Karl Barbir, The Changing Face of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century- Past and Future Scholarship

7/25/2019 Karl Barbir, The Changing Face of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century- Past and Future Scholarship

1/16

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: PAST AND

FUTURE SCHOLARSHIPAuthor(s): KARL BARBIRReviewed work(s):Source: Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie, Anno 18 (79), Nr. 1, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THEEIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1999), pp. 253-267Published by: Istituto per l'Oriente C. A. NallinoStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25817604.

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2/16

KARL

BARBIR

THE CHANGING FACE

OF THE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

IN

THE

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:

PAST

AND

FUTURE SCHOLARSHIP

The

title of this

essay

suggests

two

classic

articles: Albert Hourani's

"The

changing

face

of

the

Fertile Crescent

in the

XVIIIth

century",

and

Norman Itzkowitz's

"Eighteenth

century

Ottoman

realities".1

The

passing ofmore than 40 and 35 years respectively may appear to be an

eternity

in

the

flow

of

publication, particularly

in

contemporary

scholar

ship,

which is

organised

now

along

Stakhanovite lines.

Ideas,

however,

have

a

way

of

taking

their time

to

make

an

impact,

and nowhere

more so

than in the

work of

students

and

of readers of

these

two

articles.

In

re

reading

them,

it is

instructive

that,

in

both

instances,

the

main lines of

ar

gument

which

the authors

laid

out

have been

followed

up

by

their

stu

dents;

and

other

scholars

have

expanded

the

scope

of

research into

areas

none

could

have

imagined

possible

a

few decades

ago,

particularly

into

social and economic

history.

In a rather

perverse

sense, however, the two authors have succeeded

all

too

well:

what

was

once

simple, forty-some

years

ago,

in

the

minds

of

Gibb

and

Bowen,

for

instance,

is

now

fragmented

and

complicated.

The

verities about

ruling

institution

and

Muslim

institution,

about

Ottoman

decline,

and the

startling

claim of

Gibb

and Bowen that

they

had read

20,000

sources

(has

anyone

read that

many?)

now

have

a

quaint

look.2

As

we

have

learned

more,

in

other

words,

we

have

in

a sense

learned

less.

This

is the

price

of

specialisation.

In

a

recent text

on

the

modern

Near

East

between

1792

and

1923,

Malcolm

Yapp

wrote:

?A

generation

or so

ago teaching

Ottoman

history

was a

simple

task...

Since

that

delightful

age

of

pellucid

exposition

the

work

of

historians has contrived

to

blur

the

*

Iwould

like

to

acknowledge

the

support

of Dr. Thomas

Bulger,

Dean

of

Arts

at

Siena

College,

in

enabling

me

to

participate

n the irst Skilliter

ibrary

Colloquium

on

Ottoman

History.

In

its

original

state,

this

essay

was

informal in

tone

and

at

tempted

to

summarise and

clarify

ertain

issues raised

at

the

colloquium

and in the

author's

own

mind.

It

has

seemed

right

o

retain that

style

in

the

hope

that

his

ssay

will succeed

in

stimulating

ew

thought

bout

the

common

enterprise

f

thosewho

participated

n

this

colloquium.

1

Hourani,

Albert,

"The

changing

face

of

the

Fertile

Crescent

in

the

XVIIIth

Cen

tury",

n: Studia

Islamica,

VIII

(1957),

p.

89-122; Itzkowitz,

orman,

"Eighteenth

century

ttoman

realities",

n: tudia

Islamica,

XVI

(1962),

p.

73-94.

2

-

Gibb,

H.A.R.

and

Bowen, Harold,

Islamic

Society

and the

West,

2

parts,

in

I

vol.,

London, 1950-1957,

vol.

I,

p.

1.

OM,

n.s.

XVIII

(LXXIX),

1,

1999

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/16

254

Karl Barbir

picture

at

all

points,

to

qualify every generalisation

and

to

introduce

nothing

but

ambiguity?.3

In

spite

of all

the

progress

-

all the

articles,

books,

and

conferences

-

we

are

still

faced

with fundamental

problems,

which

may

not

be

a

bad

thing.

For

example,

if 'decline'

will

not

work

to

explain

what

was

happening

in

the

18th

-

or

for that

matter

the

17th

-

century,

then

what

will?

Furthermore,

we

still have

to

know what

was

Ottoman

about the

particular

phenomena

we

propose

to

deal

with.

Can

we,

for

example, speak,

as

Roger

Owen

once

asked,

of

a

unit of

study

de

fined

as

an

empire,

the

Ottoman,

or

as a

religious

tradition,

Islam?4

That

most

specialists

have

shied

away

from

these

sweeping,

essentialist

ap

proaches is a sign of progress.

Since

the

articles

of

Itzkowitz and

Hourani

are

certainly

well

known

and

have

helped

to

supplant

some

of

the

older

approaches,

it

might

be

useful

here,

firstly,

to

review

not

so

much

what

they

said

but,

rather,

what

they

had

to

contend

with.

Then,

secondly,

this

essay

will consider

what

can

rightly

be

called

the

changing

face

of the

Ottoman

empire

in

the

18th

century,

namely

the

new

scholarship

and

problems

which

deal with this

topic.

Itwill

conclude

with

some

remarks

concerning

the

relationship

of

this

scholarship

to

broader

cultures

and

audiences,

in

many

lands and

from

many

traditions.

Mr Hourani's article served for a

long

time as a

gateway

to the field

for

several

generations

of students.

Here

may

be

found

many

of

the

di

lemmas

with

which

we

must

still

contend,

and

a

suggested

solution

which

has

stood the

test

of

time,

although

the

author has

in

factmodified much

of what

he

said

in

that

early

piece.5

More

than

a

decade

ago,

he

made

a

startling

confession

in

the introduction

to

one

of his volumes

of

collected

essays:

'[These

essays]

are

products

of

an

attempt

both

to

write about the

modern

history

of

the

region

and

at

the

same

time

to

discover how

to

write about it and

explain

to

myself why

I have

not

been

more

successful

in

doing

so'.6 This

is

not,

I

believe,

a case

of

excessive

modesty,

but

of

3

-

Yapp,

M.E.,

The

Making

of

the odern Near

East,

London andNew

York,

1987,

p.

97.

4

-

Owen,

Roger,

"The

Middle

East in

the

eighteenth entury

an

'Islamic*

society

indecline:

a

critique

of

Gibb

and

Bowen's",

in:Review

of

the

iddle East

Studies,

I

(1975),

p.

101-112.

5

-

Over the last

two

decades,

Mr Hourani has

written

extensively

bout the

problems

of Middle Eastern

historiography.

remember

him

sharing

ideas

with

us

graduate

students

t

Princeton

University

in the

spring

f 1972.

Some

four

years

later,

e

con

tributed longessay toa collectivework examining thewhole fieldofMiddle East

ern

studies;

ithas been

reprinted

s

"The

present

state

of

Islamic

andMiddle

Eastern

historiography",

n:

Europe

and the iddle

East,

Berkeley,

1980,

p.

161-196.A

more

recent

ssay

is his "How should

we

write

the

history

f the

Middle

East?",

in: nter

national Journal

of

Middle East

Studies,

XXIII

(1991),

p.

125-136.

6

-

"Introduction",

in:

Hourani,

A.,

The

Emergence

of

Modern

Middle

East,

Ber

keley,

1981,

p.

xi.



4/16

The

Changing

Face

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

255

real

doubt

and

struggle,

an

object

lesson

for

lesser

scholars;

and

we

would

do

well

to

ponder

it.

Today,

there

ismuch

more

variety

in

modes

of

analysis

and

interpretation

than

even

ten

years ago;

and it is

almost

certain,

given

the

rapid

development

of interest in

the

18th-century

Otto

man

world,

that

fundamental

shifts

in

perspective

will

have

been

achieved

by

the

turn

of the

century.

In the

interim,

a

re-reading

of 'The

changing

face of the Fertile

Cres

cent

in the

XVIIIth

Century'

allows

for

sensitivity

to

points

that

may

not

have been

so

clear

earlier.

From

today's perspective,

what is

striking

is

the

way

in which

the author

locates the

18th

century

as

preceding

the

dramatic rise of European power over the rest of the globe during the

19th.

Given

recent

talk

about

a

'new

world

order',

it is

interesting

to note

Hourani's

argument

that

people

in Asia

were

anxious in the

1950s 'to

join

hands

with their

own

past;

and

the

changes

which

continue

do

not

tend

so

much

to

absorb the communities

of

the

East

into that of

Europe

as

to

absorb it into

a new

world-community,

linked

at

least

on

the

level

of

technique

and

of social and

political

organisation'.7

But,

of

course,

Mr

Hourani

does much

more

here.

He

goes

on

to

sketch

out

his

purpose,

namely:

to

look

once more

at

the civilization of theNear East

as

it

was

be

fore

the

full

impact

of the modern

West

was

felt,

and

to

ask

whether

in fact it

was

decaying

or

lifeless;

whether indeed

we

can

speak

of

a

self-contained

Ottoman

Moslem

society...;

and

how

far

what

happened

in the 19th

century

was

simply

the

injection

of

something

new,

or

the further

development

of

movements

already

generated

in the

very

heart

of

Near Eastern

society,

and

now

given

new

strength

r

a new

turn

by

the

insertion

nto them

of

the in

creased influence

of

Europe.8

Of

great

salience

is

Mr

Hourani's

appreciation

of the

Ottoman

empire:

'Regions so distant from one another, and peoples so varied in beliefs and

ways

of

life,

could

not

have been held

together

in

political

unity

by

any

thing

less than

a

tour

de

force'.9

But

rather

than

limiting

himself

to

poli

tics,

the

author

goes

on

in

his

survey

to

criticise the

temptation

to

judge

Ottoman

society

and

politics by

the

mythical

standard

of

Siileyman

the

Magnificent's

reign,

and

to

suggest

new

movements

of

change,

the

emer

gence

of

new

social

groups

and

forces.

In

particular,

Mr

Hourani

de

scribes

the

pattern

now

recognised

as

'decentralisation',

but identified

then

with

the

rise of

local

rulers,

such

as

the

ayan

and

derebeys;

the

changed

conditions

for non-Muslim

communities

(not

only

enhanced

7

-

Hourani,

"Changing

face...", p.

89-90.

S-Ibid,

p.

90-91.

9

-

Ibid,

p.

91.

This

forceful

tatement

as

to

be the

inspiration

or

Mr Hourani's

celebrated

1969

lecture

to

an

audience

of

non-specialists,

"The Ottoman

background

of themodern

Middle

East",

reprinted

n:The

Emergence

of

the

iddle

East,

p.

1-18.



5/16

256

Karl

Barbir

economic

opportunities

but also

changed

cultural

orientations);

and the

challenges posed

by

indigenous

movements

like the

'Abd al-Wahhab

Sa'ud

alliance

in

Arabia.10

It

is

to

these

changes

thatMr

Hourani

devotes

himself

in the balance

of his

article.

A

re-reading

after

many

years,

from

the

perspective

of

today,

suggests

two

further

observations

concerning

what

Mr

Hourani

did:

the first

is

the

centrality,

the

common

denominator,

as

it

were,

of the

Ottoman

experi

ence;

the second

is

the

dynamic

character

of

that

experience

in

the

18th

century.

From

here,

Mr

Hourani

goes

on

to

argue

that the

changed

inter

national

environment

by

the 19th

century

had introduced

new

elements of

dynamism. Among those elements were the strategic shift in themilitary

balance of

power

between

Europe

and

the

Ottoman

empire,

the

subordi

nation

of

the

Ottoman

economy

to

that

of

Europe,

and the rise

to

power

of

European

ambassadors

and consuls in the

Ottoman

empire:

'the

in

creased influence of the

West... entered

as a

factor into certain

develop

ments

already generated

from within

the

Ottoman

community'.11

Here,

there is

continuity,

rather than

abrupt change;

an

appreciation

of the

Ot

toman

environment;

and

a

broad

conception

of

history

which allows

for

the

interplay

of

political,

economic,

and cultural forces.

More

so

than

Hourani,

Itzkowitz is

concerned

to

ground

the Ottoman

experience

in some

empirical reality

which can be demonstrated

by

the

Ottoman

sources

he

uses

(primarily biographical

dictionaries and chroni

cles),

and

then

to

see

elements

of

that

reality

as

having

some

continuity

with

what

was

to

come

in the 19th

century.

The

principal

method he

uses

is career-line

analysis,

also known

as

prosopography,

which

enjoyed

great

popularity

in the

1960s

and

1970s,

and is still

a

useful

approach.12

Once

again,

a

re-reading

of this article

suggests

two

points.

First is Itzko

witz's

famous

critique

of the

Lybyer

thesis,

first

published

in 1913 and

taken

over

and

repeated

by

many

other

scholars,

and

particularly by

Gibb

and

Bowen

in

slamic

Society

and the

West.

Briefly,

and

perhaps

to

over

simplify,

the

Lybyer

thesis

posited

a

sharp

distinction

between the

'Rul

ing

Institution',

composed

of the

sultan and

converted Christian 'slaves'

who

staffed

the

military

and

bureaucracy,

as

they

existed

in

the

sixteenth

century;

and

the

'Moslem

Institution',

composed

of the official

religious

hierarchy

and related

sub-institutions such

as

Sufi

orders,

whose

mem

bers

were

free-born

Muslims.13

Taking

up

the

Lybyer

thesis,

Gibb

and

Bowen

extended

it

by

largely

attributing

the

decline of

the

Ottoman

em

10

-

Hourani,

"Changing

face...", p.

96-97.

11

-

Ibid., p. 121. The increased nfluence f theWest may be seen in thefact that

after 1792

permanent

uropean

embassies

were

established in

European capitals,

an

event

whose

bicentennial

was

celebrated in the

convening

of the irst

Skilliter

Collo

quium.

12

-

For

an

appraisal

of

this

method

see

Stone,

Lawrence,

"Prosopography...",

in:

Daedalus,

C

(Winter 1971), p.

46-79.

13

-

Described

in

Itzkowitz,

"Realities...",

p.

75.



6/16

The

Changing

Face

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

257

pire

to

the

permeation, during

the

17th and 18th

centuries,

of

the

'Ruling

Institution'

by

members of the 'Moslem Institution'.14

Situating

the

Ly

byer

thesis

from

the

standpoint

of

the

sociology

of

knowledge,

Itzkowitz

notes

something

troubling,

which

still

persists

among

us

far

too

often:

?The

fact

that the

Lybyer

thesis

quickly

became

a

truth

to

be

repeated

in

stead

of

a

springboard

to

further research is

regrettable...?.15

Itzkowitz

explains

this

phenomenon

as

the result

of

both

'comparatively

little

inter

est

in

Ottoman

history'

and

a

lack

among

historians of the

necessary

lan

guages

and

other

tools.16

But

he

also

suggests,

further

on,

a

third,

more

sinister,

reason:

today

we

would

call it

orientalism,

in

its

worst

sense.

Here,

Itzkowitz

comments

that the

Lybyer thesis, repeated by

Gibb

and

Bowen,

has the

advantage

of

being simple,

and

clear-cut,

easily

grasped,

and

-

hopefully

-

easily

remembered.

Also,

by

crediting

the

suc

cess

of the

Ottomans

to

the

presence

of

men

of

Christian

origins

in

positions

of

importance,

and the

subsequent

decline of the

great

empire

to

the

replacement

of those

Christians

by

the

Muslim

bom,

the thesis

has

the additional

merit

of

being

comforting

to

the

Christian

West's

deep-seated

sense

of

superiority.17

Itzkowitz

then

goes

on

to

refute

the

Lybyer

thesis with evidence from

original

Ottoman sources and

by using

the

prosopographic

method.

From

these

observations

concerning

an

attempt

some

30

years

ago

to

get

to

the 'realities'

of

the

18th-century

Ottoman

world,

it

is

clear

how

much

has

changed. Today,

there

are a

goodly

number

of

people,

in

many

countries and cultural

traditions,

who know

the

languages,

have

an

inter

est

in

the

field,

have

published important

studies,

and,

it

is

hoped,

have

set

aside

antiquated

ideas of

superiority,

or

at

least

made

themselves

aware

of their

own

commitments, biases,

and

prejudices.

Although

this

problem

is still contentious and

difficult,

it is

at

least

now

out

in

the

open,

for better

or

for

worse.18

U-Ibid.,p.

81.

\5~Ibid.,p.

76.

\6-Ibid.,p.

11.

17

-

Ibid.,

p.

81.

This

prejudice

is

one

of

many

which

are

grouped

under the rubric

'orientalism'

by

Edward

Said in:

Orientalism,

New

York, 1978,

one

of

the

most

in

fluential,

nd

controversial,

orks of

recent

ultural

criticism,

ith

applications

well

beyond

theOttoman

empire

or

the slamic

world.

Itzkowitz

ertainly

ried

to

convey

the

prejudices

of orientalism

when he

noted

(Itzkowitz,

"Realities...", p.

77)

that

specialists in Lybyer's time, and since, avoided consulting 'oriental' sources: ?Reli

ance

upon,

and

commendation

of,

the

European

records

was

and remains

a

prominent

feature fwhat

passes

forhistorical

scholarship

n

the

ear East?.

Kipling

penetrated

to

what

is

perhaps

at

the

root

of

this

kind

of attitude

hen

he

wrote ?You'll

never

plumb

the

riental

mind.

And

even

if

you

do,

itwon't

be

worth

the

toil?.

18 That

the

kind

of

cultural

prejudices

which

Edward

Said

explored

in

Orientalism

still

persist

is revealed in

many

facets

of

contemporary

life.

In

an

interview

broadcast



7/16

258

Karl Barbir

The

second

point

to

arise

from

a

re-reading

of

'

18th

century

Ottoman

realities'

is,

once

again,

the

way

inwhich Itzkowitz

conveys

the

dynamic

nature

of

Ottoman

state

and

society,

or

at

least

that

part

of itwith which

he

was

concerned,

namely

the

ruling

elite.

Demonstrating

the

phenome

non

during

the 18th

century

of

efendis-tnrned-pasas,

that

is,

members of

the

central

bureaucracy

advancing

to

careers

in

the

military-provincial

governor

class,19

then

to

the

vizier

ate,

Itzkowitz

goes

on

to

suggest

that

perhaps

the

development

of such

a

group

of

men

is

but the reflection

of

an

important

truggle

which

appears

to

be

going

on

-

the

strug

gle

between

the

bureaucracy

and the

military.

This,

of

course,

is ob

scured ifreligious origins rather hancareer linesare stressed.20

He

concludes

by saying

that

an

important

role

was

played

by efendis

turned-pasas

in

the

19th-century

reform

movements.

Both of these

obser

vations

are

offered

briefly

and

tentatively,

but

they anticipate

many ques

tions

which

have

since

been raised.

Itzkowitz,

like

Hourani in his

time,

provides

a

significant

alternative

to

prevailing

ideas.

The

next

generation

of

scholars

has

extended

this

assumption

of

dynamism,

of

a

living

soci

ety,

from

the elite

to

the

unprivileged,

indeed the

majority,

of

the

Otto

man

population:

townsmen,

peasants,

nomads,

and

others.21

The result is

on

National

Public Radio in theUnited States

during

the

Spring

of

1992,

James

David

Barber,

of Duke

University,

said that

our

world

can now

be divided into

two

parts: (1)

what Barber calls

'Mcworld',

those

parts

of the

globe

which

participate

n

mass

consumption

of fast

food,

fashion, music, entertainment,

computers,

faxes,

etc.

(all

of

which

cross

national

boundaries);

and

(2)

what

Barber

calls

'jihad',

those

parts

of the world still

governed by primordial relationships

stressing

ethnic

and/or

relig

ious

bonds,

constantly

at war

with the

emerging

international

plastic

culture

as

well

as

with their

neighbours

who differ n

seemingly

mall

ways

(examples:Nagorno/Kara

bakh,

Cyprus,

Lebanon, Israel/Palestine,

the former

Yugoslavia,

etc.).

Specialists

on

the

Islamicworld

and

theMiddle East will

note

with

wry

amusement

he

appropriation

f

the

term

gihad,

wrenched from

its

historical

context,

for

a

contemporary purpose.

19

-

Itzkowitz,

"Realities",

p.

86.

20-Ibid.,

p.

87.

21

-

Selected studiesof the

18th-century

ttomanworld which

are

relevant

to

the

r

gument

here

are:

'Abd

al-Rahman, A.,

al-RTf

al-Misri

fi

'l-qarn

al-tamin

'asara,

al

Qahirah,

1974;

Abou-el-Haj,

Rifaat,

The 1703 Rebellion and

the tructure

of

Otto

man

Politics,

Istanbul,

1984;

Raymond,

Andre,

Artisans

et

commercants

au

Caire

au

18e

siecle, Damascus, 1973-74;

Raymond,

Andre,

Grandes villes

arabes

a

I'epoque

ottomane,

Paris,

1985,

partialEnglish

translation,

he

Great Arab

Cities

in

the 16th

18th

Centuries,

New

York,

1984; Panzac, Daniel,

La

peste

dans

Vempire

ottoman,

Louvain, 1985; Panzac, Daniel,

"International

nd domestic

maritime

trade in

the

Ottoman empire during the 18th

century",

n: InternationalJournal

of

Middle East

Studies,

XXIV

(1992), p.

189-206;

the

collection of

studies

edited

by

Thomas Naff

and

Roger

Owen,

Studies

in

18th and 19th

Century,

Carbondale, 1977;

another

col

lection,

hilipp,

Thomas

(ed.), (Berliner

Islamstudien,

ol.

5),

Stuttgart,

992;

Mas

ters,

Bruce,

The

Origins of

Western Economic

Dominance

in

the

Middle East: Mer

cantilism and

the Islamic

Economy

in

Aleppo.

1660-1750,

New

York,

1988;

and

Marcus,

Abraham,

The Middle East

on

the

Eve

of

Modernity,

New

York,

1989.



8/16

The Changing

Face

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

259

a

much

richer,

more

complicated picture,

one

certain

to

be

modified fur

ther

by

new

inquiries.

This rather

rapid

review of

Hourani

and

Itzkowitz

must

now

be

set

aside in

order

to

consider the

present.

What,

it

may

be

asked,

is the

status

of

our

subject,

the

18th-century

Ottoman

world?

Here,

I would

like

to

suggest

three

problems

which

have recurred

for

nearly

30

years.

Al

though

they

are

by

no means

the

only

problems

which could

be

raised,

the

fact that

they

have recurred

should

suggest

once

again

how

our

stud

ies

are so

unlike

the

hard

sciences: there

are

relatively

few settled

matters;

and,

as

historians,

our

own

life

choices,

commitments,

and

times

tend

to

help shape what we find significant in the past.22 In other words, each

historian

is 'hooked'

to

a

particular

field

or

subject, just

as

Sir Hamilton

Gibb

(born

in

Alexandria,

Egypt)

was

said

by

Albert

Hourani

to

have

been

'knit

with his

doom'.23

Today,

however,

these hooks abound in

va

riety

and

context.

In

Europe

and

America,

for

instance,

the hooks

are

at

least

three-fold.

First,

an

increasing

number

of Americans

and

Europeans

are

themselves

ofMiddle

Eastern

origin:

recent

waves

of

immigration

(over

roughly

the

last

three

decades)

have

brought

Iranians,

Egyptians,

Turks,

Lebanese,

Afghans

and

Israelis,

among

others,

to

the

United States

and

Europe.

Stu

dents of the second generation, raised and educated outside theMiddle

East,

want

to

know

about the

region

from

which

their

parents

came.

Sec

ond,

students

without

that

biographical

connection

are

'hooked'

by

recent

events:

war,

revolution, terrorism,

tc.

They

want

to

know

why

these

events

occur,

and what

the

people

involved

are

like.

Some

of

these students also

have

what

might

be called

a

policy

bent:

they

want to

know what the

can

be

done

to

affect theMiddle

Eastern situation.

Unfortunately,

in

many

in

22

-

A

furious

debate in

recent

pages

of

the British

journal

Past and Present

demon

strates that such problems are not confined to the study of the 18th-century Ottoman

world. The

controversy

n that

distinguished

ournal began

with

a

modest

note

by

Lawrence Stone

concerning

what

he

regards

as

a

crisis

in

the

historical

profession:

"Notes:

history

and

post-modernism",

in: Past

and

Present,

CXXXI

(May 1991),

p.

217-218.

In

his

piece,

Stone

observes

that

contemporary

critical

theory

(particularly

deconstruction,

a

salient

part

of

post-modern

culture)

threatens

to

deny

the

possibility

of

attaining

ny

knowledge

of the

past.

Spirited

responses

were

printed

n short rder:

Patrick

Joyce

and Catriona

Kelly,

"History

and

post-modernism,

I",

in:

Past

and

Present,

CXXXIII

(November

1991),

p.

204-209

and

209-213

respectively.

tone

himself

then

replied

in

a

third

ound,

History

nd

post-modernism,

I",

followed in

the

ame

issue

by

Gabrielle

Spiegel,

"History

nd

post-modernism,

V",

in:

ast

and

Present,CXXXV (May 1992), p. 189-194 and 194-208. ProfessorSpiegel seems to

have started

he

debate

by

writing

a

fine

article,

which

Stone

very

much

admired,

nd

which

specialists

on

the ttoman

empire

in

the

18th

entury

might

well

find instruc

tive:

"History,

historicism,

nd

the

social

logic

of the

text n

theMiddle

Ages",

in:

Speculum,

LXV

(1990),

p.

59-86.

23

-

This

poetic

phrase

appears

in Albert Hourani's

'H.A.R.

Gibb:

the

vocation

of

an

orientalist',

n

his

Europe

and

the

iddle

East,

p.

104-134;

the

phrase

is

on

p.

106.



9/16

260

Karl

Barbir

stitutions,

this

policy

bent

actually

drives the

programmes

in Middle

Eastern

Studies;

I recall one American

programme

director

saying

that

should the

Arab-Israeli conflict

ever

be

resolved,

that all

programmes

of

Middle

Eastern

Studies in the

United States

would

collapse

In

a

similar

vein,

more

recently, specialists

on

the former Soviet Union

were

reported

to

be

suffering

from

a

depression:

their

field

of

study

had

apparently

dis

appeared

Third,

there

are

serious students

of

history

and

society

who

want

to

understand theMiddle

East

for

comparative

purposes;

their

ques

tions arise from the

assumption

that

all human

societies

are

comparable

and

worthy

of

respect

and

study.

Historians who live and practise in the lands where theOttoman em

pire

once

held

sway

encounter

a

different

set

of hooks.

There,

few remain

alive

to

whom

the

empire's

life,

its

realities,

are

vivid memories. If

any

thing,

the

passage

of

time has made

the

'pastness'

of the Ottoman

empire

past:

it

is

now

truly

a

part

of

history,

and

as

such it

must

be dealt with

re

alistically,

as a

part

of the

past,

rather than denied

or

condemned,

as

it

once

was,

when

nationalism

among

the former

peoples

of the

empire

be

came

the dominant

ideology,

and when

a

personal

memory

of the

em

pire's

last

rulers,

the

Young

Turks,

was

vivid and

painful,

associated

as

it

was

with Turkish nationalism

and the

disasters of the

First World

War

and its aftermath. It has only been within the last decade, for example,

that

some

Arab

scholars have

tried

to

come

to

terms

with

theirOttoman

heritage

in the realisation

that

400

years

of

history

cannot

be

swept

aside

so

neatly.24

Within this

context

of

choice

and

commitment,

the three

suggested

problems facing

students of

18th-century

Ottoman

peoples

take

on

added

meaning,

for

answers

to

them

&re

loaded with

value

judgements

and im

plicit

assumptions.

The first

problem

has

to

do with

the fact that

our

subject,

theOttoman

world

-

Ottoman

peoples

and

society

-

should

be

seen

as

'normal',

not

exotic;

comparable

to other

peoples

and

societies,

not incommensurable.

This

is the

thrust of

the

argument

in

Rifaat

Abou-El-Haj's

recent

book,

Formation

of

theModern State:

the

Ottoman

Empire.

Sixteenth

to

Eight

24

-

To

illustrate he

magnitude

of

this

roblem

of

coming

to

terms

ith

an

historical

heritage,

compare

the

historiography

f

the

period

roughly

1952-1980,

studied

sensi

tively

by

Abou-El-Haj,

Rifaat,

"The

social

uses

of the

past:

recent

Arab

historiogra

phy

of

Ottoman

rule",

in: nternationalJournal

of

Middle

East

Studies,

XIV

(1982),

p.

185-201,

with

more

recent

trends,

such

as

the

establishment of

associations

for

Ot

toman

studies in

several

Arab

countries. This

development,

in

my

view,

represents

a

trend n theevolutionof thought n theArabic-speaking partof what oncewas the

Ottoman

empire.

For

a

representative

sample

of this

new

thinking,

see

the

first

num

bers of

a new

journal,

Arabic Historical Review

for

Ottoman Studies

(or AHROS),

edited

and

published

by Abdeljelil

Temimi

of the

University

of

Tunis;

and Professor

Temimi's

essay,

"Problematiques

de

la

recherche

historique

sur

les

provinces

arabes

a

l'epoque

ottomane",

in:

AHROS,

III-IV

(December 1991),

p.

111-117

(Arabic

ver

sion,

p.

23-30).



10/16

The

Changing

Face

of the

Ottoman

Empire

261

eenth Centuries.

There,

he

decries the

historiography

which

'continues

to

emphasise

the

peculiarities,

oddities,

and

particularism

of Ottoman his

tory

and

civilisation'.25

Professor

Abou-El-Haj's

critique

will,

I

am

sure,

stimulate

considerable discussion of the

strengths

and

weaknesses of

what

we

have

done

and

what

we

may

do

in the

future.

However,

the

sooner

we

agree

that

our

subjects

of

study

are

'normal',

comparable

to

other

subjects

in other times and

places,

the better

off

we

will

certainly

be.26

In

effect,

I

am

asking

that

the

'hook' of

'exoticism'

be

rejected,

and

a

new

approach,

based

upon

certain

shared values

concerning

past

human

experience,

be

substituted. There is

no

easy

way

to

accomplish

this

task,

but

it

seems

to

me

to

be

the

only approach

thatwill

unite the efforts

of

scholars interested

in the

18th

century,

regardless

of

their

backgrounds,

interests,

and

concerns.

The second

problem

is the

persistence

of the

Ottoman

empire despite

all

the

difficulties it faced

during

the

17th and

18th

centuries. This is

the

central

problem

before all

specialists;

indeed,

if

the

empire

was

in

such

difficulty,

if it suffered

so

grievously

from internal and

external chal

lenges,

then how did it survive?

Answering

this

question requires

us

to

go

beyond

the

usual

generalisations

about

lack of

alternative

structures,

or

the

cancelling

out,

in

effect,

of

European

rivalries

concerning

the

Otto

man patrimony. In regard to the internal situation of the empire, which

rightly

remains

a

primary

target

of future

research,

Professor

Abou-El

Haj

argues

that

during

the 17th

and 18th

centuries,

there

were

apparently

contradictory

forces of

centralisation

and

decentralisation

at

work. The

way

that

they

interacted,

he

believes,

might

well have

preserved

at

least

the

essentials

of

the

empire,

but

they

also

introduced

enormous

changes:

in the

system

of

tax

collection,

the

composition

of the

ruling

elite,

the

factionalism within that

elite;

and

so on.

This

is

a

somewhat

more

elabo

rate

and

empirically

informed

hypothesis

than

that

suggested by

Hourani

40

years

ago,

an

indication

of the

progress

that has been made

and

which

has been the work ofmany hands; and it has themerit of suggesting a

dynamic

process,

rather than

headlong

decline

or

stagnation,

the

previous

25

-

4Ali

Abou-El-Haj,

Rifaat,

Formation

of

the

Modern

State:

the

Ottoman

Empire

Sixteenth

to

Eighteenth

Centuries,

Albany,

1991,

p.

1. As

Suraiya Faroqhi

and Cor

nell

Fleischer

point

out

in the

preface

to

this

ork

(p.

xi),

?such

relatively

nnocuous

statements

ay

stop

being

innocuous

when

one

considers

the

context

inwhich

they

are

made?,

namely

the

tradition hich

continues

to

see

the

experience

of other civili

sations

as

exotic,

strange,

and

not

necessarily

subject

to

trends

and

forces

similar

to

those

found

elsewhere.

26

-

That thegeneralpublic still isfascinatedby the xoticism and apparentrigidity

and

unchanging

character

f theOttoman

empire

is

revealed in

the

following

refer

ence to

the ttoman

background

of

the

modern

Middle

East

in the

recent

best-selling

collection

of

essays

(many

of

them

oncerning

the

1991Gulf

War)

by

the

ournalist,

P.J.

O'Rourke:

?Until

1918

the

Arabian

peninsula

was

ruled

by

the

Ottoman

empire,

so

called

because it had

the

same

amount of

intelligence

and

energy

as a

footstool?,

O'Rourke, P.J.,

Give

War

a

Chance,

New

York,

1992,

p.

167.



11/16

262

Karl Barbir

alternative

which Hourani

tried

to

modify

and make

comprehensible.

The third and

last

problem

is the

very

role

of

theWest. On

one

hand,

it is

tempting

for

some

scholars

to

see

the

West

as

interrupting

internal

processes

already

under

way

within

Ottoman

society.

On the

other

hand,

this

emphasis

on

'interruption'

suggests

suddenness,

abrupt

change

in the

19th

century,

rather than

an

organic,

natural

development

from

previous

experience.

If Ottoman

society,

however,

evolved in

its

own

way

during

the

17th

and

18th

centuries,

the notion

of

interruption

makes

the

'pre

interruption'

period

moot

by implication,

in

spite

of

the fact

that

we

all

have

sustained

our

own

work

by

assuming

that the

middle

centuries of

Ottoman history are important. To say or to imply that whatever hap

pened

before

the

coming

of

theWest

is

unimportant

by comparison

rele

gates

us

to

defining

our

subject

of

study

in

terms

of the

experience

of

Europe,

to

which it is

then

made

a

footnote.27

A

fascinating

alternative

to

this

rather routine

approach

was

offered

long

ago

by

Alexander

Russell,

who

was

physician

to

the Levant

Company

in

Aleppo

during

the

middle

decades

of the 18th

century.

In

his

famous

work,

The

Natural

History

of

Aleppo,

Russell offered

several

important

observations.

Mixing freely

over

the

years

with

the

local

population,

unlike

many

other

European

residents

of his

time,

Russell's

observations

are

grounded

in

a

broad

and

wise

con

ception of human nature and in a keen awareness of the strengths and

weaknesses

of both

western

and middle

eastern

societies. He

represents

in

these

respects

the outlook of the

Enlightenment.

Within

certain

obvious

limits,

one

may

generalise

from

his

observations

of

Aleppo

to

the

prob

lem

discussed

here.

Russell

reports

that:

'Religion,

not

reverenced

as

for

merly,

retains little

more

than

its

outward form:

not

having

influence suf

ficiently

to

restrain the

numerous

vices,

which

modern

luxury,

and the

frivolous

spirit

of

the

age,

have

universally

introduced'.28

In

this

obser

vation

one

may

detect

the

degree

to

which

western tastes

and

goods

had

27

-

This

point

ismade

most

forcefully y

Roger

Owen in

"TheMiddle East in the

eighteenth

century..."

cit,

p.

102,

where Owen

sharply

criticises ?what remains basi

cally

a

nineteenth

entury

istoricalmethod with

its

emphasis

on

the

narrow

study

f

texts,

ith its

definition f culture

in

terms

f

the

production

of

ideas

or

art

objects,

with its

mystificatory

ttitude

to

the role of

religion,

with itsbuilt

-

in

tendency

to

compare

so-called

Western with so-called Islamic

civilisation

-

always

to

the

latter's

disadvantage)).

Likewise,

Owen

(p.

108)

criticises

the obsession of

some

western

scholars

with

the

notion of

Ottoman

decline;

in his

view,

that

conception

is

?clearly

ideological

and

stems

directly

rom

the

nitial

project

of

examining

the iddle East in

terms

f

an

entity

alled

'Islamic'

society, something

which

can

only

be

compared

with another ntity Western society.Once thenature f this roject isclearly stated

then the

use

of

such

concepts

as

'decline' stand revealed for what

they

are:

part

of

an

ideological

apparatus

for

regarding

iddle Eastern

society

in

terms f

one

particular

world

view,

and for

preventing

tfrom

being

analysed

in

terms

f

the

real forces and

relations

at

work

within it?.

28

-

Russell, Alexander,

The

Natural

History

of Aleppo,

2nd

ed. revised

by

Patrick

Russell,

2

vols.,

London: G. G.

and

J.

Robinson, 1794,1,

p.

336.



12/16

The

Changing

Face

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

263

become

popular among

the

better-off

segments

of

Aleppine society by

themiddle

to

late 18th

century.

A

clearer

indication

of

the economic and

social

implications

of

the diffusion

of

western

consumption

habits,

and

of

important

changes

going

on

within this

one

segment

of

Ottoman

society,

is

contained

in

the

following

remark made

to

Russell

by

a

mufti

of

Alep

po,

whom

Russell

knew

intimately:

'If

you

take... the

reverse

of

what

you

have

seen

daily

practised by

us,

to

be the actual

law,

you

will

be

nearer

the

truth

nd

in

less

danger

of

misleading

your

countrymen'.29

That

Russell

and

the

mufti

were

not

exceptional

or

unusual in their

perceptions

of

their

own

times

may

be

learned from

the

famed

'

Abd al

Rahman al-Gabartl, chronicler of the 18th and early 19th centuries, wit

ness

to

the

Napoleonic occupation

of

Egypt,

the

establishment of the

dy

nasty

of Muhammad

'All,

and

busy

correspondent

with

important

schol

ars

elsewhere

in the

Ottoman

world,

from Istanbul

to

Damascus. In

his

introduction,

he

writes:

Peoples

of the

past,

from

the

time

God created

this human

race,

devoted themselves

to

the

writing

of

history,

forebear after fore

bear,

descendant after

descendant,

until the

people

of

our

time

abandoned

it,

ignored

it,

passed

over

it,

neglected

it,

onsidered

it

thework of the

idle,

and said: it is

[merely]

the tales of

the

an

cients [asdtir aUawwaliri]. By my life,theymay be excused; they

are

busy

with

more

important hings

nd

are

not

pleased

to

weary

their

pens

on

such

an

arduous

path. Things

in this

age

have been

turned

upside

down;

[history's] prestige

has

declined;

the

founda

tions

of

judgement

have become

unsteady.

Events

are

recorded

neither in

registers

nor

inbooks. The

concerns

of the

moment

that

are

not

of

[immediate]

benefit

are

lost.

What

has

passed

and

gone

cannot

be recovered

except

when

some

poor

wretch,

secluded in

the

corners

of

obscurity

and

neglect,

withdrawn fromwhat others

do,

occupies

himself in the time

of

his isolation

and consoles

his

solitude

by counting

thewickednesses

of fate

and

its

blessings.30

Here,

we

have

but

a

glimpse

of what

18th-century

Ottoman realities

and

the

changing

face

of the

Fertile

Crescent

were;

and that

glimpse

is

an

object

lesson

for the future. In

effect,

we

are

challenged,

as

other

histori

ans

are,

to

see

the

experience

of

our

subjects

of

study

as

normal;

to

evalu

ate

the relative

importance

of

continuity

and of

change;

and

to

make the

whole

process

believable

to

contemporary

readers.

In

that

connection,

the conclusion

of this

essay

introduces

a

topic

which,

on

the face

of

it,

may

not

be

so

pleasant

but which

is

not

peculiar

to

specialists

of

the

Ottoman

empire

in the 18th

century.

It

is

our

relation

ship

as

specialists

to our broader

cultures,

regardless

ofwhich

they

are.

If,

as

many

of

us

would

agree,

we are

in

some

respects

in trouble

with

the

29

-

Russell,

op.

cit., I,

p.

337.

30

-

al-GabartT,

'Abd

al-Rahman,

'Agd'ib

al-atar

Ji

'l-taragim

al-ahbar,

4

vols.,

Bulaq:

Bulaq

Press,

1879,

vol.

I,

p.

5.



13/16

264

Karl Barbir

broader

subject

of

history, history

itself is

in

trouble,

with the

broader

world

'out

there',

the

general public

which

pays

our

wages

and

which

sends

us

students,

our

hope

for

the

future.

These difficulties deserve

elaboration.

It

was

not

so

long

ago

that

non-specialist

historians,

much less

the

general public,

saw

nothing

of value in

our

interest

in

the

18th-century

Ottoman

world;31

and

it

is

unfortunate

that

there

are

still

those

who

still

make that

judgement today,

not

necessarily

out

of

ignorance

or

dense

ness,

but because of

the straitened

circumstances of

specialised

knowl

edge

in

many

countries.

There

are

several dimensions

to

this

difficulty.

One is the question ofwhat themodern Middle East is about. This may

seem

peculiar,

since

we

who

write about

the

18th-century

Ottoman

em

pire

do

not

automatically

think

of ourselves

as

students of

modern Middle

Eastern

history.

To

non-specialists,

of

course,

we are:

somehow,

we

fit in

with

what is said

about the

19th and

twentieth

centuries,

and

the

dramatic

and

conflict-ridden

years

of those

centuries.

What

we

do

may

be

seen

as

a

baseline for

more

dramatic and

more

recent

developments,

but

it is

rarely

taken

seriously.

As

recent

evidence

there

is the

December

1991

issue

of

the

American

Historical

Review,

an

astonishing

event

in its

own

right,

for

the

United

States

at

any

rate.32 This

issue

was

devoted

to

the

modern

Middle East, but confined to the 19th and twentieth centuries. In spite of

the

fact

that

several

specialists

on

the

18th-century

Ottoman

empire

were

cited in

various

footnotes,

they

remain

just

that footnotes

in

what is

re

garded

as

a more

important

historical

period,

the

'real'

modern

Middle

East,

the

19th and

twentieth centuries.

Although

none

of

us

would

dispute

the

importance

of

what is

presented

in that

issue

of the

American Histori

31

-

In that

regard,

I

would

like

to

share

an

anecdote

from

my

days

as a

graduate

stu

dent

looking

for

employment

some

20

years

ago.

I

was

confronted

in

one

interview

by a senior scholar inAmerican history who wanted to know my area of research. In

response,

I

described

my

broad field

of

interest

-

the

Ottoman-Arab

world

between

1500 and the

present

-

and the

subject

of

my thesis,

18th-century

Damascus. He

re

marked

that

my

field

seemed

awfully

narrow

to

him.

In

fact,

he

said:

'My

field is

much

broader.'

Being

impetuous

nd

rather

efensive

about

my

subject,

as

graduate

students

ometimes

re,

I

asked

him

what

his

area

of

specialisation

was.

He

promptly

replied:

'the

second

administration of

Andrew

Jackson'.

32

-American

Historical

Review,

LXXXXVI,

5

(1991),

p.

1363-1496.

The

contribu

tions

were:

Khalidi,

Rashid,

"Arab

nationalism:

historical

problems

in

the

literature",

p.

1363-1373;

Khoury,

Philip

S.,

"Continuity

nd

change

in

Syrian

political

life: the

19th

nd

20th

centuries", . 1374-1395;

Devlin,

John

.,

"The

Baath

Party:

rise

and

metamorphosis", . 1396-1407;Farouk-Sluglett,arion andSluglett, eter, The histo

riography

f

modern

Iraq",

p.

1408-1421;

Marsot,

Afaf

Lutfi

al-Sayyid,

"Survey

of

Egyptian

works

of

history",

.

1422-1434; Peterson,

J.E.,

"The

Arabian Peninsula

in

modern

times:

historiographical

urvey",

. 1435-1449;

Stein,

Kenneth

W.,

"A

his

toriography

eview

of

literature

n

the

origins

of

the

Arab-Israeli

conflict",

.

1450

1465;

Reich,

Bernard,

"Themes in the

history

f the state

of

Israel",

p. 1466-1478;

Bakhash,

Shaul,

"Iran",

p.

1479-1496.



14/16

The Changing

face

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

265

cat Review,

we

might regret the fact

that the

editor

rather

densely insisted

that the

genesis

of

that issue

?was

the

recent

war

in the

Persian

Gulf?.

Nonetheless,

the

editor did

say

that

he

hoped

that ?the

essays

[would]

di

rect...

readers

to

scholarly

works thatwould allow them

to

deepen

their

knowledge

of

Middle

East

history?.33

We

should celebrate

the fact that

someone

is

paying

attention

to

any

aspect

of

what

we

are

interested

in,

regardless

of

the

tragic

events

that

prompted

that

attention.

It

is

perhaps

ironic

thatMr Hourani's

recent

his

tory

of theArabs has

won

phenomenal

success

(more

than

100,000

cop

ies have been

sold)

in

part

because of

the

Gulf War.34 That

success

would

indicate a public, in the English-speaking world at least, receptive and

willing

to

hear

from

a

specialist.

Nonetheless,

I

would offer these

reser

vations,

in the

spirit

of

posing

them

as

challenges

to

our

futurework.

Firstly,

are

we

sensitive

to

the broader

audiences that

potentially

may

re

ceive

our

efforts,

beyond

the

specialists

whom

we

know

and

admire?

To

coin

a

phrase,

are we

reader-friendly?

Or

will

we

continue

to

be

'priests

of

a

mystery',

as

Mr

Hourani

put

it in

one

of

his

essays? Secondly,

are we

prepared

to

deal with the

diversity

of

perspectives

arising

from the

very

facts of

history

after

the 18th

century

-

namely,

the

emergence

of

nation

states

which

were once

part

of

the Ottoman

empire

and

which

now

have

to look back with

meaning

at their

respective

traditions? Can we accom

modate

this

diversity

of

perspectives?

There is

a

lively

tradition

of his

torical

writing

in the

ex-Ottoman

lands of what is

now

the

Arab

world,

alongside

the

more

familiar south

east

European

lands that have

recog

nised their

Ottoman

heritage,

for

better

or

for

worse.

Yet,

what

unites the efforts of those interested

in the

Ottoman

empire

in

the

18th

century,

other

than

chronology

and

place?

Some

suggestive

answers

may

be found in

a

recently reprinted

essay

by

William

Bouwsma,

a

cultural historian

of

early

modern

Europe.

In that

essay,

he

argues

that

history

is

accessible

to

all

individuals,

that

it

provides

social

utility, yet

that

as a

discipline

it has

forgotten

that

it

is

'two-faced',

like Janus:

it

faces

in

one

direction

-

the

profession

-

with

footnotes,

trendy

approaches,

and

academic

vaudeville;

but

it also faces in

another

direction,

toward

the

general

public,

where it

must

make

sense,

reach

common

experience,

provoke

as

well

as

reassure,

stimulate

and

move.35

The academic

profes

33

-

"In

this

issue: the

modern

Middle

East",

in:

American Historical

Review,

LXXXXVI/5

(December 1991),

.

iv.

34

-

Hourani, Albert,

A

History of

theArab

Peoples, Cambridge,

Mass.,

1991.

35 -

Bouwsma,

William,

"The

history

teacher as

mediator",

in: A Usable Past; Es

says

in

European

Cultural

History,

Berkeley,

1990,

p.

421-430,

esp. p.

423,

and

p.

425

for

history

s a

social

utility.

similar

all

for

wider

relevance,

but from differ

ent

perspective,

that

f

'hooking'

a

non-specialist

audience that

eeds

an

organising

myth,

a

not-so-factual

framework

to

explain

the

past,

is

McNeill,

William

H.,

"Mythistory,

or

truth,

myth, history,

and

historians",

in:

Mythistory

and

Other

Essays,

Chicago,

1986,

p.

3-22.



15/16

266

Karl barbir

sion

of

history,

in

some

countries

at

least,

is in trouble

because

it

has

ne

glected

its

public

and

has

failed

to

be what

it

was

when

it

began

in

the

19th

century

as a

profession:

the conscience of its

society,

and

particu

larly

of the

modern nation

state.

It

was

this

kind of

past,

and

a

role for

it,

that

was

put

to

death

afterWorld

War II.

Indeed,

Professor J.H. Plumb

celebrated its death

in

a

famous

book

published

more

than

two

decades

ago.

Plumb concluded his work

with

these

memorable

words:

'The old

past

is

dying,

its force

weakening,

and

so

it

should.

Indeed,

the

historian

should

speed

it

on

its

way,

for

it

was

compounded

of

bigotry,

of

national

vanity,

of

class

domination'.36

What do these ideas suggest tous, who come from somany traditions

and

countries and have devoted

so

much

time

to

the

18th-century

Otto

man

empire?

One

alternative,

namely

a

return to

what

Professor Plumb

decried in his

book

-

self-congratulation,

self-serving

patriotism,

even

the

worst

excesses

of

orientalism,

or

its

antithesis

-

would

do

much

to

de

stroy

thework

of the

last 30

years,

as

individual

societies

would

seek

sol

ace

in

their

own

primordial

fears.

More

than

two

decades

ago,

Professor

Plumb

himself

noted

that

'much

of

the

professionalism

of

history

remains

professional;

in

spite

of

the

huge

output

of

paperback

histories,

the

results

of

professional

history

are

not

conveyed

with the

emphasis

and

cogency

that society needs'.37 In fact, the trendby which societies retain a vivid

memory

of the

worst

aspects

of

a

mythical

past

seems

still

to

be

at

work

in

many

places

on our

planet.38

Other

alternatives,

particularly

the

big

models and

big

structures are

also

problematic.

Although

orientalism

is

in

retreat,

at

least

in

the

way

it

was

done until

fairly

recently,

and

although

modernisation

theory

is

now

regarded

as

inadequate

in

many

respects,

Marxism

and its

variants,

and

world-systems

theory,

also

have

problems.

One of the

common

difficul

ties

in

all these

approaches

is

that

they explain

too

much;

they

tempt

us

to

re-invent

our

worlds in

the times

of

our

subjects,

and

to

evade

the

patient,

empirical

work needed to establish the

validity

of such

approaches.

They

also

allow

us

to

invent

people

as

categories,

with

labels

of

our

own

choos

ing;

we

are

then

prevented

from

respecting

our

subjects'

consciousness,

or

even

paying

attention

to

it.

36

-

Plumb, J.H.,

The Death

of

the

ast,

Boston,

1970,

p.

140-145;

the

quotation

is

on

p.

145.

A

more

recent

and

much less

confident assessment

is

Novick,

Peter,

That

Noble

Dream: The

'Objectivity

Question'

and

the

American

Historical

Profession,

Chicago,

1988.

37

-

Plumb, op. cit, p. 144.

38

-

See

note

17 above.

Two

recent

essays

worth

perusing

in

that

regard

are:

Said,

Edward,

"Orientalism

reconsidered",

in:

Sullivan,

Earl

L.

and

Ismael,

Jacqueline

S.

(eds.),

The

ContemporaryStudy of

the

Arab

World,

Edmonton, 1991,

p.

35-50;

and

Tucker,

Judith

.,

"Taming

the

West:

trends n

the

writing

of

modern Arab

social

history

n

anglophone

academia",

in:

Sharabi,

Hisham

(ed.),

Theory,

olitics,

and

the

Arab

World:

Critical

Responses,

New

York

and

London, 1990,

p.

198-227.



16/16

The

Changing

Face

of the

Ottoman

Empire

267

Itmight well be asked: is there

or

can

therebe

now

such

a

thing

as a

common

approach

to

history,

one

that reminds

us

of

our

common

citizen

ship

in this

new

world

order,

however

defined,

and

helps

us

to

define

our

places

in it

so

that

we are

neither

exploiters

nor

exploited?

Our

collective

challenge,

at

least in the view of

this

writer,

lies

in

three

areas: our

agen

das,

which

we

need

to

make

explicit;

our

evidence,

which does

not

speak

for

itself;

and

our

audience,

which

we

each

must

determine.

May

we

all

be

worthy

students of

our

subject;

and

may

we

all be

aware

of

our

mutual

needs and concerns

(Siena

College,

Loudonville

N.Y.)

Documents

Karl Barbir, The Changing Face of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century- Past and Future Scholarship