Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469

8/12/2019 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469

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WarningAs of: July 31, 2014 4:40 PM EDT

Kelo v. City of New London

Supreme Court of the United StatesFebruary 22, 2005, Argued ; June 23, 2005, Decided

No. 04-108

Reporter: 545 U.S. 469; 125 S. Ct. 2655; 162 L. Ed. 2d 439; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5011; 60 ERC(BNA) 1769; 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 733; 35 ELR 20134; 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 437

SUSETTE KELO, et al., Petitioners v. CITY OFNEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT, et al.

Subsequent History:US Supreme Court rehearing denied by Kelo v.

New London, 545 U.S. 1158, 126 S. Ct. 24, 162

L. Ed. 2d 922, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5331 (U.S., Aug.22, 2005)

Prior History: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE SUPREME COURT OFCONNECTICUT.Kelo v. City of New London, 268 Conn. 1, 843

A.2d 500, 2004 Conn. LEXIS 54 (2004)

Disposition: Affirmed.

Core Terms

public use, public purpose, cases, condemnation,economic development, eminent domain, Parcel,taking property, Citys, eminent domain power,private party, development plan, privateproperty, benefits, legislatures, properties,blighted, just compensation, courts,redevelopment, neighborhood, irrigation,

deference, limits, mining, private use, planning,public benefit, transfers, projects

Case Summary

Procedural Posture

Respondent development agent, on behalf ofrespondent city, initiated condemnationproceedings with respect to land owned by

petitioners, nine property owners. The trial courtprohibited the taking of certain properties, but

the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed thatfinding and upheld all of the takings. The ownerspetitioned for a writ of certiorari, which theUnited States Supreme Court granted.

OverviewThe city approved a development plan that hadbeen submitted by the development agent. Theplan called for construction of a waterfront hotel,restaurants, retail stores, residences, and officespace; also, portions of the development areawere to be used for marinas and for support

services. The city authorized the agent topurchase property in the development area or toacquire it by eminent domain. The agentpurchased most of the required property, but thenine owners refused to sell. The Court found thatthe development plan served a public purposeand therefore constituted a public use under theTakings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Theplan was not adopted to benefit a particular classof identifiable individuals. Although the ownersproperties were not blighted, the citys

determination that a program of economicrejuvenation was justified was entitled todeference. There was no basis for exemptingeconomic development from the broad definitionof public purpose. The Court declined torequire a reasonable certainty that the expectedpublic benefits would accrue, nor was it properto second-guess the citys determination of theboundary of the development area.
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Outcome

The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Courtwas affirmed.

LexisNexis Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > FundamentalRights > Eminent Domain & Takings

HN1 See U.S. Const. amend. 5.

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental

Rights > Eminent Domain & Takings

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > State Application

HN2 The Takings Clause of the FifthAmendment is made applicable to the states bythe Fourteenth Amendment.

Civil Procedure > Special Proceedings > Eminent

Domain Proceedings > General Overview

Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services >

Community & Economic Development

Real Property Law > Eminent Domain Proceedings >

General Overview

Real Property Law > Inverse Condemnation > General

Overview

HN3 Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-186 et seq. (2005)expresses a legislative determination that the

taking of land, even developed land, as part of aneconomic development project is a public useand in the public interest.

Civil Procedure > Special Proceedings > Eminent

Domain Proceedings > General Overview




General Overview


Constitutional Limits & Rights > General Overview


Elements > Just Compensation

Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Lands &

Rights of Way

HN4On the one hand, it has long been acceptedthat the sovereign may not take the property of Afor the sole purpose of transferring it to anotherprivate party B, even though A is paid just

compensation. On the other hand, it is equallyclear that a state may transfer property from oneprivate party to another if future use by thepublic is the purpose of the taking; thecondemnation of land for a railroad withcommon-carrier duties is a familiar example.


Environmental Law > Land Use & Zoning > EminentDomain Proceedings

Real Property Law > Eminent Domain Proceedings >General Overview

Real Property Law > Inverse Condemnation > GeneralOverview

HN5 A city will no doubt be forbidden fromtaking petitioners land for the purpose of

conferring a private benefit on a particularprivate party. A purely private taking cannotwithstand the scrutiny of the public userequirement; it serves no legitimate purpose ofgovernment and will thus be void. Nor will a citybe allowed to take property under the merepretext of a public purpose, when its actualpurpose was to bestow a private benefit.




General Overview


Constitutional Limits & Rights > General Overview


Elements > Public Use

HN6The United States Supreme Court has longago rejected any literal requirement thatcondemned property be put into use for thegeneral public. Indeed, while many state courtsin the mid-19th century endorsed use by the

public

as the proper definition of public use,that narrow view has steadily eroded over time.Not only is the use by the public test difficultto administer (e.g., what proportion of the publicneed have access to the property? at whatprice?), but it has proved to be impractical giventhe diverse and always evolving needs of society.Accordingly, when the Court began applying theFifth Amendmentto the states at the close of the

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19th century, it embraced the broader and morenatural interpretation of public use as publicpurpose.

Civil Procedure > Special Proceedings > EminentDomain Proceedings > General Overview


Governments > Public Improvements > CommunityRedevelopment


Real Property Law > Eminent Domain Proceedings >Constitutional Limits & Rights > General Overview

Real Property Law > Eminent Domain Proceedings >Elements > Public Use

HN7 With respect to the public purpose

requirement for condemned property, withoutexception, the United States Supreme Courtscases have defined that concept broadly,reflecting the Courts longstanding policy ofdeference to legislative judgments in this field.



HN8Community redevelopment programs need

not, by force of the Constitution, be on apiecemeal basis--lot by lot, building by building.




General Overview

HN9The United States Supreme Court does notsit to determine whether a particular housingproject is or is not desirable. The concept of thepublic welfare is broad and inclusive. The values

it represents are spiritual as well as physical,aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within thepower of a legislature to determine that acommunity should be beautiful as well ashealthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balancedas well as carefully patrolled. If those whogovern a city decide that it should be beautiful aswell as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth

Amendment that stands in the way.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Case Transfers



HN10 The United States Supreme Court hasrejected the contention that the mere fact that astate immediately transfers properties to privateindividuals upon condemnation somehowdiminishes the public character of the taking. Itis only the takings purpose, and not itsmechanics, that matters in determining publicuse.



General Overview

HN11 With respect to takings, viewed as awhole, United States Supreme Court

jurisprudence has recognized that the needs ofsociety have varied between different parts ofthe Nation, just as they have evolved over timein response to changed circumstances. TheCourts earliest cases in particular haveembodied a strong theme of federalism,emphasizing the great respect that the Courtowes to state legislatures and state courts indiscerning local public needs. These needs arelikely to vary depending on a states resources,the capacity of the soil, the relative importanceof industries to the general public welfare, andthe long-established methods and habits of thepeople. For more than a century, the Courtspublic use jurisprudence has wisely eschewedrigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor ofaffording legislatures broad latitude indetermining what public needs justify the use of

the takings power.Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental


Energy & Utilities Law > Mining Industry > General

Overview

Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services >

Community & Economic Development


General Overview

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(3) To effectuate the plan, the city had invoked astate statute that specifically authorized the useof eminent domain to promote economicdevelopment.

(4) Given the comprehensive character of the

plan, the thorough deliberation that had precededthe plans adoption, and the limited scope of theSupreme Courts review, it was appropriate forthe court to resolve the challenges of theindividual private owners, not on a piecemealbasis, but rather in light of the entire plan.

Kennedy, J., concurring, expressed the view that(1) a court applying rational-basis review underthe Fifth Amendments public use clause shouldstrike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is

intended to favor a particular private party, withonly incidental or pretextual public benefits; (2)where the purpose of a taking is economicdevelopment and that development is to becarried out by private parties or private partieswill benefit, a court must decide if the statedpublic purpose is incidental to the benefits toprivate parties; and (3) a court confronted with aplausible accusation of impermissible favoritismto private parties should review the record to seeif the objection has merit, though with the

presumption that the governments actions werereasonable and intended to serve a publicpurpose.

OConnor, J., joined by Rehnquist, Ch. J., andScalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting, expressed theview that (1) as a result of Supreme Courtsopinion in the case at hand, under the banner ofeconomic development, all private property wasvulnerable to being taken and transferred toanother private owner, so long as the property

might be upgraded

--given to an owner whowould use it in a way that the legislature deemedmore beneficial to the public--in the process; and(2) the reasoning, expressed in the courts

[***441] opinion, that the incidental publicbenefits resulting from the subsequent ordinaryuse of private property renderedeconomic-development takings for public use(a) washed out any distinction between private

and public use of property, and (b) therebyeffectively deleted the words for public usefrom the Fifth Amendment.

Thomas, J., dissenting, expressed the view that(1) if such economic-development takings as the

one in question were for a public use, than (a)any taking was for public use, and (b) theSupreme Court had erased the public use clausefrom the Constitution; and (2) the case at handwas one of a string of the courts cases that (a)had strayed from the public use clauses originalmeaning, and (b) ought to be reconsidered.

Headnotes

EMINENT DOMAIN 33 > -- public use --

economically distressed city -- increases in jobs andrevenue -- revitalization > Headnote:

LEdHN[1A][1A]LEdHN[1B][1B]

A citys proposed disposition of some realproperty under a development plan that wasprojected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, toincrease tax and other revenues, and to revitalizean economically distressed city, including itsdowntown and waterfront areasqualified as apublic usewithin the meaning of the takings

clause of the Federal Constitutions FifthAmendment, so that the city, through itsdevelopment agent, properly could use thepower of eminent domain to acquire, forpurposes of the development project, privatelyowned parcels of this property from owners whowere unwilling to sell. Even though the parcelswere not alleged to be blighted or in poorcondition, this development plan served a publicpurpose, where:

(1) The citys plans for the developmentincluded (a) a hotel, (b) restaurants, (c) retail andoffice spaces, (d) marinas for both recreationaland commercial uses, (e) a pedestrian riverwalk,(f) new residences, (g) a museum, and (h)parking spaces.

(2) The city had carefully formulated a plan thatit believed would provide appreciable benefits to

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the community, including--but by no meanslimited to--new jobs and increased tax revenue.

(3) As with other exercises in urban planning anddevelopment, the city was endeavoring tocoordinate a variety of commercial, residential,and recreational uses of land, with the hope thatthese uses would form a whole greater than thesum of its parts.

(4) To effectuate the plan, the city had invoked astate statute that specifically authorized the useof eminent domain to promote economicdevelopment.

(5) Given the comprehensive character of theplan, the thorough deliberation that had preceded

the plans adoption, and the limited scope of theUnited States Supreme Courts review, it wasappropriate for the court to resolve thechallenges of the individual private owners, noton a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of theentire plan.

(Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter,Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37.7 > -- -- states

> Headnote:


Thetakings clauseof the Federal ConstitutionsFifth Amendmentis made applicable to the statesby the Constitutions Fourteenth Amendment.(Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter,Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 31 > -- private purposes

> Headnote:


Under the takings clause of the FederalConstitutions Fifth Amendment, the sovereignmay not take the property of one private partyfor the sole purpose of transferring it to a secondprivate party, even if the first party is paid justcompensation. Thus, the city that sought toacquire some private owners property in the

case at hand would be forbidden from taking thatproperty for the purpose of conferring a privatebenefit on another particular private party.(Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter,Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 32 > EMINENT DOMAIN40 > -- future public use -- railroad -- public

purpose > Headnote:


Under the takings clause of the FederalConstitutions Fifth Amendment, a state maytransfer property from one private party toanother if future use by the public is thepurpose of the taking; the condemnation of landfor a railroad with common-carrier duties is a

familiar example of such a taking. As to a citysattempt in the case at hand to acquire privateland for an economic development projectthrough the power of eminent domain, (1) thecity was not planning to open the condemnedland--at least not in its entirety--to use by thegeneral public; (2) the private lessees of the landfrom the city would not in any sense be requiredto operate like common carriers, making theirservices available to all comers; and (3) althoughsuch a projected use would have been sufficientto satisfy the Fifth Amendments public userequirement, the United States Supreme Courthad (a) long ago rejected any literal requirementthat condemned property be put into use for thegeneral public, and (b) embraced the broader andmore natural interpretation of public use as

public purpose. (Stevens, J., joined byKennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 32 > -- private benefit -- pretext

of public purpose > Headnote:

LEdHN[5][5]

A city that was attempting in the case at hand toacquire private land for an economicdevelopment plan through the power ofeminent domain would not have been allowed,under the takings clause of the FederalConstitutions Fifth Amendment, to take propertyunder the mere pretext of a public purpose, if the

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citys actual purpose was to bestow a privatebenefit. However, all members of the stateshighest court, as well as the trial judge involvedin the case at hand, agreed that there was noevidence that the city had an illegitimatepurpose. Therefore, the development plan hadnot been adopted to benefit a particular class ofidentifiable individuals. (Stevens, J., joined byKennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 6 > -- justification for taking

> Headnote:

LEdHN[6][6]

For purposes of determining whether a citysproposed disposition of some private propertyunder an economic developmentplan qualified

[***443] as a public use under the takingsclause of the Federal Constitutions Fifth

Amendment, although those who governed thecity were not confronted with the need to removeblight in the proposed development area, theirdetermination that the area was sufficientlydistressed to justify a program of economicrejuvenation was entitled to the United StatesSupreme Courts deference. (Stevens, J., joinedby Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 32 > -- economic development-- public character -- private benefits > Headnote:

LEdHN[7][7]

For purposes of determining whether a citysproposed disposition of some real property undera development plan that was projected to createin excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and otherrevenues, and to revitalize an economicallydistressed city, including its downtown andwaterfront areas qualified as a public use

within the meaning of the takings clause of theFederal Constitutions Fifth Amendment, theUnited States Supreme Court declined to adopt abright-line rule--proposed by some parties whowere unwilling to sell their property in theproposed development area to the city--thateconomic development did not qualify as apublic use, as, putting aside the unpersuasivesuggestion that the citys plan would provide

only purely economic benefits, neither precedentnor logic supported this proposal, for:

(1) Promoting economic development was atraditional and long-accepted function ofgovernment.

(2) There was no principled way of distinguishing economic development from theother public purposes that the court hadrecognized in prior cases.

(3) As to the contention that using eminentdomain for economic development wouldimpermissibly blur the boundary between publicand private takings, (a) the governments pursuitof a public purpose would often benefit

individual private parties; and (b) the public endmight be as well or better served through anagency of private enterprise than through adepartment of government.

(4) Hypothetical cases involving a citys transferof one citizens property to a second citizen forthe sole reason that the second citizen would putthe property to a more productive use and thuspay more taxes (a) could be confronted whenthey arose; and (b) did not warrant the crafting of

an artificial restriction on the concept of publicuse.


EMINENT DOMAIN 32 > -- public benefits --

reasonable certainty > Headnote:

LEdHN[8][8]

In holding that a citys proposed disposition of

some real property under a development planthat was projected to create in excess of 1,000

jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and torevitalize an economically distressed city,including its downtown and waterfront areasqualified as a public usewithin the meaning ofthe takings clause of the Federal ConstitutionsFifth Amendment, the United States SupremeCourt declined to require a reasonable

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certainty that the expected public benefitswould accrue, as:

(1) When a legislatures purpose was legitimateand its means were not irrational, the SupremeCourts cases made clear that empirical debates

over the wisdom of takings--no less than debatesover the wisdom of [***444] other kinds ofsocioeconomic legislation--were not to becarried out in the federal courts.

(2) The disadvantages of a heightened form ofreview were especially pronounced in cases likethe case at hand, for (a) orderly implementationof a comprehensive redevelopment plan requiredthat the legal rights of all interested parties beestablished before new construction could be

commenced; and (b) a federal constitutional rulethat required postponement of the judicialapproval of every condemnation until thelikelihood of success of the plan had beenassured would impose a significant impedimentto the successful consummation of many suchplans.


EMINENT DOMAIN 13 > -- what lands needed --

determination by city > Headnote:


In holding that a citys proposed disposition ofsome real property under a development planthat was projected to create in excess of 1,000

jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and torevitalize an economically distressed city,including its downtown and waterfront areasqualified as a public usewithin the meaning of

the takings clause of the Federal ConstitutionsFifth Amendment, the United States SupremeCourt declined to second-guess the citysdeterminations as to what lands the city neededto acquire in order to effectuate the plan, as (1) itwas not for the courts to oversee the choice ofthe boundary line or sit in review on the size ofa particular project area; (2) once the question ofthe public purpose had been decided, the amount

and character of land to be taken for the projectand the need for a particular tract to complete theintegrated plan rested in the discretion of thelegislative branch; and (3) the Supreme Courtsauthority extended only to determining whetherthe citys proposed condemnations were for apublic use within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment. (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy,Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)

EMINENT DOMAIN 12 > -- state restrictions

> Headnote:

LEdHN[10][10]

With respect to the United States SupremeCourts holding that a citys proposeddisposition of some real property under a

development plan that was projected to createin excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and otherrevenues, and to revitalize an economicallydistressed city, including its downtown andwaterfront areas qualified as a public usewithin the meaning of the takings clause of theFederal Constitutions Fifth Amendment,nothing in the courts opinion precluded anystate from placing further restrictions on thestates exercise of the takings power. (Stevens,J., joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and

Breyer, JJ.)

Syllabus

[***445] After approving an integrateddevelopment plan designed to revitalize its ailingeconomy, respondent city, through itsdevelopment agent, purchased most of theproperty earmarked for the project from willingsellers, but initiated condemnation proceedingswhen petitioners, the owners of the rest of the

property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought thisstate-court action claiming, inter alia, that thetaking of their properties would violate thepublic userestriction in theFifth AmendmentsTakings Clause. The trial court granted apermanent restraining order prohibiting thetaking of the some of the properties, but denyingrelief as to others. Relying on cases suchasHawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.

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229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. [***446] Ct.2321,andBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L.

Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98, the Connecticut SupremeCourt affirmed in part and reversed in part,upholding all of the proposed takings.

Held:

The citys proposed disposition of petitionersproperty qualifies as a public use within themeaning of the Takings Clause.

(a) Though the city could not take petitionersland simply to confer a private benefit on aparticular private party, see, e.g., Midkiff, 467U.S., at 245, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321,the takings at issue here would be executed

pursuant to a carefully considered developmentplan, which was not adopted to benefit aparticular class of identifiable individuals,ibid.Moreover, while the city is not planning to openthe condemned land--at least not in itsentirety--to use by the general public, this Courtlong ago rejected any literal requirement thatcondemned property be put into use for the . . .public.Id., at 244, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct.2321. Rather, it has embraced the broader andmore natural interpretation of public use as

public purpose.

See, e.g., Fallbrook IrrigationDist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-164, 41 L.

Ed. 369, 17 S. Ct. 56. Without exception, theCourt has defined that concept broadly,reflecting its longstanding policy of deference tolegislative judgments as to what public needs

justify the use of the takings power.Berman, 348U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98;Midkiff, 467U.S. 229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct.

2321;Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.986, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862.

(b) The citys determination that the area at issuewas sufficiently distressed to justify a programof economic rejuvenation is entitled todeference. The city has carefully formulated adevelopment plan that it believes will provideappreciable benefits to the community,including, but not limited to, new jobs andincreased tax revenue. As with other exercises in

urban planning and development, the city is

trying to coordinate a variety of commercial,

residential, and recreational land uses, with the

hope that they will form a whole greater than the

sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the city

has invoked a state statute that specificallyauthorizes the use of eminent domain to promote

economic development. Given the plans

comprehensive character, the thorough

deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the

limited scope of this Courts review in such

cases, it is appropriate here, as it was inBerman,

to resolve the challenges of the individualowners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather inlight of the entire plan. Because that planunquestionably serves a public purpose, the

takings challenged here satisfy the FifthAmendment.

(c) Petitioners proposal that the Court adopt anew bright-line rule that economic developmentdoes not qualify as a public use is supported byneither precedent nor logic. Promoting economicdevelopment is a traditional and long-acceptedgovernmental function, and there is noprincipled way of distinguishing it from theother public purposes the Court has recognized.

See, e.g.,Berman, 348 U.S., at 33, 99 L. Ed. 27,75 S. Ct. 98. Also rejected is petitionersargument that for takings of this kind the Courtshould require a reasonable certainty that theexpected public benefits will actually accrue.Such a rule would represent an even greaterdeparture from the Courts precedent. E.g.,

Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 242, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104

S. Ct. 2321. The disadvantages of a heightenedform of review are especially pronounced in thistype of case, where orderly implementation of a

comprehensive plan requires all interestedparties legal rights to be established before newconstruction can commence. The Court declinesto second-guess the wisdom of the means thecity has selected to effectuate [***447] its plan.

Berman, 348 U.S., at 35-36, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S.

Ct. 98.

268 Conn. 1, 843 A. 2d 500, affirmed.

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Counsel: Scott G. Bullock argued the cause forpetitioners.

Wesley W. Horton argued the cause forrespondents.

Judges: Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of theCourt, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, andBreyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed aconcurring opinion, post, p. 490. OConnor, J.,filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist,C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined,post, p.494. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post,p. 505.

Opinion by: STEVENS

Opinion

[*472] [**2658] JusticeStevensdelivered theopinion of the Court.

LEdHN[1A] [1A] LEdHN[2A] [2A] In 2000,the city of New London approved a developmentplan that, in the words of the Supreme Court ofConnecticut, was projected to create in excessof 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues,and to revitalize an economically distressed city,including its downtown and waterfront areas.

268 Conn. 1, 5, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (2004). Inassembling the land needed for this project, thecitys development agent has purchased propertyfrom willing sellers and proposes to use thepower of eminent domain to acquire theremainder of the property from unwilling ownersin exchange for just compensation. The questionpresented is whether the citys proposeddisposition of this property qualifies as a publicusewithin the meaning of the Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 1

[*473] I

The city of New London (hereinafter City) sits atthe junction of the Thames River and the LongIsland Sound in southeastern Connecticut.Decades of economic decline led a state agencyin 1990 to designate the City a distressedmunicipality.In 1996, the Federal Governmentclosed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,which had been located in the Fort Trumbull areaof the City and had employed over 1,500 people.In 1998, the Citys unemployment rate wasnearly double that of the State, and its populationof just under 24,000 residents was at its lowestsince 1920.

These conditions prompted state and localofficials to target New London, and [**2659]particularly its Fort Trumbull area, for economic

revitalization. To this end, respondent NewLondon Development Corporation (NLDC), aprivate nonprofit entity established some yearsearlier to assist the City in planning economicdevelopment, was reactivated. In January 1998,the State authorized a $5.35 million bond issueto support the NLDCs planning activities and a$10 million bond issue toward the creation of aFort Trumbull State Park. In February, thepharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. announcedthat it would build a $300 million researchfacility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort

Trumbull; local planners hoped that Pfizer woulddraw new business to the area, thereby serving asa catalyst to the areas rejuvenation. Afterreceiving initial approval from the city council,the NLDC continued its planning activities andheld a series of neighborhood meetings toeducate the public about the process. [***448]In May, the city council authorized the NLDC toformally submit its plans to the relevant stateagencies for review. 2 Upon obtaining state-levelapproval, the NLDC [*474] finalized an

integrated development plan focused on 90 acresof the Fort Trumbull area.

1 HN1 LEdHN[2B] [2B] [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.U.S. Const., Amdt.

5. HN2 That Clause is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. SeeChicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166

U.S. 226, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897).

2 Various state agencies studied the projects economic, environmental, and social ramifications. As part of this process, a team

of consultants evaluated six alternative development proposals for the area, which varied in extensiveness and emphasis. The

Office of Policy and Management, one of the primary state agencies undertaking the review, made findings that the project was

consistent with relevant state and municipal development policies. See App. 89-95.

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The Fort Trumbull area is situated on a peninsula

that juts into the Thames River. The area

comprises approximately 115 privately owned

properties, as well as the 32 acres of land

formerly occupied by the naval facility

(Trumbull State Park now occupies 18 of those32 acres). The development plan encompasses

seven parcels. Parcel 1 is designated for a

waterfront conference hotel at the center of a

small urban village that will include

restaurants and shopping. This parcel will also

have marinas for both recreational and

commercial uses. A pedestrian riverwalkwilloriginate here and continue down the coast,connecting the waterfront areas of thedevelopment. Parcel 2 will be the site of

approximately 80 new residences organized intoan urban neighborhood and linked by publicwalkway to the remainder of the development,including the state park. This parcel alsoincludes space reserved for a new U. S. CoastGuard Museum. Parcel 3, which is locatedimmediately north of the Pfizer facility, willcontain at least 90,000 square feet of researchand development office space. Parcel 4A is a2.4-acre site that will be used either to supportthe adjacent state park, by providing parking or

retail services for visitors, or to support thenearby marina. Parcel 4B will include arenovated marina, as well as the final stretch ofthe riverwalk. Parcels 5, 6, and 7 will provideland for office and retail space, parking, andwater-dependent commercial uses. App.109-113.

The NLDC intended the development plan tocapitalize on the arrival of the Pfizer facility andthe new commerce it was expected to attract. In

addition to creating jobs, generating tax revenue,and helping to build momentum for therevitalization of downtown New London,id.,at92, the plan was also designed to make the Citymore attractive and to create [*475] leisure andrecreational opportunities on the waterfront andin the park.

The city council approved the plan in January

2000, and designated the NLDC as its

development agent in charge of implementation.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-188 [**2660] (2005).

The city council also authorized the NLDC to

purchase property or to acquire property byexercising eminent domain in the Citys name.

8-193. The NLDC successfully negotiated the

purchase of most of the real estate in the 90-acre

area, but its negotiations with petitioners failed.

As a consequence, in November 2000, the

NLDC initiated the condemnation proceedings

that gave rise to this case. 3

[***449] II

Petitioner Susette Kelo has lived in the FortTrumbull area since 1997. She has made

extensive improvements to her house, which she

prizes for its water view. Petitioner Wilhelmina

Dery was born in her Fort Trumbull house in

1918 and has lived there her entire life. Her

husband Charles (also a petitioner) has lived in

the house since they married some 60 years ago.

In all, the nine petitioners own 15 properties in

Fort Trumbull--4 in parcel 3 of the development

plan and 11 in parcel 4A. Ten of the parcels are

occupied by the owner or a family member; theother five are held as investment properties.There is no allegation that any of theseproperties is blighted or otherwise in poorcondition; rather, they were condemned onlybecause they happen to be located in thedevelopment area.

In December 2000, petitioners brought thisaction in the New London Superior Court. Theyclaimed, among other things, that the taking of

their properties would violate the public userestriction in theFifth Amendment. After a 7-daybench trial, the Superior Court granted apermanent restraining order prohibiting thetaking of the properties located [*476] in parcel4A (park or marina support). It, however, deniedpetitioners relief as to the properties located in

3 In the remainder of the opinion we will differentiate between the City and the NLDC only where necessary.

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parcel 3 (office space). App. to Pet. for Cert.343-350. 4

After the Superior Court ruled, both sides tookappeals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.That court held, over a dissent, that all of the

Citys proposed takings were valid. It began byupholding the lower courts determination thatthe takings were authorized by chapter 132, theStates municipal development statute. SeeConn. Gen. Stat. 8-186 et seq (2005). HN3That statute expresses a legislative determinationthat the taking of land, even developed land, aspart of an economic development project is apublic use and in the public interest. 268Conn., at 18-28, 843 A. 2d, at 515-521. Next,relying on cases such asHawaii Housing

Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 81 L. Ed. 2d

186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), andBerman v.Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98

(1954), the court held that such economicdevelopment qualified as a valid public useunder both the Federal and State Constitutions.268 Conn., at 40, 843 A. 2d, at 527.

Finally, adhering to its precedents, the courtwent on to determine, first, whether the takingsof the particular properties at issue were

reasonably necessary to achieving the Citysintended public use,id., at 82-84, 843 A. 2d, at552-553, and, second, whether the takings werefor reasonably[**2661] foreseeable needs,id.,at 93-94, 843 A. 2d, at 558-559. The courtupheld the trial courts factual findings as toparcel 3, but reversed the trial court as to parcel4A, agreeing with the City that the intended useof this land was sufficiently [*477] definite andhad been given reasonable attentionduring theplanning process. Id., at 120-121, 843 A. 2d, at

574.

[***450] The three dissenting justices wouldhave imposed a heightenedstandard of judicial

review for takings justified by economicdevelopment. Although they agreed that the planwas intended to serve a valid public use, theywould have found all the takingsunconstitutional because the City had failed toadduce clear and convincing evidencethat theeconomic benefits of the plan would in factcome to pass.Id., at 144, 146, 843 A. 2d, at 587,588 (Zarella, J., joined by Sullivan, C. J., andKatz, J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart).

We granted certiorari to determine whether acitys decision to take property for the purposeof economic development satisfies the publicuse requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 542U.S. 965, 159 L. Ed. 2d 857, 125 S. Ct. 27

(2004).III

LEdHN[3A][3A] LEdHN[4A] [4A] Two polarpropositions are perfectly clear. HN4 On the onehand, it has long been accepted that thesovereign may not take the property ofA for thesole purpose of transferring it to another privateparty B, even though A is paid justcompensation. On the other hand, it is equallyclear that a State may transfer property from one

private party to another if future use by thepublic is the purpose of the taking; thecondemnation of land for a railroad withcommon-carrier duties is a familiar example.Neither of these propositions, however,determines the disposition of this case.

LEdHN[3B][3B]LEdHN[5][5] As for the firstproposition, HN5 the City would no doubt beforbidden from taking petitioners land for thepurpose of conferring a private benefit on a

particular private party. SeeMidkiff, 467 U.S., at245, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (A purelyprivate taking could not withstand the scrutiny ofthe public use requirement; it would serve no

4 While this litigation was pending before the Superior Court, the NLDC announced that it would lease some of the parcels to

private developers in exchange for their agreement to develop the land according to the terms of the development plan. Specifically,

the NLDC was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison, a developer selected from a group of applicants.

The negotiations contemplated a nominal rent of $1 per year, but no agreement had yet been signed. See 268 Conn. 1, 9, 61, 843

A.2d 500, 509-510, 540 (2004).

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legitimate purpose of government and wouldthus be void);Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.

Nebraska, [*478] 164 U.S. 403, 41 L. Ed. 489,17 S. Ct. 130 (1896). 5 Nor would the City beallowed to take property under the mere pretextof a public purpose, when its actual purpose wasto bestow a private benefit. The takings beforeus, however, would be executed pursuant to acarefully considered development plan. 268Conn., at 54, 843 A. 2d, at 536. The trial judgeand all the members of the Supreme Court ofConnecticut agreed that there was no evidence ofan illegitimate purpose in this case. 6 Therefore,as was true of the statute [**2662] challengedinMidkiff, 467 U.S., at 245, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186,

[***451] 104 S. Ct. 2321, the Citysdevelopment plan was not adopted to benefit a

particular class of identifiable individuals.

LEdHN[4B][4B] On the other hand, this is nota case in which the City is planning to open thecondemned land--at least not in its entirety--to

use by the general public. Nor will the private

lessees of the land in any sense be required to

operate like common carriers, making their

services available to all comers. [*479] But

although such a projected use would be

sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement,HN6 this Court long ago rejected any literalrequirement that condemned property be put intouse for the general public.Id., at 244, 81 L. Ed.2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321. Indeed, while manystate courts in the mid-19th century endorseduse by the publicas the proper definition ofpublic use, that narrow view steadily erodedover time. Not only was the use by the publictest difficult to administer (e.g., what proportionof the public need have access to the property? at

what price?), 7

but it proved to be impracticalgiven the diverse and always evolving needs ofsociety. 8 Accordingly, [*480] when this Courtbegan applying the Fifth Amendment to theStates at the close of the 19th century, it

5 See alsoCalderv. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798) ( An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law)

contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. . . . A

few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. . . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all

reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have

done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and

the general principles of law and reason forbid them (emphasis deleted)).

6

See268 Conn., at 159, 843 A. 2d, at 595(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (

The record clearly demonstratesthat the development plan was not intended to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other private entity, but rather, to

revitalize the local economy by creating temporary and permanent jobs, generating a significant increase in tax revenue, encouraging

spin-off economic activities and maximizing public access to the waterfront). And while the City intends to transfer certain of

the parcels to a private developer in a long-term lease--which developer, in turn, is expected to lease the office space and so forth

to other private tenants--the identities of those private parties were not known when the plan was adopted. It is, of course,

difficult to accuse the government of having taken As property to benefit the private interests ofB when the identity ofB was

unknown.

7 See,e.g., Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410, 1876 WL 4573, *11 (1876) (If public occupation

and enjoyment of the object for which land is to be condemned furnishes the only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then

the legislature would certainly have the constitutional authority to condemn the lands of any private citizen for the purpose of

building hotels and theaters. Why not? A hotel is used by the public as much as a railroad. The public have the same right, upon

payment of a fixed compensation, to seek rest and refreshment at a public inn as they have to travel upon a railroad ).

8

From upholding the Mill Acts (which authorized manufacturers dependent on power-producing dams to flood upstream landsin exchange for just compensation), to approving takings necessary for the economic development of the West through mining and

irrigation, many state courts either circumvented the use by the public test when necessary or abandoned it completely. See

Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 615, 619-624 (1940) (tracing this development

and collecting cases). For example, in rejecting the use by the publictest as overly restrictive, the Nevada Supreme Court

stressed that [m]ining is the greatest of the industrial pursuits in this state. All other interests are subservient to it. Our mountains

are almost barren of timber, and our valleys could never be made profitable for agricultural purposes except for the fact of a

home market having been created by the mining developments in different sections of the state. The mining and milling interests

give employment to many men, and the benefits derived from this business are distributed as much, and sometimes more,

among the laboring classes than with the owners of the mines and mills. . . . The present prosperity of the state is entirely due to

the mining developments already made, and the entire people of the state are directly interested in having the future developments

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545 U.S. 469, *477; 125 S. Ct. 2655, **2661; 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, ***450
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embraced the broader and more naturalinterpretation of public use as public purpose.See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,164 U.S. 112, 158-164, 41 L. Ed. 369, 17 S. Ct.

56 (1896). Thus, in a case upholding a miningcompanys use of an aerial bucket line totransport ore over property it did not own,Justice Holmes opinion for the Court stressedthe inadequacy of use by the general public asa [**2663] universal test.Strickley v. Highland

Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531, 50 L.

[***452] Ed. 581, 26 S. Ct. 301 (1906). 9 Wehave repeatedly and consistently rejected thatnarrow test ever since. 10

The disposition of this case therefore turns onthe question whether the Citys development

plan serves a

public purpose. HN7

Withoutexception, our cases have defined that conceptbroadly, reflecting our longstanding policy ofdeference to legislative judgments in this field.

InBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. Ed. 27,75 S. Ct. 98 (1954), this Court upheld aredevelopment plan targeting a blighted area ofWashington, D. C., in which most of the housingfor the areas 5,000 inhabitants was beyondrepair. Under the plan, the area would becondemned and part of it utilized for theconstruction of streets, schools, and other publicfacilities. The remainder of the land would beleased or sold to private parties for the purposeof redevelopment, including the construction oflow-cost housing.

[*481] The owner of a department store locatedin the area challenged the condemnation,pointing out that his store was not itself blightedand arguing that the creation of a betterbalanced, more attractive communitywas not a

valid public use.Id., at 31, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct.

98. Writing for a unanimous Court, JusticeDouglas refused to evaluate this claim inisolation, deferring instead to the legislative andagency judgment that the area must be plannedas a wholefor the plan to be successful. Id., at34, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98. The Courtexplained that HN8 community redevelopmentprograms need not, by force of the Constitution,be on a piecemeal basis--lot by lot, building bybuilding.Id., at 35, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98 .The public use underlying the taking wasunequivocally affirmed:

HN9 We do not sit to determinewhether a particular housing project isor is not desirable. The concept of thepublic welfare is broad and inclusive. .

. . The values it represents are spiritualas well as physical, aesthetic as well asmonetary. It is within the power of thelegislature to determine that thecommunity should be beautiful as wellas healthy, spacious as well as clean,well-balanced as well as carefullypatrolled. In the present case, theCongress and its authorized agencieshave made determinations that takeinto account a wide variety of values.It is not for us to reappraise them. Ifthose who govern the District ofColumbia decide that the NationsCapital should be beautiful as well assanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth

Amendment that stands in the way.Id., at 33, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98.

InHawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) ,the Court considered a Hawaii statute whereby

fee title was taken from lessors and transferred to

unobstructed by the obstinate action of any individual or individuals. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co., 11 Nev., at 409-410,

1876 WL, at *11.

9 See alsoClarkv. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25 S. Ct. 676 (1905) (upholding a statute that authorized the owner of

arid land to widen a ditch on his neighbors property so as to permit a nearby stream to irrigate his land).

10 See,e.g., Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32, 60 L. Ed. 507, 36 S.

Ct. 234 (1916)(The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is established);Ruckelshausv.Monsanto Co., 467

U.S. 986, 1014-1015, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984)( This Court, however, has rejected the notion that a use is a

public use only if the property taken is put to use for the general public).

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545 U.S. 469, *480; 125 S. Ct. 2655, **2662; 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, ***451
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lessees (for [***453] just compensation) inorder to reduce the concentration of landownership. We unanimously upheld the statuteand rejected the Ninth Circuits view that it wasa naked attempt on the part of the state ofHawaii to take the property of A [*482] and[**2664] transfer it to B solely for Bs private

use and benefit. Id., at 235, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186,104 S. Ct. 2321 (internal quotation marksomitted). Reaffirming Bermans deferentialapproach to legislative judgments in this field,we concluded that the States purpose ofeliminating the social and economic evils of aland oligopolyqualified as a valid public use.467 U.S., at 241-242, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S.

Ct. 2321. HN10 Our opinion also rejected the

contention that the mere fact that the Stateimmediately transferred the properties to privateindividuals upon condemnation somehowdiminished the public character of the taking.

[I]t is only the takings purpose, and not itsmechanics, we explained, that matters indetermining public use. Id., at 244, 81 L. Ed. 2d186, 104 S. Ct. 2321.In that same Term we decided another public usecase that arose in a purely economic context.InRuckelshaus v. MonsantoCo., 467 U.S. 986, 81

L. Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984), the Courtdealt with provisions of the Federal Insecticide,Fungicide, and Rodenticide Actunder which theEnvironmental Protection Agency couldconsider the data (including trade secrets)submitted by a prior pesticide applicant inevaluating a subsequent application, so long asthe second applicant paid just compensation forthe data. We acknowledged that the most directbeneficiaries of these provisions were thesubsequent applicants,id., at 1014, 81 L. Ed. 2d

815, 104 S. Ct. 2862,but we nevertheless upheld

the statute under Bermanand Midkiff.We foundsufficient Congress belief that sparingapplicants the cost of time-consuming researcheliminated a significant barrier to entry in thepesticide market and thereby enhancedcompetition.467 U.S., at 1015, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815,104 S. Ct. 2862.

HN11Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence hasrecognized that the needs of society have variedbetween different parts of the Nation, just as theyhave evolved over time in response to changedcircumstances. Our earliest cases in particularembodied a strong theme of federalism,emphasizing the great respect that we owe tostate legislatures and state courts in discerninglocal public needs. SeeHairston v. Danville &Western R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606-607, 52 L. Ed.

637, 28 S. Ct. 331 (1908) [*483] (noting thatthese needs were likely to vary depending on aStates resources, the capacity of the soil, therelative importance of industries to the generalpublic welfare, and the long-established methodsand habits of the people). 11 For more than acentury, our public use jurisprudence [***454]has wisely eschewed rigid formulas andintrusive scrutiny in favor of affordinglegislatures broad latitude in determining whatpublic needs justify the use of the takings power.

IV

LEdHN[1B] [1B] LEdHN[6] [6] Those whogovern the City were not confronted with theneed to remove blight [**2665] in the FortTrumbull area, but their determination that thearea was sufficiently distressed to justify aprogram of economic rejuvenation is entitled toour deference. The City has carefully formulated

an economic development plan that it believes11 See alsoClark, 198 U.S., at 367-368, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25 S. Ct. 676;Strickleyv. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S.

527, 531, 50 L. Ed. 581, 26 S. Ct. 301 (1906) (In the opinion of the legislature and the Supreme Court of Utah the public welfare

of that State demands that aerial lines between the mines upon its mountain sides and railways in the valleys below should not

be made impossible by the refusal of a private owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution of the United States does

not require us to say that they are wrong);ONeillv. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 253, 60 L. Ed. 249, 36 S. Ct. 54 (1915) ( States

may take account of their special exigencies, and when the extent of their arid or wet lands is such that a plan for irrigation or

reclamation according to districts may fairly be regarded as one which promotes the public interest, there is nothing in the Federal

Constitution which denies to them the right to formulate this policy or to exercise the power of eminent domain in carrying it

into effect. With the local situation the state court is peculiarly familiar and its judgment is entitled to the highest respect).

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545 U.S. 469, *481; 125 S. Ct. 2655, **2663; 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, ***452
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pesticide market.467 U.S., at 1014, 81 L. Ed. 2d

815, 104 S. Ct. 2862. 14 The owner of the

department store in [*486] Bermanobjected to

taking from one businessman for the benefit of

another businessman,348 U.S., at 33, 99 L. Ed.

27, 75 S. Ct. 98, referring to the fact that underthe redevelopment plan land would be leased or

sold to private developers for redevelopment. 15

Our rejection of that contention has particular

relevance to the instant case: HN14 The public

end may be as well or better served through an

agency of private enterprise than through a

department of gover

Documents

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469