Upload
sandipkluis
View
224
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 1/8
"Ideology and Utopia" by Karl MannheimAuthor(s): Edward ShilsSource: Daedalus, Vol. 103, No. 1, Twentieth-Century Classics Revisited (Winter, 1974), pp. 83-89Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & SciencesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024190 .
Accessed: 12/01/2015 09:08
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The MIT Press and American Academy of Arts & Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Daedalus.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 2/8
EDWARD
SHILS
Ideology and Utopia
by
Karl Mannheim
Karl Mannheim
was
extraordinarily
sensitive
to
his
national
and
continental
environ
ment
and
to
his
own
time.
He read
widely;
he
had
a
lively
curiosity
and
a
quickly moving
imagination
which enabled
him
to
respond
to
many
kinds of
events.
From
1914 until his
death
in
1947
at
the
age
of
fifty-four
he
had
only
about
a
decade
of
relative calm
:
1925
to
1929 in
Germany
and 1933
to
1939
in
Great
Britain.
The
rest
of
his
adult
life
was
spent
in
the
midst
of
war,
revolution,
and uncivil
commotion.
A
sociologist
of
such
a
sensitive im
agination
could
not
have
avoided
perceiving
these
unrelenting
and
pitiless
conflicts and
making
them
into
a
theme
of central
importance
in
his
thought.
Ideologie
und
Utopie1
was
published
in
1929 when
disorder
began
onoe
more
in
the
Weimar
republic.
In
1931,
when
disorder
was
at
its
height,
he
published
an
article
entitled
Wissenssoziologie
in
a
German
encyclopedia
of
sociology.2
In
1935,
very
shortly after
his
settlement
in
England, he
wrote
a
long essay which attempted
to
place
the
two
former
writings
in
the wider
setting
of the
plurality
of
intellectual
out
looks which
had
developed
in
Europe
since
the
Reformation,
to
assimilate
his
new
interest
in
psychoanalysis
into
his
earlier
Hegelian,
Marxian and
Weberian
so
ciology,
and
to
find
a
way
out
of the relativism
in
which
he
was
entrapped
and
most
ill-at-ease.
In
1936,
all three
of
these
writings
were
published
in
English
translation.3
The
long
essay
formed
the
introductory
chapter,
the
three
chapters
of
Ideologie
und
Utopie
followed,
and the
encyclopedia
article
constituted the
con
cluding
chapter.
The
result
was
a
book
which,
full
of
the contradictions and
uncer
tainties
of
Mannheim's
thought,
was an
adequate
expression
of his
tentacularly
rich
and sympathetic mind.
For
better
or
for
worse,
Mannheim
was,
in
his
intellectual
disposition,
a
thoroughgoing sociologist.
He
had
a
profound
distaste
for
individualism;
he believed
not
only
that the
individual
was
a
frail
reed
but
that he
scarcely
existed
as a
thinking
83
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 3/8
84
EDWARD
SHILS
reed. Mannheim began his intellectual career at the end of the First World War un
der
the
powerful
influence of
the
Hegelian
conception
of
the
objective
spirit.
As
a
Hegelian,
he
was
also
a
historicist.
He
believed that
every
society
and
epoch
had
its
own
intellectual
culture,
of
which
every
single
work
produced
in
it
was
a
part.
In
this
imposing
medium
the individual
mind
and
its
works
were
only
instances
of
the
ob
jective
spirit
or
culture
into
which
they
were
born. The individual's
mind,
the
in
dividual's
imagination,
the
individual's
power
of
reason
and
observation
were
only
fictions.
The
idealistic tradition attributed
primary
reality
to
the trans-individual
complex
of
ideas;
the
individual
was
no
more
than
a
creature
of this
trans-individual
reality.
The
properties
of
the individual could be derived from
this
reality;
the
in
dividual imposed and added little or
nothing
to it. The movement of this cosmos of
symbols
through
history
bore
no
trace
of the individual's mental
powers.
Yet
even
this
view
was
not
wholly
acceptable
to
Mannheim.
Although
it
denied
the
power
of
the individual
it
still accorded
too
much
autonomy
to
the
realm
of
the
mind,
even
to
the
collective
mind,
to
a
realm of ideas
possessing
an
inner,
self
developing
dynamic
force
of its
own.
Marxism offered
Mannheim the
intellectual
op
portunity
to
escape
from
idealism because
it
had
so
much
in
common
with
idealism.
Marxism
too
was
historicist;
it
too
was
holistic;
it
too
denied the
primacy
of
the
in
dividual.
But
unlike
idealism,
it
denied
the
primacy
of
the intellectual
sphere.
It
refused
to
accept
the
idealistic
view
that
ideas?the realm
of
symbols?have
an
in
ternal force of
their
own
which
presses
them
to
develop
in
a
direction
which
is in
herent
in
them.
It
was
this
anti-intellectualism
which led Mannheim
to
add
Marxism
to
his intellectual
parentage.
I
think that
Mannheim
was
never
an
avowed
Marxist. He
was
generally
sym
pathetic
with
socialistic ideas but he
never,
as
far
as
I
know,
associated himself
publicly
with
the Social
Democratic
Party
in
Germany
even
though
many
of his
friends
and
close
associates
did.
He
took
pains
to
distinguish
himself
from
Marxism
but
he
never
concealed
his
appreciation
of
it.
Whereas he often
spoke
disparagingly
of
idealism,
he did
not
speak
in
the
same
way
of
Marxism. Yet
he
wanted
to
go
deeper
than
Marxism
seemed
capable
of
going.
Nonetheless,
Mannheim
never
succeeded
in
emancipating
himself either
from
Marxism
or
from idealism.
The Marxian
influence
was
dominant
in
his
fundamental
belief
in
the
primacy
of
the nonintellectual
stratum
of
being
and
in
the
peripheral
significance
of intellectual
activity.
The
sociology
of
knowledge
was
intended
to
go
beyond
Marxism.
Although
he
regarded
it
as a
mark
of
superiority
of the
sociology
of
knowledge
that
it
regarded
not
merely
classes,
as
a
dogmatic
type
of
Marxism
would
have
it,
as
the determinant
of
thought-models
but
went
beyond
Marxism
to
include
generations,
states,
groups,
sects,
occupational
groups,
schools, etc.,
he
immediately
went
on
to
say:
We
do
not
intend
to
deny
that
of
all
the
above-mentioned
social
groupings
and
units,
class
stratification
is
the
most
significant,
since
in
the
final
analysis
all
the
other
social
groups
arise
from
and
are
transformed
as
parts
of the
more
basic
conditions
of
production
and
domination.4
To
his undivested
idealism
and
Marxism,
he
added,
in
the
early
1930's,
a
very
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 4/8
Ideology
and
Utopia
85
generalized
admixture
of
psychoanalysis.
To
the
power
of
culture
and social
or
existential
position,
he
joined,
in
the
early
1930s,
the
collective unconscious
as
one more
counteragent
to
the
autonomy
of
the
observing,
imagining
and
reasoning
mind.
II
The
upshot
of
these
powerful
influences
was
the
sociology
of
knowledge
and the
closely
associated
critique
of
objectivity.
The
sociology
of
knowledge
was
intended
to
be
a
study
of
the
dependence
of
outlooks, theories,
doctrines
etc.
on
the
social
posi
tion of the knower. It was intended to demonstrate that whatever human beings
believe
they
know about the
world
is
dependent
on
their
circumstances
and fortunes
in
society;
their
knowledge
and
beliefs
are,
according
to
the
sociology
of
knowledge,
over
poweringly
bound
by
the outlook which
they
have inherited
and
by
the force
of
their
social
position.
Mannheim
never
defined
*
social
position
any
more
than
he
defined the
existential
connectedness'
'
of
knowledge
(Seinsverbundenheit
des
Wissens
)
but
his
in
tention
was
clear:
thought
was
always
a
creature
of
social
circumstance,
never
the
creator
of
thought
or
social
circumstance.
Inherited
outlooks
were
adduced
to
show
the
limited
power
of the individual
mind,
never
to
show the limits of the
powers
of
social
or
class
position.
He went to
great
exertions to
distinguish
the
sociology
of
knowledge
from the
theory
of
ideology.
The latter did
no
more
than attribute
error
to
deliberate
deception,
falsification,
masking,
and
self-blinding;
in its
way,
the
theory
of
ideology
left
intact
the fundamental
capacities
of
the individual mind and this
was
not
reconcilable
with
Mannheim's
idealistic, historicist,
and
environmentalist
postulates.
According
to
Mannheim,
the
theory
of
ideology
left
the
epistemological
foundations
of
empiricism
intact;
it
assumed
that
men
possessed
the
powers
to
dis
cern
the truth but
failed
to
do
so
intentionally
because
they
anticipated
advantages
from
avoiding
the
acknowledgment
of the truth.
The
theory
of
ideology
postulated
the
existence of
an
apparatus
of
perception
and
reasoning
common
to
human
beings;
the
failure
of
this
apparatus
to
bring
forth identical results
in
everyone
was
at
tributable
to
'
'
mistakes'
'
and
to
the
power
of
passions
and
interests
which diverted
this
apparatus
from
its
proper
operation.
Still,
the
potentialities
were
there
in
the
in
dividual.
The
sociology
of
knowledge,
however,
according
to
Mannheim,
worked
at
the
deeper
levels
of the mind.
In
accordance with
the historicist
idealistic
tradition,
the
diversity
of
beliefs
which
men
have
about
themselves,
their
societies,
and the world
are
accounted
for
by
the
diversity
of
the
conceptual
or
categorical
apparatus
which
they
bring
to
bear
on
the facts.
(Facts
always
troubled
Mannheim
methodologically
and
he
expressed
his
uneasiness
by quotation marks.) Among
various
epochs, classes,
etc.,
these
conceptual
or
categorical
apparatuses
are
incomparably
and
even
un
assimilably
different
from
each
other;
their
distinctiveness
extends
to
conceptions
of
causation
and
time,
criteria
of valid
evidence,
models of
explanation,
etc.
These dis
tinctive
apparatuses
are
different from each
other because of the
different
social
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 5/8
86
EDWARD
SHILS
situations, social positions, existential conditions, life situations, etc., inwhich the in
dividual
carriers
of
these
apparatuses
live. The
discovery
of
these
affinities between
the
outlooks and the
social
situations
and the derivation of
the former from
the
latter
are
the
tasks
of the
sociology
of
knowledge.
One
sees
straightaway
how
persistent
was
the
power
of
Marxism
over
Mannheim's
thought
even
when
he
thought
he had
transcended
it.
The weaknesses of this
sort
in
the
sociology
of
knowledge
were
the
same
as
those of
the
Marxian
sociology
of
knowledge.
They
were
first,
the
assertion
without
evidence of
correlations between
vaguely
defined
independent
and
equally
vaguely
defined
dependent
variables
without
any
plausible
theoretical
linkages
between the
two
to
compensate
for
the
absence of
empirical
evidence;
and
second,
the reduction of intellectual activities to
an
epiphenomenal
status.
As
a
result
of
the first
weakness,
the
sociology
of
knowledge
never
became
es
tablished
as
a
productive
part
of
sociology.
The
subject
was
doomed
to
remain
at
the
point
of
programs
and
prolegomena
but
it
produced
no
results. There
were
of
course
other
reasons.
Most
sociologists
of
the
generation
immediately
after Mannheim
lacked
the
sophisticated
knowledge
of
intellectual
history
needed
to
undertake
satisfactory
work
in
the
field
and,
if
they
had
possessed
such
sophistication,
the
un
dertaking
would
in time
have
appeared
unfeasible
to
them. Since
it
is
a
denial of the
constitution
of
intellectual
activity
to
regard
such
activity
as
having
no
character
other
than that
imposed
on
it
by
the social
situation
of
those
engaged
in
it,
serious
sociologists
who
began
it
in
good
faith
would
surely
have
seen
through
it.
How
could
one
study
any
object
and
try
to
discover the truth
about
it
if,
from
the
very
begin
ning,
one
was
convinced
that one's conclusions
were
inevitably
determined
not
by
the
application
of
criteria of
truth
to
carefully
observed evidence but
rather
by
one's
own
social
circumstances,
such
as
class
position?
In its
Mannheimian
form the
sociology
of
knowledge
was
doomed
to
discredit but
Mannheim's
failure
even
to
provide
models of the theoretical
linkage
meant
that
it
never
reached
the
stage
of
undergoing
the
saving
revision
which
systematic
research
might
have
provided.
The
result
was
therefore
a
stillbirth.
Curiosity
and
imagination,
observational and
reasoning
power,
learning
and
systematic
study
in
the form of
observation, erudition,
or
experiment
had
no
place
in
Mannheim's
sociology
of
knowledge.
Nothing
new
could be said
by
the
performers
of
intellectual
activities studied
by
the
sociology
of
knowledge.
All
they
could
do
was
to
respond
to
their
life
situations
in
ways
which
did
not
call
upon
their
individual
in
tellectual
powers.
Any
appearance
of
individuality
in
an
intellectual
work
was
nothing
more
than
a
result of
a
variation
or
idiosyncrasy
of the
social
position
or
situation
of
the
intellectual
actor.
So
eager
was
Mannheim
to
protect
the
view
that
intellectual
action
had
no
autonomous power that itwas sufficient for him to find one trait which he could assert
to
be
dependent
on
the
social
position
of
the intellectual
actor
for
him
to
assume
triumphantly
that
all the
rest
of
the intellectual
actor's work
was
equally
dependent
on
that
situation. If
it
could
be
shown,
or
at
least asserted with
a
show
of
plausibility,
that
a
problem
had been
formulated
in
response
to
a
newly
emergent
and
practically
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 6/8
Ideology
and
Utopia
87
significant situation, then Mannheim regarded that as evidence that the entire in
tellectual
undertaking?the
analysis
of the
problem,
the
hypothesis
formulated
to
render
it,
the mode
of
gathering
evidence,
and
the
conclusion?was determined
by
the
existential
condition
of
the knower.
There
was
something
in
what Mannheim
said but
it
was
much
less
and much
different
from what
he
thought.
His
insistent
dislike of
idealism
made
it
impossible
for
him
to
acknowledge
in
principle
that intellectual traditions
are
significant,
although
by
no
means
exclusive,
determinants
of
intellectual
action;
it
was
his dislike
of the
immanent
interpretation
of the
history
of
intellectual
works?nowadays
called
internalist ?which
drew
him
into
the
sociological?or
externalist ?camp.
He
remained there until he ceased to concern himself with the
sociology
of
knowledge;
the
appearance
of
the
English
version,
Ideology
and
Utopia,
marked his
departure
from
the
subject.
His
espousal
of
a
historicist
Marxian
variant
of
a
sociological approach,
his
desire
to
escape
from
idealism,
and
his
dislike of individualism
were,
in
combination,
an
in
superable
hindrance
to
the
development
of
Mannheim's
sociology
of
knowledge.
These
commitments
prevented
him from
admitting
in
principle
that the
cognitive
powers
of
human
beings
have
in
some
historically
very
important
cases
an
autonomous
motivation
and
a
constitutive
set
of
properties
which
operate
in
all
societies
and
in
all
epochs;
he
provided
no
place
for
the fact
that
human
beings
possess
curiosity
and
imagination
and
reasoning
and
observational
powers,
and
that
the
results of these
are
precipitated
into
works which
are
then
crystallized
into
traditions.
He
failed
to
acknowledge
in
his
theory
that
intellectual
traditions
have
real
influence
on
subsequent
intellectual
works?although
in
his
own
explanations
he
repeatedly
invoked intellectual
traditions
as
ad hoc
explanations?and
that
in
tellectual
traditions
change
and
grow,
and that
they
do
so
when
the
human
beings
who
come
under
their influence
are
impelled
by
practical
desire
or
intellectual
propensity
to
deal with
problems
which
have
not
been
adequately
dealt
with
by
the
tradition
in
its
hitherto
accepted
form.
His sociology of knowledge remained
more
Marxist than it need have and than was
good
for
it. It is
not
that
the
Marxian view
of the determination of
intellectual
actions
and
works
by
class
position
is
wholly
wrong
or
utterly
irrelevant.
But it
covers
only
a
very
small
part
of the
phenomenon
and
it
does that
very
crudely.
Although
Mannheim
sometimes
suggested
in
passing
that
institutional
structures
and roles
other than
class
were
of
importance,
he
regarded
them
as
really
secondary
or
in
consequential.
He
had
little
sense
for the
social
institutional
processes
which
are
directly
involved
in
the
transmission,
establishment,
and
acceptance
of
knowledge.
Although
he
wrote
an
interesting
essay
on
the
role
of
competition
in
the
intellectual
sphere,
he
had
little
understanding
for the
competition
of
ideas and the
processes
of
selection through which some find acceptance and others are relegated to obscurity
or
oblivion.
Competition
was
for him
a
representative
case
in
which
extra
theoretical
processes
affect the
emergence
and the
direction
of
the
development
of
knowledge,
but he
interpreted
that
to
mean
that
diverse
interpretations
of
the
world.
.
. .
when
their
social
background
is
uncovered,
reveal
themselves
as
the
in
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 7/8
88
EDWARD
SHILS
tellectual expressions of conflicting groups struggling for power.
6
He did not mean
intellectuals
struggling
for the
acceptance
of
their
ideas
or
works;
he
meant
non
intellectuals
struggling
for
power
over
society.
He
never
tried
to
disclose
the
mechanisms
by
which
these
political
and
economic
conflicts
are
transferred
into
the
competition
of
interpretations
of
the world.
Had
he
tried,
he
might
have discovered
that he
was
on
the
wrong
track.6
Alternatively,
had he
worked
backwards
from
the
competition
of
interpretations
in
specific
instances,
he
might
have
contributed
to
the
development
of
a
sociology
of
knowledge
which
showed
a
realistic
awareness
of
the
fact that
knowledge
is
an
independent
value and
possesses
a
type
of
reality
which
the
Marxian
theory
in
its
usual form
could
not
accommodate.
In
this
connection
it
may
be
noted
that
although
Mannheim
often
used the
pragmatist
or
instrumentalist
idiom
in
accordance
with which
a
theory
is
wrong
if
in
a
given practical
situation it
uses
concepts
and
categories
which,
if
taken
seriously,
would
prevent
man
from
adjusting
himself
at
that historical
stage, 7
he found
no
place
for
the
investigation
of
the role
of
the
cognitive
element
in
action
or
of the
in
fluence
of
natural
and social
science
in
society.
He
did
not
do
so
because,
having
to
his
own
satisfaction
got
rid of his
idealistic
old
man
of
the
sea,
he
went
to
the
op
posite
extreme
of
denying
the
dignity
and
partial
autonomy
of
the
sphere
of
cultural
things,
including
scientific
knowledge
and the
other
symbolic
constructions of
the
imaginative
and rational
powers
of the human
mind.
Ill
This
derogatory
attitude toward
knowledge
found
a
fitting
expression
in
Mannheim's
relativism.
Now,
whereas
moral
relativism
seems
utterly
self-evident
to
the intellectual
stratum in
its
present
state
of
mind,
although
its
members
are
not at
all
reluctant
to
act
as
dogmatic
moral
preachers
to
the whole
human
race,
cognitive
relativism
is
another
matter.
Those
who shirk the
acquisition of knowledge might find
a
congenial
self-justification
in
cognitive
relativism,
but
not
those who
seek
to
acquire
knowledge.
Mannheim
was
an
honest and
serious
man
and
he
wanted
his
assertions
to
be
believed
because
of
their truthfulness and
not
because
they
were
connected with
his
existential
position
and
that
of
his
audience.
He
was
in
fact
profoundly
embarrassed
by
the
difficulty
into
which he
was
brought
by
his
relativism.
He
tried
to
find
various
ways
out.
One
was
through
the
conception
of
a
freely
floating intelligentsia'
'
which
by
virtue
of
its
detachment
from
partisanship
could
construct
a
synthesis
of
the
partial
views
at
tained from
partisan positions.
He
did
not
follow
this
up
although
it
had
possibilities
of
fruitfulness;
I surmise
that he did
not
do
so
because
it
was
contradictory
to
his
dominant
beliefs about the ineluctible pervasiveness of the extra-intellectual determinants of
knowledge.
The
other
alternative
he
sought
was
relationism,
a
proposition
which
he
left
extremely
ambiguous
and hence
compatible
both with the
relativism of which he
unwillingly
saw
the
defects
and
with the
objectivism
which
his
sociologistic
prej
udice rendered
unacceptable
to
him.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/10/2019 Karl Mannheims Ideology and Utopia
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/karl-mannheims-ideology-and-utopia 8/8
Ideology
and
Utopia
89
IV
All this
notwithstanding,
Ideology
and
Utopia
has remained
continuously
in
in
the
United
Sates and
Great
Britain
for
nearly
forty
years.
In
recent
years,
it
has
found
admirers
among
the
newer
breed
of
misologists,
and there
is
no
doubt
that
in
his
vague
and
portentious
declarations there
can
be
found
authority,
couched
in
the
somber
tones
of
a
German intellectual
of his
time,
for
disparaging
the
whole
enter
prise
of
science
and
learning.
Yet
that
alone does
not
quite
exhaust the
grounds
of
his
persistent
appeal. Perhaps
they
lie
in
the
gravity
of
his
mood,
in
his
large
epochal
perspective,
and
in
the
impres
sion which he
always
gave
in
his
personal bearing
and
in
the
overtones
of his
writings
that,
despite
the
repeated
assertions to the
contrary
in those
writings,
the
quest
for
truthful
understanding
is
one
of
the
grandest
and
worthiest
activities
in
which
human
beings
can
engage
in
this
life.
It
is
a
great
pity
that he
spent
a
substantial
part
of
his
too
short life
arguing
for
a
hopelessly
wrong
position
which his
own
demeanor
refuted.
References
1.
Karl
Mannheim,
Ideologie
und
Utopie
(Bonn:
F.
C.
Cohen,
1929).
2.
Mannheim,
Wissenssoziologie,
Handw?rterbuch der
Soziologie,
ed. Alfred Vierkandt
(Stuttgart:
F.
Enke,
1931).
3.
Mannheim,
Ideology
and
Utopia:
An
Introduction
to
the
Sociology
of
Knowledge
(London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1936).
4.
Ibid.,
pp.
247-248.
5.
Ibid.,
p.
241.
6.
Then?
was
a
dogmatic
streak
in
Mannheim's
beliefs which led
him
to
make
assertions
like
the
following:
...
fundamental
philosophical
differences
to
which
pure
theoretical differences
. . .
[may]
be
reduced
are
.
.
.
invisibly
guided
by
the
antagonism
and
competition
between
concrete
conflicting
groups.
Mannheim felt no
obligation
to render visible the invisible ; he
simply posited
and
accepted
its
existence.
7.
Mannheim,
Ideology,
p.
85.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.93 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 09:08:18 AM