Katharsis in the Enneades of Plotinus

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Katharsis in the Enneades of PlotinusAuthor(s): Hazel E. BarnesSource: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 73 (1942),pp. 358-382Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

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358 Hazel E. Barnes [1942

XXIV.-Katharsis in the Enneades of Plotinus'

HAZEL E. BARNES

THE WOMAN'S COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

According to the teaching of Plotinus the Soul attains the Ekstasis by aprocess of purification involving two distinct steps. The Soul is united to theIntellectual-Principle by first pursuing, later abandoning Virtue and Self-knowl-edge, and by studying dialectic. The study of philosophy brings it to the Onebut involves ultimately the rejection of the intellectual act. The Soul itself isaffected,and the process has a positive as well as a negative aspect.

Katharsis nGreekreligionnd philosophys from hebeginninga means of separatingMan's soul from he body. At first, s inparticularwith heOrphics, heseparationsviewedalmost iterally.The soul is believedby means of ritualisticpurificationo be re-leased from he wheel ofbeing, that s,from he necessity f everagain inhabiting he mortalbody, conceivedalways as the soul'sprison. Plato in borrowing he conception nevitably ubstitutesa spiritual purification or the ritualistic. Personal immortality

afterdeath,when the soul is finally reedfrombodilyties, is theultimategoal. But there xists lso the desirefor presentpsycho-logical and spiritual eparationof soul and body,which s at oncea preparation nd immediate nd. This is basicallythe theoryofPlotinus. There are two changeswhich the particulardevelop-mentsof his own systemmake necessary. First, his acceptanceand formulationf the beliefhinted at in Plato and developedbythe Middle Platonists,that Matter itself s Evil, gives himmeta-

physical as well as psychological ustification ordemandingthatthe body be abandoned entirely. In the second place, the tran-scendentnatureof the One or the Good, to which he gives moreemphasis than Plato, necessitatesan abandoning of intellectionitself n the approach to the Highest,thusextending he scope ofkatharsis.

With these two importantexceptions,the ideas of the twomen are not dissimilar. It is not my purposeto present com-parisonofthe twoor to discussthe historical easons behindthose

1Translations and terminology (and capitalization) are based on, though not

always identical with, the work of Mackenna and Page, Enneads (London, 1917-1930).

In particular I have used Mackenna's designation for the three Plotinian realms:

vro , the One; vois, Intellectual-Principle; 4Ivvxi',oul.







Vol. lxxiii] Katharsis n Enneades ofPlotinus 359

clhangeswhich Plotinus made. T he significant oint is the factthat alreadywithPlato (slhown articularlyn Socrates' discussionin the Phaedo) katharsis s more than a separation. The Soul is

not mlerelyreedfrompollutionbut is itself nternally tlectedbythepurification,s made to concentrate ts powers. The process smore than evena psychological eparation; t is a spiritualrenewal.Failure to realize that such is the case in the thought f Plotinushas been, I believe, a major erroron the part of many Plotinianscholars.

It is well known that Plotinus himselfwas disturbedby theproblemof the Soul's relationto evil. Mletaphysicallypeaking,

he could not admit that an act of creationwhich mitatedthat ofthe Primal Cause could be in any sense at all an evil or a failure.Thus he was forcedto say that the voluntary mbodiment f theSoull Was goo(d. Yet fr-oillle lplilosol)llicalpoint of view, theremustof necessity e a certain lement f evil or defilementnvolvedin the union of Soul and Body in orderforhim to advance his pleathatthe human being houldreach everupwardto the Intellectual-Principleand so free his Soul from material ties. If the bondslinking oul to Bodyaredesirable, here an be no reasonfor esiring

to free heSoul from hem. The reconciliation f the two ideas isaccomplished by the use of an argumentbased on time. Theinitialentryof theSoul is allowed to be a metaphysicalnecessity.The Soul is a god, a laterphase of thedivine;but under tressofits power and of its tendencyto bring orderto its next lower, tpenetratesto thissphere in a voluntary plunge; if it turnsbackquickly, all is well; it will have taken no hurt by acquiring theknowledge f Evil and comingto understandwhat sin is (4.8.5).

Nevertheless, f the Soul remains in the lower world too long,fleeingheAllwhich s itshomeand exercisingts own ndividuality,then it is overcomeby the gradual encroachment f MVatterndlenicC s n1o oniger itlhout vil.

Whether he Soul's unionwiththebodily s evil only n processof timeor at the momentof the first escent, n eithercase it isentanglementwith Matter that producesthe evil. For with Plo-tinusMIatter, eingviewedas absolute privation, s Evil absolute.

Furthermore,t is at least sometimes onceived s being n activelyevil force s wellas a passive one. The result s thatthere re twoways in which its association with the Soul is harmful. First,Matter is accretion. The Soul takes on that which s alien to itself







360 Ihazel E. Barnes [1942

and is laden with a heavy burden,as it were,which imnpedestsflight pward. In morepsychological erms,the Soul by its con-cernforearthly hings s prevented romuninterruptedontempla-

tion of the divine. Second, Matter brings bout dispersionn theSoul. The Soul's power is enfeebledby its entanglementwithMatter so that its (livine facultiesno longerhave freeplay. Itlacks the strength nd power to raise itselfup to contemplatioll fthedivine.

Soul's entanglementwithMatter is but the last in a series ofdownwardsteps. The Soul's ultimategoal is the One, and thiscannot be reachedsimply by the takingaway of Matter. Accre-

tionand dispersionbothwerepresent s soon as theOne had over-flowed o produce the Intellectual-Principle,nd again when thisgave birthto the Soul. Matteris theonly positive, bsolute Evil'.It is onlythroughMatter that the Soul can lose evenpartially nyof ts ownnatural powers. But in so faras thedeparturefrom hedivineOne is concerned, ach step down is apostasy. Each newquality, howevergood in itself, s accretion, ntroducesdispersion,and so is relativelyevil. The Soul's union with the One is pre-vented by those very qualities which distinguish t as Soul andlikewiseby those qualities in the Intellectual-Principle, hlich itmust first ttain if it is to reach the One. By the possessionofanythingwhich s not in the One, it is rendered mpure and'mustbe purified efore hegoal is achieved.

If thedescentand subsequentdefilement ftheSoul was accom-plishedby the accruement falien qualitieswhichbrought he en-feebling f its powers, he reascent s to be achievedby thedirectlyopposite process. Addition is to be replaced by subtraction,dis-

persion by concentration. Since it is the presence of the alienwhich renders the Soul unable to concentrate, o collect its fullpowerswithin tself, t is the processof gettingrid of the foreignelementswhichreceives most of Plotinus' attention. But the factthatthere s always a positive'side as wellmust notbe overlooked.The Soul, then,must be purified fthat which t has takenon. Inthe Plotinianhierarchy hequalitiesofeach lower realmare not tobe imputedto thehigher ne. The higher ealm ausesand includes

but does notpartakeofthe lower ones (6.7.42). Thus the advanceto each new stage is achieved by the abandoningofthe lower one,withthe discardingof all the qualities inherent n it. To a largeextent it is entirelynegative; but once the negative process is







Vol. lxxiii] Katharsis n EnneadesofPlotinus 361

complete, the step into the higherstate has been accomplished.Each higher ealm s reachedautomatically fter heattainment fthepeak of the lowerone. To attainthehigher, ne mustdevelop

the full capacities of the lower. This perfections achieved bydiscardingall alien matter-that is, the qualities of a still lowerrealm-and so enablingthe state or power n questionto be mosttrulyand purely tself. Repose from he alien leaves the char-acteristic ctivity ntact (5.3.7).

In the reascentthe katharsis s thus continuous. In the lowerstages the objects of purificationre to a certainextentevil inthemselves n that they involve dependenceon Matter. In the

later the purifications only of that which is merelyno longerneeded because of being supersededby somethinghigher. Theactivitiesof which the Soul is purifiedn the later stages are inthemselves oodand have brought he Soul up to itspresentheight.They may,however, ecause oftheirverygoodness, ct as a snare,deceiving the Soul into thinking hat it has already reached thedivineand so prevent tsstriving o go higher.

Plotinus refers o the ascent as a sort ofmystic ourney to betakenby initiates 1.3.1). The path is upwardfrom helowest ofthree realms to the highest. The first tage is thusfrom heSoulto the Intellectual-Principle, he second fromthe Intellectual-Principalto the One. The first scent,however, ctuallyconsistsof twosteps:thefirstwithin hesphere fthe Soul itself,tsawaken-ing to a realizationof its own nature and origin; and the second,the actual advance into the higherrealm. In otherwords,Soulmust attain its highestcapacity as Soul before it can becomeIntellectual-Principle. Each man must come to a realization of

the essential life-that is, the divine Soul-within him and itspositionas an integralpart,an identitywith theAll-Soul. So farthe problem s an individualone, varying n its solutionwiththecharacter nd circumstancesfeach humanbeing. Once theunionwith theAll-Soul s realized, thenthepath to be trod s always thesame, the step frompure Soul to pure Intellectual-Principlendeventuallyfrom ureIntellectual-Principleo theOne.

While it is truethat katharsiswithPlotinus is forthe purpose

of enabling the Soul to be unitedwith the One during ife, t isimportanto rememberhatthe goal is by nomeansan harmonious,complementary ynthesis fSoul and Body. Repeatedly he urgesthe fact that the separationof the two must be absolute- in a








spiritualsense, of course,-that in any compromisebetween thetwo,Body will inevitablybe dominant,that any good in this lifeexists never through uch a partnership ut only throughSoul's

repudiation fit,that the iberation f theSoul is not a withdrawingfrom ertain vil aspectsof Body buta flight ntirelyway fromt.2

The condition ftheembodiedSoul is like goldin the naturalstate.The gold is hidden in inferior,xtraneousmatteralmost beyonddetection,but all the qualities which make the metal preciousremain ntact. The taskof bringingt to itsfinesttate is achievedby removing hat which has collected around it. Similarly,theSoul mustbe liberatedfrom ll thatpertainsto Matter,so that it

maybe free o exercise ll thepowers nherentn it. So long as itattaches any importanceto Body, there s a thinning ut or di-minishing f its own powers,both as Soul and as a potentialpartof each of themoredivine realms. Whileits divinity s not essen-tiallychanged, ts active power s not unaffected.

The purificationf theSoul, then, s a steadywithdrawalfromall that is inferioruntil it contains nothingextraneous to thedivineOne. How is this to be accomplished? The answer s thesame as that given by Plato-by the pursuitof philosophy. We

are specifically old so in several places. In the treatiseOn theAnimate nd Man when Plotinus s speakingofthevariouspossiblemodes of coalescenceof Soul and Body, he says that in case Soulis partlyattached and partlyfree, t will be the two-fold ask ofphilosophy o directthe lowerphase ofthe Soul towardthe higherand in so far as is possibleto separate it from ts instrument,heBody (1.1.3). Again nthe astEnnead hespeaksof the twophasesof theSoul and says thatthehigherwillbe held downby thelower

so longas the owerremains. If,however, hilosophy as freed hehigher oul (ELb ravreXwsbcaetexXoaootoa), thenthe lowerdepartsalone to an inferior ealm and thehigher, he true Soul, mayenterinto the ntellectualworldpurifiedfanycontamination romowerexistence (abmrqE KaOapcosev rc4Potp743v6epos -ppflj.vouabrrTs6.4.16).Againwe are told thattheman who is capable ofenteringntotheIntellectualRealm is the one with the natureof the lover and adisposition nherently hilosophical 5.9.2). Finally, in takingup

theproblem fwhether r not theSoul is to be consideredmperviousto earthly nfluence, lotinusasks, Why then f the Soul has beenunaffected romthe beginning, s it necessaryto make the Soul

2See 3.6.6; 2.3.9; 5.1.10; 1.7.3; 1.8.8; 5.4.15.








immune y meansof philosophy AbraOrTrIv qlvXtlv K tbtOLToctas

roteZv.6.5)?In suchstatementswe are toldspecifically ut without labora-

tion that katharsis s accomplishedthroughphilosophy. A closeexaminationof the Enneades will show, I believe,that the philo-sophical approachis maintained hroughoutn connectionwiththeSoul's purificationnd that the conceptionofkatharsisas accom-plished by philosophy orms he foundation f the wholePlotiniansystem.3 Yet the term philosophy varies according o the par-ticular tages nthe ascent. Thus at one time s meantthatpartofphilosophywhich is equivalent to mere ratiocination, t another

dialectic; at still other times philosophy s thoughtof as purereligion. For purposesof discussion we may divide the studyofthe approach to the One and its achievement hroughphilosophyinthe sameway as does Plotinus. Thus wehave first he approachto the Intellectual-Principle,econd the approach to the One, orthe Ekstasis.

I. THE APPROACH TO THE INTELLECTUAL-PRINCIPLE

(1) The Virtues. Without trueVirtue, says Plotinus, God isbut a name. By it the Soul is cleansed; through t, along withwisdom, God is made manifest 2.9.15). With Plotinus as withmost ofthe Greekphilosophers, irtue ncludesbut is never imitedto moralgoodness. With himmorethan with any of the othersVirtue s intellectualized. To a certainextent,particularly n thepassages dealing with metempsychosis, irtue is loosely equatedwithmorality nd justice, and Vice with theiropposites. But ingeneralhisbelief hat the earthly ifeof the Soul is never an end in

itself eads Plotinus to make of thevirtues imply means ofsepa-rating the Soul from all bodily concerns and training t to lookupward to the Intellectual-Principle.With Plato he declares thatall the virtues re purifications.Virtue n its truesense is not theregulation f earthly ifebut an internal iberationfrom t. In amorepositive ense t is the Soul's retirementnto tself s theresult

3 Marcel De Corte has discussed this subject in an article, Technique et fonde-ment de la purificationPlotinienne, Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie 5 (1931) 42-74.

His discussion, which is excellent so far as it goes, falls short, it seems to me, in twoimportant points: first,he fails to realize that the Soul itself s affectedby the purifica-tion; second, he does not distinguish between dialectic and philosophy, as does Plotinus,and so does not give proper emphasis to the fact that there are two distinct stages inthe process of katharsis.








ofpurificationf all thatbelongsto theexternalworld. This viewmust neverbe misconstrueds meaningthat earthlymorality ndgoodnessare unimportantn Plotinus'eyes. But their mportance

is takenforgranted s ofnecessityncluded n a higher onception.Plotinus' views on Virtueand man's philosophicalpurposearesummedup in hisfamous entence oming t the end ofhistreatiseOn Virtue: Our concern s not to be sinless but to be divine(1.2.6). This is,of course, losely inkedwiththe Platonicdoctrineofattaining ikeness o God,whichPlotinus quotes directly, ayinglike Plato that in attainingthis likeness ies our escape from viland thisworld. To Plato's explanationthat this likenessmeans

becoming ust andholy, ivingbywisdom (pueTabpovkews -yeveioa),

Plotinusadds the words oXwsEvAperT (1.2.1). Thus it is Plotinuswhoemphasizesthenecessity fVirtue;but he does so only for hesake of givingit a specificand strict nterpretation, hich laterleads to a partial discardingof it. Plato goes on in the passagementioned o what he believesto be the truereason forpractisingVirtueand shunningVice. God is in no wise and in no mannerunrighteous,but utterlyand perfectlyrighteous,and there isnothing o like him as that one of us who in turnbecomesmost

nearlyperfect n righteousness. It is hereinthat the trueclever-ness of a man is foundand also his worthlessnessnd cowardice;for the knowledgeof this is true Virtue,and ignoranceof it isfolly rmanifestwickedness (Theaetetus 76 B-C).

WithPlato, then,man mustpursueVirtue merelybecause Godis perfectrighteousness. This is not untrueforPlotinus,but hedoes not see things uite so simply. To beginwith,he dividesthevirtues nto two-or perhapsthree differentlasses. The firsts

thatofthecivic virtues, nd these Plotinusdecidesare notcapableof bringing bout likeness. For how, he asks, can therebe aquality such as couragewherethere s no danger,or self-restraintwhere here re no falseallurements romwhichone shouldrestrainoneself? The conclusion s that the civic virtues n so faras theyare associatedwith mortalreasoningfacultiesdo not exist in thedivine realm. These are all closely bound up with those con-comitantsof bodily existencewhichare not found n the divine.

Phronesis s pure ratiocination; ndreiais concernedwiththe pas-sionatenature;sophrosyne roducesthe harmonybetweenpassionand reason; dikaiosynes the employment f each ofthevirtues sit should command or obey. It is obvious that we cannot gain








likenessto God by virtues so firmly ound to the bodily. Thecivic virtues are not thoseby whichmen win the ultimatemysticvision.

Yet therehave been men possessedof the civic virtueswhomtraditionhas recognized s divine. We mustrecognize hat thereare bothtwo planesofexcellence nd two classes ofvirtues owhichwe may attain. The virtuesof this lowerplane are by no meansto be despisedso longas theyare viewed in theproperperspective.Moral excellence s formfor the Soul (6.7.27). The lowervirtuesregulate and ennobleour lives here. They set limitsand measureto our desires and emotions. They save us fromfalse opinion.

For a manbecomesbetterbybeing ubjecttomeasure ndremovinghimself rom he sphereof the unbounded and unmeasured. TheSoul is as Matter to the acts of the virtues,and they are like animage ofthe best which s above. By replacing he uttermeasure-lessness ofMatter with someslightparticipationn ideal form, hevirtuesbringthe Soul a little nearer to the divinethat is beyondform. Then the Soul beingcloser to the divinethan thebodyandthus more akin participatesmorefully, nd deceivingus, it almost

seems like the divine itself. It is in this way that those whopossess the civicvirtues cquire likeness 1.2.2).It will be notedthat even in thispraise ofearthlyvirtuesthey

are givenno trueultimatevalue. Divinity s not reachedby suchvirtues,only an illusion because of an approximationto it. Ifman is deceived by this appearance,Virtuebecomes itself snareand a hindrance o the Soul. All practicalvirtues n themselvesare simply ensiblequalities, and qualities are associated with the

Soul in its apostasy. The practicalvirtuesare important s con-tributing o theexternal ocialwell-being fhumanity. Theymakeforbeauty and order n the worldand so are desirable,but theyarenotnecessary 6.3.16).

An extensionof this idea is the beliefthat good is not derivedfromthe act itselfbut fromthe innerdispositionprompting t.Heracles is the type of a hero of virtuous actions. Through hisnoble servicehe was deemedworthy f being a god. But he did

not have the contemplativenatureand so was notwhollyworthyofbeing n thehigher ealms. Something fhim remainedbelow,and that is why thepoet put Heracleshimself mong thegods andhis shade in the lowerworld 1.1.12).








Since it is clear that likenessto God cannotbe attainedmerelyby the practiceof civic or practicalvirtues,Plotinus assumes theexistenceofa higher lass ofvirtuesof the same name as the lower

but moreintellectual n nature. Even these ideal virtuesdo notof necessity xist in the divinestate, but through cquiringthemwe attain likenessto a Being in which theyhave no place. Itis the Plotinian principleof advancing by means of that whichmustbe discarded ust before heultimategoal is achieved. In thefinal nalysisthehigher irtues re littlemorethan katharsis tself,in thisinstancethe freeing f the intellectfrom ll that is bodily.

PlotinusdiscussesPlato's sayingthat all the virtuesare puri-

fications.4 In what sense, he asks, are we to thinkPlato meant

this? The Soul's evil comesabout throughtsfusionwiththebody,by sharing ts statesand, so to speak, thinkingwith t. Thus eachof the fourcardinal virtues is interpreted s one aspect of thepurifying rocess. Phronesis refersto the Soul's separating itsintellectfrom he body and acting alone. Sophrosynes refusingto be affected y the passionsof the body. Andreiais ceasingtofear eparationfrom he bodyby death. Finally dikaiosynes thedominanceof reasonand intellectwithoutopposition 1.2.3).5

After he acts of the highervirtuesthe Soul is left mmunetopassion,and onewouldnot be wrong nsayingthatsuch a Soul hadattainedlikenessto God. For the divine is pure,and its activityis such that likeness to it is wisdom (1.2.3). Now the Soul willhold itselfaloof from ll passions and affections,nd all that itgives to the body will be bestowedas upon something eparate.For theSoul's truegoodlies ndevotiontothe ntellectual-Principle,which is its kin (1.2.4). Freedom to exercisethis contemplation

is won by the purification hichthe highervirtueshave achieved.At timesPlotinusmakes the connectionbetweenthe virtuesandintellect little loser. In one passagevirtues re said to be speciesand not primarygenera because theyare all subordinateacts ofintellect 6.2.18). In anotherwe read that the virtuesof theSoularethosebywhich he vision sdirected o the ntellectual-Principle,wisdom and thought (1.2.7). But it must be remembered hatwhilethehighervirtues re closelyboundup withthe intellectual,

theydo not constitute he intellectual ct itself. Virtueisof the

4For the development of this idea in Plato and Plotinus see E. Brehier, APETAI

KAOAP2:EI2:, REA 42 (1940) 53-58.6 See also 1.6.5-6.








Soul, not of the Intellectual-Principle r the One. The highervirtues are not even the actual contemplation f the Intellectual-Principle. They are thepurificationfall that wouldprevent hat

contemplation. They form the intellectualattitude that allowsthe vision.That the highervirtues completelysupersede the lower is

brought ut in a passage in which Plotinus divides men into threegroups:thosewho live bysense and pretended easoning,hosewholive by a virtuewhich enables themto select well among lowerthings, nd those who live bydivinecontemplation. Oftheseonlythe third lass everattains ultimatetruth 5.9.1). It maybe said

that thosewho pursue thepracticalvirtuesbut notdivine contem-plationhold a middlepositionanalogous to that ofChristianswhowould live by worksalone. The Christianwho lives a moral lifeand keepsGod's laws is more to be commended han hewho ivesalife of wickedness;yet without divine love he is nothing. ThePlotinianphilosopher, oo, is to be praised forfreeing imself romthe owestphasesofbodilyaffections,utwithout he divinevisionhe still ives in unreality. The object of our imitation s not goodmenbut the divine (1.2.7).

It is clear that all the virtuesare means of purification.Thecivicvirtuespurifymanofobjective evil; that s, theyrestrainhimfromvice. The intellectualvirtuescompletely ree heSoul ofalldependenceuponthebodily. Both ofthesearenegative. Is therea positiveVirtue? Virtuein the positivesense is that whichre-mains afterthe Soul's achieved purification. It is the essentialact, the Soul's truegood-in otherwords, the Soul's vision, thecontemplation of the Intellectual-Principle.Purificationbrings

about the Soul's turningfrom the bodily to the Intellectual-Principle. The Soul's virtue s the actual vision whichresults nits identification ith the Intellectual-Principle1.2.4).

To sum up, there are three teps in the approach to the Intel-lectual-Principle y Virtue: (1) the turning f theSoul frommoralevil and lack oforder; (2) the turning f the Soul fromBody intoitselfand its own reason; (3) the turning f the Soul from tselfto the ntellectual-Principle,nthis ast case alone notaccomplished

by any truediscarding flowerelements. It is seen thatVirtue-or the virtues-becomes more and more intellectualized s theprocessofpurificationnd theconsequentreascentof theSoul con-tinue. By thetimethatthethird tep has beenreached,Virtue s








only a means of identification ith pure intellect, nd no ethicalcoloringwhatsoeverremains. Virtueas commonly onceivedhasbeen sought,practiced, nd ofnecessity ranscended.

(2) Self-Knowledge.rvcoot-avrovas Plotinususes it has some-what essofan ethicaland psychologicalndmoreof a metaphysicalcharacter than with Socrates. The Platonist by self-knowledgecomes to knowthe Soul in its relationto the divine. The Neo-Platonistby looking nwardarrives t the realization hat he him-self s onewiththe divine. Plotinus nhis teaching oncerning hehigherand lower parts of the Soul includes the idea that self-knowledges thepropermethodof earningproperly o understand

them (6.4.17). rvcot YauToJvs said to those who, because they aremanifold, ave the task of appraising hemselves incetheydo notknowall or someof their onstituentsust as theydo notknowtheirown origin r principle f Being (6.7.41).

But the attainment of self-knowledge ith Plotinus includesmore than the realization of one's psychologicalnature and ca-pacities. It takes on a metaphysical haracterby which the con-templationof oneself eads one to the understandingf the divine

Soul within. Following this the Soul's contemplationof itselfresults n the perception f the Intellectual-Principle ithin tselfand consequently he achievement f self-identity ith the higherrealm. Man containswithinhim potentiallyboth the Soul andthe Intellectual-Principle. By looking nwardhe maycontemplatethemand eventuallybe identifiedwiththem.

Self-knowledges a meansof innergrowth s presentedperhapsmost clearly n the treatiseOn Beauty. If man would know thebeautywhichthe Soul possesses, ays Plotinus,he mustwithdraw

withinhimself. If he does not yetfindhimself eautiful,he mustlabor like the creatorof a statue, cutting way what is excessive,straightening hat is crooked,and so forth. When the statue ofthe innerman is made perfect,henone is gathered nto thepurityof his own being where nothingof externalscan cling to him.Then he becomes thatveritable ight, eryvision, nd so mounting,hisSoul can approachthedivineIntellectual-Principle.

The view that our perceptionof beauty, form, ntellect, nd

the good mustbeginwith the studyof thosequalitieswithinour-selvesis notwhollydissimilar o the Platonic doctrinewhichwouldhave our appreciationof beauty dependenton our knowledgeofthe idea ofbeauty,whichwe learned n a formernd higher tate.








Nevertheless, ifferencesncrease as one looks for them. For onething,Plotinus states thatthegod in each of us is the same (6.5.1).By looking nwardwe piercemore and morebeyondall the acci-

dental properties f ourselvesas individualhumanbeingsuntilatlast we see the trueselfwithinus,whichis divine and above allthat whichaccentuatesourdistinction rom therrealbeings.

The preceptyvwOtavrov, then,s applied o theprocess ftheSoul's contemplationof its own naturewhile purifyingtselfofexternal-that is, bodily-interests. In otherwords,self-contem-plation s again a form fkatharsis. The turningnward s for hepurposeofenablingtheSoul to be alone. Even thecircularmove-

ment oftheheavens Plotinusexplainsas comingabout because theSoul always discoversmorethanSoul, whileSoul alone is what itwouldfind 2.2.2). For theSoul to regain ts unionwiththehigherpower,two thingsmust be done. First, the Soul must learn toknow the worthlessness f those objects which it now honors.Second, itmustrecall ts ownorigin nd worth. For itsseparationfrom the Intellectual-Principle as come about as the result offorgetting hence it came and consequentlyholding tself n dis-honor and glorifyingn inferior xternals. The second methodsupersedesthe first nd if clearlybrought out explains the first.The Soul mustnow look inwardand by seeingonly itself earntoknow ts own origin nd ultimategoal. To knowourselves s toknow oursource (6.9.7).

Self-knowledges an intellectual,on the whole,positive formof katharsis,for t raises the soul to the Intellectual-Principleyteaching t to knowmoreof its own nature. Yet as was the casewith the virtues,self-knowledges eventuallydiscarded. In the

treatise On IntellectualBeauty Plotinus describes the man whothrough elf-knowledgend the appreciationof innerbeauty hasarrived t the desiredgoal. At thatmomenthe may see an imageof himself iftedto greaterbeauty; but this he ignores, ovelythough t is, and sinks into perfectunity with the divine. Theturningto the divine is in two phases. First comes separationwhen man is aware of himself. Then as he advances inwardhefears heseparated ife nd forgets imselfn theveryact ofturning

inward. If he does not lose this self-awareness,he vision is notcomplete; and he keeps himselfapart fromthe divine. Activeself-knowledge as led to the desiredgoal by being first ought,thenachieved,and thenabandoned.







370 IHazelE. Barnes [1942

(3) Dialectic. In the treatiseOn DialecticPlotinustellsus thatthere rethree ypesof menwhoare capable ofreaching he ultimategoal. They are themusician, helover, nd thephilosopher. The

musicianand the lover must be guided by outside influence; hephilosophermay advance by the impulseof his own nature. Themusicianproceedsfrom heperception f tones,rhythms,nd formsin natural sounds to the realizationof the correspondences ndrelationships ehind them. Then he mustbe taughtthatwhat sothrilledhim was the intellectualharmonyand that the beautywithin t was not a particularbeautybut universalbeauty. Fromtherehe must go on to study the truthsof philosophyuntil he

understands hosethingswhichhithertohe possessed n ignorance.The lover,who belongsto the class above that of the musician,throughwhich the musician must pass on the journey upward,advances from he perception f physicaland particularto intel-lectualand universalbeauty after he mannerprescribed y Plato.The philosopher, nlike theothertwo,does not need to beginwiththe separationfrombodilyinterests, orby his verynature he isalready prepared or heupwardstep. He begins t oncethe studyof mathematics, ywhich he maywin a comprehensionfabstract

thought nd a faith n the ncorporeal,rainingn the higher irtues,and finally hepursuitofdialectic.

It is the pursuit of dialectic which completes the necessarytrainingof all three classes. This is the science of reality,andPlotinusexplainsverycarefullywhat he means by it. It is thatwhich eachesthetruenatureofthings,howing heposition f eachobjectwithregard oreality. It dealswithBeingand itsdistinctionfromNon-Being and with the Good and the Not-Good and the

eternal and the perishable. These things it studies with truescience,not opinion. It comprehends he Ideas, traversestheentire Intellectual realm, then knowingthe Being in Intellect,arrived at Unity, it contemplatesand is at peace (1.3.4). Inotherwordsit bringsthe Soul to perfect dentitywith the Intel-lectual-Principle; nd in thisunion the Soul joins in the essentialactivityofthe Intellectual-Principle,hich s thecontemplation fthe One. It mustbe noted that this passage does not indicate a

unionwiththeOne. The Intellectual-Principle,hilecontemplat-ingtheOne, is at no time dentifiedwith t.In this description ialecticseems to be puremetaphysics. Is

it to be understoodas identical with philosophy? Fortunately








Plotinusanticipatesthisquestionand tells us that it is not. Dia-lectic is the preciouspart of philosophy,which s itself he mostprecious. Philosophyuses dialectic in a relationship ven closer

than thatin whichother killsuse arithmetic,n forming concep-tionof the laws ofthe universe nd in its contemplation fethics;fordialecticsets forth he practicesfromwhichethics result. Thedifferences even moremarkedbetweendialectic and ratiocination.Dialectic deals not with rules and theories but with reality. Itknowsuntruths nd sophismsonlyas falsities utside tsowncanonoftruth. Verbal propositions re beneath t, though t knowsthetruthbehind them. Petty precisionsof process it leaves to any

-other cience whichmay care forthe work. Above all it compre-hends themovements ftheSoul. It is a sortofsuper-reasoning.With wisdomit stripsall thingsof Matter and presentsthemintheiruniversal spect.

By dialectic we can overcome heweakness ofourusual mentalacts,which are not pureintellectbut humanreasonswayedby allthat is external (3.4.17). The hierarchyof reason in the Plo-tinian ystem s roughlyparallelto thatofthevirtues. The know-ing of sensible thingscomes first. All knowledge nvolving anysort of sense perception s the specific act of the embodied Souland has no true significance. Next comes such reasoning as iscarriedon by themindalone; that s mereratiocination. It is thismentalact which s providedfor n thetraining iven by thestudyofmathematics,which eads to the understanding f the abstract.After histherecomes that use and act ofreason (XoyLo-IOs)whichis characteristic ftheSoul. This, it is probable, s notdissociatedfromdialectic, fortheobject ofreasoningwithboth is trueBeing.

Witheach level ofreason as witheach plane ofvirtue, he lower salways supersededby the higher, nd even the essential act oftheSoul willeventuallygive place to thatof the Intellectual-Principle.

Closely connectedwithdialectic is Plotinus' doctrine of form.In the pursuitof beauty we learn to know the beautiful first nsensibleobjects. Then thisveryappreciation of themteaches usto find eauty n thenon-sensible ntilwe love thatwhich s totallyunrelated to earthlybeautyand look on earthlybeautyas a snare

tokeepus from hedivine. In thesameway we advancebyleavingthe formless nd learning to perceive form,but our goal is thatwhich s withoutform. The bestofMatter is thatwhich has someform. Soul is form o all ofMatter. The Intellectual-Principles








form o Soul. But the primal ourcefromwhichall formhas comeis formless 6.7.28 and 33). To a certainextentform s reason,particularly n the realm of the Platonic Ideas, which Plotinus

adopts as havingtheirdwelling n the Intellectual-Principle. Cer-tainlyour perception fform omesthrough eason;and the Ideas,which are divine,purelyintellectualform,must be seen throughdialectic.

As the resultof the trainingby dialecticthe Soul achieves theIntellectual-Principle.The first rinciples f the scienceare givenby the Intellectual-Principletself. The rest dialecticdevises foritself, niting nd dividinguntil t comesto perfect ntellect. For,

he says,we read that dialectic is the purest Ka6WapWnraroV)chieve-

ment of intellectand wisdom. Dialectic, then, is -the finalstepaftertheSoul has been purified romBody. Yet it is itself sortof katharsis. It is dialectic which determines he nature of thevirtueswhich act as purifications. It is dialectic which purifiesthoughtof earthlyelementsand presents t in universal terms.Dialectic is the means by which the Soul exerts ts own absoluteact of Virtueand obtainsthevisionofthe Intellectual-Principle.

(4) The First Katharsis Achieved. In describingthe actualvision of the Intellectual-Principle, lotinus' language is at firstpurelymetaphysical, inally lmostmystical. The Soul's approachis by no means an accretionof knowledge, perceiving f divineobject by active subject. The Soul does not learnto comprehendthe Intellectual-Principles one studies to masterthe contentsofa new book. This cannot be true for two reasons. First, the

distinction etweensubject and object does not existin the Intel-

lectual-Principle. Knowing is an absolute, achieved state, not aprocessofbecoming. Second, theSoul does not striveto compre-hend the Intellectual-Principle ut to become one with it. One

mustbe carefulto observePlotinus' oft-repeatedwarning nd not

view his realms too concretely,either spatially or temporally.There is no difficultyn the concept of the Soul's identificationwiththe Intellectual-Principle.The studentwho becomesan artistis not changed fromone personinto another. He is merelythe

same man developingpowerswhichwere always withinhim but

hithertontirely rpartiallyunrecognizednd dormant. The samedivineessence s present lways; accordingto theconcentration fits powers, it is called Soul, Intellectual-Principle,r the One.







Vol. lxxiii] Kathaursisn EnneadesofPlotinus 373

Man's ability to reason out these matters comes about partlythrough hefactthatSoul, though he owestof the threerealms, snevertheless ntellective,partlybecause the Intellectual-Principle

is in us as well as Soul, a part ofus to which we are always rising(1.1.13). The Philonicconception f By Light, Light (cos 4corw)is directlyparalleled by the Plotinian Intellectual-PrinciplebyIntellectual-Principle Po-vsw).6 It is for this reason that theSoul aided by dialectic is able to bridgethe gap even though tsown intellectual owers re inferior.

The act of identification f Soul and Intellectual-Principlessimultaneously self-realizationnd a loss ofself. We are most

completely ware of ourselveswhen we are mostcompletelydenti-fiedwiththeobject of ourknowledge (5.8.11). The man in sucha state is like one possessedby a god. Givinghimself ompletelyto the innerdivineintellections, e becomes no longer he seerbuttheseen,theperfect nityofsubjectand object. The vision tself,we are told, s seeinga god givingbirth o beautiful ffspring.It isbeholding the realityof a functioning niverse n its relation todivinecause. Plotinusresorts o thefigures f Greekmyth. Zeus,theSoul, is thesovereign fthevisibleuniverse. By beholdinghisbeauty we may gain an impressionof the greaterbeauty of hisfatherKronos, the Intellectual-Principle,who is fetteredto anunchangingdentity 5.8.13). Man's identification ith the Intel-lectual-Principle s the experience f a sense of unionbetweenhisintelligence r essentialBeing and the intellectualessenceunder-lying all reality. It is the absorption of the restrictedndividualmindorsoul into theultimate,universalmind, hroughwhich loneit has powerand Being.

The natureof the Intellectual-Principle as been thesubject oflengthydiscussionby manywriters, nd it need not be dealt within detail here. Plotinus gives a good sentencedescriptionof it:It is veritable Intellect which as such thinks of authentically

existing eings ndmakesthem xist. It is,then, uthenticBeing.The Intellectual-Principles ultimate reality,which is identicalwith true ntellection,bsoluteknowledge.

The consideration f the nature of the achieved vision of the

Intellectual-Principlehows how each one of the steps previouslydiscussed s necessary o attain it. Firstof all, thedivine ntellect6 For a discussion of this conception in the works of Philo see E. R. Goodenough,

By Light, Light, The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (Yale, 1935).








is separatedfrom ll sensualor perishable hings. For thisreasonthe virtuesmust be pursued as a means of separatingthe Soulfrom bodily interests. Second, the Intellectual-Principles self-

knowing. Thus the initiate must begin with self-introspection,learning o knowhis own natureas man and as a partof the divine.Third, it is pure intelligence. Hence the higherformsof Virtueare intellectualized, nd the contemplative ife s the only one oftrue value. Finally, the Intellectual-Principles not only intelli-gence but reality; it is the intellectionof Being. For this theonly true approach must be dialectic. This science is, of course,intellectual,both in itself and in its being the culmination,the

ideal formof the lowermental sciences,whichmust be masteredby all philosophers.7 In addition, t is the scienceof Being; andits achievedgoal is theknowledge fBeing,which s the ntellectual-Principle. Dialectic is not itselfthe Intellectual-Principle,ut itis the final and only step which leads to the very heart of theIntellectual-Principle.

By dialectic,thepreciouspartofphilosophy,man freeshimselfeven from hesciencesand mentalacts whichhave broughthim sofarupward. The change mplied n Soul itself s discarded. He is

still Soul, but he is the unchanging ntellectual-Principles well.Finally even dialectic is leftbehind. It is the last rung of theladderby whichman has climbedout of thecave and stepped ntothe outerworld.

THE APPROACH TO THE ONE

The Intellectual-Principles the natural dwellingplaceof theSoul. The One is to be apprehendedonlyin thoseraremoments

ofmystic nion,theEkstasis,whichPorphyry ells us thatPlotinusexperiencedonly fourtimes in the course of theiryearstogether(Vita 23).8 Yet the memory f the vision remainseven aftertheactual Ekstasis is a thingofthe past, and it is onlywhentheSoulpossessesthismemory nd theknowledge hat the visionmaycome

7 It is noteworthy that Plotinus gives less emphasis to the training of the human

mind than does Plato. Human knowledge is everywhere neglected by Plotinus forthe

sake of dwelling on spiritual values. Though Plotinus' system is more definitethan

Plato's in emphasizing the presence ofan

Intellectual-Principle,it is the spiritualized

Soul and not the glorifiedhuman intellect that attains the divine vision.8 A. H. Armstrong presents a careful comparison of the nature of the One and of

the Intellectual-Principle and their relation to the human soul in The Architecture f

the ntelligible Universe in the Philosophy ofPlotinus (Cambridge, 1940).








again, that life in the Intellectual-Principlean be lived to thefullestdegree. Thus the Ekstasis, howeverrare, s necessaryforthenormal,perfectifeof theSoul, which s led in the Intellectual-

Principle.As has beensaid, thevision of the One cannot be attained until

the union of the Soul with the Intellectual-Principle as beenachieved. We must behold the One not by bringingn anythingofsense or by taking nto the Intellectual-Principlenything romSoul; butbeholding he mostpurebypureIntellectual-Principlendfrom hepeak ofthe Intellectual-Principle 6.9.3). Yet whiletheSoul is thusled to see thatwhichthedivine ntellect ontemplates,

nevertheless efore heactual identification ith theOne can comeabout, the Soul must be purified f those qualitieswhich charac-terizethe Intellectual-Principles distinct fromthe One. Theseare multiplicity nd intellection. Multiplicityn thesecond realmcomesabout through he factthat it is the home of the Ideas andthat its contemplation f the One is in itself denial ofunity;forwherethere are one to contemplate nd one to be contemplated,there is multiplicity. For the human Soul intellection n thisrealm is contemplation nd meditation upon realityand divinecause. It is a sinking of oneself n a universalMind. But thisMind is ever in quest of somethinghigher, nd by this questingintellection,he Soul arrives at the utterreposewherethere s nomoredesiring. Like thehighervirtues, ntellection ids at first nproducingkatharsis and in preparing he Soul for the finalstep.Yet ultimately t too is abandoned.

It may be well here to remark hatthediscarding fall specificquality as not belonging o the One does not necessarilymply a

completelynegativeview of the nature of the One. The One isnotabsolutenegationbut absoluteperfection. The constantnega-tionswhichPlotinusapplies to it are simply o emphasizebymeansofrefusing o admit inadequate restrictiveerms, he transcendingpositiveaspect ofthe One. The Soul mustempty tself fearthlyqualities in order to take on the divine; it does not becomeemptyin orderto make itself part of nothing. But the natureof thedivine ofwhich t becomes a part cannotbe predicated n human

terms. This view of the One as both the negation of all knownqualitiesand yetperfect ullnesss reflectedn thepurificationhichthehumanSoul mustundergo. That is to say, the Soul mustbothpurify tselfof its weaknesses,of accretion, and concentrate ts








powers,buildingup its strength o that it maybe capable ofcon-tainingthedivine. The processof ridding he Soul of its limitingqualities must be accomplishedbeforean approach can be made

beyondthem.The One is also calledbyPlotinus The Good, though hetermhas, of course, no ethical connotationbut designatesrathertheuniversalreIXetovhich s beyondall specificreXeta. It will be re-called that Plotinus' finaldesignation f a positivevirtue found nthe first tage of the ascentwas the essentialact of the Soul, theactual process of the Soul's contemplationof the Intellectual-Principle. With thisconceptionof Virtueas a movement oward

a higher ealmofreality,we beginto approachPlotinus' theory fspecific nd absolute Good. Since already in the first tep Virtuehad thusbecomenon-ethical,t is not surprisinghatnowgoodnessbecomes a matterof native activity exertedby one existentinreaching oward nother. This is the central hought f thetreatiseOn the Primal Goodand Its Secondary orms 1.7). In this essay,in which there s frequent onfusion etweentheGood as absolute,motionless chievement nd the Good as a methodof leading theSoul upward,threesignificant ointsstand out. First, it is said

that the Good for each entity-that is, its highestvirtue-is itsnaturalactivity,which n the case of the rightly unctioningoulis everupwardto thePrimalGood. On thehigher lane theSoul'sgoodness is its perceptionof the Primal Good as being the truecause of the Soul's attractionto the Intellectual-Principle. ThisactivedesirefortheGood, the reaching ut for t is themethodbywhichthe Soul attains it. Second, the Soul is said to be able toachieve the Good, not only by reachingout for t but becoming

likeit. Here certainly s implieda positiveconceptionof boththeOne and themethodofattainingunion with t. Finally,theGoodis said to be possessedin Unity,Being,and Form. Of theseonlythe first elongs n theGood itself. Againwe have an example ofthe higherplane reachedby means of thosethingswhich are to beabandoned once the goal is achieved. The Good, then, is theultimateand may be attainedby the Soul's exercisingts naturalinclination oward t.

It is clearthatthere an be in this second stepno directparallelto the part played by the first wo classes of virtuesin the,firstkatharsis. Likewise self-intellections no longer considered anadequate method 5.6.5). This might eemrather urprisingince








the very essence of the Intellectual-Principles self-intellection.For what othername couldbe givento a knowledge hat s absolutewithno distinctionbetweensubject and object? It may be that

to have the Intellectual-Principleome to recognizethe presenceof the One within it as the resultof conscious self-examinationwould imply a distinctionbetween the knower and the known,which is just what Plotinus is vigorouslydenying. At any ratethe contemplation ftheOne by the Intellectual-Principles neverthesame as the Soul's vision of t; for heformer emands a certainseparationwhich n the case of the Ekstasis is denied. The Soulwhile t lives in the Intellectual-Principlehares n the divinecon-

templation, ut it knows a stillhigherdesire. In the Ekstasis theSoul is not the Intellectual-Principleontemplating. It is theOneitself.

How are we to explain this transcending chievement? Is itby any knownprocessother than intellection? And what nameare we to give intellection n thishighestplane? Taking the lastquestionfirst,we may recall that in the earlierstep, the last andultimately ffectivemethod ofbringing heSoul to the unionwiththe Intellectual-Principlewas the pursuit of dialectic. At thatphase ofhis discussionPlotinusexplicitly tated thatdialecticwasbuta part, lthough preciouspart,ofphilosophy. Sincedialectic,thelowerofthetwo,brought heSoul to the Intellectual-Principle,is it not possible,or rathernecessary,to assume that philosophyplays at least a part in bringing heSoul to thevisionoftheOne?There is one passage in which,as it seems to me, Plotinusclearlyand beyond question applies the termphilosophyto the Soul'sattemptto knowthe One. He is speakingin the last Ennead of

thepain thatcomes to theSoul when t tries ograsptheconceptionof absolute unity. He continues, Soul mustsee in its own way;this s by coalescence,unification; ut in seekingthusto knowtheUnity, it is preventedby that very unification romrecognizingwhat it has found; it cannot distinguish tselffromthe object ofthis ntuition. Nonetheless,t is necessaryforone to do thus fheis goingto striveto comprehend heUnitybyphilosophy (6.9.3).Certainlythere s no termotherthan philosophyto be applied to

intellectual ctivityexerted n the efforto comprehenddivinity,noother, hat s, oncethelowerforms freasonhave beenruledout.If it is the task ofdialecticto bringthe Soul intothe Intellectual-Principle,where lsecan be thefield fphilosophyave at theheight








of the Intellectual-Principle,tandingwith the Soul as it preparesto experience heEkstasis?

Granted that it is intellection s philosophywhich plays an

importantpart in this finalstep, what specificallys its function,and is it initself ll sufficient?That intellectionloneis notenoughis made very clear. This maybe partlybecause intellections notpresent n theOne itself. For true ntellections a reaching owardthe highestGood, and the One cannot have a reachingout whenthere s nothing eyond tto which t can aspire. Partlyresponsiblein all probability s simply the fact that in the ultimatevisionPlotinus like most mysticsdemands that therecome forthpower

from hePrimalSource and thatwithout t man is powerless.To analyzeincut and driedfashion healmostpoetic descriptionwhich Plotinusgives of the Ekstasis is as unfair s forthe presentpurpose it is necessary. The poetic language,however, s the in-evitable result of his attempt to describe somethingsurpassinghumanknowledge nd never a screenfor nadequate formulationfideas; and thereare several definite onceptionswhichstand outclearly. In most ofthesepassages there s an accompanying tate-ment to the effect hat intellections finally bandoned. In the

treatiseOntheMultiplicityfthe deal Formswe are toldthatwhenby the love of Beauty, conceivedhere as the love of form,we ap-proach the first rincipleof Beauty, whichis formless,we are tothinkof it not as attainedby the Soul but as comingto the Soul,which s present o receive t after urning rom tsold environmentand preparingtself s beautifully s possibleand coming ntolike-ness withthe divine. The Soul nowperceivesthe presencemani-festedwithinher. The Evacvdns possible because there are no

longer wobut one. Whilethevisionremains, istinctions lost-and Plotinus brings n here the parallel of the earthlyunion oflovers. Withtrue udgmenttheSoul perceives hat it has reachedthe ultimate goal of its desire and that thereis nothinghigher.The truthwhich t perceivesnow it can affirmeyonddoubt,butit will make the affirmationater and silently. By this Plotinusprobablymeans that the state is not one of conscious knowingbut thatwhile t cannot aterbe put intowordsforothers, ts truth

and powerwillnotbe lost to himwho has experiencedt. Now the

Soul realizesthe nferiorityf all which t formerlyccepted. Evenintellectiont willdiscard; for ntellections movement, nd this tdoes notdesire. It is through ecomingtselfntellectual-Principle








that the Soul now experiencesthe vision; by becoming ntellec-tualized it has been able to take its stand in that intellectual ealmwhich it first ontemplated. But once catching a glimpseof a

higherrealm, the Soul leaves the lower ust as a personwill con-templatea beautiful house only until its greatermaster has ap-peared. The Soul now knowsno movement ince the Supremeknowsnone; it is nownot even Soul since theSupreme s not in lifebut above life; t is no longer ntellectual-Principle,or heSupremehas not intellection,nd the likenessmust be perfect; hisgraspingis not even by intellection, orthe Supreme is not knownintel-lectively 6.7.34-35).

Following this passage Plotinus reviewsagain the intellectualstepsby whichthe Soul has reached ts presentposition. He con-cludeswith a significantentence. At the momentpreceding heEkstasis the seeker is still strivingupward with his intellectualcapacities, but suddenlyweptbeyondt all bythevery rest fthewaveof ntellecturging eneath, e is lifted nd sees,neverknowinghow; thevisionfloods heeyeswith ight,but it is nota light how-ing some otherobject, the light tself s thevision. I Clearly thevisioncomes about as theresultofbothintellectionnd thepowerof the One. The latteris predominant, ut it acts almost simul-taneouslywith the wave of intellection. Neitheralone would besufficient.

In the final ectionofthe last Ennead Plotinuspresents sortofsummary fhis deas on thenatureoftheEkstasisand itsattain-ment. He repeats that in the Ekstasis thereare not twobut one.It is not a visionperceivedbut a unity pprehended, nd the mageof t, ftheseekerwillbut remember, illremainwithhim. While

it lasts,there s no passion,no outgoingdesire,no reason,no intel-lection,no individual self. In perfect tillness,he has attainedutter rest. He is like one who has progressed o the innermostsanctuarybeyondthetemple mageswhichheformerly orshipped.The union is not a visionbut a goingforth rom elf (Ko-raots),asimplification airXwcos), renunciation r 6oo-tsbrov), a reachtoward ontact EEos 7rpo'sloiv),a reposeorats), and a medita-tion towardadjustmentvrEptw6?knrp6s 4ap,oyt5v). Any other

meansofseeingfails. Even thosewhohave notseen theSupremeareaware of tsexistence incetheywill be awareoftheir wnsource,96.7.36: fevcx#exlsti r4, ab7-4iro3 voioD ZOj' KbiAarT, a't 4oD Ir' acroD otov oLtOGavros.

See also 6.9.4.








willknowPrinciplebyPrinciple, nd possessa craving hat s neversatisfieduntil the Ekstasis is achieved. The Soul when it hasreached this height s not in something lien but in itself. It is

not Being but beyond Being,self-gatheredn the Supreme. Theselfuplifteds an imageoftheSupreme. Ifwe pass beyond mageto archetype,we have won the ultimategoal. If we fall back, wemust reascend once more, knowing ourselves all order again,lightenedof our burden,advancing throughVirtue to the Intel-lectual-Principlend through hewisdomofthisto theOne. Thisis the life of thegods and godlikeand blessedmen, freedom romall that is here,takingno pleasurein what is here,a flight f the

solitary o thesolitary.In generaloutline the course of the Soul's experienceon thehighestplane is not radicallydifferentromwhat it underwent nthe lower tages. Formerlyt purifiedtself fall whichpreventedit frombeingwhollySoul, thenall whichkept it frombecomingIntellectual-Principle;nd it emergedpure intellect. In this laststagetheall-transcendingatureof the One demandsthatkatharsisbe complete. Nothingwhichcan be given any name of qualitymay remain; nd so multiplicitynd intellection, hich re the only

two properties emaining,must be discarded. The formernvolvesa loss of self-awareness. This has alreadybeenmet ntheapproachto theIntellectual-Principle,ut therePlotinuswas concernedwiththeself s a particularhumanbeingwith ndividual nterests. Hereit is a higherpsychological warenessof the Soul as experiencingsomething lse rather hanas being t which s beingsacrificed. Ifmustbe remembered, owever,that the change is not a negation.As the Soul becomes somethinggreater, t is itself nfinitelyx-

panded. It has not lost itself n nothingness.As has been said, man's intellectual activityon this highest

plane is called by Plotinus philosophy. Unlike dialectic on thelower evel tdoes not take theSoul quiteall thewayon its ourney.This does not mean that philosophy s mere ratiocination r thatit is in anyway at all identicalwithordinaryhuman mentalproc-esses. The factthat it is infinitelybove dialectic,which s itselfdivine, s sufficientefutation orany such argument. Philosophy

is a sortof ideal dialectic. As the latter bridgesthe gapbetween

human and divineintellection,o philosophyperfects ivineintel-lectionand leads the way to that which s beyond all intellectualcomprehension.








I have triedto emphasizethroughouthisdiscussion hatwhilethe Soul is requiredto stripitselfof all that is alien to the One,there s always a simultaneouspositiveprocessofbuildingup and

concentrating ts powers. This is the preparationon the part ofthe Soul of which Plotinusspeakswhenhe referso thepreparationand adornmentwhichthe Soul has taken on before t awaits thecomingof the Ekstasis as the resultofpowerfrom bove. Philos-ophy is the means by which the Soul thus prepares tself. It islearning o see that there s more than intellect, ealizing hat onecan by the act of recognizing hat fact prepareto experience t.After the Ekstasis has been achieved, philosophytranslatesthe

experience into terms valuable for the more normal course ofthe Soul's life n the Intellectual-Principle.Saying that the finalEkstasis comes as the resultof a poweroutsidethe Soul, that theSoul receives t rather han takes it, is likelyto involve us in moreof an idea of separationboth temporaland spatial than Plotinuswouldhave us hold. The completion fthephilosophical repara-tion, he nstant fperfect eadiness, nd theactual absorbing ftheSoul into the One by Itselfare simultaneous. The crest of the

wave of ntellect raises theSoul intothemysticpower. Withouttheintellect he Soul could notachieve theEkstasisanymorethanit could be absorbed into the divineunionwithoutdivinepower.

Philosophy,we may conclude, has been the methodby whichthe entireprocessofkatharsishas been accomplished. Philosophyis the means of learningto knowthe moralvirtuesand the intel-lectual ones. Philosophypossesses as a precious part of itselfdialectic,whichenables the Soul to completethe first tep in itsascent.

Philosophy teaches the Soul by each one of thesemeansto cast off ll in itself hatis inferior,nd to concentrate, o perfectall that s divine. Finally t is the ntellectual erceptionhatthereis something eyondall intellect, nd it is theactivityoftheintel-lect whichpreparesthe Soul to receivethat power. As the sub-ordinatepartsofphilosophyhave accomplished heearlyphasesofpurification,o true philosophyachieves the finalkatharsis. Asthe last step, philosophy s itselfrejected,but it is rejectedonlybecause the natureof theOne is so greatthat anythingwhich

wecan comprehendmust be forthat veryreasondiscarded. Philos-ophyis rejectedbecause it is not the One, and theOne is all thatcan remain.








The theory fkatharsiswhichPlotinuspresents eems to me aremarkable ttemptat resolving heproblemof rationalism ersusmysticism. He is, of course,not the only intellectualmystic,but

he is important or having given us one of the most detailed andlogical expositionsof such a way of life that can be found. Hedoes not make the mistakeof attempting o describe in specificterms n experiencewhich transcends he specific. Yet in provingthe necessity f recognizing he existence,desirability,nd impor-tance of such an experience,he reasons n termsof almostmathe-maticalprecision. Ifwe granthisconclusion hatthere s somethingbeyond intellectto be obtained, we must admit that the steps

leadingto it are entirely onsistent.Since theprimalcause cannot

be definedn termsmaterialor mental, t is fittingo hold that itcannot be reached by efforts urely physicalor intellectual. Onthe otherhand, since it is only through he intellect hat one cangraspthe possibility fthegoal to be reached, t is logicalto main-tain that intellectual ctivity s the highestduty and privilegeofman and thatit is right o sacrifice o it all otherpursuits. In thephilosophical pproach there s an evergreater ntellectualization,but Plotinus never falls into the errorof worshipping he means

insteadofthe end.Katharsis s not n itspractical pplicationnegativebut positive.

No lesserthing s givenup untila greaterhas beenseen. Further-more, t is not reallya denial of the individual. By katharsisonedevelopswithinhimself hose powerswhichwould otherwiseneverbe recognized. Earthly life,moreover, s not only a preparationfora life afterdeath; forthe Ekstasis comesto the livingman, tohim who lives most fullythat intellectual ife whichdistinguishes

him from thercreatures.

Documents

Katharsis in the Enneades of Plotinus