Kant Moral Stanford

8/12/2019 Kant Moral Stanford

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Kant's Moral PhilosophyFirst published Mon Feb 23, 2004; substantive revision Sun Apr 6, 2008

Immanuel Kant (17241804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he

dubbed the ategori!al Im"erati#e$ (I)% Immorality thus in#ol#es a #iolation of the I and is thereby

irrational% &ther "hiloso"hers' su!h as o!e and *obbes' had also argued that moral requirements arebased on standards of rationality% *o+e#er' these standards +ere either desire,based instrumental

"rin!i"les of rationality or based onsui generisrational intuitions% Kant agreed +ith many of his

"rede!essors that an analysis of "ra!ti!al reason +ill re#eal only the requirement that rational agents

must !onform to instrumental "rin!i"les% -et he argued that !onformity to the I (a non,instrumental"rin!i"le) and hen!e to moral requirements themsel#es' !an ne#ertheless be sho+n to be essential to

rational agen!y% .his argument +as based on his striing do!trine that a rational +ill must be regarded

as autonomous' or free in the sense of being the author of the la+ that binds it% .he fundamental"rin!i"le of morality / the I / is none other than the la+ of an autonomous +ill% .hus' at the heart

of Kants moral "hiloso"hy is a !on!e"tion of reason +hose rea!h in "ra!ti!al affairs goes +ell beyond

that of a *umean sla#e to the "assions% 3oreo#er' it is the "resen!e of this self,go#erning reason in

ea!h "erson that Kant thought offered de!isi#e grounds for #ie+ing ea!h as "ossessed of equal +orthand deser#ing of equal res"e!t%

Kants most influential "ositions are found in The Groundor! o" the Metaph#si$s o" Morals(hereafter'

Groundor!$) but he de#elo"ed' enri!hed' and in some !ases modified those #ie+s in later +orssu!h as The %riti&ue o" 'ra$ti$al (eason' The Metaph#si$s o" Morals'Anthropolog# "ro) a 'rag)ati$

'oint o" *ieand(eligion ithin the +oundaries o" Mere (eason% I +ill fo!us on the foundational

do!trines of the Groundor!' e#en though in re!ent years some s!holars ha#e be!ome dissatisfied +ith

this standard a""roa!h to Kants #ie+s and ha#e turned their attention to the later +ors% I myself stillfind the standard a""roa!h most illuminating' though I +ill highlight im"ortant "ositions from the later

+ors +here needed%

1% ims and 3ethods of 3oral 5hiloso"hy 2% 6ood ill' 3oral orth and uty

9% uty and :es"e!t for 3oral a+

4% ategori!al and *y"otheti!al Im"erati#es

;% .he ature

?% .he *umanity


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out$ the foundational "rin!i"le of a meta"hysi!s of morals% Kant "ursues this "roEe!t through the first

t+o !ha"ters of the Groundor!% *e "ro!eeds by analyFing and elu!idating !ommonsense ideas about

morality% .he "oint of this first "roEe!t is to !ome u" +ith a "re!ise statement of the "rin!i"le or

"rin!i"les on +hi!h all of our ordinary moral Eudgments are based% .he Eudgments in question aresu""osed to be those any normal' sane' adult human being +ould a!!e"t% >o+adays' ho+e#er' many

+ould regard Kant as being o#erly o"timisti! about the de"th and eGtent of moral agreement% Dut

"erha"s he is best thought of as dra+ing on a moral #ie+"oint that is #ery +idely shared and +hi!h!ontains some general Eudgments that are #ery dee"ly held% In any !ase' he does not a""ear to tae

himself to be "rimarily addressing a genuine moral se"ti! su!h as those +ho often "o"ulate the +ors

of moral "hiloso"hers' that is' someone +ho needs a reason to a!t morally and +hose moral beha#iorhinges on a rational "roof that "hiloso"hers might try to gi#e%


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morality a priori' then +e may !onsult fa!ts dra+n from eG"erien!e in order to determine ho+ best to

a""ly this "rin!i"le to human beings and generate "arti!ular !on!lusions about ho+ +e ought to a!t%

Kants insisten!e on an a priorimethod to see out and establish fundamental moral "rin!i"les'

ho+e#er' does not al+ays a""ear to be mat!hed by his o+n "ra!ti!e% .he Groundor!' for instan!e'maes re"eated a""eals to em"iri!al fa!ts (that our +ills are determined by "ra!ti!al "rin!i"les' that

#arious moti#ations are #ariable in "rodu!ing right a!tions' and so on)% ater ethi!al +ors rely e#en

more hea#ily on em"iri!al generaliFations% Kant did not tae himself to be em"loying su!hgeneraliFations in seeing out and establishing the fundamental moral "rin!i"le' only in a""lying it to

human beings% >e#ertheless' it is not al+ays easy to tell +hether Kants arguments gain their

"lausibility only by relying on ideas established by obser#ations of human being and the +orld theyinhabit%

It one sense' it might seem ob#ious +hy Kant insists on an a priorimethod% meta"hysi!s of morals

+ould be' more or less' an a!!ount of the nature and stru!ture of moral reality / in effe!t' a

!ategoriFation of duties and #alues% Hu!h "roEe!t +ould address su!h questions as' hat isa dutyChat !indsof duties are thereC hat isthe goodC hat !indsof goods are thereC' and so on% .hese

a""ear to be meta"hysi!al questions% ny "rin!i"le used to "ro#ide su!h !ategoriFations a""ears to be a

"rin!i"le of meta"hysi!s% nd meta"hysi!al "rin!i"les are al+ays sought out and established by a

priorimethods%

5erha"s something lie this +as behind Kants thining% *o+e#er' the !onsiderations he offers for an a

priorimethod do not all ob#iously dra+ on this sort of rationale% .he follo+ing are three !onsiderations

fa#oring a priorimethods that he em"hasiFes re"eatedly%

.he first is that' as Kant and others ha#e !on!ei#ed of it' ethi!s initially requires an analysis of ourmoral !on!e"ts% e must understand the !on!e"ts of a good +ill' obligation' duty and so on' as

+ell as their logi!al relationshi"s to one another' before +e !an determine +hether our use of these

!on!e"ts is Eustified% 6i#en that the analysis of !on!e"ts is an a priorimatter' to the degree that ethi!s!onsists of su!h an analysis' ethi!s is a priorias a +ell%

&f !ourse' e#en +ere +e to agree +ith Kant that ethi!s should begin +ith analysis' and that analysis is

or should be an entirely a prioriundertaing' this +ould not eG"lain +hy allof the fundamentalquestions of moral "hiloso"hy must be "ursued a priori% Indeed' the most im"ortant "roEe!t is to sho+that +e' as rational agents' are Eustified in holding oursel#es to the standard enshrined in the I% If this

"roEe!t must also be !arried out a priori' it !annot be be!ause it is an analyti!al "roEe!t% onformity to

moral requirements is not itself !ontained in the !on!e"t of rational agen!y' nor is there any

!ontradi!tion in asserting that a fully rational agent !an be immoral% -et' Kant argued' no eG"erien!e!an tell us +hether any +ill' in!luding our o+n' !onforms to the I either% hat !ounts$' regarding

su!h !onformity' is not the a!tions one sees' but their inner "rin!i"les' +hi!h one does not see%$

(4407) Indeed' be!ause of the dismal re!ord of human beha#ior' the more +e eG"erien!e it' the less!onfiden!e +e ha#e that any +ill e#er !onforms to moral norms% Hin!e obser#ation !annot establish the

ne!essary !onformity of rational +ills to the I' Kant regards the !laim that they do !onform as an

eGam"le of an a priori s#ntheti$!laim' an a priori!laim that is not analyti! or !on!e"tual' yet +hoseEustifi!ation !annot rely on obser#ation% .his is the se!ond reason Kant held fundamental issues in

ethi!s must be addressed +ith an a priorimethod .he ultimate subEe!t matter of ethi!s is the nature

and !ontent of the "rin!i"les that ne!essarily determine a rational +ill%


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and establishing the "rin!i"le that generates su!h requirements +ill not su""ort the "resentation of

moral oughts as ne!essities% Kant argued that em"iri!al obser#ations !ould only deli#er !on!lusions

about' for instan!e' the relati#e ad#antages of moral beha#ior in #arious !ir!umstan!es or ho+ "leasing

it might be in our o+n eyes or the eyes of others% Hu!h findings !learly +ould not su""ort the absolutene!essity of moral requirements% .o a""eal to a posteriori!onsiderations +ould thus result in a tainted

!on!e"tion of moral requirements% It +ould #ie+ them as demands for +hi!h !om"lian!e is not

absolutely ne!essary' but rather ne!essary only if additional !onsiderations sho+ it to be ad#antageous'o"timifi! or in some other +ay feli!itous% .hus' Kant argued that if moral "hiloso"hy is to guard

against undermining the absolute ne!essity of obligation in its analysis and defense of moral thought' it

must be !arried out entirely a priori%

ontents

2. Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty

Kants analysis of !ommonsense ideas begins +ith the thought that the only thing good +ithoutqualifi!ation is a good +ill% hile the "hrases hes good hearted' shes good natured and she

means +ell are !ommon' the good +ill as Kant thins of it is not the same as any of these ordinary

notions% .he idea of a good +ill is !loser to the idea of a good "erson' or' more ar!hai!ally' a "ersonof good +ill% .his use of the term +ill early on in analyFing ordinary moral thought in fa!t "refigures

later and more te!hni!al dis!ussions !on!erning the nature of rational agen!y% >e#ertheless' this idea of

a good +ill is an im"ortant !ommonsense tou!hstone to +hi!h he returns throughout his +ors% .he

basi! idea is that +hat maes a good "erson good is his "ossession of a +ill that is in a !ertain +aydetermined by' or maes its de!isions on the basis of' the moral la+% .he idea of a good +ill is

su""osed to be the idea of one +ho only maes de!isions that she holds to be morally +orthy' taing

moral !onsiderations in themsel#es to be !on!lusi#e reasons for guiding her beha#ior% .his sort ofdis"osition or !hara!ter is something +e all highly #alue% Kant belie#es +e #alue it +ithout limitation

or qualifi!ation% Dy this' I belie#e' he means "rimarily t+o things%


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of desires that $ouldo"erate inde"endently of moral demands that maes goodness in human beings a

!onstraint' an essential element of the idea of duty% Ho in analyFing unqualified goodness as it o!!urs

in im"erfe!tly rational !reatures su!h as oursel#es' +e are in#estigating the idea of being moti#ated by

the thought that +e are !onstrained to a!t in !ertain +ays that +e )ightnot +ant to' or the thought that+e ha#e moral duties%

Kant !onfirms this by !om"aring moti#ation by duty +ith other sorts of moti#es' in "arti!ular' +ith

moti#es of self,interest' self,"reser#ation' sym"athy and ha""iness% *e argues that a dutiful a!tion fromany of these moti#es' ho+e#er "raise+orthy it may be' does not eG"ress a good +ill% ssuming ana!tion has moral +orth only if it eG"resses a good +ill' su!h a!tions ha#e no genuine moral +orth%

.he !onformity of ones a!tion to duty in su!h !ases is only related by a!!ident to !ontent of ones +ill%


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!onformity of our +ill to la+ as su!h%

hat' then' is the differen!e bet+een being moti#ated by a sense of duty in the ordinary sense' and

being moti#ated by duty in Kants senseC It is' "resumably' this 3oti#ation by duty is moti#ation by

our res"e!t for +hate#er la+ it is that maes our a!tion a duty% Dut +e !an rationally o"t out of ourmembershi" in the !ity' state' !lub or any other so!ial arrangement and its la+s / for instan!e' by

quitting the !lub or eG"atriating% .hose la+s only a""ly to us gi#en +e dont rationally de!ide to o"t

out' gi#en the o""ortunity% &ur res"e!t for the la+s guiding us is qualified' in the sense that the thoughtthat the la+ gi#es us a duty is !om"elling only if there is no la+ +e res"e!t more that !onfli!ts +ith it3y res"e!t for the la+s of my !lub guides my a!tion only insofar as those la+s do not require me to

#iolate !ity ordinan!es% Dut my res"e!t for !ity ordinan!e guides me only insofar as they do not require

me to #iolate federal la+% nd so on%

@#entually' ho+e#er' +e +ill !ome to la+s that a""ly to us sim"ly as members of the !lub of rationalagents' so to s"ea' as beings +ho are !a"able of guiding their o+n beha#ior on the basis of dire!ti#es'

"rin!i"les and la+s of rationality% e !annot !hoose to lay aside our membershi" in the !ategory of

su!h beings' or at least it is un!lear +hat the status of su!h a !hoi!e +ould be% Ho' su""ose that there issome la+ "res!ribing +hat any rational agent must do% .hen +e ha#e an idea of a duty that +e !annot

rationally o"t out of% hen +e do something be!ause it is our moral duty' Kant argued' +e are

moti#ated by the thought that' insofar as +e are rational beings' +e must a!t only as this fundamentalla+ of ("ra!ti!al) reason "res!ribes' a la+ that +ould "res!ribe ho+ any rational being in our

!ir!umstan!es should a!t% hate#er else su!h a la+ might be' it is' in #irtue of being a "rin!i"le of

reason' true of all rational agents% 3y res"e!t for su!h a la+ is thus not qualified my res"e!t for thela+s of my !lub' !ity' !onstitution or religion guides me in "ra!ti!al affairs only insofar as they do not

require me to #iolate la+s laid do+n by my o+n "ra!ti!al reason' but my res"e!t for the deli#eran!es of

my o+n reason does not de"end on +hether it requires me to #iolate the former sorts of la+s% In this

!ase' it is res"e!t for (rational) la+fulness as su!h guides me%

.he forgoing line of argument re#eals a distin!ti#e as"e!t of Kants a""roa!h his a!!ount of the

!ontent of moral requirements and the nature of moral reasoning is based on his analysis of the unique

for!e moral !onsiderations ha#e as reasons to a!t% .he for!e of moral requirements as reasons is that +e!annot ignore them no matter ho+ !ir!umstan!es might !ons"ire against any other !onsideration% Hin!ethey retain their reason,gi#ing for!e under any !ir!umstan!e' they ha#e uni#ersal #alidity% Ho' +hate#er

else may be said of moral requirements' their !ontent is uni#ersal% &nly a uni#ersal la+ !ould be the

!ontent of a requirement that has the reason,gi#ing for!e of morality% .his brings Kant to a "reliminaryformulation of the I I ought ne#er to a!t eG!e"t in su!h a +ay that I !ould also +ill that my maGim

should be!ome a uni#ersal la+ (4402)% .his is the "rin!i"le +hi!h moti#ates a good +ill' and +hi!h

Kant holds to be the fundamental "rin!i"le of all of morality%

ontents

#. $ate%orial and &ypothetial mperati(esKant holds that the fundamental "rin!i"le of our moral duties is a $ategori$ali)perative% It is ani)perativebe!ause it is a !ommand (e%g%' ea#e the gun% .ae the !annoli%$) 3ore "re!isely' it

!ommands us to eGer!ise our illsin a "arti!ular +ay' not to "erform some a!tion or other% It is

$ategori$alin #irtue of a""lying to us un!onditionally' or sim"ly be!ause +e "ossesses rational +ills'

+ithout referen!e to any ends that +e might or might not ha#e% It does not' in other +ords' a""ly to uson the !ondition that +e ha#e ante!edently ado"ted some goal for oursel#es% &f !ourse' other

im"erati#es ha#e a similar non,!onditional form%


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not a""ly to you only on the !ondition that you ha#e some end that is ser#ed by being "olite% Dut this

im"erati#e is not $ategori$alin Kants sense' sin!e it does not a""ly to us sim"ly be!ause +e are

rational enough to understand and a!t on it' or sim"ly be!ause +e "ossess a rational +ill% Im"erati#es

of etiquette a""ly to us sim"ly be!ause "re#ailing !ustoms single us out as a""ro"riate obEe!ts ofa""raisal by standards of "oliteness' +hether +e a!!e"t those standards or not%

.here are oughts other than our moral duties' but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought

in being based on a quite different ind of "rin!i"le' one that is the sour!e of h#potheti$al i)peratives% hy"otheti!al im"erati#e is a !ommand that also a""lies to us in #irtue of our ha#ing a rational +ill'but notsi)pl#in #irtue of this% It requires us to eGer!ise our +ills in a !ertain +aygiven+e ha#e

ante!edently +illed an end% hy"otheti!al im"erati#e is thus a !ommand in a !onditional form% Dut not

any !ommand in this form !ounts as a hy"otheti!al im"erati#e in Kants sense%


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our a!tions% .he form of a maGim is I +illAin %in order to realiFe or "rodu!e +here A is some

a!t ty"e' % is some ty"e of !ir!umstan!e' and is some ty"e of end to be realiFed or a!hie#ed by

in % Hin!e this is a "rin!i"le stating only +hat some agent+ills' it issub-e$tive% ( "rin!i"le for an#

rational +ill +ould be an ob-e$tive"rin!i"le of #olition' +hi!h Kant refers to as a "ra!ti!al la+%) eill (1A7;' 1A8A)

and :a+ls (1A8A' 1AAA)' among others' tae this formulation in effe!t to summariFe a de!ision"ro!edure for moral reasoning' and I +ill follo+ them


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something I +ant$% n immoral a!tion !learly does not in#ol#e a self,!ontradi!tion in this sense (as

+ould the maGim of finding a married ba!helor)% Kants "osition is that it is irrational to "erform an

a!tion if that a!tions maGim !ontradi!ts itself on$e )ade into a universal la o" nature% .he maGim of

lying +hene#er it gets +hat you +ant generates a !ontradi!tion on!e you try to !ombine it +ith theuni#ersaliFed #ersion that all rational agents must' by a la+ of nature' lie +hen it gets +hat they +ant%

*ere is one +ay of seeing ho+ this might +or If I !on!ei#e of a +orld in +hi!h e#eryone by nature

must try to de!ei#e "eo"le any time it +ill get +hat they +ant' I am !on!ei#ing of a +orld in +hi!h no"ra!ti!e of gi#ing ones +ord !ould e#er arise% Ho I am !on!ei#ing of a +orld in +hi!h no "ra!ti!e ofgi#ing ones +ord eGists% 3y maGim' ho+e#er' is to mae a de!e"ti#e "romise in order to get needed

money% nd it is a ne!essary means of doing this that a "ra!ti!e of taing the +ord of others eGists' so

that someone might tae my +ord and I tae ad#antage of their doing so% .hus' in trying to !on!ei#e ofmy maGim in a +orld in +hi!h no one e#er taes anyones +ord in su!h !ir!umstan!es' I am trying to

!on!ei#e of this a +orld in +hi!h no "ra!ti!e of gi#ing ones +ord eGists' but also' at the #ery same

time' a +orld in +hi!h Eust su!h a "ra!ti!e does eGist' for me to mae use of in my maGim% It is a +orld!ontaining my "romise and a +orld in +hi!h there !an be no "romises% *en!e' it is in!on!ei#able that

my maGim eGists together +ith itself as a uni#ersal la+% Hin!e it is in!on!ei#able that these t+o things

should eGist together' I am forbidden e#er to a!t on the maGim of lying to get money%

Dy !ontrast +ith the maGim of the lying "romise' +e !an easily !on!ei#e of ado"ting a maGim ofrefusing to de#elo" any of our talents in a +orld in +hi!h that maGim is a uni#ersal la+ of nature% It

+ould undoubtedly be a +orld more "rimiti#e than our o+n' but "ursuing su!h a "oli!y is still

!on!ei#able in it% *o+e#er' it is not' Kant argues' "ossible to rationally +ill this maGim in su!h a+orld% .he argument for +hy this is so' ho+e#er' is not ob#ious' and some of Kants thining seems

hardly !on#in!ing Insofar as +e are rational' he says' +e already ne!essarily +ill that all of our talents

and abilities be de#elo"ed% *en!e' although I !an !on!ei#e of a talentless +orld' I !annot rationally +ill

that it !ome about' gi#en I already +ill' insofar as I am rational' that I de#elo" all of my o+n% -et'gi#en limitations on our time' energy and interest' it is diffi!ult to see ho+ full rationality requires us to

aim to fully de#elo" literally all of our talents% Indeed' it seems to require mu!h less' a Eudi!ious

"i!ing and !hoosing among ones abilities%


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!a"a!ities of theirs at some time%


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*umanity is not an end in this sense' though e#en in this !ase' the end lays do+n a la+$ for me%

&n!e I ha#e ado"ted an end in this sense' it di!tates that I do something I +ill a!t in +ays that +ill

bring about that end%

n end in the negati#e sense lays do+n a la+ for me as +ell' and so guides a!tion' but in a different+ay% Korsgaard (1AA?) offers self,"reser#ation as an eGam"le of an end in a negati#e sense e do not

try to "rodu!e our self,"reser#ation% :ather' the end of self,"reser#ation "re#ents us from engaging in

!ertain inds of a!ti#ities' for instan!e' "i!ing fights +ith mobsters' and so on% .hat is' as an end' it issomething I do not a!t againstin "ursuing my "ositi#e ends' rather than something I "rodu!e%

*umanity is in the first instan!e an end in this negati#e sense It is something that li)its+hat I may do

in "ursuit of my other ends' similar to the +ay that my end of self,"reser#ation limits +hat I may do in

"ursuit of other ends% Insofar as it li)itsmy a!tions' it is a sour!e ofper"e$tduties% >o+

self,"reser#ation is asub-e$tiveend' +hile *umanity is an ob-e$tiveend% Helf,"reser#ation is subEe!ti#ein that it is not an end that e#ery rational being must ha#e% e do "la!e more im"ortan!e on it than

most of our other "ositi#e ends% De!ause self,"reser#ation is more im"ortant to me than eG!itement' I

am not a base,Eum"er' and so self,"reser#ation "uts a limit on my beha#ior% Dut I !ould maeself,"reser#ation less im"ortant if I +ish' and "erha"s "ut eG!itement in its "la!e so that it' and not

self,"reser#ation' limits "ursuit of my other ends% *umanity is an ob-e$tiveend' be!ause it is an end

that e#ery rational being must ha#e insofar as she is rational% *en!e' it limits +hat I am )orall#per)ittedto do +hen I "ursue my "ositi#e andsubEe!ti#e negati#e ends%

.he *umanity in myself and others is also apositiveend' though not in the first "ositi#e sense abo#e'

as something to be "rodu!ed by my a!tions% :ather' it is something to realiFe' !ulti#ate or further by my

a!tions% De!oming a "hiloso"her' "ianist or no#elist might be my end in this sense% hen my end isbe!oming a "ianist' my a!tions do not' or at least not sim"ly' "rodu!e something' being a "ianist' but

!onstitute or realiFe the a!ti#ity of being a "ianist% Insofar as the *umanity in oursel#es must be treated

as an end in itself in this se!ondpositivesense' it must be !ulti#ated' de#elo"ed or fully a!tualiFed%*en!e' the *umanity in oneself is the sour!e of a duty to de#elo" ones talents or to "erfe!t ones

*umanity% hen ones maes ones o+n *umanity ones end' one "ursues its de#elo"ment' mu!h as

+hen one maes be!oming a "ianist ones end' one "ursues the de#elo"ment of "iano "laying% ndinsofar as *umanity is a "ositi#e end in others' I must tae a!!ount of their ends in my o+n "lans% In sodoing' I further the *umanity in others' by hel"ing further the "roEe!ts and ends the ado"tion and

"ursuit of +hi!h !onstitutes that *umanity% It is this sense of *umanity as an end,in,itself on +hi!h

Kants arguments for im"erfe!t duties rely%


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some standard of assessment% :es"e!t for the *umanity in "ersons is more lie ar+alls re!ognition

res"e!t% e are to res"e!t human beings sim"ly be!ause they are "ersons and this requires a !ertain sort

of regard% e are not !alled on to res"e!t them insofar as they ha#e met some standard of e#aluation

a""ro"riate to "ersons%

ontents

/. *he Autonomy +ormula

.he third formulation of the I is the Idea of the +ill of e#ery rational being as a ill that legislatesuniversal la%$ (4492) lthough Kant does not state this as an im"erati#e as he does in the other

formulations' it is easy enough to "ut it in that form !t so that through your maGims you !ould be a

legislator of uni#ersal la+s% .his sounds #ery similar to the first formulation% *o+e#er' in this !ase +efo!us on our status as uni#ersal la+giversrather than uni#ersal la+"olloers% .his is of !ourse the

sour!e of the #ery dignity of *umanity Kant s"eas of in the se!ond formulation% rational +ill that is

merely bound by uni#ersal la+s !ould a!t a!!ordingly from natural and non,moral moti#es' su!h asself,interest% Dut in order to be a legislator of uni#ersal la+s' su!h !ontingent moti#es' moti#es that

rational agents su!h oursel#es may or may not ha#e' must be set aside% *en!e' +e are required

a!!ording to this formulation to !onform our beha#ior to "rin!i"les that eG"ress this autonomy of therational +ill / its status as a sour!e of the #ery uni#ersal la+s that obligate it% s +ith the *umanity

formula' this ne+ formulation of the I does not !hange the out!ome' sin!e ea!h is su""osed to

formulate the #ery same moral la+' and in some sense unite$ the other formulations +ithin it% Kant

taes ea!h formulation that su!!eeds the first in its o+n +ay to bring the moral la+ !loser to feeling$%.he autonomy formula "resumably does this by "utting on dis"lay the sour!e of our dignity and +orth'

our status as free rational agents +ho are the sour!e of the authority behind the #ery moral la+s that

bind us%

ontents

0. *he Kin%dom of nds +ormula.his formulation has gained fa#or among Kantians in re!ent years (see :a+ls' 1A72J *ill' 1AA2)% 3anysee in it as introdu!ing more of a so!ial dimension to Kantian morality% Kant states that the abo#e

!on!e"t of e#ery rational +ill as a +ill that must regard itself as ena!ting la+s binding all rational +ills

is !losely !onne!ted to another !on!e"t' that of a systemati! union of different rational beings under!ommon la+s$' or a Kingdom of @nds$% (4499) .he formulation of the I states that +e must a!t in

a!!ordan!e +ith the maGims of a member gi#ing uni#ersal la+s for a merely "ossible ingdom of

ends$ (449A)% It !ombines the others in that (i) it requires that +e !onform our a!tions to the maGims of

a legislator of la+s (ii) that this la+gi#er lays do+n uni#ersal la+s' binding all rational +ills in!ludingour o+n' and (iii) that those la+s are of a merely "ossible ingdom ea!h of +hose members equally

"ossesses this status as legislator of uni#ersal la+s' and hen!e must be treated al+ays as an end initself% .he intuiti#e idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to a!t onlyon "rin!i"les +hi!h !ould earn a!!e"tan!e by a !ommunity of fully rational agents ea!h of +hom ha#e

an equal share in legislating these "rin!i"les for their !ommunity%

ontents

. *he nity of the +ormulas

Kant !laimed that all of these I formulas +ere equi#alent% =nfortunately' he does not say in +hat
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sense% hat hesa#sis that these are basi!ally only so many formulations of "re!isely the same la+'

ea!h one of them by itself uniting the other t+o +ithin it'$ and that the differen!es bet+een them are

more subEe!ti#ely than obEe!ti#ely "ra!ti!al$ in the sense that ea!h aims to bring an Idea of reason

!loser to intuition (by means of a !ertain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling$% (449;)% *e also says thatone formula follo+s from$ another (4491)' and that the !on!e"t foundational to one formula leads to

a !losely !onne!ted$ !on!e"t at the basis of another formula (4499)% .hus' his !laim that the

formulations are equi#alent !ould be inter"reted in a number of +ays%Kants statement that ea!h formula unites the other t+o +ithin it$ initially suggests that the formulasare equi#alent in )eaning' or at least one !ould analyti!ally deri#e one formula from another% 5erha"s

Kant thought this' but it is not #ery "lausible .hat I should al+ays treat *umanity as an end in itself'

for instan!e' does not seem to mean the same thing as that I should a!t only on maGims that are!onsistent +ith themsel#es as uni#ersal la+s of nature%

5erha"s' then' if the formulas are not equi#alent in meaning' they are ne#ertheless logi!ally

interderi#able and hen!e equi#alent in this sense% .he uni#ersal la+ formula is not itself deri#ed' as

some of Kants inter"reters ha#e suggested' from the "rin!i"le of non,!ontradi!tion% .hat +ould ha#ethe !onsequen!e that the I is a logi!al truth' and Kant insists that it is not or at least that it is not

analyti!% Hin!e the I formulas are not logi!al truths' then' it is "ossible that they !ould be logi!ally

interderi#able% *o+e#er' des"ite his !laim that ea!h !ontains the others +ithin it' +hat +e find in theGroundor!seems best inter"reted as a deri#ation of ea!h su!!essi#e formula from the immediately

"re!eding formula% .here are' nonetheless' a fe+ "la!es in +hi!h it seems that Kant is trying to +or in

the o""osite dire!tion% &ne is found in his dis!ussion of the *umanity formula% .here Kant says thatonly something hose e.isten$e in itsel"had an absolute +orth$ !ould be the ground of a !ategori!ally

binding la+% (4428) *e then boldly "ro!laims that *umanity is this absolutely #aluable thing referring

to this as a "ostulate$ that he +ill argue for in the final !ha"ter of the Groundor!% (442An) &ne

might tae this as Kants intention to deri#e thereby the uni#ersal la+ formula from the *umanityformula/"something is absolutely #aluable' then+e must a!t only on maGims that !an be uni#ersal

la+s% Dut (he "ostulates) *umanity is absolutely #aluable% Thus' +e must a!t only on maGims that !an

be uni#ersal la+s% .his (I thin) anomolous dis!ussion may +ell get at some dee" sense in +hi!h Kant

thought the formulations +ere equi#alent% >onetheless' this deri#ation of the uni#ersal la+ formulationfrom the *umanity formulation seems to require a substanti#e's#ntheti$!laim' namely' that *umanity

is indeed absolutely #aluable% nd if it does require this' then' !ontrary to Kants o+n insisten!e' theargument of Groundor!//does not a""ear to be merely an analyti! argument meant sim"ly to

establish the !ontent of the moral la+%

.he most straightfor+ard inter"retation of the !laim that the formulas are equi#alent is as the !laim that

follo+ing or a""lying ea!h formula +ould generate all and only the same duties% .his seems to besu""orted by the fa!t that Kant used the same eGam"les through the la+ of nature formula and the

*umanity formula% .hus' the uni#ersal la+ formulation generates a duty to M if and only if the

*umanity formula generates a duty to M' (and so on for the other formulations)% In other +ords' res"e!t

for *umanity as an end in itself !ould ne#er lead you to a!t on maGims that +ould generate a!ontradi!tion +hen uni#ersaliFed' and #i!e #ersa% .his +ay of understanding Kants !laim also fits +ith

his statement that there is no obEe!ti#e "ra!ti!al differen!e bet+een the formulations although there

are subEe!ti#e differen!es% .he subEe!ti#e differen!es bet+een formulas is their differen!es inmeaning' "resumably differen!es that a""eal in different +ays to #arious !on!e"tions of +hat morality

demands of us% Dut this differen!e in meaning is !om"atible +ith there being no "ra!ti!al differen!e' in

the sense that !onformity to one formulation !annot lead one to #iolate another formulation%

ontents
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1. Autonomy

t the heart of Kants moral theory is the "osition that rational human +ills are autonomous% Kant sa+

this as the ey to understanding and Eustifying the authority moral requirements ha#e o#er us% s +ith

:ousseau' +hose #ie+s influen!ed Kant' freedom does not !onsist in being bound by no la+' but byla+s that are in some sense of ones o+n maing% .he idea of freedom as autonomy thus goes beyond

the merely negati#e sense of being"ree "ro)influen!es on our !ondu!t originating outside of

oursel#es% It !ontains first and foremost the idea of la+s made and laid do+n by oneself' and' in #irtueof this' la+s that ha#e de!isi#e authority o#er oneself%

Kants basi! idea !an be gras"ed intuiti#ely by analogy +ith the idea of "oliti!al freedom as autonomy

(Hee :eath 1AA4)% onsider ho+ "oliti!al freedom in liberal theories is thought to be related to

legitimate "oliti!al authority state is free +hen its !itiFens are bound only by la+s in some sense oftheir o+n maing / !reated and "ut into effe!t' say' by #ote or by ele!ted re"resentati#es% .he la+s of

that state then eG"ress the +ill of the !itiFens +ho are bound by them% .he idea' then' is that the sour!e

of legitimate "oliti!al authority is not eGternal to its !itiFens' but internal to them' internal to the +ill ofthe "eo"le% It is be!ause the body "oliti! !reated and ena!ted these la+s for itself that it !an be bound

by them% n autonomous state is thus one in +hi!h the authority of its la+s is in the +ill of the "eo"le

in that state' rather than in the +ill of a "eo"le eGternal to that state' as +hen one state im"oses la+s onanother during o!!u"ation or !oloniFation% In the latter !ase' the la+s ha#e no legitimate authority o#erthose !itiFens%

In a similar fashion' +e may thin of a "erson as free +hen bound only by her o+n +ill and not by the

+ill of another% *er a!tions then eG"ress her o+n +ill and not the +ill of someone or something else%

.he authority of the "rin!i"les binding her +ill is then also not eGternal to her +ill% It !omes from thefa!t that she +illed them% Ho autonomy' +hen a""lied to an indi#idual' ensures that the sour!e of the

authority of the "rin!i"les that bind her is in her o+n +ill% Kants #ie+ !an be seen as the #ie+ that the

moral la+ is Eust su!h a "rin!i"le% *en!e' the moral legitima!y of the I is grounded in its being aneG"ression of ea!h "ersons o+n rational +ill% It is be!ause ea!h "ersons o+n reason is the legislator

and eGe!utor of the moral la+ that it is authoritati#e for her%

Kant argues that the idea of an autonomous +ill emerges from a !onsideration of the idea of a +ill that

is free in a negati#e sense$% .he !on!e"t of a rational +ill is of a +ill that o"erates by res"onding toreasons% .his is' firstly' the !on!e"t of a +ill that does not o"erate through the influen!e of fa!tors

outside of this res"onsi#eness to reasons%


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another reason' namely' the fa!t that it does not "ro#e that +e really are free% In the %riti&ue o"

'ra$ti$al (eason' he states that it is sim"ly a fa!t of reason (Fa$tu) der *ernun"t) that our +ills are

bound by the I' and uses this to argue that our +ills are autonomous% *en!e' +hile in the Groundor!

Kant relies on a dubious argument for our autonomy to establish that +e are bound by the moral la+' inthe se!ond %riti&ue' he argues from the bold assertion of our being bound by the moral la+ to our

autonomy%

.he a""arent failure of Kants argument to establish the autonomy of the +ill' and hen!e the authorityof moral demands o#er us' has not deterred his follo+ers from trying to mae good on this "roEe!t% &nestrategy fa#ored re!ently has been to turn ba! to the arguments of Groundor! //for hel"% Kant

himself re"eatedly !laimed that these arguments are merely analyti! and hy"otheti!al% .he !on!lusions

are thus fully !om"atible +ith morality being' as he "uts it' a mere "hantom of the brain$% (444;)Kant !learly taes himself to ha#e established that rational agents su!h as oursel#es must tae the

means to our ends' sin!e this is analyti! of rational agen!y% Dut there is a !hasm bet+een this analyti!

!laim and the su""osed syntheti! !on!lusion that rational agen!y also requires !onforming to a further'non,desire based' "rin!i"le of "ra!ti!al reason su!h as the I% >e#ertheless' some see arguments in

Groundor! //that establish Eust this% .hese strategies in#ol#e a ne+ teleologi!al reading of Kants

ethi!s that relies on establishing the eGisten!e of an absolute #alue or an end in itself% (I say more

about this teleologi!al reading belo+%) .hey begin +ith Kants o+n stated assum"tion that there is su!han end in itself if and only if there is a !ategori!al im"erati#e binding on all rational agents as su!h% If

this assum"tion is true' then if one !an on inde"endent grounds "ro#e that there is something +hi!h is

an end in itself' one +ill ha#e an argument for a !ategori!al im"erati#e% &ne su!h strategy' fa#ored byKorsgaard (1AA?) and ood (1AAA) relies on the a""arent argument Kant gi#es that *umanity is an end

in itself% 6uyer' by !ontrast' sees an argument for freedom as an end in itself% (6uyer 2000) Doth

strategies ha#e fa!ed teGtual and "hiloso"hi!al hurdles% onsiderable inter"reti#e finesse' for instan!e'is required to eG"lain Kants star insisten!e on the "riority of "rin!i"les and la+ o#er the good in the

se!ond %riti&ue(;;7,?7)

ontents

11. 4irtue and 4ie

Kant defines #irtue as the moral strength of a hu)an beings+ill in fulfilling his duty$ (?40;) and

#i!e as "rin!i"led immorality% (?9A0) .his definition a""ears to "ut Kants #ie+s on #irtue at odds +ith!lassi!al #ie+s su!h as ristotles in se#eral im"ortant res"e!ts%


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.hird' in #ie+ing #irtue as a trait grounded in moral "rin!i"les' and #i!e as "rin!i"led transgression of

moral la+' Kant thought of himself as thoroughly reEe!ting +hat he too to be the ristotelian #ie+ that

#irtue is a mean bet+een t+o #i!es% .he ristotelian #ie+' he !laimed' assumes that #irtue differs from

#i!e only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different "rin!i"les ea!h in#ol#es% (?404' 492)Dut "rodigality and a#ari!e' for instan!e' do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough +ith

ones means% .hey differ in that the "rodigal a!ts on the "rin!i"le of a!quiring means +ith the sole

intention of enEoyment' +hile the a#ari!ious a!t on the "rin!i"le of a!quiring means +ith the soleintention of "ossessing them%


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eGtent it denies that right and +rong are in some +ay or other fun!tions of goodness or badness% It

denies' in other +ords' the !entral !laim of teleologi!al moral #ie+s%


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20th !entury theorists ha#e follo+ed 3ills suggestion' most notably' :% 3% *are% *are argued that

moral Eudgments su!h as Htealing is +rong$ are in fa!t uni#ersal "res!ri"tions (>o stealing any+here

by anyoneL$) nd be!ause they are uni#ersal' *are argued' they forbid maing eG!e"tions% .hat in turn

requires moral Eudgments to gi#e ea!h "ersons +ellbeing' in!luding our o+n' equal +eight% nd +hen+e gi#e ea!h "ersons +ellbeing equal +eight' +e are a!ting to "rodu!e the best o#erall out!ome% .hus'

in his #ie+' the I is sim"ly utilitarianism "ut into other +ords$ (*are' 1AA9' "% 109)% 3ore re!ently'

a#id ummisey (ummisey' 1AA?) has argued that Kants #ie+ that moral "rin!i"les are Eustifiedbe!ause they are uni#ersaliFable is !om"atible +ith those "rin!i"le themsel#es being !onsequentialist%

Indeed' ummisey argues that they must be res"e!t for the #alue of *umanity entails treating the

interests of ea!h as !ounting for one and one only' and hen!e for al+ays a!ting to "rodu!e the besto#erall out!ome%

.here are also teleologi!al readings of Kants ethi!s that are non,!onsequentialist% Darbara *erman has

urged "hiloso"hers to lea#e deontology behind$ as an understanding of Kants moral theory on the

grounds that the !on!e"tion of "ra!ti!al reason grounding the ategori!al Im"erati#e is itself a!on!e"tion of #alue% *ermans idea is that Kant ne#er meant to say that no #alue grounds moral

"rin!i"les% .hat' she argues' +ould im"ly that there +ould be no reason to !onform to them% Instead'

Kant thought the "rin!i"les of rationality taen together !onstitute rational agen!y' and rational agen!y

so !onstituted itself fun!tions as a #alue that Eustifies moral a!tion% (1AA9' 291) *ermans "ro"osal thushas Kants #ie+ grounding the rightness of a!tions in rational agen!y' and then in turn offering rational

agen!y itself u" as a #alue% Doth 5aul 6uyer and llen ood ha#e offered "ro"osals that differ from

*ermans in !ontent' but agree on the general form of teleology that she defends as a reading of Kant%6uyer argues that autonomy itself is the #alue grounding moral requirements% 3oral thining !onsists

in re!ogniFing the "ri!eless #alue of a rational agents autonomous +ill' something in light of +hose

#alue it is ne!essary for any rational agent to modify his beha#ior (1AA8' 22,9;)% nd ood argues thathumanity itself is the grounding #alue for Kant% hile the se!ond %riti&ue!laims that good things o+e

their #alue to being the obEe!ts of the !hoi!es of rational agents' they !ould not' in his #ie+' a!quire any

#alue at all if the sour!e of that #alue' rational agen!y' itself had no #alue% (1AAA' 190J see also ""%1;7,8)

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Kant Moral Stanford