kant

Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to

Kant on Religion within theBoundaries of Mere Reason:

An Interpretation and Defense

Throughout his career Kant engaged with many of the fundamental ques-tions in philosophy of religion: arguments for the existence of God, thesoul, the problem of evil, and the relationship between moral belief andpractice. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is his major work onthe subject. This Guidebook is an excellent starting point for anyonecoming to Kants important but complex work for the first time. LawrenceR. Pasternack presents and assesses:

the philosophical background to Religion within the Boundaries of MereReason

the ideas and arguments of the text the continuing importance of Kants work to philosophy of religion

today.

Lawrence R. Pasternack is Associate Professor of Philosophy at OklahomaState University, USA.

ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOKSEdited by Tim Crane and Jonathan Wolff

University of Cambridge and University College London

Plato and the Trial of Socrates Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith

Aristotle and the Metaphysics Vasilis Politis

Rousseau and the Social Contract Christopher Bertram

Plato and the Republic, Second edition Nickolas Pappas

Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations A.D. Smith

Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling John Lippitt

Descartes and the Meditations Gary Hatfield

Hegel and the Philosophy of Right Dudley Knowles

Nietzsche on Morality Brian Leiter

Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit Robert Stern

Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge Robert Fogelin

Aristotle on Ethics Gerard Hughes

Hume on Religion David OConnor

Leibniz and the Monadology Anthony Savile

The Later Heidegger George Pattison

Hegel on History Joseph McCarney

Hume on Morality James Baillie

Hume on Knowledge Harold Noonan

Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason Sebastian Gardner

Mill on Liberty Jonathan Riley

Mill on Utilitarianism Roger Crisp

Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations Marie McGinn

Spinoza and the Ethics Genevieve Lloyd

Heidegger on Being and Time, Second edition Stephen Mulhall

Locke on Government D.A. Lloyd Thomas

Locke on Human Understanding E.J. Lowe

Derrida on Deconstruction Barry Stocker

Kant on Judgement Robert Wicks

Nietzsche on Art Aaron Ridley

Rorty and the Mirror of Nature James Tartaglia

Hobbes and Leviathan Glen Newey

Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Michael Morris

Aristotle and the Politics Jean Roberts

Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception Komarine Romdenh-Romluc

Frege on Sense and Reference Mark Textor

Kripke and Naming and Necessity Harold Noonan

This page intentionally left blank

Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to

Kant on Religion within theBoundaries of Mere Reason

Lawrence R.

Pasternack

First published 2014by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

2014 Lawrence R. Pasternack

The right of Lawrence R. Pasternack to be identified as the author has beenasserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs andPatents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilisedin any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known orhereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any informationstorage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registeredtrademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent toinfringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataPasternack, Lawrence, 1967Routledge philosophy guidebook to Kant on Religion within the boundaries of merereason / by Lawrence R. Pasternack. 1 [edition].pages cm. (Routledge philosophy guidebooks)

Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.2. ReligionPhilosophy. I. Title.B2792.P37 2013210.92dc232013018379

ISBN: 978-0-415-50784-4 (hbk)ISBN: 978-0-415-50786-8 (pbk)ISBN: 978-1-315-87430-2 (ebk)

Typeset in Garamondby Taylor & Francis Books

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ixLIST OF FIGURES xiPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii

Introduction 1

1 Faith, knowledge and the Highest Good 17

2 Religions two prefaces and the moral foundationsof pure rational faith 61

3 Part One of Religion: Good, evil, and human nature 85

4 Part Two of Religion: The change of heart 131

5 Part Three of Religion: The kingdom of God on earth 174

6 Part Four of Religion: Authentic and counterfeitservice to God 215

7 Conclusion 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY 259INDEX 264

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Unless otherwise indicated, translations will follow the CambridgeEdition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Allen Wood and PaulGuyer, eds. (1992). With two exceptions, works will be citedusing the abbreviations below along with the volume and pagenumber following the German Academy edition. The firstexception is the Critique of Pure Reason, where citations will usethe standard A/B edition format. The second exception is Religionwithin the Boundaries of Mere Reason (6:3202), where no identify-ing abbreviation will precede the volume and page number.

AN Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of ViewBL Blomberg LogicCF The Conflict of the FacultiesCJ Critique of JudgmentCPrR Critique of Practical ReasonDL Dohna-Wundlacken LogicET The End of All ThingsGR Groundwork of the Metaphysics of MoralsID Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan AimJL Jsche Logic (aka, Immanuel Kants Logik ein Handbuch zu

Vorlesungen)

LR Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of ReligionMM Metaphysics of MoralsMT On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theo-

dicyPP Towards Perpetual PeacePT On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philo-

sophyRefl ReflexionenRP What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany

since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?TP On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory

but Is of No Use in PracticeVL Vienna LogicWE An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?WO What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?

x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

LIST OF FIGURES

1 Inner and outer spheres of religion 3, 772 Religions chiasmic structure 9, 2163 Critique of Practical Reason versus Religion

on the soteriological threshold 1444 The remarkable antinomy 1935 Kants taxonomy of natural and revealed religion 221

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I began work on this book in the summer of 2011, after receivingan invitation from Tony Bruce to write a volume on Kants Reli-gion for Routledges Guidebook series. Both the philosophy ofreligion and systematic theology have been important parts of myintellectual life as far back as my undergraduate education.Through my time at Yale and Boston University, my intereststurned to German Philosophy, and eventually to Kant in parti-cular. My professional scholarship on Kant ranges from his epis-temology to his ethics; and, in recent years, my interests havemoved full circle, or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say,have achieved a sublation through an increasing focus on hisphilosophy of religion. I am thus very grateful that such a fittingproject was offered to me and at a particularly apt point in mycareer.After nearly a year of preparatory study, ranging from core

Lutheran texts to current scholarship on Religion, I began draftingthe manuscript in the spring of 2012, during which I received areduced course load. I would like to thank my department head,Doren Recker, for granting this and other accommodations. Frommy department as well, I would like to thank Eric Reitan, ScottGelfand, and our administrative assistant, Sarah Mutschelknaus,

who helped me with formatting, with the bibliography, and withvarious other final tasks before submitting the manuscript. Let mealso here express my gratitude to everyone at Routledge whohelped shepherd the manuscript through its final stages.My brother, Howard, created the five figures in this book. I

hand drew what I wanted for each, faxed them to him, and hethen created far more refined graphics than I could have on myown including the use of a parabola to represent the asymptoticapproach of our eternal striving to moral perfection. He alsodirected me to Pirkei Avot, quotations from which appear inChapter 5.Of course, I also have many Kant specialists to thank, many of

whom I spent time with at APA or NAKS events, had long dis-cussions with over the phone, or via email. On many occasions,these exchanges helped me refine the arguments and positionscontained in this work. They include: Henry Allison, SharonAnderson-Gold, Aaron Bunch, Andrew Chignell, Sam Duncan,Patrick Frierson, Courtney Fugate, Nathan Jacobs, PatriciaKitcher, Colin McLear, Kate Moran, Chris Surprenant, KristiSweet, and Oliver Thorndike.I would like to make special mention of those who were the

most generous with their time and most influenced the viewspresented herein. On numerous occasions, Pablo Muchnik and Ispoke for hours over the phone, and had extended discussions atfive different conferences during the past two years. He also cameto Oklahoma twice during this period, the first funded by anOSU Arts and Humanities External Researcher Grant and thesecond by a NAKS travel grant. Although we interpret Kantsdoctrine of the Highest Good differently, he most definitely drewmy attention to the importance of its corporate aspects. Second, Iwould like to thank Steve Palmquist, who suffered through a veryvery rough early draft of the manuscript, and had the patience tosee through that roughness to the philosophical positions buriedbeneath. His extensive comments on that draft are greatly appre-ciated, as is also his willingness to travel from Hong Kong toOklahoma, staying here for nearly two weeks. As with Pablosvisit, Steve received funding from OSUs Arts and HumanitiesExternal Researcher Grant and, in addition to our time together,

xiv PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

he also offered his time to a number of our graduate students.Third, I would like to thank Rob Gressis, who drew my attentionto the relevance of Kants Theodicy and persuaded me that itmarks a key transition point in Kants theory of evil.Lastly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my wife,

Robyn. Hardly do I have the space to list all that she has so lov-ingly offered. From her endless emotional support during myyears of surgery and physical therapy following a major car acci-dent, to her faith in me as I struggled to regain my physical andscholarly footing as I recovered, to her Sisyphean efforts in tryingto keep the house as quiet as possible during my seemingly end-less hours of work at home, her willingness to adapt to my longnights at my desk, and her munificent delivery of morning coffeeto my bedside. I want her to know that none of it has goneunnoticed or unappreciated.

xvPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Kants Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is rarely readcover to cover or studied as a whole. Readers tend to focus on justPart One, sometimes Parts One and Two, but usually stop there,paying little to no attention to Parts Three or Four. The second-ary literature on Religion accordingly reflects this imbalance,resulting in not only a reductive reading, where the text is treatedas primarily an extension of Kants moral anthropology, but also,given the subject matter of Part One, it is usually taken to be anoverall gloomy and pessimistic text, one that casts humanity in avery grim light.1

However, just as there has been a broad reassessment of Kantspractical philosophy in recent decades, one that has revealed a farricher ethical theory than the formalist deontology that is especiallypronounced in the Groundwork, so we are now at the cusp of asimilar shift in how his philosophy of religion is understood. Someof the most recent secondary literature has sought to overturn theold biases against Religion, finding within it not just an addendumto his practical philosophy, but also a rich examination of theChristian religion crafted with the subtlety and sophistication thatshould be expected from one of historys greatest philosophers.

A central goal of this book is to participate in this reappraisal,battling against such well-entrenched claims as that Religion offersan essentially pessimistic account of human nature, that it offersmerely a litany of wobbles, fumbling between traditionalChristianity and Enlightenment values, that it reduces religion tomorality, and that it is a text ultimately hostile to faith. Most ofthese views arise from a piecemeal approach to Religion, one thatreads the text too selectively, pays far too little attention to PartsThree and Four, and generally fails to understand the overallunity of its four parts. It is thus the purpose of this book tointerpret Religion more holistically: presenting a vision of thewhole shaped by a unifying interpretative scheme, and showinghow that scheme is played out in each of its four parts.The interpretation that I will here develop will be guided by

Kants doctrine of the Highest Good. That there is some con-nection between this doctrine and his positive philosophy of reli-gion is commonly recognized. But, as I will show, each ofReligions four parts concerns different components of this doc-trine; and the shift from Parts One and Two to Parts Three andFour parallels the well-known dual structure of the HighestGood, a structure roughly akin to what has been variously char-acterized as its immanent and transcendent conceptions, itsectypical and archetypical forms, and its two elements, one ademand and the other a promise.2 As I will later discuss, thefirst of each paired set refers to a duty to promote the HighestGood, and the second of each paired set refers to an ideal state ofaffairs in which happiness is distributed according to moralworth.Through his doctrine of the Highest Good, Kant develops a

pure rational system of religion (6:12), and as we shall see, hemakes use of this system to engage in an experiment thatcompares the contents of alleged revelation (6:12) to his PureRational System of Religion. More precisely, the experiment thatruns through the whole of Religion (what in the Second PrefaceKant enumerates as the second experiment) tests a particularhypothesis.3 From the doctrine of the Highest Good, Kant gen-erates his Pure Rational System of Religion. From its allegedrevelations, Christianity has produced a system of doctrines,

2 INTRODUCTION

Historical! Ecclesiastical Faith

i----t- Pure Rational System of Religion

rituals, and ecclesiastical traditions. The experiment then com-pares these two spheres, inquiring in particular as to whether allthat is contained in the latter that is essential to our salvation canalso be found in the former. Thus, the formula tested by theexperiment of Religion is whether Pure Rational Faith (ReinerVernunftglaube) = Saving Faith (seligmachender Glaube).As I hope to show, this experiment has been well thought out

by Kant. It is not, as Gordon Michalson has claimed, merely aseries of wobbles between incompatible Enlightenment andChristian commitments (Michalson 1990: 810). Nor is it aFailure, as John Hare has claimed, unable to offer an adequatebridge across the moral gap between our duties and our naturalcapacities (Hare 1996: 6068). Throughout this book, I willdefend Religion against these criticisms as well as offer an inter-pretation that neither distorts Kant into an Agnostic or Deist, onthe one hand, nor a traditional Christian on the other.4 As I willargue, the fundamental aim of Religion is to determine whether allthat is essential and necessary to salvation appears not only inalleged revelation but can also be found in the Pure RationalSystem of Religion.5 Implicit within this aim is Kants own reli-gious orientation, what in Part Four he describes as PureRationalism (6:155). But this could easily mislead. Kant is nothere using Rationalism in the sense we associate with Spinozaor Leibniz. Nor is he endorsing the reduction of religion toreason.Rather, the Pure Rationalist is one who allows for revelation,

miracles, and other claims that are not amenable to universal

Figure 1 Inner and outer spheres of religion

3INTRODUCTION

agreement, but considers them inessential to Saving Faith.6 As weshall see, Kants Pure Rationalism is guided by the commitmentthat Saving Faith must be available to all. This puts revelation ata disadvantage as it can extend its influence no further than thetidings relevant to a judgment on its credibility can reach(6:103). Revelation may still carry the requisite content, but inorder for salvation to be available to all, and, further, in order forthere to be a Universal Church for all humanity, its doctrinesmust be discoverable through reason alone and be convincinglycommunicated to everyone (6:103).We shall return to the parameters of Kants Pure Rationalism

and Religions experiment in due course. But first, let us considerthe issues surrounding its publication and how these issues maychallenge the view that Religion should be read as a unified trea-tise rather than just an assemblage of separate pieces (Stcke) thatonly through historical accident were brought together into asingle volume.

RELIGIONS PUBLICATION

Kant originally intended to have each of Religions four partspublished as separate articles in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. Thisis why each is called a part or, what might have been a bettertranslation, a piece (Stck) (as we say in English, Thats a nicepiece of writing or He has a piece in that collection). How-ever, political circumstances forced Kant to pursue a differentcourse.7

The first essay, On Radical Evil in Human Nature, waspublished in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in April 1792. But thesecond was denied an official imprimatur by the Prussian Cen-sorship Commission. Although the Berlinische Monatsschrift hadrelocated to Jena after the tightening of censorship policies inPrussia, Kant asked its editor to continue to secure Prussianapproval for each piece. The first was granted, on the groundsthat like other Kantian works, [it] is intended for, and can beenjoyed only by thinkers, researchers and scholars capable of finedistinctions.8 But the second was denied the imprimatur bywhat had recently become a very conservative commission.

4 INTRODUCTION

J. E. Beister, the journals editor, appealed the decision first tothe commission and then to the court of Frederick William II. Buthis attempts failed. Though Kant still could have had the Berli-nische Monatsschrift publish the essays since the journals relocationremoved it from the reach of the Prussian censors, he did not wantto so blatantly circumvent the commissions authority, and soinstead chose a path that kept him within the letter of the law.The kings predecessor, Frederick the Great, was far more

sympathetic to Enlightenment ideals, and under his reign nearlyall works produced within universities were allowed to forgoofficial review by the Censorship Commission. With the excep-tion of treatises directly relevant to political policy, they merelyneeded to be assessed by the academic faculty appropriate to theirsubject matter. This still remained technically a legal option forKant, and so he assembled all four parts into a single volume andsent it first to a member of the theology faculty at Knigsberg,seeking to confirm that it was, indeed, not a work of theology butrather of philosophy. With that established, he then submitted itfor examination to the dean of philosophy at Jena.9 Then, withtheir approval of the manuscript granted, Kant chose to have itpublished by Friedrich Nicolovius, who recently established hispublishing business in Knigsberg after having apprenticed inRiga under Johann Friedrich Hartknoch (who published Kantsmajor writings of the 1780s).The four essays thus became the single text, Religion within the

Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kants first book-length work since theCritique of Judgment. It was published in the spring of 1793, witha second edition appearing less than one year later, in early 1794.However, Kants publication strategy (along with the contents ofReligion) did not sit well with the commission, and he received aroyal rescript in October 1794, prohibiting him from publishingfurther on matters of religion.Kant responded with a letter that swore to refrain altogether

from discoursing publicly, in lectures or in writing, on religion,whether natural or revealed (CF: 7:10). From late 1794 until thedeath of Frederick William II in 1797, he abided by the royalorder and his promise. But with the succession of FrederickWilliam III, who redressed the numerous abuses of his

5INTRODUCTION

predecessors conservative reign, including its more stringentcensorship edicts, Kant considered himself again free to publiclyexamine religious topics. Thus, in 1798, he published The Conflictof the Faculties. The text addresses various questions about theproper scope of each academic discipline, including the relation-ship between philosophy and theology. It also includes within itspreface, the remonstratory letter of 1794 signed by JohannChristoph Wllner, the kings notoriously conservative Ministerof Justice and Religious Affairs, as well as Kants formal responseto it, where he asserts that Religion makes no appraisal of Chris-tianity and so cannot be guilty of disparaging it (CF: 7:8).

RELIGIONS AIM AND CONTENT

Despite their final form as four parts of a single work, we knowfrom correspondence that Kant originally intended four separateessays on religion to appear serially in the Berlinische Mon-atsschrift.10 We cannot know for certain the extent to which PartsThree and Four carry out his original intentions for his plannedthird and fourth essays, but the first two parts were written beforeKant had to revise his original plans for publication. We may,nevertheless, consider ourselves fortunate that the project unfol-ded as it did, since the publication of the unified text of Religionalso prompted Kant to add a first, and then a second preface, bothof which contain extremely helpful remarks about Religions over-all expository structure and philosophical agenda. As brieflymentioned above, the Second Preface describes Religions ongoingexperiment11 to compare traditional Christian doctrine with thePure Rational System of Religion; and the First Preface not onlydiscusses the relationship between philosophical and biblicaltheology, but also offers a new and important argument for theHighest Good. We shall return to the two prefaces in Chapter 2.But first, let me offer here a very brief overview of Religions fourparts, to begin to show how they each stand in relation to theHighest Good, and how through that relation, they contribute toan overall unified project.The experiment of Religion moves through four central issues in

Christianity. Part One examines the nature of sin or, more

6 INTRODUCTION

precisely, the doctrine of Original Sin. Part Two turns to thecounterpart to sin: the question of how redemption is possible.Together, these parts follow an arc of inquiry at the level of theindividual, and as we shall discuss more fully in subsequent chap-ters, this arc corresponds to the first layer of the doctrine of theHighest Good: our duty to promote it insofar as it is within ourpower. Part Ones examination of sin articulates our common moralstarting point: that we as a species are morally corrupt, have chosento prioritize self-interest over morality, are riddled with self-deception, and harbor a Propensity to Evil. Part Two then carefullyworks through the Christian doctrine of Atonement throughChrist, the nature of Gods judgment, how we may become well-pleasing to Him, and how our debt of sin may be lifted.The Highest Good, when taken as a duty, commands that we

promote it insofar as it is within our power to do so. This con-ception of the Highest Good is first articulated in the SecondCritique, and the scope of this duty, as we shall discuss in moredetail, concerns what in that text in particular is characterized asour pursuit of moral perfection. However, we shall see that thisduty is reformulated in Religion, in accordance with some ofKants other revisions to his moral anthropology. Though thismore radical duty for perfection still remains within Religion, thestandard for moral worthiness is replaced by the Change ofHeart, a change in the order of priority that we give to theincentives of morality and self-interest.Parts Three and Four move on to the second layer of the

Highest Good, which may be understood as an ideal state ofaffairs wherein happiness is distributed in accordance with moralworth. Part Three begins with an important discussion of howeven one who has undergone a Change of Heart is still vulnerableto recidivism due to the corrupting influence that human beingshave on one another. This is an extension of our unsocial socia-bility, the locus classicus for which is Kants 1784 Idea for aUniversal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.In the essay, Kant primarily describes our unsocial sociability

in terms of a healthy competitive drive and believes that it can beadequately regulated by a constitutional civil regime (ID: 8:22).But in Religion, with its deepening grasp of the nature of

7INTRODUCTION

immorality, Kant admits that no human juridical solution is suf-ficient (6:99). Secular social structures can govern our outwardconduct (6:98). But our unsocial sociability is a manifestation ofour inner moral nature and will infect our dealings with oneanother in too many subtle ways. He thus claims that our unso-cial sociability must be dealt with through a change to oursociety that emanates from an inward change within its citizens.This change Kant presents in religious terms, describing anEthical Community which is conceivable only as a peopleunder divine commands (6:99). Unlike more secular ideals thatat best keep our unsocial sociability at bay, the Ethical Commu-nity involves our liberation from this pathology and so offers usan escape from the dominion of evil [and the] incessantdanger of relapsing into it (6:94).Although the Ethical Community has often been taken out of

context and treated as a secular social ideal,12 Religion is unequi-vocal that this community is a work whose execution cannot behoped for from human beings but only from God himself(6:100). It requires God as its founder, lawgiver, and agent of thedistribution of happiness in accordance with moral worth (6:99).It is, thus, a way of representing the ideal of the Highest Good;and Part Three, after introducing this ideal and explaining itsrelationship to the scope of our moral duties and capacities, thenmakes use of it in its discussions of the Universal Church of thePure Rational System of Religion, the history of Christianity,Providence, and eschatology.Part Four continues with the ecclesiastical topics introduced

towards the end of Part Three. When Kant introduces the Uni-versal Church, he presents it as a prefigurement of the EthicalCommunity as well as a vital instrument for the collective humanduty to replace our unsocial sociability with the shared goal ofspreading the Good News of Pure Rational Faith to the whole ofhumanity. Unfortunately, though, our Propensity to Evil can justas much corrupt religious institutions as it can corrupt ouragency. Thus, a key theme of Part Four is what attitude weshould take towards the instruments of church ritual and doc-trine, and how to guard against their being degraded intocounterfeit service and servile faith.

8 INTRODUCTION

Individual Society

I Part One Part Two I I Part Three Part Fourl t t

J 1 Redemption Corruption

In short, Parts One and Two focus on that layer of the HighestGood germane to the individual, and Parts Three and Four concernits second layer in relation to history, society, and ecclesiology.Religion as a whole is thus balanced at mid-point, shifting its focusfrom the individual to society. Furthermore, as Parts Two and Threeboth concern moral transformation (at the level of the individual,then at the level of society) and Parts One and Four concern thesources and mechanisms of corruption (again, first for the individual,then for society), Religion as a whole has also a chiastic structure.A chiasmus is a literary form found in classical literature, in the

works of many great authors such as Milton and Shakespeare, andin many books of the Bible. It can occur at the level of a sentence,a paragraph, or the plot of a story, employing symmetries of lan-guage or narrative so that in a four-part chiasmus, the first partwould have a parallel structure to the last, and the second partwould parallel the second-to-last. We find precisely this in Reli-gion as Parts One and Four focus on corruption and Parts Twoand Three focus on redemption. This may, of course, be just acoincidence, but it does offer additional evidence that we shouldsee Religion as composed by Kant with the intention that its fourparts be taken as a unity.

PURE RATIONAL FAITH: AN INTERPRETATIONAND DEFENSE

As expressed above, this book will offer an interpretation of Reli-gion that presents each of its parts as stages in an experimentcomparing Christian doctrine to the Pure Rational System ofReligion. Of course, not all the doctrines of Christianity will

Figure 2 Religions chiasmic structure

9INTRODUCTION

overlap with this system. Various contents of alleged revelations,various traditional rituals and practices will fall outside of it.Kant is not troubled by this result, nor should the believernecessarily be, depending upon what remains within reasonssphere, what is outside it, and how Kant evaluates the importanceof the latter.The general issue taken up by his experiment is far from ori-

ginal to Kant. Many others have also addressed the scope ofoverlap between Natural and Revealed Religion. It is directlydiscussed in Aquinass Summa Theologica.13 It is also considered inLutheran discussions of pure versus mixed articles of faith.14

Further, the relationship between Natural and Revealed Religionis not merely a prevalent concern in the eighteenth century, butit may be seen as the central issue for the philosophical theologyof that period.15 What, however, is original to Kant is how hedeals with the relationship between Natural and Revealed Reli-gion. First, he rejects how Natural Religion is ordinarily approa-ched, i.e., as an issue for theoretical reason. In the Critique of PureReason, he attacks the traditional arguments for Gods existence,and even contends that we cannot form a determinate conceptionof God through theoretical reason. Accordingly, anyone whogains their impression of Kants religious views from the FirstCritiques Transcendental Dialectic will likely see him as anAtheist or Agnostic. Nevertheless, as he famously declares in theSecond Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, he wants to establishthe limits to knowledge in order to make room for faith (Bxxx).This is not, however, a concession to some sort of non-rational

Fideism. Rather, Kants conception of faith is one that is rational,but distinct from such epistemic forms of assent as knowledgeand opinion. Faith, for Kant, is grounded in the needs of practicalreason and thus the room for faith to which he alludes is theroom for a practical activity of reason that is distinct from thetheoretical.Our understanding of salvation is, likewise, a matter of practical

reason. It flows from the Highest Goods synthesis of morality andhappiness; and for Kant, salvation is understood in terms ofwhat we must do to become worthy of happiness. Hence, whenKant considers the relationship between Natural and Revealed

10 INTRODUCTION

Religion, his central focus is on the practical, on the doctrines ofChristianity that are essential to our salvation and whether or notthey are coextensive with the religious needs of (practical) reason.Kant accepts that there is more to religion than what is essen-

tial to our salvation, but for him, the remaining doctrines, rituals,and other ecclesiastical vestiges should be regarded as accidentaland arbitrary products of history (6:158).16 They may be bene-ficial to the vitality of [ones] pure religious disposition (6:182).They may offer symbols and rituals so that those struggling tograsp the highest concepts and grounds of reason [have] some-thing that the senses can hold on to (6:109). Perhaps there is evenan abiding need for some symbols and rituals given the difficul-ties that people face when trying to manage these highest con-cepts. However, insofar as they fall outside the scope of PureRational Faith, they are each internally contingent (6:105)and none should be, in themselves, considered essential to oursalvation.Symbols may be valued as instruments that help us by way of

their more vivid mode of representing things (6:83). Ritualsmay help build fellowship within a church. But the necessaryarticles of religion must either be derived directly from reason or,if subjectively arising out of an alleged revelation, must never-theless be objectively derivable from reason (6:156). In otherwords, Kant accepts that revelation can be the source of religioustenets, but with the important qualification that whatever isessential to our salvation, even if offered in a revelation, must alsobe derivable from reason alone.17 This is one of the core principlesof Religion, and according to Kant, its violation is the commoncause of servile and delusory faith, counterfeit service to God,and ecclesiastical despotism.Contrary to the accusations made against Religion, those who

claim it to be a litany of wobbles or an ultimate Failure, thisbook will develop a defense of Religion as a frank and internallyconsistent treatise on philosophical theology, one that is thor-oughly consistent with the main principles of TranscendentalIdealism, and one that is eminently defensible by way of thoseprinciples. It will not paint Kant as an Agnostic or as a Deist.18

Nor will it exaggerate his Christian credentials. There is no secret

11INTRODUCTION

piety in Religion hidden behind an Enlightenment veneer. Kantwas well-enough aware of the religious agenda of Frederick Wil-liam II and his ministers so that any interpretation built upon thebelief that he had to mask his true Christian commitments,commitments with which his censors would have sympathized, isuntenable.19 On my reading, there is (almost) no guile or pre-varication in Religion.20

NOTES

1 For a survey of interpreters who offer reductive readings of Religion,see Firestone and Jacobs 2008. I would include as well James DiCen-sos reading, such as is found in his recent work on Kants Religion(DiCenso 2011 and 2012). Some examples from recent literature thatattribute to Religion a gloomy picture of human nature include Much-nik 2009: xxiii and Frierson 2010: 4855. Pessimism is also implied bythose who interpret Kant such that we are so morally corrupt that wemust depend upon a divine supplement to overcome sin. See my dis-cussion of Gordon Michalson, Philip Quinn, and Nicholas Wolterstorffon this issue in Pasternack 2012. We will discuss many of these worksthroughout this book, especially in Chapters 4 and 7.

2 These refer respectively to Silber 1959, Wike and Showler 2010, andInsole 2008. In Chapter 1, I will move from these characterizations ofthe Highest Good to one that I think best reflects the two layers of thedoctrine.

3 The Second Preface mentions two experiments. The first I understandto be the construction of the Pure Rational System of Religion, whilethe second compares this System to the doctrines of traditionalChristianity. Given that the second experiment employs the first, thefirst, or more precisely, its outcome, is articulated through each ofReligions four parts. However, it is the second experiment, the com-parison between traditional Christianity and the Pure Rational Systemof Religion, that sets Religions purpose and agenda. Accordingly,unless otherwise indicated, phrases such as Religions experimentand the experiment of Religion refer specifically to the secondexperiment.

4 What I mean by traditional Christianity may be clear to some read-ers, but not so to others. While there are, of course, ample differences

12 INTRODUCTION

that span across Christian denominations, theologians, and periods, Itake the Christian tradition to (almost) uniformly hold that: (a) there isone God; (b) He is active in human history (i.e., I see Deism as not aform of Christianity); (c) the Doctrine of Hypostatic Union is true;(d) God chose the historical event of the Crucifixion as a necessarythough not sufficient condition for our salvation; (e) its necessitystems from an Augustinian view about the depth of our sin; (f) itsnon-sufficiency stems from some commitment on our part throughwhich we may partake of a righteousness that is not our own (this isa Pauline phrase that Luther is fond of and appears as well at 6:66 see also: 1 Corinthians 1:30, Philippians 3:9). Hopefully, the abovecaptures the most essential Christian doctrines in a way that accom-modates denominational variants. The above also, I believe, capturesnot only the core tenets of traditional Christian theology, but alsoexpresses the core tenets of such prominent Christian Philosophers asPhilip Quinn, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Eleonore Stump. On how Iphrased (d) see Stump 1988 and Chapter 15 of Stump 2003.

5 From this point forward, I am going to use the definite article ratherthan Kants pure rational system of religion or a pure rationalsystem of religion. If there truly is such a system, then the would bemore appropriate to its universal and necessary status.

6 In Kants Deism, Allen Wood writes that pure rationalism seemsscarcely deserving of its name, and it is hard to imagine anyone whowould hold to it. For it apparently takes the position that God hasgiven us certain commands supernaturally while denying that we aremorally bound to carry them out. This surely cannot be a position Kantintends to embrace (Wood 1991: 11). Nevertheless, Kant writes thatwhile we have no reason to assert that an ecclesiastical statute isdivine in origin, it would be arrogant peremptorily to deny that theway a church is organized may perhaps also be a special divine dis-pensation (6:105). Kant also accepts as possible that the historicalintroduction of the latter [a new religion] be accompanied as it wereadorned by miracles (6:84). Hence, quite in conformity with PureRationalism, these miracles could serve as the basis for celebratoryfestivals and other practices which are intrinsically contingent in thattheir observance is without moral value in itself, but nevertheless canbe of instrumental value as means that help worshipers with thehighest concepts and grounds of reason (6:109) or in other ways are

13INTRODUCTION

conducive to the visible church. In short, Wood dismisses PureRationalism even though Kant quite clearly accepts the possibility ofdivine dispensations that pertain just to religions outer form. I willreturn to this issue in greater detail in Chapter 6.

7 A much more detailed account of the events can be found in Dilthey1890: 41850, also available in volume four of his Gesammelte Schrif-ten. In English, see di Giovanni 1996: 4148, Lestition 1993, andHunter 2005.

8 See 11:329, dated March 6, 1792.9 There is some disagreement as to which university Kant sent the

manuscript. It was previously thought that he merely had his collea-gues at Knigsberg review it. However, the extant manuscript is signedby J. C. Hennings, the dean of philosophy at Jena. See Arnoldt 1909:3237.

10 11:42930, dated May 4, 179311 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, and as we shall discuss more

fully in Chapter 2, I take the second experiment to be the central pro-ject of Religion, i.e., the investigation of the scope of overlap betweentraditional Christian doctrine and the Pure Rational System of Religion.The first, unstated experiment, I take to be the construction of thePure Rational System, originating with the Highest Good and its Pos-tulates, and derived from these, the further principles that reason canidentify as essential to our salvation.

12 See Reath 1988, Rossi 2005: 5365, Guyer 2005: 289, and Moran 2009.13 I.I.Q1.a1 (Whether, besides philosophy any further doctrine is

required?), II.II. Q1.a5 (Whether those things that are of faith can bean object of science?), II.II.Q2.a3 (Whether it is necessary for salvationto believe anything above natural reason?), etc.

14 See Schmid 1889: 55, 115. Schmids Doctrinal Theology of the EvangelicalLutheran Church presents the views of many of the key Lutherantheologians from the Augsburg Confession of 1530 through to theseventeenth century. In addition to Luthers own writings and PaulAlthauss The Theology of Martin Luther, it serves as the basis for muchof this books presentation of Lutheran theology. Unfortunately, thereis no systematic study of the Lutheran Pietists comparable toSchmids study of the Lutheran Scholastics. Nevertheless, Pietism wasan important part of Kants childhood and I have drawn from variouscollections of their works. Franz Albert Schulz, a Pietist, was both his

14 INTRODUCTION

familys pastor and the director of the Collegium Fridericianum; and aswe shall see as we move forward through this book, Religion considersnot only some distinctly Lutheran doctrines, but also some that areeven more particular to the Pietist movement. On the Pietism inKants youth, see Kuehn 2001: 3555.

15 See for example Gerrish 2006.16 This is, Kant claims, how they should be regarded even if they are

genuine products of divine revelation or celebrations of actual mira-cles. Hence, as discussed in Note 6, above, and as we will discussmore fully in subsequent chapters, Kant accepts the possibility thatGod is active through history, offering us various forms of aid, somemore directly related to our individual salvation, others on a largerscale, helping shape the institutions that take on that charge in theworld. Of course, Kant also maintains that we cannot ever know whe-ther or not some alleged revelation or miracle is genuine. We cannotdistinguish between a natural and supernatural cause (cf. 6:191 andCF: 7:63), and to build a church around beliefs in supernatural inter-ventions is a dangerous religious delusion (6:171), one that leads tothe violation of our conscience (6:188).

17 To help reinforce an important but neglected point, let me reiteratethat Kant further recognizes that revelation may not only convey tenetsthat are essential to our pursuit of salvation (i.e., those that must alsobe derivable from reason alone). Revelation may also offer ones thatare intrinsically contingent but help shape the outer form ofreligion giving us rituals that may help promote and sustain churchmembership or principles for how a church is to be organized. See6:84, 6:1056, and 6:155.

18 There are many who downplay religious commitment in Kant, turningit either into an Error Theory, or in other ways recommending that wedo not take seriously faith in God and/or immortality. See for example:Reath 1988, Davidovich 1993 and 1994, Guyer 2000 and 2005,DiCenso 2011 and 2012. With the exception of Guyer, who has othergrounds, the above build their views primarily from certain passagesin the Third Critique. In the next chapter, we will discuss the salientThird Critique passages and will also return to the topic in the Con-clusion.

19 Interpreters who want to bolster Kants Christian credentials, pressingfor even more than Religion explicitly suggests, include: Maria 1997,

15INTRODUCTION

and Firestone and Jacobs 2008. This approach strikes me as neithertextually supported nor one that fits the circumstances of Kants life,especially during the conservative reign of Frederick William II. Whilethe far more secular environment of contemporary academia may beless welcoming to such commitments, that was not the case duringKants day. Hence, an interpretation of Religion shaped by the viewthat behind its Enlightenment veneer there are traditional Christiancommitments that Kant chose to mask strikes me as built upon amisunderstanding of his historical and political circumstances.

20 The one place where I think Kant is not being forthright, and perhapsnot honest with himself either, is in the First Prefaces defense of hiswork as outside the purview of the theological faculty. This issue willbe discussed in Chapter 2. See also my forthcoming Pasternack 2015.

16 INTRODUCTION

11FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE

HIGHEST GOOD

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attacks the ontological, cos-mological, and physico-theological (design) arguments, challengesthe grounds used for the existence and immortality of the soul,and even contends that we cannot, through theoretical reasonalone, formulate an adequate conception of anything within therealm of the supernatural, including God. On the basis of theseand related objections, many have come to see Kant as no friendto religion, having created, so it seems, substantial barriers to anycredible positive theology.1 This, however, was not his intention.Although his writings contain numerous arguments against manyreligious tenets, they are not actually against these tenets as such,but against how they have been appropriated by the metaphysicaltradition.According to Kant, metaphysics is inherently flawed, a product

of theoretical reasons illicit extension of concepts that should belimited to experience alone. Hence, when religion is approachedas if it were a form of metaphysics, building argument throughthe powers of theoretical reason, it too must be dismissed as an

illegitimate intellectual enterprise. Just as Kant argues that the-oretical reason has failed, and by necessity will continue to fail inits various metaphysical endeavors, it will likewise fail to provethat God exists, that there is a soul, and so forth. Many havetaken this to mean that Kant is, in the end, an Atheist orAgnostic, or perhaps at best, an Error Theorist, who sanctionsself-imposed religious illusions for practical purposes.2 But thesemisread Kants intentions. His criticisms of religion were notmeant to deny its tenets, but rather to liberate them from theo-retical reason so that they could be given a more legitimate foot-ing. This agenda has, in fact, considerable similarities to MartinLuthers own views on reason and religion a point that shouldhardly be taken as coincidence since Kant was brought up in aLutheran Pietist household and his childhood education was atthe Collegium Fridericianum, a Lutheran Pietist institution (Kuehn2001: 2460).Just as Luther himself asserts that reason is limited to our

experience and not able to apply itself to invisible things(Luther 1883: 1.40III.51),3 so likewise, a cornerstone of Trans-cendental Idealism is that knowledge is confined to the scope ofpossible experience. When we employ theoretical reason in ourattempt to grasp a reality beyond experience, we fall into errorand illusion. This holds for both metaphysics in general as well asfor theology. So, just as Luther claims that Reason is the greatestenemy that faith has (Luther 1883: 2.3.68), Kant too regardsreligious belief as requiring a basis outside of theoretical reason.Their similarities can be pressed even farther, for they not only

see theoretical reason as incapable of warranting our assent to reli-gious doctrines, but that such an approach occludes their true sig-nificance. Both the Lutheran understanding of Original Sin andKants rendering of it as an innate Propensity to Evil representhuman beings as fallen creatures, fractured within, as our relation-ship with God is also fractured. This is not something that can besolved by reason, at least not in its theoretical mode. It is, rather,through faith that we must confront our state of sin and find ourway to redemption. Religion is not, for either Luther or Kant, anintellectual enterprise, but a matter for the heart, a practical pro-blem that demands a practical rather than theoretical solution.

18 FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE HIGHEST GOOD

The title, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, hardlysuggests this Lutheran passion, but this is precisely what the textis about, as is Kants overall philosophy of religion. He standswith Luther in a shared belief that there is a tension between faithand reason, though for Kant, this tension is specifically withreason in its theoretical employment. Practical reason, by contrast,is an ally of faith, and unlike its theoretical counterpart, itrecognizes our fallen nature. In fact, in the Critique of PracticalReason, Kant acknowledges that even if we had all of eternity toimprove ourselves, we would still, through our own powers, fallshort (CPrR: 5:123n). If we were morally perfect, were unen-cumbered by sensuous inclinations, and had a holy will, ouractions would necessarily accord with moral laws. But this is notwhat we humans are. Our self-interested pursuit of happiness willalways agitate against the moral incentive; and, as Kant declareson numerous occasions, this conflict can only be resolved througha turn to religion. He advocates for such a turn in all three Cri-tiques, such as can be seen in the Critique of Pure Reasons famousstatement that we must find the limits to knowledge in order tomake room for faith (Bxxx). It underlies his commitment to theHighest Good, and is manifest in the declaration of ReligionsFirst Preface that morality inevitably leads to religion (6:6).We will begin our commentary on Religion in the next chapter,

but before we move on to the text itself, it is important tounderstand the place of religion within Kants overall CriticalPhilosophy, as well as what tenets of the latter are most impor-tant to his positive philosophy of religion. Hence, in this chapter,we will explore some of the key philosophical issues that underlieKants Religion and why he believes that practical reason mustturn to religion. More advanced readers may find themselvestempted to skip over some of these discussions, but I want toemphasize that my commentary on Religion is guided by variousstances on these underlying issues and familiarity with them willprove helpful as we progress through the many analyses to come.We will begin with a brief overview of Transcendental Idealismin order to set the stage for Kants distinction between faith andother modes of assent. We will then turn to his understanding offaith as a propositional attitude. Lastly, we will begin our

19FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE HIGHEST GOOD

examination of Kants doctrine of the Highest Good, a doctrinethat in my view resides at the heart of his positive philosophy ofreligion.

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND THECRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS

Kant interpretation has long suffered under the yoke of the so-called two-worlds interpretation. This interpretation dates backto some of the earliest reviews of the Critique of Pure Reason (seeFeder and Garve 1782, as well as Garve 1783); and through thewritings of H. A. Prichard and Peter Strawson, it came to dom-inate the Anglophone reading of Kant. According to this view,Kant proposes two metaphysical domains: things as they appearto us in experience versus things as they are in themselves, inde-pendent of us. The formers objects have such characteristics asbeing in time and in space, having unity and limit, and existingwithin a nexus of causal connections. The latter, by contrast, lackall the properties of the former, are unknowable as they are inthemselves, and yet only become available to us once filtered orshaped by the a priori structures of our consciousness.Many two-worlds interpreters see Kants project as little more

than a version of Subjective Idealism, of the sort we most com-monly associate with George Berkeley.4 They take Kants positionto be a sort of phenomenalism that is, the world for us isnothing but a series of inner states, with the addition of anunknowable metaphysical ground behind phenomenal experience.Under this interpretation, Kants philosophy languished throughmuch of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like somany others, Strawson too thought that despite Kants intentions,the Critique of Pure Reason presents just a more ornate version ofthis familiar philosophical model. However, unlike other Anglo-phone readers, he saw in Kants writings resources that could beseparated from their metaphysical encumbrances and be broughtinto the service of analytic philosophy.The real value of Kants philosophy, according to Strawson,

comes from what he calls the Principle of Significance. Strawsondefines this as the principle that there can be no legitimate, or


even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which doesnot relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of theirapplication (Strawson 1966: 16). The conceptual aspects ofexperience (i.e., the determination of objects as unities, as boun-ded by limits, etc.), as well as time and space, are contributionsprovided by our faculties, whereas things-in-themselves are to beunderstood as the way things are once we abstract away from allthat our faculties have contributed. Thus, as the latter is definedby its independence from our cognition, it is also defined byits independence from the concepts provided by our faculties.Hence, things-in-themselves would not be temporal or spatial,unities, bounded by limits, causally related, or, perhaps, evencountable.So, even though Transcendental Idealism holds that there can be

no knowledge of things-in-themselves, it is still (putatively) com-mitted to there being a reality of unknowable things-in-themselvesas well as to the mysterious transcendental affection throughwhich things-in-themselves transmit data to us. Thus, according toStrawson, Transcendental Idealism remains a form of metaphysics,and so is in violation of the Principle of Significance (Strawson1966: 41), even though we can still extract this principle fromanalytic argument of the Critique and then use it to both bar anyfurther metaphysical indulgences as well as the Cartesian-typeskepticism that is predicated upon the distinction between experi-ence and a reality beyond it.Since Strawson, various alternative interpretations have arisen,

the most prominent of which appears in Henry Allisons KantsTranscendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (2004). Unlikemost other interpretations of Kant, Allisons methodological ortwo-aspects interpretation rejects the notion that things-in-themselves have any positive metaphysical standing. It rejects theview that there are two distinct sets of objects (one phenomenal,one noumenal) and, instead, maintains that Kant only discussesthings-in-themselves in order to clarify that the epistemic condi-tions for possible experience presented in the Critique should notbe mistaken for metaphysical claims.The notion of things-in-themselves has only a negative func-

tion: to clarify to the reader what is not being examined. When


Kant discusses our forms of intuition and pure concepts, he wantsus to understand that they are constitutive conditions for how weexperience objects (and are determinative of objecthood as such).They pertain to how we experience the world and are not to betaken as about the world independent of how we experience it.Hence, references to things-in-themselves serve to distinguishbetween what these conditions do and do not concern. This ismost clear in the section of the First Critique explicitly devoted tothe phenomena/noumena distinction.In On the Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in

General into Phenomena and Noumena, Kant states that thenoumenon must be understood to be such only in the negativesense (A252/B309); this concept is necessary in order not toextend sensible intuition to things in themselves (A254/B310);and, The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundaryconcept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, andtherefore only of negative use. The division of objects intophenomena and noumena, and of the world into a world of senseand a world of understanding, can therefore not be permitted atall in a positive sense (A255/B311). These passages help toillustrate that the Critique does not carry the metaphysical com-mitments proffered by the two-world interpretation. Ratherthan a metaphysical treatise about two domains of objects, thetext should be read as an inquiry into and demonstration of thea priori conditions that govern our experience, how we sense,think, and judge.These conditions set out what is built into experience for

beings such as ourselves. They provide, on the one hand, whatmay be considered subjective conditions (since they pertain onlyto finite beings), while on the other hand, should still be under-stood as objective in that they determine what objects are like forus, for all of us. That is, unlike the phenomenalist reductionfound in the two-worlds interpretation, the methodologicalinterpretation presents the objects of experience as there for oneand all as intersubjective and as part of a shared empirical rea-lity of matter dwelling within time and space.To concretely illustrate the intersubjective character of this

reading of Transcendental Idealism, imagine a group of


individuals who (per their experience) are sitting around a tablewith a sculpture at its center. Some will see the sculptures face inprofile, while others will see it from a frontal view. Each spectatorwill, therefore, have a different experience. For a Subjective Ide-alist, the object of experience is merely phenomenal, existing justin the minds of each perceiver. Their objects will be qualitativelydifferent, but more significantly here, they will also be numeri-cally distinct since there is no shared physical object, presented toeach relative to their viewing angles. Each observer rather just hashis own mental contents, a bundle of colors and shapes. Thesecontents may be qualitatively similar (similar shades of color forexample), perhaps even qualitatively identical (in ideal lighting),but there is no quantitatively identical thing that is common tothe observers.By contrast, the Transcendental Idealist who takes time, space,

limit, unity, etc. as the epistemic conditions through whichexperience is constituted, will take the object as one that isshared, just as these conditions for experience are shared; andrather than foundering upon the fact that the numerically iden-tical sculpture will take on qualitatively distinct appearances foreach observer, the Transcendental Idealist will rather regard thelatter as simply illustrative of the Euclidean nature of sharedspace. In other words, the conditions upon which each experienceis made possible likewise set out how the object will be experi-enced by others, including how the singular object in a sharedspace and time will appear differently to each observer, dependingupon the present angles, lighting, etc.It may be hard for some readers to get away from the psycho-

logical and phenomenalist reductions of Kants forms of intuitionand pure concepts, but they are not like filters we each apply toan undetermined noumenal object affecting us. Rather, they arefeatures of a shared space and shared objects determined not bythe discrete psychological processes of each observer; they arefeatures of the world for beings such as ourselves. It is, thus, bestto read each step of transcendental analysis found in the Critiqueof Pure Reason, not as stages along a psychological assembly pro-cess, but rather as an analysis that penetrates into how the worldis given to us: what Empirical Reality is like.5


Returning to the metaphysical question, where does this leavethings-in-themselves? It is tempting to answer this question byreference to Kants caution that we should not mistake the con-ditions for possible experience as metaphysical claims about atranscendent reality. This is, at least, the dominant point made inhis comments about things-in-themselves in the Critiques Trans-cendental Analytic.As for its Transcendental Dialectic, Kant likewise continues to

oppose any positive use of things-in-themselves by showing thefolly of trying to gain knowledge of them through the applicationof the epistemic conditions presented in the Analytic. It is notthat we cannot think about things-in-themselves by way of ourpure concepts, but rather, as illustrated in the Dialectics Anti-nomies, we cannot adjudicate between the plurality of speculativemetaphysical projects that have been developed over the centuries.Concepts alone may be able to generate internally consistentmetaphysical models, but once untethered from experience, thereis no way to determine which model is correct.The Antinomies thus serve to illustrate why we cannot have

knowledge of things-in-themselves. Although our conceptualapparatus makes empirical knowledge possible, when we try touse it to generate metaphysical systems, we certainly can accom-plish the task, but we can do it too well, so to speak: reason candemonstrate that the world must have had a beginning in time,and it can demonstrate that it never had a beginning; it candemonstrate that all things are composites and so there is noultimate simple, and it can demonstrate that there must be anultimate simple.6 A moments reflection on the history of philo-sophy, with its multitude of metaphysical systems, illustratesKants point. Theoretical reason can forever continue spinning itswheels, developing and defending different answers to questionsabout ultimate reality.This point of reflection, he notes, may lead to skepticism and

despair, or to obstinance and dogmatism favoring one answerdespite the equal credentials of the alternative. Either way,metaphysics, Kant claims, is the death of a healthy philosophyand the euthanasia of pure reason (A407/B434). The Transcen-dental Dialectic thus shows us the damage that metaphysics can


do to healthy philosophy. It also serves as a form of therapy bytrying to bring us to terms with reasons pathological drive toknow what ultimate reality is truly like.Nevertheless, in the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant seems to

deviate from the Analytics more ardently negative, methodolo-gical use of things-in-themselves. The Third and Fourth Anti-nomies, in particular, intimate a more positive use than anywhereelse in the Critique so far. The Third Antinomy presents us withthe conflict between freedom and determinism, while the FourthAntinomy deals with the affirmation and denial of the existenceof a necessary being. In response to these two Dynamical Anti-nomies, Kant suggests that both thesis and antithesis may beaffirmed, so long as one of them is attributed to the phenomenalrealm and the other to the noumenal. Accordingly, in the case ofthe Third Antinomy, freedom and determinism may both beaffirmed by having the phenomenal realm determined by causallaws, while allowing for at least the possibility that freedomreigns in the noumenal.This is no proof of freedom, but it does show that nature at

least does not conflict with causality through freedom (A558/B586).Moreover, in his Solution to the Third Antinomy, Kant exploresthe idea of a causality of reason, distinguishing it from deter-ministic physical laws, and linking it to normative laws. Thenoumenal realm is thus no longer simply a limit-concept intro-duced for methodological purposes. Rather, in the last two Anti-nomies, as well as in his ethical theory and philosophy of religion,we find Kant exploring the noumenal and though he alwaysholds on to the claim that through theoretical reason, we cannever know anything of its nature, he nevertheless permits assentin the form of faith.This is the upshot of our brief venture into Transcendental

Idealism. Kants claim in the Critique of Pure Reasons SecondPreface that he sought out the limits to knowledge in order tomake room for faith should not be discounted as just an emptybromide. Quite to the contrary: we see both in the Transcenden-tal Dialectic and then later in the Canon, how the Critiquechampions the Lutheran aspiration discussed at the beginning ofthis chapter.


Although this book will still generally follow the methodolo-gical interpretation of the noumenal where theoretical reason isconcerned, as we advance into Kants practical philosophy andphilosophy of religion, a new affirmative stance must be added.This move is essential to Kants entire positive theology and tounderstand how such positive noumenal intimations can bereconciled with the dominant anti-metaphysical thrust of theTranscendental Dialectic, let us turn to how Kant distinguishesfaith from knowledge.

FAITH AS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE

The Critique of Pure Reason has many more pages that at leastappear to be antagonistic to religion than offer it any support. Asmentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it attacks the tradi-tional arguments for Gods existence, challenges the existence ofthe soul, and argues that through theoretical reason alone, wecannot generate a sufficiently determinate conception of God.Yet, as also mentioned in brief, these objections should not bemisinterpreted as anti-religious. Kants aim is not to do awaywith religion, but rather to save it.As long as religious doctrines are thought to be within the

purview of theoretical reason, theology can be treated as a science,requiring a class of specialists whose life is devoted to the tech-nical analysis of doctrines, and expecting the laity to put theirfaith in the hands of these presumed experts. But this can lead(and has led) to religious despotism, for it expects us to accept theprofessional theologians word on doctrinal disputes over subtledistinctions and obscure details that only they presumably canunderstand.The alternative that Kant recommends has its roots in Luthers

doctrine of universal priesthood (i.e., that we are all our ownpriests). Like Luther, Kant wants to remove religion from themonopoly of the schools and set it on a footing suitable to thecommon human understanding (Bxxxii). Yet, at the same time,he does not want it to fall into the blind fervor of Enthusiasm,wishful thinking or superstition. Although Kant distinguishesfaith from both opinion and knowledge, this is far from a license


to irrational assent. Just as there are a priori principles governingexperience, so likewise there are universal grounds pertinent tofaith, grounds shaped by the common needs of our practical lives.They pertain to our fallen nature, a nature that all of humanityshares, and thus for Kant, faith is grounded in such a way that it(like other legitimate forms of assent) is intersubjectively valid(see Pasternack 2011).However, this validity, unlike that of opinion and knowledge,

is not grounded epistemically. These other propositional attitudesgain their justification through evidence, argument, or othercommon theoretical warrants that, Kant claims, if communicatedto others, should lead them to assent as well (assuming no biasesstand in the way). He refers to the modes of assent that commanduniversal assent as conviction (berzeugung), against which hecontrasts persuasion (berredung). The latter he describes ashaving its ground only in the particular constitution of thesubject (A820/B848), and as such has only private validity(A820/B848). We may think of such instances of assent as havingtheir roots in personal bias or emotional needs such as is presentin wishful thinking, bandwagonism, and what Kant calls thedelusion of logical egoism (JL: 9:80; VL: 24:87475).By contrast, conviction has grounds that are universally valid

(BL: 24:202), valid for everyone merely as long as he has reason(A820/B848), necessarily valid for everyone (A821/B849), orobjectively valid (CJ: 5:461).7 Knowledge (Wissen) is an obviousinstance of conviction. In its case, it carries sufficiently forcefulobjective grounds that we can hold the proposition to be truewith certainty. Similarly opinion (Meinung), though it falls shortof certainty, is also based upon objective grounds that if commu-nicated should lead others to a similar (though measured) assent.Unlike persuasion, where our assent is driven by a particularpsychological interest that does not hold common to all, opinionis based upon some evidence and/or some argument, enough stillto justify assent, but in a weaker form that corresponds to thelevel of probability that the grounds have established. We can, forexample, find in lecture notes from the Blomberg Logic: Onecan opine something without believing, namely if one has moregrounds for the cognition than against it. Here I hold something


to be true without its having an influence on our actions. Toknow something, however, is nothing other than to cognize itwith certainty (BL: 24:24142). Similarly, we have to opine, orholding-to-be-true based on any insufficient ground, whichnevertheless has more importance than the ground of the oppo-site (BL: 24:227).8

Kant does not, however, limit our legitimate modes of assent tojust knowledge and opinion. Although these modes gain theirlegitimacy from epistemic grounds, he further claims that faith(Glaube) is also a mode of conviction, and thus is likewisenecessarily valid for everyone (A821/B849). Nevertheless, itslegitimacy cannot be epistemic, as its objects are outside of pos-sible experience. It cannot be based upon evidence, nor by way oftheoretical reason, since valid use of the latter must still rest uponthe conditions for possible experience. Instead, faith gains itslegitimacy through the needs of practical reason, needs that are intheir own way still necessarily valid for everyone.Although in earlier texts, Kant more closely followed the looser

account of faith found in George Friedrich Meiers Auszug aus derVernunftlehre (1752), the textbook from which Kant lectured onlogic for forty years, as the Critical Period advanced, he came tonarrow the proper objects of faith to those that are based on apractical principle of reason (which is universally and necessarilyvalid) [and so] can make a sufficient claim of conviction from apurely practical point of view (CJ: 5:463). These objects includethe Highest Good (as a state of affairs that will ultimately cometo be) and the two Practical Postulates that he considers to benecessary for its realization: Gods existence and the immortalityof the soul. However, as we will discuss at length through muchof this book, while the above should be understood as the foun-dational objects of faith, many further principles (Divine justice,the Propensity to Evil, the Change of Heart, etc.) flow from them,perhaps in a manner similar to the relationship between the FirstCritiques pure concepts and the further predicables that arederivative and subalternate from the former (A82/B108).Collectively these principles of faith, which command universalconviction, are called by Kant the Pure Rational System ofReligion, or the doctrines of Pure Rational Faith.


Still, the question remains as to how Kant draws upon theneeds of pure practical reason to ground faith how, that is, he isable to distinguish faith from persuasion. After all, one mightassent to God, immortality, and so forth, on grounds that areidiosyncratic or irrational. One might, for example, claim a spe-cial private dispensation, some revelation or insight for oneselfalone. Or, one might merely desire so ardently that the tenets offaith are true that one comes to affirm them out of wishfulthinking.The latter, in fact, was an accusation made by Thomas Wizen-

mann, one of Kants contemporaries. Wizenmann argued thatjust as love leads to delusions about the beloved, so this may aswell be the case with regard to the Highest Good and its Postu-lates. That is, the needs which lead to religious assent are simplydriven by emotional desire rather than practical reason. Kantdirectly responds to this accusation, acknowledging that if onesassent has to do with a need based on inclination, then it fallsto persuasion. However, he asserts that legitimate faith has itsroots in a need of reason arising from an objective determiningground of the will, namely the moral law, which necessarily bindsevery rational being (CPrR: 5:143n). Thus, as we are all boundby the moral law, if it in some way depends upon or draws us tothe Highest Good, and in turn, to its Postulates, then, unlike thevariable and subjective character of persuasion, faith has anobjective and universal basis.9

But to repeat, this basis does not come out of theoreticalreason. Its source, rather, is in the practical. Precisely what thissource is will be a topic for later in this chapter, but put veryroughly, Kant argues that our commitment to morality isintertwined with a commitment to the Highest Good and theconditions that make its realization possible.10 This is, more-over, a conviction for Kant, and, like knowledge, it is supposedto be certain for us. Yet, the nature of this certainty is differentthan what applies to knowledge. The difference is not only inthe grounds for assent, but in some further way that Kantexpresses cryptically as follows: I must not even say It ismorally certain that there is a God, etc., but rather I ammorally certain etc. (A829/B857). Accordingly, faith has in


some sense a personal or subjective character to it; yet it still hasgrounds that distinguish it from persuasion in that the groundsof faith, as rooted in the needs of practical reason, are groundsthat hold for everyone.An analogy may here be drawn to Descartes Cogito, for the

certainty one has in ones own existence seems more aptlyexpressed as Kant did above with I am certain rather than Itis certain. The latter formulation is less indicative of the first-person privileged character of the Cogito. So faith, we might say,has a similarly privileged first-person status. Despite the factthat we all have a need for faith arising from our inward moralstruggles, this assent develops out of a personal path throughthese struggles and should be understood, in a certain sense, assubjective. Although there is a universal need for faith, it is notcharacterized by Kant as objective, for it is not rooted in aprocess of logical inference. It is, rather, subjectively neces-sary in that it is a need we each encounter in our practicallives.11

One might worry that if its certainty has a first-person char-acter, perhaps no account of why faith is needed is possible. Butits putative ineffability does not follow from the first-personcharacter of its certainty. Just as Descartes describes a first-person process through which we each can come to certaintywith regards to our own existence, Kant explains why faith isneeded in terms that allow each of us to reflect, become aware ofthe compelling force of the moral law within, and come to seehow it further calls for the Highest Good and the Postulates.However, beyond such generalities, Kant has great difficultyformulating the nature of our practical needs and how they aresupposed to lead to the Highest Good. All three Critiques aswell as the First Preface to Religion contain arguments whoseaim is to establish this connection, but they all differ from oneanother not just in minor details, but in philosophically sub-stantive ways. Through the remainder of this chapter, we willexamine the accounts he offers in the Critiques, and as part of thenext chapters discussion of Religions prefaces, we will examineits presentation of the practical grounds upon which our hopeand faith depend.


KANTS DOCTRINE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

It is generally accepted that Kants doctrine of the Highest Goodcontains two layers or aspects. They have respectively been calledits immanent vs. transcendent aspects, its ectypical vs. arche-typical layers, or its form as a demand vs. as a promise.12 The first(immanent, ectypical, demand) aspect of the doctrine presents theHighest Good as a duty to which we are bound. It is, as we willdiscuss below, more specifically an imperfect duty, one that weare obligated to positively promote, rather than a perfect andnegative sort of duty, such as the prohibitions against lying,stealing, or killing. It is, rather, more like our duties to becharitable or to further our talents, in that it commands that weconscientiously pursue an end insofar as it is within our power todo so. The second (transcendent, archetypical, promise) aspect ofthe doctrine pertains, by contrast, to an ideal whose realization isbeyond our power. It is usually rendered as an ideal state of affairswherein there is a distribution of happiness in proportion tomoral worth. For the sake of convenience, let me refer to the firstaspect of the doctrine as HGd (the Highest Good as duty) and thesecond as HGi (the Highest Good as ideal).In the next section, we will explore Kants actual arguments for

the Highest Good. But first, let us look more closely at the doc-trine itself, the respective roles of HGi and HGd, and the view,found in recent literature, that Kant substantially revised HGiduring the Critical Period, removing all or some of its religiouselements. As we shall see, this view, despite its current popular-ity, cannot be sustained once one looks carefully at its presumedtextual basis. Later in this section, we will look more closely atHGd. But we shall begin with HGi, and the controversy regard-ing whether or not it refers to a state of affairs that takes place ina future life or is merely a social and secular ideal pursued forthe sake of future generations.

HGi AS A SECULAR VS. RELIGIOUS IDEAL

It is generally agreed that at least in the Critique of Pure Reason,Kant did see HGi as taking place in the afterlife, where through


Divine justice, we receive happiness in proportion to our moralworth (A814/B842).13 He there argues that this principle of dis-tribution cannot be realized in this life, either through the caus-ality of nature or through our common moral efforts: how theirconsequences will be related to happiness is determined neitherby the nature of the things in the world, nor by the causality ofactions themselves and their relation to morality (A810/B838);and a few pages later, he also states that: the sensible world doesnot promise us that sort of systematic unity of ends (A814/B842).14 Thus, in order for HGis distributive principle to berealized, Kant posits God as its agent along with an extra-mundane realm of grace (A812/B840) separate from the causalorder of nature and governed by Divine justice. As he states, it isonly through the positing of this alternate realm that our con-duct in the sensible world (A811/B839) can receive its justdeserts, for in this world, nature does not offer such a connec-tion (A811/B839) to what we each morally deserve.In my opinion, Kant continues to hold to an extramundane

model of HGi throughout the Critical Period, and does so for thesame reasons we find stated in the First Critique. Although, as weshall see, he moves through numerous different arguments for theHighest Good, and makes various other changes to the religiousprinciples tied to it (such as to the conditions upon which ourmoral worth is judged as well as whether or not punishments canbe eternal), his commitment to the core Postulates of God andImmortality remain unchanged.Not all interpreters, however, agree. Andrews Reath, for

example, in his Two Conceptions of the Highest Good, arguesthat by the Third Critique, Kant abandoned his earlier theologi-cal conception of the Highest Good in favor of a secular one, onethat refers simply to a social agenda, without any need for eitherGod or immortality (Reath 1988). A similar view has also beenexpressed by Paul Guyer, who claims that even in the SecondCritique, Kant began to show some reservations about his formerportrayal of HGi and dramatically separates the postulation ofimmortality from the postulation of God (Guyer 2005: 289).Guyer even asserts that the highest good is not any part of adoctrine of punishment or retribution: It does not imply that the


virtuous should be rewarded with happiness and the viciouspunished with unhappiness(Guyer 2005: 289n).Nevertheless, there is a surfeit of textual evidence that runs

against these views. Despite Guyers assertion that the highestgood is not any part of a doctrine of punishment or retribu-tion, there are dozens of passages, found as much in Kantswritings of the 1780s as the 1790s, that very clearly assert thatHGi does involve the distribution of happiness in accordancewith moral worth. A few relevant passages from the First Cri-tique have already been quoted. In the Second Critique, we have,for example: happiness distributed in exact proportion tomorality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to behappy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world (CPrR:5:110).15 We can also find similar formulations of HGi inReligion (6:5, 6:99, 6:161) and in various essays of the 1790s,including the Theory/Practice essay (TP: 8:279), The End ofAll Things(ET: 8:32830), and the Real Progress (RP:20:298). In all of these, reward and punishment are unam-biguously linked with the Highest Good. This is a positionthat appears from the start of the Critical Period and is a viewthat is never retracted.As for the view that Kant eliminated the Postulate of Immor-

tality from HGi, I suspect that it is rooted in a preference on thepart of some contemporary Kantians to alter his views so thatthey better suit the secular tendencies of contemporary academia.Of course, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such altera-tions. There may be good philosophical reasons for rejecting thisPostulate or in other ways adapting Kants doctrine.16 But thetrend, unfortunately, has been to present HGi as if the textsthemselves advance this secular position.The most frequently cited passage used to support the secular-

ization of the Highest Good is 5:450 in the Critique of Judgement.It contains the phrase the highest good in the world, and sinceReaths Two Conceptions of the Highest Good it has been theprimary basis for the view that by 1790 Kant migrated from another-worldly to a this-worldly rendering of HGi. The HighestGood, so it has been argued, is no longer viewed by Kant astaking place in a future life, but in this one. It will obtain in


the world and so it is humanity rather than God who is to beheld responsible for its realization.Of course, it is granted that Kant does use in the world when

discussing the Highest Good. In fact, the phrase appears in var-ious texts of the Critical Period a point that might prompt oneto see the secular interpretation as all the stronger. However,these passages cannot offer such a benefit. This is because in theworld appears well before the putative shift to a secular model ofthe Highest Good. It occurs in both the First Critique (e.g. A814/B842) and quite abundantly in the Second Critique, (CPrR:5:122, 5:125, 5:126, 5:134, 5:141, etc.). Moreover, it is used incontexts where one could not plausibly take it to have a secularmeaning. The most glaring example of this is at 5:122 in theCritique of Practical Reason, right in the opening line of the sectionThe Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure PracticalReason that is, right where Kant argues for the Postulate ofImmortality! Similarly, it can be found in the Second Critiquessection that discusses how we are justified through the extensionof pure reason for practical purposes (CPrR: 5:134) to affirmfreedom, immortality, and God. Kant there reminds us that bythe theoretical path, they cannot be established; yet by thepractical law that commands the existence of the highest goodpossible in a world, the possibility of those objects of pure spec-ulative reason is postulated (CPrR: 5:134).Thus, it hardly seems reasonable to assume that in the

world should be read as referring to just the natural causalorder of this life. Instead, there are many passages where Kantuses the phrase to indicate something more broad, akin to in allthat is or in all of creation. In fact, he explicitly discusses themeaning of Welt in the Critique of Pure Reason, noting that Wehave two expressions, world and nature, which are sometimes runtogether (A418/B446). But, he continues, they can also differin meaning. When dealing with cosmology, for instance, Kantassigns to world a transcendental sense, namely, the abso-lute totality of the sum total of existing things (A419/B447).Therefore, given that he does use in the world in contexts thatclearly include the afterlife, it is appropriate to understand it inthis sense.


The above textual argument may be sufficient to rebut thesecular reading of HGi. But we may also challenge it by lookingclosely at the passage most often used to support it. Although thephrase in the world is gleaned from 5:450, the context in whichit appears is simply ignored. This is a passage drawn from section87 of the Critique of Judgment, where Kant discusses moral tele-ology and in relation to it the moral proof of the existence ofGod (5:447). This proof is built upon the Highest Good as thefinal end or purpose of creation. It calls upon us to strive afterthe Highest Good, i.e., the imperfect duty identified by HGd.But then Kant continues on to a discussion of HGi. Just as heargued in the First and Second Critiques, so in the Third, hewrites, it is impossible for us to represent these two requirementsof the final end [i.e., happiness and morality] as both connectedby mere natural causes (CJ: 5:450), and thus God is again pos-ited as a moral cause of the world (an author of the world) (CJ:5:450).Immortality is not explicitly mentioned in the passage but it

appears not long after, still within the same section of the Critiqueof Judgment, in what I would like to call the Parable of theRighteous Atheist. In this parable, Kant discusses a righteousman (like Spinoza) who takes himself to be firmly persuaded[berredete] that there is no God and there is also no future life(CJ: 5:452).17 Kant then argues that the Righteous Atheist willsuccumb to despair and lose his motivation to follow morality.Kant by no means dwells on the issue of immortality here, but itis mentioned, for it is only through the faith that HGi will obtainin the future life that one can face down the purposeless chaosof matter (CJ: 5:452) and sustain ones commitment to mor-ality.18

We can also find similar comments through the rest of the1790s. They appear in the Theodicy essay of 1791, throughoutReligion, in 1794s The End of All Things, and in the Conflictof the Faculties, published in 1798. In fact, it turns out thatthere are more texts containing affirmations of the immortality ofthe soul in the 1790s than in the 1780s. Of course, that is not tosay that Kant migrated to a belief in the afterlife as the CriticalPeriod advanced, but it does seem more on his mind in later


years, as religious topics in general also were. Moreover, whileKants argument for the Highest Good evolved through the years,the phases of which we will discuss shortly, throughout all thesechanges, we find the same core argument for the Postulate ofImmortality. As discussed briefly above, and as we will re

Documents

kant