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Kickoff Colloquium September 1, 2010. Brain Teaser 1. Brain Teaser 2. x 0 < x 1. 1. Alice chooses two reals by an unknown process. xb. 2. Bob chooses a uniformly random bit b. x b. Your goal: guess b with probability better than 50%. 3. You get only x b. What’s the Problem?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Kickoff ColloquiumSeptember 1, 2010
1Brain Teaser 1
Brain Teaser 2
1. Alice chooses two reals by an unknown processx0< x12. Bob chooses a uniformly random bit b3. You get only xb
xbxbYour goal: guess b with probability better than 50%Whats the Problem?Wallpaper apps on Android Market are found to be gathering phone numbers, subscriber ID, etc, and transmitting to an unknown server registered in ChinaThieves steal your car and GPS and use it to find your home, stealing your other carHackers plant malware in Windows Mobile games that make expensive calls to Somalia
SoftphoneMini laptop/netbook +.Powerful sensors
Location (GPS)Motion (Accelerometer)CompassMicrophoneCamera
How bad could it get?Bring down 911 systems?Blind air traffic control?Facilitate espionage?
Friend or Foe?Whats the good news?We have an opportunity for clean-slate development of softphone securitySoftphone platforms are nascent and relatively fluid architecturallyNew modalities to leverage in support of securityPhysical proximityMobilityRich sensor data stream
OverviewUser Security and PrivacySystem SecurityAttacks on the HardwareAuthenticationProtecting User PrivacyAttack DetectionIncentives
User Security and PrivacyAttacks on the HardwareSecuring the HardwareAvoid creating side channels, design of hardware with built-in attack detection M. KarpovskyHardware Hardened ModulesPreventing side channel leakage L. ReyzinManaging LeakageExposure-resistant cryptography L. ReyzinProtecting User PrivacySecure, distributed sensing N. Triandopoulos
User Security and PrivacyLeveraging Sensing to AuthenticateSensor-BasedSensor-generated secrets L. ReyzinProximity-BasedSensor-based proximity verification L. Reyzin, D. Starobinski, and A. Trachtenberg
System SecurityAttack DetectionPhysical Layer, esp SDRAnalyzing SDR threats M. Crovella, D. Starobinski, G. TroxelStatistical Attack DetectionCrowd-sourced attack detection M. CrovellaAdvanced AuthenticationCode authenticationResilient over-the-air programming A. Trachtenberg and D. StarobinskiData authenticationDistributed data authentication N. Triandopoulos
System SecurityEconomicsEconomics and security impact of spectrum managementD. StarobinskiIncentive-compatible traffic controlProtocol design S. GoldbergEconomic approach to unwanted trafficAttention bonds for spam suppression S. Homer
A Unique TeamAll nine of the principal investigators are faculty members at Boston UniversityVery rare to have such a broad and deep collection of expertise under one roofCross-cutting collaboration betweenComputer Science,Electrical and Computer Engineering, andMetropolitan College Computer Science
CollaboratorsRaytheon BBN TechnologiesExperts in software defined radioUniversity of WarwickDigital forensics, malware propagation, formal modelingDeutsche TelekomMajor handset vendor (T-Mobile) and network service providerExtensive security experience
Mark CrovellaProfessorComputer Science DepartmentCollege of Arts and Scienceshttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/crovella
Research InterestPerformance evaluation Parallel and networked computer systems Internet measurement and modeling Self-similarity and heavy-tailed distributions in network traffic
Steven HomerProfessorComputer Science DepartmentCollege of Arts and Scienceshttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/homer
Research InterestTheoretical computer science Complexity theory Quantum computing Learning theoryParallel and probabilistic algorithms
Sharon Goldberg
Assistant ProfessorComputer Science DepartmentCollege of Arts and Scienceshttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/goldbeResearch InterestNetwork Security Mark Karpovsky
ProfessorElectrical and Computer EngineeringCollege of Engineeringhttp://mark.bu.eduResearch InterestDesign of secure cryptographic devices and smart cards Routing in interconnection networks design and protection of cryptographic devices Fault-tolerant computing Error correcting codes Testing and diagnosis of computer hardware
Leonid Reyzin
Associate ProfessorComputer Science DepartmentCollege of Arts and Scienceshttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/reyzinResearch InterestCryptography
David StarobinskiResearch InterestWireless networking and security Network economics StochasticProcesses Algorithms
Associate ProfessorElectrical and Computer EngineeringCollege of Engineeringhttp://people.bu.edu/staroAri Trachtenberg
Associate ProfessorElectrical and Computer EngineeringCollege of Engineeringhttp://people.bu.edu/trachtenResearch InterestError correcting codes Security and algorithmsData synchronizationLocation detection Sensors, PDAs, smartphonesNikos Triandopoulos
Research Assistant Professor RISCS Center and Computer Science http://www.cs.bu.edu/~nikosResearch InterestInformation Security & Privacy Network Security Distributed System Security Secure Protocol Design Tanya Zlateva
Associate ProfessorComputer Science DepartmentMetropolitan Collegehttp://people.bu.edu/zlatevaResearch InterestComputational Modeling of Visual Perception, Recognition, Three Dimensional Representations of Object Shape, Parallel and Distributed Processing
Integrated SecurityEconomicsMetadata (MC)Cost for inconvenience (DS)HardwareHigh costs for security (MK)Can sensor mitigate costs? (AT)Network and System LevelCrowdsourcing anomaly detection (MC)Smartphone as a sensor network (DS)Software-defined radios (GT)
Economics: metadata and cost for inconvenienceHardware: costs are very high $100k certification + high power consumption how can we reduce them? Maybe using sensors.Network: Smart phone as DTN Relationship to social nets
26The Promise of UbiquitousCommunication and ComputationUnrestrained collaboration in groups large and smallExamples:Crime-reporting with protection from corruptible authorities (when police are potentially corrupt)Political organizing without (state-owned?) media filtersReal-time traffic monitoringDisaster reliefProblems:How do you get valid information In a way that preserves individual privacyIn a way that gives people a reason to participate(no privacy no participation)(no validity data pollution no participation)Privacy - more than confidentialitya general concern, decomposable intoconfidentiality of contents of communication (TLS)freedom from traffic analysis (Tor for IP, ?)freedom from query analysis (private information retrieval)confidentiality of location (?)? (?)
softphone-related particular challengeslocation, location, location!always-with-human and multifaceted (entertaintment/payment/work/play/love): surveillance like never beforeAlso a general concern with various aspects:
Validity of reports or shared informationreputation-based, ground-truth checkable,User authenticationusing password, sensors, proximity, anonymous credentials,Reliable distributed data managementp2p-based, best-effort vs. 100% accuracy,Dynamic group formationbased on user registration/revocation, access controlled,
Non-solution for any of the above:Register every cell phone to a name, punish for bad communicationInformation Reliability & IntegrityWhats different (given all this prior work)Promises (not available on PCs):High mobilityOpportunistic networkingRich sensingAlways-onPeer-to-peer (wifi/bluetooth) and infrastructure mode
Challenges (not the same as PCs):Computing constraints (e.g., for evaluation of sensory data or running heavy protocols): memory, speed, powerFixed protocols at the phone network layer that areboth privacy unfriendly and insecureCentral control (large companies/government regulation) that may be unaligned with user incentives