern countries, despite this overlap, to isolate a homogeneous Jewish race statistically. The avowal of Moasic or Jewish faith is also no foolproof evidence, because as a result of the former Jewish missionary movement with its convers­ions of masses of heathens and Christians, also because of changes of faith in modern times via mixed marriages and "conversions", there are more than a few people of Jewish faith who are not racially Jewish. On the other hand compulsory Christianity in the last century and the increase in baptized Jews and non-practiseing Jews have reduced their

177

Appendix B

number. Thus in 1893 Leroy-Beulieu estimated the loss of Judaism to Christianity to be between for and ten times as great as the present number of adherents to the Jewish religion. According to Maurice Fishberg and Mathias Mieses, three times the present Jewish population have been absorbed by Aryan Europe. Even Hans GUnther esti~ates the Jewish population of Germany at double the number of Jews of moasic faith with German nationality. Finally, the Lithuanian Jew Brutzkus goes so far as to classify the Berlin Jews on the basis of their blood composition as beine purer Europeans than the Germans in Berlin.

According to these opinions the number of racial Jews in Europe includ­ing half-breeds was assumed to be three times as great as the number of religious Jews (in Eastern Europe twice as great, in Middle Europe four times as great and in the rest of Europe as much as eight times as great) and approximately 6% Jewish blood was calculated to be in the European population. In contrast Burgdorfer estimates the Jewish population of Germany in 1933 at 850 000 full, half and quarter Jews (based on 502 000 religious Jews) and the Jewish population of Austria in 1934 at between 300000 and 400000 (based on 191 481 religious Jews). The German census of the racial Jews in 1939 lists the only slightly higher figure of 330 892 full 72 738 half and 42 81 I quarter Jews with the figure 307 614 religious Jews. These figures cannot be regarded as trustworthy, particularly in the case' of the half and quarter Jews.These figures can only be considered to represent minimums. They originated as anSwers to a question appearing on a card to be filled out for the German census of 1939 "Was or is one of your grandparents Jewish?" This question was to be answered yes or no for each grandparent. Since these cards were to be handed in in a sealed envelope and could not be exa­mined on the spot, they were filled out poorly. In many cases instead of an answer there were only marks made in the corresponding boxes.

The first official attempt to classify Jwes by race was immediately sabotaged by the Jews. It occurred during the Austrian census of March 7, 1923. Vicechancellor, Dr. Frank (Greater German Peoples'Party) signed a decree shortly before the census, according to which question 7 (language) of the census form was also to be answered by listing "ethic origins and race". Since the census forms had already been print.J'd this was only indicated on a red page without any explanation, instruct­ions or examples. The Austrian Jews sabotaged this question in the Jweish Marxist press shortly before the census by calling on its readers to answer the quetion about race "w hit e". The result was that the "white race in Austria was about as widespread as the influence of the Jewish Marxist press and parties". Only in Karnten and Burgenland were the data analyzed with dubious results, whereas in the remaining states', particularly in Vienna the project was abandoned as pointless.

II. JEIVISH STATISTICS IN GERMANY

The following material on the number and development of Jews in Germany is based on the official census figures, on similar statistical investi­gations of the Reich and on statistical calculations and estimates. The material is however, mainly provided by the Reich Jewish Union in Germany and the Jewish Religious Centers in Vienna and Prague which deal with census forms and figures, population movement and extrapolation in addition to calculations and estimates. These Jewish offices work under

178

The First Korherr Report

the supervision and for the purposes of the Main Reich Security Office. Aside from the questionable initial statistics on Jews the Reich Jewish Union of Germany seems to do reliable work. On the basis of statistics prepared by this office and checked by the Main Reich Security Office the following figures can be established for the development of Jewry in Germany from the seizure of power (Jan.30, 1933 in Altreich, Mar. 1938 in Austria, Mar. 1939 in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) up to Jan. 1, 1943:

1. Jewish Population of Altreich with Sudetengau and Danzig Jewish population of Altreich(without Sudetengau und Danzig on Jan. lO, 1933 ------ approx. 561 000

Decrease from Jan.30, 1933 to Jan. 1,1943 due to Excess deaths (in Altreich) 61 193

- 352 534 Emigration Evacuation - 100 516

- 514 243

Increase from Dec. I, 1933 to Jan. I, 1943 due to the annexation of the Sudetenland + Other changes (Danzig, movements within the area, officially sanc~onated conversions,

2 649 x )

recognition as a first class half-breed, new registrations, cleaning up of files) + 921

+ 4 570

Jewish population of the Altreich(with Sudetengau and Danzig) on Jan. I, 1943 ---- 51 327

2. Jewish Population of Ostmark Jewish population of Ostmark on Mar. 1,1938

Decrease from mar. I, 1938 to jan. 1,1943 due Excess Deaths Emigration Evacuation Other changes

Jewish population of Ostmark on Jan. I, 1943

approx.

to 14

- 149 47

509 124 555 710

220 000

- 211 898

8 102

3. Jewish Population of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia Jewish population of the Protectorate on Mar.ls, 1939 118 310

Decrease' from Mar. 15, 1939 to Jan. 1, 1943 Excess deaths Emigration Evacuation

Jewish popUlation of the Protectorate on Jan.l, 1943

due to 7 074

26 009 69 677

- 102 760

15 550

x) Tis figure of 2 649 Jews in the Sudetenland was arrived at in the

179

Appendix B

census of 1939. Before the annexation of the Sudetenland into the Reich the Jewish population was approximately 30 000, who rapidly moved to the Protectorate without crossing a national border and without loss of property.

The newly acquired Eastern Territories (except for Danzig) are not included in the statistics. These figures cannot be calculated. There are, however, various estimates of Jewish population at the time of the annexation into the Reich which indicate a figure of approximately 630 000. In addition there are approximately 160 000 Jews in the district of Bialystok and there were approximately 1,3 million Jews in the General Government when it was set up (without the district of Lemberg with a Jewish population of approximately 700 000). That would give us a total Jewish population of about 2,5 million for the entire Greater German Territory (without the occupied Eastern Territories), the greater part of which are in the new East. On Jan. I, 1943 the Jewish population of the Reich without the new Eastern Territories , without the Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt and without the Jews working in the programs of the Schmelt organization is only 74 979. Of these 51 327 in Altreich, 8 102 in Ostmark and 15 550 i~Protectorate. In the Altreich with the Sudetenland only 9,2% of the Jewish population at the time of the seizure of power now remain. On Jan.30, 1943 the Jewish population was only 48 242 or 8,6%. On Feb.22, 1943 only 44 589 or 7,9%. Berlin,which comprised 1/8 of the Jewish population of Germany in 1880, over 1/4 in 1910 and almost 1/3 in 1933, had not less than 32 999 Jews on Jan. I, 1943 or 64,3% of the total Jewish population of the Altreich, on Jan.30, 1943 only 30 121 and on Feb.28, 1943 only 27 281. In Ostmark it is only Vienna that accounts for any Jewish population at all. Of the 51 327 Jews of the Altreich 23 197 are men and 28 130 women. 40 351 are religious Jews, 10 976 non-practiseing Jews. 16 760 l;ve in mixed marriages, in Ostmark 4 803 (of 8 102), in the Protectorate 6 21 I (of 15 550).

III. THE WEAKNESS OF THE JEWISH RACE

The Jewish population of Germany shows an extraordinarily high excess ~ of deaths which is not ortly due to the high mortality rate of the Jews but also to the very low birth rate. Thus the natural popUlation change in the Altreich with the Sudetenland from 1933 to 1942 developed as follows (according to the estimates and data of the Reich Jewish Union of Germany since the figures based on religious Jews are much more complicated and less reliable):

180

The First Korherr Report

Jewish Birt~and Deaths in the Altreich (figures up to 1939 are calculated or estimated)

year births deaths excess of deaths

1933 3 425 8 925 5 500

1934 2 300 8 200 5 900

1935 2 500 8 100 5 600

1936 2 300 8 000 5 700

1937 100 8 000 5 900

1938 000 448 6 448

1939 610 8 136 526

1940 396 6 199 5 803

1941 351 6 249 5 898

1942 239 657 418

1933-1942 15 221 76 914 - 61 693

From the day of the seizure of power (Jan.30,1933) to Jan. I, 1943 the excess of deaths of the Jews in the Altreich with the Sudetenland was 61 693; this represents the result of 14 921 births and 76 114 deaths. The emigration on the one hand and lack of data on the number of deaths in concentration camps in the figures provided by the Reich Jewish Union on the other leave room for many errors, however, despite the decrease in the Jewish population a cursory examination is enough to recognize the relatively constant Jewish death rate. That would give us a Jewish mortality rate of 80-85 per 1000 (compared to the average European mortality rate of 10 to 15 per 100~ in 1942. Moreover, the decrease of births is noticeable and is far ahead of the decrease in the Jewish population. The birth rate for the Jews in the Altreich would only be approximately 2 1/2 per 1000 in 1942 according to these calculations. Similarly in Ostmark between Mar. 3, 1938 and Jan.l, 1943 there were 15 188 Jewish deaths as opposed to 679 births. Finally in the Altreich there were only 14 Jewish children born in Dec. 1942 and in Jan. and Feb. of 1943 only 7 and 8 respectively. It must be taken into consideration that Jewry has had a low birth rate in the civilized Western countries for decades, as shown by the denominational birth statistics. The Jew Felix Theilhaber pointe to the "fall of the German Jew" in 191 I which was only kept in balance by the constant re­supplying of East Jewish blood. This phenomenon was only partly due to the ageing of Jews in major cities, mainly it was a result of the real weakness of the Jewish race. The age structure of the Jel"ish population must be taken into consider­ation when trying to understand the extraordinarily high Jewish death rate and their low birth rate. After their long wandering the German Jews are composed mainly of the aged so that their age distribution represented graphically resembles a "club" in the words of the Reich Jewish Union, which is also objectively the case. Children and people in their fertile years are missing while the aged comprise not only a greater proportional part of the population but also a numerically greater part of the popUlation. This is also the cause of the high suicide rate among the Jews since suicide is primarily prevalent amont the aged.

181

Appendix B

IV. JEWISH HlIGRATION FROH GER~1ANY

The emigration of the Jew8 from the East to Middle and Western Europe and from Europe overseas to the United States of America is a pnenomenon which has been observed for decades. Hany Jews emigrated from Germany, mainly between le40 and 1870, after this, however, this emigration all but ceased due to the new economic possibilities of the Reich. Instead the Germans began to emigrate. The Jewish emigration from Germany after 1933, to a certain extent a continuation of the interrupted emigration of 1870, attracted the attention of the entire civilized world, parti­cularly of the Jewish-governed democracies. Attempts were made by various groups using different methods to classify this emigration nu­merically and structurally, however, no consistent results were ob­tained. The statistics on German emigration, the figures of the Reich Jewish Union in Germany and of the Jewish Religious Centers in Prague and Vienna, foreign statistics, calculations and estimates, the statis­tics on international Jewry and the figures of scientific studies ex­hibit a great variation. Prof. Zielenziger of Amsterdam calculated an emigration of 135 000 between the seizure of power and the end of 1937 wheras the Reich Jewish Union lists the figure 203 000. This emigration increased considerably after 1938 but ceased almost completely (with a few exceptions per month) with the prohibition of Jewish emigration in the autumn of 1941. The Reich Jewish Union and the Jewish Religious Centers of Prague and Vienna list the following high emigration figures (including duplications):

Emigration from Figure Time Period

Altreich with Sudetenland 352 534 (Jan.30, '33-Jan. I, '43)

Ostmark 149 124 (Har. I,' 38-Jan. I, '43)

Protectorate 26 009 (Feb.15,'39-Jan.I,'43)

The initially hectic emigration precludes the possibility of obtaining exact figures. Also, the countries listed as destinations, insofar as concerns European countries, can be considered as a temporary stopover in most cases. Of the emigrants from the Altreich approximately 144 000 went to other European countries, 57 000 to U.S.A., 54 000 to South America, 10 000 to Hiddle America, 53 000 to Palestine, IS 000 to Africa (mainly South Africa), 16 000 to Asia (China) and 4 000 to Australia. Of the 144 000 who emigrated to other European countries over 32 000 went to England, 39 000 to Poland or the General Government, 18 000 to France, 8 000 to Italy, 7 500 to the Netherlands and 6 000 to Belgium. It is to be assumed that most of these emigrants went on to emigrate overseas. The following figures are listed for the Jewish emigrants from Ostmark: 65 500 to other European countries, 50 000 to America, 20 000 to Asia, 9 000 to Palestine, 2 000 to Australia and 2 600 to Africa.

182

The First Korherr Report

V. THE EVACUATION OF THE JEWS

The evacuation of the Jews superseded the Jewish emigration , at least in the territory of the Reich. This evacuation was prepared after the prohibition of Jewish emigration in autumn 1941 on a large scale and was carried out extensively in the entire Reich territory in 1942. In Jewish statistics this appears under the heading "emigrations". Accord­ing to the figures of the Hain Reich Security Office the following number of Jews had "emigrated" by Jan. I, 1943 :

from Altreich with Sudetenland

from Os tmark

from the Protectorate total

100 516

47 555

69 677 2T7748

These figures also include the Jews evacuated to the Ghetto for the aged in Theresienstadt.

The figures for evacuations from Reich territory including the Eastern Territories and also from territories under German control or influence between Oct. 1939 and Dec.30, 1942 are:

I. Jews evacuated to France from Baden and the Palatinate .............................. .

2. Evacuation to the East from Reich territory including the Protectorate and the district of Bialystok .................................... .

3. Evacuation from Reich territory and the Protec-torate to Theresienstadt ........................ .

4. Transportation of the Jews from the Easterns Provinces to the Russian East ................... .

Number passed through the camp in the General Government ................... . through the camp at Warthegau ............... .

5. Evacuation of the Jews from other countries, namely:

France (as occupied before Nov.IO, 1942) .. .

Holland ................................... .

Be 19ium ................................... .

Norway ................................... .

Slovakia ....................•..............

Croatia ..................... " ............ .

Total evacuation (including Theresien-stadt and special treatment) .................... .

without Theresienstadt .......................... .

183

6 504

170 642

87 193

449 692

274 166 145 301

41 911

38 571

16 886

532

56 691

4 927

873 549

786 356

Appendix B

6. In addition there are the figures of the Main Reich Security Office for the evacuation of the Jews from the Russian territories including the formerly Baltic countries since the beginning of the Eastern campaign ...................................... . 633 300

The above figures do not include the Jews in ghettos and concentration camps. The evacuations of Jews from Slovakia and Croatia were carried out by these countries themselves.

VI. THE JEWS IN THE GHETTOS

Here are to be listed:

I. The ghetto for the aged in Theresienstadt where have been delivered a total of 87 193 Jews

of these from the Reich Territory 47 471 (Ostmark 14 222) from the Protectorate 39 722.

At the beginning of 1943 there were 49 392 Jewish inhabitants

of these were German citizens 24 313 were from the Protectorate 25 079.

The decrease in these figures was primarily due to deaths. Besides Theresienstadt there were a number of Jewish homes for the aged and hospitals for invalids with a much smaller capcity. They are in the Reich territory and are not counted as ghettos nor places of evacuation.

2. The ghetto Litzmannstadt with a Jewish population of 87 180 in the beginning of 1943. Of these 83 133 are of former Polish nationality.

3. The figures for the rest of the Jewish population, mainly living in the remaining ghettos of the General Government were listed or estimated as of Dec.31, 1942 at:

District

Krakau

Radom

Lubl in

Warsaw

Lemberg

Total for the General Government

184

Jewish Population

37 000

29 400

20 000 (estimated)

50 000

161 514

297 914

The First Korherr Report

VII. THE JEWS IN THE CONCENTRATION CAt1PS

From the seizure of power to Dec31, 1942 ed to concentration cam~s,

73 417 Jews were deliver-

of these were again released have died

leaving a balance on Dec.31, 1942 of

36 943 27 347

9 127 Jews.

It is to be observed that the first figure does not represent different Jews as the repeated commitment of one Jew would be counted more than once. The Jews in the evacuation stations of Auschwitz and Lublin are not included in these figures. The concentration camps yield the following figures, divided according to commitments, releases, deaths and population on Dec. 12, 1942:

Jews in Concentration Camps

Concentration Camp Commitments Releases Deaths Population ----- on Dec.31, 1942

Lublin/men 23 409 4 509 14 217 4 683

Lub I in/women 2 849 59 131 2 659

Auschwitz/men 4 917 3 716 200

Auschwitz/women 932 720 212

Buchenwald 16 827 13 805 2 795 227

Mauthausen/Gusen 2 064 985 79

Sachsenhausen 960 6 570 344 46

Stutthof /men 28 13 15

Stutthof/women 3 3

RavensbrUck/women 321 531 787 3

RavensbrUck/men 273 44 229

Dachau 12 026 I I 140 886

GroB-Rosen 231 231

Lichtenburg 195 195

Neuengamme 192 2 190

FloBenbUrg 80 2 78

Sachsenburg 52 52

Esterwegen 36 33 3

Niederhagen 12 12

Natzweiler 10 10

Totals 73 4 I 7 36 943 27 347 9 127

185

Appendix B

VIII. JEWS IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS

At the beginning of 1943 there were 458 Jews in penal instituti"ons in the territory of the Reich as follows:

Sentenced

Preventive detention

Hark house

Totals

Men Women

350

29

379

78

79

IX. JEWS INVOLVED IN WORK PROJECTS

Total

428

29

458

At the beginning of 1943 there were 185 776 Jews involved in work projects relevant to the war effort in the territory of the Reich.

They were divided as follows:

I) Within the inspectorates of the security police and the SD (without Posen and without the Russian Jews) there were 21 659 Jews. Of these 18 546 with German nationality, 107 from the Protectorate, 2 519 stateless and 487 foreigners. They are divided among the inspec­torates as follows (without Posen):

Berlin 15 100 Konigsberg2) 96 Braunsch)'ei g 110 MUnchen 313 Breslau 1 2 451 NUrnberg 89 Danzig Salzhurg 7 Dresden 485 Stettin 18 DUsseldorf 673 Stuttgart 178 Hamburg 497 Vienna 226 Kassel 259 Wiesbaden 139

l)without the Schmelt organization 2)without the Russian Jews

2) In the inspectorate Konigsberg there are also 18 435 foreign Jews i.e. almost exclusively Russian Jews.

3) In the inspectorate Posen in ghettos and work camps there are ~ Jews, mainly Polish-.----

4) In the Schmelt organization (Breslau) there are 50 570 Jews~ Of these 42 382 are atateless and 8 188 are foreign.

186

The Firtst Korherr Report

x. EUROPEAN JEWISH STATISTICS

The collapse of European Jewry began decades ago with the racial deter­ioration of the Jews in the cities on the one hand and the Jewish emigration on the other. In 1927 the Jewish statistician Lestschinsky elucidated the decline of European Jewry as follows: " In the beginning of the 19th century Europe accounted for 85% of the world Jewish population with Russia, Austrohungaria and Germany having 80% of all Jews. There were only 2 - 3 000 Jews in America at that time. In 1925 63% of all Jews were in Europe, within the borders of Germany, Russia and the Austrohungarian Empire there were only 57% remaining, 30% in America and 7% in the rest of the world". According to the calculations of the Reich Office for Statistics, in 1880 Europe accounted for 88,4% of the world Jewish population, in 1937 only 60,4%. In 1943 Europe should not account for more than 1/3 of the world Jewish population.

The following is a list of the Jewish population in some important European countries:

More Recent Census or Estimate Country Census Year Jewish Year Jew.pop. % of

population in 1000 total pop.

Altreich 1933/35 502 799 1943 51 0,07 Austria 1934 191 481 1943 8 0, I Czechoslovakia 1930 356 830 -Protectorate 1943 16 0,2 Danzig 1929 10 448 Memel Territory 1925 2 402 1937 2,0

Belgium 1937 80 1,0 Bulgaria 1934 48 398 1937 50 0,8 Finland 1937 2 0,04 France 1937 280 0,7 Greece 1928 72 791 1937 90 I, I Great Britain 1931/33 234 000 1937 345 0,7 Italy 1930 47 825 1937 52 0,1 Yugoslavia 1930 68 405 1937 75 0,3 Ireland 1936 4 0, I Latvia 1935 93 479 1937 96 4,9 Lithunia 1923 155 125 1937 175 7,4 Netherlands 1930 III 917 1937 135 1,6 Poland 1930 3 113 933 1937 3 300 ) 9,6 Rumania 1930 984 213 1941 302 1 2,2 Slovakia 1940 89 3,4 Soviet Russia 1926 2 570 330 1939 4 6002) 2,4 Hungary 1930 444 567 1940 750 3) 5,8

I) New territorial division. 2) New territorial division with East Poland; the figure is estimated. 3) New territorial division; the figure is calculated.

187

Appendix B

The total Jewish population of the world was estimated at 17 million in 1937. Of these, over 10 million were in Europe. They are or were concentrated in Europe mai~lGI~ the German~occupied formerly Russian and Polish territories between the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, also in the trading centers of Middle and Western Europe, in the Rhine and along the Mediterranean coast.

Between 1937 and the beginning of 1943 the Jewish population of Europe should have decreased by an estimated 4 million, partly due to excess mortality of the Jews in Hiddle and Western Europe and partly due to the evacuations, mainly in the Eastern territories, which are counted as a decrease here. Moreover, it was not possible to count all of the deaths of the Soviet Russian Jews in the occupied Eastern Territories while those in the remaining European part of Russia and on the front have not been included at all. In addition to this there are the masses of Jews who have fled from European Russia to Asian Russia and the emigration of Jews ahroad from the European countries outside German influence is a largely unknown quantity. Altogether European Jewry must have decreased by almost 1/2 since 1933 that ist to say, during the first decade of the development of power of National Socialism.

188

Der Inspekteur fUr Statlstik

Tgb.Nr.;6/g.R8. Dr.K./K.

Ap:")€,lid i Cl'S

Fiji /

Berlin, 2;.;.194;

r oh'.;.· r:\ D:~' ("1", ...... ....... -h ·"1 v· __ , 1\..,1f"':"; ..... '\.~Jl ..... , j~J';;'U~ .... • \-"

H-Cberstur.:abanni'tihrer Dr. R. Bra n d t Para.Stab Re1chs:ftihror-H Bar 1 1 n

Lieber Pg. Bra n ~ t

~maJ3 Befehl des Relch3~rers -Gel:ei.!lI-.vcn:. 18.1.194'3. Tgb.Nr.32/2/43 g und den entsprecr.enden Sef~hlen ~es Relchs1'\r:lrers (ill das Reicn33iche::-l:ei tsha'..!:;;ta.::::t hace io:;'

dem RelchssiC'herhe1tshaupta:nt den i:l. Absch::-i:'t bel!ol,;e~'::e

Berlcht tiber DDie Endloaung dar europlilschen Juden!ruge" al8 eTaten vorlaufigen :!lericht zur Ver:t'Ugung gestellt.

Ein endgUltlger, auagebautar Bericht mit tadelloeem Zahlenmaterial und mit einer hieb- und stlchfesten 3ilsnz tiber die zahlenmaI31ge Entw1.cklung deB Judentt1:.1S dlirfte am besten viellei,:)ht fUr den Stand yom 1.Juli, 1.0Lt.)Der oder 31.12.1943 nach Borgt'~-i.ltiger Voroereitu.:ng der Z'.).­

nachst noch sehr w1dersprechenden zahlenmiDigen Unter­lagen zu erst ellen sein. leh ware L'men da.."lk:bar. 'Renn Sis dem Reichaflihrer einen dieabezUglichen Vorschlag machen wtirden, zugleich 'Nsre ieh fUr ~it teilung da."Ubar. welche Einzelfragen aus dem Bericnt dar Reiccsfuhrer besser ausgearbei tet oder zurlickges tell t hub,,;n 'Nill.

Anlage: 1 Ber1cht (16 Bliitter)

JP.9

B e 1 1 R - I 1 t 1 l:l J. .

4- 4,;# /~IU'

Inspector of Statistics Tgb.Nr.36/g.Rs. Dr.K./K.

Appendices

Berlin, Mar. 23, 1943

SECRET REICH MATERIAL

SS-ObersturmbannfUhrer Dr.R. Bra n d t Personal Staff ReichsfUhrer SS Berlin

Dear Comrade Bra n d t ,

According to the secret order of the ReichsfUhrer of Jan. 18, 1943, Tgb.Nr.32/2/43 g and the corresponding orders of the ReichsfUhrer to the Main Reich Security Office, I have placed the first preliminary report, copy enclosed hereby, as to the "Final Soltion of the European Jewish Problem" at the disposal of the ~1ain Reich Security Office.

It should be possible to produce a definitive elaborated report with flawless numerical material and unassailable figures as to numerical development of Jewry, perhaps at best as of July I, Oct. I or Dec. 31, 1943 , after careful preparation of the presently still very contra­dictory numerical data. I would appreciate your passing this suggestion on to the ReichsfUhrer and would also be grateful if you could inform me as to which points in the report the ReichsfUhrer would like to have ex­panded or deleted.

Enclosed: I Report (16 pages)

190

H e H tie r

Korherr

Der Reichat~\

Tgb.4. JJ(3)~3 :17".

Appendices

p ;.1)4-'

;1/1' - ~ I ;~ -/ I i \.... "';',',

• I

Geh.ei..M Re1ch&AlCJhe -.---...... ~, All dell ~ At1.5 !ert~en ehd der ~1cherhe1t~llze1 und dee SD. ~~. AU!lfart~ B e r 1 1 11

Ic.h habe .ie., stati.3t1ochan 3erlc!l+'; das 10-.\3~kteurs tl.i.r Statis!:1.k ~r die }~osung d,u' J~de.Q!=1lg1t

eriwl~I1.

lcb. halta disee!l Bcrl.c:.ht al3 allO!l.f'all.zigu Uatorial t'W:' apatere Zei tOil, 1l!ld Z1I3r ZU 'rar:lUllg,t~QD.

tUr rech~ gut. Ia Augenbllek d.nr.t ax" wader Ye..""6r!entUcht noo.U "i tergegebeA werden.

Du. w1c".1;1~ta 1st mir Il3.cb. 1I1e Tor, dA3

Jetzt an Juden naeh dcm Vsten. fibgt)!a!lren .. !.rd, .. as U-berhaupt: nur me1lScllcomOgll~ at. In den lrurzen .IolQlllJ.tsmelciu..llg"~ der Sicherhe1tspolize1 will len lediglieh ~tgatollt be~en. .111 aonatlieh abgetah.ren worden 1st und 1928 zu diesOlll Zci 1;­

p.JJlkt noch an Juden Ubrig bliab.

191

The Reichsfuhrer-SS

Tgb.Nr. 1573/43 RF/V.

Appendices

Field Command Post, Apr.9, 1943

SECRET REICH MATERIAL

3 copies copy 3

To the Chief of Security Police and SO B e r 1 i n ------

I have received the statistical report of the Inspector of Statistics about the final solution of the Jewish problem.

I consider this report to be good material for a later date if necessary, namely for cover-up pur­poses. At present it must not be published nor allowed to circulate.

What is of primary importance to me at the moment is that as many Jews be transported to the East as is humanly possible. In the short monthly reports of the security police I only want to be informed as to how many Jews have been transported per month and how many still remain.

Hirranler

192

Appendices

/Vo - ~- 19 b Dol.' Ro1oh~Uhro~i PcrnC~lahor Stab

Pe1d-Ko~doatel1o~ 1~194~

'rc~.rrr.

-V.

An don

(~~Ct""c~n~c n'"?-" .,~, ,;)("",("~~,:~!' ~ ~ ••• , .... ... "" •• :/, .. / \ .. ..,.J'~

2 Auofcrtlrrun~CD fb, Auafert1;:;ung

wl>oktour ti.!.r StntiBt1lt , P~;. Xorhorr Bor11n

Dor nolchorilhrar-Ji~ hat I.llrGn otntlstlochon Dorlcli1i fibor "Dio E:ldlo::nm3 dar ouro:pll1nchen Judontl'nc;o" orh1ll. ton. ~ VJUl'l.ocht, do.,'l M ke1nor Sto110 V()Zl "~olldcrbo:w)1d­

lung dar Judcn"c;o.::~rochcn. \:Jird. 1114 Selta 9, I'Uokt 4, r.ufl (13

tolgendorco;~~ co1Bona

":rro.n~.l?ort1ct"W13 vo,n Judcn QUB ,don Ootprov1.nzcn oach den rucs1.1::chon OntC'o1I

ED wuruon durc~oooluouat du:.:-ch <110 L.lcor 1J:l Gcnoralc;ouvornot'.'Jilt ••••• durch dio Lacer 1.111 Warthoc;au ••••••••••••• "

I~Q4J undoro Forz:ruJ.1c~ dart nioht GonCll:'.Clon wordon. loll sonde dD:l von Roich:.;{Uhrcr..Jj~ boroltu ab~ozolclllloto .I::;c' pI.'

daB Dol'1chtoo zurliok JJ1t dar Dltto,dicDQ Scite 9 entapl'oeil'" l ab»~~n und'QS ~lodor zurUckzuDondon.

~) f'r-. ',A--<:" ,\ 1:-1,/,," r'{"

t..J<c. .. 9. ~. t"/i'(~'.r.. ( ~; (-'7 L 1-'-<-( _

~I::;O ~11.t. ~ \~berot~ub8nO!Uhror

\93

Appendices

The ReichsfUhrer-SS Personal Staff Tgb.Nr.

Field Commando Post,Apr. 10, 1943

-v.

SECRET REICH MATERIAL 2 copies copy 2

To the Inspector of Statistics, Comrade Korherr Berlin

The ReichsfUhrer-SS has received your statistical report on the "Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem"., He does not wish the words "special treatment of Jews" to be used at all. On page 9, point 4 the text must read as follows:

"Transportation of Jews out of the Eastern Provinces to the Russian East: Number of those passed through the camp in the General Government .. through the camp in Warthegau .............. ,"

A different formulation must not appear. I am sending back the copy of the report already signed by the ReichsfUhrer-SS with the request to make the indicated changes on page 9 and return it.

Brandt

I Enclosure SS-ObersturmbannfUhrer

194

The Korherr Report Completed

Geheime Reichssache

/JIO- ::-;CJJ I

DIE El';DLUSL'NG DBR EJaOl'j~lSC:iJ!:!I JUDZ!lt'R.Ai.lE ._ •••••• D •••• D ••••••••• a ••• z.a ••• ~saa ••••

Statistischer Bericht

llotwendige Vorbemerkung. Judenstatiatiken sind immer m1t Vorbehalt au.tzunehmen, da bei der zahlenmiii.l!.:;en Erta,Hlung des Judentums etete mit besonderen ~ehlern zu rechnen le~. Fehlerquellen liegen u.a. in Mesen und Entwtcklung des Judentums, seiner Abgrenzung, seiner mehrtauaendJnhr1gen ruhelosen ,ianderschnt't, den zahllosen Aufnahmen und Aus­tritten, den Angleichungsbestrebungen, der Vermischung mit den .i'1rtsvoljcern, vor allem aber 1m BemUhen des Juden, s1ch der Erfaseung zu entziehen.

Schlie311ch hat die Statistik teils nla Notbehelf, ta11s wegen der weitgehenden Ubereinstimmung z'~schen jUd1scher Rasse und jUdischem Glauben, te1ls im kontessionellen De~en des letzten Jahrhunderts betangen, bis zuletzt die Judan nicht nach ihrer assse, eondern nach ihrem~eligiosen Bekenntnis erfaat. Die Ertassung der Juden nech der Rasae gestaltet aich auch -vor allem durch die auaerliche Ver­kleinerung des Judentums infolge Austritt, L~ertritt, weiter zurUckliegender rassischer Verm1schung und durch Tarnung- eehr echwlerig, .ie die miUlungene Erfessung der RasseJuden in Osterreich 192} und die ~rhebur.g der Voll-, Hal1:- und Vierteljuden bei der deutschen Volksz~hlune 1959 zeigen. J~dische Bestandazahlen sind im allsemeinen nur cIa ~indeetzahlen zu 'Rerten, !lobei der .r'ehler m1 t ~er1ngerelll

jUdischem Blutanteil immer gr~aer Kird.

,'nat unUberR1ndl1che Schwieriskeiten bereitet die ;·;rstellw.t:" einer e1nigermaDen zuverI1ssicen Stat1st1k Ub~r ~est~d und llewegun,~ des Judentums in den ges.snten Ostgebieten se1 t lJeginn des z·,veiten Neltkr1et:"es, der unkontrollierbarc :Jasl5en von Juden in Be',vegung sebracht hat.

195

Gebiet

Appendix C

-2- -,1/ ... '" /;1 <.../ t-. / .. / :2 \ ... /

BlLALlZ Di::S JUD.t.:lL.'u-:.;S

., e 1 t. Die GeaamtZahl der Juden au1' der ':;rde scc.!itzte

man im letzten Jahrzehnt auf 15 bis 18 :':illionen, zuweilen

auch auf weit tiber 20 llil1ionen. Das Statistische Heichsamt

gab fUr das Jahr 1937 die Zahl mit 17 ~illionen an.

E u r 0 p a. Davon Itben um 1937 et ... a 10,3 ,.:1l11onen(60v:i;

in i:.'uropa und 5,1 !Jillionen( 30 vH) in Amerika. Ut::. 1.'380 hat t

der europtiische Anteil noch 88 vH, der ~erikunische erst gut 3 vH betragen.

In ZuroI'a hliufen bz·,v. hliuften sic:: die Jucle~ vor D.ll~.:::. i:1

den n~~ehr von Deutschl~d besetzten frUheren polnisch­

russischen und baltiscten Gebieten z.vischen 0stsee und

Finnischem :Jeerbusen und dem Sch'Rarzen und Asom:chen ::eer,

daneben in den Handelsclttelpunkten :.:ittel- '.lnd ieste'.lroi1D.s, 1m .:llietngebiet und an den KUsten des ::itte:b:eers.

D e u t s c h 1 and Die ';udenbilanz des J.eici:es iet

an die verschieden erollen Zei tri"iUlLe sei t der je.veil1.:en

:JachttibernahJ:le in seinen Tel1Gebl.:ten geb'=den. ,,:rst von

dieaen Zei tpu."lkten = beCi=t das .. \bfl uten der J'.1Uen in

groUem Stile Vorher gab es in munchen Gebieten soser e:ne

Zunahme der Juden als Folge de& Abtlusses aus Gebieten, die zum Reiche kamen.

Zur Zeit der jeweiligen UnchtUbernnb~e QDd 8ffi 31.12.1~~2 betrug die Zanl der Juden in

Zeitpunkt der :Jech t Ubernabne

Z a hId e r J u d e r. vor der ~

:,!achtUbernal'..r.:e 31.12.1')42

Altreich

Sudetenland Ostmark

30.1.1933

29.9.1938

13. ;.1 ?38

16.3.193')

Sent .1939

561 OvO 30 ce·o

22v i.,vU

} 51 "",)'7 /~ I

8 1 ,'2 3c)u:}en und U:ihren

OstGec1ete (tit Bialystok)

Gener!l.lSouv. kit :'e:;;be rt;)

i. Usa :::J. ::1 .? n

(Ju..n1 1940)

Sept.1939 (J'.mi 1 '}4U )

196

118 0\.-'0 15 550

79J JOG 253 210

2 Ch..'O ()l~O 2,(}7 1]1 ~

) '119 ,,_J t) ... "j _

The Korherr Report Cotn"leted

-3- /110- 0- 1 73 Zu den Zahlen vor der jeweiligen MachtUbernahme iet ergunzend

zu bemerken, daG aie z.T. ineinanderflie~en. So stromte der

GroBteil dar 30 ooa Juden des Sudetenlandes (27 000 Glaube~s­juden) vor der Vereinigung mit dem Reich ohne UbersChreitung

einer Staatsgrenze und ohne Verm~gensverluste rasan ins

Protektorat ab, ist alao in den Zai:.len fUr Bl'hmen und Mlihrell

von 1939 zu einem Teil wieder enthaltell. Dus Sudetenland

zKhlte am 17.5.1939 nur mehr 2 649 Juden.

FUr die Zeit kurz vor dem zwe1 ten .1el tJcrieg Bl3t sieh die

Zahl der Juden im Reichsgebiet mit Protektorat und General­

gouvernement fUr einen festen &e1 tpunkt. an,geben bZ'If. ab­

echatzen. Sie betragt um den 17.5.1939 in

Altreich

Sudetenland

Oatmark

233 973

2 649

94 270 BOhmen und UIDlren 110 000

Oetgebiete rd. 790 000

Generalgouv. rd. 2 000 000

ZU8aJIl1!1en :3 120 892

}

Zum Verghdch: am 31.12.1942

51 327

8 102

15 550

233 210

297 914-

606 103

Altreich und Ostmark batten bis zum Kriege 'Reit tiber die

Halfte ihres -z1vilisierten und sterilen- J~denbestandee

bereits abgegeben, vor allem dUrch Aus· ... anderunt:, R:',trend im

Osten der Zusamroenbruch der fUr die Z~unft eef~rlichen

fruchtbaren Judenmassen UberR1egend erst im Krieee und

besonders seit den ~vaku1eruntsmaOnahrr.en von 1942 deutli~h

wird.

Daa Jadentum hat aich dam1t von 1933 bis 1943 lnnerha)b de~

erweiterten Reichsgebietes, also im ze:'..tlich-r.'hll:!lichen

Bereich der nat1onalsoziulistischen Sta&.tsf"inrurlg. um r.md

, • 1 U111ionen K~pfe vermindert. Im Altreich sank der

Bestand auf fast 1/12, in der Ostmark gar auf 1/27, 1~ ~ene­

ralgouvernement und in B1,;hmen und iJ:ihren auf et'll'u 1/7. in f

den Ostgebieten auf 1/3 bis 1/4.

197

Gebiet

Utreich

,4.pl~e.nJix \..

-4-

AuswandtH·'.l!lij. St.erbeUbt::rschul3 und "vakuier~. Jicscr .'.'':::k­

gant; ist. das Ergebnis des '::uso.=Gn,vir<:ens von .':"US.'/o.:·,c:.<i=-:.1'10 •

Ste=beUb,,:::,schw; und C:v~erun.g • .'IOZU noch .:;erir.;.:r':ic:i:e

sonstige V",r:inderun~er;. kOmI:len (z.J. sener.m15te f..ustr;'t.t,~, ;';l­

erkennung als :':ischline I .Grades, :jeuerfc.ssung. ':,-rt.eibe­

reinigung), !{orUber die fol,~ende 'rabelle Au!'schl

Zeitruwr. A b n a h m e (-) oder Zunahme der ,;\1':'..8n von •••• durcn bis 31. Aus'.van- ~terbe- ,:,VaiCU- ;:onst. 12.1942 a: e I"'1.lIl2; Uber- ierun~ '}er:in- InSf""8SU!r.·.

schuB a:er~.

382 534 -61 193 - 100 516 '+4 570 - 539 6F; ,l'Jit Sude-

1 30 .1.33 (29.9.38) i ;enland

)st::Jz;.rk I 1 3. j. )8 149 12~ I -14 5i)9 - 47 555 - 710 - 21 1 8~h

l\';=en und - 25 699 j - 7 074 :.;ahren 16.3.39 - 69 677 - - 1.:;2 450

)steebiete I Sept. 39 - 334 673 - 222 117 - - 556 79J cit Bialy- (Juni 40' ,tok)

:eneralgouv. I Sept. 39 mit Lemberg)i (Juni 40' - 427 920 -1 274 166 - -1 702 Cd6

Z usa m men -1 402 126 -1 114 031 +3 86ll - 3 112 8 ~"I

Die 13ilanz fUr Al treich. ,)stmark und .5jhL~en und:.;::lrer.

men sieht folgender~~en aUG:

Z'J.:3[4fl-

Anfanesbestnnd d~ Juden bei je\veil.~:o.chtJbernuLme:

VerUnderu.~ben durch: Auswand.e rung SterbeUberschW3 Evakuierung ~leuerr'ass~.1ng US'll

Hestand 8::J 51.12.1942:

929 GOO

- 557 357 - 82 776 - 217 74d + 3 860 - 1:64 c.l21

74 979

~er aullerorden:li:~i:2 Sterbe:.ibcrzl..!na':':' der C':.lJ.t.\:~<z·.:;. ir', n,l..:'­

reich 1st 1nfolb"t? der a.~or:n.alen "oJ oc:r3.1 :8r"'..lI:~ 'l.::.i :"2~ . ..:r::~:.::.'(

che des ';udent~s ebenso S'.1'::' ";e'cl1rte:::a:::;~1';; l{i'2 3'..1;' 1:0':" . :-:~'"

11cb:.<:eit zur'~el::zuf'lhren: i:::: 1.'.,'lertel 194) z;',!:~';.," ::-,[;,J! .2": .0'"­b)lIten, 1 11,) Sterbe!:.ille. ;)ie ~ahle::: '~'::,~r ;"".!s.',a::(i'~=·~:-.: 'J.:'.J

SterbeUberschu1.l(Kriec::s.vi::re:1!) der,)st;,;:.;icce ',<.'1d. ,i'=3 :',;::e!:'~:-

_ ~Q'..lVerneJlent2 2:'r:.C. ~1ct.t L:.: .. cnprJ.:'cElr. :.il...· -::'::,i ~:~.: ': ;:', ~:"~:~~"-

198

The Korh.rr Re~ort Coo~leled

-5-

Ergebnis aus Anfangs- und ~ndbestand und ~vakuierun~en der

Juden. Vom 1. 1. 1943 bis 31. 3.1943 fand nus dem rleiehsz;ebiet ::U t

Buhmen und :~i.ihren, neuen Ostgebleter. und Bezirk Bialystok

Nieder die Evakuierung von 113 015 Juden naeh de~ vsten

stat t, e benso die ;lohnsi tzverlegung von 8 025 Juden ins

Al tersghet to 'l'b.eresienstad t. Die Judenzahl in Deut schlanrl.,

nrunentlich in den Ostgebieten, '.vurde dadurch neuerdings

stark herabgesetz t •

~ischehen. Die ~ahl der Juden 1m :le1chsgebiet v~n 1939 e~: h~lt am 31.12.1942 einen nicht ger1ll6en ~eil von Juucn in

~ischehen:

Juden davon in "est am 31.12.42 :Jischehe

;,ltrelch 51 327 16 760 34 567

Ostmark 8 102 4 803 3 299

Bohmen und !.llihr~n 15 550 6 211 9 359

Zusammen 74~ll 27 774. 47 205

Die Judenzahl des Altreichs hat sich inz,Yi!3chen ,'leiter von

51 327 am 31.12.1942 auf 31 910 am 1.4.19~3 vermindert. un­ter diesen 31 910 Juden leben \iber die Hlilfte, u:.iml1ch

16 668 in ~schehe, dnvon 12 117 in privilecierter ur.d 4 551 in nicht pr1vllegierter ":isehehe. AuDercie::: d',:rfte in

der Auistelluns noch eine gro~ere Anzc.hl von J~ltien :ni tce -

zc,hlt sein, die schlieSlici:l als U11').U!'tindbsr ab;:;eschriaben

'/lerden wissen,.vie es aucn t.ei jede:n c;in,Yoil:.er;cotJ.:Jter 1::1-

tr;e!" '}lieder vor\~o:::-.mt. Jer 3estcnd dcr Jt.:.dC.l L:. a1':.':::1 ,\e'..cl.s,

gebiet( or~'1e Ostsebicte) n:\he::t s::..cn seine::: ~:r.cle.

Arbei tse1ns:::.tz. 'Ion tie::. i::i ,'ei~::si:ebiet 1"b2r.c.(~!: C'.ltl~n bet::',r:der.. slch Zll ~e6inn des ,;r...tres 1'?45

21 659 in ~rieg!3Micr:ci~e:n Arba:tseinsut~.

~azu ko~.en ill lcrieS!J.vict~.:._e:--.J Arceitsei!1sQ..tz 1'-1 455 J()',~'!' rU3sisc!le 'J~den !~ I~apekte~r-~ere~ch i.~r~i~8t~r;. 5·) S';. sto.ater .. lase und ~usl.;"ind·i.scL:e ,j~1de!1 i=. LOo.if.~:'~ir.Gc..~~ : ...:::--.:::~~': t

(~reGl3.'.l) '.t:"lc!.. ()5 112 e[~e~~. ~')lr.':'::C't'.c u'.lu.e~l :.::-. ::; .. et::)- " .. :"''1''':'

: .. ~:.:.}re:.n:Jut::: i:.: : .. :r 2·,·::2' . .:r-.~,-:!r~:':~f'~ ~0~:e!~.

Ig9

-6- Appendix C

Konzentrat1onsl;gar. In Konzentrat1onslugern befanden sich am }1.12.1942'insgesamt 9 121 Juden, in Justizvollzugsnnetal­ten 458 Juden. Die 13elegstnrlce dar i:onzentrationslcger mit luden war !olgende:

Mauthausen!Gusen 79 Lublin 7 }42 Sachsenhausen 46 Auschwitz 1 412 Stuttho! 18 Buchenwald 227 RavensbrUck 3.

Altersghetto. Im einzigen Altersghetto Theres1enatadt gab es Antang 1943 zusamcen 49 392 Juden, die von den Bestands­zahlen abgesch.rieben sind.

Evak'..lierung uua anderen europl"lischen :':'ndern. Im deu';schen Macht- und :':intl~bereich a'..l13erhalb der lteichssrenzen far.den tolgende Evakuierungen von Juden sta~t:

L1Ulder

Frankreich (soweit vor

bis 31.12.42

dem 10.11.42 besetzt) Niederlande Belgien Norwegen Griechenland Slowake1 Kroatien Bulgarien Auaerdem in den russiscnen Gebieten e1nschl. der frtiheren bultischen LOnder seit Beginn des 0st!'eldzuges

Zusamz:;en

41 911 }8 571

16 886 5}2

56 691 4 927

635 300

792 818

1m 1.V1erteljahr !ill 7 995

13 832 1 616

158

13 435 854

11 364

49 254

E u r 0 p H 1 s c h e J u dan b i 1 a n z. ~ie Ver­minder1.lnc des Judentuns in "::uropa dlirfte druni. bervitD [::1

4 :-:11lionen i{(3pfe be tr:lgen. ::;:he re ,J uden be st::nde z:·l;le~. Co·.lI'

dem europ. :(ontinent (neben .1u..ilanu r;U; etlla 4 .. :El.) nur !'".'ld Unsarn (750 v\.J0) '.lnd :\;.:;::).'·nien (3..;2 0JU), v1ellaL:;;t noeh lra.~kreich. !!~r ~cJCs1cnti.:. t ~:l3.:l r.~·:er: dcm c..n~;e:.··:[_r+:'t-:n ~J.c(:"=:':"''''r:

eli, ~ ·jJ.i~cLe Aus.l.:..r.c.er·.lr.£: :.mel den .~ '~ji!Jc;_en ::tc~rt-" ;·t.·,]r:-:ch ' .• 1.;

The Korherr Report Completed

-7- ftO - c l 1'3 in den auUerdeutschen Stauten ~~ittel- und ;/esteuropae, aber auch die unbedinst vorkoUlmenden ;)oppelz~ihlu.'1:::en 1n1'ol£7e der jildischen llulctuat10n, drum dUrl'te die Verminder'.lnC des Ju­dentums 1n :europa von 1957 bis Anfung 1943 !lui 4 ;"2 ,.~lll1o­

nen zu sch.;';tzen se1n. Dabe1 kor..nte von den :'odesf~llen der sowjet-russischen Juden in den besetzten Ostgeb1eten nur ein Te1l erfaSt werden, w~hrend d1ejenicen im Ubr1gen europai­schen RuJllnnd und an der rront Uberhaupt nicht enthv.l~en sind. Dazu kommen die Yunderungsstrome der Juden 1nnerhalb RW3lands in den as1atischen Bereich hinJber. Auch der .i1:.Ul­

derungsstrom der Juden aus den europiiischen Liindern a".l...er­halb des deutschen E1nflu~bereic~s nech Coersee ~st ei~e weitgehend unbekarJlte Gr~~e.

Insgesamt dUrfte das eurooa1sche Judentum seit 19~~1~~ 1m ersten Jlilirzehnt der n.:l.tionulsoziel1stJ:scr_~l.;.§.chteE.1:: faltun~1 bald die Halfte se1nes Best~des verloren nahen. Davon ist wieder nur etwa die ~;lfte, also ein Viertel des europnischen GeB~tbeBtandas von 1937, den ande=en ~rdte1-len zugeflossen.

200 201

Appendix D

Secret Reich Material

THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH PROBLEM

Statistical Report

Necessary Preliminary Remarks. Jewish statistics are to be accepted only with reservations since certain mistakes must be reckoned with in the statistical analysis of Jewry. Among the causes of these errors are the character and development of Judaism, its definition, the many thousand years of restless wandering, the numerous conversions to and from Judaism, the efforts towards integration, the miscenigation with the native population and above all the efforts of the Jews to avoid registration.

In the end, partly as an expedient and partly due to the large degree of overlap between the Jewish race and the Jewish religion, partly caught up in the denominational thought of the last century, Jews have been classified not according to their race but according to their religion. The registration of Jews according to race is extremely diffi­cult, above all because of the reduction in their numbers due to secessions, conversions, earlier rill'ial interbreeding and concealment, as shown by the unsuccessful regislrnt ion of Jews by race in Austria in 1923 and the classification of .lpws into full, half, and quarter Jews in the German census of 1939. Jewish statistics should generally be interpreted as minimal figures whereby the errors of classification tend to vary in inverse proportion to the amount of Jewish blood.

We have faced almost insurmountable difficulties in the compilation of accurate statistics regarding the Jewish population and its movements in the Eastern Territories since the beginning of the second world war, which set uncontrollable masses of Jews in movement.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JEWRY

w 0 rId. The total Jewish population of the world was estimated to be between 15 and 18 million in the last decade, sometimes at over 20 million. The Statistische Reirhsamt (German Bureau of Statistics) estimated the total Jewish population of the world at 17 million in 1937.

E u r 0 p e . In 1937 10,3 million (60%) were living in Europe and 5,1 million (30%) in America. In 1880 the European Jews comprised 88% of the world Jewish population and the American Jews only slightly more than 3%. In Europe the Jews are, or rather, were concentrated in the formerly Polish, Russian and Baltic territories now occupied by Germany between the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, also in the trading centers of Middle and Western Europe, in the Rhine and along the Mediterranean coast.

202

The Korherr Report Completed

G e r man y . The Jewish population of the Reich is related to the length of time since the seizure of power in the different territories. This marks the beginning of the great Jewish exodus. Up to then there had even been an increase in the Jewish population in some territories as a result of their exodus from territories already occupied by the Reich.

At the time of assumption of power and on Dec.3l, 1942 the Jewish population was:

Terri tory.

Altreich

Sudeten land

Ostmark

Bohemia and Moravia

Eastern Territories (incl. Bialystok)

General Government (inc 1. Lemberg)

Tot a 1

Date of Assumpt­ion of power

Jan.30, 1933

Sep.29, 1938

Mar.13, 1938

Har.16, 1939

Sep. 1939 (June 1940)

Sep. 1939 (June 1940)

Jew ish Pop u 1 a t ion before Assumpt- on Dec.31, 1942 ion of power

561 000 51 327

30 000

220 000 8 102

118 000 15 550

790 000 233 210

2 000 000 297 914

3 719 000 606 103

There is a certain amount of overlap in the figures prior to the assumption of power. Thus most of the 30 000 Jews of the Sudetenland (27 000 religious Jews)before the annexation into the Reich rapidly fled to the Protectorate without crossing a national border and without loss of property and appear again in the figures for Bohemia. and Moravia· in 1939. On the 17 May 1939 there were only 2 649 Jews in the Sudetenland.

For the time shortly prior to World War II it is possible to list figures for or estimate the Jewish popUlation of the Reich territories with the Protectorate and the General Government:

for comparison Mar. 17, 1939 Dec. 31, 1942

Altreich 233 937 51 327 Sudeten land 649

Ostmark 94 270 8 102

Bohemia and Moravia 110 000 15 550

Easterns Territories c. 790 000 233 210

General Government c.2 000 000 297 914

Total 3 120 892 606 103

Altreich und Ostmark had already lost well over half of their civilized and sterile Jewsih population before the war, mainly due to emigration, while in the East the collapse of the dangerous fertile Jewish masses only became clear during the war and particularly after the evacuation measures of 1942.

203

Appendix D

The Jewish population of the extended German Reich was reduced hy 3,1 million between 1933 and 1943 under the leadership of National Socialism. In Altreich the population dropped to 1/12, in Ostmark to 1/27, in the General Government and in Bohemia and Moravia to ahout 1/7 and int the Eastern Territories to between 1/3 and 1/4.

Emigration, Excess Mortality and Evacuation. This reduction in the popu­lation is the result of a combination of emigration, excess mortality and evacuation and certain minor changes due to other factors (such as officially allowed conversions, recognition as a first class half-breed, new registrations and cleaning-up of files). The following chart explains:

Territory Time Period Decrease (-) or Increase in the Jewish Pop. _I from ... to due to Dec.31,1942 Emigration Exceso;. E~acua- Other Total i

Mortallt tlon -----

Altreich Jan. 30,1933 -382 534 -61 193 - 100 516 +4 570 - 539 673 (with Sudet-(Sep.29, 1938) enland)

Ostmark Mar.13,1938 -149 124 -14 509 - 47 555 - 710 - 211 898

Bohemia and Moravia Mar. 16,1939 - 25 699 - 7 074 - 69 677 - - 102 450

Eastern Terriaries Sep. 1939 - 334 673 - 222 117 - - 556 790 (wi th Bia ly- (June 1940) stok)

General Gov. Sep. 1939 - 427 920 -I 274 166 - -I 702 086 (with Lemberg(June 1940)

Tot a 1 -I 402 726 -I 714 031 +3 860 -3 112 897

The figures for Altreich, Ostmark Bohemia and Moravia together are:

Jewish Population at time of Assumption of Power

Changes due to Emigration Excess Mortality Evacuation New Registration etc.

Population on Dec. 31, 1942

+

929 000

557 357 82 776

217 748 3 860

854 021

74 979

The unusual excess mortality among the Jews, for example in Altreich, can be attributed to abnorming aging and the weakness of Jews as well as to a low birth rate and a high mortality rate. In the first quarter of 1943 there were 22 births and 1 113 deaths. The firgures for emigration and excess mortality (the turmoil of war!) in the Eastern Territories

204

The Korherr Report Completed

and the General Government cannot he checked. The figures represent re­sults calculated from the origin Jewish population, the final population and the evacuations. Between Jan. I, 1943 and ~1ar.3, 1943 113 015 Jews "ere evacuated from the Reich including Bohemii and Moravia, the new Eastern Territories and the district of Bialystok to the East and 8 025 Jews were moved to the Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt. The Jewish population of Germany, particularly in the Eastern Territories was significantly reduced once again hy this.

Mixed Marriages. The Jewish population of the Reich in the boundaries of 1939 includes a significant proportion of Jews in mixed marriages:

Jewish Population Mixed Ma rriages Rest as of Dec.31, 1942

Altreich 51 327 16 760 34 567

Ostmark 8 102 4 803 3 299

Bohemia and Moravia 15 550 6 21 I 9 339

Total 74 979 27 774 47 205

The Jewish population of the Altreich has continued to decrease from 51 327 on Dec.31, 1942 to 31 910 on Apr.l, 1943. Of these 31 910 Jews more than half, namely 16 668 are living in mixed marriages, 12 117 of them in privileged marriages and 4 551 in not privileged marriages. These figures also include a number of Je",s who are untraceable, as always happens in any registration of inhahitants. The Jewish population in the old Reich (without the Eastern Territories) is approaching its end.

Deployment of Labor. Of the Jews living in Reich territory at the be­ginning of 1943

21 659 were working in areas important for the ",ar effort.

In addition to this 18 435 Jews from Soviet Russia were involved in the war effort in the inspectorate of Konigsberg, 50 570 stateless and foreign Jews were working in the camp at Schmelt (Breslau) and 95 112 formerly Polish Jews were working in ghettos and camps in the inspecto­rate of Posen.

Concentration Camps. There were a total of 9 127 Je",s in concentration camps and 458 in penal institutions on Dec.31, 1942 as follows:

Lublin

Ausch",itz

Buchenwald

7 342

412

227

Mauthausen/Gusen

Sachsenhausen

Stutthof

RavensbrUck

79

46

18

3.

Ghetto for the Aged. In the only Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt there were a total of 49 392 Jews in the beginning of 1943. This figure represents a compilation of other figures.

205

Appendix D

Evacuation from other European Countries.Within the realm of German influence and power beyond the boundaries of th~ Reich the following evacuations have taken place:

Country

France (as occupied be­fore Nov. 10, 1942)

Holland

Belgium

Norway

Greece

Slovakia

Croatia

Bulgaria

In the Russian terr­itories including the former Baltic countries since the beginning of the eastern campaign

Total

up to Dec. 12, 1942

4 I 9"

38 57 I

16 886

532

56 69 I

4 927

633 300

792 8 I 8

in the first quarter of 1943

995

13 832

616

158

13 435

854

I I 364

49 254

E u r 0 pea n Jew ish S tat i s tic s . These figures indi­cate that the Jewish population of Europe has already been reduced by 4 million. On the European continent (after Russia with c. 4 million) only Hungary (750 000), Rumania (302 000) and possihly France have large Jewish populations. In additon to the abovementioned figures, if one takes into account the Jewish emigration, the excess mortality in the non-German countries of Middle and Western Europe and the unavoidable double counting due to the fluctuation of the Jews, then the reduction of the Jewish population of Europe from 1937 to the beginning of 1943 could be estimated at 4 1/2 million. Moreover, it was not possible to count all the deaths of Soviet-Russian Jews in the occupied Estern Territories while those in the remaining European part of Russia and on the front have not been included at all. In addition to this there are masses of Jews who have fled from European Russia to Asian Russia and the emigration of Jews from the European countries outside German influence abroad is a largely unknown quantity.

Altogether, European Jewry must have been reduced by almost 1/2 since 1933, that is to say, during t~e first decade ~f the development-orl'0wer of National Socialism. Again half, that is a quarter of the total Jewlsh population of 1937, has fled to other continents.

206

;,\p:"\( nd ices

J>er lnapekteur rur Stat1at1k{9':::'6T)/~~erlin W 35. 19.4.1543 Tgb.Br. 48/43 geh.Ra. JPotadamer StraBe 61

Geheime Reichssacha ij-Oberaturmbanntuhrer Dr.B. Bra n d t Pers.Stab Relch8tUhrer-~ B e r I 1 n

Lieber Pg. Bra n d t

Mein kUrzllcher Berloht Uber dle Endl~sung der Judentrage mlt 16 Selten Umtang war von mlr zur Ber10htung an den BY erstellt worden, wie mir der RF mtindllch betohlen hatte.

GemaE dem neuen Befehl des Relohs!Uhrers vom 1.4.1943 an

den Chet der Sloherheltspolizel und des SD zur Erstellung eines gekUrzten Ber1chtes sur Vorlage an den FUhrer m1t eindeut1ger Bilanz habe ieh vor einigen Tagen dem Reiebs­slcherbeitshauptamt den in Abscbrltt beifolgenden Berlebt von 6 1/2 Selten zur E1narbe1tung in seinen Gesamtberleht sugeleltet.

loh dart dazu, falls der RF nlcbt ganz einverstanden sain sollte, bemerken: Eine eindeutige Bilanz tur elnen fest~n Zeltraum fUr das ganze heutige Reich laBt sich trotz alles vergossenen SohweiBes niebt erst ellen . lob habe darum nebel, einer Geeamtbilanz mlt wecbselndem Antangezeitpunkt ver­schledene Teilbilanzen gebraeht. Die vorhandenen verschie­denen .An!angs - und SohluIlzahlen d1fferieren z. T. tlIJl hundert.

tausende von Juden. Die vorhandenen ~den lassen Rich auch mit den vorhandenen Unterlagen nicht, w1e es wUn­schenswert ware, nacb Juden im Arbe1tseinsGtz, in KL's, 1m Altersghetto, in privilegierter i.:1schehe teilen, sodaS der verblelbende Rest sofort rUr die Evakuierung zur Ver­fUgung steht. Sowohl beim Arbeitseinsatz wie in den KL'8

lassen dle bisberigen Unterlagen keine zuverlassigen SchlUsse beztiglich der raumlichen Zugeboriekeit dar Jude~ (von der Staatsangehorigkeit abgesehen) zu. Darum muBte 1ch hier eine eindeutige ~ilanz ve~eiden, doch geben die Zahlen an sicb einen brauchbaren Anhaltapunkt.

Anlage g.Bs. H e 1 1 H 1 tIe r

~Ol

~.~

The Inspector of Statistics Tgb.Nr. 48/43 ge.Rs.

Appendices

Berlin W 35, Apr. 19, 1943 Potsdamer StraBe 61

SECRET REICH ~~TERIAL

SS-Obersturmbannflihrer Dr.R. Bra n d t Personal Staff Reichsflihrer-SS Berlin

Dear Comrade Bra n d t ,

My recent 16 page report on the final solution of the Jewish problem was prepared by myself to be delivered to the Reichs­fUhrer, as ordered verbally by the Reichsflihrer.

According to the new order of the Reichsflihrer of Apr. I, 1943 to the Chief of Police and SO as to the preparation of a condensed report with rigorous numerical data to be shown to the FUhrer, I passed on the enclosed 6 1/2 page report to the Main Reich Security Office several days ago for inclusion in its overall report.

I would like to add, in case the ReichsfUhrer is not in agree­ment, despite great effort it is not possible to arrive at accurate totals for a particular time period for the whole German Reich. Therefore, in addition to a total figure with changing beginning dates I have also listed various subtotals. The initial and final figures differ in places by hundreds of thousands of Jews. Unfortunately, the remaining Jews cannot be divided, according to our statistical information, into Jews involved in work, in concentration camps, in the Ghetto for the Aged, in mixed marriages, so that the remainder would be ready for evacuation. The information up to now on Jews involved in work and Jews in concentration camps does not allow uS to draw accurate conclusions as to their former geographic distribution (aside from nationality).For these reasons I had to avoid a clear numerical total, nevertheless, the figures serve as a useful basis.

1 Enclosure Secret Reich Material

H e H t 1 e r

Korherr

208

Appendices

DER UEICJlS(t'OllR"~R II XViI/lt Geheime Reichssache Der Inspekteur fUr Stlltistlk .:---

Tgb.Nr. 51/43 g.Rs _ H '~,t"I;'";;'" l::- ~'I'I'" ') P.lld.m .. S .... 1Io1t ••

\

.- .' Berlin W 35, den 28 4 1943

-~:-v < ...... - ..

'- )

~. )

~

• ,. l' t. ~'I .> (_'..J T.,of •• ft .. .. \,. . .

Betr.z Abtinderung dee Berichtee Uber "DIe EndlHsung der europ~ischen Judenfrage

Bezugz Dort. Schreiben T. 10.4.4' Tgb.Nr. -- -V.

An den Pereonlichen Stab RF-U lII.lId. H-Hfe~. Mel n e B e r lin SW 11 Yrlnz-Xlbreo&t:Straae 8

Liebe Pg. M e i n e

2 Aus!ertigungen

"'. Auster tigung

/IH~ Beiliegend gebe ich den mir mit obigem Sohrelben Uber­eandten Berioht naoh ertolgter Ab~derung surUck.

1 Anlage

~Hell Hitler!

r~

209

THE REICHSFUHRER SS

The Inspector of Statistics

Tgb.Nr. 51/43 g.Rs. - H.

Appendices

Berlin W 35, Apr.28, 1943 Potsdamer StraBe 61 Tel. 22 46 02

SECRET REICH MATERIAL

2 copies copy I

Concerning: Changes in the report "The Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem"

Referring to letter of Apr. 10, 1943 Tgb.Nr. -- -v.

To the Personal Staff RF-SS to the attention of SS-HauptsturmbannfUhrer Mel n e B e r lin SW I I ' Prinz-Albrecht-StraBe 8

Dear Comrade Men e ,

I enclose the changed report returned to me in your above­mentioned letter.

H e H t 1 e r I Enclosure

Korherr

210

Appendix E:Korherr's Past and Present Activities

:l

Richard KORHERR lives in Braunschweig (Lower Saxony). Gripenkerlstr. 4, Tel.: (0531) 791777.

Photograph taken in July 1978 (Cop. Klarsfeld).

In a letter to "Der Spiegel" (31-1977) Korherr said that it had been ,published "that on Himmler's orders I had calculated the number of Jewish victims in the spring of 1943. Actually, these figures were delivered to me complete and with a text by the Main Reich Security Office with the order to change neither the wording nor the figures".

In July 1978, in a conversation with a member of our group, Korherr implicitly recognized that he actively participed in the drawing-up of the two "Korherr Reports" on the basis of the documentation provided by Eichmann's Service.

211

INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES

CITED IN THE STUDIES OF

DR. BILLIG AND MR. WELLERS

Abetz, 46 Adler, II Aretz, In

Bek, 133 Bergelson, 141-142 Berger, 49 Bormann, 27,36,37,41,70 Bouhler, 55,56,130 Brack, 55, 130, Brandt, 45,55,56,145,146 Broad, 113,115,119 Buber, 17 Buhler, 56,57 Burg, 108 Butz, 108

Christopherson, 108,110-112 Coogan, 126

Dannecker, 8,13,16,23-25,28-34 Dibelius, 128 Diels, 7,36,60 Dietrich, 36,69-72 Dubost, 122,126

Eichmann, 6,8,12-14,16-21,23-35,43,45,46,51-57,60, 139,143,148,149

Evans, 125

Faurisson, 108 Feldscher, 55 Flesch, 15 Frank, 32,36,53,56 Freytag, 7, 15 Frick, 5

Gerstein, 120-138 Gil bert, 38,64 Globocnik, 22,52,53,55,56,58,61,

64,68,120,121,130,131, 134,136,137

Glucks, 59 Goebbels, 1,2,4,26,38,68-70 Goering, 3,7,9,26-28,44,48,50,51,

56,57,63,113,114 Goldmann, 14 Grawitz, 135-137 Greiser, 53,54

212

Grynszpan, 16,26 Gunther, 33,121,134 Gustloff, 5

Hagen, 8,12-30,33,34,46 Hasselbacher, 7 Haught, 25 Heckenholt, 135-138 Heerdtlinger, 111 Heimer, 17 Hess, 5 Herman, 118 Heydrich, 4,7,8, la, 11,14,17,18,

20,22,24,27-29,31-35, 37,42,44-47,50-59,61, 65,67,68

Hinnnler; 4,7,8, la, 11,15,17,22, 36-38, 41,43-50,52-55, 57-65,70,130,134,135, 145, !lt6, 148, 158, 159

Hitler, 1-10,15,27,28,32,36'-52, 55-57,61,63-65,69-72, 134,136,146,148,149

Hoess, 5,53,55,56,58,60,114,115 Hoettl, 139, 140 Horty, 70 Hossbach, 37

Joffroy, 125,126,133

Kaltenbrunner, 37, 63 Kasztner, 143,144 Kammler, I 12 Keitel, 48 Kirschneck, 112 Knochen, 17,30,33,34 Kogon, 122 Korherr, 63-65, 139, 145,146,148-

150,153-161 Krisshaber, 22 Kruger, 56,61

Lahousen, 45 Lammers, 48,58 Laval, 68 Lestchinsky, 139,140 Lewental, 119 Ley, 5 Linden, 121,131 Lischka, 7,15,16,29-31,33,34

)

Loesener, 25, 53-55 Luther, 33,46,57

Meyer, 57 Mildenstein, 8,12 Mordowitz, 116 Muller, 11,53,55,159

Nebe, 11,54 Neumann, 58 Niyszli, 119,143,145

Oberg, 68 Oberhauser, 137 Obermeyer, 121,137 Ohlendorf, 47 Olden, 38 Otter, 121,127

Pfannenstiel, 121,131,136 Picker, 36,41 Pohl, 60,61 Poliakov, 124,127,128,140 Polkes, 18,19 Priifer, 112

Rasch, 54 Rassinier, 107,115,120,122-126,

128-137,140-143,145, 150,154,158

Rath, 26,28 Reichenau, 48 Reitlinger, 140 Ribbentrop, 4,45,46,57,70 Roeder, 108

INDEX

213

Rohm, 37 Rosenberg, 4,19,44,47,48 Rosin, 116 Rothfelds, 122 Rousset, 126 Rublee, 4

Schacht, 4 Scheidel, 108 Schellenberg, 30,44 Schirach, 37, 63 Schlegel, 108 Schroeder, 8,12,19 Schwarz, 24 Seyss-Inquart, 32 Six, 8,13,14,16-18,22-25,30,41,45 Speer, 6 Stahlecker, 21 Streicher, 4,12,17,25,71 Stroop, 156 Stuckart, 55

Thomas, 49

Vallat, 46, Veesenmayer, 144,145 Vrba, 116,117

Wetzler, 116 Winter, 14 Wirth, 121,130,132,135-137 Wisliceny, 8,12,18,19,30,139,

140 Wolff, 45,61

BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION

(extracts of the Certificate of Incorporation under Section 402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law)

hereby certified that: . The purposes for which the corporation is formed are to advance public awareness 1e persecution of Jews and other minorities as practiced during the period of the Nazi me in Germany; to educate the public about genocide and about the evils of Nazism, -Semitism and other anti-minority ideologies; to warn against and to expose the ,ivai and the resurgence of anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination and secution identified with Nazi ideology; to gather and to disseminate information ut the Nazi persecution of Jews and other minorities, about genocide and the Nazi locaust; to gathef and to disseminate information about Nazi, anti-Semitic and -minority ideologies and practices wherever they may exist; to contribute to the Ition and maintenance of a moral and ethical climate inimical to Nazi, anti-Semitic anti-minority ideologies and practices in all their forms and inimical to their survival ~esurgence; and to do any other act or thing incidental to or connected with the ~going purposes or in advancement thereof ... "

Ir contribution is deductible for income tax purposes and may be sent to Beate lfsfeld Foundation, 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y 10022.

opy of the last financial report filed with the Department of State of the State of New k may be obtained by writing to New York State Department of State, Office of lrities Registration, Albany, N.Y 12231 or to Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 515 dison Avenue, New York, N.Y 10022.

214

Beate I<ilarsfeld was born in Berlin in 1939. « A German and a Lutheran, she has become throughout the world, by virtue of her coura·­geous acts, a symbol of the most praiseworthy struggle against anti-Semi­tism, against the vestiges of Nazism 'and for peace 'between the Arab countries and Israel ». These words describing Beate Klarsfeld were sent from Israel to Oslo in 1977, when she was the first German to be nomi­nated by Israel for the Nobel Peace Prize. Her candidacy was supported by fifty-six members of the Knesseth (among whom we may cite Menahem Begin, Itzhak Navon, Abba Eban) and by numerous university professors.

For ten years, she has led the combat to end the impunity of Nazi criminals. In 1975, she succeeded in obtaining the ratification by the Bundestag of the law authorizing the trial of leaders of the Nazi police network which operated in France. In July 1978, she was instrumental in obt·aining the indictment of the three Nazis primarily responsible for the deportation of 76.000, Jews from France: Lischka, Hagen and Heinrichsohn are to be tried in Cologne.

Beate Klarsfeld awoke the conscience of the, German people when in 1968 she publicly slapped Kurt Georg Kiesinger, former Nazi propagandist, in a courageous protest against the latter's presence in the German chan­cellery.

Arrested several times in Germany, Mrs. Klarsfeld was imprisoned in Warsaw in 1970 and in Prague in 1971 as she demonstrated against anti­Semitic campaigns and repression. She was again arrested in 1972 in La Paz, where she found and identified the former head of the Gestapo of Lyon, Klaus Barbie. She demonstrated in Damascus after the Yom-Kippur war against the refusal to puhlish a Ust of Israeli prisoners of war and against their mistreatment. In October 1974, she was arrested in Rabat, during the summit meeting of the Arab States, as she was distributing in the streets leaflets in favour of Israel. In May 1977, she demonstrated in Buenos Aires and in Montevideo to denounce torture and growing anti­Semitism.

In 1977, Beate Klarsfeld was honoured in New York with the first. Adele Rosenwald Award of the United Jewish Appeal. She lectures in the United States every year under the auspices of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'Nai Brith. The Klarsfelds and their two children live in Paris.

Serge Klarsfeld, a lawyer, also holds a Master's degree in history from the Sorbonne. He is in addition a graduate of the Institut des Sciences Po­litiques in Paris.

Born in 1935, he escaped by miracle from the Gestapo at the time of the arrest of his father. The elder Klarsfeld perished at Auschwitz.

Active with his wife in the fight to obtain the trial of Nazi criminals, Serge Klarsfeld is the most virulent enemy of the Neo-Nazis in Germany. He is also the author of the monumental « Memorial of the Deportation of the Jews from France ».

215

The Launching of the "Final Solution" by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

The Existence of Gas Chambers The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report

by Georges WELLERS

Edited by Serge KLARSFELD

.Those propagandists who seek to rehabilitate Nazism are perfectly aware that wh#marks it indelibly is the infamous genocide of the Jewish people. They take advantage of the credibility of the public and the more or less unconscious desire of the latter that this nightmarish mass murder had never taken place. That is why the Neo-Nazis have during recent years launched an offensive which has had a certain success. Their principal themes are the following: that Hitler was not responsible for the "Final Solution ", that the gas chambers as a means of extermi­nating the Jews never existed, that the number of Jewish victims has been very considerably exaggerated.

The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania is based on irrefutable German documents. Through an examination of often unpublished papers of the Service for Jewish Affairs of the SD, a careful study of the orders for the "Final Solution" and the Fuhrer's announcements of this Solution, Dr. Joseph Billig for the first time shows step by step how the decision to exterminate the Jews was reached.

Professor Wellers in a first study demolishes the Neo-Nazi arguments which are in contradiction with the accounts of those, SS or internees, who themselves saw the gas chambers in operation.

In the second study, devoted to the number of victims"Professor Wellers brilliantly demonstrates that more than 1,800,000 Jews were liquidated by the Nazis in the Soviet Union. His conclusions are supported by indisputable .figures which have never before been presented. He explores, in addition, the extraordi­nary report drawn up for Himmler by the Inspector of Statistics of the SS, Richard Korherr, who established with great precision the Jewish losses as of December 31, 1942, and as of March 31, 1943.

Georges Wellers thus succeeds in demonstrating that, in taking as a basis only the indisputable figures, one reaches a total of more than 4,800,000 proven victims, all while leaving out of consideration other Jewish victims in numerous countries.

An app~ndix contains the totality of the Korherr reports in the original German text~ Their unabridged versions are publicly printed for the first time and are followed by an English translation. Moreover, we have succeeded ip:-­locating the infinitely valuable Korherr himself in Lower Saxony. The Neo-Nazi~ will therefore not be able to claim that Korherr never existed and that the docu~ ments in question were falsified or even invented. f

THE BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 leN· 543.313.20 { Printed In Franc;e