Khrushchev'sd

DownfallA STATEMENT BY THE UNITED SECRETARIAT

OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL page 2

New Deepening ofSino-Soviet Rift?By Joseph Hansen page 11

PIONEER PUBLISHERS5 East 3rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10003 25"

Khrushchev's Downfall-New Stage in the Crisis

of the Soviet Bureaucracy

Statement by the United Secretariatof the Fourth Intern ational

[The following is the text of adeclaration issued Oct. 19 by theUnited Secretariat of the FourthInternational, the international or­ganization of revolutionary so­cialists founded in 1938 by LeonTrotsky.]

I

The sudden removal of Khrush­chev as head of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union [CPSU]and head of the Soviet govern­ment offers fresh and strikingproof of the deep contradictionbetween the progressive characterof the economic structure of theSoviet Union and the retrogradepolitical institutions set up byStalin.

The launching of the spaceshipVoskhod was the most tangibleevidence of the immense advancesachieved by Soviet science andindustry. Three days later camethe downfall of Khrushchev, offer­ing a completely opposite spectacleof political weakness and confu­sion.

The new Kremlin chiefs at oncehastened to assure the world thatthe sudden change-over did notsignify any alteration at all of amajor character in either domesticor foreign policy. They propose tofollow substantially the samecourse as Khrushchev.

Why then did the bureaucracydump Khrushchev?

If the top bureaucrats disp laylittle concern over Khrushche v'sgeneral line, it is because they,like him and Stalin before the m,are utter empiricists. They becameworrie'd over what they considerto be Khrushchev's excesses andblunders in applying the line.

The truth is that Khrushchevended up in blind alleys in variousfields, increasing tensions andsharpening contradictions. Seekinga way out, the bureaucracy de­cided to make a start by offeringhim up as a scapegoat.

In the field of domestic eco­nomic policy, Khrushchev was as­sociated with the grandiose prom­ises about raising the standard ofliving of the Soviet masses. Fornine years, things did improve forSoviet consumers - Khrushchev'spopularity during this period wasbased on this. But the situationchanged radically when, due tothe stagnation of agricultural pro­duction for five years, he wasobliged to increase the price ofmeat and butter and to importla-ge quantities of grain from thecapitalist countries. The long linesin front of bakeries last winterdealt a mortal blow to his po p­ularity. The good harvest th isyear could not save the situation

Khrushchev's "virgin-lands"pro ject likewise ended in failure.Pravda's sudden allusion to "hare­brained schemes" that disregardthe advice of scientific specialistsrefers to the "vlrgin-lands" projectwhich was undertaken against theadvice of the Academy of Sciences.

The bankruptcy of Khrushchev'sagr icultural policy - which theFourth International has pointedto since 1955 as decisive forK hr ushchev 's leadership of theCPSU - is all the more seriousin view of the fact that the belat­ed turn toward intensive agri­culture ca nnot give immediatelarge-scale results; and the crea­tio n of a major chemical industry,required as a concomitant, de­mandstime.

The plans for establishing achemical industry, which werelaunched with great publicity,have been considerably sloweddown due to a general loweringof the rate of industrial growthin the USSR. It was impossibleat one and the same time to main­tain a rapid improvement in thestandard of living for the masses,to keep up with the imperialistpowers in an armaments race,grant increasing aid to the colonialbourgeoisie. undertake feverishconstruction of homes, and in­crease the volume of investmenton the colossal scale needed tomaintain a constant high rate ofindustrial expansion.

Economic DiHiculties

It must also be emphasized thatthe economic reforms introducedby Khrushchev, which succeededin overcoming the difficultiescreated by the hyper-centralization

t¥~~~~i~J]i~~f:~f:~economic impasse.

Khrushchev was not ready totake the "big leap forward" thatwould have been possible w it h the

introduction of democratic plan­ning and workers' self-manage­ment.

The bureaucracy sacrificedKhrushchev, holding him respon­sible for the agricultural and in­dustrial difficulties, hoping in thisway to gain time for experiment­ing with new solutions. However,possible reforms can prove only oflimited efficacy. What is needed isa radical transformation of thewhole system of management.

BlundersIn the field of foreign policy,

Khrushchev became the scapegoatfora series of blunders that grave­ly lowered Soviet prestige. Theseincluded the miscalculation in­volved in putting rockets in Cuba,the unkept promise of an im­minentsolution of the problem ofWest Berlin: the vote in the UNto send the "blue helmets" to theCongo where the operation endedin the murder of Lumumba. Itwas above all the way in whichhe handled the Chinese questionthat aroused the most resentmentand opposition.

Was it necessary to carry thedispute between the CP SU andthe Chinese Com munist pa rtyonto the government leve l? Toabruptly halt Soviet aid to China?To grant military aid to Nehru ina war involving the People's Re­public of Ch ina? To go back onthe agreement to help China insetting up a nuclear industry?S uch questions undoubtedlyworried a growing number of So­viet leaders. Above all,was it wiseto schedule the pre-co nference of26 Communist parties for Dec . 15.1964. without assurances in ad­vance that a big majority of theseparties would accept the invita ti onand support the Soviet theses?

In truth. the manner in whichKhrushchev handled the Sino­Soviet con fl ict added up to adisastrous balance in the eyes of

~,~e ~,~Vi~ot;;:l~~~i~~acf:;t~~~~t~~~~~

movement was de str oyed , theauthorit y of the Soviet partybrou ghttoa new low everywhere.Its dir ecti ves we re no longer Iol­low ed ev en am ong parties backingthe K remlin aga ins t Peking. Theconflict set up enormous centri­fugal for ces, not only among par­tie s, as sho wn in Italy, but amonggovernments , as shown in Ruma­nia. Sh ould East Germany tomor­row protest against the projectedrapprochement with Bonn andtake the road being followed byRum ania, Kremlin control overmore than half of the buffer coun­tries would be in a state of disin­tegration.

Again, by sacrificing Khrush­chev, the Soviet bureaucracysought to halt the steady deteriora ­tion in its relations with P eking.The main obstacle to resumptionof the dialogue having been elim­inated, Peking can in turn makeits own concessions without losingface .

If the December pre-conferencenow takes place, its meaning maybe completely altered. The un­bridled polemics, the irresponsibleacts that have cha racterized bothsides may cease. If reconciliationis not reached, the conflict is atlea st taken out of the gutter andreturned to the green baize tablesof the dipl omats and "theoretic­ian s."

Khrushchev's years in officewill become kn own as the periodof "de-Sta lin iza tio n ." Under na­tional and international conditionscompl et ely different from th oseth at made it possible for the So­viet bureaucracy to usurp powerin the Soviet Union and for Stalinto con vert this power into a per­sona l au tocra cy wi elded with in­crea sing arbitrariness, the Sovietma sses ar e no longer willing toendure a ruthless police regime,the complete subordination oftheir standard of living to spec­tacular-soundingprojectsthatin.

Khrushchev

volve enormous was te.To avoid an imp edin g explosion

such as occ ur red in East Germanyin 1953 and in P ol and and Hun­gary in 1956, an d to save their spe­cial privileges and thei r grip onpower, the leaders of the Sovietbureaucracy deliberately sa cr ificedthe Stalin cult and lib eralizedtheir regime. In doi ng so, theyalso eliminated some of the mo starbitrary and obnoxious methodsof leadership and adm in ist r ationthat Stalin introduced int o Sovieteconomy, governme nt, science andculture and whic h increas inglyblocked progress.

Khrushchev, ofte n pic tured asthe most typical rep re sentative ofthis "de-Stalinization" was neitherits principal initiator n or its mostresolute protagonist. Ma ny times,in various fields, yo unger andmore dynamic forces so ught topress "de-Staliniz atio n" further.The logic of this wo uld have beenthe rehabilitation of Le on Tr otskyand his generation of Bolsheviks.The advocates of fur ther "de­Stalinization" we re called to order

or even silenced."De-Stalinization" was not

~~i~~h~~:v~~s f~~r~~~:ln~li~:e~iwas a course of half measures, ofdoled-out concessions, approved

~~r:~~c::~~~~c:;~~~~trf~~~hi~a higher degree of personal se­curity as well as a popular re­sp on se from the masses. The ob-

{~~~i~~u::ect~~ ~~~~in~:t~~;:~ate after Khrushchev's downfall.

Rising Self-ConfidenceThe years of progressive im­

provement in their standard ofliving lessened the fear that para-

!J~:dS:~~:ts:~~~~tt~~~;i~;l:_~~~:fidence on the rise because of theconce ssions they won, will nevertolerate a return to the regime ofmisery and terror. Any attempt toreturn to the methods of Stalinwould be met with a violent pop­ularreaction.

It is highly significant that thenew leaders hastened to declare,in the first issue of Pravda afterKhrushchev's downfall, that theline of the Twentieth and Twenty­second Congresses of the CPSUwill be continued. In this way theypr omised the masses that whateverel se may occur and whatever theappearances in secondary fields,the essential gain s of "de-Stalin­izati on" will be maintained. Therewill be no going back to an all­powerful police , to ferocious rep­ressive laws in the plants, to thelow standard of living of Stalin'stime. The effort to raise the stand­ardof living of the masses will bekept up . These concessions to themasses will in the long run onlyreinforce their self-confidence andfurther undermine the rule of thebureaucracy.

Just as objective conditionspermit no fundamental retrogres­"ion in "de-Stalinization," so theypermit no fundamental alterationin the field of foreign policy. The

Soviet bureaucracy has neverheaded toward world war - theopposite contention is simply oneof the lying themes of imperialistpropaganda. On the other hand ithas never deliberately fostered so­cialist revolution, the only road toa world of enduring peace. Bothcourses, in quite different ways,involve destruction of bureaucraticrule.

What the men who oustedKhrushchev will do is follow hispolicy of so-caIled "peaceful co­existence." This policy did notoriginate with Khrushchev: par­entage belongs to Stalin. Khrush­chev's policy of "economic com­petition with the United States"was only the application undernew conditions of Stalin's oldthesis about "building socialismin one country."

The new leaders of the bureau­cracy may use stronger languagethan has been Khrushchev's habitfor the past two years, if only tofacilitate resumption of conversa­tions with the Chinese and tocamouflage their own uncertaintyand lack of assurance until theirpositions have been consolidated.It is possible that they will modi­fy some of the more scandalousways in which Khrushchev haslately coIla borated with Americanimperalism, his course, for in­stance of joining with the Pen­tagon in arming the Indian bour­geoisie (against the Indian massesas weIl as the People's Republicof China) and giving Americanimperialism a free hand in theGulf of Tonkin and in the Congo.

Without doubt any spectacularsoftening of relations betweenMoscow and Bonn has now beenruled out, a perspective that hadcaused uneasiness in East Ger­many. Poland and Czechoslovakia,particularly since the West Ger­man bourgeoisie refuses to recog­nize the new borders of Germanyand continues to seek nuclear armswithin the framework of a NATO

multilateral nuclear force.As un der Khrushchev and Sta l­

in. the Soviet bureaucracy willcontinue to seek an overall ar­rangement with Washington basedessentially on joint defense of thestatus quo. It will continue to op­pose the dissemination of nuc leararms, faithfully doing its best tokeep them from other workers'stales, no matter what Washin gtondoes in givi ng countries like Can­ada stockpiles of nu clear wea pons.It will propose slow ing dow n thearms r ace and advocate d isarma­ment.

Continued Sell-OutsIt w ill cont inue to seek eco­

nomic collaboration w ith the col­onia l bou rgeoisie as an alt ernativeto fostering soc ia list re vo lut ions inthe colonia l a rea which could rad­ica lly a lte r the re la tio nshi p offorces to the d isadv an tag e ofbureaucrati c rul e in th e USSRhowever ad van tage ou s it mightturn out for th e w orke rs ' sta tes asa who le. It w ill con ti nue to dowhat it can to conf ine w orking­class struggles in the im peri ali stcountries within the limits of cap­ita list rul es and reg ula tio ns, post ­poning any bids for pow er thereuntil after per-capita productio nin the USA has fallen beh ind th atof the USSR.

Under these condi t ions , an y sud­den liqui dat ion of the Si no -So vietconflict through both states andboth parties comi ng to comp let eagreement on a common line is asimprobable as a reversa l of "de ­Stalinization" and the po licy of"pcaceful co-existence." The Sino­Soviet dispute is not the productof any "blunders" by K hrushchev .Itcxpresseslhedcepdifferencesin interests of two bureaucra ciesdifferently situated w ith reg ard10 imperialism, the internationa lrevolution and the masses of thei rown countries.

The success of the fir st Chinesenuclear test has profoundly af-

fected the int ernation al sit ua tionof the People 's Republic of China.It co uld accele rat e it s admission to

:l!~a:;;;A~~:~y~~~r~~~~~~cou ntr ies follow ing the recognitiongra nted by F rance. But Johnsonwill not wit hd raw the SeventhF leet from the Far Ea st, give upTa iwa n [Fo rmos a ) or approve thedisso lu tio n of SEATO. So long as

~~~hai"r~;~ ~:;n~~~~~i~t~re;:u~:perialist ag gress ion and suffers apa rtial eco no mic blockade. Thissit ua tion h as long been suff icien tto comp el Peking to pursue acourse th at is quite different fromMoscow 's.

By con ti nuing to follow them ain lin es of policy advanced bySt alin and dev eloped by Khrush­chev, th e new Kr emlin chiefs willfind the mse lv es caught in thesame profound difficulties that ledto poli tical di saster for their pre­decessor .

The Soviet burea ucracy dumpedK hrush ch ev in hope of finding ate m po rary solution to the contra­di cti on s it fa ces. It will perhapshave gai ned t ime, pro vided thatthe ne w team is accepted by thegreat maj orit y of the apparatusand th e politi cal cr isis does notun der go a new sen sational turn.Bu t the bureauc racy is incapableof overcoming the contradi cti onsresul t ing fro m th e very nature ofi ts ru le. F ar fro m being able toattenua te th e contradictions anddi ffi cu lti es, K hru shchev's succes­sorsare mo re likely to exacerbatethem.

To pr event things from becom­inghighl y explosive in theeco­nomic field, the pl an for agricul­tura l investments m us t be pu tthrough in doubleq u ick order . Bu tKosygin the technoc ra t , who iskn own to have got into a disputewith Khr ushchev ove r the alloca-

~~;d~~e~~~~~~~:;~, e~r~e:t~i~~;not display greater readiness thanKhrushchev to sacrifice heavy in­dustry. The very fact that Kosy­gin was chosen to share top rankwith Brezhnev is evidence of theweight of his sector in the bureau­craticcaste.

On the other hand, a generalslowing down of the rate of in­dustrial growth would certainlynot augur well for the chemical­industry plans and fora quanta­tive improvement in agriculture.In order to get out of the impassesomething has to give - eitherthe aspirations of the masses, thepredilections of the technocraticsector of the bureaucracy, the de­mands of the managers of plantsand trusts, the appetities of theKolkhozian peasants, or the inter­ests of several layers at once.

Things are not much better inthe field of international politics.TIle new masters in the Kremlinare anxious to demonstrate theirattachment to the cause of "peace­ful co-existence" by some specta­cular gesture. But how is it pos­sible to win improved relationswith Peking and at the same timereassure Washington when thetwo aims require moves of adiametrically opposite nature?

InternatianalTensions;The same holds true in the in­

ternational Communist movement.Of course, some improvement inrelations with Peking could slowdown the Chinese in their drive toset up a new international pro­Chinese Communist movement incompetition with Moscow's "of­ficial" movement. But how is itpossible to avoid seeing that thesudden downfall of Khrushchevhas increased the uneasiness, theworry and the confusion affectingall the Communist parties?

How is it possible to avoid see­ingthatthisousterandthecondi­tions under which it took place,

will inevitably strengthen the al­ready skeptical attitude of foreignCommunist militants toward So­viet documents and theses, theirtendency to stop lining up mech­anically with every turn taken bythe Kremlin? Precisely those whoran into the biggest difficulties inexplaining "de-Stalinization" andestablishing the prestige of theunknown Khrushchev may feelthe worst foreboding at the pro­spect of putting a new god on thepedestal, after the transition of"collective leadership" once againends in the selection of a new"first secretary" to wear the man­tle of power.

PolycentrismContrary to the intentions of the

top bureaucrats, and even the im­mediate consequences which canprove to be deceptively encourag­ing to them, the elimination ofKhrushchev, instead of arrestingthe slow disintegration of theKremlin's sway over the interna­tional Communist movement, canend up by accelerating it. Thebureaucracy reproached Khrush­chev with having promoted thetendency toward "polycentrism"by his acts. The act of suddenlydiscarding him can only encouragethe growth of this same "poly­centrism" in the internationalCommunist movement.

Without a single leader of highcaliber, with only bureaucratsscreened and doubly screened byStalin in the days of the purgesand the liquidation of every singlefigure who displayed the slightestcapacity for independent thought.the bureaucracy will prove lesscapable than ever of re-establish­ing its prestige after this newblow to monolithism. The Sovietbureaucrats will have to accustomthemselves to seeing their movesdiscussed more and more. theirswitches subjected to increasing­ly hard criticism in the interna­tional Communist movement.

Those parties that have dis-

played tendencies to follow anindependent course, whether to theright as in Italy or to the left asin Venezuela, will now be all themore inclined to give free rein tothis inclinaiton. And those partiesthat managed up to now to presentthemselves as models in submis­siveness, as in France, may sud­denly display a quite new look."Polycentrism" will tend increas­ingly to reveal that it has a logicof its own.

The same logic applies to theworkers' states. For them, too, thedownfall of Khrushchev is both anoutcome of a crisis profoundlyaffecting the whole system ofworkers' states and a new ele­ment tending to deepen that crisis.All of them are well aware of thecoincidence, if not causal rela­tion, between the explosion of the­first Chinese atom bomb and thedownfall of Khrushchev. Theabrupt removal of the head of theSoviet Union contributes to a rad­ical modification in the relation­ship between the USSR and theother workers' states.

Situat ion Chang ingThese states nave changed con­

siderably since the days of ab­solute subordination under Stal­in. First they saw the Yugoslavrevolt, then the appearance ofChina as an independent power.The feeling of revolt grew high,flaring in the uprisings in EastGermany, Poland and Hungary.The Kremlin regained its grip atthe cost of some loosening of con­trol. Years followed of steady ero­sion of the authority of the Sovietbureaucracy under pressure of themasses as well as the indirect con­sequences of "de-Stalinrzation."The collapse of Khrushchev dealtthis authority another very hardblow. The result will be fresh im­petus to "polycentrism" on thislevel,too.

And what will be the ultimateconsequences in Soviet society ofKhrushchev's downfall? The

masses are ripe for a radicalchange in the political regime.After the shock of surprise at theabrupt disappearance of Khrush­chev from the political scene, themasses will feel inclined for manyreasons to demand of the newKremlin chiefs that they carry outthe promises repeatedly made byKhrushchev.

The list of these promises is along one, ranging from erecting astatue to commemorate the vic­tims of Stalin's terror to assuringa standard of living within a fewyears equal to that of the work­ers in the United States. New de­mands, suggested by the nature ofthe change-over itself, will beadded.

The downfall of Khrushchevwill give new and powerful im­pulsion to critical thought amongthe masses of the Soviet Unionand therefore new and powerfulimpulsion to further dislocationsin the bureaucratic regime.

After the liquidation of the cultof Stalin, after the sudden re­moval of Khrushchev, the Com­munists in the Soviet Union, in theworkers' states and throughoutthe world can better appreciatethe historic scale of the crisisshaking the rule of the bureau­cracy in the Soviet Union. Theycan better understand that farfrom constituting a threat to thestability of the Soviet state andthe "socialist camp," the establish­ment of the norms of proletariandemocracy is a primary conditionfor achieving stability. Trotsky'sanalysis is being proved to thehilt.

The main lesson to be drawnfrom the downfall of Khrushchevis the need fora thoroughgoingchange in the political structure ofthe Soviet Union.

Khrushchev was ousted by adecision of strange nature. Neither

the Soviet Communists in theirvast majority nor the membersof the international Communistmovement know who made it, whocarried it out, the reasons for it,the arguments advanced. They donot know the views of the victimnor his defense against the secretaccusations. Clearly genuine so­cialist democracy, proletarian de­mocracy, does not exist in theSoviet Union.

Official Propaganda

The official propaganda assuresus that a communist society isbeing constructed; that is, a so­ciety in which the state and allforms of constraint associated withthe state have disappeared. Theofficial propaganda assures usthat "the entire people" holdspower (the new program adoptedby the CPSU at the Twenty-sec­ond Congress solemnly baptizedthe Soviet state as the "state ofthe entire people" and the Com­munist Party as the "party of theentire people").

The people, supposedly inpower, saw the governmentabruptly changed without evenknowing what members of theCentral Committee were presentat the Oct . 14 meeting that madethe decision, how they voted, orwhat the motions were they votedon . It does not know in whatrespect the program of the newgovernment differs from that ofthe old. The state belongs to the"entire people" but the "entirepeople" remain in ignorance of thestate's business.

Government power in the So­viet Union is exercised by a forcemuch broader than a single man,even one as dictatorial as Stalin.But clearly it is not the "entirepeople" nor the proletariat. Whatis this force?

Is it the "Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union" wielding powerin the name of the people? Themillions of party members heard

the news for the first time overthe radio Oct. 15 or read it inPravda the next day. What aboutthe "Central Committee" of theCPSU? This body displayed itsreal social base when it assembledhundreds of top bureaucrats fromallover the country in 1957 togive Khrushchev his mandate.Whether the meeting that deposedKhrushchev was of this characteror much smaller, it ,too, represent­ed only the bureaucratic castewhich has monopolized politicalpower in the Soviet Union formore than 35 years.

In his "testament"-which un­questionably played a role in thedownfall of Khrushchev - Pal­miro Togliatti declared that theSoviet Union has no t yet returnedto Leninist norms and has not yetestablished freedom of opinion anddiscussion in political questions.This is correct, if but a pale re­flection of the truth. The way inwhich Khrushchev was replacedshows how distant the SovietUnion is from the norms estab­lished in Lenin's time when theUSSR was much poorer, weakerand under far greater imperialistpressure than today.

The norms of Soviet democracycall for workers' and peasants'councils (soviets), within whichall groupings and persons whorespect the country's constitutionare guaranteed freedom of expres­sion. Under these norms, a con­gress of all the councils (congressof soviets) designates the head ofthe government on the basis of astated program and after full pub­lie discussion.

In the Communist Party, Lenin'sconcept of democratic centralismmeant full discussion among theranks before decisions were takenby leading bodies, it meant free­dom to form tendencies on thebasis of publicly declared plat­forms and with fulJ right to de­bate the issues before the mem­bership, delegates to decision-

making bodies being elected onthe basis of such documents andafter a democratic discussionthroughout the party. Under theconditions of today a system ofmultiple working-class parties tostrengthen the process of prole­tarian democracy would be quitefeasible.

The re-establishment of prole­tarian democracy in the SovietUnion would greatly strengthenthe unity of the proletariat andthe peasantry. It would make pos­sible the establishment of popularconfidence in the governmentsuch as has not existed since thedays of Lenin. One of its enorm­ous advantages would be the es­tablishment of an orderly institu­tional mechanism for the normalchanges in leadership.

Abroad, especially in the im­perialistcountries, the attractive­ness of the Soviet Union to thelaboring masses would be great­ly enhanced. The advantages ofSoviet democracy for the workersboth individually and as a wholewould be proved in life.

It is for the establishment ofnorms of proletarian democracyalong such lines - even broaderand more effective than in Lenin'stime - that the Fourth Interna­tional has long battled.

Wor~ers Democracy

The bourgeois journalists andpoliticians contrast "Westerndemocracy" with the practicesthat became established underStalin. Capitalist democracy, how­ever, never extended into produc­tive relations, and in the politicalsphere it has suffered vast erosion,giving way at times to fascism.The norms of proletarian democ­racy extend right into the fac­tories and farms and throughoutthe whole structure of society.Proletarian democracy is qualita­tively superior to the best everdeveloped under the bourgeoisie.

~ 10

The introduction of socialistdemocracy in the Soviet Union re­quires a political revolution tobreak the monopoly of power nowheld by the bureaucrats and toreturn it to the mass of workersin the cities and countryside. Thedownfall of Khrushchev and themanner in which it was broughtabout show both how necessarythis revolution remains and howits approach is being hastened.

Monolith CrocksWhen the Stalin cult was dealt

its death blow in the Soviet Unionat the Twentieth Congress in 1956,the international Communistmovement was shaken to the bot­tom. In the United States, for in­stance, it finished the CommunistParty as an effective organiza­tion. Elsewhere it gave rise to bigdiscussions, to changes in leader­ship and to splits.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has hadsimilar impact, the repercussionsgoing far beyond the ranks of themembership. The success of theCuban Revolution, which broughtto the fore a new revolutionaryleadership originating outside theCommunist movement, addedfurther to the ferment.

Khrushchev's downfall nowbrings a new dynamic ingredientin this gigantic process which atbottom involves the break-up offossilized structures and the con­struction of a new revolutionary­socialist leadership on a worldscale.

Communist militants thereforehave a deep interest in drawingall the lessons from tltis latestevent. They should press for fulland free discussion of every sin­gle issue involved in the ouster ofKhrushchev. One of the first re­quisites is to hear Khrushchev'sown defense of his course. Thestenographic record of the sessionsthat ended with Khrushchev in aminority should be made availableat once and Khrushchev should be

granted space in the Soviet pressand an opportunity to appear ontelevision and the radio to ex­plain his side. All working-classtendencies, including the Trotsky­ists, should be granted the rightto participate in the discussion.

In their own parties, Communistmilitants everywhere should drawone very big obvious lesson; thatis, the danger of relying on Mos­cow for leadership. The disastrousnature of Stalin's guidance wasrevealed for the blind to see atthe Twentieth Congress. Nowfresh revelations are on the agendaconcerning the consequences ofMoscow's leadership since Stalin'sdeath.

The Communist parties mustlearn to work out their own rev­olutionary Marxist policies inde­pendently in the light of the needs

of the revolutionary process intheir own countries. The end re­sult of this will be to enormouslystrengthen the camp of the work­ers' states by hastening the end ofcapitalism.

The downfall of Khrushchevunderscores once again the factthat the major problem facing theinternational working class is thecrisis in leadership. This crisis canbe resolved only through the con­struction of a new leadership ge­nuinely capable of carrying outthe program of revolutionary so­cialism on an international scale-in the imperialist countries, thecolonial world and the sectors thathave already won their revolu­tions and achieved the status ofworkers states. This is what theFourth International has foughtfor since its inception.

New Deepening ofthe Sino-Soviet Rift?

BJ' Joseph Hansen

[On Dec. 12 Prarda announcedthat a commission would meet inMoscow on March 1 to plan aworld conference of Communistparties. It was Khrushchev's planto hold such a preparatory meet­ing rm Dec. 15, which the editorialin the Chinese Communist Party'sofficial organ Red Flag. discussedbelow, branded as one of the de­posed Soviet leader's crimes.]

On Nov. 20 Peking radio toldthe world to stand by for an im­portant statement. This proved to

be an editorial in Red Flag, theofficial journal of the CentralCommittee of the Chinese Corn­munist Party. The editorial. en­titled "Why Khrushchev Fell," wasa harsh attack against the formerSoviet premier.

The tone of the attack and thearguments advanced have been metwith glee in Western circles. par­ticularly Washington. It has gcn­erallv been interpreted as a warn­ing to Khrushchev's heirs thatthev must accept unconditionalsurre-nder. The Nov. 21 Nell' YorkTimes. for instance, vo iccd the

editori al opi n ion th at th e K remlincan hardly avo id an swerin g th eattack and ye t will find it hi ghl yemb arrassin g to do so. Th e Ti mestheref ore con clud ed , "Th is is noth­ing less tha n th e beginning ofChin ese political wa rfare ag ains tthe n ew Soviet leadership. In largeme asure what Peking n ow assa ilsas th e Khrushch ev line is pr ecisel ywh at has bee n un veiled th is mo nthas the Br ezhn ev-K osygin lin e."

Th e gloa t ing in imp erialist cir ­cles ari se s fr om the conclusionthat Chou En-lai's trip to Moscowend ed in failure , that the attemptto patch up the Sino-Soviet dif­fer ence s proved futile , and thatthe rift will now become deeper.The sigh of relief in these quartersis quite audible, for they hadearlier taken an opposite view.With Khrushchev gone, it ap­peared to them, the People's Re­public of China and the SovietUnion might well find a way tocompose their differences , at leaston the sta te level, and succeedin presenting a common frontagainst the Western powers.

WarningIt is true that the editorial is

aimed at the Brezhnev-Kosyginteam although the stick is os­tensibly wielded on a dead horse.The editorial even obliquely at­tacks those who hope for the continuation of "Khrushchevism with­out Khrushchev" ; and this givessubstance to the elation of theWestern experts. Neverthelesstheir conclusions app ear rathersimplistic, if not hasty, and areevidently affected by wishfulthinking. Peking knows its Mos­cow and the editorial may havedouble a ims. It does serve warningon Brezhnev-Kosygin; but it ispremature to conclude that Maohas already written off Khrush­chev's heirs and has decided totry to sweep them into the samewa st e-ba sk et in which th eir patronended up.

Twelve main ch arges a re le v-

e lle d agains t Khrushchev. The sear e as fo llo ws :

1) Un der pr etext of combattingth e cult of th e personality Khrush­ch ev att ack ed Stalin, using thefoul est language. By doing this, heopposed Marxism-Leninism.

2) H e sou ght general co-opera.ti on with American imperialism.He sen t rockets to Cuba and thendocilely withdrew them on the or­ders of the American pirates. Hetri ed to sell Cuba's sovereignty byagreeing to the United Nations in­spection of the island.

3) He bowed to American nu­clear blackmail and sought to pre­vent China from building its ownnuclear force. He injured the de­fense of the Soviet Union andsigned a partial test-ban treaty.

4) He sought in all ways to ob­struct revolutionary movements inthe ca pitalist countries, advisingth em to ta ke th e leg al parliamen­tar y road to soc ia lism.

5) He sought to opp ose the na­tional lib eration movement andsabotaged it. When the U.S. cookedup the Tonkin Gulf incident,Khrushchev tried to cover it upunder the banner of peaceful co­exi stence.

6)He suppo r te d Tito, attemptingto reverse the 1960 condem n at ionof the "clique of the renegadeTito."

7) He did everything he couldto inure and undermine Albania.

8) He spread innumerable ru­mor s and slanders about the Chi­ne se Communist Party and MaoTse-tung.

9) He took as hi s models theCommon Market and the capitalistbloc , reducing the industries of the"brother Communist countries" to"mere subsidiaries."

10) He used the congresses ofhi s and other parties to launchsweeping att acks against partiesthat remained faithful to Marxism­Leninism.

11) He played the role of apatriarch,decidingtoconvokean

illegal meeting of the internationalCommunist parties to split themovement.

12) He followed a series of rev i­sionist policies leading towardcapitalism; his blind direction ofSoviet agriculture and industry

~~~~~~~ga~~ao~a~~n~hegr~:~io~~~ficulties for the Soviet people.

Not Pro-MaoistsThere is no doubt that the West­

ern experts are correct in conclud­ing that the publication of thesecharges runs directly counter tothe explanations offered by Brezh­nev-Kosygin for the ouster ofKhrushchev. They are also correctin concluding that Mao regardsBrezhnev-Kosygin as Khrushchev­ists and not Maoists. One point atleast would thus seem to be set­tied-the superficial speculationthat Khrushchev was ousted by apro-Peking grouping has provedto be dead wrong.

Noteworthy in this respect isthe fact that the editorial lists"de-Stalinization" as No. I in thecrimes of Khrushchev. In thepeculiar language of the Sino­Soviet conflict, "de-Stalinization"and "Khrushchevism" are synon­ymous, and praise of Stalin ­from Peking's viewpoint - is onlynext to praise of Mao himself.

Careful examination of thecharges in the editorial indicatesthat the authors have other peoplein mind besides Brezhnev-Kosy­gin. The editorial is designed toreassure those who have ralliedto Peking's banners. The firmnessof tone tells them that Chou En­lai's negotiations do not mean a"sell-out" is contemplated, what­ever agreement or partial agree­ment Peking mav cvemuauygain. The inclusion of tl1e pointabout Albania is significant in thisrespect. The references to Cubaand to the "brother Communistcountries" are to be taken in thesame light. All those inclined toback Peking, or to assert inde-

Mao Tse-tung

pendent dews. are assured thatPeking wiII not make any deal attheir expense. This hearteningnews, of course, helps maintainthe pressure, a prime requisite ifhard bargaining is contemplated.

If this is what is aimed at,thenthe warning itself seems more pro­portion ate. Instead of the "begin­ning of Chinese political warfareagainst the new Soviet leadership."it can be read as a firm notice toKhrushchev's heirs that unlikeKhrushchev they must recognizethe growing weight and standingof the People's Republic of China.If Brezhnev and Kosygin imaginedthat Peking can be fobbed offwith little more than a scapegoat.even one as plump as Khrushchev,they can disabuse themselves. Maois not unmindful of the Kremlinawarding him a prize. such asKhrushchev's scalp. but he alsowantssomethingmoresubstantilll.

Pelting requires, and feels en­titled to, big economic aid fromthe USSR and on much morefavorable terms than were grant­ed in the past. Otherwise--

\.

What the Chinese leaders have.done is to present Brezhnev-Kosy­gin with the same dilemma facedby Khrushchev. They have addeda request for an early rep ly .Khrushchev's hei rs have thusfou nd the breathing space theysought through the ouster of theirpatron and collaborator r a thershort, at least insofar as the Sino­Soviet co nflict is co ncerned. Maohas nothing to gai n by waiting.He is forcing the new team in theKremlin to face up immediately tothe d ilem ma which they won bytaking ove r.

Kremlin's DilemmaT he problem is how to appease

both P ek in g and Wash in gt on w iththe rel ati vel y limited resources atthe d isposal of th e Sovi et bu reau­cracy. To provide China with aidon the scale demanded (a nd re­quired) wo u ld - in the abse nceof cutting down the ove rhead costof b ur ea ucr at ic pa rasitism -meanimmen se sac rifices by the Sovi etpeop le, sacrifices on the sca le ofthe S talin era. This is what Maoappears to be insisti ng on withhi s emphasis on the "g lo ries" ofStalin's ti me and the "co nt ri bu ­tio ns" of the late pa ra noiac dic­tator.

But if Br ezh ne v- K osy gin d ecid ethey ca nnot meet Mao's p rice, thenthey a re th reatened with continua­ti on of th e attack in the areaw he re they, like Khrushchev, a remost vulnerable-ideology, wherethey have clearly r e vi sed Ma r x ­ism . To outflank P ek in g in thisfield requires carrying "de-Stalini­zation" to its fina l conclusion, therevival of genu ine Le ni n ism. T h iswould sig nify the rehabilitation ofTrotsky, the establishment ofproletarian democracy and the re­sumption of the world-wide rev­olutionary program that guidedSoviet foreign policy in the timeof Lenin . The bureaucratic castecannot do this without destroyingitself. something few of its mem obers arc willing to contemplate.

Moreover, it would mea n aworsening of relations with im­perialist America. But immensepressure from this quarter bea rsdown on the Soviet Un ion. Du eto their social base and social ties,the characteristic response of theSoviet bureaucrats to imperialistpressure-and they were trai nedin this personally by Stalin - isnot to m ou n t a coun te r -offe ns iveb ut to bend and to co ncede, ifbending and conceding is at allpossible.

Thus the P eking ed ito ria l, eve nif it is not a signal of re ne wedpolitical wa r but simply a signaltha t B rezh nev -Kosy gin ar e in for

hardbargaining.cancausepertur_bation in the Kremlin. If it is fol­lowed up before they have sue­ceded in consolidating the ir vic­tory over Khrushchev, a new cr is isin the top circles of the Sov ietbureaucracy and further co nv ul ­sions in the international Com­munist movement can be expected.

Where While House Comes InHowever, there is still an oth er

element that should not be lost.igh t of. American im per iali sm isvery much involved in th is sit ua­tion. Not so strangely, ex pressio nsof regret over the dow n fa ll ofKhrushchev were to be fo u nd inthe American press. Was the shoe ­wielding premier the wo rs t fig­ure,afterall,to haveas ru ler ofthe USSR; that is , fro m WallStreet's viewpoint? If he w as notthe worst, could it be sa id thateverything possible was d one togive him a hand in h is diffi cul ­ties?

Wha t we a re r e ferring to hereis a commonplace in in ternationalpolitics. K h r ushchev sho w ed hisawa reness of it by di scr eetly in ­d icating th at as between Johnsonand Goldwater he p re fer red thefor me r in the Wh it e Hou se . WithSt alin , thi s was sta nda r d proce­d u re, co nsti tuti ng in hi s politics asubstitute for r e volutionary pro­gra m. Ame r ica's rul er s have not

displayed comparable dexterity ontheir side since the days of Roose­velt, who even went so far as to

~:~O~h~:S~~~ Si:;~e_~p t~~i;l~:(He inspired the notorious Holly­wood film Mission to Moscow.)

Johnson's Policy

Now that Johnson has been set­tled in the White House with thebiggest majority vote in moderntimes, he faces the problem ofwhether to continue in the brink­manship style of Truman andDulles or whether, in the traditionof Roosevelt, to attempt a policyof greater sophistication.

By embarrassing Khrushchev'sfollowers, the editorial in RedFl.aggives the State Department andthe White House a vigorous shake.What shall the policy of the "GreatSociety" be in relation to Moscowand Peking? Mere gloating overthe discomfiture of Brezhnev andKosygin? Or shall active measuresbe undertaken to shore them up asa "lesser evil?"

To operate really effectively inthis situation, however, a seem­ingly very contradictory move isrequired; namely, U.S. rccogni­tion of the People's Republic ofChina. Only through contact withboth sides can Washington hopeto mount a policy of playing themagainst each other; i.e., favoringnow one, now the other, with theaim of weakening both in the pro­cess. In the immediate situation,Johnson could relieve the pressureon Brezhnev-Kosygin by himselfgranting concessions to Peking anddangling the bait of bigger pos­sibilities.

But is Johnson fundamentallystrong enough to get away withan abrupt change of this type inU.S. foreign policy despite its be­ing demanded for some time bysignificantsectorsofleadingbour­geois circles? Can he follow in thepath blazed by de Gaulle? And inthe long run will such a policy

actually succeed?True, from the viewpoint of

American imperialism, certainaspects of Mao's propaganda areintriguing. Particularly noticeableare his expressions of admirationfor Stalin, his praise of Stalin'spolicy of building "socialism in onecountry," his repeated assurancesof the correctness of Stalin's waron Trotskyism, the program andmovement pre-eminently identi­fied with active development ofworld revolution. Imperialism canappreciate a genuine Stalinist.American, British, French andGerman imperialism all found itpossible to do profitable businesswith the original himself. Andwhat other language can Mao re­sort to in talking across the wallsof "fortress America" to the polit­ical translators in the State De­partment?

Bargaining Purposes?

But America's knowledgeablefigures in this field must ask them­selves whether it is really Mao'sgame to seek a base in the rev­olutionarystruggles of today forbargaining purposes as Stalin did.If not a "mere agrarian reformer."as he was once pictured to be. isMao after all a mere Stalinist?And if so, can Mao really be de­pended upon to deliver the wayStalin did? Is it possible in theworld of today for Mao, with themost honorable of intentions. toget away with betraying revolu­tions the way Stalin did? Hasn'tthe element of independent lead­ership. as exemplified by theCUbans, become so strong thatrecognition of China would simplystrengthen that tendency, not onlyin the long run but in the im­mediate future?

Khrushchev's heirs consequentlyare not alone in facing a dilemmaover China. Kennedy's heir hasalso been handed a hot potato.What will he do with it?

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