KEYES v OBAMA - 69 - OPPOSITION to MOTION to Dismiss Case ; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 56 filed by Plaintiff Pamela Barnett - Gov.uscourts.cacd.435591.69.0

8/14/2019 KEYES v OBAMA - 69 - OPPOSITION to MOTION to Dismiss Case ; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIE

1/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs Preliminary Response to Defendants 9-4-09 (Document 56) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

DR. ORLY TAITZ, FOR THE PLAINTIFFS

29839 SANTA MARGARITA PARKWAY

RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA CA 92688i

Dr. Orly Taitz, Attorney-at-Law29839 S. Margarita PkwyRancho Santa Margarita CA 92688ph. 949-683-5411

fax 949-766-7036California State Bar No.: 223433E-Mail: [email protected]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANTA ANA (SOUTHERN) DIVISION

Captain Pamela Barnett, et al., Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action:

Barack Hussein Obama, SACV09-00082-DOCMichelle L.R. Obama, Hilary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Robert M. PLAINTIFFS PRELIMINARYGates, Secretary of Defense, RESPONSE TO DOC. #56Joseph R. Biden, Vice-President and DEFENDANTS MOTION TOPresident of the Senate, DISMISS (with reservation of

Defendants. right to Amend Complaint)

PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS 9-04-09MOTION TO DISMISS

(with reservation of rights to Respond further by filing PlaintiffsSecond Amended Complaint on or before Friday October 2, 2009)

Case 8:09-cv-00082-DOC-AN Document 69 Filed 09/21/2009 Page 1 of 35


2/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28




RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA CA 92688ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES (PG 1)

POLITICAL RELATIVITY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL ABOSOLUTES (PG 1, l 10)

QUO WARRANTO (PG 3, L 19)

PLAINTIFFS PRE-LITIGATION INQUIRIES (PG 4, L26)

CLASSES OF PLAINTIFFS: OATH TAKERS AND CANDIDATES (PG 9, L 11)

WHAT IF THE POLITICAL MAJORITY CHOOSES SLAVERY? (PG 13, L 20)

STANDING-POLITICAL QUESTION-REDRESSABILITY: FLAST V COHEN (PG 16,L 17)

CONSTITUTION AS IMMUTABLE FRAME (PG 21, L 12)

CONCLUSION (PG 25, L 14)



3/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28




RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA CA 92688iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

United States v. Carolene Products Co

304 U.S. 144, Footnote 4 page #17

Wisconsin v. Yoder

406 U.S. 205 (1972) page #17

Flast v. Cohen

392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968) pages #19,20,25

United States v. Sprague,282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931) page #23

Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) page #23

D.C. v. Heller

128 S.Ct. 2783, 2788; 171 L.Ed.2d 637, 648 (2008) page #23

D.C. v. Heller, supra,

128 S.Ct. at 2790-1; 171 L.Ed.2d at 650 (2008) page #25

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 [1990] page #25



4/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28




RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA CA 926881

MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFPLAINTIFFSPRELIMINARYRESPONSETODEFENDANTSMOTIONTO

DISMISS,tobesupplementedbyfilingPlaintiffsSecondAmendedComplaintonorbeforeOctober2,2009

Come now the Plaintiffs with this their Preliminary Response to

Defendants September 4, 2009, Document 56 Motion to Dismiss (with

reservationof rights toRespond further by filing Plaintiffs Second Amended

ComplaintonorbeforeFriday,October2,2009).POLITICALRELATIVITYvs.CONSTITUTIONALABSOLUTES:ISTHE POLITICALQUESTIONDOCTRINEVIABLEASAMEANSTOEVADECOMPLIANCEWITHUNVARIABLESTANDARDS?

Fundamentally, this case comes down to a single bifurcated question

question: (1A) does the constitution mean what it says when it lays down

absolute parameters, such as the age and citizenship qualifications to be

President, and (1B) towhom does the investigation and enforcementof this

constitutionalprovision:totheCongress,thePeople,orcanthePresidentgetby

merelyassertinghisqualificationswithoutpresentingevidencewhichwouldbe

competent asSummary Judgment(admissible)evidenceunderRule56ofthe

FederalRulesofCivilProcedure?

ThePlaintiffshavebroughttheircomplaintasamatteroffirstimpression

toask thisCourt todetermine, find,hold, and rule that the investigationand

enforcementofthisrightbelongstothepeople,evenmembersofadiscreteand

insularminority of the people, even if this group lacksmajoritarian political

power. Plaintiffs respond to the DefendantsMotion toDismiss and ask thisCourttorule,pursuanttotheFirstandNinthAmendmentsthattheymaysueto

enforce constitutional absolutes, such as the constitutional requirements for

PresidentoftheUnitedStates.Plaintiffsassertaninalienable,reservedrightto

sueforConstitutionalconformityinthiscaseeventhoughtheyconcedethatthe



5/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





Defendantshaveshownthatprimary,firstlineactionscouldandshouldhave

beentakenbymembersofCongressortheElectoral College,pursuanttothe

TwelfthandTwentiethAmendmentsforinstance. Case8:09-cv-00082-DOC-AN,Document56,Filed09/04/2009,Page2oof32:DefendantsMotionto

Dismissat13,ll.1-14.

Of course, what Congress must do in the case of obvious electoral

deadlocksorrecognizedandadmittedproblemswithqualificationforofficeis

not at all the point raised by Plaintiffs complaint and evidence. Plaintiffs

complaint and evidence allege and confirm that the Presidency in 2008was

takenbyfraud,andnotevenbyfraudinthecountingofvotes,butbyfraudin

the traditional common law sense of a material misrepresentation of an

important fact uponwhichPlaintiffs could be reasonably expected to rely to

theirdetriment,andtothedetrimentofconstitutionalgovernment.The Constitutions textual commitment of this responsibility is aresponsibilitythatCongresshasembraced.BoththeHouseandtheSentate have standing committees with jurisdiction to decide

questionsrelatingtoPresidentialelections.

Idem:DefendantsMotiontoDismissat13,ll15-17.

WhereCongresshasdoneabsolutelynothingtoinvestigateorprosecutea

question, Defendants position appears to be that this very inaction or

acquiescence by Congress creates a presumption of legitimacy. Apparently,

DefendantswouldhavethisCourtbelieve,hold,rule,andacceptthatutterand

completeinaction,stonysilenceevenbytheVicePresidentofanopposingparty

sittingasPresidentoftheSenateduringthecertificationoftheelectoralvoteto

Congresspursuantto3U.S.C.15,isandmustbesufficienttosatisfythepeople

that the President hasmet the Constitutionalqualifications for office. Idem:

MotiontoDismissat13-14.TheDefendantspositioninthisregardissimply



6/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





apreposterouscopout.DefendantsineffectaskthisCourttoconclude,find,

hold, and rule that willful disregard of the letter of the law is proof of

compliance with that law. Plaintiffs submit and contend, by contrast, thatCongress neglect and derogation of its duty to take investigative or

prosecutorialactiondoesnotrenderanyunchallengedactionlegitimate.Surely

inafreesociety,thesovereignpeoplehavemoreandbetterrights.

NorisCongressionalinactionsufficienttonullifyandobliteratetherights

of thepeople to Petition theFederalCourts forRedressof oneormore very

specificconstitutionalviolations,orforthatmattertopetitionacourttodeclare

andadjudgethattheelectoralprocesshasbeenpervertedbyfraud.Therulein

a free society must be the contrary: whenever authority or eligibility are

questioned,Congress, and indefaultofCongressional action, thepeople,may

and should presume the absence of authority and eligibility. The Federal

JudicialCourtsarethefinalrecourseofthepeople,andtheaccessof thepeople

to the Courts to challenge the unconstitutional exercise of authority is

guaranteedbytheFirstandNinthAmendments.

QUOWARRANTO

Oratleast,thisisthe theorybehindthe lawofquowarranto,whichis

andwas(asapracticalmatter)thepointatwhichtheundersignedcounsel,on

behalfofherclients,thePlaintiffs,beganherquestforthepreservationoftruth,

justice,andtheAmericanWay:bywhatcredentials,qualifications,rightortitle

doesanypersonwhoholdsofficeclaimhisrighttothatoffice.Thecommonlawwrit ofquowarranto has been all but completely suppressed at the federal

level in the United States (in that it is limited in exercise to the Attorney

General),anddeprecatedatthestatelevel.



7/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





Plaintiffs contend that quo warranto remains a right under the Ninth

AmendmentasthisclauseoftheBillofRightswasunderstoodandpresumedby

the Founders. It is the promise of the reservation of the right to bring thesovereign prerogativewrit ofquo warranto, which affords the only judicial

(andindeed,onlypoliticallyrealistic)remedyforviolationsof theConstitution

bypublicofficialsandagents.ItwastogivetheCourtstheindependenceto

judge and punish constitutional violations and derogations without fear of

politicalreprisalthattheFoundersgavelifetenuretoArticleIIIjudges.

Plaintiffs accordingly demand that this Court breathe life into quo

warranto and all the other royal prerogative writs preserved in the Ninth

Amendmentwhichmustbecombinedwithageneralreinvigoratingstandingfor

privateprosecutionofpublicrights,subvertedbythedecisionin Frothingham

v.Mellon,262U.S.447(1923),asisdiscussedinS.Winters,TheMetaphorof

Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, Stanford Law Review July,

1988,40Stan.L.Rev.1371(seefurtherdiscussionbelow):

It isalmost derigueur for articlesonstandingtoquoteProfessorFreund's testimony to Congress that the concept of standing is"among themost amorphous in the entire domain ofpublic law."One of the traditional criticisms of standing law is that it isconfusing and seemingly incoherent. Even the staunchest judicialadvocates of the doctrine readily admit as much: "We need notmincewordswhenwesaythattheconceptof'Art.IIIstanding'hasnotbeendefinedwithcompleteconsistency...."

The history of Plaintiffs struggles to raise aneffective challenge to the

Defendants failure to prove the Presidents constitutional qualifications for

officemeritsomebriefattentionhere.

PLAINTIFFSPRELITIGATIONINQUIRIES:quowarranto&FOIA QuoWarranto

On March 3rd undersigned attorney has submitted a quo warranto

complaintonbehalfofsomeoftheplaintiffsasrelatorstotheAttorneyGeneral



8/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





oftheUnitedStates,Mr.EricHolder(LetterandApplicationforWritattachedas

ExhibitG).Mr.Holderdidnotrespond.

OnApril1st

theundersignedattorneyhassubmittedquowarrantorequestonbehalfofsomeoftheplaintiffsasrelatorstotheU.S.attorneyfortheDistrict

ofColumbiaJeffreyATaylor. Mr.Taylorneverresponded,butratherquithis

job within 60 days. No response was ever received from his successor U.S.

Attorney Channing Philips either (Certified Receipts of letter to Mr. Taylor

ExhibitH). When the government (attorney general)does not proceedwith

quowarranto action,theplaintiffscanstepintotheshoesof thegovernment

andinstitutetheirownactionasRelators.Thatwhatwasdoneinthisaction.

Defendants show a certain confusion of mind at several points in their

Motion toDismiss,for example intheirdiscussionofquowarrantoonpages

1618 of their September 4, 2009, Motion to Dismiss when they write that

PlaintiffsexpressapparentdissatisfactionwiththeprecedentsintheDistrictof

Columbia(MotiontoDismissat18,ll13).

What Plaintiffs actually reported on pages1416, 3238 of their First

AmendedComplaint,was the storyofHollister v. Soeteroand how this case

showsthefutilityofmakingdemandsontheAttorneyGenralintheDistrictof

Columbianotasshownbyprecedentbutbytreatmentinvolvedin silencinga

fellow attorney (Hemenway) who earlier this year dared to TRY to raise

questionsconcerningObamaseligibilityintheD.C.circuit,hewassanctioned

merely for trying. Themere fact that several courts have unjustly closed thedoor on this inquiry is not evidence that the inquiry itself is frivolous or

unwarranted.Itismorelikelyevidenceofthepoliticalnatureofsomeofthe

courts,andofaconcertedefforttochillprofessionalenthusiasmforpolitically

dangerousconstitutionalchallenges(SeeC.J.TaneyinLutherv.Bordenbelow).



9/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





The question is not one of precedent, the question is whether politics

dictate the outcome in many or most Obamarelated cases, where avoiding

discovery and factfinding is the primary (and outcomedeterminative) goal.Plaintiffsubmitsthatifdiscoveryiseverallowedinthiscase,itwillberapidly

settledbytheresignationorimpeachmentofthePresident.Ifthestonewallof

secrecyandsuppressioniseverremoved,ifCaliforniasunshineiseverallowed

to shine for oneday on the real evidence, the Presidency of Barack Hussein

Obama will be rapidly brought to a rather embarrassing close, and the

Defendantscounselknowit,justasJudgesLandandLazzaraknowitinGeorgia

and Florida. Secrecy and refusal to divulge information can have only one

possiblepurpose: tohideaninconvenienttruth. EverywherethePlaintiffsor

theircounselhavegone,theyhavebeenmetwithresistance,whichcanonlybe

describedasirrationaliftherewerenothingtohide.

The purpose of pleading and arguing the elements and history of quo

warrantointhiscaseis tobreachthebarriersinthiscaseandcutthroughto

theheart of thematter. This Courthas thepower to do oneof two things:

under choice of law principles this Court MAY (because of the residence or

principleplaceofresidenceorofficesofmostoftheDefendants),underchoice

oflawprinciples,applythequowarrantostatuteoftheDistrictofColumbia,

acknowledgingonvenueprinciplesthatPlaintiffswillneverhaveanyfairtrial

oranythingclosetodueprocessinwhatiseffectivelytheDefendantsbackyard.

Alternatively,thisCourt,pursuanttoitspowersunderthedeclaratoryjudgmentprinciplesof28U.S.C.22012202or42U.S.C.1988(a),utilizetheprinciplesof

constitutionaland common law to fashionanappropriatemodern remedy to

taketheplaceoftheancientwritofquowarranto.Traditionalpetitionsfor

writofquowarrantooranequivalentremedySHOULDbeavailabletoensure



10/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





thesovereigntyofthepeopleovertheirgovernment,andthedemocraticability

ofthepeopletoengageinselfgovernanceandsupervisionovertheirservants:

Thenotionthatstandingisabedrockrequirementofconstitutional

lawhasasurprisinglyshorthistory.Frothinghamv.Mellon,which

rejected a taxpayer suit to enjoin a federal spending program, is

generallythoughtofasthefirstmodernstandingcase.

......

One legitimately may wonder how a constitutional doctrine now

saidtoinhereinarticleIII's"caseorcontroversy"languagecouldbe

solateinmakinganappearance,dosowithsoskimpyapedigree,

and take so long to be recognized even by theprimary academic

expositorsofthelawoffederalcourts.

StevenL.Winter,supra,40Stan.L.Rev.at13751377

It does indeed seem that the doctrine of standinghasserved to act as a

highly arbitrary and somewhatcapricious guardat the Courthousedoor, and

Plaintiffsdemand theirsovereign rightofentry, even if thisrequiresthat the

Court reform or restrict the doctrine of standing to reinvigorate the First

AmendmentintheFederalCourtsbyreinforcingtherighttopetitionforredress

of grievances. As has been shown above, legal criticism of the effect of the

standingdoctrineonjurisprudenceisveryintense.Thesimpletruthisthatthis

doctrineisoverextendedandoverreachingandshouldbereignedin.

Withoutthesovereignrightoftopresumelackofauthority,andtodemand

strictproof thereof,viaquowarranto or itsdeclaratory judgmentequivalent

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1988(a), theremaybe no residual rights or powers of

selfgovernanceleftintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Themajorityof thepeople

bymajorityvotecontrolallthathappenswithintheframeworkofconstitutional

law.

By judicially revisiting its origins in the First Amendment (right to

petition)andNinthAmendment(intendedtoreserveroyalprerogativewritsto



11/35


12/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





however,were notmade formallyunder the rubric of FOIA, but directly and

informallybytheirundersignedcounselintheformatofherdossiers(Exhibits

BF).Anotheroneoftheconcernsraisedbythedefendants,wasthatofvenuebasedon residence inOrange County, and in fact, several plaintiffs reside in

Orange County or elsewhere within the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States District Court for the Southern Division of the Central District of

California,althoughthisisoneofseveralmattersthatwillbestberesolvedby

thefilingofPlaintiffsSecondAmendedComplaint.

CLASSESOFPLAINTIFFS:OATHTAKERSandCANDIDATES

In addition to being citizen members of the body politic, American

Citizens at least within themeaning of the 14th Amendment, electorate, the

people,allthePlaintiffsinthecaseinanyevent,aretaxpayers,andtheypossess

thereservedrightsoftheFirstandNinthAmendments,aswellascertainmore

specific rights, according to the several classes of the Plaintiffs (civilian,

legislative, andmilitary). Four Plaintiffs in this case are also candidates for

Article II elective office who ran against the de facto President and Vice

President in 2008, two of whom (Dr. Alan Keyes and Gail Lightfoot) are

representedbytheundersignedcounsel.

Firsttobenotedis thatthereare currently46Plaintiffs representedby

the undersigned counsel. The largest group of Plaintiffs is composed of

members of the United States Military (all branches), Active, Reserved and

Retiredsubjecttolifetimerecall.Theoathofamilitaryofficerisestablishedby5U.S.C.3331,whichstates:

An individual,except the President, elected orappointed toan

officeofhonororprofit inthe civilserviceoruniformedservices,shalltakethefollowingoath:I,AB,dosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesagainstallenemies,foreignanddomestic;thatIwillbeartruefaith



13/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





andallegiancetothesame;thatItakethisobligationfreely,withoutanymental reservationorpurposeofevasion;and that IwillwellandfaithfullydischargethedutiesoftheofficeonwhichIamabouttoenter.SohelpmeGod.Thissectiondoesnotaffectotheroaths

requiredbylaw.Seealso:http://www.history.army.mil/faq/oaths.htm

Anyofficerwhohastakenthisoathfacesapersonaldecisionandchoice

regardinghisanswertoaquestioninlife,theimportanceofwhichishardto

measure or understand: what does it mean to support and defend the

ConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesagainstallenemies,foreign,anddomestic,and

what general or specific conduct does it require to bear true faith and

allegianceto thesame?Theanswer isthatiftheCourtswillnotdecide,say

whatthelawis,itisdifficulttoknoworimaginewhowill.Cf.,e.g.,Marburyv.

Madison,5U.S.137(1803).

Butgiventhedoctrinesofstanding,redressability,andpoliticalquestion,

who enforces the Constitution and by what presumptions should an officer1

answerorevenevaluatethecriticalquestion:

Whenthewhimsofapoliticalmajorityviolatetheconstitution,howdoes

a soldier reconcile the liquid and transient, almost effervescent, political

realitiesofcommandwithhisorherabsoluteconstitutionaloath,whichbrooks

no exceptions? The oath of a commissioned military officer is a solemn

covenantbetweenthatofficerandallhigherauthorities,bothofthisearthand

outsideit,thathewilldonotmerelythatwhichisordered,butthatwhichhe

believestoberight.Duringtheconductofthiscase,theundersignedattorney

1Or for that matter an enlisted man, who takes a significantly different oath, which

includes, significantly, [inserted after exactly the same language to take this obligationfreely, adds the language] and that I will obey the orders of the President of the UnitedStates and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the regulations andthe Uniform Code of Military Justice.



14/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





hasseenatleasttwofinemilitaryofficerspunishedandthreatenedonaccount

oftheirexerciseofconscience,inaccordancewiththeiroath.

WhenthemilitaryPlaintiffsbecamecommissionedofficersandofficersoftheUnitedStates,theytookanoathtosupport,defend,andbeartruefaithand

allegiancetotheConstitutionandtowellandfaithfullydischargethedutiesof

theircommissions.Plaintiffshereinallegethattheyarebeinginjuredintheir

employmentbybeingrequiredtoserveunder,takedirectionfrom,andreport

toaconstitutionallyineligiblesuperior,Mr.BarackObama.Plaintiffsallegethat

thisrequirementisindirectandunequivocalconflictwiththeiroathandthat

they cannot serveunderMr.Obama,without violating theiroaths. Plaintiffs

alsoallegethat,shouldtheyrefusetoserveunder,takedirectionfrom,orreport

toMr.Obama, theywillbeatsubstantialriskofdisciplinary action, including

removal, for insubordination or other, related grounds. The recent cases of

MajorStefanFrederickCookandCaptainConnieRhodes lendcredenceto the

fearsofswiftandbrutalD.o.Dretaliationformilitaryofficersexerciseoftheir

FirstAmendmentrights(ExhibitI).

Plaintiffsfurtherallegethatbeingrequiredtoserveunder,take

direction from, and report to a constitutionally ineligible superiormaterially

and fundamentally (andadversely) changes the termsand conditionsof their

employmentasMilitaryOfficer.BoththeU.S.SupremeCourtandseverallower

courts have recognized that placing a plaintiff in a position where he either

mustviolatehisorheroathofofficeorrisksubstantial,adverseconsequencesconstitutesadirect,personal,andconcreteinjuryforpurposesofstanding.In

BoardofEducationv.Allen,392U.S.236(1968),alocalschoolboardbrought

anactionchallengingtheconstitutionalityofastatestatutethatrequiredlocal

public schoolauthorities tolend textbooks freeofcharge toprivateparochial



15/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





schools. The Court found there could be no doubt that the school board

membershadapersonalstakeintheoutcomeoflitigationsufficienttoconfer

standing:Appellants have taken an oath to support the United StatesConstitution. Believing [the state statute] to be unconstitutional,theyareinthepositionofhavingtochoosebetweenviolatingtheiroathandtakingasteprefusaltocomplywith[thestatestatute]thatwouldbelikelytobringtheirexpulsionfromoffice....

Allen,392U.S.at241,n.5.

TheU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiareachedasubstantially

similarconclusioninClarkev.UnitedStates,705F.Supp.605(D.D.C.1988). In

Clarke,themembersoftheCityCounciloftheDistrictofColumbiabroughtsuit

tochallengeafederalstatutethatrequiredthemtoadoptanamendmenttothe

DistrictofColumbiaHumanRights Act or facea lossof federal funding. The

Courtfoundthatthemembershadoathstanding,citingtheSupremeCourts

rulinginAllen:

Alternatively,thecourtfindsplaintiffshaveoathofofficestanding,undertheprinciplesrecognizedbytheSupremeCourtin[Allen].InAllen, the Court found that legislatorswho had taken an oath touphold the Constitution had standing to challenge theconstitutionality of a law when they risked a concrete injury byrefusingtoenforcethelaw. Inthatcase,plaintiffsfacedachoiceofviolatingtheiroathsbyenforcingalawwhichtheybelievedtobeunconstitutional orrisk expulsion from their jobs. Plaintiffs herearesimilarlyplaced.BecauseCongresshasconditionedallDistrictfundsontheCouncilsvote,theCouncilmembersmusteithervotein a way which they believe violates their oaths, or face almost

certainlossoftheirsalariesandstaffsaswellaswater,policeandfireprotection.

Clarke,705F.Supp.at608(internalcitationsomitted).

Othercourtshavereachedthisconclusionaswell.SeeRegentsoftheUniv.

ofMinn.v.NACC,560F.2d352,36364(8thCir.),cert.dismissed,434U.S.978



16/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





(1977);Aguayov.Richardson,473F.2d1090,1100(2dCir.1973),cert.denied,

414U.S.1146(1974).

Ifanything,Plaintiffsinjuriesinthiscaseismoreconcreteandcompellingthan the circumstances of the board members inAllen and the city council

members in Clarke because Plaintiffs injuries is far more directly and

inextricablyintertwinedwithhisemployment. BecausePlaintiffsaremilitary

officers, they must serve under, take direction from, and report to de facto

PresidentObama.RequiringPlaintiffstoserveunder,takedirectionfrom,and

report toaconstitutionally ineligiblesuperiorinviolation oftheiroath isnot

merely anemotional response that Plaintiffsmighthave to seeingde facto

President Obamas name on official documents, orders, or photographs in a

militarymess hall. It is a fundamental andmaterial change in the termsand

conditions of Plaintiffs employment. De facto President Obama and the

DepartmentofDefensehaveplacedPlaintiffsinthepositionofeitherviolating

theiroathsordisregardingtheirchainofcommand,eitheractionwhichwould

result in almost certain disciplinary action, including removal, being taken

againstPlaintiffs.

WHATIFTHEPOLITICALMAJORITYCHOSESSLAVERY?

If the State of California were, for example, by its famous system of

Propositionswhereby the people amend the stateconstitution regularly, to

violate the plain letter of the Federal constitution by reinstituting chattel

slavery,inviolationoftheThirteenthAmendment,thereislittledoubtthatthereactionwouldbeswift:theUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticewouldfilesuit

(withhundredsofamicicuriae)tohavethenewly(butdemocratically)enacted

proposition declared unconstitutional. The reason for this is simple: the

constitutionplacesouterboundariesonthatwhichispoliticallypermissible.



17/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





The restrictionson the naturalborn citizenship status of aPresident of

theUnitedStatesconstituteasimilarlyabsoluteboundary.ThisUnitedStates

District Court can and indeed must decide whether the First and NinthAmendments reserve to the people their sovereign right to question (by

Petition) their grievances concerning electoral (political) violations of or

derogationsfromtheabsoluteconstitutionalqualificationsofthePresident.As

Daniel Webster argued to the Supreme Court in the mother of all political

question cases, Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581, 7 HOW 1, 4344

(1849):

1st.Thatthesovereigntyofthepeopleissupreme,andmayactinforminggovernmentwithouttheassentoftheexistinggovernment.2d.Thatthepeoplearethesolejudgesoftheformofgovernmentbestcalculatedtopromotetheirsafetyandhappiness.3d.That,asthesovereignpower,theyhavearighttoadoptsuchformofgovernment.4th.Thattherighttoadoptnecessarilyincludestherighttoabolish,toreform,andtoalteranyexistingformofgovernment,andtosubstituteinitssteadanyotherthattheymayjudgebetteradaptedtothepurposesintended.5th.Thatifsuchrightexistsatall,itexistsintheStatesundertheUnion,notasarightofforce,butarightofsovereignty;andthatthosewhoopposeitspeacefulexercise,andnotthosewhosupportit,areculpable.6th. That the exercise of this right, which is a right original,sovereign, and supreme, and not derived from any other humanauthority,maybe,andmustbe,effectedinsuchwayandmannerasthepeoplemayforthemselvesdetermine.

Inthatcase,ChiefJusticeTaneyalsoheldthatwhateverthepowergrantedbyArticle III, the powerof the Federal Judiciary did not extend to judging state

constitutionalviolationsoftheRepublicanformofGovernmentguaranteeof

ArticleIV,Section4:

Again, the Constitution of the United States enumerates specially



18/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





the cases over which its judiciary is to have cognizance, but

nowhereincludescontroversiesbetweenthepeopleofaStateasto

theformationorchangeoftheirconstitutions.(SeeArticle3,sec.2.)

................

If it be askedwhat redress have the people, if wronged in these

matters, unless by resorting to the judiciary, the answer is, they

havethesameasinallotherpoliticalmatters.Inthose,theygoto

the ballotboxes, tothe legislatureorexecutive, for the redressof

suchgrievancesasarewithinthejurisdictionofeach,and,forsuch

asare not, to conventionsand amendmentsof constitutions.And

when the former fail,and these last are forbidden bystatutes, all

thatisleftinextremecases,wherethesufferingisintolerableand

theprospect is good of relief by action of thepeoplewithout the

formsoflaw,istodoasdidHampdenandWashington,andventureaction without those forms, and abide the consequences. Should

strong majorities favor the change, it generally is completed

withoutmuchviolence.Inmoststates,whererepresentationisnot

unequal,ortherightofsuffrageisnotgreatlyrestricted,thepopular

will can be felt and triumph through the popular vote and the

delegatesofthepeople inthe legislature, andwill thus leadsoon,

andpeacefully,tolegislativemeasuresendinginreform,pursuant

tolegislativecountenanceandwithoutthenecessityofanystronger

collateral course. But when the representation is of a characterwhichdefeatsthis,theactionofthepeople,eventhen,ifbylarge

majorities, will seldom be prosecuted with harsh pains and

penalties,orresistedwitharms.

Changes, thus demanded and thus supported, will usually be

allowed to go into peaceful consummation. But when not so

allowed, or when they are attempted by small or doubtful

majorities,itmustbeconcededthatitwillbeattheirperil,asthey

willusuallyberesistedbythoseinpowerbymeansofprosecutions,

and sometimes by violence, and, unless crowned by success, and

thussubsequentlyratified,theywilloftenbepunishedasrebellious

ortreasonable.

48U.S.at5455,12L.Ed.at604605,7HOWat122124(1849).

Whateverthevirtues of thisbrightlinechoice (betweenpoliticalaction

byballotandrevolution,withnopossibilityofjudicialintervention)mayhave



19/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





seemed toChief JusticeTaneys political question doctrineplainlywasNOT

intendedtorestrictthepoweroftheArticleIIIFederaljudiciarytoregulatethe

FederalGovernmentscompliancewiththeConstitution. Asan alternative toTaneyssomewhatbrutal implicitformulation love

thestatusquo,changeitbypolitics,orgofomentaviolentrevolutionanddeal

with the consequences, Plaintiffs herein join with and in the arguments

presentedbytheircoPlaintiffsRobinsonandWileyintheirparallelbriefinthis

case.Robinson&WileyhavepointedoutthatwherenoConstitutionalremedy

exists for an outrageous and egregious constitutional violations, the Courts

oughttoinferone,astheydidintheapplicationofthestandardsofacivilaction

under42U.S.C.1983,1988toFederalLawEnforcementofficersinthecaseof

Bivensv.SixUnknownAgents ,403U.S.388(1971).SeeCase8:09-cv-00082-

DOC-AN,Document67,Filed09/18/2009,Page6of18:MarkhamRobinson

&WileyDrakesResponsetoMotiontoDismissat2.

Standing-PoliticalQuestion-Redressability

TheFlastv.Cohen+First&NinthAmendmentReservedRightsSolution

Asdiscussedabove,theDefendantsaskthisCourttodismissthePlaintiffs

complaintwithinatriangularstrangleholdandviceofstandingredressability

politicalquestion.Paralleltobutindependentofthisthreeprongedargument,

the Defendants claim that certain statutes, as well as the historical custom,

practice, and policy, of the evaluation of elections in the United States has

effectively deprived the Article III Courts of any power to adjudicate the

constitutionalqualificationsofthepresident.

The Defendants also claim that these samestatutes, historical customs,

practices, and policies, deprive thepeople of any meaningful access to the

CourtstodeterminewhethertheirhighestConstitutionallydesignatedofficers



20/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





areincompliancewiththeelementalmandatessetforthinArticleIIoftheU.S.

Constitution.Accordingly,Defendantswouldnowandforeverleave thepeople

bereft of all power, short of the electoral power achieved by tyrannicalmajorities (as they were described by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison in the

Federalist Papers) to demand that constitutionally unqualified leaders be

removedfromoffice.AssuggestedabovebythequotefromChiefJusticeTaney

thisonlyleavestheunattractiveoptionofarmedrevolution,andoneprimary

socialfunctionandpracticalpurposeoftheCourtsistoupholdrespectforlaw

andgovernmentandtherebytomaintainthepeace.

Theresidualpowerofdiscreteandinsularminoritiestoprotectnotonly

theirownconstitutionalrights,buttoasserttheconstitutionalrightsofallthe

people,isoneofthegreatandperenniallyrecurringconstitutionalconundrums

inAmericanlegalhistory(cf.UnitedStatesv.CaroleneProductsCo.,304U.S.

144,Footnote4themostfamousfootnoteinhistory).InthefieldofFirst

Amendment freedom of speech and religious free exercise, the power of

discrete and insularminorities such as the Amish to delineate constitutional

absolutesislegendary,seee.g.Wisconsinv.Yoder,406U.S.205(1972).

In the present case, Plaintiffs are a discrete and insular minority who

demandfullenforcementandrespectbeaffordedtothatclauseofArticleIIof

the Constitutionwhichstates: No person except a natural bornCitizen,ora

CitizenoftheUnitedStates,atthetimeoftheAdoptionofthisConstitution,shall

beeligibletotheOfficeofPresident;neithershallanyPersonbeeligibletothatOffice who shall not have attained to the Age of thirtyfive Years, and been

fourteen Years a Resident within theUnited States. This clause is not self

enforcingonitsface,unfortunately.Whoistojudgewhetherapersonhasmet



21/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





thesequalifications?AreanyrightsreservedbytheConstitutionto thepeople,

exceptaspoliticalmajorities?

PlaintiffscontendthattheFirst,Second,Ninth,andTenthAmendmentsallreserve rights to the people acting neither as individuals nor as political

majorities,butcollectivelyasdiscreteandinsularminoritiesofconscience,and

thatComplaintorPetitionsfiledwiththeArticleIIIConstitutionalCourtsarethe

legitimate paths of access bywhich the people, so defined, may address the

wrongs,andcorrectthedeviationsandderogations,whichthesomnolentifnot

somnambulatingpoliticalmajoritymayfromtimetotimeallow.Inshort,itis

theright,province,andconstitutionalplaceandpowerofdiscreteandinsular

minoritiesofdissenterstoutilizetheirequalaccesstothecourtstopreservethe

constitutionwhenthepoliticalsystemfailssotodo,regardlessoflongstanding

butconstitutionallyuntestedcustoms,practices,andpolicies.Thetheory,the

hope,thedreamis,uponproperpetition,theArticleIIIjudiciaryalonewillhave

thestrengthandcouragetoreaffirmtheConstitutionastheSupremeLawofthe

Land,andtherebytosetasideabusesorindividualviolationsandderogations

that longstanding customs, practices, and policies (which is to say political

decisions)haveallowedtooccur.

The boundary between custom, practice, and policy having the

appearanceorforceoflawandactuallawisoftendifficulttosurveyandtracein

the landscape of litigation, and it is quite true that as amatter of historical

custom,practice, and policy, the Courts of theUnited States havenever beenseriously called upon to judge the constitutionalqualificationsof any person

politicallyelectedtotheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.Butatsome

stage, the Courts must accept and recognize their judicial responsibility and

statusastheeffectiveforumof lastpeacefulresort inhoursofnational crisis.



22/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





The Courts duty in this case is to address first whether the Article II, U.S.

Constitutionallegalrequirementshavebeenfollowedbythebodypolitic,and

thentoinvestigatewhetheranyderogationsresultedfromfraud,whichwas,ifitoccurred,massive,systematic,andquiteunprecedented.

That is the sum and substance of Plaintiffs complaint, and by its very

nature these questions, which attack the heart and function of the political

system as having been constitutionally corrupted, are not susceptible to a

merelypoliticalresolution.

ThePlaintiffsinthiscasedemandthattheCourtdelineatetheboundaries

ofthepoliticalandtheconstitutional,anddeclareandadjudgethatthepeople

oftheUnitedStateshavetherighttodelineatethatwhichistheconstitutional

rightofapoliticallypowerlessminorityofthepeopletosecureforthemselves,

and to protect themajority, even, from the follies of their ownmajoritarian

blindness.

All the cases concerning the establishment clause, and the excessive

entanglementofChurchandStateinthiscountry,havebeenraisedonbehalfof

minorities such a Catholics, Jehovahs Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists,

Quakers, and similar groups whose specific beliefs were offended by

majoritarianlawsenactedbypoliticalmajorities.

Plaintiffs propose quite simply that the rule of taxpayer standing

applicabletopublicsupportofreligion,e.g.Flastv.Cohen,392U.S.83,88S.Ct.

1942,20L.Ed.2d947(1968),beappliedtotheconstitutionalqualificationsofthePresident.Thegeneralruleisthatbothfederalandstatetaxpayersdonot

have Article III case and controversy standing to challenge a particular

expenditureoffundssimplybecausetheyaretaxpayers.Plaintiffssubmitthat

the Flast v. Cohenexception is applicable in this case, essentially for all the



23/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





samereasons(includingafocusonthefundamentalrightssecuredbytheFirst

Amendment) that it was applied in that other case to which no other ready

means of allowing entry to the Courthouse was possible. By application ofOckhamsrazor,Flastv.Cohenoffersthesimplest,andforthatreasonthebest,

possiblesolutiontothequestionofstanding.ItisappropriatebecausetheFirst

AmendmentsEstablishmentclauseisanalogoustotheArticleIInaturalborn

citizen clause as an absolute limitation on the unconstitutional exercise of

power by government whose effect (i.e. injury) will always be by definition

diffuseratherthanparticularizedtoanyindividualorgroupofindividuals.

THECONSTITUTIONISANIMMUTABLEFRAME:POLITICSAREAMOVINGPICTUREWHICHCANNOTEXTRUDE

Another way of putting this is that the political question doctrine,

properly applied, should exclude court challenges toanything, whichmay be

constitutionally done within the framework of the Constitution. It is well

known,however,thatdifferentlevelsofscrutinyapplyeventothatwhichmay

(under certain circumstances), permissibly be done within the constitution2

.Butinnocaseshouldtheabilityofpeopletoassertconstitutionalabsolutesbe

limitedorconstrained,becauseofCongressand thePresident fail toabideby

the Constitution, what recourse is there other than to the Court? Titles of

nobility,billsofattainder,expostfactolaws,andintergenerationalcorruption

ofbloodareallabsolutelyforbidden,justlikeslavery.Butsoistheaccession

2For example, content-based restrictions on Freedom of Speech should only be

allowed on the most extreme of circumstances, whereas time-place-and-manner (e.g.media or location specific) limitations on Freedom of Speech are subject to onlyintermediate scrutiny, and restrictions on the content of purely commercial speech (e.g.commercial advertising) is often subjected only to the lowest rational basis- test ofconstitutional scrutiny.



24/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





tothepresidencyofanypersonwhoisnotanaturalborncitizenoftheUnited

States.

Thiscase,thePlaintiffsstatusasadiscreteandinsularminority(whichincludes an exceptionally large number of members of theU.S. Military) has

made them members of new class, scorned in the establishment press as

birthers. Plaintiffs status as an ideological, politicallypowerless,minority

arisesfromtheirconstitutionaldevotiontotheenforcementofaconstitutional

clausewhich, probably becauseof its simple and selfexplanatorynature, has

neverbeforebeenjudiciallyrecognizedasanenforceablerightofthepeopleto

bepronouncedandenforcedinaconstitutionalcourt.Defendantsattemptto

trivializethe importanceofthe constitutionand itsmandatesbyarguing that

any supposed violation of Plaintiffs individual rights is too slight to support

standing.

Earlier in this Memorandum of Points and Authorities, an implausible

hypothetical reintroductionofSlaverybypopularplebescite inCaliforniawas

proposedasanexampleofapopularelectoralactthatwouldnotreceiveeven

the slightest political question abstention nor demand that anyone be

enslavedbeforeaCourtwoulddeclarethispropositiontobeunconstitutional.

Theredresswouldcomeinthedeclarationofunconstitutionality.Evenifthe

proposednewslaveryhadnoproposedtargetclassofpersonstobeenslaved,

itwoulddoubtlessbeenoughtosaythatallAmericansareoffendedifthereis

thechancethatevenonewouldeverbesoldandreducedintoslavery.TheoffensetoallAmericansislikewisecompleteifaPresidentwasinauguratedon

January20,2009,despitehavingconcealed,disguised,andobfuscatedhistrue

naturalborncitizenshipasthatofanothercountry.



25/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





So, the fact that this is a case of first impression does not render it

frivolous. In fact, in this case, it is the Plaintiffs who rest their case on an

express,simple,butsoundconstitutionalmandate,andtheDefendantswhocanfindnoconstitutionaltextwhatsoevertosupporttheirownposition.

The Defendants open, and make a cornerstone, of their September 4,

2009,MotiontoDismisswitharathercuriousconfusionarisingfromtheirown

difficulty in linedrawing between the rolesofCongress and the Courtswhen

theywrite:

Plaintiffs cannot use this Court to investigate and decide thePresidents fitness for office or their related claims, however,without contravening the very Constitution that they purport touphold,whichprovidesthattheElectoralCollegeandtheCongresshaveexclusivejurisdictionofsuchpoliticaldisputes................. . Plaintiffs have failed to meet the jurisdictional and statutoryprerequisitesoragainseektohavethisCourtadjudicateissuesthataretextuallycommittedtootherbranches.

Case8:09cv00082DOCANDocument56atPage8of32;Obamaet

al.DefendantsMotiontoDismissat1,ll.812.

TheissuessoughttoberaisedbyPlaintiffsinthiscaseregardingboth whether President Obama is a natural born citizen of theUnited States, and therefore qualified tobe President, aswell asany purported claims raised byany criminal statutes cited in theFirstAmendedComplaintaretobejudged,accordingtothetextofthe Constitution,bythe legislativebranchof the government,andnotthejudicial.

Idemat11,ll.2329,12,l.1

Plaintiffs and their undersigned counsel are astonished at this bold

assertion by the Defendants of a precept of constitutional law, without any

textualcitation.TheDefendantsfailuretociteorquoteanylanguagefromthe

Constitution is understandable because the precept articulated above simply

doesnotexist.Nowheredoestheconstitutionoranystatuteorotherlawlimit



26/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





the direct power and right of the people to demand an accounting of the

constitutionalqualificationsoftheir(evenifduly)electedleaders,includinga

judicial interpretation of the natural born citizen clause ofArticle II, and aresultingjudicialapplicationofthatinterpretationtothePresident,evenifthat

applicationincludesarecommendationofremoval:In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that

"[t]heConstitutionwaswrittentobeunderstoodbythevoters;itswords and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary asdistinguished fromtechnicalmeaning."UnitedStates v. Sprague,282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931); see alsoGibbons v.Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).Normalmeaningmayofcourseincludeanidiomaticmeaning,butitexcludes secret or technical meanings that would not have beenknowntoordinarycitizensinthefoundinggeneration.

D.C.v.Heller,128S.Ct.2783,2788;171L.Ed.2d637,648(2008)

AfurthersourceoftheDefendantsconfusionandinabilitytodrawproper

linesandboundariesbetweenhistoricalcustomandpractice,ontheonehand,

andtherightandpowerofthepeopletodemandpunctiliouscompliancewith

the plain letter of the constitution on the other, arises from their profound

mischaracterization of this case as one exclusively concerning elections and

electoralprocedureandrelatedlaw.Electorallawconcernstheproceduresfor

voting andallocation of representationamong thepopulationandgeographic

territoryoftheUnitedStates.

ThePlaintiffs complaint in this case concerns the reserved rights of the

people,specificallythefundamentalFirstandNinthAmendmentrightsofthepeople.TheFirstandNinthAmendmentstotheConstitutiongivepowertothe

people individually and collectively, byand throughall lawfulmeansandnot

merely through the electoral process, to demand strict conformity and

compliancewiththeelementarypreceptsofconstitutionalintegrity.Defendants



27/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





show their confusion of questions of electoral procedure with the

constitutionallyabsoluterightsofthepeopleinwriting:

PlaintiffsaskthisCourttoentertainachallengetothe2008electionofPresidentBarackObamabyrequiringthePresidenttodisprove,inthisCourt,theirinnuendoallegingthatheisnotanaturalborncitizenwithinthemeaningoftheUnitedStatesConstitution.

Case8:09cv00082DOCANDocument56atPage8of32;BarackObamaetal.DefendantsMotiontoDismissat1,ll.48.

Andthenfurther:

ThisCourt,therefore,iswithoutjurisdictiontodetermineanyissuesrelatedtothePresidentsfitnesstoholdoffice,andthiscaseshouldbedismissedwithprejudiceandjudgmententeredaccordingly.

Idemat1,ll.2124

ThewordpeopleishighlightedabovebecausetheSupremeCourthas

recentlyandimportantlyconstruedtherightsofthepeopleashavingcertain

rightssecuredtothemasagroup.Indeed,Plaintiffsdaretoapproachthis

CourttoassertthattheenforcementoftheletteroftheConstitutionisinfacta

"RightofthePeople":Thefirstsalientfeatureoftheoperativeclause[oftheSecond

Amendment] is that it codifies a "right of the people." TheunamendedConstitutionandtheBillofRightsusethephrase"rightofthepeople"twoothertimes,intheFirstAmendment'sAssemblyandPetition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment's SearchandSeizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar

terminology ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certainrights,shallnotbeconstruedtodenyordisparageothersretainedbythepeople").Allthreeoftheseinstancesunambiguouslyrefertoindividual rights, not "collective" rights, or rights that may beexercisedonlythroughparticipationinsomecorporatebody.

ThreeprovisionsoftheConstitutionreferto"thepeople"inacontext other than "rights"the famous preamble ("We thepeople"), 2 ofArticle I (providing that "the people"will choose



28/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





membersoftheHouse),andtheTenthAmendment(providingthatthosepowersnotgiventheFederalGovernmentremainwith"theStates" or "the people"). Those provisions arguably refer to "thepeople" acting collectivelybut they deal with the exercise or

reservationofpowers,notrights.NowhereelseintheConstitutiondoesa"right"attributedto"thepeople"refertoanythingotherthananindividualright.

"'[T]hepeople'seemstohavebeenatermofartemployedinselect parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its uses] sugges[t] that 'thepeople'protectedbytheFourthAmendment,andbytheFirstandSecondAmendments,andtowhomrightsandpowersarereservedin theNinth andTenthAmendments, refers to a classof personswho are part of a national community or who have otherwisedevelopedsufficientconnectionwiththiscountrytobeconsideredpartofthatcommunity."

D.C. v. Heller, supra, 128 S.Ct. at 27901; 171 L.Ed.2d at 650 (2008)(citingUnited States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108L.Ed.2d222[1990])(boldemphasisadded).

CONCLUSIONS

This response is timely filed on the Equinox, Monday, September 21,

pursuanttoRule6(a)(2)becauseoftheinterveningFederalHolidayonLabor

Day.PlaintiffspraythattheCourtdenyDefendantsDocument#56Motionto

Dismiss in all respects, grant Plaintiffs taxpayer standing on analogy to the

EstablishmentClausestandingauthorizedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt

inFlastv.Cohenand/or,eitherinadditionorinthealternative,findandhold

that the First and Ninth Amendments expressly reserve to the people a

generalizedrighttopetitionforredressofgrievancescausedbyconstitutional

violationssuchastheestablishmentofreligionortheviolationofthenatural

borncitizenshiprequirementofArticleII.

Respectfullysubmitted,Monday,September21,2009TheEquinox



29/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





By:______________________________________________

Dr.OrlyTaitz,Esq.,AttorneyatLaw

(CaliforniaBar223433)

AttorneyforthePlaintiffs29839S.MargaritaPkwyRanchoSantaMargaritaCA92688ph.9496835411Fax:9497667036EMail:[email protected]



30/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





PROOFOFSERVICE

ItheundersignedCharlesEdwardLincoln,beingover theageof18and

notapartytothiscase,soherebydeclareunderpenaltyofperjurythatonthis,Monday, September 21,2009, I provided facsimile orelectronic copies of the

Plaintiffs aboveandforegoingPlaintiffsPreliminaryResponse toDefendants

9409(Document#56)tothefollowingattorneysattorneyswhosenameswere

affixed totheSTATEMENTOF INTERESTwhohaveappearedin thiscasein

accordancewiththelocalrulesoftheCentralDistrictofCalifornia,towit:

THOMASP.OBRIEN

LEONW.WEIDMAN

ROGER E. WEST [email protected] (designated as lead counsel for

PresidentBarackHusseinObamaonAugust7,2009)

[email protected]

[email protected]

FACSIMILE(213)8947819

DONEANDEXECUTEDONTHISMondaythe21stdayofSeptember,2009.

CharlesEdwardLincoln,IIITierraLimpia/DeoVindicec/oPeytonYatesFreiman603ElmwoodPlace,Suite#6Austin,[email protected]

Tel: (512) 9231889



31/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





EXHIBIT A:

Capt.BarnettsJanuary2009FOIARequest

&StateDept.Response



32/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





EXHIBITSB-F:

Dossiers#1,3,4,5,6



33/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





EXHIBITG:

Letter&ApplicationforWrit



34/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28





ExhibitH

CertifiedReceiptsoflettertoMr.Taylor



35/35

1

2

3

4

56

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ExhibitI:

Capt.Roadsletterreportingpressureagainst

testifying


Documents

KEYES v OBAMA - 69 - OPPOSITION to MOTION to Dismiss Case ; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 56 filed by Plaintiff Pamela Barnett - Gov.uscourts.cacd.435591.69.0