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Philosophy East and West, Volume 56, Number 3, July 2006, pp. 370-391(Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\8QLYHUVLW\RI+DZDLL3UHVVDOI: 10.1353/pew.2006.0033
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid (30 Mar 2015 04:46 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pew/summary/v056/56.3chong.html
ZHUANGZI AND THE NATURE OF METAPHOR
Kim-chong Chong
Division of Humanities, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Introduction
While it is well known that Zhuangzi uses metaphor extensively, there is much less
appreciation of the role that it plays in his thought. This essay therefore investigates
the role of metaphor in Zhuangzis thought. At the same time, this investigation is
closely tied up with questions about the nature of metaphor. Comparisons will be
made between what I conceive to be a central metaphorical structure in the
Zhuangzi on the one hand and certain contemporary views of the nature of meta-
phor on the other. It is hoped that these comparisons will help to illuminate the pur-
ported metaphorical structure and the role that this structure plays in the philosophy
of the Zhuangzi.
Zhuangzi uses the metaphors of the heart-mind as a mirror and goblet words
to empty the heart-mind of any distinctions. The paradoxical nature of these words
teaches one to be open to multivalence, and not to be attached to specific views.
This use of metaphor seems to be explained by Donald Davidsons view of metaphor
as having no cognitive content beyond its literal meaning: while a metaphor may in-
timate certain thoughts, these are not contained within the metaphor itself. What
is significant about a metaphor is its imaginative use to intimate any number of
things. Thus, it might be said, a` la Davidson, that it is precisely this nature of meta-
phor that explains how Zhuangzi is able to stay free of (being attached to) any
distinctions.
Davidsons view is opposed by others who claim that, although it is non-
propositional, a metaphor possesses cognitive content. Robert Allinson has argued,
for instance, that there is a central metaphor in the Zhuangzi, namely Zhuangzis
dream of (being) a butterfly. The inherent message of this metaphor is said to be the
attachment of highest value to the idea of beauty. Although not stated conceptually
or propositionally, the message is nevertheless conveyed preconceptually. As we
shall see, Allinson inadequately supports the attribution of a preconceptual level of
cognition, and he is mistaken in his interpretation of Zhuangzi. But, ironically, this
mistake may illustrate the view that metaphor operates at the preconceptual level:
Allinsons interpretation of Zhuangzi is a result of some non-propositional metaphor-
ical structure in Allinsons own thought that maps values in spatially embodied terms
of higher and lower. And insofar as it can be shown that Zhuangzi operates in
terms of a different metaphorical structure, this would seem to support the view of
metaphor as a preconceptual, deeply embodied structure of thoughta view that
has been best articulated by Lakoff and Johnson.1 More will be said about their
theory of metaphor in the conclusion below.
370 Philosophy East & West Volume 56, Number 3 July 2006 370391> 2006 by University of Hawaii Press
But, ultimately, which view of metaphorDavidsons or Lakoff and Johnsons
best describes Zhuangzis use of metaphor?2 This question cannot be answered
easily, and I shall offer some reflections at the end of the extended discussion to fol-
low. First, we shall analyze both Allinsons and Davidsons views on metaphor. Sec-
ond, this leads to a description of the metaphorical structure underlying Zhuangzis
thought. Third, this is contrasted with the metaphorical interpretation of the Zhuangzi
given by Allinson. Fourth, we shall conclude with a discussion of how the structure
of Zhuangzis metaphorical argument fits or does not fit the Davidsonian and Lakoff/
Johnson views of the nature of metaphor.
Metaphor and Cognitive Content
A generally recognized feature of a metaphor is that it cannot be paraphrased with-
out remainder.3 In other words, something is lost in the attempt to paraphrase the
metaphor. However, there are at least two different views about what this signifies.
One view is that there is a special cognitive content that is lost in the attempt at para-
phrase. Another is that apart from its literal meaning there is no such special content
to a metaphor. Robert Allinson, in his book Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation,
holds the first view, while Donald Davidson, in an essay titled What Metaphors
Mean, holds the second, opposite view.
The something that is lost in the attempt to paraphrase a metaphor, according
to Robert Allinson, is the special cognitive content of the metaphor, and what is lost
is precisely the understanding of the meaning of the metaphor. As Allinson says:
What is lost in the attempt to provide a literal prose paraphrase for the metaphorical
equivalence is precisely the understanding that occurs as a result of the apprehension of
the meaning of the metaphor in the moment of grasping the metaphor. The understanding
of the metaphor (which is shorthand for saying the understanding of the meaning of the
metaphor) is a result of the engagement of the holistic or the intuitive cognitive capacity.
(A36)
Allinsons claim is not only that the meaning of a metaphor is lost in the attempt
to paraphrase it, but also that the mind has a holistic or intuitive cognitive ca-
pacity whose function is to capture this meaning. The term preconceptual faculty
is also used by Allinson, interchangeably with the holistic or intuitive cognitive
capacity (A26). Applying this to the Zhuangzi, Allinson argues that what appear
to be relativistic statements in the text are made in the context of metaphors, and
these statements serve to silence the analytic faculty of the readers mind.4 This
silencing of the analytic faculty enables the minds preconceptual faculty to grasp
the inherent cognitive content of the metaphors (A7). Allinson provides the following
argument:
If we could translate a metaphor into a literal prose paraphrase without any cognitive re-
mainder, we could then say that we have understood a metaphor through a conceptual
or second-level order of processing. If, however, we cannot translate a metaphor into a
literal prose paraphrase without a residue that cannot be conceptually understood, and
Kim-chong Chong 371
we still understand something by that metaphor, then we can say that a metaphor is intel-
ligible on a preconceptual level. If we are willing to grant that a metaphor can be under-
stood although it cannot be translated completely into a prose equivalent, then we are
saying that a metaphor can be cognized by a primary cognitive process. (A3536)
By conceptual understanding Allinson is referring to something captured by
the critical and analytical functions of the mind. His claim is that since a metaphor
cannot be translated into a literal prose paraphrase in the conceptual/analytic mode,
it must be understood, instead, through a preconceptual mode. There are two as-
sumptions here. First, it is assumed that the mind possesses a cognitive preconcep-
tual faculty distinct from the conceptual one. Second, it is assumed that a metaphor
possesses a cognitive content that constitutes its special meaning. Much of Allinsons
argument hangs on the first assumption of a preconceptual faculty. Although he dis-
cusses this in terms of the intuitive power of the childs mind (A28), this is merely
suggestive and inadequately supported.5
Leaving this aside, let us concentrate on the claim that since a metaphor cannot
be paraphrased it must have a special cognitive meaning. Allinsons argument, as
given in the last long quotation above (A3536), may be laid out as follows:
If a metaphor can be fully paraphrased into prose (without cognitive remainder), then we
have understood it conceptually. [p implies q]
But: a metaphor cannot be fully paraphrased into prose (without cognitive remainder).
[not p]
Therefore: We have not understood it conceptually. [not q]
It is evident that this argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent.
From the fact that a metaphor cannot be paraphrased, it does not (necessarily) follow
that we have not understood it conceptually (as opposed to preconceptually). In-
stead, it is possible that there is nothing thereno inherent or special meaningto
understand.
This is precisely the point that Donald Davidson makes. While agreeing that
metaphors cannot be paraphrased, Davidson holds that this is not due to some novel
meaning lodged within them:
If a metaphor has a special cognitive content, why should it be so difficult or impossible
to set it out? . . . We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has
a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning). . . . The common error is to
fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes and to read these contents
into the metaphor itself. (D260261)
[T]here is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and much of what we are
caused to notice is not propositional in character. When we try to say what a metaphor
means, we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. . . . Seeing as is not
seeing that. Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal state-
ment that inspires or prompts the insight. Since in most cases what the metaphor prompts
or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, recognition of some truth or fact, the attempt to
372 Philosophy East & West
give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided. (D262263;
my italics)
According to Davidson, there is no cognitive meaning or content beyond the lit-
eral meaning or content of a metaphor, and this is why a metaphor cannot be
paraphrasedthere is simply nothing there to paraphrase. The impression that it
has a special cognitive content is made by the fact that a metaphor provokes certain
thoughts, and there is a tendency to read these thoughts back into the metaphor it-
self. But there are endless ways to read a metaphor. Seeing a metaphor as something
is not to see that it is something.
Another philosopher, Marga Reimer, has observed that Davidsons argument has
the valid modus tollens form:
If a metaphor had a special cognitive content, then it would be possible to give literal
expression to this (putative) content [p implies q]; it is not possible to do this [not q]: so, a
metaphor has no special cognitive content [not p].6
Reimer notes, however, that the first premise can be challenged. The premise as-
sumes that the special cognitive content of a metaphor (if it exists) must be sentential
and given a literal expression in that mode, that is, in terms of (propositional) prose.
Against this, it could be argued that the notion of a proposition could be expanded
to include anything representational, including, for example, maps, pictures, and
memories.7 In the context of our discussion, note that this would accommodate
Allinsons view of a preconceptual cognitive understanding as involving a holistic,
visual, or pictorial representation (A3637). Reimer replies, however, that adopting
this broader representational notion of a proposition would mean losing the im-
portant distinction between the intimation of a metaphor and the meaning of a de-
clarative sentence. After all, the distinction is rooted in the fact that metaphors are
not amenable to literal paraphrase; metaphors are not propositional in this nar-
rower sense.8
This insistence on observing the narrower sense of propositional does not help
Davidson. A strict, definitional demarcation is made here between a proposition
(a declarative sentence) and a metaphor. The former is said to have meaning or
cognitive content, while the latter can only intimate. Thus, cognitive content is
by definition propositional and unambiguously literal, while metaphorsince it
can intimate any number of thingshas no cognitive content. Clearly, Davidson is
worried that there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and in this
regard he would prefer to confine the honorific of having cognitive content and
meaning to propositions. However, metaphors need not be as limitless in scope
as Davidson alleges. Thus, we could acknowledge that they could have a certain
structure, ruling out certain interpretations. This point will have application later,
when we look at the reasons for not accepting Allinsons claim that the central
message of the Zhuangzi is self-transformation and transcendence, from being in a
low state to a high one. First, an explication of the notion of a structure in
the Zhuangzi that makes such a reading as Allinsons questionable will have to be
given.
Kim-chong Chong 373
Metaphorical Structure in the Zhuangzi
In order to illustrate a certain metaphorical structure in the Zhuangzi, we need first to
look at the context of Zhuangzis critique of the other philosophical schools. This
critique appears in the second chapter of the Zhuangzi, the Qiwulun .9
The chapter starts with Nanguo Ziqi informing his disciple Yancheng Ziyou that he
has lost his self (wu sang wo 10) and asking whether he understands this. This
is immediately followed by the question whether, having heard the pipes of man, he
has heard the pipes of earth, and (if) having heard the pipes of earth, whether he has
heard the pipes of heaven. Here, Zhuangzi compares the vociferous disputes of the
philosophers (the pipes of man) to the sounds that emerge through the hollows in the
forest when the wind blows (the pipes of the earth).
The contentious nature of the self is described next. Zhuangzi details the state of
the heart-minds of those engaged in endless intellectual disputes. So caught up are
they that their spirits cross when asleep (hun jiao ), and they are restless while
awake, fighting with their heart-minds (xin dou ). He describes the various psy-
chological states and emotions of the combatants: joy, anger, grief, delight, worry,
regret, and so on (W37).
When Yancheng Ziyou asks what the pipes of heaven are, Nanguo Ziqi replies,
Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so that each can be itself
all take what they want for themselves, but who does the sounding? (W37) (Fu chui
wan bu tong, er shi qi zi ji ye, xian qi zi qu, nu zhe qi shui ye
).11 This is a rhetorical assertion that the hollows are
what they are, and the sounds erupt through them naturally. Zhuangzi goes on to say
that like music from empty holes and mushrooms springing up, no one knows how
the disputes and the emotions of the participants originate.
There is, nevertheless, a difference between the sounds emanating from the
hollows and the vociferous disputes of men. In the former case, the sounds subside
once the wind ceases to blow, while in the latter, the combatants continue restlessly
because of their heart-minds. There is, perhaps, a lesson to be learned from the fact
that there is nothing (psychological) behind the spontaneous sounds of the hollows,
whereas the disputes of men are due to the state of their heart-minds. They cannot
cease because they have a heart-mind that is already fixed on a point of viewwhat
is later described as cheng xin , the fixated or completed heart-mind. Here, it is
said that if we follow our cheng xin as the criterion of judgment, then who does not
have a standard? In that case, even the fool will have a standard of judgment. It
would be to put things in reverse order to claim that disputes of right and wrong
(shi fei ) arise before one has a completed heart-mind. In other words, disputes
arise because the different parties each have fixed opinions of right and wrong, good
and bad, beautiful and ugly, et cetera.
Next, Zhuangzi says: Words are not just wind. Words have something to say.
But if what they have to say is not fixed (qi suo yan zhe te wei ding ye
), then do they really say something? Or do they say nothing? People suppose
that words are different from the peeps of baby birds, but is there any difference, or
374 Philosophy East & West
isnt there? (W39). By his earlier reference to words and teachings as the outpour-
ings of completed heart-minds and the present allusion to the fact that they are actu-
ally not fixed (wei ding ), Zhuangzi means that there is no agreement on stan-
dards of meaning, value, and truth. In this respect, therefore, Zhuangzis question
in the previous sentence seems to suggest, rhetorically, that there is no difference be-
tween words and the peeps of birds.
But it would be a mistake to think that Zhuangzi is unambiguous about this. The
reason is that he is conscious about the logical status of his own statements. For in-
stance, he says: Now I am going to make a statement here (you yan yu ci).
I dont know whether it fits into the category (lei ) of other peoples statements
or not. But whether it fits into their category or whether it doesnt, it obviously fits
into some category. So in that respect it is no different from their statements
(W4243).
If the words of the philosophers are no better than the sounds of the hollows or
the peeps of birds, what is the status of Zhuangzis own words? And if the philoso-
phers are emotionally entangled in their disputes, isnt Zhuangzi himself similarly
entangled? Note that the term yan , translated by Watson as statement, also
means words. Part of my argument is that we should not see Zhuangzi as stating
propositions and thereby trying to establish the truth of any position. Instead, his
words have a certain metaphorical structure that enables him to resist being pinned
down to any position.
This can be seen to operate in two ways. The first is the way in which the xin
or the heart-mind is metaphorically determined as a mirror or still water that reflects
but does not store whatever comes before it.12 The second is the free-flowing
and empty metaphorical structure of his wordsor what has been referred to
as goblet-words. Both are related, the goal being to maintain the clarity of the
heart-mind.
The passages describing the heart-mind as a mirror and still water have been
widely cited, and perhaps it is unnecessary to quote them.13 However, we should
note that where the heart-mind is unobscured, it is congruent with a state of the
dao. As Zhuangzi puts it in the form of a question and answer:
By what is the dao obscured (yin ) such that there is true and false (zhen wei )? By
what are the teachings/words obscured such that there are (assertions of) right and wrong
(shi fei )? Where has the dao gone?14
Dao is obscured by little accomplishments (xiao cheng ), and words/teachings are
obscured by the vain and flowery (rong hua ). This is why there are the disputes be-
tween the Confucianists and the Mohists, who contradict each other (shi qi suo fei er fei
qi suo shi ).15
This conception of the clarity of the heart-mind in terms of the metaphor of the mir-
ror differentiates it from the clarity of discursive discourse. The aim of Zhuangzis
discussion in the Qiwulun is to clear the heart-mind of disturbing impurities,
namely, the storage of distinctions. It is not to heighten the minds capacity to make
distinctions and, on that basis, to state any particular doctrine. The project, in other
Kim-chong Chong 375
words, is not one of critical inquiry but of stilling the heart-mind.16 This is indi-
cated negatively in a passage that begins just after the description of the pipes of
heaven. Here, Zhuangzi describes the disputants as being engaged in daily strife of
the xin (ri yi xin dou ), and we have already described this. In the present
context, we should also note the following description of the disputants: They grow
dark, as though sealed with seals. . . . [W]hen their xin draw near to death, nothing
can restore them to the light. This observation is an extension of the mirror meta-
phor. The entangled heart-mind is described as being sealed.17
The second way in which Zhuangzi avoids being pinned down to any position
lies in his implicit strategy of using goblet-words (zhi yan ). The zhi is a wine
goblet that tips when full and rights itself when empty.18 Shuen-fu Lin has clearly
described its relation to words, as follows:
[T]he zhia wine vessel used as a metaphor for the mind [xin]is originally empty and
gets temporarily filled with liquida metaphor for wordswhich comes from a larger
wine container only when the occasion requires one to do so. . . . Since the mind [xin] is
like the zhi vessel without any fixed or constant rules or values of its own stored in there,
and takes ideas always from outside when the occasion for speech arises, it will never
impose artificial distinctions and discriminations upon things. This is what [is meant by]
mindlessthe mind to be done away with here is, of course, the cheng xin or fully
formed mind-heart. . . . Zhi yan, then, is speech that is natural, unpremeditated, free from
preconceived values, always responding to the changing situations in the flow of dis-
course, and always returning the mind to its original state of emptiness as soon as a
speech act is completed.19
In several cases, the structure of Zhuangzis words resembles the operation of
the goblet. The strategy here is to take a particular distinction (good/bad, right/
wrong, this/that, allowable/not allowable, self/other, being/nonbeing, beginning/
no beginning, true/false, etc.) and through an outpouring of paradoxes and infinite
regresses, empty the heart-mind of the distinction. The following example comes
directly after Zhuangzi says that he does not know whether his words fit into the cat-
egory of other peoples, and whether it does or not, it obviously fits into some cate-
gory, and in that respect is no different from the words of others.
However, let me try making my statement (yan ). There is a beginning (you shi ).
There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning (wei shi you shi ). There is a not
yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being (you ). There
is nonbeing (wu ). There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing (wei shi you wu
). There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there
is nonbeing. But I do not know, when it comes to nonbeing, which is really being and
which is nonbeing. Now I have just said something (you wei ). But I dont know
whether what I have said has really said something or whether it hasnt said something.
(W43)
The infinite regresses have the effect of taking away what was initially a clear distinc-
tion, in this case between beginning and no beginning on the one hand and between
being and nonbeing on the other. Zhuangzi seems happy with the position that al-
376 Philosophy East & West
though he has said something, it could also be said that he has not said anything.
Either he has said something or he has said nothing. But in saying that he has said
nothing, he has said something. In contemporary logic, this is known as a semantic
paradox, of which a well-known example is the liars paradox: the cognitive content
of This sentence is false (that is, what it says) cannot be determined.
Consider also the following example. Zhuangzi says, Wu wu fei bi, wu wu fei
shi . Zi bi ze bu jian, zi shi ze zhi zhi
20or Everything has its that (bi), everything has its this (shi). From the point
of view of that you cannot see it, from the point of view of this you know it.21 In
other words, there is nothing that is not seen from another perspective (bi) as well
as from this perspective (shi). While something may be seen or known from one
perspective, it may not be seen or known from another. Zhuangzi continues:
So I say, that comes out of this and this depends on thatwhich is to say that
this and that give birth to each other. . . . (The sage) too recognizes a this. But a
this which is also that, a that which is also this. His that has both a right and
a wrong in it; his this too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still
have a this and that? Or does he in fact no longer have a this and that? A state
in which this and that no longer find their opposites (bi shi mo de qi ou
) is called the hinge of the Way (wei zhi dao shu ). When the hinge is fitted
into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its
wrong too is a single endlessness. So, I say, the best thing to use is clarity (gu yue mo
ruo yi ming ). (W3940)
This passage is prompted by a reference to the interminable disputes of the Confu-
cians and Mohists. Zhuangzi observes that there is a mutual origination and depen-
dency of concepts. At another level, the sage is said to recognize that both terms of a
binary pair of concepts coexist in one thing. This is said to amount to the fact that
there is, perhaps, no distinction after all (that is, where the concepts no longer find
their opposites).22
Another example of goblet words begins with, Things all must have that which
is so; things all must have that which is acceptable. There is nothing that is not so,
nothing that is not acceptable, and so on (W40). Zhuangzi goes on to describe the
understanding of non-fixity as a vision of the oneness of things or the dao. The per-
son who understands this is described as one who sees right through (wei da zhe
). This is followed by an explanation of how such a person would operate by
grounding himself in the notion of use instead of categories:
Only the man who sees right through knows how to interchange and deem them one; the
Thats it which deems (wei shi) he does not use, but finds for them lodging-places
in the usual (yu zhu yong ). The usual is the usable, the usable is the inter-
changeable, to see as interchangeable is to grasp; and once you grasp you are almost
there (yong ye zhe, yong ye ; yong ye zhe, tong ye ; tong ye
zhe, de ye ; shi de er ji yi ). The Thats it which goes by cir-
cumstance (yin shi) comes to an end; and when it is at an end, that of which you do
not know what is so of it you call the Way. (G54)23
Kim-chong Chong 377
I have followed Graham here because he has a good analysis of the terms wei shi
and yin shi as contrasting technical terms. The former characterizes the disputes
of the philosophical schools, with each school deeming something to be the case,
while the latter recognizes that in calling something what it is, one is going by
some circumstance.24 Shortly after, Zhuangzi says that finding a lodging place for
the usual (looking at things in terms of their use and interchangeability), instead of
placing them in categories, is called clarity (ci zhi wei yi ming ). With
the notion of use being linked to clarity, we are now in a position to explain
more precisely and in practical terms what it means to empty the heart-mind of
distinctions.
The implication of this link between clarity and use is that we should not
be stuck on any specific view. Instead, we should be open to the possibility of multi-
valence. This applies to the conception of ming itself, which I have all along trans-
lated as clarity. In an essay titled To Use or Not to Use: The Idea of Ming in the
Zhuangzi, Yuet-keung Lo has argued that instead of clarity, ming should be
ironically darkness par excellence, an idea that is posed against Confucian think-
ing. Lo argues that Rather than urging his disciples to exert their ming, the method
of yi ming [] is to stop their use of ming, which relies on their essentially finite
intellect. Only then will they attain to the state of hundun in which the sensory chan-
nels of their ming are yet to be bored into distinct entitites.25 One of Los arguments
is the external etymological evidence that yi can be read as (to stop). It is pos-
sible that Zhuangzi did not confine his use of ming to any one mode, and Los read-
ing is consistent with Zhuangzis use of the metaphorical device of goblet words that
we have described earlier. Consider another instance of yi ming in the following
passage: What one calls right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other
calls right. But if we want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best
thing is clarity (ze mo ruo yi ming ) (W39). One might expect that here
Zhuangzi is referring to a mode of discursive clarification to illuminate matters. He
seems to anticipate this, but (perhaps jokingly) hands us the opposite. In other words,
clarity, again, is not what we might expect (illumination), but a stilling of the heart-
mind. This ironical play on yi ming as stopping clarity also means that Zhuangzi
is not committed to preferring or valuing one thing. In other words, despite his cri-
tique of the other schools, Zhuangzi is not committed to espousing clarity above
all other values. Again, this illustrates the operation of goblet words, insofar as the
espousal of clarity would constitute a fullness, which, however, is prevented
by the tipping over of a play on the word.
Zhuangzis handling of the notion of use helps to support the point that he
consciously steers clear of the espousal of any value. First, consider the following
parody. He refers to those who exhaust their spirits (that is, their heart-minds) to
achieve oneness and yet do not know that what they are separately after is the
same (lao shen ming wei yi er bu zhi qi tong ye ). This is
evidently a reference to the contending philosophical schools. A keeper of monkeys
informs his brood that he is going to give them three acorns in the morning and four
in the evening. The monkeys respond angrily, upon which the keeper says: All
378 Philosophy East & West
right, four in the morning and three in the evening. This makes the monkeys happy.
Zhuangzi comments:
Without anything missed out either in name or in substance, their pleasure and anger
were put to use; his too was the Thats it which goes by circumstance (yi yin shi ye
). This is why the sage smooths things out with his Thats it, thats not, and
stays at the point of rest on the potters wheel of Heaven. It is this that is called Letting
both alternatives proceed (liang xing ). (G54)
Zhuangzi is hinting that the theories do not make a difference. Instead, it is how
words are used that puts a different perspective on things.
Some may be uncomfortable with Zhuangzis Letting both alternatives pro-
ceed (or, literally, walking two roads). This could mean either that he is not con-
cerned about ambiguity or that he is being manipulative. But we should put what he
says in context. In the Zhuangzi, we find stories about deformed men, gnarled trees,
and other objects that are conventionally designated as useless. In each case,
Zhuangzi posits some other perspective from which what has been deemed use-
less may yet be seen to have some use. More broadly, what is conventionally
regarded as deformed or ugly may still have the power (de ) to attract or, in some
instances, enable one to remain free and stay clear of harms way. However, this is
not an absolute lesson, as we learn from the story of the goose that could not cackle
(hence deemed useless because it could not warn its owner of intruders) and was
chosen for dinner over another that could. This story comes directly after Zhuangzi
tells his disciples about the tree that is deemed worthless and is therefore able to live
out its years (W209).26 With the link between clarity and use referred to above,
we should also be careful about espousing, and being attached to, clarity.
We have described above how Zhuangzis metaphors operate structurally. In the
next section, we shall deny the possible objection that any interpretation of meta-
phors in the Zhuangzi is as good as any other. Instead, we can still say that one
interpretation is more appropriate than another, given the understanding of the struc-
ture of Zhuangzis use of metaphor, as we have described it. We shall explicate this
with reference to Allinsons interpretation of the Zhuangzi.
The Butterfly Dream
Consider the metaphorical image that Allinson claims to be central to the text,
namely Zhuangzis dream of (being) a butterfly.27 The following are claimed to be
the meanings inherent in the metaphor: the idea of beauty and the highest positive
value attached to it, and the symbol of metamorphosis from inferior to superior, old
to new, low to high, crawling to flying (transcendence), less to more developed, and
so on (A73). The metaphor is said to symbolize a one-directional and a one-time in-
ternal transformation from the ugly and lowly to the beautiful and transcendent
(A74). The result of this transformation, according to Allinson, is happiness, freedom,
and a certain playfulness (A74). In the final analysis, the butterfly dream serves as
Kim-chong Chong 379
a key to understanding what the whole of the Zhuangzi is about by providing an
example of a mental transformation or awakening experience with which we are
all highly familiar: the case of waking up from a dream (A81).
But the metaphorical image of Zhuangzis dream of (being) a butterfly cannot
have the meaning that Allinson claims it to possess. The point can first be made
more generally, with reference to the Zhuangzi as a whole, and later by compar-
ison with another interpretation of the dream image. Allinsons interpretation of the
Zhuangzi is flawed because he has applied a metaphorical structure that does not
belong to it. For instance, in referring to beauty as having the highest value
(A72), Allinson draws a comparison with Platos Symposium. But it is simply a
mistake to see Zhuangzi as prizing beauty in this way. Zhuangzi does not prize
the higher or upper end of the following dichotomies: ugly/beautiful, inferior/
superior, lowly/high, old/new, crawling/flying, less/more developed, et cetera. It is
not difficult to look for examples in the Zhuangzi to refute the idea that Zhuangzi
values the higher side of each of these dichotomies. The following example should
suffice to make the point: in response to a question about where the dao resides,
Zhuangzi answers that it is in the ant. When his interlocutor expresses amazement
that it can be as low as that, Zhuangzi places it lower still, and this goes on until
Zhuangzi says, It is in the piss and shit! (W241).28
Earlier, we described Zhuangzis project of maintaining clarity of the heart-mind,
and the structure of the metaphorical argument that supports this. The multivalent
strategy of this structure would refute the project of transcendence that Allinson
attributes to Zhuangzi. It could also be argued that Zhuangzi does not value any of
the higher states because he would see no stability to any of these positions.29 Fur-
thermore, he takes seriously the ontological view of the oneness of things, which is
expressed as the idea that the dao is everywhereeven in the lowest of things, as
we have just seen. Given this contextual understanding, therefore, the butterfly
dream cannot be said to suggest a transcendental awakening.
Neither does it connote a state of doubt. In this regard, it would be instructive
to consider another interpretation of the butterfly dream. Hans-Georg Moller has
observed that the usual (Western) interpretations of the dream take it that there is
a continuous Cartesian I that underlies the whole episode, from Zhuang Zhou
(Zhuangzi) first dreaming that he is a butterfly to when he wakes up, as himself.30
Under these interpretations, Zhuangzi doubts whether he is himself or whether he
is the butterfly dreaming that he is Zhuangzi. Citing the editor and commentator
Guo Xiang, Moller argues that in the original text there is no reference to a continu-
ous self and no doubt on the part of this self about whether it is one entity or another.
Instead, there is no memory that connects the butterfly with Zhuangzi, and each seg-
ment of the episode is as authentic as the other.
It would take us beyond the limits of the present discussion to delve further into
this topic. Whatever the merits/demerits of Mollers own interpretation, it is at least
closer to the philosophical and contextual understanding of the Zhuangzi than Allin-
sons. This may be seen in terms of one of the central themes in the text, namely the
relation between life and death. Moller states that following his interpretation, the
380 Philosophy East & West
point about dreaming and waking is best made as a parallel to the relation between
life and death. As Moller notes:
Just as Zhuang Zhou, during the time of the dream, is completely replaced by the butter-
fly, who does not know anything of a Zhuang Zhou who was awakeand vice versa
the one that is dead does not know anything of the one that is aliveand vice versa.
Therefore, it is wrong to worry about death, since it is perfectly certain and without any
doubt that it is impossible to prove one of the two realms to be more authentic than the
other.31
This, it should be noted, is compatible with Zhuangzis project of clarity.
Conclusion
We may now return to the question that was raised in the Introduction: which view
of metaphor best describes Zhuangzis use of metaphor? As mentioned, there is no
easy answer to this question, and I offer here some tentative reflections. Let us first
consider Davidsons view that metaphors have no cognitive content. This seems to
fit Zhuangzis project of maintaining the emptiness of the heart-mind. That is, the
emptying devices of the mirror and the goblet seem to parallel the idea that meta-
phors are empty of cognitive content. Thus, it could be argued that Zhuangzi is able
both to avoid self-contradiction and to adopt a position of multivalence precisely be-
cause the nature and logic of metaphoras Davidson describes itis such that it is
cognitively empty.
This would be a neat and straightforward view of the matter, except for one
problem. Part of the reason why Davidson denies any cognitive content or meaning
to a metaphor is that beyond its literal meaning a metaphor can intimate any number
of things. The cost of agreeing totally with Davidson here would be that we could
not legitimately take issue with any interpretation of the Zhuangzi, such as Allin-
sons. But, as we have seen, there is a certain structure of metaphorical argument in
the Zhuangzi that would rule out Allinsons reading. In his discussion of the butterfly
dream, for instance, Allinson is influenced by a certain metaphorical model that
belongs to a tradition of thought that could be described as both Greek and Judeo-
Christian: this is the doctrine of perfection and of salvation from a lower to a higher
(transcendental) state, or going beyond the mundane. This is, however, not the met-
aphorical milieu that sustains Zhuangzi, for whom there is no transcendental state,
but a state of clarity. Furthermore, this is not logical clarity, but the clarity of the
heart-mind and its freedom from the fixity of distinctions (which is not to say that at a
practical level, there are no distinctions), and an ontological vision of the oneness of
all things. The metaphors of the heart-mind as a mirror and words that operate as the
wine in a goblet that tips when full both project stillness or equilibrium, without its
being stated propositionally. This non-propositional strategy, at the same time, serves
the purpose of non-fixity, and is congruent with the maintenance of equilibrium.
To some readers, this attribution of a structure to the metaphors of the
Zhuangzi and their non-propositional strategy would seem to be best described
Kim-chong Chong 381
by the theory of metaphor advocated by Lakoff and Johnson.32 Thus, Lakoff and
Johnson stress the non-propositional form that metaphor takes in terms of certain
embodied sensorimotor experiences and that constitutes a necessary condition of
propositional utterances. Against an Objectivist33 position such as Davidsons,
Lakoff and Johnson hold that at a deeper preconceptual and unconscious level,
meaning and content lie not in propositions but in non-propositional metaphorical
structures and patterns of thought. These structures are a function of sensorimotor
experiences that are mapped or projected onto (more) abstract areas of life.34 These
metaphorical mappings or projections occur in terms of neural networks that we are
largely unconscious of. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson talk of the cognitive uncon-
scious, unconscious conceptual systems, and the hidden hand of the uncon-
scious mind (that) uses metaphor to define our unconscious metaphysics.35
However, the kind of structure that I have described in the Zhuangzi is more
actively applied than the conception of a cognitive unconscious would seem to
indicate. Applying Lakoff and Johnsons methodology to the Zhuangzi would put
the stress on how Zhuangzi unconsciously uses, say, the concept of self according
to certain metaphorical schemas.36 What I hope to have demonstrated in this essay,
however, is that there is an argument that Zhuangzi more actively and consciously
puts forward. This is not to say, absurdly, that unlike ordinary mortals Zhuangzi is
able to transcend the kind of sensorimotor mappings that occur at the unconscious,
neural level. But there is no need to bring in the use of unconscious metaphorical
schemas here, especially when there is a conscious sense of the non-propositional
that can be accounted for, in referring to the structure of Zhuangzis argument, using
as it does the metaphorical devices that have been described earlier. In this regard,
reference to the cognitive unconscious would be unhelpful in giving due recogni-
tion to the deliberate use of these metaphorical devices and their non-propositional
nature.
That is, the non-propositional nature of Zhuangzis argument lies in semantic
paradoxes, infinite regresses, irony, wordplay, and fables (e.g., the butterfly dream,
the monkeys, the trees, and the goose that cannot cackle), and so on. These enable
Zhuangzi to hint at certain things (e.g., clarity) but at the same time without his
being forced (logically) to assert or to adhere to anything.37 This may generally be
said to be the result of their having the overall structure given by the mirror and
goblet metaphors. As I have tried to show, Zhuangzi is very much aware both of
the clarifying nature of his metaphors and of their logical function in deflecting
criticism that he is forced to admit the propositional espousal of any value.
Zhuangzi attempts to free us from boundedness through his metaphors. It would
be interesting to consider whether, and to what extent, we can free ourselves from
certain ways of perceiving the world. Certainly, Zhuangzi himself was not free: he
could not help but grieve when his wife died.38 If Lakoff and Johnson are right about
metaphors being embodied and unconscious ways of perception, we may not free
ourselves, or at least the possibility is severely limited for us all, even though it
should be noted that Lakoff and Johnson have indicated a variety of ways in
which metaphorical thought patterns may be extended. In any case, for Zhuangzi,
382 Philosophy East & West
the degree and extent to which it may be possible to free oneself is not universal but
is something that is up to the individual and his or her circumstances. We are
reminded here of Zhuangzis remark about the cheng xin or completed heart-
mind: If a man follows the [heart-mind] given him and makes it his teacher, then
who can be without a teacher? . . . Even an idiot has his teacher (W3839). In addi-
tion, readers familiar with the Zhuangzi will know that it contains many amazing
stories of unusual individuals who are able to live spontaneously and to go with
the flow of things. We may not be able to emulate these unusual characters, but it
is to Zhuangzis credit that he at least opens up the possibilities through his rich and
imaginative use of metaphor.
Finally, it might be held that I have misunderstood or inadequately elaborated
the contemporary views of the nature of metaphor discussed, especially that of
Lakoff and Johnson. It could also be that what I have said (e.g., about the non-
propositional nature of the metaphorical devices used by Zhuangzi, and his attempt
to free us from boundedness through these devices) is not incompatible with these
views. Certainly, there is more room for discussion, and that is why the reflections
above are tentative. Nevertheless, a consideration of these views has been neces-
sary to help illuminate (what I see as) a central structural argument in the Zhuangzi
that relies on metaphor. I leave the reader to judge how pertinent the comparisons
and reflections have been, and whether the comparisons have served the purpose of
illuminating the Zhuangzi.
Notes
I am indebted to the anonymous referees, not all of whom would agree with what I
have said but who were generous enough to give allowance for this. This essay has
gone through a few revisions, with the complication that in trying to accommodate
one of the referees I did not please another (who preferred an earlier, less involved
version)! I thank Roger Ames, John Greenwood, A. T. Nuyen, Sor-hoon Tan, and
Cecilia Wee for their comments. In the notes that follow, I have used hanyu pinyin,
but the use of Wade-Giles has been unavoidable, given my citations of other, earlier
works. Thus, in these cases, Zhuangzi has been spelled as Chuang Tzu, Chuang-Tzu,
or Chuang-tzu; dao as tao; and so on.
The following abbreviations are used in parenthetical references in the text and
Notes; numbers given after an abbreviation refer to the page in the work cited (e.g.,
D245 and A35 mean, respectively, Davidson, p. 245 and Allinson, p. 35).
A Allinson, Robert. Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the
Inner Chapters. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.
D Davidson, Donald. What Metaphors Mean. In Davidson, Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
G Graham, A. C. Chuang-tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from
the Book Chuang-tzu. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
Kim-chong Chong 383
W Watson, Burton, trans. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1968.
1 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1980); Mark Johnson, The Body in the MindThe Bodily
Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987); and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh
The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic
Books, 1999).
2 Some readers might think it necessary to state at the outset what the term met-
aphor refers to in this essay. Thus, for instance, a metaphor has been techni-
cally and narrowly defined as being distinct from a simile. In the latter case a
comparison is made between two things, for example O my loves like a red,
red rose. In a metaphor, instead of a comparison a word or expression that in
literal usage denotes one kind of thing is applied to a distinctly different kind of
thing. Using the same example, we would have the metaphor O my love is a
red, red rose (see M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed. [Boston:
Heinle and Heinle, 1999], p. 97). I shall use the term metaphor more broadly
in this essay, and, as we shall see, the nature of metaphor is itself a matter of
contention. A broader use of metaphor is shared by all the writers discussed.
Thus, Robert Allinson describes metaphor as a reduced myth (A34). David-
son, while observing the technical distinction between metaphor and simile,
stresses that his view of what a metaphor is depends on the distinction
between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor
belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the
imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the
ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of
the sentences they comprise (D247). It has been observed that by drawing
the meaning/use distinction in the way Davidson intends for it to be drawn, it
becomes possible to view metaphor as importantly similar to a wide variety
of other linguistic phenomena (see Marga Reimer, Davidson on Metaphor,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 [2001]: 143). Mark Johnson, too, has stated,
I will not be using metaphor in the traditional sense as merely a figure of
speech; rather I shall identify it as a pervasive, indispensable structure of hu-
man understanding by means of which we figuratively comprehend our world
(see Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. XX).
3 With the exception of a dead metaphor, which is defined as one which, like
the leg of a table or the heart of the matter, has been used so long and be-
come so common that its users have ceased to be aware of the discrepancy
between vehicle and tenor (see Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, p. 98).
Lakoff and Johnson, however, warn against being too quick in thinking of
certain metaphors as dead (see Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh,
pp. 124126).
384 Philosophy East & West
4 For discussions of whether Zhuangzi is a relativist, see Allinson, Chuang-Tzu
for Spiritual Transformation, especially chapter 8, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Was
Zhuangzi a Relativist? in Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Essays on
Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1996). Both Allinson and Ivanhoe discuss authors who attri-
bute a relativistic position to Zhuangzi, for example Chad Hansen, A Tao of
Tao in Chuang-tzu, in Victor H. Mair, ed., Experimental Essays on Chuang-
tzu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), and David Wong, Moral Rel-
ativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). A. C. Graham refers to
Zhuangzi as holding an uncompromising moral relativism (G4). My view is
that Zhuangzi is not a relativist, at least in the sense that he does not proposi-
tionally state any thesis of relativism. The debate regarding skepticism and rel-
ativism in the Zhuangzi has been carried forward in Scott Cook, ed., Hiding the
World in the WorldUneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 2003).
5 Referring to the two cognitive functions, the analytic or conceptual and the in-
tuitive or aesthetic (the latter two terms are used interchangeably with precon-
ceptual), Allinson suggests that we may think of these as correlated with the
current scientific concept that the brain is divided into two hemispheres (A26).
In a note, he states that whatever the merits are of the scientific evidence for
this division, it possesses a certain metaphorical value, and Whether or
not these correspond exactly with what science is discovering is not the point.
The point is that the metaphor of separate cognitive capacities is not so likely
to be disposed of as an unscientific idea given the empirical discoveries of
science (A178). Allinsons reference to the empirical evidence of science
is vague, and his reference to such evidence possessing a certain metaphori-
cal value does not help to clarify matters.
6 Reimer, Davidson on Metaphor, p. 145.
7 Ibid., pp. 144145. Reimer cites Richard Moran, Metaphor, in Bob Hale and
Crispin Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996), as putting forth this objection to Davidson. Moran refers to
Robert Stalnaker, Pragmatics, in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Seman-
tics of Language (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972).
8 Reimer, Davidson on Metaphor, p. 146.
9 The Qiwulun is the second chapter of the seven Inner Chapters of the
Zhuangzi, and this chapter is generally considered to be the work of Zhuangzi
himself. Graham notes that The last word in the title [lun] is sometimes under-
stood as discourse (The discourse on evening things out), sometimes in its
more basic sense of sort out (in coherent discourse). Comparison with the
three-word titles of the other Inner chapters favours the latter alternative
(G48). Graham also speculates that it was a Syncretist editor of the second
century B.C. who devised the headings of the Inner Chapters (G29). I shall
Kim-chong Chong 385
not be concerned with philological matters such as these; readers who are
interested should consult Harold Roth, Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu? in
Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed., Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts (La Salle:
Open Court, 1991), and A. C. Graham, How Much of Chuang Tzu Did
Chuang Tzu Write? in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical
Literature (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986). Nevertheless,
some questions of textual reading will arise, and I shall note these in the course
of the discussion. For the Chinese text, I have consulted Chen Guying
(Guuying), Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi , rev. ed., 2 vols. (Taipei: Tai-
wan Shangwu, 2000), and Guo Qingfan , Zhuangzi jishi , 4
vols. (reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993). For the English translations, I
have consulted Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu;
Graham, Chuang-tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the
Book Chuang-tzu; and James Legge, The Texts of Taoism (Oxford University
Press, 1891; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1962). I have modified
the translations where I have felt this necessary.
10 One might be tempted to say that there are two selves or two levels of the self
represented by wu and wo, and that the wo-self is what is disposed of in Nan-
guo Ziqis case. However, this positing of two levels of the self may not be nec-
essary. Nanguo Ziqi is perhaps simply saying (as we shall see) that he has freed
himself from certain psychological and emotional states. For an interpretation
of wu and wo as two levels of self, see David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking
from the Han (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 57.
11 Following Guo Qingfan. Chen has added tian lai zhe after fu, reading fu tian lai
zhe, chui wan bu tong .
12 Harold Oshima describes an important function of metaphor as the model
whereby the abstract idea is actually imagined and pictured. More than just a
descriptive analogy decorating an idea, it is the determinative model for the
understanding of that idea (Harold Oshima, A Metaphorical Analysis of the
Concept of Mind in the Chuang-tzu, in Victor H. Mair, ed., Experimental
Essays on Chuang-tzu, p. 73).
13 The following is from chapter 7, one of the Inner Chapters:
The Perfect Man uses his xin like a mirrorgoing after nothing, welcoming nothing,
responding but not storing. Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself
zhi ren zhi yong xin ruo jing , bu jiang bu ying , ying er bu
cang , gu neng sheng wu er bu shang . (W97; Chen, Zhuangzi
jin zhu jin yi, p. 238)
The following is from chapter 13:
The sage is still (jing ) not because he takes stillness to be good and therefore is still.
The ten thousand things are insufficient to distract his heart-mindthat is the reason he
is still. Water that is still gives back a clear (ming ) image of beard and eyebrows;
reposing in the water level, it offers a measure to the great carpenter. And if water in
386 Philosophy East & West
stillness possesses such clarity, how much more must pure spirit (jing shen ). The
sages heart-mind in stillness is the mirror (jian ) of the Heaven and earth, the glass
(jing ) of the ten thousand things. (W142; Chen, Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 353)
14 My translation, modifying Watson and Graham. See also James Legge, trans.,
The Texts of Taoism (Oxford University Press, 1891; reprint, New York: Dover
Publications, 1962), pp. 181182. Legge uses obscured for yin .
15 My translation, modifying Watson and Graham.
16 Cecilia Wee has alerted me (independently of the papers cited below) to the
similarity between Zhuangzi and the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Sextus Empiri-
cus, whose aim was the attainment of ataraxia or peace of mind gained through
epoche or the suspension of (dogmatic) judgment. Lisa Raphals makes a dis-
tinction between skeptical recommendations and methods on the one hand,
and skeptical doctrine on the other. While the latter is self-refuting, the former
is not, and Raphals gives an account of Zhuangzis skeptical method (Lisa
Raphals, Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus, in Kjellberg
and Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi;
see also Paul Kjellbergs Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi in the same
volume). While the stated parallel between Zhuangzis project of clarity and
ataraxia is noted, I shall reserve judgment on whether Zhuangzi was a skeptic
in any sense. This would call for further investigation that goes beyond the con-
fines of this essay. But see Chad Hansen, Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepti-
cism in the Zhuangzi, in Scott Cook, ed., Hiding the World in the World.
17 The Chinese word used here is yan . Chen reads this as se , i.e., sealed or
clogged up (Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 49 n. 16). The ideal clarity of the xin
is elsewhere described as being in an empty mode of fasting and as forget-
ting. See Harold Oshima, A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in
the Chuang-tzu, p. 77, and Antonio Cua, Forgetting Morality, in his Moral
Vision and Tradition (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press of America,
1998).
18 W303 n. 1. Instead of goblet words, Grahams spillover saying should
also be noted (see G26). This and two other metaphorical modes, imputed
words (yu yan ) and weighty words (zhong yan ) (or repeated
words chong yan) are referred to in chapter 27 and chapter 33 of the
Zhuangzi (W303). Zhi yan is the most philosophical of the three while the
other two are more literary and rhetorical. As Watson says, imputed words
are words put into the mouth of historical or fictional persons to make them
more compelling, while repeated or weighty words are words of the
wise old men of the past which are repeated or quoted to give authority to
the argument.
19 Shuen-fu Lin, The Language of the Inner Chapters of the Chuang Tzu, in
The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History, ed. Willard J. Peter-
son, Andrew H. Plaks, and Ying-shih Yu (Hong Kong: The Chinese University
Kim-chong Chong 387
Press, 1994), p. 65. I have benefited greatly from this excellent paper. I have
changed Lins Wade-Giles romanizations to hanyu pinyin. Lin notes A. C.
Grahams description of zhi yan as a spillover saying and his description
that It is speech characterized by the intelligent spontaneity of Taoist behavior
in general, a fluid language which keeps its equilibrium through changing
meanings and viewpoints. We should also note Grahams remarks that zhi
yan says most when it says least and least when it says most, that it shifts freely
from one standpoint to another (G65 and 26, respectively). Watson says that
zhi yan are words that adapt to and follow along with the fluctuating nature of
the world and thus achieve a state of harmony (W303, quoted in Lin, The
Language of the Inner Chapters of the Chuang Tzu, pp. 6566). Lin also
notes that zhi yan is a pun on the zhi of zhi li , which refers to certain
crippled and deformed characters in the text. This makes zhi yan refer to
words that are jumbled [i.e., deformed], having neither a head not a tail
(Lin, ibid., pp. 6667). Zhuangzis words do seemdeliberatelyto have this
jumbled nature. The jumbled nature of Zhuangzis words reminds the sensitive
reader that, just like deformed characters and gnarled trees, they may still have
some use or uses. See also Youru Wang, The Strategies of Goblet Words:
Indirect Communication in the Zhuangzi, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31
(2) (June 2004): 195218.
20 Originally, instead of , we have (as, e.g., in the Guo
Qingfan edition). The reason for the emendation is that pairs with instead
of (knowledge) (Chen, Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi, p. 61 n. 2).
21 Modifying Watson, who does not make the emendation just mentioned above,
thus reading through understanding you can know it (W39), Graham trans-
lates this as if you know of yourself you know of them (G52).
22 The passage above regarding the mutual existence of binary pairs has in recent
years been interpreted in deconstructionist ways. For instance, Youru Wang
explains it as saying: The other has its absent presence in the one. This ab-
sence, this trace of the other, paves the way for the transformation of every-
thing, and makes possible the subversion of everything (Youru Wang, Philos-
ophy of Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi, Journal of
Chinese Philosophy 27 [3] [2000]: 350). The following Derridean readings
have appeared in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy: Michelle Yeh, The
Deconstructive Way: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Chuang-tzu, vol.
10 (1983): 95126; Chung-ying Cheng, A Taoist Interpretation of Difference
in Derrida, 17 (1990): 1930; Chi-hui Chien, Thefts Way: A Comparative
Study of Chuang Tzus Tao and Derridean Trace, 17 (1990): 3149; Wayne
D. Ownes, Tao and Difference: The Existential Implications, 20 (1993):
261277. See Also Mark Berkson, Language: The Guest of RealityZhuangzi
and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness, in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe,
Essays on Skepticism, Relativisim, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. While acknowl-
edging the insights that a Derridean reading can have for an understanding of
388 Philosophy East & West
the Zhuangzi (and vice versa), I shall confine myself in this essay to the role and
the nature of metaphor in the Zhuangzi.
23 Chen leaves out yong ye zhe, yong ye; yong ye zhe, tong ye
; tong ye zhe, de ye , shi de er ji yi . Legge
uses ordinary for yong . Watson has the constant, while Graham has it
as usual, which is closer to Legge.
24 See G1011 and 5254.
25 Yuet Keung Lo, To Use or Not to Use: The Idea of Ming in the Zhuangzi,
Monumenta Serica 47 (1999): 150.
26 This story is discussed in some detail by Allinson in chapter 12 of his book.
27 Last night Chuang Chou dreamed he was a butterfly, spirits soaring he was a
butterfly (is it that in showing what he was he suited his own fancy?), and did
not know about Chou. When all of a sudden he awoke, he was Chou with all
his wits about him. He does not know whether he is Chou who dreams he is a
butterfly or a butterfly who dreams he is Chou. Between Chou and the butterfly
there was necessarily a dividing; just this is what is meant by the transformation
of things (G61).
28 See also p. 18 of Watsons Introduction. It might be objected that this exam-
ple cannot be attributed to Zhuangzi, since it is from chapter 22 of the
Zhuangzi, one of the Outer Chapters and not from the Inner Chapters,
which are generally attributed to Zhuangzi himself. As Harold Roth puts it,
chapters 1722 contain material which often imitates the themes and style
of the Inner Chapters, which . . . scholars conclude represents the writings
of later followers of Chuang Tzu (Roth, Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?
p. 81). Nevertheless, the example is congruent with Zhuangzis philosophy of
non-adherence to any particular value, let alone any higher value.
29 Youru Wang, Philosophy of Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the
Zhuangzi, p. 3, has a fine discussion of the infinite transformation of things.
Robert Allinsons more recent essay On Chuang Tzu as a Deconstruction-
ist with a Difference, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30 (3/4) (September/
December 2003): 487500, despite its title, still talks of a movement from
lower to higher, a one-way transformation, and a point of truth. Referring to
the myth of a fish that is deconstructed as a fish and reconstructed as a bird
in the first chapter of the Zhuangzi, he says:
The deeper, analogical truth that is prefigured here is a one-way transformation, from
bound vision to unbound vision. It is not an endless, cyclical transformation of fish
into birds and birds back into fish. It is a movement from lower to higher, from that
which is bound to that which is free. It is also not a transformation from a state of knowl-
edge to a state of confusion. It is a transformation from a point of view that is limited to a
point of view that is unrestricted and far seeing. (p. 488)
Kim-chong Chong 389
And in the next paragraph, he goes on: The bird that flies upward into the air
symbolizes the attainment of a higher state. . . . Referring to a dream story in
the Qiwulun that mentions a Great Awakening, Allinson says: But the
dream story is, after all, only a metaphor. It is a metaphor that on a physical
level stands for a mental awakening on a higher level (p. 493).
30 Hans-Georg Moller, Zhuangzis Dream of the ButterflyA Daoist Interpreta-
tion, Philosophy East and West 49 (4) (1999): 439450.
31 Ibid., p. 442.
32 See Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, and Johnson, The Body in the
Mind.
33 A term used by Mark Johnson in The Body in the Mind, p. 72.
34 Mark Johnson gives the following example:
A metaphor, in this experiential sense, is a process by which we understand and
structure one domain of experience in terms of another domain of a different kind.
Thus, in the metaphor SEXUAL EXPERIENCE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE we project mean-
ingful structure from our experience of forceful interactions of physical objects and
events onto the domain of our sexual experience. Many of the connections across these
two domains are experiential projections at the preconceptual level of our understand-
ing. We thus come to experience our sexuality by means of these preconceptual struc-
tures that are meaningful to us in a bodily way. ( Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 15;
Johnsons italics and capitals)
35 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. See especially chapter 2, The
Cognitive Unconscious. The reference to unconscious conceptual systems
is on p. 13, and the hidden hand on p. 14.
36 As has been done by Edward Slingerland, Effortless ActionWu-wei as Con-
ceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003). Just to give an example of how Lakoff and Johnsons method-
ology is applied, consider the following. Slingerland detects in the Zhuangzi a
combination of the SELF AS CONTAINER and the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphori-
cal schemas, giving rise to the following conceptual structure (the arrows de-
pict a conceptual projection or mapping from a sensorimotor domain to the
abstract domain of self):
Inside of Container! Real Self (Fits Subject/Essence)Outside of Container! False Self (Does Not Fit Subject/Essence)Citing Confucius (Confucius as figuratively portrayed in the Zhuangzi ) warning
Yan Hui against trying to set a certain king straight: Outwardly he will accord
with you, but inside he will be unrepentant, Slingerland comments, In other
words, he will falsely (on the surface, as we would say in English) agree with
Yan Huis advice, but he will not really take it to heart. As in English and the
other Warring States texts we have examined, this coordination of inner with
390 Philosophy East & West
the Essential Self and outer with the False Self seems to be a universally
accepted convention that would not need to be justified or explained to the
reader (Slingerland, Effortless Action, p. 187). I have discussed Slingerlands
application of conceptual metaphor to Chinese philosophy in another paper
titled Metaphorical Use versus Metaphorical Essence: Examples from Chinese
Philosophy, in Davidsons Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive
Engagement, edited by Bo Mou (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006).
37 Without getting into a technical debate on the meaning of a proposition, I
take a proposition to assert or contend that something is the case. None of the
devices I have mentioned as present in the Zhuangzi, and as governed by the
metaphorical structure that I have described, can be said to assert or to con-
tend that something is the case. Similarly, given their multivalent nature, nei-
ther can it be said that they necessarily imply that something is the case.
38 The description of him sitting with his legs sprawled out, pounding on a tub
and singing, when his friend Hui Tzu (Huizi) comes to offer condolences,
and his explanation, Now shes going to lie down peacefully in a vast room.
If I were to follow after her bawling and sobbing, it would show that I dont
understand anything about fate. So I stopped, do not necessarily indicate that
he had managed to stop grieving (W191192).
Kim-chong Chong 391