Founda'ons,  Weds  11th  Mar  2015  

Key  Concepts  Revision  Session    

U;lity,  Rights,  Jus;ce  

U;litarianism  

U;litarianism:  the  basic  idea  

•  The  principle  of  u;lity  is  that  which      

‘approves  or  disapproves  of  every  ac;on  whatsoever,  according  to  the  tendency  which  it  appears  to  have  to  augment  or  diminish  [happiness]’  

•  An  ac;on  conformable  to  the  PU  ought  to  be  done,  or  is  right  

•  When  this  concerns  the  community,  the  interest  it  is  concerned  with  is  the  sum  of  the  interests  of  its  members  

•  It  applies  not  only  to  ‘every  ac;on  of  a  private  individual,  but  of  every  measure  of  government’  

 

The  argument  

•  Can’t  be  proven  directly  

•  People  actually  do  live  and  argue  on  its  basis  

•  What’s  the  alterna;ve?    •  Misery  is  good?  •  Morality  could  be  founded  on  principles  which  do  not  regard  

the  consequences.  But  such  principles  are  mere  caprice  and  despo;cal  

 

Advantages  

•  Person  neutral  (cf.  Wedderburn’s  £15,000)  

•  Mo;va;onal  –  people  desire  happiness  

•  End  neutral  –  doesn’t  maWer  what  makes  people  happy    

•  Clear  applica;on  

 

Two  variants  

There  are  ‘direct’  and  ‘indirect’  forms  of  u;litarianism.  The  most  common  are:  

   (Direct)  •  Act-­‐u;litarianism:  apply  the  Principle  of  U;lity  to  ac'ons  

   (Indirect)  •  Rule-­‐u;litarianism:  apply  the  Principle  of  U;lity  to  rules  

 

Commitment  1  

•  Bentham  is  very  clear  about  what  counts  as  u;lity:  pleasurable  states  of  mind  (hedonism)  

•  Is  this  right?    

 Some  good  things  in  life  are  not  clearly  pleasure          preference  sa'sfac'on      My  preferences  can  develop,  and  for  the  beWer        welfare  

     (Note  that  this  is  s;ll  within  the  broad  framework)  

Commitment  2  

•  A  cardinal  measure  needed,  for  interpersonal  comparison  

•  Can  you  even  make  INTRApersonal  cardinal  measures  of  u;lity?  Objec;on:  Some  goods  are  incommensurable,  so  the  u;litarian  calculus  is  inapplicable.  Hypothe;cal  compensa;on  test  

•  Move  to  ordinal  rankings?  Market  mechanisms  provide  maximum  interpersonal  desire-­‐sa;sfac;on?  Goodin:  principle  of  charity,  in  assuming  that  others  are  much  like  ourselves  

Commitment  3  

•  A  func;on  for  u;lity:  maximising  the  (expected)  sum    

                 Two  tax  policies  

•  Fairness  seems  to  drop  out  of  picture.  Vicarious  and  exemplary  punishment  permiWed  

 

Jill   Jack   Jane  

Policy  A   5   5   5  

Policy  B   9   5   2  

Commitment  3  

•  Alterna;ve  func;ons  readily  available    Maximise  average  u;lity      Maximin  (maximise  the  minimum  payoff)    Maximax  (maximise  the  greatest  possible  payoff)    …  

•  How  to  decide  between  these?  The  moment  we’re  arguing  about  alterna;ve  func;ons,  we  are  using  moral  concepts  and  reasons  other  than  pleasurable/valued  mental  states  

   Fairness  is  the  most  obvious  moral  ‘baggage’  leh  behind  

Rights  

Why  Rights?  

•  A  rival  radical  vision  

•  Addresses  the  (puta;ve)  shortcomings  of  u;litarian-­‐style  moral  theories  

•  Dominant  language  of  contemporary  moral  discourse?    

The  func;on  of  rights  

•  Stringent  demands  

‘Rights  are  best  understood  as  trumps  over  some  background  jus;fica;on  for  poli;cal  decisions  that  states  a  goal  for  the  community  as  a  whole’        

                       Ronald  Dworkin  

•  Create  ‘exclusionary  reasons’,  in  protec;on  of  individuals.  ‘Rights  talk’  reflects  this  

 

The  concept  of  a  right  1  

 Dis;nguish  ins'tu'onal  from  non-­‐ins'tu'onal  rights  

•  Ins;tu;onal  (or  ‘posi;ve’)  rights:  law,  employment  

•  Non-­‐ins;tu;onal  Societal  conven;ons    Moral  or  natural  rights.  Could  be  specific,  or  belong  to  everyone  as  a  result  of  their  being  a  human  

 

The  concept  of  a  right  2  

 Dis;nguish  nega've  from  posi've  rights  

•  Nega;ve  rights  require  people  not  to  do  things  against  you  e.g.  security  of  person,  property;  liberty  

•  Posi;ve  rights  require  people  to  do  things  for  you  e.g.  rescue,  welfare,  healthcare  

   

Rights  in  conflict  

•  External  conflict,  between  rights  and  (e.g.)  consequences  

•  Internal  conflict,  between  different  kinds  of  rights  At  most  one  right  could  be  absolute  But  worse,  only  one  right  holder  could  enjoy  that  absolute  right  

•  Some;mes  it’s  obvious  which  right  takes  priority.  Some;mes  not  

•  Perhaps  the  jus;fica;on  of  a  right/rights  will  tell  us  how  to  deal  with  conflict?  

 

Jus;fica;on  and  schedule  

•  Two  ques;ons          SCHEDULE:  What  human  rights  are  there?  

     JUSTIFICATION:  In  virtue  of  what  (if  anything)  do  human  rights                  exist?  

•  Answers  interrelate.  Could  take  SCHEDULE  as  primary,  and  argue  ‘boWom  up’.  Or  take  JUSTIFICATION,  and  argue  ‘top  down’        

Jus;fica;on:  Status  concep;ons  

•  Any  capacity  or  property  which  has  value  in  itself  may  provide  this  grounding  

•  Humans  as  ra;onal,  as  autonomous,  as  made  in  the  image  of  God,  as  having  a  life  plan,  as…  

Jus;fica;on:  Status  concep;ons  

•  Some  face  the  task  of  bridging  from  human  need  to  interpersonal  claim  (e.g.  non-­‐metaphysical  versions,  such  as  Griffin)  

•  It  may  uncomfortably  rule  some  people  out:  babies,  mentally  incapacitated.  It  may  also  rules  others  in:  sophis;cated  animals,  supernatural  agents  

•  Of  limited  use  poli;cally.  Not  everyone  agrees  

Jus;fica;on:  Poli;cal  concep;ons  

•  Don’t  worry  about  the  (deep)  Founda;ons.  We  can  all  agree  that  there  are  some  ways  that  people  should  not  be  treated  

•  Start  from  the  schedule,  and  work  up  

Jus;fica;on:  Poli;cal  concep;ons  

•  Significant  impact  on  the  Schedule:  considerably  fewer  rights  Liberal  democra;c  rights  especially  

•  What  if  people  actually  don’t  agree?    The  equal  applica;on  of  the  Schedule  to  all  people  has  not  been  obvious  historically  

•  A  restricted  Schedule  may  have  influenced  the  func;on:  a  litmus  test  for  legi;macy  of  interven;on  

Universality?  

•  Are  rights  universal?    Well,  what  kind  of  rights  are  we  talking  about?  And  with  what    jus'fica'on?  

 

Jus;ce  &  Equality  

Jus;ce  &  Equality  

•  Jus;ce:  ‘giving  people  their  due’,  the  ius  suum  

•  But  this  is  merely  formal,  and  specifies  no  content  ‘The  Roman  legal  code  conceptualised  with  firm  and  unwavering  clarity  the  almost  universally  shared  “intui;on”  that  to  treat  a  slave  as  if  he  or  she  had  any  en;tlements  would  be  a  gross  viola;on  of  the  basic  principles  of  jus;ce.’  Raymond  Guess,  Philosophy  and  Real  Poli'cs,  p.  74  

   What  are  people  due?  And  due  in  what  capacity?        Some  considera;ons  are  morally  irrelevant,  some  relevant.  Relevance  may  change                according  to  situa;on  

•  Dis;nguish  primary  jus;ce  from  rec'fying  jus;ce;  former  concerns  distribu;on.  What  posi;ve  claims  do  people  have?  

 

Do  inequali;es  maWer?  

•  Should  we  be  concerned  if  the  overall  level  of  inequality  in  a  society  (e.g.  in  income  or  wealth)  increases?  

•  Should  we  be  pleased  if  the  overall  level  of  inequality  across  the  world  decreases?  

 •  Should  we  be  concerned  about  inequali;es  between  

par;cular  groups  (e.g.  men  v  women,  ethnic  Chinese  in  UK  v  ethnic  Bangladeshis  in  UK)?  

Distribu;ve  Principles  

1)  Sufficiency  –  people  have  enough    2)  Equality  –  gaps  maWer  Equality  of  outcome  Equality  of  opportunity  

3)  Priority  to  the  least  advantaged  –  absolute  posi;on  of  worst  off  

Jus;ce  as  Fairness  

Principles  derived  from  thought  experiment  of  original  posi;on  and  veil  of  ignorance    U;litarianism  rejected:  allows  the  welfare  of  some  people  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  greater  good  of  the  many  

Rejects  happiness  as  the  metric  because  that  denies  personal  responsibility  for  preferences  

Instead,  primary  goods:  rights  and  liber;es,  opportuni;es  and  powers,  income  and  wealth  

Rawls’  Two  Principles  of  Jus;ce    

1.  “Each  person  has  the  same  indefeasible  claim  to  a  fully  adequate  scheme  of  equal  basic  liber/es,  which  scheme  is  compa;ble  with  the  same  scheme  of  liber;es  for  all”  

2.  “Social  and  economic  inequali;es  are  to  sa;sfy  two  condi;ons:    

–  First  they  are  to  be  aWached  to  offices  and  posi;ons  open  to  all  under  condi;ons  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity;  and    

–  Second,  they  are  to  be  to  the  greatest  benefit  of  the  least-­‐advantaged  members  of  society  (the  difference  principle)”  

Equality  of  opportunity  

Formal  equality  of  opportunity  (careers  open  to  talents):  jobs  and  offices  

should  be  offered  on  a  compe;;ve  basis  and  awarded  to  those  who  are  best  

qualified  to  hold  them.  

Fair  equality  of  opportunity:  ‘….those  who  are  at  the  same  level  of  talent  and  

ability,  and  have  the  same  willingness  to  use  them,  should  have  the  same  

prospects  of  success  regardless  of  their  ini;al  place  in  the  social  system,  that  

is,  irrespec;ve  of  the  income  class  into  which  they  are  born.    In  all  sectors  of  

society  there  should  be  roughly  equal  prospects  of  culture  and  achievement  

for  everyone  similarly  mo;vated  and  endowed’.  

Rawls’  difference  principle  

Social  and  economic  inequali;es  are  just  when  (and  only  when)  they  work  to  the  (greatest?)  benefit  of  the  worst  –off  group  in  society,  e.g.  by  ac;ng  as  economic  incen;ves  for  the  more  talented  

Is  this  too  stringent?    Why  should  we  set  this  condi;on  on  inequali;es  so  long  as  everybody  is  lihed  out  of  poverty  (the  sufficiency  view)?  

Is  this  too  lax?  Might  large  inequali;es  be  bad  even  if  they  help  to  improve  the  posi;on  of  the  worst-­‐off  group  in  absolute  terms?  

Reasons  for  opposing  inequality  

Instrumental  reasons:    inequality  is  bad  for  people    Cf.  Wilkinson/PickeW,  The  Spirit  Level:  see  TED  talk  at  hWp://www.ted.com/talks/richard_wilkinson.html  

Intrinsic  reasons:    a)  some  inequali;es  are  unjust/undeserved/unfair;    b)  some  inequali;es  produce  social  rela;onships  that  are  incompa;ble  with  equal  respect  

Conclusion:  how  are  jus;ce  and  equality  related?  

Jus;ce  requires  equality  of  some  things  (equal  basic  rights,  equal  opportuni;es)  but  not  of  all  things  

Inequali;es  of  outcome  can  be  just  when  they  are  deserved  and/or  there  are  equal  opportuni;es  to  achieve  them  

Some  think  that  inequali;es  of  outcome  are  just  when  they  serve  as  incen;ves,  again  provided  there  are  equal  opportuni;es  to  achieve  them  

But  we  may  s;ll  be  concerned  about  inequality  for  other  reasons:  because  of  its  effects,  or  because  we  think  it  is  intrinsically  bad