Kissinger, Henry A.-The Congress of Vienna. A Reappraisal.pdf

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1/18

Trustees of rinceton University

The Congress of Vienna: A ReappraisalAuthor(s): Henry A. KissingerSource: World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 264-280Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008974.

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2/18

THE

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

A

Reappraisal

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

IT

is

only

atural

hat

period

nxiouslyeeking

o

wrest

eace

rom

the hreat

f nuclear xtinction

hould ook

nostalgically

o the

ast

great

uccessfulffort

o settle

nternational

isputes

y

means f

a

diplomatic

onference,

he

Congress

f

Vienna.

Nothing

s

more

temptinghan oascribets chievementsothe ery rocessfnegotia-

tion,

o

diplomatic

kill,

nd o

willingness

o

come o

n

agreement -

and

nothing

s

more

dangerous.

or the effectivenessf

diplomacy

depends

n elements

ranscending

t;

n

part

n the

domestic

tructure

ofthe tates

omprising

he nternational

rder,

n

part

n

their

ower

relationship.

Any

nternationalettlement

epresents

stage

n

a

process

y

which

a nation econcilests vision fitself ith hevision f itbyother

powers.

o

state an

doubt

ts

own

goodfaith;

t

s the

vehicle f ts

social ohesion.

ut,

qually,

o

power

an

stake

ts

urvival

ntirely

on

thegood

faith f

another;

hiswould

be

an abdicationf

the

re-

sponsibility

f

statesmanship.

he

whole

domestic

ffort

f

a

people

exhibits

n effort

o

transformorcento

bligationymeans f con-

sensus

n the

nature f

ustice. ut

the nternational

xperiencef a

state

s a

challenge

o

the

universality

f

ts

notion

f

ustice,

or

he

stabilityf the nternationalrderdepends n thereconciliationf

differentersionsf

egitimacy.ould nation

chieve ll itswishes,

it would

trive

or bsolute

ecurity,

world rder ree

rom

he on-

sciousness

f

foreignanger, nd

one

where ll problems

ave the

manageability

f

domestic

ssues. utsince

bsolute

ecurityorone

powermeans

bsolutensecurity

or ll

others,t is

obtainablenly

through

onquest,

ever

s

part f a

legitimateettlement.

An internationalettlementhich sacceptedndnot mposed ill

therefore

lways

ppear

omewhatnjust o

ny ne

of ts omponents.

Paradoxically,

he

generality

f

this

dissatisfaction

s

a conditionf

stability,

ecausewere

ny

ne

power

otally

atisfied,

ll

others

ould

have o

be

totally

issatisfiednd

revolutionary

ituation

ould

nsue.

The

foundationf

a stable

rdersthe

elative

ecurity-andherefore

the

relative

nsecurity-ofts

members.

ts stability

eflects,

ot the

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3/18

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 265

absence f unsatisfied

laims,

ut the

absence f

a

grievance

f

such

magnitude

hat edress ill

be

sought

n

overturning

he ettlement

rather han

hrough

n

adjustment

ithin

ts framework.

n

order

whose tructures acceptedyall majorpowerss legitimate. n

order

ontaining

power

which

onsiders

ts structure

ppressive

s

revolutionary.he

security

f

a domestic

rder esides

n

the

pre-

ponderant

ower f

authority,

hat

f

an

international

rder

n

the

balance f

forces

nd n ts

xpression,

he

quilibrium.

But

f

an

international

rder

xpresses

heneedfor

ecurity

nd an

equilibrium,

t is

constructednthename f a

legitimizing

rinciple.

Because

settlement

ransforms

orce

nto

cceptance,

t

must

ttempt

totranslatendividualemandsnto eneraldvantage.t is the egiti-

mizing

rinciple

hich

stablishesherelative

justice

f

competing

claims nd the

mode ftheir

djustment.

his s not

o

say

hat here

need

be an

exact

orrespondence

etween

he

maxims

f

legitimacy

and

the onditionsf

the ettlement.

o

major ower

will

give

up

its

minimum

laimto

security-the

ossibility

f

conducting

n inde-

pendent

oreign

olicy-merely

or

the

sake of

legitimacy.

ut

the

legitimizing

rinciple

efines

he

marginal

ase. n

I919,

the

Austro-

Hungarianmpire isintegratedot omuch romhe mpact fthe

war

as

from

henature

f the

peace,

ecause

ts

continued

xistence

was

incompatible

ithnational

elf-determination,

he

legitimizing

principle

f

the

new

nternational

rder.

t

would

have

ccurredo

no

one

n

the

ighteenth

entury

hat he

egitimacy

f

state

epended

n

linguistic

nity.

t

was

inconceivable

o

the

makers

f

the

Versailles

settlementhat here

might

e

any

other

asis

for

egitimate

ule.

Legitimizingrinciplesriumphybeing aken or ranted.

Although

here ever ccurs

n

exact

orrespondence

etween

he

maxims f

the

egitimizing

rinciple

nd

the

onditions

f the

ettle-

ment,

tability

epends

n

a

certain

ommensurability.

f

there xists

a substantial

iscrepancy

nd

a

major

ower

which

eels

isadvantaged,

the

nternational

rderwillbe

volatile.or

the

ppeal

y

revolution-

ary

power

o the

egitimizing

rinciple

f

the

settlement

reates

psychological

istortion.

he

natural

xpression

f

the

policy f a

status-quoower s law-the definitionf a continuingelationship.

But

gainst

permanently

issatisfied

ower

ppealing

o

the

egitimiz-

ing

principle

f he nternational

rder,

orce

s

the

nly

ecourse.

hose

who

have

most

gain

from

tability

hus

become he

advocates

f a

revolutionary

olicy.

itler's

ppeal

to

national

elf-determinationn

theSudeten risis

n

I938

was

an

invocation

f

justice, nd

thereby

contributedo

the

ndecisivenessfthe

esistance:t

nduced

he

West-



4/18

266

WORLD POLITICS

ernpowers

o

attempt

o construct

truly egitimate

rder

y

satis-

fying ermany'sjust

claims.

Only

after

Hitler

nnexed

ohemia

and

Moravia

was t clear hat

e was

aiming

or

ominion,

ot

egiti-

macy; nly hen id the ontest ecomene ofpurepower.

The majorproblem

f

an international

ettlement,hen,

s

so

to

relate

he laims

f

egitimacy

o the

requirements

f

security

hat

no

power

will

express

tsdissatisfaction

n

a

revolutionaryolicy,

nd

so

to

arrange

he

balance

f

forces s

to

deter

ggressionroduced

y

causes

ther han

he

conditionsf the

ettlement.

his

s

not

me-

chanical

roblem.

f the international

rder ouldbe

constructed

like a

mathematical

xiom,powers

would consider

hemselves

s

factorsn a balance ndarrangeheirdjustmentsoachieve per-

fect

quilibrium

etween he forces

f

aggression

nd

the

forces

f

resistance.

ut

an exactbalance s

impossible,

nd not

only

because

of thedifficulty

f

predicting

he

ggressor.

t is

chimerical,

bove

ll,

because

while

powersmay ppear

o

outsiders

s

factorsn

a

security

arrangement,hey

ppeardomestically

s

expressions

f

a

historical

existence.

o

power

will ubmit

o

a

settlement,

owever

ell-balanced

and

however

secure,

hich eems

otally

o

deny

ts

vision

f

tself.

There xistwokinds f quilibriumhen: generalquilibriumhich

makes t

risky

or

ne

power

r

group

f

powers

o

attempt

o

mpose

itswillon the

remainder;

nd

a

special

quilibrium

hich

efineshe

historical

elationf

certain

owers

mong

achother.

he

formers

the

deterrent

gainst

general ar;

the atter

he

ondition

f

mooth

cooperation.

n international

rders

therefore

arely

orn

utof the

consciousness

f

harmony.

or evenwhen

heres

an

agreementbout

legitimacy,heconceptionsf therequirementsfsecurityill differ

with

the

geographical

osition

nd

the

history

f

the

contending

powers.

ut

of

ust

uch

conflict

ver he

nature

fthe

quilibrium

the Congress

f

Viennafashioned

settlement

hich

asted

lmost

exactly century.

For the

problem

t Viennawas not

imply

ow to

protect

urope

against

renewed

rench

nslaught.

here

was

generalgreement

bout

the

extent

f France

ompatible

ith

he

peace

of

Europe,

ut

this

only harpenedhedisagreementsithinhevictoriousoalitionbout

the

relative

pheres

f

nfluence

f

Austria,russia, ussia,

nd

Great

Britain.

nd this

ontest as

madeall the

more

ntractable

ecause

each

ofthe

protagonists

eant

omething

ifferent

y

he erm

equi-

librium o

frequently

nvoked:WhentheBritish

oreign

Minister,

Castlereagh,poke

f

the

equilibrium,

e

meant

Europe

n

which

hegemony

as

mpossible;

ut

when

Metternich

ppealed

o

the

qui-



5/18

THE CONGRESS

OF VIENNA

267

librium,

e ncluded Germany

n

which

russian

redominance

as

impossible.

ussia's

emand or

Poland

threatenedhe

equilibrium

of Europe

nd Castlereaghould,

herefore,ardly

elieve hat

ny

other roblem asworth iscussingeforeheTsar's retensionsere

thwarted.

russia's

nsistencen

Saxony

merelymperiled

hebalance

within

Germany,

ut

thiswas

enough

o

absorb hefull

energy

f

Metternich.astlereagh

as

interested

n

creating

Central urope

which

wouldbe

strong nough

o

resist

ttack

rom oth heWest

and the East;

Metternich

esired he same

thing,

ut he was

also

concernedbout

Austria'selativeosition

ithin

entral

urope.

o

Castlereagh,

heContinental

ations

ere

spects

f

a defensive

ffort;

but o theContinentalationshegeneral quilibriumeant othing

if

t

destroyedhehistoricalosition

hich o themwas the eason

or

their xistence.

o

Castlereagh,

he

quilibrium

as a mechanical

x-

pression

f he alance

f

forces;

o

heContinentalations,reconcilia-

tion

f

historical

spirations.

This

led to a

diplomatic

talemate,

ade

all themore ntractable

because

ritainndAustria

adsecured ost

f

their

pecial

bjectives

during hewarso that ewbargainingeaponswere eft o Russia

and

Prussia, stalemate

hich

ouldbe

broken

nly

by adding n

additional

eight

o

one

side

fthe

cales.

ince he

ole

uncommitted

major ower

was

France,

he

ormer

nemy

merged

s the

key

o the

European

ettlement.

hus grewup

a

myth

boutTalleyrand's

ole

at theCongress

f

Vienna,

f the

diabolical it

who

appeared

n the

scene

ndbroke p

a coalition

fhostileowers, ho then

egrouped

them

nto

pattern

o his

iking y

nvoking

he

magic

word legiti-

macy ndfrom n outcastmergeds the rbiterfEurope.' o be

sure,

ince he

Treaty

f

Paris

had

settled

rance's

oundaries,

alley-

rand

could

afford erhaps

he mostdisinterested

pproach. is wit

and

caustic

omments

ecame

amous,

o thatGentz ould

ay

f

him

thathe had

both he

aughers

nd

the hinkers

n

his side.

But

these

efforts

ould

have vailed

ittle,

ad not thethreat

f

Francebeen

eclipsed

y

the

danger

rom

he

East,

had

not

the

differencesmong

theAllies ecome reaterhan heirommonear fFrance. o long

1

It is a legend pread

by

thosewho

confuse

esults nd causes and

by professional

diplomats

wontto

ascribe o mere

negotiating

kill what

s

possible

nly through

he

exploitation

f more deep-seatedactors.t

has

gained

currency ecause

Talleyrand,

whose

monarch ad

notcome

to

Vienna,

was

obliged

o write oluminous

eports,

nd

in order to cement

his shaky

domestic

osition,

he former

oreign Minister f

Napoleon tended

to

emphasize

his

indispensability.

ee,

for

example, Harold G.

Nicolson,The Congress

f Vienna,

New

York,

946;

Duff

Cooper,Talleyrand, ew

York, 932; Crane Brinton,

he Lives

of

Talleyrand,

ew

York, I936;

Guglielmo

Ferrero, he Reconstructionf Europe,

New

York,

941.



6/18


7/18

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

269

causeAlexandernd Castlereagh

ouldnever gree n

basic

premises.

In

order o obtain framework

ornegotiation,heprotagonists

on-

stantlyhiftedositions,retendingoagreewith he

ther's

rinciples,

but nterpretinghem na manner hich educedhem oabsurdity.

Thus

Castlereaght one

tage ecame n aviddefender

f

completely

independentoland,

whileAlexander n another

ccasion

efended

hisPolish lan s a contribution

o Europeanecurity.hat

Alexander

did notpropose o etprotestationsfAlliedunity

eprive

im

of

his

Polish

poils ecame pparent

n theoccasion f

his first

nterview

withCastlereaghn theday after is arrival.2or

the

first

ime,

e

avowed isPolish

lans

n detail. e proposed

o

keep

ll

of

he

Duchy

ofWarsawwith he xceptionf small ortionobeceded oPrussia.

These

laims,

lexanderrgued, erenot he

result

f

ambition,

ut

theoutgrowthf a moralduty nd motivated

y

the sole

desire

f

achievinghehappiness

fthePolish eople. n short,

ince heywere

not dvanced

n

thename

f ecurity,hey

ouldnot hreatennyone.

Castlereagh,

n

reply,

rged

hat

Russian

ppendage

xtendingeep

into

Central urope

would onstituteconstant

ource f

disquiet or

the est fEurope. ut heTsar eft o doubt hat

e was

unwillingo

withdraw

rom isPolish

ossession.

he nterviewetween

astlereagh

and

Alexander

ad thusmadeevidenthat

ersuasiveness

ouldnot

suffice

nd that

henext

tage

f

the

negotiations

ouldhaveto be

based

n force

r the

hreat

fforce.'

III

While

Castlereagh as negotiating

ith heTsar,he made every

efforto assembleuch force. s an abstractroblemn diplomacy

his

task eemed

imple.

ut

although

he

equilibrium ight

e

in-

divisible,t

did

notappear o to tscomponents.

he Tsar couldnot

be resisted ithout united

ront

f he est

fEurope,

ut hepowers

of Europewerenot t all in accord egardinghe

realdanger. hey

did not

wish

o

seethegeneral quilibriumverturned,

ut heywere

not

prepared

o

resist

t the acrificef

that art

f

t

on

which heir

historicalosition epended. strongussiamight ominateurope,

but too

powerful

russiawould

outstrip

ustria

nd

a

unitedGer-

manymight

menace

rance.

Hardenberg,

hePrussian

minister,

as

2Castlereagh's eport.

ee

Charles

Webster,

ritish

iplomacy, 813-1815, London,

I92I,

pp.

I97ff.,

ctober

,

I8I4.

8

The exchange ontinued hrough ctober n

a

series

of

memoranda: astlereagh

to

the Tsar,

October

2, I8I4,

see

Duke of

Wellington, upplementaryespatches,

Correspondence

nd

Memoranda,5 vols.,

d.

by his son,London, 855-1872, IX,

p.

332;

the

Tsar's

reply,

ctober

0,

p.

386; Castlereagh'seply,

ovember

,

p.

4IO.



8/18

270

WORLD

POLITICS

more

nterested

n

Saxony

han

n

Poland;Talleyrand

as almost

s

afraid

hat

he

problem

f

Poland

would

be settled

ithout

im

as

that

t wouldbe settled

gainst

im;and

Metternich,

hilenot

ndif-

ferentotheextensionf Russia ntoCentral urope ndofPrussia

intoCentral

ermany,

id

notwish o

resist

penly ince

his

would

cause

he runt

f

the fforto

fall

n Austria,

he

mostxposed

ower,

while

urrendering

he

policy fclose

ooperation

ith

russia

which

Metternich

onsideredhe

key

oAustrian

ecurity.

I barricade

yself

behind

ime,

Metternich

old

theSaxon

nvoy,

and makepatience

myweapon. '

Thus Castlereagh's

ffort

o

create

united

rontgainst

ussia

ed

to anambiguouseriesf constellations,f half-heartedoalitionsnd

tentativeetrayals,

f

promisesf

unyielding

upport

oupled

with

hedges

gainst ad

faith.

Matters

ere

finally rought

o a head

by

Prussia,

he

power

which ould

east

fford

elay.

oralthough

he

treaties

f Kalish,

eplitz,

nd

Chaumont

ad

guaranteed

russiats

territorialxtentf

805,

they ad

never

pecified

here

russia

might

find he

requisite

erritories,

articularly

f t

ost tsPolish

ossessions

toRussia. heavailableompensations,omposedfformerrovinces

or

formeratellites

f France,

rimarily

n the

Rhineland,

ere

nade-

quate.

And hey

ere ndesirable

ecause

f heir

eographic

eparation

from hemain art

f he

russian

onarchy

nd

theCatholic

eligion

of

heirnhabitants.

hus

Prussia

ame

o ook oward

axony,oveted

since

he time f

Frederic

he

Great,

ontiguous

ith tsown terri-

tories nd

with

predominantly

rotestant

opulation.

ut Prussia's

negotiating

osition

as the weakest

f

those

f the major

powers.

UnlikeRussia,twasnot npossessionf tsprize.UnlikeAustria,t

had

not

made

ts

participation

n

thewar

dependent

nobtainingts

special

onditions.f

now

the

Polish uestion

as

settled

efore

hat

of Saxony,

russia

wouldhavepaidthe

penalty

or ts

total

ommit-

ment;

f

having

ought

he

war

with o much ervor

hat

ts

participa-

tion

had

never een

negotiable,

f

neglecting

he

peace

because

he

war,

n

effect,

ad become n

end n tself.

nd Prussia

equired

us-

triancquiescencen the nnexationfSaxony,ecauseheorganiza-

tion of Germany,

he indispensable

ondition

f

Prussia's

ecurity,

would

become

llusory

f Austria

merged

n theSaxon ssue

s

the

protector

f

the

econdary

erman

owers.

It

is not

urprising,

herefore,

hat

n

October , i8I4,

Hardenberg

submitted

memorandum

greeing

o

an

intermediaryystem

ased

4

Wilhelm chwarz,

ie

Heilige Allianz,Stuttgart,

935, p.

13.



9/18

THE CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

271

on

Austria,russia nd

Britain,

nd

directed

gainst

Russia.5

ut

he made

Prussia's

ooperation

n the

Polish

uestion

ependent

n

Austrian

greement

o the nnexation

f

Saxony

nd

tothe

provisional

occupationfSaxony yPrussia s a token fgoodfaith.n its enta-

tive uest

or

llies,

n

itspedantic ffort

o achieve he

dvantage

f

every

ourse f

action, he

Hardenberg

emorandum

erely

erved

to

llustraterussia's ilemma: ussian

upport ight ain

t

Saxony,

butnot

egitimacy;

hile

Austrian

upport

ight ield

t

Poland,

ut

not Saxony.

he

Hardenberg emorandumasa pleanot

to

leave

Prussia

ependentn thegood

willof

the

Tsar;

to create

European

order

ased

on

Austro-Prussianriendship,utalso

on

Prussian

os-

session fSaxony.

But

this

ffort

o combinencompatible

olicies rovided

Metter-

nichwith he

means o separate he

Polish nd Saxon

question y

one

ofhis

intricate

aneuvers.n October

2,

he

transmittedwo

notes oHardenbergnd

Castlereagh

hose one fgrudginggree-

ment

o

Hardenberg's

roposal bscuredhe act hat he

moral

rame-

workwhich

wasbeing reatedo resistn

Polandwould

rove qually

effectiveo

resistn

Saxony,

ndthat

ardenberg,

nhis ffort

ohedge

his risks, admadehisdefeatnevitable.or Castlereaghnhis over-

riding oncernwiththe

balance f

power nd Hardenbergn his

obsession ith

axony

verlookedwo ubtle nd

mutuallynconsistent

reservations

n Metternich's

espatches:hatPrussia's

nnexationf

Saxony

hould

not lead to a

disproportionate

ggrandizement,

condition

learly mpossible

f fulfillmentf Prussia

egained er

Polish

provinces,6

nd

that

Austria's

greementn the Saxonpoint

was conditionaln the uccessfthe ffortothwartheTsar'sdesign

on

Poland7-which,

n

turn,

would

eavePrussia

solated n the n-

evitableontestver

he

nterpretationf the

first eservation.

But

while

Metternichas

preparing

he

moral rameworkor n

effort

o

separate

russia nd

Russia,

astlereaghas

ooking nly o

Poland,

s

if the

European quilibrium

ould

be

created

ith hene-

cessity

f mathematical

quation.

n

October

3,he

finallyucceeded

in

getting

russia

o

agree

o

a common

lan

of

action

gainst ussia

on the basisofMetternich'semoranda.8he three owers nder-

took

oforce

he

ssue

y onfronting

he

Tsarwith

he

hreat

f

bring-

ing

thePolish

uestion

efore hefull

Congress

f

a

reasonable

ettle-

5Comte

d'Angeberg,

e

Congres

e Vienne

t

les

Traite's e

1815,

Paris,

863-1864,

II,

p.

1934.

6

Text

of

noteto

Castlereagh,

bid.,

I, pp.

939ff.

7

Text

of note to

Hardenberg,

bid., ,

pp.

316ff.

8

Castlereagh's

eport,

Webster,

p.cit., . 212,

October

9,

i814.



10/18

272

WORLD

POLITICS

ment ould

not be obtained y direct egotiations.

hey

proposed

three

cceptable

olutions:

n

independent

oland s

it

existed

rior

to the irst

artition,

rump oland

n

the

cale

f

79I,

or the

eturn

of thethree artitioningowersotheir ormerossessions.9

The

threat

f an appeal

o

Europe

n

Congress

as

the

asteffort

to settle

he

European

quilibrium

y

a

combination

ithin

he nti-

French oalition.

WhenMetternich

alled

n

theTsar

to

present

he

ultimatum

n

the

Polish

question,

e

was

dismissed

aughtily

nd

even hallenged

oa

duel.

Andwhen,

nOctober

0,thethree

ov-

ereigns

eft o

visitHungary,

lexander

ppealed

o

hisbrother

on-

archs

gainstheir

ministers.

e

failedwith

heAustrianmperor,

ut

itdid notproveoodifficultoconvincehe todgyndunimaginative

Prussian

ing

that he

ecret

egotiations

fthe

hree

ministers

ere

an actof

bad

faith.When

hemonarchs

eturned

o

Vienna,

arden-

berg

was ordered,

n the

presence

f the

Tsar,to

refrain

rom

ny

further

eparate

egotiations

ith

isAustrian

nd

British

olleagues.

In

thismanner,

n

November

, the

contest

ver

Poland

ended

for

the ime eing.

he

effort

o achieve

n

international

rder

ased

n

agreementndnot on force eemed ohavereturnedo its starting

point.

IV

Butthiswas

a

mistaken

mpression.

or f

Castlereagh's

ailure

ad

proved

hat he quilibrium

ould

notbe achieved

hrough

demon-

stration

f its necessity,

etternich's

lmost

mperceptible

omple-

mentary

ffortad created

he

moral

ramework

or

reopening

he

issue y nappeal o egitimacy.heprocrastinationhich adproved

so maddeningo Castlereagh

ad

in fact

been

Metternich's

ost

f-

fective

means to

overcome

is

dilemmas,

or

delay

strengthened

Austria's

hief

argaining

eapon,hat

egitimacy

an

be

conferred

but

not

exacted,

hat

t

mplies

greement

nd

not

mposition.

o

the

weekshad

passed

while

Europe

complained

bout

the

frivolity

f

theAustrian

inisternd

the

ldschool

f

Austrian

iplomats

aged

that heir Rhenish inister,hom hey icknamedrincecamper-

lin,was

betraying

he

Empire

o

Prussia.

ut

n the

admiration

or

the

famous

hrase

f

the

Prince e

Ligne:

Le Congres

anse,

mais

il

ne marche

as,

t was

overlooked

hat

he

Congress

as

dancing

itself

nto

trap.

When

Hardenberg

ffered

etternich

is

cooperation,

e

believed

Meorandum

e procedure,

bid.,pp.

213ff.



11/18

THE CONGRESS

OF

VIENNA

273

that e

was clinching

is

gains

nd

that e

was

obtaining guarantee

of

Saxony,

owever

he

Polish

egotiations

nded.

ut

becauseMetter-

nich's

eply

ad made

Austrian

greement

o the

nnexation

f

Sax-

ony onditionaln the

uccess

ftheir ommonmeasures,he fforto

connect

hetwo ssues ecame

means o

separate

hem. or if

the

Polish

negotiationsucceeded,

russia

would ose her

moral

laim

o

Saxonyn

the

yes

f

Europe.

f

Prussia

egained

er

olish

ossessions,

the

nnexation

f

Saxony

would

represent

he

disproportionateg-

grandizementgainst

hich

Metternich

ad

warned

astlereagh.

ut

ifthePolishnegotiations

ailed,

russia

ould

oseher

moral

laim o

Saxony

n

the

yes

f Austria. russia'ssolation

as assured

one he

less urely,ecause he act fresistanceas lmostscertaino lienate

the

Tsar

as its

uccess.

aving

demonstrated

ustria's

uropean on-

cern

y

yielding

n

Saxony,

ntransigence

ould

now

be

defended

y he

requirements

f the

European

nd nottheGerman

quilibrium.

nd

Castlereagh,aving

btained

ustrian

upport

n

thePolish

negotia-

tions,

ouldno

longer

e able to treat heSaxon

ssue

s an

internal

German

ffair.

here ouldbe no doubt

f the

ttitude

f

France r

of he maller ermantates.russia,n ts ffortoobtaineinsurance,

had

only

ucceeded

n

achieving

ts

solation.

When,

n November

,

Hardenberg

nformed etternich

f

the

King's

rders

nd ofthe

difficulty

f

carrying

ut he

greed lan

with

respect

o

Poland,

Metternich

inally

ad the

moral

asis

or

ction.s

Austria

as

interested

n

theclosest

elationship

ith

Prussia,

e

re-

plied,

utno

longer

t the

price

f

the

destruction

f

Saxony.1 fter

being

forced

o tolerate

ussian

ggrandizement

n

Poland,Austria

couldnot cquiescenPrussianggrandizementithin ermany ith-

outupsetting

he

equilibrium

ompletely.

etternich

uggestedn

alternative

lan

which

maintained nucleus

f

Saxony,

hile

giving

a

large

art

f

t to

Prussia,

ogether

ith ther

ompensations

n

the

Rhineland.

ut

all

protestations

f

friendship

ould

not

hide

thefact

that

russia as

outmaneuvered,

hat

Metternich

ad

ost

ut n

Poland

only

o win

n

Saxony

nd

then

artially

o

restorehe

situationn

Poland ymeans fSaxony.

It

did

not

matter

hat,

n November

,

the

Russian

militaryovernor

of

Saxony

urned ver

he

provisional

dministration

o

Prussia,

r

10

D'Angeberg, p.cit., , p. 406

(Hardenberg's ote

to Metternich). here is

yet

another

ndication, lthough

no

proof,

hat Metternich

ever

intended he Polish

negotiationss

anything ut a means

to

isolate

Prussia

on

the

Saxon question:his

dismal defeat

during

his

interview ith Alexander.

At

no

other

time

n

his

career

did

Metternichhoose frontal

ttack, egotiate

o

ineffectively,

r

surrendero

easily.

11

Text, ibid.,

I, p. 505.



12/18

274

WORLD POLITICS

that he

russian

ilitary

ere

hreatening

ar.

Russia,

t

the

eriphery

ofEurope,

might

est

ts laim

n

Poland

n the act f

possession,ut

a power ituated

n

the enter f

the

Continentould

urvive

nly s

thecomponentf a legitimaterder othwithin ermanyndin

Europe. hus, lthough y themiddle f December heCongressf

Vienna seemed o have reached complete talemate,ehind he

scene fundamental

ransformationas

preparing

tself.

stalemate

is

not otal

ntil

ll

thefactors

re

engaged

nd France

was

still n-

committed.

he contests

uring

ctober

nd

November

ad exploded

themyth

f

Allied

unity

nd

the hreat f

France

o

longeroomed

larger han

hat f the rstwhile

lly.WhileCastlereagh as despair-

ing about hePolish ailurendaccusingMetternichf never aving

really

ntended

o

resist,'2

combination

as

forming

n the Saxon

question

whichwas

to

give

a

new

directiono

the

contest.

or the

coalition

which

ould

resist

n

Saxonywas, by definition,lso the

coalition

hich

ouldresist

n

Poland.

And

the

claims

f

power

e-

feated

n

one

quarter ould,

lmost

ecessarily,

imit he

ssertionsf

arbitrariness

n the

other. o

it was

proved,

fter

ll,

that he

equi-

libriumwas indivisible,lthoughhe solution id notcomeabout

through

consciousness

fthis. t was not n

the

name f

Europe hat

Europe

was

saved,

ut n the

name f

Saxony.

V

But

before

his ew ombination

ould e

formed,

omestic

ressures

on

Castlereaghearly

reckedMetternich's

inelypunplan.

An

in-

sular owermay ighttswarsnthe ame f he uropeanquilibrium,

but t

willtend

o

dentify

he hreats

o

the

quilibrium

ith

hreats

to

its

mmediate

ecurity.

ecause ts

policy

s

defensive

nd

not

pre-

cautionary,

t

willmake

he ause f

war

depend

n

an

overt ct

which

demonstrates

he

danger.

ut

he

danger

o

the

quilibrium

s

never

demonstrated

ntil t

is

already verturned,

ecause

n

aggressor

an

alwaysustifyvery tep, xcept

he rucial

ast

one,

s

the

manifesta-

tion

of

limited laims

nd exact

cquiescence

s the

price

of

con-

tinuedmoderation.o be sure,Britain ad enteredhefray gainst

Napoleon

t

an

early tage

nd

continued

he

ontest ith

reat er-

sistence.

ut he hreat

othe

quilibrium

adbecomemanifest

hrough

an

attack

n theLow Countries

nd a

challenge

o Britain's

ommand

of

the

eas.Now

the

ssuewas

Poland, owever,

distant

ountry

both

geographically

nd

psychologically.

t was notclear ntil t

was

12

Webster,

p.cit.,

pp.

248ff.



13/18

THE

CONGRESS OF

VIENNA

275

proven

hat

he

Rhinewas best

defended

long

he

Vistula

r

that

there

xisted

ny

hreat

o peace

xcept rance.

n

this rame

f

mind

the

Cabinet

onsidered

he

Polish

dispute

n

irritating

utgrowthf

Continentalivalry,hreateningpeacedearlywon, nddealtwith

it

primarily

nder

he spect

f

ts mpact

n Britishomestic

olitics.

On

October

4,

Liverpool,

he

British

rime

Minister,

rote

astle-

reagh

hat he

less

Britain

ad

to dowith

Poland]

..

the

better

and

he

transmitted

memorandumy

heChancellorf he

xchequer,

Vansittart,

ho

imply

eniedhe

reality

fthe

Russian

anger.With

the

petulancef

mediocrity

onvincingtself

hat

he

asy

way

out

s

also

the

course

f

wisdom,

ansittartrgued

hat he

absorption

f

Polandwould ddan elementfweaknessotheRussian tatewhile

proving

onduciveo

British

ommerce.1

inally,n

November

2,

the

Cabinet

ent ts

first

nstructions

o

Castlereaghincehis arrival

in

Vienna: It

s

unnecessary,

rote

athurst,

forme to

point ut o

you

the

mpossibilityf

.

.

consentingo

involve

his

ountry

nto

hostilities

. .

for ny

of the

objects

hich ave

hithertoeen

under

discussiont

Vienna.

14

Thus, t

the

crucial

oint n

the

negotiations,astlereaghas de-prived fhisonlymeans fexertingressurendat a

moment

hen

the

ssue

was

becoming

ne

ofpure

power. or

Prussiawas

being

drawn y

Metternich's

emporizing

nto

precipitate

ction.As it

ob-

served

ts

moral

nd

material

asis

lipping

way, ts

one

ecame n-

creasingly

ellicose.ts

militaryere

penly

peakingf

war ndeven

the

more

moderate

ardenberg

inted

t extreme

easures.

ut if

possession

ithout

egitimacy as

illusory,

egitimacy

hrough

orce

provedhimerical.astlereaghasmerelyefiningrussia'silemma

whenhe

told

Hardenberg

hat

he

[Hardenberg]ould

not

regard

an

unacknowledged

laimas

constituting

good title

nd

thathe

never ould n

conscience

r

honor

.

make

he

mere

efusal

f a

recognitioncause f

war.

.. 15

In this

ituation

astlereagh

id

not

propose

o

follow

is

Cabinet's

nstructions.o

announce ritish

is-

interest ould

remove he

majordeterrent

o

war

and, n

itseffort

to

guarantee

eace,

he

Cabinet

wouldhave

broughtboutwhat

t

fearedmost. relse, British ithdrawalrom he ontest ouldhave

led

to

an

Austrian

urrender

nd to

a

complete

verturn

f the

equilibrium.

So it

happened

hat

Castlereagh

nd

Metternich

ound

hemselves

on the

ame

ide n

a

battle hose

moral

ramework

ad

been

defined

13

Ibid.,

pp.

220ff.

14Ibid.,

pp.

247ff.

'5

Ibid.,

p.

255.

December

,

i8I4.



14/18

276

WORLD

POLITICS

by the

wily

Austrian inister.

he more ntransigent

russia's

tti-

tude, he

trongerecame

Metternich's

osition. ithout

he

necessity

for bstract

iscussion,

ustriamerged

s the

protector

f the

sec-

ondaryowers.WhenMetternichroposedn allianceo Bavariand

Hanover nd

the

construction

f a German

eaguewithout

russia,

he was

simply

iving

xpression

o

a general

onsensus.

twas

at this

point,

when

he

astvestiges

f theAlliance

weredisappearing,

hat

Talleyrand

eappeared

n

the

cene.He

emerged

ecause

Metternich

put

him

on the stage

nd his

eloquence

was

but

a reflection

f

Metternich's

esire

or nonymity,

or

Metternich

as

not nterested

in appearing

s

the gent

f

Prussia's

umiliation.

t

was

Metternich's

desirehat ventshould ome bout naturally,ecause hatwould

minimizehedanger

f

personal

chisms;

t was

Talleyrand's

ffort

that hey hould

ppear

caused,

or hat

would

cement is

shaky

domestic osition.

Talleyrand

as given

his

opportunity

yMetternich,

ho com-

municated

o him the

Austrian

ote

o Hardenberg

nd thus

made

clear

hat

heBig

Four

hadnot

een

ble o ettle

he ssue.'

alleyrand

replied n a trenchantemorandum,hich sserted

hesuperiority

of the

claims f egitimacy

ver he

requirements

f

theequilibrium

and denied he

possibility

f

deposing

ings,

ecause

overeigns

ould

not

be

tried,east f

all

bythose

who

covetedheir

erritories.

t was

not

or russia

o

statewhat he

would

ake,

alleyrand

rgued

oldly,

but or he

legitimate

ing

ofSaxony

o defineow

much e

would

yield.'7

t was

a

masterly

ummary

f all the

nconsistencies

f

two

months

f

acrimony,

ut his

was

not

ts

ignificance.

alleyrand

ad

served rance etteryremainingavailable hanbywriting em-

oranda.

The

real

importance

f the

exchange

ay

in the fact

that

France

was once

gain

part

f the oncert

f

Europe.

Only

short

tep eparated

alleyrand

romull

articipation

n

the

deliberations.

astlereagh,

ho

had

hoped

o avoid o drastic step,

finally

greed

n December

7.

When,

n December

I,

Castlereagh

and

Metternich

roposed

hat

enceforth

alleyrand

articipate

n

the

meetingsf theBigFour, t was

clear hat

he

special

laims f

the

Alliance

had

ceased

before

russia

ad

gained

he fruits f its

war

effort.

ven

he

Tsar,

n

Castlereagh's

ords,

would ot dvise

russia

to resist

ow that

he has

secured

is

own

arrangement

n

Poland.

Thus

driven

ack

on its

ast

resources,

russia

hreatened

ar.

16

Clemens

Metternich,

us

Metternichs

achgelassenen

apieren,

vols.,

ed.

by

Alfons

on

Klinkowstroem,

ienna, 88o,

I,

pp.

503ff.

7

Ibid.,pp.

sroff.,

ecember

9,

i8I4; D'Angeberg,

p.cit.,

p.

546ff.



15/18

THE CONGRESS

OF VIENNA

277

But

the

reaction

merely

erved o indicate

russia's

mpotence.

Castlereagheplied harply

hat such n insinuation

ight perate

upon a power rembling

or ts

own existence

ut musthave

the

contraryffectpon ll alive o theirwndignity;nd I addedthat

if such temper eally revailed,

e

were

not

deliberating

n

a

state

of ndependencend t

was

better

o

break

p

the

Congress. '8

hat

sameday,Castlereaghroposed

defensivelliance etween

rance,

Austria,nd Britain.

o be

sure, alleyrand

as

required

o

guarantee

the Low Countries

nd to

reaffirm

he

provisions

f

the

Treaty

f

Paris.ButTalleyrand'sreatest

chievement

t Viennawas

precisely

this xhibitionf self-restraint,

his

efusalo

attempt

o

sell French

participationn the lliance or territorialdvantage,nefforthich

would

have

united

ll

the

other

owers gainst

im.

As a

result

e

gained omething

ore

mportant,

he nd

of the solationf

France

and thereal

recognition

f

ts

equality.

If the defensive

lliance

provided

he crisis

f the

Congress

f

Vienna, t also

paved

he

way

for tsresolution.n

anynegotiation

t

is understoodhat orce s theultimate

ecourse. ut

t

is

theart

of

diplomacyokeep his hreatotential,okeepts xtentndeterminate,

and

to commit

t

only

s

a

lastresort.or

once

power

as

been

made

actual, egotiations

n

theproper

ense

ease.A

threat o use force

which

roves navailing

oes

notreturn

he

negotiation

o

thepoint

before hethreat

as

made. t

destroys

he

bargainingosition lto-

gether,or t s

a

confessionot

of

finite

ower

utof

mpotence.

y

bringing

atters

o a

head,

Prussia

ound

tself

onfronted

y three

powers

hose

etermination

ouldnotbe

doubted,lthoughhe reaty

itself emainedecret. ndtheTsarproved lukewarmlly.A series

of

partial

ettlements

ad isolated

russia ecause satisfied owers

will

not

fight

or

he

claims

f

another,

f an

honorable

lternative

presents

tself.

Castlereagh,herefore,

ook

up

the

proposal

f

Metternich'semo-

randum

f December

o

by

whichPrussia

was to obtainpart

of

Saxony

nd

extensiveerritories

n

the

Rhineland.

t soon

became

apparent

hat russia

ould

not

arry

ut

her hreat

f

war.ByJanu-

ary ,

i8i5,

afterMetternichndCastlereaghadrefusedonegotiate

without

alleyrand,

ardenberg,

o

save

face,

imself

ecommended

Talleyrand'sarticipation.'9

n

January, Castlereagh

ould

report

that the

larm

fwar s

over. 20

he

Saxon

uestion

as

henceforth

officially

iscussed

y

the

now

Big

Five and

was resolved

argely

18

Webster,

OPOcit.,

.

278,

January

,

i815.

I

Ibid.,

.

280.

20

bid.,

.

282.



16/18

278 WORLD POLITICS

throughnofficialegotiationsn whichCastlereaghlayed

herole

of the ntermediaryetweenMetternichnd Talleyrand

n the

one

side ndtheTsar ndHardenbergn the ther.

In his endeavoro achieve final ettlement,astlereaghad to

resist n attempty Prussia

o

move he

King of Saxony

o

the eft

bankof theRhine nd an effortyAustria osavetheElbe fortress

of Torgau

for

Saxony.

ut

with

he aid

of the Tsar,

he convinced

Prussia hat

n

the nterestf the

European

quilibrium

he

would

have

to

assume he

defense f

theRhineland,

nd he madeclear o

Austria

hat he

defensivelliance xtended

nly

o an actual

ttempt

to overthrowhe

European quilibrium,

ot to internal

erman

r-

rangements.2'he dangerfwarhad alsomade heTsarmore liable.

WhenCastlereaghuggestedome

oncessionsn Poland n order o

make the

Saxon

arrangement

ore

palatable

o

Prussia,

lexander

agreed o returnhe ity

f

Thorn o Prussia. n Februaryi, a final

agreement as

reached.n

Poland,

Austria etained

alicia

nd the

districtf Tarnopol,

hile

Cracowwas

constituted

free

ity. russia

retainedhedistrict

fPosen nd the

ity

fThorn

which ontrolled

theupperVistula.

he remainder

f

the

Duchy

of Warsaw

with

populationf

3.2

million ecame heKingdomfPolandunder he

Tsar of Russia. n Germany,

russia btained wo-fifthsf Saxony,

Swedish omerania,

uch

of the eftbank of the

Rhine, nd the

Duchy

f

Westphalia.

ustria ad

already

een

ssured

ompensation

in Northerntaly nd predominance

n

all of taly hroughhe stab-

lishmentf dependentynasties

n

Parma nd

Tuscany.

On

June , i8i5,

the

final

ctsof Vienna

were

atified

y Europe

assembledn congress.t was theonlymeetingf theCongress f

Vienna.

VI

There re

wo

ways

f

onstructing

n

nternational

rder:

y

will r

renunciation,y force

r

legitimacy.

or

twenty-fiveears urope

had been

convulsed

y

an effort

o

achieve rder

hrough

orce

nd

tocontemporariests essonwasnot ts failure ut tsnearsuccess.

Under

Napoleon urope

had been

unified rom

he Niemen

o

the

Bay

of

Biscay

ut

its cohesionwas

supplied

y

the

power

of the

Grande

Armee.

t

is not

urprising,hen,

hat

n

their

fforto

create

an alternative

he

tatesmen

fVienna

ooked

ack

o a

period

which

had known

tability

nd

that

hey

dentifiedhis

tability

ith ts

21

Ibid.,

p.

295,

January

9,

i815.



17/18

THE

CONGRESS

OF VIENNA

279

domestic rrangements.or

was

this

ssessments ludicrous s

a

self-righteous

istoriography

ade

t

appear

ater

n.

For

one of

the

reasons

whichhad

impelled

Napoleon

ver

further as

his

often

repeated onvictionhat hesurvivalfhisdynastyn a worldof

legitimate

onarchs

epended

n the uccess f his arms. n

short,

Napoleon onfrontedurope

with

revolutionary

ituation ecause

he

considered

he unimpaired

aintenancef the

other

overeign

statess incompatibleith

isown

existence.

By

contrast,ne

of thereasons

or

he

uccess

f

theVienna

ettle-

ment

was

precisely

he

absence

f

such n

ideological ulf.

Whena

power onsiders

he domestic

otion f

ustice

f another

overeign

state mortalhreato ts wn urvival,obasis ornegotiationxists.

Safety

an then

nly

be found

n

physical

xtent; iplomacy

s re-

duced

o maneuveringor

position

nd

such

djustments

s do occur

have

but a tacticalignificance:

o

prepare

he

ground

or

the

n-

evitable howdown. his

s

not

to

saythatdomestic

tructuresust

be identical

efore

meaningful egotiations

an

take

place.

It

is

enough

hat here xists o

power

which

laims oth

xclusiveness

nd

universalityor tsnotion f ustice.ordiplomacyhe rtofrelating

powers

o each other

y

agreement

an

function

nly when each

major

ower ccepts

he

egitimacy

f

the xistencef

the

others.

In

Vienna,

f

course,

he

consensus

ent

furtherhan

his. here

existed

general greement

bout

he

nature f

just domestic

r-

rangements,

hich

by imiting

isksmade

for

flexibilityf

relation-

ship. he problem

f

relating

state's

ision

f tself

othevision f t

by

the

powers,

efined

n

the

beginnings one of

thekey

problems

of an internationalettlement,as rarelyimpler han t Vienna.

This

was

the reason

or

the

success-for

he

possibility-ofsecret

diplomacy,

hat

ntangibles

ere

nderstood

n

the amemanner.

o

be

sure,

he esults

f

theVienna

Congress

eflected

o no

small

egree

the skillof

the

diplomats

n

making

se of

their

pportunity.oth

Metternichnd

Castlereaghere

xtraordinary

egotiatorsapable f

shaping

conferenceo their nds:

Castlereaghhroughis ability

o

reconcile ifferent

oints

f view

and a

singlemindednesshich

enabledhim to keepdiscussionsocussedn essentials; etternich

through

he

art

of

defining

framework

hichmade

concessions

appear,

ot s

surrenders,

ut s

sacrificeso the

common

ause.

But

whatever

he

kill f

the

diplomats,

he econd

eason

or he uccess

ofthe

Congress

s no

lessfundamental:hat n

theface f

all

protesta-

tions

f

friendship

nd

of a real

measure f

deologicalgreement

he

importance

f

power-relationships

as never

ost

ight

f. The con-



18/18

280 WORLD POLITICS

viviality

f the

tatesmen

ust ot

obscure

he

fact

hat

he

European

order merged

rom he

threat

f war

and

the

formation,

owever

temporary,ftwohostilelliances. he issuewas decided otonly y

the

persuasiveness

f the tatesmen

ut

by

therelative

trength

fthe

opposingamps.

The

settlement

roved

ll

the

more

asting

ecause

he

negotiators

at Viennadid not confuse he

atmosphere

f the conference

able

with

he elements

f

stability

f

the

nternational

ystem.

states-

man

cannot

makethe survival f

his

charge

ntirely

ependent

n

the continued

ood

will of another

overeign

tate;

not

only

be-

causehe has no control ver hecontinuationfthisgoodwill,but

more

mportantly

ecause

he

best

guarantee

or

ts

remainingood

is not o

tempt

t

by

too

great

disproportion

f

power. he

Vienna

settlementook

nto

ccount

his

elationship

f

ecuritynd egitimacy.

It did

not

rest

n

unsupported

oodfaith,

which

would

have

put

too

great

strain

n

self-limitation;

or

on

the

efficacyf

a

pure

evaluation

f

power,

whichwould

have

made

calculation

oo

inde-

terminate.

ather,

here

was created

structure

n

which

he

forces

were ufficientlyalanced,othat elf-restraintould ppear s some-

thing

more

han

elf-abnegation,

ut

which ook

ccount f

thehis-

torical

laims f

ts

omponents,

o that

t

met

general

cceptance.

o

power

felt o dissatisfied

hat t did

not

prefer

o

seek ts

remedy

within

he

frameworkf the

Vienna

ettlement

ather han

n over-

turning

t. Since

the

nternationalrder id

not

contain

revolu-

tionary ower,

ither

deologically

r

in

power

erms,ts

relations

became

ncreasinglypontaneous,

ased

n

thegrowingertaintyhata

catastrophicpheaval

was

unlikely.

he result

as

a

century ith-

out

major

war.

Documents

Kissinger, Henry A.-The Congress of Vienna. A Reappraisal.pdf