Karl Popper as Social Philosopher

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Karl Popper as Social PhilosopherAuthor(s): Anthony M. MardirosSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Sep., 1975), pp. 157-171Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230563 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume V, Number 1, September 1975

Karl Popper As Social Philosopher

ANTHONY M. MARDIROS, University of Alberta

In these days of inflation, perhaps we should not be surprised that the fourteenth and latest addition to the Library of Living Philosophers1 should require two volumes. Previous subjects, in-

cluding Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and G.E. Moore, were ade-

quately accomodated within the covers of one volume. This expansion is hardly justified by the contents of the volumes. The most interesting and useful material is to be found in Popper's opening autobiographical section, but the other contributors and critics for the most part are disappointing in their lack of critical bite.

For this reason perhaps Popper's reply to his critics adds little to our understanding of his philosophical positions, although even when his critic is as acute as A.J. Ayer, Popper's reply has an air of defensive ob- fuscation.

Another recent book giving a brief but clear exposition of Popper's philosophy by a former student, Bryan Magee2 also fails to give his views the critical examination they deserve.

It is in the area of his social philosophy that the failure to challenge Popper is most marked; only Peter Winch, in the Living Philosophers volume, offers any challenge in this area, and Popper remarks (quite justly, I think) that he has difficulty in comprehending the point of Winch's criticism.

1 The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by P.A. Schilpp, (Open Court, 1974) Vol. XIV, Books I & II , in the series "The Library of Living Philosophers" edited by P.A. Schilpp.

2 Popper, by Bryan Magee (Collins, London, 1973) in the series Fontana Modern Masters.

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It is also remarkable that although a great deal of Popper's polemic is directed against Marx, not a single one of the critics represented in this volume is even remotely sympathetic to Marxism.

Since Popper himself in all of his writings makes much of the value and indeed of the necessity of criticism, I propose, after some preliminary exposition of his social philosophy to put forward what I think are major defects in his approach to the study of society.

Until the appearance of "The Open Society and Its Enemies" in 1945 Popper was known chiefly for his contributions to the logic and

methodology of the natural sciences. However, with the publication of this book, he immediately ranked as a social philosopher of first class importance, and he was shortly afterwards appointed to the

Readership (and later the Professorial Chair) in Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. There is no doubt that his

early preoccupation with the methodology of the natural sciences coloured and determined his view of the social sciences and their

possibilities and limitations.

The essential method of the natural sciences, Popper maintains, is that of trial and error, or, as he later said, conjecture and refutation. Scientific theories never become fixed, established, absolute truths, and are always liable to qualification, reconstruction, or even com-

plete overthrow. Like all other theories they are speculative and

hypothetical. It has been thought that scientific hypotheses differ from other hypotheses in that they may be verified by observation or ex-

periment, and that then they take on a new status as proven truths.

Popper denies that this is so, for, as he argues, no experiment or observation can conclusively prove a hypothesis to be true. If we make a

prediction on the basis of a certain scientific theory, and if the event turns out as predicted, this does not prove the theory to be true, any more than the success of an astrologer's prediction proves astrology to be a genuine study, for no series of instances can logically demonstrate the truth of a generalization. No matter how many rabbits with large families we observe, we can never logically prove the generalization, "all rabbits are prolific." However, a single contrary instance, that is, one mature rabbit with no off-spring, will be sufficient to prove the

generalization false. It is characteristic of scientists therefore that they constantly strive by every means at their disposal, not to prove their theories,true, but to falsify or disprove them. The natural sciences are characterized by the skill and relentless ingenuity with which theories are hunted down and proven false. The positive content of any science therefore consists of those theories which have survived a number of

searching tests and have not yet been proven false. Theories, beliefs and opinions are unscientific if they have not been or are no longer subjected to this process of attempted falsification.

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Popper as Social Philosopher

When Popper turns his attention to the study of society, he argues that if there are social sciences they must, if they are really scientific in-

vestigations, conform to this pattern. He comes to the conclusion that to some extent genuine social sciences exist, and others not yet developed are possible, but that the field of social study is obstructed and obscured by the existence of many types of study which do not conform to the scientific method. Either no resolute attempt is made to falsify these theories or they are of such a type that it is literally im-

possible to falsify them by any kind of observation. The sponsors of such studies claim that either the study of society is not and cannot be scientific, or that social science has essentially different characteristics from natural science. Popper argues that at the best this view is gravely mistaken while at the worst it is charlatanry.

In his book, and in a series of articles written at the same time,3 he attacks one such approach to the study of society which he terms historicism.

Historicism in its most developed form is the study of history in

society, with the aim of discerning certain laws, recurrences, regularities or patterns which will enable one to prophesy the future. It is connected also with the study of social origins, in the hope that the seeds of future events can be discerned in the past so that we can determine the future of a society by looking at its beginnings.

Popper's chief methodological objection to historicism is that it is not scientific in the sense already defined. There are social sciences but history is not one of them.

"For in history, the facts at our disposal are limited and cannot be repeated or im- plemented at our will. And they have been collected in accordance with a preconceived point of view; the so-called 'sources' of history only record such facts as appeared sufficiently interesting to record, so that the sources will on the whole contain only facts that fit in with a preconceived theory. And since no further facts are available, it will not, as a rule, be possible to test that or any other subsequent theory."4

Popper contends that historicism is not only an incorrect method of study but that it also has undesirable social consequences. If we believe in the laws of history and if we believe that societies develop according to a certain inevitable pattern so that we can predict the future, then he thinks we may well draw the logical conclusion that the development of society is not the result of our choices, wills and decisions, but of inexorable laws beyond our control. Thus, thinking we are not free, we will actually lose by default the freedom which we

3 Later published as "The Poverty of Historicism." Routledge & Kegan Paul, Lon- don. 1957.

4 "The Open Society and Its Enemies" Vol. 2 Chapter 25. Page 265.

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in fact have, by fatalistically failing tochooseon occasions when it is im-

perative for us to do so. Popper thinks that in fact the theory of historicism has been used and is being used more or less deliberately to rob people of their freedom to choose their social institutions, by persuading them that they have not got this choice anyway.

The development of civilization has in general been from the early tribal or closed towards the free, open democratic society. The closed society is characterized by conformity, obedience to authority and tradition, lack of individual thought and initiative, and an inertia which resists all social change. Such societies did in fact closely resemble the historicist pattern because in them the capacity for individual choice was entirely dormant. However with the development of this capacity for individual initiative, we get the emergence of open or democratic societies which can potentially change in any direction that the citizens choose, thus having a future without limitations. From time to time there are attempts, some of them successful, to prevent social

change and to turn society back from the open democratic form to the closed tribal form. For this purpose the theory of historicism has been a potent weapon in the hands of the reactionaries.

There is however a subtler and more dangerous use of historicism as a tool of social engineering. Frequently social critics and reformers conceive the idea of remaking society, or reconstructing the whole of our social life according to a more equitable, rational and coherent

plan. The Utopian social engineers devise their plans by unscientific historicist methods, that is, they try to find out where society is going and they try to plan accordingly. Since the historicist aims at predicting large-scale changes the Utopian engineer makes large-scale plans for social change. These large-scale plans are, according to Popper, essen-

tially untestable. Since they are large-scale they cannot be tried out ex-

perimentally in a small way, they can only be tried in the event, and

then, if the plan is gravely in error, disaster and consequent human

misery cannot be avoided. The carrying out of large-scale plans demands an increasing concentration of social power in a central

authority and hence is inimical to democracy, and this dictatorial

tendency is reinforced by the fact that large-scale plans always excite

opposition, and since it is difficult to get majority support a resort must be made to minority rule.

As an alternative to this method of social change, Popper recommends what he calls piecemeal social engineering or piecemeal planning. This approach aims at making small changes and gradual reforms in this or that social institution; it does not aim at replanning the whole of society, for this would be to go beyond the limits of social science. Social science cannot study the development of society as a

whole, but it can study smaller units such as various social institutions. On the basis of such study small experimental changes can be made,

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and the essentially scientific process of trial and error can operate without inviting catastrophe. The Utopians, says Popper, are too ambitious, they want to make people happy, whereas we should be content with the gradual removal of some of their pains and discomforts.

I have expounded Popper's views in general terms, but now we must add that he has a more specific target.

A spectre is haunting Karl Popper - it is the spectre of Karl Marx. Volume II of "The Open Society" devotes ten chapters to a critique of Marx in which all the characteristic doctrines which Popper attacks are attributed to Marx. In his autobiography, rather surprisingly in view of his rejection of "psychologism", Popper describes the origin of his later sustained effort to refute Marx:

"It happened shortly before my seventeenth birthday. In Vienna, shooting broke out during a demonstration by unarmed young socialists who, instigated by the communists, tried to help some communists to escape who were under arrest in the central police station in Vienna. Several young socialist and communist workers were killed. I was horrified and shocked at the police but also at myself. For I felt, as a Marxist, I bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy - at least in principle. Marxist theory demands that the class struggle be intensified, in order to speed up the coming of socialism. Its thesis is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution. That was the Marxist theory - part of so-called "scientific socialism". I now asked myself whether such a calculation could ever be supported by "science". The whole experience and especially this question, led me to a life-long revulsion of feeling".5

This is the record of a traumatic experience but it also purports to be a logical argument, a test case which shows up the inadequacy of a theory; but the logic of the argument escapes me for it appears to be a series of non-sequiturs. Many such incidents such as Popper relates, have occurred throughout history in relation to many causes in the attempt to right a wrong or protest an injustice. I do not see that they have any bearing upon the validity or the invalidity of the theories which the participants may have held. But if we turn to the theory which Popper has constructed for the people in question, namely the balancing of goods and evils in the face of possible alternative actions, it is clear that Popper himself later held the same view in a different context. In World War II he supported the Allied war effort as he makes clear in his autobiography. This involved acquiescing in the sacrifice of a great many lives because of the necessity to struggle against the greater evils stemming from a Nazi victory. There is no reason to believe that Popper suffered any pangs of conscience (sorrow, sympathy or pity are another matter) over this choice and certainly he has not recorded them.

5 See "The Philosophy of Karl Popper" Vol. I, page 25.

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However, logically or illogically, this incident started Popper thinking about the "scientific" credentials of Marxism and led to his for- mulation of the demarcation of science from other kinds of enquiry,6 which was designed to confront Marxism with the dilemma of either being scientific but falsified by the failure of some of its predictions, or else immunized from refutation by constant re-interpretation and supplemental explanations, and therefore non-scientific.

For Popper science is the paradigm of rational enquiry and physics is the paradigm of science.

"If we are to look upon the theory of knowledge as a theory of discovery then it will be best to look at scientific discovery. A theory of the growth of knowledge should have something to say especially about the growth of physics and about the clash of opinions in physics."7

This emphasis upon physics as the paradigm of science and of rational enquiry, has led many philosophers to classify Popper as a positivist and a variant of the Vienna Circle. Popper himself repudiates this view, which he calls the "Popper Legend" on the ground that he thinks that metaphysics, for instance, is a proper subject for enquiry even although it cannot comply with the stringent requirement of scientific theories, namely that they be falsifiable.

"If a philosophical theory were no more than an isolated assertion about the world....without a hint of any connection with anything else in the world, then it would be beyond discussion"8

but it exists against a background of problems and other theories so that the critical approach, the search for difficulties or contradictions and their tentative resolution can be carried far beyond the boun- daries of science. Furthermore, metaphysical problems at a certain stage of development can become scientific ones and on the other hand, scientific enquiry is constantly giving rise to metaphysical problems. It is worthwhile noticing in this connection that the entire body of Popper's own work lies outside of science as he defines it.9 His school and university education was largely in mathematics and physics and he is apparently sufficiently knowledgable in advanced theories in physics to be able to discuss philosophical problems which

6 "The Philosophy of Karl Popper" page 89, Popper says "after all it had been in part a criticism of Marxism that had started me, in 1919, on my way to Logik der Forschung."

7 Ibid. Page 71.

8 "Conjectures and Refutations" page 198.

9 He would insist with characteristic verbalism on using the word "demarcates."

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arise in these fields, but his work is essentially philosophical or metaphysical or methodological and he never proposes or makes a

prediction for testing it in a "scientific" way. In fact it is clear that the main lines of his thinking were laid down in

1934 when his first book "Logik der Forschung" was published, and that they have remained substantially unchanged so that since then he has been engaged in explaining, defending and to some degree, ex- tending, the implications of his philosophical theories arrived at 40 years ago. There are not many philosophers who find it necessary to republish a first book written 25 years before10 because they are assuming its results in their new writings.11 Not only are his original theories largely unchanged but they have been reinforced, buttressed and defended against objections. All this is plainly evident in his autobiography and in his "Reply to Critics."

Popper also argues that the Darwinian theory of natural selection is also unable to count as a scientific theory. It is irrefutable because it claims as a truism that anything which does survive must therefore have succeeded in passing through the net of natural selection. Pop- per argues "it is therefore important to show that Darwinism is not a scientific theory but metaphysical. But its value for science as a metaphysical research program is very great, especially if it is admitted that it may be criticized and improved upon".12

In the light of Popper's defence of metaphysics, his views on the theory of natural selection, and the non-scientific nature of his own enquiries, his stringent demarcation of science from other ways of thinking seems to be considerably reduced in importance.

In fact one begins to suspect that it is a bludgeon to be used selectively to strike down theories which Popper dislikes - such as Marxism and the various forms of psycho-analytic thought

- while sparing those which Popper favours.

One may well agree that Marxism is not easily or even significantly comparable to physics; on the other hand, as Marx implied when he sent a copy of "Capital" Volume 1 to Charles Darwin, it does have some affinities with Darwinism. Just as the theory of natural selection provides a framework and a program of research for biological investigations, so Marxism provides both a framework and a research program for the study of societies and social change.

Darwin's theory served as the basis for what has been called "Social Darwinism" and for evolutionary theories of ethics conceived in terms

10 1959 "The Logic of Scientific Discovery. '

11 "The Philosophy of Karl Popper" P. 118.

12 Ibid. Page 137.

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of a rigid "scientific determinism." It is possible to criticize and reject these without abandoning the Darwinian theory itself.

Similarly, there are aspects of Marxism, some of them indeed in- troduced by Marx and Engels, which can and should be abandoned without necessarily involving the abandonment of the central insights of Marx. Darwinism and Marxism are both names associated with a particular man who happened to play a special role in developing a central core theory. We should not allow loyalties or aversion to these men to affect our estimation and critical investigation of the theories in question, and, to borrow a phrase from Popper, we should not at- tach too much importance to the names which are used to designate these theories. I conclude from all this that there is nothing in Popper's theory of the nature of science which would lead us to think that Marxism is any less valuable than Darwinism, or for that matter, Pop- perism.

There are similar difficulties involved in Popper's strictures on history and historicism. One may agree that history is not a science in Popper's sense of the word, nevertheless historians have developed standards of judgement and theories or interpretations that are sometimes confirmed or falsified by the discovery of documents or by archaelogical or other evidence, that is, history can be studied critical- ly. Again one may agree with Popper that the future is open and that it at least in part depends upon our thoughts and actions now and in the future, so that it is not the case that everything that will happen is already predetermined. But unless our interests in history are purely antiquarian we cannot help asking "What relevance has man's past experience to the problems which face him now and the problems which we see looming in the future for which we must prepare now?". Again, so far from being scientific, Popper's own enquiries are as historical as they are metaphysical. "The Open Society" is an enquiry into the history of certain ideas premised upon the notion that the genesis of these ideas is important to their understanding and that this understanding has a bearing upon our future. The historical prediction which emerges from this book runs as follows: "Unless a sufficient number of people realize the falsity of certain ideas and ways of thinking, then the nature of our society will be changed for the worse." The irony is that in the same book ("The Open Society") Plato who made a prediction of the same form is charged by Popper with the sin of historicism. The person who makes a prediction of this kind is not do- ing so in order to test a theory (although this may happen incidental- ly) but in order to prepare himself and others for action;13 or

13 Scientists also make predictions of this kind in relation to the growth or decline of population, earthquakes, typhoons, ecological disasters, etc.

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sometimes, as in the case of Marx, to encourage persistence in actions already undertaken.

Sometimes such predictions are implicit rather than explicit. In his autobiography Popper says:

"If there could be such a thing as socialism combined with individual liberty, I would be a socialist still. For nothing could be better than living a modest, simple and free life in an egalitarian society. It took some time before I recognized this as no more than a beautiful dream; that freedom is more important than equality; that the attempt to realize equality endangers freedom; and that, if freedom is lost, there will not even be equality among the unfree."14

Clearly this contains an implied prediction which partially closes down our open future by ruling out as forever impossible a free and egalitarian society - its purpose is not to test an historical thesis but to discourage us from certain actions. It must also be remarked that in an unequal society freedom is necessarily one of the things that are dis- tributed unequally.

The making of conjectures about the future is therefore an or- dinary outcome of historical thinking. If, as many conjectures do, they leave open or even invite the possibility of some intervening oc- currence, then they do not really foreclose upon the future. Some, however, like the one just quoted from Popper, do claim to rule out certain possibilities and they do so in order to influence our actions.

Another theme which occurs frequently in Popper's writings is the importance of tradition. He tells us that problems arise out of what we inherit from past thinking and action and that it is important to be aware of this. This is a dominating motif in "The Open Society" and is the rationale for its exploration of the history of certain ideas. Popper claims that our social institutions are rooted in these traditions and that if we wish to change them we must do so gradually, for institutions detached from tradition are dangerous and corrupt. Here we get from Popper another implied historical prophecy which would run as follows, "Any future attempt to make large-scale or sweeping changes in the structure of society for the purpose of improving the human condition are bound to fail."

It is clear then that despite Popper's ambiguous attitude towards the study of history, he himself is very much involved in historical investigation and in the attempt to draw lessons from history which are applicable to our future. Perhaps Popper would admit this but claim that his historical predictions are different from those of "historicism" because they are based on the "logic of the situation," that is, upon the

14 "The Philosophy of Karl Popper." Vol. 1. Page 27.

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tracing of the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions.15

However he originally intended the logic of the situation to be the method of the particular social sciences (economics is the only one he names) leading to more or less short term and conditional predictions which he takes to be of the same general character as those in the natural sciences. If the method of the logic of the situation is extended to include Popper's own historically based predictions about which social policies can or cannot be successful in any foreseeable future, then it would seem than even a Toynbee or a Spengler could claim to be using the same method.

Certainly one may agree with Popper that there are no overriding laws of history which absolutely predetermine the future and there is a

very real sense in which the future is open and can be changed one

way or another by human decisions and actions. Popper certainly deserves credit for emphasizing this and for his serious and detailed efforts to show that this sort of human freedom is compatible with what we know about the nature of the physical and biological world.16

However, we can quite well admit that people make decisions and that upon such decisions our future depends, without asserting that man is free to choose any sort of future at all. Just as our decisions are limited by our physical capabilities, so they are limited by all sorts of other factors - economic, geographical and political. So that at any particular stage of history people are faced, not with a completely free choice but with a choice between certain alternatives. Sometimes this choice may be narrower, sometimes broader, it is never perhaps en-

tirely eliminated and certainly it is never completely free and uncon- ditioned. So it is possible to have a study of those conditions which limit our choices and present us with alternatives. This is the study of history. It is the study of human choices at various stages of history and of the conditions which narrow that choice. It should be particularly concerned with the alternatives immediately presented to us so that we decide more or less only between actions and courses which are possible to carry out, and do not decide upon the impossible. From such a study we cannot discover what values or ends we should seek, but we can learn to modify or adjust our values in the light of what is

possible. The future depends upon us but we can make it what we will only

with certain limits and the study of history throws light upon the

15 Popper agrees that "Marx himself was one of the first to emphasize the importance, for the social sciences, of these unintended consequences". See "Conjectures and Refutations" Page 342.

16 This iswell discussed byJ.W.N.Watkins' "The Unity of Popper's Thought" in The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Vol. I. Page 371-412.

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nature and extent of these limits. It makes us freer in the sense that it prevents us squandering our decisions upon the impossible.

It is clearly possible to accommodate most of Marx's social theory within such a framework and thus to avoid whatever force there is to Popper's charge against what he chooses to call historicism.

Just as it is possible to break down the barriers which Popper sets up between metaphysics, history and science, so also one can call into question the distinction which Popper makes between the holism which he rejects and the methodological individualism of which he approves.

This is perhaps one of the most incoherent sections of Popper's social philosophy. Popper argues that we cannot study society as a whole and advocate changes in the whole structure, rather we must be content to study individual parts of society and bit by bit introduce changes in these smaller units. However his view, that the social sciences are concerned with the study of institutions and with the logic of situations which go beyond what individuals will, already takes us beyond the methodological individualism which he advocates.

Within the Popperian framework we soon discover that individualism refers not to the actions of this or that person but rather to the operation of collections of people organized in certain ways which we call institutions. Individualism thus refers to organized collections of people and the rules that they set up, and not in fact to the actions of particular persons. Popper then contends that planning through the study of individual institutions is possible and leads to social progress, while large-scale planning is impossible and leads to disillusion and disaster. But by introducing the notion of social enquiry as being concerned with institutions and with the logic of the situation rather than with the study of the thoughts and actions of individual people, Pop- per has already given up the notion that social science is merely concerned with individuals in any credible meaning of that terminology. The question then becomes not one of deciding between enquiry into the behavior of wholes or into the behavior of individuals, but rather of deciding which wholes contribute to the proper study of social science or social philosophy, whichever name one chooses to call it.

Popper chooses the smaller wholes rather than the larger ones but one suspects that his 'reasons' are ideological rather than rational. Nevertheless, let us give him the benefit of the doubt. Popper seems to think that in social affairs we can have something analogous to the laboratory where we can try things out on a small scale for test pur- poses and so if results are favourable make the changes more general. Obviously this is a desirable thing to do up to a point, but we must not exaggerate the importance of such experiments. For instance, what works in the experimental school may not be so successful when extended to schools at large.

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Bryan Magee tell us "The British higher education system already contains at least one department devoted to the Popperian study of institutions (set up by Tyrrel Burgess at the North East London Polytechnic) and its results are both simple and of great potential usefulness, for huge sums and efforts are commonly expended on mistaken policies without any provision for the tiny sums and efforts required to see if undesired results are emerging."17

The naivety of this comment by Magee is incredible. For the last 100 years at least, experimental schools of one sort or another have been legion. I do not doubt that we have learned something from these experiments but certainly they have not played the role that either Popper and Magee expect. In social investigations conditions change with the size of the experiment. What works in the experimental school may not be successful when extended to schools at large. Robert Owen's factory experiments and his miniature socialist com- munities, although not completely barren in results, did not have any decisive bearing on the desirability of improving working conditions in the factories, or of establishing a socialist society. The success or failure of an island of socialism in a capitalist economy tells us little about the workings of a socialist economy. Owen's factory system might well have failed but it would not have been correct to conclude from this that the industrial system could be run only on the basis of poor working conditions.

The very nature of most social problems requires large-scale many- sided solutions rather than individual piecemeal reforms. The aboli- tion of slavery in the nineteenth century which Popper regards as a source of everlasting pride for Great Britain and the United States18 was stultified because it was treated as merely the isolated problem of setting free the slaves. It needed no experiments to establish the fact that what was also required was the education, technical training, and the establishment of the former slaves as free and equal citizens in fact as well as in law, and that this could only be done as part of a large-scale and many-sided plan.

In the nineteenth century, the people got the vote, elementary education and increased leisure. All these things were desirable but again they turned out to be less beneficial than was expected, largely because they were unco-ordinated so that the education bore little relation to other possible reforms. Education, instead of providing training in citizenship and the wise use of leisure, merely aided the propagandist in the use of irrational methods of persuasion and

17 "Popper" by Bryan Magee. Page 77.

18 "Conjectures and Refutations" Page 370.

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created a market for the inferior in literature. No doubt this was preferable to the previous condition of ignorance and squalour in which the English people lived, but nevertheless is was a sad perver- sion of social reform.

Piecemeal enquiry and piecemeal planning only become in- telligent in so far as they cease to be piecemeal. Popper at one stage almost recognizes this. He says

"It may be questioned perhaps whether the piecemeal and holistic approaches here described are fundamentally different, considering that no limitations of the scope of a piecemeal approach have been given. As this approach is understood here, constitutional reforms, for example, fall well within its scope; also it is not intended to exclude the possibility that a series of piecemeal reforms may be inspired by one general tendency, for example, towards a greater equalization of incomes. In this way piecemeal methods may lead to changes in what is usually called "the class structure of society". Is there any difference it may be asked between such more ambitious kinds of piecemeal engineering and the holistic or Utopian approach? And this question may become even more pertinent if we consider that, when trying to assess the likely consequences of some proposed reform, the piecemeal technologist must do his best to trace the repercussions of any measure on the "whole" of society."19

Popper goes on to say that there is no hard and fast line of demarcation and that the large-scale planners in fact when it comes to action use the method referred to in the quotation. Popper says that there are not two methods in practice but only two doctrines of which one is true and the other is dangerous and liable to lead to mistakes.

But surely a doctrine can only lead to practical mistakes if it does make a difference in method. It is the difference between treating social problems in isolation from each other and treating them as in- teracting situations. If piecemeal engineering remains piecemeal and does not develop into large-scale planning then it fails to become in- telligent. The ecological disasters of the last decade and the ones looming up in the near future have surely driven home this point. However, in his autobiography, Popper remains completely imper- vious to this experience.

The holistic planner, as Popper presents him, is largely a straw man; Popper claims that to plan everything is impossible and therefore holistic planning is impossible; but this is a piece of verbalism. If by definition holistic planning is made to mean planning everything then it is no doubt impossible. But this has no relevance to the real issue of large-scale versus piecemeal planning. One can assert the necessity of large-scale planning and its superiority over piecemeal planning without claiming that everything must be planned.

19 K. Popper: "The Poverty of Historicism". Page 68.

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Popper also claims that the holistic planner is forced to organize people as well as things and therefore people must be changed to fit into the new society. This means, he says, that we have no way of testing whether or not the new dispensation is better than the old. This can only be done if the people concerned remain the same.

Clearly this argument, for what it is worth, can be urged against piecemeal planners. I suppose that slum clearance would constitute the sort of planning of which Popper would approve. But slum clearance is not merely a matter of changing material conditions and it is not merely material conditions which we want to change. We also aim at removing child delinquency, gangsterism, alcoholism, disease, etc., and in changing the material conditions we aim at changing the people concerned, and the material changes must be planned with these other changes in mind. If our slum clearance is successful, if we raise the level of living in a particular community in this way, would it not be absurd of a critic to say "This is not a test of your plan for you have changed the people and made them fit into your plan."

Or let us consider penal reform. If we change the character of the penal institution, this involves bringing about a change in the ad- ministrators, in the wardens, and in the prisoners and if there is no such change then the reform has failed.

Popper further argues that since holistic planning deals with people this introduces an element of uncertainty which makes it impossible to plan on a scientific basis. But the piecemeal planning of social institutions involves people just as much as large-scale planning does. If the personal factor makes large-scale planning impossible, it must also make piecemeal planning impossible. This is the basis of the commonly made distinction between the "social sciences" and the "natural sciences." It makes social engineering more difficult than physical engineering, but it is no reason for ultimate despair and the abandonment of rational methods. As a matter of fact this difficulty is a more serious problem for small-scale investigations into human affairs than it is for the study of broad tendencies and general movements in society. It is easier to predict the behaviour of large groups of people than it is to predict the action of an individual person.

In the last resort Popper turns to what he has frequently castigated as "psychologism," namely the attempt to deal with theories in terms of the desires and wishes of their proponents. Popper tells us in "The Open Society" and elsewhere that those like Plato who want to return to an earlier form of society are motivated by a fear of change, while those like Marx who appear to be in favour of change show by their desire to control it that they also fear change.

This line of argument clearly invites a retort. Uncontrolled change might well be frightening but the will to plan and control large-scale changes requires courage and intelligence, while the insistence on

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small changes only must surely spring from personal satisfaction with things as they are and a deliberate blindness to the ills of our time.

In 1956, Popper gave a public lecture on "The History of Our Time: An Optimist's View"20 in which he announced that "Our free world21 has very nearly if not completely succeeded in abolishing the greatest evils which have hitherto beset the social life of man."

He went on to claim that in these favoured areas of the world, poverty, unemployment, penal cruelty, religious and racial dis- crimination, rigid class differences, and the will to fight aggressive wars, had almost if not quite disappeared. It is hard to imagine that even nearly twenty years ago a social philosopher could take quite such a rosy view of the world or portions thereof, although I suppose if one insists upon looking at things in a piecemeal fashion one might be forgiven for failing to see the connection between the affluence of one part of the world and the poverty and misery in other parts. Like Mr.Podsnap22 "He never could make out why everybody was not quite satisfied, and he felt conscious that he set a brilliant social example in being particularly well satisfied with most things". There is nothing in his autobiography to indicate that his satisfaction with the society in which he lives has decreased and there is no indication that he is at all eager to confront his social philosophy with the problems and dis- contents of our time.

Although Popper in contrasting the closed with the open society writes enthusiastically of the latter, because in contrast with the former, it leaves open the door to social change and hence to a better society, and although he accuses the enemies of the open society of wishing to resist change because of their fear of it, it is plain that Pop- per himself fears change and wants it only in small doses. He does not really want an open society but merely one with the door left just a little ajar.

May 1975

20 Later published in "Conjectures and Refutations" Page 364-384.

21 Popper says "By the word 'our' I mean the free world of the Atlantic community - especially England, the United States, the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, and the outposts of this world in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand."

22 See Charles Dickens: "Our Mutual Friend" Book I, Chapter XL

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Karl Popper as Social Philosopher