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K.-O. A PEL
FROM KANT TO PEIRCE: THE SEMIOTICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF TRANSCENI?ENTAL LOGIC
I. TilE TRANSCENDENTAL DIMENSION OF MODERN
'LOGIC OF SCIENCE'.
\I;
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24 K .- O. A PEL
The h is to ric al p oin t o f th is s yn ta ctic -s em an tic r ec on str uc tio n o f e pis te -m ology becom es apparent if one puts the question of w hat has becom e of
the Kantian consciousness in the m odern logic of science, i.e.: of the
tr an sc en de nta l s ub je ct o f s cie ntif ic k nowle dg e. T he o ff ic ia l a nswe r c ou ld
'be: T his suppositi,on is no longer needed. In as far as the question refers
to m an as a subject of science the subject m ay be reduced to an object
of science, that is, of hum an science as behavioral science; in as far, on
th e o th er h an d, as th e qu estio n r efe rs to a lo gic al c on ditio n o f the p os sib il-
ity and validity of science the transcendental function of the K antian, su bje ct m ay b e s ub stitu te d b y th e lo gic o f sc ie ntif ic la ng ua ge : th e lo gic
o f la ng ua ge an d th e em piric al c on firm atio n o f p ro pos itio ns o r sy stem s o f
propositions together take the place of Kant's transcendental logic of
object ive experience.
H ow ev er , t his o ff ic ia l v iew o f th e m o de rn lo gic o f s cie nc e, i n m y o pin io n,
h as fa llen s ho rt o f th e re al p ro blem s W it w hic h it is c on fro nte . t Imp li esa n id eo lo gic al m ome nt w hic h c on ce als th e f ailu re o f th e o rig in al p ro gr am -
T ile o f th e m o de rn lo gic o f s cie nc e. th e p ro gr am !, ne o f, Lo gic al Em pir ic i~ .
For the bstitution of the transcendental function of the sub'ect 0
k no wle dge b y 'th e' lo gic o f sc ie ntific la ng uag e c ou ld b e s erio usly p ro pa-gated Just aSlong as one could ho e to guarantee the intersub 'ectivit
o t e pOSSI I e v alt Ity of em pirical science b the s ntax and sem antics
of on e so-ca e a ng ua ge o j th in gs o r J a cts . This was just the point by
W hich the young W lttgenstein in his Tractatus felt entitled to call the
'lo gic o f lan gu age ' 'tr an sce nd en ta l', a pp ar en tly w ith a n allu sio n to K an t
(Tractatus 6.(3), and to identify the subject of scientific know ledge as a
th in g w hic h do es not e xi st in the w orld, w ith the function of language as
a lim it of the w orld (ib.5.62; 5 .6 31 ; 5 .6 32 ; 5 .6 4) .
In the m eantim e, how ever, it becam e clear that neither the logical con-
sistency nor, far les e em irical testability of science can e w arranted
y the 1 0 ical nd se one angua e 0 thin s or facts. It
proved necessary in two places to introduce the so called pragmatical
dimension, i.e., the Im enSlO n 0 the in te rp re ta tio n 0 S I I1 S,as a con Itlon
o f th e p os sib ility a nd v alid ity o f s cie ntif ic p ro po sitio ns .- (I) One of the t oretic situations was the f~mous problem of
v er if ic atio n, w he re i t w as n ec es sa ry t o c on ne ct th e r ec on s r u - te d- ImTgu a- e
o science w ith the observable facts. It becam e apparent here as a con-
se uence of the ver ~ ua e-anal sis that the modern 10 ic o f
I
IIIIII
FROM KANT TO PEIRCE
sc ien ce ca nn ot c on fro nt th e th eo rie s o r h ypo .!h es e~ o f s cie nce w ith b
.J ac ts ,b ut o nly w ith s o c alle d basic statenlents. B ut in o rd er to p ro vid e v
dit for the basic statem ents them selves one requires an intersubject
agreem ent of the scientists as t e pragm atic interpreters nf G Gi,"
.,Eropositions, !hat is. as subjects of science in as ,far as they cannot
p rin cip le b e re du ce d to o bjec ts of e mpir ica l sc ien ce .
M oreover, the language of this intersubjective agreem ent cannot,
te rm s of lo gic al se ma ntics , b e id en tic al w ith th e lo gic ally re co nstr uc
language of science; it m ust rather coincide practically w ith the not
form alised Ian ua e needed for com munication betw een em pirical sc
tists and the designers of sem antical fram ew orks about the pra m
interpretation of a anguage of sC Ience.~
(2 ) J Jy th is la st o bse rv atio n w e h av e a lso a lre ad y in dica ted th e s ec o
still m ore fundam ental, point, w here the substitution 0 transcenden
function of t e epistem ological subject bv the syntactic or sem ant
rules of a scientific Ian ua e w as doom ed to failure. A fo.sed l angu
o science just cannot make use of the on e p os tu lated lo gic al fo rm
"language or of the w orld, w hich, according to the early W ittgenstein
transcendental. A form ahsed lan2ua2e of science has to be m troducedlegitim ized as a conventional fram ew ork by scientists, w ho can and m
provtae the Iramework with a pra matical inter retati
anJ{lla1!e .!.....
B y th is it h as b ee n s ho wn , in m y o pin io n, th at th e p ra gm atic dim en
of the sign-function, which was introduced into the m odern logi
science by C harles M orns, cannot, as L ogical E mpiricists w ould-I
b e re du ce d to a to pic o f e mp iric al ps ych ~iQ gY . T h e p ra 2m atic d im ens
may rather be c ed as iotical analaue to the transcenden
. s yn th esis o f a pp erc ep tio n p os tula te d by K an t. Ju st a s K an t, a s an an a
" '; )f co nSC IOu sn es s, h ad t o p os ti ff ii te a s a p re su ppos it io n. .. of e pi st emo lo" th at b y cogni ti on som~~~~~l~!!l!£ilc un it y o f. con~ , !~s
to be reached, - in just the sam e w ay m odern logicians of science, start
f rom a s em io tic b as is o f a na ly sis , c oU la ,- or ra tn er s ho uld , p os tu fa re ;-
lfmusf b - e p o s s l b i e , - fo r ' s o m e t W n g i i k e ' . f fi c l ii f if y o j T i i ie i S U l ij iC i lv e f i i ie r p r e - -
ta tio /J o f th e wor ld to be reached by~ way o f m te rp re ta tlo n o f s~
(Ad vo ca te s o f m od er n, a na ly tic al p hilo so ph y m ig ht p er ha ps o bje ct
the difference between the m odern logic of science and that of K
c on sis ts in th e v ery fa ct th at o ne is n ot e ntitled to po stu late a tra nsc en d
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26 K.-O . APEL FROM KANT TO PEIRCE
tal unity of interpretation of the world but has to be satisfied with a
" cr i~ i~ al c o nv en tio na lism' c on ce rn in g th e in te rp re ta tio n o f s cie ntif ic p ro -pO SItIon s b y e xp erts. I th in k tha t in this o bjec tio n K . R . P opp er , th e late r
W ittgenstein, and the later Carnap would agree. O ne could, however,
give the follow ing answ er to the objection from a quasi-K antian point of
view: critical c on ve ntio na lism, in c on tr ad is tin ctio n to dogmatical (meta-
p hys ic al) co nve ntio nalism , m ay n ot h av e th e inte ntio n to red uce k now l-
edge to mere convention; it m ay rather intend to m ake a difference, by
the w ay of afallibilistic re se rva ti on , be tween ad hoc-conven ti ons o f expe rt s.a nd th e ab so lute ly in te rsu bjc ctiv e co nse ns us co nce rnin g th e v alid ity o f
sc ien ti fi c p ropos it ion s. That means , howeve r, t ha t c ri ti ca l convent ional ism ,
u nd ers ~oo ~ righ tly , d oes n ot ex clu de b ut pr esu ppo se s th e p ostu late (th er eg ul at Iv e I de a) o f a n absol ut el y i nt er su bj ec ti ,, ~ unity-o f in terpretat ion .)
Perhaps these critical rem arks about the situation of the modern
a~alytical "I?gic of scien~' are able to convince you that this disciplin~
vi a pragmatIcs an d e sp ec Ially by the p rob lem o f inlersubjective itl1erpreta-
lion im plie d in p ra gm atic s is d ir ec te d b ac k to a K an tia n ty pe o f'tr an sc en -
d en ta l p hilo so ph y'. I f th is s ho uld b e th e c as e y ou w ill n ot h av e o ve rlo ok ed
th at th e w ay su gge sted b y m y rem ark s d oes n ot lea d b ac k to th e h isto rica l
K an t, no t ev en to nin ete en th -ce ntu ry ty pe N eo -K an tian ism bu t rath er to
a la ng uag e-a naly tica l or sem io tic al tran sfo rm atio n o f tra nsce nde nta l
philosophy.
II. P EIR CE 'S S EM IO TIC ALTRANSFORMATION OF
KANT'S TRA,N SCENDENTAL LOGIC
pretation of Peirce's Philosophy.l But I will try to m ake clear m y
thesis, that Peirce's philosophical approach m ay be understood
semiotlcal trans or s ranscendentarIO-ic in a dIscu
w ith so me ren ow ned in ve stil!:a to rs o f th e re latio ns hip be tw een K an
Peirce.2
Jilrgen von Kern " to be credited for havin for the first tim e
lyse in a serious way the close relationshi between Peirce and Ka
IS 00 CII. S. P eirce und der P
PeIrce in 1892 su ed in deducin his three universal cate ories
ness, Secondness T classification of the ro
func tlOns3 into s in u lar , d ua l an d plural ones, and in this w ay has s
an analogy to Kant's m etaphyslca de uction of the categories from
ta ble o f j udgmen ts. V on K em psk i h old s, ho wev er, th at this m etap hy
o ed uctio n s o to sp ea k is h an ging in the air, b ec au se the re is n o co rrc s
oin g tran sc en den tal d edu ctio n of th e c ateg ories fr om the 'hig hest po
that is: from ndental s nthesis of a erce tion (von cm
o p. c it ., pp. 57ft'). K ant's hi~he1-t point, so holds von K em pski, i
Peirce "occult transce " a nd t he re ~ r e h e c ou ld n ot u nd er s
m uch less resolve, the chief roblem of K ant's: the roblem of explaithe necessity of our ideas bein~ determ ined by categories. H enc f
could not m anage the transition from his '10 ical form s' to the cate
o expenence, and finally had to ~ive up the Kantian approach and to
-JOlts place a phenom enological discovery of the categories and a
K antia n m etap hys ics for a n ind uctiv e v erific atio n o f th e ca teg or ies
58ft"). B this Peirce fell into line, as an original outsider, with
K an tia nism, o r r ath er w ith its d is so lu tio na!.!. e turn 0 e cen
b y th e ph enomen olo gica l tur n. -)t ca nn ot b e d en ied th at v on K em psk i's a na ly sis w in s m uc h p la us ib
n ot o nly by the su g~ este d his to ric al pa ralle ls b ut als o bv th e d ev elo pm
o f P eirc e's ph ilo so ph y in its late r' pe rio d (esp ecially by its e stab lish
phenomenology or phaneroscopy as pr ima ph il osoph ia a nd th e p re ce
conception of a metaphysical cosmology on the basis of 'objec
idealism')
N evertheless, one m ay get quite another picture if one starts
Pe 'irc e's ea rly w ritin gs 0 ~6 0';-S an d '7 'O 's an d a na lys es f rom th is~
spe ct iv e P ei rc e's h ie r~ al c la ss [f ic ai Tono fs cf en ce so n'9 "( )'~ el 1- at "
'th is tim e p he nom en olo gy ;-;r i~ a D hilos ap hia has by no m eans ta
It is a rem arkable fact that the very program me sketched out just now has
in fac t b ee n d ev elo ped in d eta il b y a n Ame rica n c on te mp orary o f G erm an
N eo -K antia nism . It w as C ha rles S . Pe irce , th e K ant o f Americ an P hilo s-
op hy, as on e m ay pe rha ps c all h im , w ho in itiate d th e th ree -dim en sio nal
sem iotic, w hich now adays has been introduced into the m odern 'logic of
science' by Charles M orris, as the triadic foundation of his "logic of
~ nq u. ir y'; a nd th is lo gic o f in qu ir y w as in te nd ed f rom th e b eg in nin g _that
IS: SInce the deduction of the "N ew List of Categories' in 1867 _as a
c ritica l rec on stru ctio n (in th e se ns e of se tting u p a n eq uiva len t) o f K an t's
Cri ti qu e o f Pur e Reason .
I c an no t - w ith in th e lim its o f th is p ap er - develop in extenso my i nt er -
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28K .-O. APEL
FROM KANT TO PEIRCE
th e p la ce o f a lo gic al d ed uctio n o f th e c ateg ories b ut o nly h as to illu strate
th eir v irtu al a lic atio n after th eir fo rm al d ed uctio n in th e m ath em atical
lo gic o f r ela tio ns ( no t b elo ng in g to p hi1 0~ J!Y! ),~ _1 J9 .,p -c .e vio us tp th eir--~-_.~ -~-, - - -.._-----quasi-transcendental ded ction in the norm ative sem " ,
' finquiry'.
(It m ay b e admitted in th is co ntex t th at P eirce d id n ot su cceed in settin g
u p a co nsisten t sy stem atic rep resen tatio n o f h is p hilo so ph y, a nd th at th e
fragments of his designed architecture leave a lot of free play to the
interpreters). ,
But let us turn to the transform ation of K ant by the early Peirce.
\' on K em psk i (p . 59) has realised th at P eirce.:-'in h is o pin io n o ~ly in
..b iiliter w ork s..= - has fo un d ak in~~~_~I !. ?~~ !~ .: .! ,? r . !! !~g .h es t p o in t' o f. .
K an t: nam ely th e catego rr thirdness, which he conceives in 1903 as a
'SYnonym o f r ep re se nt at ~E~_( l'. ei rc e; 5: -r b5 '" )a i1 d t hu s t ak es a s t he b as i; -; r
l1 is lo g ic ( ofTr ic ru lr y) -:-Von Kempsk i i s awar e o f t he f ac t t ha t thirdness as a
7i!ediation 6y si~ ns or repr~:Seniaij01i'o ( s o m e i J i m g t o an interp'refanrrsTn
P eirc e's lan gu ag e someth in g lik e an an alo gu e o f K an t's o bjec tiv e u nity o f
I de aS 1 11a s elf co ns clO u sn es s. B ut f ie h old s th at th ir dn es s in P eir ce 's p hi-
~ema1l1s a conception of an abstract logical structure and insofar
cannot take over the functi f the 'hi hest oint' in a transcendentaldeduction. P eirce did not realise - according to von K em pski _
th at "the1!!?.~~.!L.2! the possibility of 0 ~ectrve nowe ge IS I entrca WI t e(thinking) 1-;;,
a nd he IS sa id 't o-have r' ij eCi ec fXancsdoc frme th at -" th e
su reme Ie i I tion of ature" 'es' our un erstandin em s I
6 0f ., 6 3, 6 5f .) .
It m ust h ow ev er b e sta te d th at P eirc e h im se lf in p lain co ntrad iC tio n.1 o
t he se t he se s has C la imed fo r h imsel f t he 'Cope rn ic an s tep': s o i n 1 8 7 1 he '
writes in his review of Berkele after havin introduced his own theor f
realit :, "rndeed w hat K ant called his Coperni can s tep w as recisely the
passage from the nom inahstrc to t e realistic view of reality. It w as theessence of hIs hlloso l1y to regard the real object as determ ined b the
mind. T hat w as n othing else th an to consider every co ncep tio n and intui-
~which enters necessarily into the ex enence 0 an ob'ect an whic
IS n ot tran sito ry a nd acc id en ta, .as h av in g o bj~ ctiv e v alid ity ..." (P eirce ,
8.15).
A nd in full acc
in 1868 and in 1878 a
judgm ents, in order to answ er w ith its hel~ the question how synt
ju dgmen ts a re p ossib le. H e sa ys in th is co ntex t: "W hatev er is u niv er
true of m ex ience... is inv 1 t e condition of ex erie
(ib. 2 .6 91 ; c f. 5 .3 32 M ).
H ow can these tran scend ental argum ents be reconciled w ith P e
rejectIOn of 'occult Tran ndental'sm ' uoted b von Kern ski?.
e answer is that P .'tion of 'Transc dentalis '
refer to t Ie id ea o f th e 'h ig hest ,? oin t' o f a 'tran scen den tal d ed uctio n'to those features of Kant's rocedure which in Peirce's 0 i .c 0 o glS tlC a nd c ir cu la r. 4-
The investigations of M . Murphey in particular have shown
Peirce, in his long study and transform ation of K ant, w hich resulte
th e 'N ew L ist o f C ateg ories' o f.!.§ 2!L h ad th e tran scen den tal d ed uc
o f the catego ries just as m uch b efore h is eyes as th e m etap hysical d e
tion.
A s to von K em pski's criticism o f Peirce 's h aving n eglected th e tr
cendental s nthesis of apperce tion one ma find equivalent coun
evidence in Peirce's reproaching Kant because his method 'does
a is pla y th at d ir ec t re fe re nc e to .th e un it y o f cons is tenc wh ic h a loneva 1 Ity to the categones .T he p hras e 'u nit o f c on sisten cy ', u se d b y P eirce in h is critic ism , s h
1'1e Irection in w hich P 'rce .self is searc 111 f or the 'hi est
o is 'transcendental deduction ': H is concern, itis true~t witl~
o bje ctiv e u nity o f id eas6 in a se/fconsciousness bu t r ath er w it h t 'f ie 'S em
't ic al ~ons is te nc y o f a n i nte rs ub je ct iv ely v al id representation o f th e o bjy signs, w IC conslstenc , accor III to elrce, can on y e ecided ab
In the dimension of sifl,n-interpretation ( af te rwa rd s c all ed /Jraf!mati
C h. M orris} . T he y ou ng P eirce ch arac te rize s th e u nity o f co nsisten c}
w as searching for as follow s in 1866: "W e find that every judgem entsubject to a condition of consistency: its elem ents m ust be capable
bemg brought to a unity. This consistent u ' since it bel t
judgem ents m a be said to belong to us. O r rather since it belongs to
judgem ents of all m ankind. w e m ay be sal C t9 ~png~- Th is early utterance sh ow s that the 'unity of co nsistency ' Peirce
o ok in g fo r lies b ey on d th ;P e~ o!!~ u nity o fS ~iiS clO usn ess , w hic
'"K ant's IIU ghest p oinr. Peirce co nfirm s th is in 1 868 in his sem ioti
T heory of M in d, w here h e say s:
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30 K.-O. APELFROM KANT TO PEIRCE
c on sc io u~ ne~ is a v ag ue te rm ... c on sc io us ne ss i s some tim es u sed to s ig ni fy t heI t ~m k, o r ~ na ty I n t h ou gh t; b ut t he u ni ty i s n o th in g b ut c on si st en cy , o r t he r ec og ni ti ono f It. C on sistency b elon gs to ev ery sign , so far as it is a sign ... th ere is no clem entw ha te ve r o f m an 's c on sc io us ne ss w hic h h as n ot s om eth in g c orre sp on di ng to it in th e
A...w o~ d... the w ord o r sign w hich m an u ses is th e m an h im se lf... th e o rg an is m i s o nl ya n In st ru me nt o f t ho ug ht. B ut th e id en tity o f a m an c on sis ts in th e consistency o f w h ath e does a nd thi nk s. .. ..
2.228). This schem a im plies, according to Peirce, three categorie
( 1) S im p le Quality without relations, which makes u the respect
p J> in of v iew , un der w hich som ething is exp ressed as someth in g in
sue/mess (category th e F ir st, l at er c all ed Firstl/ess). T o th is categ
co rrespo nd s the sign -type of 'Ico ns' w hich h as to b e im plied - a s Reater m akes clear 8.41' 3.363' 5.119 - in every predicate of a perce
Judgment in order to integrate felt ualities of t e rea world. .
nt eSls 0 a hich makes up the argument of a perce
judgement..(2 ) ~e dyadic re la t iOl / o f th p <: ;8" tn i t: i denot ed ob ie c~ 9r r at he r ob j
(category the Secol/d, l a te r ca lled Secondl/ess). To t hi s c at ego ry c or re spon
the sign-type 01 'li1d'ices' which has to be found - as P eirce later m a
c e ar 7, , 352; 8.41ff.) - in every verceptual iudgement
instance as a function of the pronoul/s an d adverbs) in o rder to w arr
th e s pa ce -tim e- id en tific atio n o f th e o bje cts w hic h a re te ;-b e d ete rm in ed
p re I ca te s.~(3) Th e t r iad ic re la t ion o f th e s ig n-fu nctio n a s a 'm ed iatio n' o r 'rep
~n tation' of so meth in g as sU mething to an 1I1 terpretan t (catego ry
Third, l at er c al le d Thirdl/ess). To t hi! >~n tr .g ar .y c or re spond s t he m .& . !
of conventional 'Symbols', which is the sub'ect or medium
unctIOn 0 s nt eSls ua the re resentation of something as som eth
o y co ncepts. B ut th is repre.~elltatioll by symbols would be 'void' W it-th e integ ration o f th e fu nctio n o f iI/dices and of icol/s, Just as w ith K
co nce ptio ns w ith ou t in tu itio ns are 'v oid '. O n th e o th er h an d th e fu nct
of iI/dices an d ico ~s_ blind if no t in tegrated into the fun ction o f rep~
ta tio n to an in terp retan t, ju st a s w ith K an t in tu itio n w ith ou t c on cep ti
IS 'b lin d'. - In deed: o nly -il/terpret~tio-;; f il iS ti' iC im ie x: fw lc ti on
':'m ean in g, ;a yo fth e p ulse o io fa sig n-p ~si a s w ell as th 6 ico ll-fu nctio n
i'model or a diagram or even of a picture. (The last point should
serio usly reg ard ed b y th e sy ntac tic -sem an tic p hilo so ph y o f fo rm alilanguages).
B ut in o rd er to sh ow h ow th is se mio tical d ed uc tio n o f th re e fu nd am
t~1 categones and of three types of signs m ay help to explain the po
bU1 ty an d v alid ity o f e xp erien ce. it IS n eces sary to co ordmate w ith P e
~ he th ree fu nd am en tal k in ds o f in fere nce to th e th re e k in ds o f c ateg o
an d th e th ree'ty pes o f sig ns : th at is to p arallel Thirdness and concept io
symbols with deduction as a ratio nally n ecessa ry ag en t, Secondl!ess
F rom h ere Peirce co mes im mediately to th e decisiv e con clusio n w hich
leads to the 'highest point' in the sense of a s em io tl ca l w ll ty o f c on si st en t
ilzterpretation: H e says: the eX istence O -r-tlrought1fOW(iepends on
w ha t IS to b e h ereafter; so th at it h as o nly a o ten tial ex isten ce, d ep en detrt
on e uture t ought of the community" (5.313-31 .-
.H ut how should it be ossible to deduce from the 'highest point' w hich
IS su gg este d h ere th e categories or even the p rin ci p e s of pOSSI e expe-
~rience?-.Do not Peirce s ormu a IOns ear t e appearance 0 emJ!: pre-
ossessea by a pre-K antian rationalism w hich co nfu ses th e fo rm al log ic
of langua e w 'th the t ranscen uhon 0 ~ob je cts o f e xv er ie n~p .?..This ob'ection ma be not without warrant if directed against the
~ od ern a na ly tic al 'lo gic o f s cie nc e . o r,ex am p e ag am st m o ern d ed uctiv etheory of explanation set u in the fra a formalised Ian ua e'
ut it does n ot ho ld fo r P eirce. H e b n o m eans con siders the form allo gi~
of concep tua l - or pro ositio mbols as a sufficient su shtute for
K an t s tran scendental l0i:ic, h ilt gn th e-oo atI:ary he in jtiate!> for tlU s
.purpose, w ith the help of Kant's Copernican turn, his new 'synthetic
lo g~ c 0 1 m qu uy'; a!!d he postu lates in h is q uasl-{ r~end ental sem io tic,
~s!~~nceptual symbols..!..w o other types of signs w hich are thoughtto m _~ keth~ tran sit~ 2!!.P.9ssi~ ~ the stim ulation of sen sation and'1h e
~ qu alitie ~ o f f e:lin g to c on c:p .! .io ~~ a n~ _j~ ~~~n ts _.! ~e ctiv elr' B ut" "ti;real basIs of th ts transfo rm atIO n of tran scen den tal 1 0 ic is ro vided by th e
act that Peirce in 1867 perform ed a 'transcendental deduction' of tqe
t hree t ype s Qj s ign s par al le l w it h th e three kinds o(in ferences as iIlu~trations
of the t hree un iver sa l ca tego r ie s which are implied, as he shows, in the
sign-rela tion (semiosis as rovisionally 'the hi hest oint' of his 'tran-
s cen den tallo gic' (C f. M urp hy , ch . Ill)..Th e sign-relation or representation can b e m ad e exp licit, acco rding to
P eIrce, by th e follow in g schem e of d efinition: A siJ!:n is som ething th at
stan ds fo r someth in g in some resp ect o r q ua lity to an in terp retan t (5 .2 83 ;
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32 K .-O. APEL FROM KANT TO PEIRCE
iI/dices with iI/duction as th e co nfirm atio n o f th e e:e neral b y fac ts in sp ace
and tim e, and fin ally Firstness with abduction a s th e s yn th etic c og nitio n
o f n ew q ua litie s o f s uc hn es s.
( Th is c ha ra cte ris tic c om pleme nta tio n o f th e a na ly tic lo gic o f d ed uc tio n
by a synthetic logic of induction and abduction or hypothesis w as also
in the six ties o f the 19th century broug ht about by a criticism of K ant's
treatise Dief al sc h e Sp it zf in d ig ke it d er v ie r s yl /o gi st is ch en F igur en . A t th is
tim e in deed P eirce w as alread y cQ nvinced by D uns S cotus that the study
of th e syIIog ism h ad to precede the stud y of the fo rm s of ju dgm ent sinceo nly in th is w ay a re th e 1 0g icaIIy sig nifican t d ifferen ces o f th e ju dgmen t
to be foun d (cf. M urph ey, pp , 5 6ff.)..
The disc~!'.~ of abduction or hypothesis 8 , wh ich is an in fe ren ce from
a ~ult of a possible deduction and a presupposed general premise
to th e co ntin gen t (m in or) p rem ise o f a sy llo gism , p ro ved to b e esp eciaIIy
im portant for Peirce's p ragm atistic log ic of inq uiry: for hvoothesis IS
accord mg to P eirce the sin Ie kind of fn feren ce by w hich ou r k now ledge
IS expanded in the sense of Kant's synthetic judgments 0 exp ,
w hich th erefo re, acco rd in g to P eirce, m ay b e in terp reted as u nco nscio us
abductive inferences, B ut now , since ever abduction or hypothesis
p resuppo ses a genera p rem ise and therefore h as to b e teste y m duction,a duction and induction together provide the answer to t e ques IOn
im pfiC fu yaske~ by K ant, accoroing to p arce~ - to the Question: how
sYnth etI c J udgemen ts a re possible and valid ( 5.3 48 a nd 2 .6 90 ).
-;4:/J(Juction or h othesis ex lain s ossibilit of ex erience insofar as it
brings about the s nthesis as a reduction of the m anifold of sense-im -
p re ss IO ns a nd q ua litie s o f fe elin g to th e u nity o f c on sis te nc y in p er ce ptu al
u gments and also in ex lanations aw. ere in tlie rst place the
icon-function of redicates has to be mediated with t 'ntensional
m ean in g of the p red icates as sym bols: as. for instan ce, in the statem ent
"This (which looks so and so) is likely to be a case of plague".induction, o n th e o th er h an d, ex plain s th e em pirical ju stificatio n o f th e
g en eral p resu pp ositio ns o f all e xo erien ce. b e th ey im plicit in p ercep tu al
judg ments o r ex plicit in law like statem ents. H ere in the first" place the
index-function of I n ua e as the identification of ob'eets here and now
has to be mediated with the extensional m eaning of the predicates as
s ym bo ls o f c la ss es ; a s, f or in sta nc e, in th e s ta teme nt: "This or here is~
c as e o f p la gu e" .~ ~-
In o th er w ord s: T he 'h ig hest p oin t'-o f P eirce's tra nsfo rm atio n o f K
tr an sc en de nta l lo gic is th e 'u ltim ate o pin io n' o f th e 'in de fin ite c ommu
or inv estigators'. A t this po in t one m ay find a converg ence of the se
tic al p os tu la te o f th e tr an sin div id ua l unit 0 inter retation and of
postulate -'dation o f ex eri
in th e IO I1 J{ U I/. The quasi-transcendental subject of this unity is
mdef in it e c ommu l1 it y o f e xp e riment at io n w hich is id en tical w ith th e~] in it e c ommw li tv q f i nt er p. .r et at io n.~
From this last resu osi' of a uasi-transcendental logic P
c an no t, it is tr ue , d ed uc e th e 'p rin cip le s' o f s cie nc e a s s yn th etic ju dg em e
a priori in line w ith K ant's in ten tion s. B ut from his highest -po in t o f
h e c an m ak e p la us ib le th at th os e a bs olu te principles a p rio ri a re n ot n ee
"and that the m aintenance of those prinCiples am ounts to preservin\
rem na nt o f m etap hy sical d ogma tism . T his h e can ! -h ow jus t by appea.-.----
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34 K.-O. APEL FROM KANT TO PEIRCE
to K an t's su prem e p rin cip le o f sy nth etical ~ dg em en ts in co nn cctio n w ith
h is own lo gic o f s yn th etic in fe re nc es , f or fr om h is p os tu la te o f th e u ltim ate
op inion he can d educe as transcend entall necessar not an.'ons
b ut th e u l1 1v ersa v a I Ity o f sy nth etic in feren ce s i/1 t he 1 01 / ru at is:
o f th e method o f in du ctio n a nd a bd uc tio n.
This he did in 1869 and 1878 (5.341-52 and 2.690-93). In a w ay he has
»ut Kant's r egu la t ive pr inc ip les of experience in the place of Kant'scons ti tutive prmclples o f ex en en ce' o n tl1 eassum tlO n, th at th e reg ulativ e
prmciples in the long run turn out to be constitutive. - Thus b shiftin
e necessary and u niv ersal validit of scien.
to the end
o f th e (in e fil1 lte )p ro cess o f in qu iry it is o ss ib lc fo r P eirce to e sc ap e
um e's scepticism W it out m Slstm g w ith K ant on th e necessity and-muver sa li ty o f p r opo si ti on s whkh for t hemo~ ;; nt a re a cc ep te dby ex~
These r o~itinn" "!'In miBT: "" (j n e lr ce s t ransc enden ta l p resupposi -
tio ns, b e co nceiv ed as fallib le, th at is co rrig ib le, b y h yp oth ese s w IC come
nea re r t o th e u lt iI ri ate opl i'i i'O f i: "" (T li er es no doub t th at mo st o f t he mode rn
log ic ia ns o f s cie nc e p re fe r th is f al lib il is ti c a nd me li or is.
'c
ncep Ion 0 t e antian doctrine, which clings to. the Platoni~ of
s ci en ce a s eplsteme. ~mTrar to PCircc's conception is in this respect
ror instance the position of K . R . Popper).
If one con siders this osition as a lausible and con sistent transform a-
tion of Kant's transcendental 10 ic of experience, then one WI ar y e
-.!atls e d b y th e criticism w h~ ch M urp he y b rin gs fo rw ard ag ain st-E ~
understanding of Kant in his reat mono ra h on Th e D e v e l o p m ! ! ! ! . ! . . . ! ! L
. .!irce 's PhiJoso£lzy( p p. 2 51 T . ) . Murp hey 's criticism is ch iefly d irectedagainst the t: e oun Peirce in his Kant-studies does not accept
K ant's 'critical' distinction betw een noum ena and phenom ena and m
consequence cannot 'ustif s nthetical 'ud ments a priori as principj"es
o f the possible excerienct; of p ~po men a b ut ta.l< cs bis refug e w ith fait
a s a f ou nd atio n o f th e p rin cip le s. - H ow ev er, if..s> ne l oo ks a t th ~
l! l th e lig ht o f P eir ce 's f in al a ch ie veme nt o f th e tr an sfQ .[ J1 1:1 tio no f tra D:,s ce nd en ta llo gic , th e a pp ro ac h o f th e y ou ng P eir ce s eams to b e c on se qu en t
and l eg it ima te :- (I) F rom h is sem io tical co ncep tio n o f co gn itio n P eirce co uld n ot accep t
Kant 's d is ti nc ti on b etween knowab le obj ec ts o f e xp er ie nc e and t hi n s i n- emse ves w IC are suppose to e m a e as existing (and even as
affecting the senses!)~!2!!!x. unknow at;~ .!.. cl~ for cognifiO fi,~
acco rd in g to P eirce, reach es as far as th e tru th -claim o f m ean in gfu l h yp
iheses, for, on the other hi\nd ~O LPeirce: as we have seen, there is
cognition which would not by Its very essence, be a h othesls, that
an a d uctiv e in feren ce. P eirce's arg um cn ts aJ!;ain st th e v ery m ean in g
iiie c on ce tio n o f u nk now-;b le th in gs in th em se lv es w hic h I u nfo rtu na te
cannot bring to the fore in this place rank foremost am the stron
o . ~ ectio ns w hich h .!-~ been directed against Kanuince the days
'Jacob""f."1'U'"StiIlo re co nv in cin g, in m y o pin io n, is P eirce's p ositiv e tra
""fo rm atio n o f th e fam ou s K an tian d istin ctio n, w hich tak es in to ac co
Kant 's l eg it im a te mo tiv es w ithout g et ti ng e nt angl ed i n t he nons en si ca li ti
Instead of laying the difference b etw een unkno wab le and k now able
jects P eirce d istin gu ish es b etw een th e real as th e k nowab le in th e lo ng
a nd wha te ve r m ay b e th e r es ult o f a n a ctu al c og nitio n b as ic ally u nd erly
to th e re serv atio n o f fallib ility (5 .2 57 , 3 10 ). T he p ro blem o f u nk nowa
th ing s- in -t hemse lv es by t hi s t ur n i s t ra ns fo rme d in to th e p robl em o f i nf
ap pro xim atio n, w hich , in deed , is a p arad ox ical p ro blem to o.
( 2) B ut n ow th e d is tin ctio n b etw ee n u nk nowa ble th in s -in -th em se lv
which affect the senses and henomena which are redeterm ined a
t clr orm al structure b y the m ind th at is, K ant's tran sccndentall ea
recon It the Co ernican turn. How can Peirce appea
the latter and n everth eless reject th e form er? rhe answ er is: P eirce
not, as w e have seen, refer the C op ern ican turn to the m ind as the fac
o t /e p rulC/ es but t 'nd as th efa cu lt 0 s IIth et' .;1 1e re llc es
h ere fo re is e ntitlp ct, in m y o pin io n. to c linR. ..1 PK an t's -c en tr a} d oc t
that a transcendental foun of the objectivit of science is nece~
an pOS SI e, an d n ev erth eless p o~ tu l:!te th at all scien tific p ro po sitio n
h yp oth es es m ay b e c or re cte d b y e xp erie nc e, th at is : b y c on fr on ta tio n
t e rea e a n erce tlOn of its -con
tIOnal quali ties.1~
(3) Finally, regardin the foundation of the rind les of scienpractica aith, w hich was critizised b y M . M urphey,. one has to stat.:
this position of the oung Peirce is con sistent w ith his final ra m a11
transformation of K antianism . A lso the later Peirce could not a
th e K an tian d istin ctio n b etw een th eo retical an d p ractical reaso n w
e apparent y reJecte ac 10 1 8 6 1 . 1 2 F or, to eth er w ith t e d istin.between noumenaand phenomena Pei rc e h as a ls o t o nul li fy t he Ka
d is tin ctio n b etwe en r eg ula tiv er d~ nd mo ra l p os tu la te s: 'f h~
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36 K.-O . APEL fROM KANT TO PEIRCE
process of Inquiry as a real enterprise of hum an practice, the progress
and outcome 0 w IC IS m act uncer am , IS Itself the object of logic an
o f a m or al e np ;a p;eme nt.
A t th is p oin t Pe irce 's sem iotic al tra ns for'm atio n of th e 'h ig hest p oin t'
o f th e tr an sc en de nta l lo gic r ea ch es its hi f(hest /Join t in w hat later has bee~
called Peirce's 'Lop;ical Socialism '13: A m an who w ishes to proceed
l og ic al ly i n t he s en s~~e ir :. ~" !. sx n!he ti cJOgj~~f1l 1q ui ry Im stOsuIT~~r
all th e priv ate in tere sts o f h is fiilite "" ilf e: a lso th e priv ate inte rest in fiis
personal salvation (which IS eXISen I ler e aar s senseinterest 0 e 111e mi te cOl11l11/1nitvi nce on lv the r .o ln '1 l. .! !n it yhas a chance
to reach the ultim ate truth: "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to
save the whole wor ,IS I oglca in all his inferenc .el . So the
soc ia l p ri nc lp e i s r oo te d i nt ri ns ic al lv i n l og ic ( 5. 35 41T ., 2 .6 54 f. ).
U nlike the pragm atism of Jam es, w ho in his essay T he W ill to B eliev e
o f 1 89 7 d efe nd s th e su bjec tiv e inte res t of th e sin gle m an in a be lief for h is
life just because he cannot wait for the ultimate opinion, the young
P eir ce c on sid er s h is p oin t o f 'lo gic al s oc ia lism' a ls o a s a p ra ctic al p os tu la te. of ethics. For he expects - o r h op es - th at th e so cial p rog re ss of sc ien ce
w ill b rin g ab out s im ultan eo us ly a ra tion aliz ation of h um an c ond uc t14 ,
w hose 'habits' m ay be conceived as being analogous to naturai law s andtherefore m ay establish in the long run the 'concrete reasonableness' of
t he un ive rse .
This last thought of Peirce's too is a consequent transform ation of
K antianism ; for K ant's categorical im perative in its m ost speculp.tive
version reads: "Handle so, als ob die M axim e deiner Handlung durch
d ein en W ille n z um a llg em ein en ' N atu rg es etz w er de n s ollte ".
3 I'eirce had di~covered the later ~o called flroflo,vilimla/ fllllctimr,v under theRhemata, cpo CP, 3.420. - C po J . v . K em psk i: Ch. S. P ei rc e I Il Id d er P ra gn ra ti
S tu ttg art 1 952 , s . 5 5iT .4 T hus the young Peirce w rites in 1861: "P sychological transcendentalism say
the results of m etaphysics are w orthless, unless the study of consciousness produ
w arrant for the authority of consciousness. B ut the authority of consciousness
be v alid w ith in the co ns cio us ne ss o r els e n o s cien ce , n ot e ve n p sy ch olog ica l tran
de nta lis m, is v alid ; fo r ev er y s cie nce s up po ses th at an d d ep en ds u po n it f or v ali
( Qu ot at io n f ro m Mur ph ey , The Dev el opm el lt o f P e ir ce 's Ph il os op hy , p . 2 6.)5 Q uoted from M urphey, p. 65.
8 A decisive nuance of Peirce's interpretation of K ant is concealed by the fac
K an t's term Vorstellllllg is usually translated into E nglish by 'representation'.P eirce , ho we ver, s uch a tr an sla tio n a lr ead y im plies a s em io tica l tran sfo rm atio n
very concept ion .7 Quoted from Murphey, p. 89. Cf. Peirce, 5.289 n.: just as we say that a b
in motion, and not tliat motion is in a body, w e o llght to say that w e a re in though
not that thoughts are in us".8 P eir ce u nd ers to od th is d isc ov ery as a n in terp retation o f A ris to tle. C po h is Memo
COll c el 'l li ll g the Ar is to t el ia ll Sy ll ogi sm, Nov . 1 86 6 ( CP , 2 .7 92 -8 07 ).9 Cpo th e fo rm ula ti on in 5 .4 07 (I 8 7 8!). -.10 S ee for instance the follow ing argum entation of 1905 (5.525): 'K ant (w hom
than adm ire) is nothing but a som ew hat confused pragm atist... but in half aw ays the D in g a ll .fidr has been proved to be nonsensical; and here is another
It has been show n (3.417) ..hat in the form al analysis of a proposition, after a
w ords can convey has been throw n into the predicate, there remains a subject
indescribable and that can only be'pointed at or otherw ise indicated, unless a wfinding w hat is referred to, be prescribed. The D ing an sich, how ever, can neith
indicated nor found. C onsequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing t
false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown
m ean ing les s su rplu sag e. B ut w he n th at is d on e, w e s ee c le arly th at K an t reg ard s
T im e, and his C ategories just as everybody else does, and never doubts or has do
their objectivity. H is lim itation of them to possible experience is pragm atism
general sense; and a pragm aticist, as fully as K ant, recognizes the m ental ingr
in these concepts Cpo 5.452.11 C po above p. 97 iT .about the cognitive function of the 'indices' and 'icons'.
12 Peirce writes in 1861: Faith is not peculiar to or more needed in one pro
of thought than another. F or every prem ise w e require faith and no w here else isany room for it. T his is overlooked by K ant and others w ho drew a distinction be
know /edge andfai tl r" . (Q uotation from M urphey, loc. cit. p. 2M.).13 C po to this topic the D issertation of G . W artenberg: Logi sc lr er S oz ia li sl 1l u
Tral ls fo rmat ion de r Ka ll ts c lr en Tral ls z el ldenta lp lr i lo s op l ri c d l ll 'c ! , C Ir. S. Pe ir c e, Fran
a .M . 1 97 0, ( fo rt hc om i ng ).14 For a criticism in P eirce's 'Scientism ' cpo G . W artenberg, loc. cit.; further
K .-O . A pel: 'Szientism us odeI' transzendentale H erm eneutik 7' in: Hermel le ut ik
Dia/ektik, T ii bi ng en , 1 97 0.
Unive rs it y o f Saal 'b ri ic ken
REFERENCES
1 Cp oK . -O . A p el : 'D er p hi lo so ph is ch e H in te rg ru nd d er E nt st eh un g d es P ra gma ti sm u s
b ei Ch .S . P ei rc e', i n: C h .S . P ei rc e: Sclrri[ten I, F ra nk f.a .M ., 1 96 7; u nd K .- O. A pe l:
' Pe ir ce 's Denkweg vom Pr agma ti smus z um Pr agma ti zi smus ', i n: Ch .S . Pe ir ce : SclrriflenII, Fr ank f. a.M ., 1970 .2 Quo ta ti on s o f Pe ir ce a re , a s u sua l, f rom Collected Papers, v ol . I -V I ( ed . b y Ch . H ar ts -h or ne a nd P . W e is s) , H ar va rd U n iv er si ty P re ss , 1 93 1- 35 , 2 19 60 , v ol . V II -V II I, ( ed . b yA . W . B urks, 1958, 21960, as for exam ple: C P, 5.263
= C olle cte d P ap ers , v ol. V ,p a ra g ra ph 263.