Keynote Presentation to Networking and Security Research Center (NSRC)

Industry Day 2012

Robert A. KehletBasic and Applied SciencesJ9 Research and DevelopmentDefense Threat Reduction Agency

26 April 2012

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTRA History

Counterproliferation

Non-Proliferation

WMD

Threat

Reduction

Today

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics

Secretary of Defense

Director, DTRA

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and

Chemical and Biological Defense

Programs

1947 1997 1998 2005 2007

DTRA BASIC RESEARCH

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DTRA safeguards the United States and its Allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by providing capabilities to reduce,

eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

Nuclear Weapons... difficult to acquire,

devastating in use

Chemical Weapons... cheap and easy to make

... casualties not widespread

Biological Weapons…. not difficult to find/use

… attacks not quickly recognized, … casualties

propagate with time

Radiological Devices... dangerous to assemble with

high contamination impact… low lethality

High-Yield Explosives... easily available materials with many ways to deliver

… point targets WMDTHREATS

Providing Solutions Across the Full Spectrum of Combating WMD

DTRA Mission

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RD-BA Directorate Focus

Foster farsighted, high payoff research focused on the unique challenges to prevent, reduce, eliminate, defeat

and mitigate threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

• Attract next-generation workforce

• Advance the fundamental knowledge and understanding in the sciences

• Promote university research to support WMD threat reduction

• Facilitate transition of research results to higher levels of S&T maturation

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Impact:• Near real-time

support for pre-event predictions, damage assessments and strategies to remediate the effects of WMD attack (e.g. cascading failure, change in demand)

Motivation and Long-Term Objectives• Motivation: A WMD event will have a large geographic impact

simultaneously across multiple networks causing cascading failures and decreased capacity across networks with shifting demand

• Objectives: Expand understanding and identify methods/strategies for the response, resilience, and recovery of interconnected networks to the extreme environments associated with WMD effects DTRA Niche:

• Extreme conditions over a wide area simultaneously affecting multiple networks

• Cascading failures across infra-structure networks

• “Hardening” and mitigation strategies from impacts of WMD use

Current Practice:• Network structure and

dynamics are fairly well understood

• Early research into adaptive recovery of networks whose structure has changed

• Little to no capability to predict, prioritize or manage changed demand for remaining infrastructure capacity

Physical Networks & Network Theory

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One potential WMD Environment

• A high altitude nuclear weapon burst can produce an “electromagnetic shock wave” covering a significant portion of the United States

• Such geographically-large “insults” simultaneously affect networks, their interconnections, and may induce cascading failure

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Physical Networks & Network Theory

Physical Networks& NetworkTheory

Algorithms to Extract State of Network

Network Dynamics withRespect to Multiple Failures

Adaptability to cascadingFailures & Interdependencies

New Theories for Adaptive Recovery

Failure Reporting and Robustness

Rapid Analysis of Dynamics

Recovery Strategies andOptimized Survivability

Modern Technical Network Behaviors

Analysis of technical networksUnder multiple failures

Robust Network Design Strategies to Counter Multiple Failures

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Challenges & Barriers:

• Field is relatively nascent, little research in the DTRA niche exists

• Changing research focus to include cascading and interdependent networks

• Limited DTRA mission niche

Opportunities:

• Research on analyzing the robustness of interdependent networks

• Research on topology categorization for interdependent systems of networks

• Bio-inspired resilient network design

Objectives:• Identify factors for network robustness of interdependent networks

• Discover theory and create algorithms for WMD damage assessment

Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of

Network

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Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network

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Physical Networks & TheoryNetwork Dynamics - Multiple

Failures

Challenges & Barriers:

• Fundamental models for dynamic topologies are needed

• Real networks are interdependent

Opportunities:

• Rapid analysis algorithms could contribute to containment and remediation of major damage

Objectives:• Identify behavior of networks including changes in network topologies over time

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Physical Networks & TheoryNetwork Dynamics - Multiple

Failures

A failed node

A subsequent failed node

A node within the impact radius, but not affected by

the failure

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Physical Networks & TheoryNetwork Dynamics - Multiple

Failures

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Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive

Recovery

Challenges & Barriers:

• Lack of fundamental mathematical representations for network dynamics with changing topologies

• Inability to process massive data sets for data-to-decision close to real time

• Understanding of human cognition for autonomous systems

Opportunities:• Mathematical

methods for burst robustness and rapid analysis of cascading failures

• Strategies for network repairing and resource reallocation via topology, logic structures and multilayer network dynamics

• New theories to speed up data-to-decision process

Objectives:• Develop mathematical based strategies and techniques for identifying stopping cascading failures, repairing damaged networks, and ultimately for adaptive recovery from WMD attacks.

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Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive

Recovery

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Physical Networks and TheoryModern Technical Network Behaviors

Challenges & Barriers:

• Abundance of network data available, but few characteristic events

• Validation of theory

Opportunities:

• Predict and prioritize changed demand and identify optimal strategies for allocation of remaining capacity under varying attack scenarios

Objectives:• Characterize

impact of changed demands on networks due to WMD attack

• Characterize Modern-technical feedback of networks and its impact

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Physical Networks and TheoryModern Technical Network Behaviors

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Basic Research Awards 2007-2011

1

23

9

3

3

14

10

12

8

5

DC

MA

9

University Grants (includes 6 industry)

5

4

4NJ

16

13

2

2

10

8

1

5

MD

6

CTCTRI 1

1

6

11

2

9

6

1

2

10

7

3DOE National Laboratory Awards

2

DOD Laboratory Awards

6

6

2

1

1

2

1

1

3

2

212 RD-BA FY07-11 6.1 Grants as of 11 Aug 2011

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• Mathematical constructs beyond graph representations to capture geometric and dynamical characteristics

• Create revolutionary (continuous) dynamical models which could capture/characterize temporally and spatially changing properties after a WMD event

• Identify functional relationships and dynamical changes among the network layers after a WMD event

Physical Networks and TheoryFuture Directions

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Summary

• DTRA has DoD’s only basic research investment that is 100% focused on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

• DTRA is dedicated to long-term university-centric basic research to CWMD

• Support training of next generation workforce • University engagement is critical to our success

• 250+ research teams at 100+ universities & laboratories conduct quality research for CWMD

• Your participation is WELCOME!!• We invite ideas, peer reviewers, research partnerships &

collaboration

• Information and links to solicitations at:• www.dtrasubmission.net/portal

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Questions??

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