The Water and Sanitation Program is aninternational partnership for improving waterand sanitation sector policies, practices, andcapacities to serve poor people

June 2005

Field Note

Rogues No More?Water Kiosk OperatorsAchieve Credibility in KiberaThis field note describes practical actions taken to formalize the independent marketplace of waterkiosk operators serving poor households in a large urban settlement in Nairobi, Kenya. Theestablishment of an association enabled a large group of local water operators to find commonground and work together to improve their credibility, start a process of regulating their own serviceand begin to develop a productive dialogue with the utility.

Serving the Urban Poor

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Introduction

In Africa, informal settlements areenormous, growing rapidly andunderserved. By 2020 it is estimatedthat more than half of the people ofAfrica will reside in urban areas,increasing the present urbanpopulation from 300 million to 700million1. The high rates ofurbanization, coupled with low ratesof economic growth, suggest that thispopulation growth will predominantlyoccur in the sprawling andunderserved informal settlements —where about two-thirds of the peoplein African cities currently live, mostwithout access to basic water supply,sanitation and electricity services.

These data highlight the immensity ofthe problem and the urgency withwhich governments, donors and otherstakeholders should tackle the

practical problems constraining servicedelivery to the urban poor.Public utilities in African cities have

seldom expanded water supplynetworks into these informalsettlements, despite being home to asignificant proportion of the urbanpopulation. Most efforts to serve theurban poor in marginalizedcommunities have been limited to theprovision of a few standpipes, deliveryby water tankers or other makeshiftarrangements.

Kenya is no exception. The major citiesof the country have large and rapidly-growing informal settlements, andstruggling utilities. The institutionalarrangements for water supply have beenweak, resulting in a cycle of declininginvestment, deteriorating service, anddiminishing financial returns.

Water supply provision in Kenya ischaracterized by low coverage,unreliable service, poor financial

1 WUP, 1998

Executive SummaryExecutive SummaryExecutive SummaryExecutive SummaryExecutive Summary

In the informal settlement of Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, more than half a millionpoor people have little or no access to the utility water supply. Instead, theirdemand for water is met by a burgeoning informal water market in which morethan 650 local entrepreneurs sell water through kiosks scattered throughoutthe settlement.

In the context of wider sector reforms in Kenya, this field note describes thepractical actions that were taken to create a bridge linking this independentmarketplace and the utility. In particular, the establishment of an association oflocal water providers enabled the otherwise disparate entrepreneurs to act inunison and thereby promote self-regulation, improve their credibility anddevelop relations with the utility.

The result is a better business environment for the providers, less leakage forthe utility, and most importantly, greater accountability to customers - allimportant steps in developing better water services for the poor.

A glimpse of the sprawling informal settlement in Kibera, Nairobi

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management, and neglected operationand maintenance. This has translatedinto generally inadequate serviceswhich are particularly lacking for theurban poor.

New climate for reform

Political changes in 2002 ushered in anew climate of reform in Kenya. Thenew government’s policies focus ongood governance, devolution and apositive investment environment.Kenya has produced a PovertyReduction Strategy Paper, entitled“Economic Strategy for Wealth andEmployment Creation”. It emphasizespoverty reduction through job creation,investment in people, social protectionand good governance. A key pillar ofthe National Poverty Eradication Plan isimproved access to basic socialservices in conjunction with broad-based economic growth.

A push for good governance tostimulate economic growth and providebetter services has also had an impactin the water sector. A new water policycame into effect in 1999, redefining therole of the government to focus onregulatory and enabling functionsrather than direct service provision.

The government plans to emphasizesupporting private sector participationand community management ofservices, rather than continuesubsidizing inefficient utilities withpublic funds.

The key principles of the reform are:• Separation of policy, regulation and

service provision

• Separation of water resourcemanagement from provision ofwater and sewerage services

• Devolution of responsibilities forwater resource management andwater service provision to the locallevel

• Enhancing the sustainability ofservice provision.

The Water Act of 2002 (enacted inMarch 2003) lays the legal frameworkfor implementing the policy and sets upthe institutions required. Executiveauthority has been devolved to newinstitutions.

The Water Services Regulatory Board isresponsible for water supply and

sewerage and the Water ResourcesManagement Authority for waterresources.

Responsibility for water servicesprovision is vested in Water ServiceBoards, under the regulation of theWater Services Regulatory Board, andthe Act provides for licensing of WaterService Providers by these boards.Seven Water Boards have already beenestablished across Kenya, with one forNairobi. The Nairobi Water andSewerage Company (the utility) wascreated from the former Water andSewerage Department of the NairobiCity Council and, since August 2004,has been the principal Water ServiceProvider to the city.

Most efforts to serve Kibera residents have been limited to the provision of a few standpipes

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Challenges forNairobi’s Water Utility

Water supply in Nairobi has beenplagued for many years withinefficiency and complex managementand logistical problems. This has led toinadequate water services, with thepoor suffering the most. A 2002 study2

identified both the physical state of theinfrastructure and poor management askey constraints.

Although the utility supplies 392,000cubic meters each day andconsumption is only 350,000 cubicmeters, there are constant shortagesand service interruptions. Of those thatare presently served by the utility, 40percent do not receive a 24-hoursupply. Some 30 percent receive wateronce in two days while 10 percentreceive water only once a week3.Unaccounted-for-water is over 50percent of the total volume of treatedwater produced.

Much of the unaccounted-for-waterresults from physical leakage, and therest is due to water theft and failure tobill, essentially as a result ofmismanagement. The new NairobiWater and Sewerage Company istasked with improving this situation.

Only about 187,000 or 42 percent ofthe total households in Nairobi havelegal water connections. Nearly allothers, largely poor households, obtainwater from kiosks, water delivery

services and illegal connections.Although a few kiosk owners haveprivate tubewells, the water purchasedfrom vendors is usually originallysourced from the network.

Household surveys4 in Kenya revealthat poor households spend 45minutes on average collecting waterevery day while the non-poor spendonly 18 minutes. The time spent oncollection per day varies significantlybased on the level of service.Households with private connectionsspend about five minutes. Those withyard taps spend 15 minutes, and those

relying on kiosks spend as much as 55minutes collecting water.The tariff structure in force in Nairobi isan increasing block tariff (see Table 1).The official water tariff provides littleindication of what people are actuallypaying, however. Despite low averagewater use, estimated at only 40 litersper capita per day, households arepaying remarkably high unit prices forwater. The average cost is estimated tobe Ksh260 per cubic meter (US$3.50)6.The main reason behind these highprices is that households are buyingwater from on-sellers such as tankers,kiosks and water delivery services.

Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4

Consumption – m3 0-10 10-30 30-60 > 60

Tariff – Ksh/ m3 12 18 28 35

Tariff – US$/ m3 0.16 0.24 0.37 0.47

Table 1: Water Tariff for Nairobi City5

A kiosk for retailing water

2 PPIAF, 20023 PPIAF, 20024 WSP, 19975 US$1 is equivalent to approximately Ksh 756 World Bank, 2004

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Despite the utility’s attempts to delivera subsidy through the tariff, there isevidence that the poor, who are morelikely to rely on water sold by thirdparties, pay more per unit of water7.

In an attempt to partially address theproblem, the utility has established aflat rate of Ksh10 per cubic meter forbulk supply to water kiosks servinginformal settlements. However, this hasnot been effective in bringing downcosts to consumers as few kioskoperators are actually billed at this rateas they often end up being charged theregular domestic tariff (for reasons thatwill be explained below).

As consumption is high, this pushesthe price of water into the highestblocks of the tariff. These costs, as wellas the investment costs and overheadsincurred by the kiosk operators,translate into very high prices at kiosks.

Stark reality of Kibera

Kibera is the largest and most denselypopulated informal settlement in sub-Saharan Africa. With an estimatedpopulation of at least 500,000, theinformal settlement of Kibera is hometo at least a quarter of the population ofNairobi. It covers an area of about 250hectares, with a density of more than2,000 people per hectare8.

Kibera supplies labor to the nearbyindustrial area and more affluentresidential neighborhoods. Despite itslarge population and strategic

importance in the economy of the city,Kibera has been provided with fewservices, and most residents have noland tenure. Inadequate water supplyand sanitation are seriousenvironmental challenges faced bythose living in Kibera9.

Despite attempts in 1988 to ‘infill’ thewater supply network, there are stillonly approximately 25 kilometers ofpiped network in the entire settlement,

and much of this network receives littleor no water.

Kibera gets less water than othersettlements in proportion to its size fortwo main reasons. One is the limitedcapacity of the pumping station on thetrunk main feeding this part of the city,and the other is the tendency to divertavailable water to neighboring highincome areas where both politicalinfluence and revenue collection aregreater.

Water kiosks fill the gap

In response to the unfulfilled demandfor water and sanitation services,private small scale providers haveseized a business opportunity andstepped in to fill the gap. Theiroperations are so extensive, andalternatives so limited, that at thepresent time they are the primarysupply for most people in Kibera. Thepredominant type of small scaleprovider in Kibera is the water kiosk.There are some 650 water kiosks inoperation, of which 98 percent are runby private entrepreneurs, and a few(about 20) are run by CommunityBased Organizations or NonGovernment Organisations (NGOs)10.

The kiosk operators lay lengths of pipe,as much as 1,500 meters, to reach thefew trunk mains and gain access to thenetwork. This informal network isconnected to storage tanks, usuallyconstructed of galvanized iron sheets,between two and six cubic meters incapacity. From these tanks, the kioskoperators sell the water to consumers,who collect it using 20-liter jerry cans.

Pipes supplying water kiosks find their way through

sludge and solid waste

7 Gulyani, et al, 20058 WSP, 19979 WSP, 199910 WSP, 1998

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Kiosk operators lay pipes alongexisting channels including opensewers full of solid waste andcontaminated water. This allowscontamination of water during itstransportation from the utility networkto the kiosk. Many use low qualityplastic pipes to reduce costs, as metalpipes are much more expensive andcould be stolen. Plastic pipes have theadded advantage of being flexibleenough to follow the winding andirregular paths found in most of Kibera.

Contamination also occurs at the kioskdue to poorly maintained storage tanksand unhygienic handling.

Water kiosk userspay high prices

No matter what they are compared to,the prices that these kiosks charge ishigh. Although the utility has, in thepast, made a recommendation thatwater be sold for Ksh1 per jerry can

(about US$0.10), this is seldomobserved because of the costsassociated with establishing andrunning water kiosks. A more commonprice is Ksh2 (or Ksh100 (US$1.30) perm3 ), which is eight times the lowestblock of the tariff at domestic

connections and four times the averagetariff in Kenya.

During water shortages, the pricesbecome even higher, soaring to Ksh5 oreven as much as Ksh10 for a 20-literjerry can (the equivalent of Ksh500 orUS$6.60 per m3). The unit cost of waterin Kibera can thus rise above theaverage price of water at privateconnections in European countries.

There are many reasons that the wateris so expensive, with most beingbeyond the control of the vendorsoperating the kiosks.• Capital investment: The estimated

investment by each private vendorto establish a water kiosk is aboutKsh75,000 (US$1,000). The bulk ofthis cost comes from laying pipesto connect the kiosk to the distantutility network. A sample of 63kiosks examined in 1998 showedthat the total length of pipe

A meeting of water kiosk operators in Kibera

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Kenya TanzaniaSenegal

UnitedKingdom

France

Kiberashortage

Germany

Kiberamaximum

Estimated Average Tariff (2003)

US

$/m

3

Kiberaminimum

Figure 1: Comparison of Kibera water prices11

11The figures for average tariff in the countries shown are based on estimates from recent literature and accounts from utility experts.

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installed was almost 20 kilometers,or an average of over 300 metersper kiosk12. Vendors report that pipecosts account for at least half ofinvestment costs13.

• Corruption and rent-seeking:Vendors report that at least aquarter of their initial investment isin the form of bribes to facilitate aconnection (known locally as‘speed-up’ fees). The utility requiresa great deal of information toregister a water connection,including the applicant’s plotnumber, address details, alandlord’s certification as a proof ofresidence, and a certificate ofemployment. The kiosk operatorshave problems fulfilling theserequirements as they are often notemployed in the formal sector, andmany people in Kibera do not have

clear land title, or have landlordswho will not provide a certificate. Inaddition, vendors are required tomake on-going unofficial paymentsto utility officials in order to stay inbusiness.

• Tariffs: Despite the fact that a bulkrate has been incorporated into thetariff policy, this has not beeneffective in bringing down costs forconsumers. One reason is thatkiosks are usually registered asdomestic connections due to therequirements of obtaining a bulkconnection and additional costs(such as a deposit which is doublethat of a domestic connection).Kiosks are usually charged tariffsaccording to the increasing blocktariff, and end up pay high retailrates. At the highest block of thetariff, each additional cubic meterpurchased by the operator costsKsh35, or Ksh0.7 per jerry can.

In some cases, high prices are a result

of vendors taking advantage oftemporary shortages to make rapidprofits. These shortages are usuallycreated by general problems at theutility, which result in serviceinterruptions. However, there arereports that artificial shortages aresometimes created through collusionwith utility officials.

Another factor making it possible forvendors to demand high prices is theapparent concentration of sales within asmall number of kiosks. A survey of 55kiosks in 1997 showed that 66 percentof the water sold over a seven-day periodcame from 29 percent of the kiosks14.

Kiosk users have no option but to paythe high prices, and little recourse.Most of the residents in Kibera aretenants, and many of the water vendorsare their landlords, making usersreluctant to protest against unfairpractices at the kiosks.

12 WSP, 199813 Consultations with kiosks operators in March 200314 WSP, 1998

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Long history of neglect

There are several reasons that Kiberagets little attention from the utility:• Revenue collection in the

settlement is negligible, due inpart to low billing rates by theutility (less than 10 percent ofwater delivered is billed15) and lowpayment rates by the water on-sellers. An example is that only 11percent of kiosk operators paidtheir bills in 1995 and 199616

which, according to estimates,results in a payment rate of lessthan one percent

• There are many illegal connectionsand the utility is reluctant toprovide more water in anenvironment where much of it willbe stolen

• Despite its large population, the

water delivered to Kibera isestimated to be less than 10percent of the city’s totalconsumption.

All these factors result in few incentivesfor the utility to address the needs ofKibera.

On the other hand, evidence fromconsultations with consumers showsthat residents of Kibera are not onlypaying for water, but are paying verylarge amounts. The approximateamount paid by consumers in Kibera tomeet their daily water needs can beestimated as follows:• The amount of water supplied by

the utility to Kibera settlement isabout 20,000 m3 per day

• It is estimated that 40 percent of thewater supplied is lost throughleakage and the remaining 60percent is sold at kiosks

• A jerry can of water is sold for aminimum price of Ksh2

• Each jerry can holds 20 liters, sothere are 50 jerry cans per m3.

Based on these figures it can beestimated that collectively theconsumers in Kibera spend aboutKsh1.2 million every day on water. Thisis equivalent to Ksh438 millionannually. By comparison, the utility billsabout Ksh3 billion per year, but collectsonly 30 percent, or Ksh900 million.This means that the revenues collectedby kiosks operators in Kibera are abouthalf of those collected by the utility. Ifthe water currently being consumed bykiosk users was all billed and paid for atthe bulk rate, the utility would collectan extra Ksh44 million annually,increasing their revenue by five percent.

The utility has historically done little totry to address the problems in Kibera,preferring to simply use water rationingto limit its losses. Until recently, theattitude towards kiosk operators wasthat they were part of the problem.Driving water vendors out of businesswas seen as an effective measure toreduce unaccounted-for-water.

This attitude is illustrated by actiontaken in 2003 when the Minister ofWater Resources announced that legalproceedings would be initiated againstwater vendors who were not properlyregistered. This was reported in thepress under the headline “Rogue watervendors put on notice”17. The Ministeradmitted that much of the illegal waterbusiness was carried out incollaboration with corrupt ministry andutility officials, but offered noconcessions or immediateimprovements in the way the systemwas administered. With a lack of

Most kiosk customers buy water in 20-liter jerry cans

15WSP, 199816WSP, 199917Daily Nation, 2003

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enforcement these threats had littleimpact except, perhaps, to make watervendors feel even more vulnerable tocorrupt officials.

Kiosk operatorsform an association

Despite the official attitude, most kioskoperators are keen to reduce the priceof water and improve their service. Forinstance, many of them would like toestablish pay-per-use showers andsanitation facilities. The current level ofinvestment made at the kiosksdemonstrates that capital isavailable. However, from theperspective of the kiosk owners,there are significant impediments toregistering a kiosk, managing itsoperation, and getting enough water.

The Water and Sanitation Programin Africa (WSP-Africa) engaged withkiosk operators in March 2003 tolearn more about their operationsand constraints. This initial contactwas very limited, consisting ofinformal meetings with about 15kiosk operators18. However, about ayear later, after the new Water Actwas enacted, kiosk operators soughtWSP-Africa support over concernsthat the water sector reforms wouldaffect their businesses. This feararose from what they saw happeningin the transport sector. Here, undermuch-needed reforms, new ruleswere enforced for privately-managedpublic transport and all drivers hadto re-register; but before this couldbe achieved many of them were outof business for months.

In May 2004, WSP-Africa helpedorganize a meeting with kioskoperators at which one of thearchitects of the Water Act spoke ofits implications for the water on-selling business. He explained thatthe Act clearly defines a role for smallscale water providers and encouragescompetition between various serviceproviders to increase efficiency.

The implication was that Kibera watervendors need not fear the Act, as longas they could comply with the lawand improve their services to remainthe preferred means of water service

delivery in the settlement. As a resultof this meeting, the kiosk operatorsdecided to form an association, whichthey called Maji Bora Kibera (MBK) -the Swahili translation of ‘better waterservices for Kibera’.

With the help of WSP-Africa, MBKdrafted a constitution, formed anexecutive committee and applied forofficial registration. An invitation wassent out to all the water businesses inKibera, and over 200 kiosk operators metto form groups based on theirgeographic location in the settlement andelect representatives to the executive.

Members of MBK announce their commitment to improve water services18 WSP, 1998

1010101010

This was followed by a campaign toincrease membership, which grew tomore than 500 in a few weeks.

WSP-Africa then worked with MBKthrough a series of half-day meetingsto determine both what members coulddo to improve their credibility, and whatissues they wanted to formally engageon with the utility. WSP-Africa hadmeanwhile approached the newly-formed Nairobi Water and SewerageCompany about becoming involved,and arranged a meeting with theManaging Director, the person incharge of water supply for poorsettlements, and the commercial andtechnical managers. As an outcomeof this meeting, a joint task forcewas formed, with members from theutility, MBK and WSP-Africa.

At the suggestion of the utility, MBKwrote a letter stating clearly the problemsthat the water vendors in Kibera faced,and the approach they wished to take.

The letter was a watershed in vendor-utility relations, and the first steptowards achieving true credibility andrecognition for the water kiosks. Theletter stated that:• The problems faced by the

members were water shortages, lackof bulk water connections (forcingvendors to use regular domesticconnections), illegal connections,corruption and lack of sewerage(even though customers wereobliged to pay seweragesurcharges)

• The members of MBK offered toengage in initiatives to regularize allconnections, pay their billsregularly, stop paying bribes, reportleakages and expand services tounserved areas

• The utility was asked to provide aregular supply of water at the bulkprice, read meters regularly andaccurately, give the vendors noticeof interruptions in service andfollow a timetable for water

rationing, allow weekly payments,visit Kibera, and provideengineering advice for networkimprovements.

MBK gave a concrete commitment thateach member would pay a flat monthlyrate of Ksh500 over a three monthperiod while all accounts were beingregularized. Regularization includesmaking illegal connections legal,allocating account numbers for allconnections, and setting up a paymentschedule for arrears. MBK and theutility agreed that members wouldcome to the utility offices in groups of15 or 20 to facilitate this regularization.

MBK also designed a sign to be paintedon the tanks of members. This signindicates the member’s NWC accountnumber, and states that he or she has ameter, pays bills regularly, and does notpay bribes. It also gives the phonenumber of MBK to which complaints orsuggestions can be directed. MBK hasstated its intention to expel anymember that does not abide by thesecommitments.

MBK and the utility continue to buildtheir relationship. Most importantly, theshift for vendors is that theirbusinesses have been recognized asvalid enterprises.

What now forwater vendors?

During the meetings with MBKmembers, a number of options wereexplored for strengthening self-regulation, and working with thecommunity and utility to further

Kiosk operators and a Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company official meet to address issues of mutual interest

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improve conditions. Some optionshave already become part of the jointutility/vendor dialogue, including:• Reducing rent-seeking associated

with registration of a kiosk,operation and bill-paying

• Reporting leaks where the kioskoperators have committed toinforming the utility of network faults

• Making billing and collection morereliable and regular.

Some issues that are yet to beaddressed include:• Reducing barriers to market entry

for prospective kiosk operators bystreamlining the registrationprocess, and making it easier forkiosk operators to access theofficial bulk tariff

• Removing the solid waste thatclogs the open drains of Kibera andcontributes to contamination ofwater in the connections

• Developing a mechanism forconsumer feedback regardingkiosk operation in terms of hygienicstorage and handling of the water,pricing and customer service.Ideally, consumers would organizeinto associations which would carryout random water testing and ratethe services offered by kiosks.Users could be involved in theassessment of whether licensesshould be renewed. Waterconsumer associations could alsomake use of the media tocommunicate concerns and urgekiosk operators to improve

• Building capacity of kioskoperators by holding trainingprograms on hygienic waterhandling and small businessmanagement. Kiosk operatorscould also be educated about the

health and environmentalimplications of their business, andbe trained to pass hygienemessages on to their customers.

As of mid-2005, the kiosk operatorswere working with the utility toregularize connections and clear arrears.There were also moves to increase thesecondary network in Kibera to addressthe urgent need for more networkinfrastructure in the area. A combinationof a new institutional framework, anenhanced capacity of the water vendors,timely external intermediation and a

pragmatic attitude on the part of thenew water company - driven by itsmandate to make rapid improvements –has resulted in promising collaborationand concrete action.

There remains some concern that theassociation could potentially be anobstacle to long-term change in Kiberaif the members are determined toprotect their own interests at theexpense of consumers. However, thereis recognition that both the utility andvendors could gain from thiscollaboration.

An example of the utility’s efforts to regularize water supply in informal settlements, foreseen for Kibera

June 2005

WSP MISSION:WSP MISSION:WSP MISSION:WSP MISSION:WSP MISSION:To help the poor gain sustainedaccess to improved water andsanitation services.

WSP FUNDING PWSP FUNDING PWSP FUNDING PWSP FUNDING PWSP FUNDING PARARARARARTNERS:TNERS:TNERS:TNERS:TNERS:The Governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium,Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan,Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, The UnitedNations Development Programme, andThe World Bank.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:This paper has been prepared from an originalfieldwork report by Shagun Mehrotra, with final textby Clarissa Brocklehurst, under the teamleadership of Alain Morel. Detailed feedback andtechnical support was provided by Wendy Ayres,Sabine Bongi, Piers Cross, Wambui Gichuri,Mukami Kariuki, Andreas Knapp, Japheth Mbuvi,Cyrus Njiru, Eustache Ouayoro, Janelle Plummer,Nathalie Semoroz and Shao Wen. The paper wasedited by Melanie Low and produced by ToniSittoni and Sarah de Villiers Leach, with theassistance of Jane Wachuga and Peter Ng’ang’a.

Cover photo: Shagun MehrotraPhoto credits: Shagun Mehrotra and Alain Morel

Water and Sanitation Program -

Africa

World BankHill Park BuildingUpper Hill RoadPO Box 30577NairobiKenya

Phone: +254 20 322-6306Fax: +254 20 322-6386E-mail: wspaf@worldbank.orgWebsite: www.wsp.org

References

Collingnon, Bernard and M. Vezina. 2002. Independent Water and Sanitation Providers inAfrican Cities: Full Report of a Ten Country Study. Water and Sanitation Program,Washington D.C.

Conan, H, and M. Paniagua. 2003. The Role of Small Scale Private Water Providers inServing the Poor, Asian Development Bank.

Gulyani, Sumila, Debrabrata Talukdar and R. Mukami Kariuki. 2005. Water for the Urban Poor:Water Markets, Household Demand and Service Preferences in Kenya. Water Supply andSanitation Sector Board Paper Series Paper No. 5.

Hicks, J. F. 1998. Enhancing the Productivity of Urban Africa, Infrastructure, AfricaRegion, World Bank.

Mehrotra, S., and A. Morel. 2003. Regulating Small-Scale Providers for Water Supply: ACase Study in Kibera, Nairobi, An Interim Report by WSP-Africa, Nairobi.

PPIAF. 2002. A Study of Options for Private Sector Participation for the Water andSanitation Services in Nairobi, Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Nairobi.

The Nation. 2003. “Rogue Water Vendors Are Put On Notice” The Nation – Kenyan DailyNewspaper, February, 21.

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 1997. Kibera Rapid Needs Assessment – UrbanEnvironmental Sanitation Issues, Report by WSP-Africa, Nairobi. .

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 1998. Study of the Water Kiosks of Kibera, InformalPaper, WSP-Africa, Nairobi,

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 1999. The Water Kiosks of Kibera. Fieldnote,UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Nairobi.

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 1999. Water and Environmental Needs of Kibera.Fieldnote, UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Nairobi.

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 2003. Sector Finance and Resource Flows forWater Supply, A Pilot Application for Kenya. WSP-Africa, Nairobi.

Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). 2003a Engaging in Self Regulation. Unpublished report.

Water Utility Partnership (WUP). 2003. Better Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor,Good Practice From Sub-Saharan Africa, WUP, Abidjan.

World Bank. 2001. Summary of the Study Water for the Urban Poor: Insights fromHousehold Surveys in Kenya, The World Bank, Nairobi.

World Bank. 2004. Project Appraisal Document, Nairobi Water and SewerageRestructuring Project, Water and Urban Unit 1, Kenya Country Department, AfricaRegion, Report No: 28825-KE, The World Bank, Nairobi.

Serving the Urban PoorThis series of field notes on Serving the Urban Poor aims to provide lessonsto public sector decision-makers, managers and implementers, and theirprivate partners, to tackle the challenges of service delivery to the urban poor.The series is concerned with the key issues and actions necessary to improvethe scale and rate of progress towards the MDGs in urban areas: making utilityreform work for the poor; enhancing the role of local private providers;promoting incentive driven, predictable enabling environments; andstrengthening consumer voice and mechanisms to improve the accountabilityof service providers.