B·368

JX 670

5/28/67 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD BY A. M. HENDRY

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MAC:re i 2 8 ~l ay 19 67

M E M O RAN DUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT : Cll~ M eeting. 2 8 May 1967 ~ -~. \ \ J IJ.!?- -. ' \J "" .... __ .J . -/- ' - .',

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This rn.emorandurn. confirms oral gui.:!ance issued by COMUS­I>U,C'/ following the subjec~ =eehng.

a . Indications that the 330 NVA division may be d eploy­ing southward from its permanent base at Thai B inh raises the question of the si::e force the enelTlY can organize, deploy to SVN and support. A detailed analysis will be made to determine this. Significant fa.ctors to be addressed are: Replacement support ior NVA/VC, recruiting problems. anununition tonnage requirelnents. rnajor transportati?n entry points for ammunition and war consum­abies into NVN. Additionally . all evidence of Camb odian inv olve'­ment in logistic support of NVA/VC forces in SVN ",ill be pulleq into this anal y s i s to include political arrangements v.tith the Cambodian Government. (Action: J2 ' - Suspense : 7 June 1967)

b. In spite of recent US and AR VN aggrf:: ssive s poilin g actions, intelligence information still indicates the pos sib iln y o f large scale ~nerny coordinated attacks on mUltiple fronts. It is possible that Hanoi has not accepted recent set backs and has re­acted to effective ROLLIN G THUNDER results by go ing for broke in the southa Such strategy could expose and make large numbers of the enemy' s forces vulnerable. COC will advise all FWMAF and AR VN forces immediately to be prepared for such an eventu­ali ty. (Action: As indicated above)

c. COMUSMACV conunented on the void in intelligence in the area around Khe Son. (Action: J2)

GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year i nterval" Not automatically declassified

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B-370

MACJ02 SUBJ: ' CllC Meeting, 28 May 1967

d. Recent photography reveals possible surface-ta-surface

missile /RX sites in Cambodia. DlA will be provided copies of these

photographs without delay. It is imperative that this situatlon be

watched closely. J2/S0G will prepare a back channel bnn ging this

to ADM Sharp's attention and advising him to contact DIA for their

evaluation. He will also be advised that COMUSMACY probably will

request a.dditiona.l authority in this area by a subsequent front chan­

nel message. (Action: A. indicated above - Suspense: 29 May)

e. The movement of two U. S. brigades from II Field

Force makes it necessary to establish a General Reserve from ARYN

Airborne/Marine force •• Immediate action will be taken to determine

the mechanics and prepare the directive ior one battalion to be on

6 hour alert, followed by additional bat~alions at 6 hour intervals.

Necessary coordination will be effected with JGS and II Field Force.

As a related action, a well organized ha'rassrnent program to include

B'- 5"Z strikes will be designed for the war zone C area. (Action: COC

Suspense: Comp,leted action by 30 May)

f. The highly successful air campaign in NYN may pos­

sibly trigger retaliatory enemy attacks against SVN electrical power

sources. The Saigon system would be a logical choice. In addition

to insuring adequate security measures. a recovery plan is necessary.

The availabi~ity of back-up resources either in stock or available for

air lift will be determined. The possibility of obtaining nuclear

powered generators will be investigated. (Action: DEP CORDS

Suspense: Give progress report at 3 ,june ene meeting)

g. COMUSMACY expressed his interest in experiments

with the thelation process that have heen taking place in Laos and di­

rected the following priority act.ons:

(1) Seventh Air Force will develop air delivery methods

for selected tar get,.. in the TIGER HOUND area.

(2) J3 will make a study of the use of this technique

in selected areas in South Vietnam and determine the steps n e cessary

to accelerate procurement. The Ashau Valley roads will I"eceive pri­

ority attention in this study.

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MACJO? SUBJ: .,CUC Meeting, 28 May 1967

(3) MACSA will express MACV's interest in the tactical application 01 this proc~ss to the Washington Scientific COITlrn.unity.

(Action : As direc~ed above - Suspense: Each action agency report progress NLT 3 June)

h . SaG will investigate the potential use of the reported 342 LAVE tribesmen who have moved from Cambodia into southern Laos, (Suspense : Status report by 15 June)

i. Seventh Air Force was directed to be prepa.red to execute a GRAND SLAM in the DMZ area on short notice. Additionally, J2 will make a study of new SLAM targets in southern Laos before the full onset of the southwest monsoons. (Action: 7th AF / J2 in coordi­nation with SaG)

j. As directed in the 20 May cnc meeting, J2 presented a revised version of the latest VC Irregular Forces strength and Political Order of Battle, COMUSMACV directed the following: Co­ordinate the study with CAS and Barry Zorthian, Colonel Bankson will present the public release plan for approval, brief the Mission Council and obtain their endorsement before forward ing to higher headquarters and Washington. (Action: J2/IO - Suspense: Completed action NLT 5 June).

Copies furnished: 7AF DEP CORDS J2 J3 COC SaG MACSA 10 SJS (2)

CJ.-~H~~~R~ ~. Brigadier General, \)SAF Deputy Chief of Staff

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B-372

JX67S

5/9/68 CABLE· FROM WESTMORELAND 1'0 WHEELER AND SHARP (MAC 6055)

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ft::~'f

~ .'~. >. ~~~i '~ ~;~~:~~?'rs:;=:iCz1R~:r:~:r;o~A~:~: ,,:--: , ·.:~1 ~ '~:~~>~~'E{ ~~~:: ~~~~i~fir~iW~~g· 1~~'-~~~·--'zN . r-:TH~DCL.·&;·t A.~D"-.. :,' .~:'O:: ;:~~ .. '::-~~:~~'~ :" " ; ...... . -.•.. _::: :: .. ~~.~,,:::~.:--~_ .. _ -:--=-:'.; __ ~~ .:-:.:::::.:-~~:~~.: .: t·:-: :: .:.~~_-:-:- :.-.-:.: . • -:' ::. :.'. ".- -.: ': -;.:. ,'.':: ,": ::-: :.:~}"~. :.:~~:' .. ~:. ,.<.:~~~-:;: . ~~~ ~"_:'~;!~nz,r:ffl.~I~.q;~ .~;;~~.~t~~a;,~~~.t:~~~I"~.0;~"~~E~:,'~~~:~~~":~~i;;:~~~ .. · :·;~l~::~:;r. . . "' p.:::suU( PUSS'IUD'f WOULD_ ~~ ,SDf[}:6_ qNcp).C . fJ:IP : ~;.q, t~x·:c,). ,;:<!.: l~, ~:'~~?TR:: i~" c;;~';1~:"prii'0j,X~t"C 'CUL~'- ro:Ab'~;;~~" ~GR'; f··;oo·.C' iF-:NOT:i --;;,= .. . ~, ' :>f~i~} . : ... : .::. . ..' __ . ". '-.". ' .: .. :.;. ':~~:~. ".. ~ : .. ' . ':.-.:: . .. ::' ..... ::.: .•. , .~ -. '- ', ."; ..... . ". :. .. .. . . . :'':: .':;" .,,' _. '." . . -.' .. ~'.. . "'. f:f:~;~ .... ';":. YOll WOULD . A~_~T: at;~ulPrED.· ~Ii~Tlt!:.·yAArI~.G y~~s. ,or nn: ;~:'~Ll>,smiED ~tt% ': ;·:~.rilrn:~~T "GD.I_c~iS:· ~p_ nrus:]iPAP;:ll I~ ARRIVE .. ~.r ~~~U.~il;:~~ c'{1f~~f~ ii .. -. ml.OR::D pQs-IrioN~' .;'.:::: .. :' .. " ',i~ti~!i%i . ~ '" . : .... " .. ~ ····-s: S G_ C 2.4: . r;;;~

< ._. __ • __ : ___ -_- -;-~ •• ~z .. ~~",-...... ~~ .

B-376

JX 682

3/25/67 CABLE FROM'liQWLERTO BROWN (DOD DOCUMENT 28) ,

B-377

REFLECT --.0 .. . , ...... ,,", - WILL BE - --

- .-.. "' . t : •

-.. ' ,~,. ~ : .... ' . . .":" .... .. .,. ,I' _?, , . .. . .... ~!... .:: ~ "', . . '.

INDICATED THEREIN. THE PRELIMINARY STUDY IS BASED ON TENUOUS ' , :' .. ...

METH ODOLOGY. BECAUSE OF LACK OF DETAILED-COUNTRY-WIDE INFOR-.. MATI ON, XTRAP OLATI ON AND CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS HAVE HAD

-... .~ \ . . ..."

:';9 \'- '~ TO BE EMPLOYED: QJR PLANS ARE TO PURSUE S1UDY IN GREATER ",::;.':?,:.: "'- , . ,, '-: - - : ~ - - -" ",' t · : . . ... ..... -. .. . .

-i rETAIL, TI11E PERMITTING. TEAM'S PRESENT FEELING IS THAT

~I~~~r\(- POLITICAL ORDF;,R OF BATTLE SHOULD, REPEAT sHouLD' BE TitHED :fi~/'~ ~ . ·t I

.... "::Pf.. RAT:L Y ArID liOT _rA LL E il tHTP. I e'! At mE;,!':" ST P. u -iGT? • . ' - '-

',:."

'~' .. " " ::. -, •..

B-378

'f

'!, • !":. ::" ," :'''::':-':-.' ~ .. '~ .. .. . ," V:") .";.:": ?';' .. . ... . :~ ' . .;r' , -. _ _ ._.

(ALLED FOR CARRYING ANY NEW TOTAL "ON STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTION , p • • : .... - :.~ ; _ ~ ',"' ;-":h. . , .

( ":'!R0X DECD1BEii 64"-THROUCH PRESENT-. nilS PLAN COMPLETELY UN-

.... . " '.: ':- ," . ... ~ " -':" ~'''''~~' .' - , . , . .... , ,I • ,...; "

"" " AC • ..EPTABLE TO J2, MAClJ AS WELL AS "DIA TEAM. "J::!, 11AClJ HAS

\."

. . .. ':- . ,.;:", " ':, ;'

INSTITUTED WORK TO DEVELOP REALISTIC READJUSTMENT OF AN Y NEH

FIGURE IN ORDER TO DEVELOP MEANINGFUL STRENGTH TREND. TEAM

TOLD TIlAT WHEN MAClJ STUDY IS COMPLETED IT WILL BE FOR{,ARDED

TO DIA FOR COI11"!ENTS PRIOR TO RELEASE.

525

;,~;:; ~" \ . , : . ...

~~, @ NNNN "

B-379

JX 692

·12/67, SOUtHEAST ASIA ANAi.YSIS REPORT (LBJ 5)

-5rnJ • ~~C5 FORN

8-380

\J.~x;,~, o ,0 i ~ -f-tl e a 0t,( ,: ?~<:).~:~-~. . ~ t/t~ .. l '-0 " : ; :"_':'"

!"r!; ·N ,~ l:V~ !o! ~ .m.'- . . :" , -.·~ .,''' .·. ;-. r '. '-; ~ ~ ~ _ -::J <;:::.;;;: . . ::.·::,;.::'_;:''::~;::·::·i·:·

ro,. 1.\ ;v \..

_ ~lk .. a. .. ~ Ail _ ' . • . , .,_ .. _ ..• __ ._ . .. , •..• . ,

·I:·,:;.~:i:~::;::::'~J r--.. _ .-.. Q~­~. t.. ~I _ ~; ~ ! _. ,v ;;'--,.. . 1 . ~ ._

~ Si. '- ill lO: lII.

n::CLASSJ.: l~D

DECEMBER -.:"

1967

PREPARED BY ______________ _

OASD (SA)· S=:A PROGRAMS DIVISION

ASD/SA CONTROL NO.6 - 811

DCW":'fC~m AT J Y£A!\ ~-n:!\v AI.S ;

Z;-"':::-_,fltUr.!:)_ A! • !-... J4. r.:..lR.3 .. OOD'tlLtt~. !o "-

, ,,. . ... - ... _---

... ' . . -~ - . ..

......... -_. - -_ .. - - " '---

~1' ~:'-n_~

NO FORN

,. Go

o

'III,:,".

o th fI CO~~~: ~trc~; . ~ V: i,VA

Tot.a.l

Ad.::.inl:::!riJ:~iv~ S~r\'ic~

1 "!'''!'c~.D.3.~:2./ Cue:-:- i:.l.:l.::: ~o:l!" ::l~l e:lse a::::'

Pollticc.l Ca.:lre (\-: Ir..!ras~:-..lcture)

Total All Categories

8-381

-CO?iFtot1'l1IAL

'T.':'''::: 1

T~:. ··: ,,~, 1'~::' '' - '- -: .. . - C'~ I, ... ----- .

1 C1J :..s::t;-:!.t.-2.'

62,85:? C;1.7C:J

11~,:;)2

25,753

~7 ,597

':10.175

~

j; .,. .: :: ::!.:::-.... -, -'::./ .. . :~: :~ ~ -"'~

''') ;J.::? 0_ , ~!. _

53. - (,J D :. ,))2

8,!.,30'::

.1

235,852

62,852 5~ .. 700

l..!.-:; ,!:62

39,000

75.17:-15".5c') 155,47.3- , ... j,;,w

395,025-482,452

!J '!'!1'! ;:re~~:::~.:l.t..l:::-. .sr.::!. :t:,,'!:-..gt~ es!i!:::.ates u:;e:! b:.- t·:;.:', b~!":::-e 31 O::::to\;:)e!" 1957 .. Y ,!,b.~ pre 31 Octob!!!" 1957 t.otal 03 ?reseot.atio::. \.'it::: th~ n··~· esti..=.<i.te3 or

a:i=.i r.ist.:"e!ive ~!!::-':ic!!, gue!':,,!.ll!!. e.r.~ po:'iti:::a! c!!.-jre ~t.:-~::~'!.!:l:.

;J "~;~'/' S !'le· .. · pres!!:::::. :io~J .;1 t.::.c~.;:t. !eU -c.e!"!!!'lse J sec!"~~ 3e!~~-defe~s!., e.::.:i ~l.!.!.!.::a.l ce.:ir!: e.:::i hi:: :".'! •.•• ::-:.re:-.t:-:.h e~-:..!.::.::!::.e:: o:..~ a-::.i:-.:.::-:.::-:.-.:i·/:- ~~::-·.i.c"2 c:.=.:! ~uer::- ill~ s":.re!l~h=.

y "7:1-;; 01:':' cJ,":.i1 c.i·/ij~= ~~':' lO::",CrjO :'0 1::::,,0:):) i :'rer..:.le::-:, r:::..: ;:~:.· ::"..:.-:.:.ir.Z cn~­".~i::- .:: c!" t.ne:'. ::.::.::. -:.h:! i"..l~!"::-":"ll~ e.:::: "tt; ':! c.-:'!'.~::- ~",;~,-::::::-::J.': .!.:,,,:=. se:,:' -::e!"e."!.se e:::./o::- se::::-e~" sel..f-:!f:fensc pe!"::o:"!.:!~l." - t·:.;..C ": ~::-iei'i::6 0:1. ~r.e=: .. v :-::.'!:, c:- Battle, 2:' :;0',' 67.

!I roe :~lf-defense ~orces p::-ovide a base for rec::-u1t~e:l-:' ~s vell ~s fo::- pclitical &~~ lObi:-:'ical S~:~~~, but are not a fig~!.i~b fo:'ce cc=?ara~le -:'0 toe eJe::-rl11as. Al ttoug~ secre-:' se.!.: -def~nse !'crces cause so:.::! ca!ual "':.ies L~d da..::z.ge, the:, QO ao~ re})resen"t a cor.!.i.'1ue.l or de?e:o.:iable force anj Coo root fo:-::. a valie. Pa..!"t. o!" "the ener::.:r f

: :c.ilita:-:i force. Tne polit1c2..l cacre (i!"'..!'ras':.I".J.::'.J..!'e) has .1:.0 =.!..l.1tU":I tu::ction. - t-:A.CV briefin~ on EneC'.,;( Order of Bat:'le, 24 ;;0·' 67.

!I Includes eo~fir:~:, proba~le, ar~ possitle.

eormnUlTltlL 4

----_ .. :---

t " ~ -'--..,

c: >- c

~ .,. " ::> ;=

'-' !

i :: -: ,= ~

1 ... _ ... _-. ..

B-382

---Wi: FIOErITlAL

Rece:"l~ C3?t.U r eC docu.-.~r, t= ir.:lic!lt ~· th::.t. ' ':!1 ~ r....lf'r:-.:.ll ~ I'C!"' Ce: f:l:.==!..:r b ~ larger

tha., p!"e·:~o'..l.:l :l e:: t.lI:..:lt.e ~.E..t l·:';':·: e::'i=~t-;-: : ~.:::.:. t::·.::!:- cu:ren~ :;~r~:-.zt :-, r~e~

f r o;, 7C._ qO,) to 90,0:)0 , Jr.U C:1 large:' th2~ it. ,:; :=::-e', iOt..;;; e:t.lI'u,t~ 0: 33,O:X) 'to

40.000.'£/ Tabl e 2 an:' Gr:l?h 1 sho~: ~t!" ~::; : !i i:l:!"er!.:i::~ st.ea.:!ily frc::!" Decer:.ber

lq64 tr~oug~ Decc~be::- 1966 . peakinb a~ 125,2~J 2~j ~!i~~ declini:-~ c~:lrplJ to

tn , 3CO by Octobe'!" 1907. tr:lile tt-.i:; ne',; e:;ti:-~~e is C:l i.=:p:"o ve::!.2:1': ave::- previou!:

n\J.lt.bers, additional date. i:l the futu r e c:!n be eX?ect.e:! t.o t:.o:iifi it.

The old r·~.cv es~:imate of 39,175 'Doli ":.ica~ c~1!""=' \o'2S based on a:l e3.!'ly GVil

study . P,J.::hough l·lA.C V has droppe:i this c~te;o:-./ lro::! it:; r.ilit.:lIY DB, it now

estiI:..:ltes that ~olitical cadre have nu. .. :c· er~:i cet., .. ee:\ 7) , 00J and 85 ,000 !>i..c.ce

Decer..be, 1964. - (11::; best esti=1:e is e:. ,C;:;O.)

Col~'1 3 o~ the Table 1 shows l:ha:. ~a;:?e~s \o;he:1 \o'e place the neH ::::~!"ength

e!:tit:..:lt~ s int.o i·;;.:::V's ole. forc.at. I!' ... e assc.::e t::ta~ the self-defe!lse 2.!:.1 secret

sclf-defe:!:se ezti:lates have not change:' (1.:'!.:V did not revise the fitr..u-es) "'e get

a 1:ota! s~rength of 395,e52, about 100 , 000 greater than the old estioate ar.~

about 150 ,000 b~eate:- than the ne," esti=.ate. If we as~~e tha~ secret self'-

defense and self-defense forces stillcor.3ti~ute t_~-thi~ds of the irregula: forces£!,

ve get an estiIt2.te of a'.Jout 480,000 v:/rTtfA, 0:- t;;1ce the ne ..... military 03 estj-3t~.

Thus the new estioate is 395,000 - 480,c~o on a basis cocparable to the old

294,000. The co~?utations do not sho~ tha~ e~~~ st~ength has increased, but

that previous estiz::lates of enemy stren;th "'ere too low.

The ne'" lI:.':'.~V retrospective estizat'e:5 of '::/:iV;'" strc::t;t:: arc preser.~ed above

in Ta':Jle 2 a:'1:i Graph 1. They ::ho .. · a pea!.. '''':.j:-:'/A tili ta:.:{ ~:'ren6th o!' ab~u-:.

28!.. ,C:J in uece=::":)'e!", 1966 0:1 C. qua~'te~l.r oa!:is (s~!"e!'i.E-::" a~'tu:ll.ly peakec! i:1

Octo oe:- 1956 e~ 283 ,000) sh~-pl.;r decli:li.::e::; 'to abou't 236 ,0;») by O~i:ooer 1967, 8.!l

av~rage of 4B~ net losses per ~~th. 7te 45,C:Q ~Je!"~~lla de~line a=co~ts

fo~ 94~ of the tot.al reporte~ drop o!' 48,coa. \;e not.e, however, that the Ea.cJ..et

Evalu~tio!1 SysteD, froc I·tarcr: to August 1957, !"eports e !let increase of onl.,y

five h~~ets where the guerrillats ~litary cc~t.rol has b~en broken.

Defi:!.itions

MACV's definitions of the enemy's forces included in the old ~ ne~

~stimates are provided below.

}'or ex':.Ple; enel!\Y doc=ents (CD~C Leg 01-2552-67, 02-1846-67 an:! 05-1704-

67) cap_ure_ ~n January and H,," 1967 5C--·S· tha- guer ill t h

b J ~!)-..... r 0. s !"eng-:.. \les

et.ween 150 ,000 and 1&J 000 at tho o··ts·· o~ l~'<:' "

' - 04 _ .... J. 7J":).

The Ol~ data divided the 100,000 1:0 120,000 irregulars, roUShly putting ooe_

third 0_ theo ~nto the guerrillas and the other two-thi~s int.o self-defeose

and secret self-defense personnel." - l-!ACV briefing on Enemy Ord""r 0'" B .... u 24 Novel:lber 1967. - - a_ e,

See footnote y, Table 2.

C01iFIDEMTIAL

- '. :--:-=-.,...:.. :.~ - -- 5

--_. ~ . ' -- - .~ ~ .• "' "1'~_ - -.: "'- .• ~ -.~. •. .. ~ ;.

B-383

COIlFlBEilTlAt

GRAPH #1

rD·! P..s~03~:TIV:: ~:'!r:.;r=: 0: \·C/ r~"V .. \ O?\D':"~ O~· L,\: ';:':, S'T?::: ~JT;l:

300

275

250

200

175

150

125 .

100 T ---- -.,,-----~ .

.~

75

50

25

Dec 1964

Mar Jun Sep Dec 1955

.. --:--,....;... .:..~ - ~--

• M.:lr Ju.'l Set)

1966-

C9NFIDE:/TIAL 6

~. . " ~ _. ..~."

• Dec

Tcital

:Coltbat

Gue::-rilla

Ad.!:li.c. Ser

Jun Se", oot 1967 -

!

.... ... .. ... . ~ -.­, , I ~! ~

'" c.. c:

t, o= . '"' ~ , , I. . ~ . ~

~ . ;; l " .- ".:.l

8-384

CQIIFIS:iITlAL

CC;':':)1.-:': Co=:.b.!l. .... force= :lr~ the ~:1~r:.::1 s ::::'.~~:':·/~!'" .:l:;'':' cc=.':,j~'; !:'.J?JY.)::--:' u:1it::~

l<:.:;"'uve:- u:li t.s art" in!'a:"lt rj', a!'1:.:>r, se~l:!" i 1::;, :i:lppe!" a::.:! r ~con::::.iss~!lc~ e~e­

mc::~:; c f pla~co!l loevel u:!=n,,"a!"':' reg:lrc.les~ =:- zubor':'i:::l:'ic::. Cc:::~~.: :'·J.::tlort

\!::i~s are those fire st:ppo:-:., ai:- defe:!s-: e:::i t.ec:--.r..ic.r!ls~!'·lict' '...:.:1..4.."7.$ orga:lized

at bat.talion level and above , and not clz~sified u:'l.:ie!'" ai=.iniztrati·/e service.

S~parate fire support co=?~~ies are cla~~~~ as co=~at sl:~port.

A~-'i!1i s'";r~t i VO? Se!"vice: l·!lli tilry person~~l in ide:-l'";i:'iec COS'n:, :!.iIi ta:y region,

::.iIi :.ary sl..::=ree;io:1, province, ani dist:-ic-:. s-:a.fis, .an::! rea:- service technical.

ur.its of all tj~es directly sl:bor~inate t~ toe h~a:iqua!"t~rs.

!~e~l~=s: These are orga~ize~ forces co=?Oseo o~ gu~~~ill~, sel~ de!~~se ar~ '

secret. sel~ c.cfens~ elee.ents · :ubo:-dinate ~o village a:~:i h~~~ level VC o::-g2on­

i:atio:1s. These forces perfor:::l a ~ide v2.::-ietl" o!' cissic~:; 1.0 the su;:;:ort of VC

ac~iv1ties an~, in fac~, provide a ~raini~4 and uDbili%~~ion base fo~ the VC

ma~euve::- and co~bat support forces. Gue::-::-~l1as are ful1-t~e forces organized

into squads ar.:! pla~oons which do not. al .... ·ays stay in the:!.::- hoz:e village or

ha=let. Typical :issions for guerrillas ~e collectio:1 o!' t~~es, prop~g~da,

protection o!' .village party cO:::.ittees, ~"'::i te!'rorist an~ sabotage activities.

Selr Defense Forces are a VC para-~itar~ structure respo~sibl~ for the defense

ot ha=let and village areas cO:'ltrolled by the ve. These fo!"ces do not leave

their ho~e area, an~ they perfor.c their ~~ties on a part-time ba:is. Duties

consist of conducting progaganda, const~:~i=g fort1!'ic~~ionz, an~ defeneing

hoce areas. Se':ret Self Defense FCI:!"ces a:!"e a c12.!'lcies~in!: \": orga=iza"tio::l ... -::.len

perfor.r.: the same ge::!eral fur:.=:.io:1 in GV!; cO:ltrolle::i villages a!l=' h~e-:s as do

:th-e ssl!' defe!lse forces in v: cc:r~rolle:! ~eas. Thei= o?era-:io:1s involve i.o­

~ellige:lc~ co~ection as well as sabotage z..::.=. prOp33il!lda a':tivities.

Viet Con~ l:-.I"rastructure: The Viet Cor.6 :"!li'=ast:-uctU!"e o!'" uolitical ca:ire 1s

aesif=lej as the poll~ical B!ld ad.cinistrative organiza-:ion tnrOU4;:1 ",·:u.cn the

Viet Cong control or seek to control the 50uth Vietnaoese p~ople. It e=oo~es

the part:r (People I s Revolutio:t.ar:r Party) :ontrol structure) which in=lt.:.des a

corc:m.and and ad..a1inistrative apparatus (Cen':!"al Office South Vietnac) at the

nation~l level, and the leaders~p an1 a~-;nistration of a parallel front

org~nizetio~ (Notional Front fo~ the Lib.~~tion of South Vi.tn~). both of

.. ':-.i=h eX1;.end frem the national tb.roug~ the h.!.:J.let level ..

Sourc.: H~CV Monthly Order of Battle S,,~-e:-y. 31 August 1967.

COHFlB:liTIAL 7

B-385

JX 711

11/15/67. CIA MEMORANDUM RECONTROVERSIAL JUDGMENTS IN THE SNlE (CIA #308)

.... - " .,

, \

15 Nnvcr.-.r.e:- 1967

SuDJECT: PotentioJ.ly Conl=c>versial Ju<l.mcntf or Data Holding Changes in J4. 3- 67

1. ! niilr::ation:

Agreed figures for CY J966 a r e:

Accepted: 55,000

Posdble: 31,000

Total 86,000

Thu< far in CY 1967 (through 30 September) agreed total, arc:

Accepted: 23,000

Possible : 12,000

Total 35,000

Juci~ment made in esrir..1ate (para~raph 12) !.~ th?=.:

"Infiltration thu! far in 1967 tt"l tCl.l~ about 3:',000 in <.Lll c ategories (accept~c.l and pcssil>lt ·) . .:'...l l o·." .. ing f(J:" tht: probability that later i:tformatiOl: will r3.:'s(.: thl:~ ( :~g\.lre5, enc ~:-:trapolating, it now ;! ppe<.:.:r~ that t (J !.~l inf5.1tration :OT 1')67 will b·; !1') rn 0 1'<': th<::.:-. last y<.:ar's ann pes ~lbl y scm ewhat les: . We;· (·s ti..~ lat (' tr .. at some t-::. to 75 'pe: -: t:r.t of L'1e in1i!~ ratl Or. will ?Tobably consist of replacemt..'nt personnt=lloT cxl5ting ur.its. ThE:: !"emau.dcr y .. ill probably in(~~l\de s(:ver. t c nine or~a:uzed "T(.;;llnl'ht;: '\\·'~.i.ch will ade! t(".} the.~Cvrn:":1\.t.;':5t force .... structure -- bct act neces~a-:-ih' theil' t o t('.1 ~ili.t ···\, st"'n-t~ b c' . ••• .:.:.. • • ~ '.!. ... , e C!us E: lo sse s have :-c:o;ultec in {' L'ne:-J.llv lowe- un~t S"e~ ths e . ., • .. •• g . ':"her e still z..P?E::2.:-~ to be- nli clei:.r-cc: Eea~onal natteT:1. ir. i:'liiltratio:l or d.I':'; sign.i~icant inciic.1.tior. :hat Ellr:.oi is t unwilling to cii::pc.tc~: add.it:;.o)n~·l men and units to Sc.u-::n

o

I I I I , I I I I , I I I I I I , I , I I I I , I I

i I I I I

r Vietnam. " t " -:~;::I~1\12;h4ct~ 1'S #188946/67

. ~ _ ... ,:_" - ~ .... ... . • . COT"W f\to. Jt t j~L!,..: tt"~~l"::~·~';:';'~i~~f:;;"1-!;>.;~';r?='C:h.:r., *,""",.,.",*,,, At Wi. .... os, -

B-387

• G!t]i~~;.4J1!jVE • There is no major controversy hert, but indi,-ici.ual infiltration i$ becoming ~re difficult to count, particularly in un.i.ts that move back and forth across the DMZ.

2. Current Stren~ths:

14.3 changes both the figures and the iorrnat of current holdings. A copy of MACV's current (30 October) OB is attached. The estimate's changes ar e outlined below:

a. Regular (Main and Local) Forces: MACV holds 1'=-1;-67"-, :':7~0~0'-a->':'s;:0'::f;::::;3:-;;0C-:::02'-c-:to.o-';b'::e'::r;:.!....:';:E"'s":t'::iI'::rr:'-:'.ate say 5 (para 25

and Table 3):

NVA 54,000

VC Main and Local 64,000

Total 118 , 000

This figure fluctuates constantly. The discrepancy between MACV's figure and the f\'1E does not reflect a controversy.

b. Administrative Sen>ices: These (also called Support personnel) are no,\,," carried at 25,653.

The estimate (para 27) raises this holding to lI at least 35-40, 000 AcLT'!l inistrative Service persor.nel in South Vietnam." This does not include Suppo ::-t personnel in Laos, Cambodia or iInrnediately north of the DMZ. Fu:-therrnore, as indicated by the "a t least, " this figure in the estimate is a floor threshold , not an encompas sing range. This has been an area of controversy.

c. Guerrillas a.lld Othe:r Para..'l"!1ilitar y Elements: The current M-~CV holdings ca:-ry an lIi::- r egular" figure of 112,760 1 which was encompassed by the old ::-<.nge of 100-120, 000 , ca:-:-ied in 14.3- 66. This figure inclucie~ l>ot.~ guer=illas and othe r iire~ula.T elernentll= (Self Defense and Secret Self Defe!'lse ) . The figure h~s been as sll..-:1ec to be

-&~I~'E TS # 188946/ 67 C o py No. _~/'--__

- 2 -

8-388

• • made up of 1/3 guerrillas and 2 /3 "others , .,

i. e. I the actual iJnplied holdings have been: ., Guerrillas: 33,333 - 40 , 000

Others: 66,667 - 80,000

14 . 3- 67 carries (para 30) a range estL."atp of 70-90 , 000 for the guerrillas

only. It does not quantify any current estimate for the others, though it

does say (para 36) that some documents suggest that in early 1966 the

SeU Defense forces (alone) were on the order of 150 , 000. (The full

text of para 36 is attached hereto.) MACV e,,:plicitly did not want any

quantified estimate of these "otherll paramilitar1· elements' current size.

We attempted to evolve a compromise which avoided a specific current

number , but indicated that the reader should be thinking in six digits.

This guerrilla/irregular estimate i. another major source of potential

controversy. Note particularly that the new guerrilla figure (70-90,000)

i. not a reduction of the old "paramilitarr" figure (112,760) but, instead,

an increase in that figure's guerrilla component (33,333 - 40,000).

d. Political Cadre: Old estimate (i. e ., current MACV

holding): 39 ,1 75. (mE 14 . 3-66 said 40,000.) This

is based on an old, out-dated and niver accura.te

GVN figure.

14 . 3-67, on the political o:-gardzation, says: ''It! nwnbe::-s are large -­

with a hard core estL".a.ted at about 75 . 000 - 85,000 -- but more L"11portant

is the:: wide geographical exter.t of its powe:- and thE: dedication and

effectiveness of its personneL" We regard tht- 75-85.000 fig\!re a distinct

iInprovement over the old figure but conside:- it subject to furthe:- a!l2-lysis

a.nd refinement. The term 'fhard core " is intendec tG suggest t...~at there

are others who do not appear in this iigure.

3. Communist Losses:

No controversy i."l this area. For 1966 all losses esti,~'nated at 103 , 000,

,-no fo~ 1967 we estimate comparable fi!;'ure will be 170 , 000. [Table I/

P:-oble..T. area is that these totals cannot be applie d to i:ldividual components,

1; e. , f~gular forces , guerrillas , e tc .

TS 1i188946/67

Co py Nc. _--<, __ _

B-389

(

4. VC Manpower Inputs:

Some controversy over r~cruitrnent level lClT t.'l-tis year. ~'1Els estilnatc of what recruitment was last year -- 7, 000 per month -- agreed to by MACV.

MACV estimates 3,500 per month for first half of 1967, and is re"lsmg downward for last half. NlE estimates recruitment between 3, 000 and 5, 000 per month for all of 1967. This is based on our evaluation of the MACV study.

GAC:mee Copy No.1 - DCI (lor Pres. Johnson)/14.3/6i - New Order of Battle file Copy No. Z - Destroyed Copy No.3 - GAC Chrono ~opy No.4 - VAS Chrono

TS # 188946/67 Copy No. _-..J/'--__ _

• 4

B-390

"./ '/' gil" ! • ,r"

COMMUNlST CROUND FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM (MACV Figures As O! 30 Octobcr 1967)

Re,ulus

NVA VC Ma.i: Foree/Local Force

A4minist1'&tive Services

bTegw.us

53.800 6Z.. 90Z.

116.702

is.oS3

112.760

(Note: &bout 1/3 of these &1'e guerrUl&S, a.nd 2/3 belong to eith.r the self clefense 01' oecret sel! cle!ense forces.)

Political Orcler of B&ttle 39. 175

~ ..

~ ..

B-391

• • NIE 14.3-67

36. 0= c=rent evidence do ... s .not enable us to estimate the present size of the.e groups ("eli-defense, secret seli-defense, the "Assault Youth, " or other similar VC organizations) with any meas=e of confidence. Some documents suggest that in early 1966 the aggregate size of the seli-defense £orce was on the order of 150,000. This force and the other groups, however. have Ul1questionaqly suffer .. d substantial attr.ition since .that time .... s well a.s an appreciable decline in quality. beca.use of loss .... recruiting of SOme of their m .. mb .. rs into the guerrillas or other VC military components and, particularly. the shrilalal.ge in VC control of populat .. d areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are stilllarg .. and constitute a part of the overall Cf'mmunist effort, they are not offen.ive mUitary £orces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of ba1:'".le total. Neverthele. s. som .. of their members account for a part of the total Communist military losses.

r '. . : .

B-392

• .. "'. c1 ..... ;::. •.• ~ ... 'C' ..

NIE 1'L3-67

TABLE 5

ESTIM:ATED COMMUNIST LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1966 1967 (E.ti=ated Tota1)~1

Killed-in-Action 55,500 90,000

Permanently Lost from Wounds 19,000 31,000

Military Returnees 13,000 21,000

Prisoners 2,300 7,000

Deserters 13,000 21, 000

TOTAL 103, OO~I 170, OO~I

a l The 1967 esti..'7latea totals are the projections of averages 0: Communist losses during the !irst C? months of 1967.

b l These totals include not only Reg 1..lla:- r:1.ili;::a:-y forces and guerrillas, but alsc an unknown nUr:lber of other Comr.1.un:s~ elements such as self­defense. secre: self-defense forces, .assault youth, etc.

)S': ;as. GSJi!,g UX;l (2A sa ,t5C = a

B-393

JX 723: . itt.

9/11/67, DCI CABLE TO CA~VER'RES1NIEl DISCUSSIONS . '. (CIA#9'52·)~( .. I.\i"i:· "

IC

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8-394 ," v -

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1%7 0'''.£ IN eJ; ~I"'C NO.

MESSAc;e 70R:.I

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(::I;:) 0: I-ZSSA!E)

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2 8 SEP 1983

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B-395

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Approved tor Reloase Date

28 SEp 1983

"-"':.~. ~ :...---­-'.-".'~ ....... .. ~ -

B-397

JX 767

4/10/67. BARRIE WILUAMS MEMO-TRIP REPORT (DB;2C066)

i , , I

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B-398

DIAA'-4A2 /Kaj VllU_IJ_/S9708/l0 Apr '7

Trip &aport

10 April 1967

1 . (V) AutllorttYI nA J.ettar Clner ....... r W-'7, 4atetI1311arcta 1967.

2. (U) D.t .. 8ftd Pl."". VhitHI IIo\CY n, 15 Mareh-l &!>rl1 1967; llef .... e

J.1.laoa OfUc.e, 110,,& ~q, )-4 April 1961; CIEl'AC Jl. )-4 April 1967 .

1. CV) eo-a1u .... ar "'rtyl 1Ir. C. C. r_lar, Jr . , " j or J . ... rrte

Vl111~, Captain T~,. J. aaniaatoo., 1Ir. WalteT 1: ••• ncock. - Kut~

Are. Offlc.e (DIAAP-4) .

4 . E9~ !urpo.e ot Trip: To ft801_ .tatini ... l d1UereDee. 1. reported

a~-1Ditlated battal1011-ata. or larser attecka ca.pl1a4 frDa the OP-~-5

Weekly ...... ry .. porta aDd tU J2 IIACf ftll.IIII'IU, and rebtH ie_. of

operat1_lI1.aulll&aacc nportilll. uiteria, daf1nitl_. aDd ,roc:aciarea ..

d i rected loy the Cbau.aa, .Joint Caleta of .taff. 1A ad.d1t1ml, .pacific

""utiou. ftlatt.q to ....,. ~r of Nttle 1D South Yi.t ... aod .at1utlft

proc."r .. loeiq "ployed by J2 )W:V .. n poMd for __ I' by tbe DIADIl.

5. CV) hraOllll CoGtectedl

• II/co.lI McCIarlati_, J2 • II/Gell a.o._ • ./Call ~ry, SA 4u Corp.

• C.l~. Qalef latal Dtrtat_ • 1.tCoI 1Ioqllll, n KaUut ••

• 1.tCo1 a-It1u, Csi.t 01 ar, lAtal DiY

• OtHr J2/J3 Staff, &VlI OIl "n_l .... U'l'Uft)' "1'_1

• Captata IIcEl-a. hpatJ J2

• Othar J2 luff

• LtCo1 fbil1!,. AP-W

"J 'then, \

at (I/Z£) Pact. and IU.eeaa.l09:

" ' .. Stathtical .1tt.ftJICC .... .,.rat1oul aIIIII 1atcll1.DDc.e rcportu. AP-4

.f ~-illit!ated ~atuliOll-ai.. or IBraar attackal A "'ic Btatlatical

,"'ftrl..c7 _lata" ... the _-,. 1.p .... 1. att..,ka rci>orted ill the O,-UP·,

Waek.17 a.-r)' ...s cu tabalaU_ 8ppaadq ill cAe J2 IIACV J'--Br)' lUlJrrUP.

U-4J.2

_=Ge ·l!p2-~

8-399

1a .. at~t to ~lv. tha .. lI1ffen"" .. aad ~teraiJle u.., t.;>11.,..U-•• Sf ~, of ~ lIiffere_t toeab, • jote .Jl/lJU/CIXN.:; t_ • .....t...r eM p~~ 10 __ tail. n.e elace nlat1ajl to .-, .tt.c .... _re o~...r c.-Dar with the ~c. of thh uta, crIteria, repcn-till& ,,~"area • ... ~ .. of 1&f~u_. .... .. diU ... l ...-i ... u .... ot nporU,. t-ehail"". and I'roce4uro •••.• ~tRd .. " two te_ ...... r. _ • fi.ld "hit to u... au.cv ...... 1&ory ctn.p to tn« AltVII 4d\ Coq.. DeHc:1nael0. _rc feua4 La the t.;>l_t.U_ of J';.;.S OP-UP-~ r.porHog proc.-z-. •• 1A thh c..-cti_ 1t _a t-.d that althooolh the op-au-~ rtpOTtill& ia.tRetJ. ..... provi4ee! tor a parop'a,b _ n .. u.ucal dat.a .adn o&l:la Corp. ar .. _titled '7art U - .C la1tiated .kUCJlII (Lara- k.ale)." CIte para,raph _. _bto.tly poal>U.Md as "'1IOIIlt." Dat. owa1lallle .t ~ tt.e of .. 1Im.don of OP-UP-~ lIid Maw lup ocal_ ot~ _t tbe .. uta _rc c.rried Daly La tbe aarratbo p«t1_ of the _kly OP-Ul'-~ &lid ~o aot 0ALarM 18 tM .t.aU.tical dat.. .... a441tu.ul aAortccaiq 10 the ayat ..... that l.rr-.c:.lc &ttaco roported to MACV .tur the repon ouIooaiaa1_ for a 11 ... ti_ ~r1od .. t llbich o=vrrod eriaC tM ~riod of th.t report _r __ t reao1arly c:o.tr.d ..,. w.cv 1_ the .. n.t1". port!_ of ooabaaqooeat OP-UP-~'.. ~ tlpOiatiaC of 1a£onoatl __ • llaias oce,., a.bod. nw ~ta1led a-i_tl_ ot CIte I'LCV rebtu elata _ • ......,.-1a1tl.tod .ttac:lt. 'or J....-ry 1967 ro .... led tbet tbe clefWtiOll. DUe! IIy J2 IIlCV ( ... i'Jt~~ IIy tJoo; CDlCPIoC 11lu1l1paco COllhreace) procluc:04 "ata wbich carried a 111.10"111& 1111' lleaUOIl. 'rite ODOIIY ia1 U.ted llatta11 __ &1 .. CIt' lara- .ttaco .. nl'Oftod 1a ~ J2 KACV PnIIiTiltl for J._ery _rc .ot; the produc:t of nfi-a elata aacI wore ... t .. abu:ted .. to .1gnlf1c:....:.. n.. -" for acb All ... 1 .... t1otl _. epp.roat. nh 1" to the dAvel~at of criteri. to ... i.t 10 ... luatlag the otanlflcaae. of reporttte1 • ...." .ttac:lta ( ... T.b A fOJ: crIta"i.). • ftft'aloaUoD of th~ J.,.,ary HUJrD.O' .ttack .uta I!OI!>l.."l~ Ute ... erIt.rla 13 ...... 1 .. TJ.lI' B. htare IIACV O!'-U;P-~'. will report .. a1p1fl.....c:~ !.up Icala au.co ....s.r Pert IV of the aUthtieal .uta for oacb Corpa &rOa . n.e OP-~·S'a will olao lie .-pelatoll. nw IIAC'1 ~ly pnDtn.£P'. will t.. clDd. a tlcaer1pti_ eocI .v.loatlO11 of a1pifieaat _DeIly attacU.

b. "11M iIlf_ttoa obtai,," fn. *CV .. the .,.e1f1C: qa. .. t1 ..... poNd by the IIU1II. ft'tr c .... red ill ~ Ub ... 1odieatodl

Tu c: - lAcH&ft ill &aa.:r .Irntplar Ithlll-th. v.a II - lacre ... 1a &Daly Pol1tieal Order of &attla. TAlI ! - JUJ:V Cooobat UfocU ..... ~ bt1Qi 17ulIIL v.a , - IIACV W.tch Lht/llroppl~ !hUt. fro. Orcler of B.ttla. TU C .... .., Are ..... traltuU_. T ..... - \'iet c.... la-c-.rt.ry &eervitu.. ~ I - .10' c.aa 1.oaM. (DOW, Pe~atly u.:.padutod).

7. ~ »1._1_ .1th J2 IIlCVI .'

a. ».ria!; th.oo exit .. briaf1aa: tty the all. T •• vith X/c. .. McChriat1_. II. qned tbat ill the futun .." r .. ieal do ...... ill proc:tte1un ••• ucla ••

2

SECRET NO FORdGN OISSHI4 .. ""-, , .-~ .~. . -..... -....... ' .~ ", .. ~ ~.

8-400

tao. Unpln nra .. th ....s pol1Ucd atnll&tA ca.qH. ,,111 M I.hUI_ .... ~ far' .Ilt. alii! con _u._/_a, 'rnsce ,r1.or ~ ret .....

~o II • . ~ n _. 1& "'11 .. ~at with tM rec hti_ o~ tM 8u.a

aM De .1l<--.tb U_ lq ab-..u M ___ 1a .11 ..-raa" "1&1:111& t • • A 1aflltraU_ 1ato ITII. Ibh _. t,.l_ata4 La the 1 ~rU 1967 tJe1y aaport.

•. n.. t_ r.~a~ ~ ......... a1 .. U_ M ...se of ,"iat ~ 1 ... COUIltry nenol_at.. n.. n autecS thai: the 7OOO/math Up" ... a "c.pabllity. " aod tlaat a r .... &lMau __ 14 .. ac<'ClWt>l1Aoed .. _ra lAIR-_U_ 1>"<' a ... aUaIoI ••

Ill. 'lIM n _. _t ta f~ ol a •• u. .. Pall.Uc.al eriu at Ntde ..... rata froa ataer • ..." a~. Ie ~t •• ta4 tlaat tboe ,.Utica1 au.ca.%. 1a _ tatalTd pert at tIM ~ta aua:qtll ~ _t M acsoo •• ted f= 1a ...... 111& tIaa a1_t. _i4an-4 ... tAr.at ..,1ch _t ... 4aatro,ed.

•. (J) A .... rl.f .t 1II:r. F_ln- _. ~sta4 .t CIJlC'PIoC ~ CapUtll »:.xl_ill. Depaty n. _ 1 April 1"7. 'lIM .1~a1_ c ..... red 111 penal the po1at_ rAt...! at IIlCV ad tIM n-. f4r u.. 1 April do.up 1 .. ra;.ortll1& 1Af1l­tnti_ .... tll17 .... n.... ... to tIw ~ .. oar-r 1. CIlICl'IoC. n per_l. CIae .. d. ot th.i_ 4Iaft1ef ........ U .... I ••

t . (8)'" 11&1 .. 'rialt _. clabeta<! with tu Dd .... Uau- OfU.,.. IIoa& ltollg ICC -.l CIaiAa_ -ur of Ntd. 11lf_tt_ pc-che<! helt to mAAr-4 _ ra~_t of WCoI lbllUl'a. nou 1a a ... tvt atop eaabtu.: ~ .t u ... -.! Laf_U ... M~" h.te .... pereOlllllll aM ~ ..... 17.t. a:ad .bGald M ~apcI - -ul-?foriijiI: , .... p. ''\f''t .. ",~ "":J'o~ 0

Eo c:zoaax C. FOJLU. • .JL ClS-14 "IMP-4

o •

... ... ;: ~:. ,

B-40 1

TAB B ~"eO f'5 .............. 'c·, g:o:-'''''=" __ ;.I < _ .u.1 , I C •. :..I ..... ' :oJ ••

C011PARISON 01' STATISTICS

VC/NVA Initiated I.arge-Sca1e Attacks

t OPREP 5. M:>..CV PERH!TrtEP NE~': C?!T"RIl'. * . .

~ 1966 Feb 6 11 4 .' Mar 10 10 7 S

Apr 4 S 0 0 . ,

May 4 14 7 , ~ .'

Jun 6 14 7 't Ju1 0 14 2 ~ Aug 5 16 2

Sep 0 14 3 •

Oct 2 22 4 ..... Nov 2 15 3 ~

Dec 0 11 1 I

1967 Jan L £2. 4 ,S TOTAL 40 174 38 33

* COMUSMACV assessment using new criteria.

.. .. _ .. -.-.-.--.--- ...... ---'.

. ,

, . . ,

8·402

TAB C

INCREASE I N IRREGULAR STRENGTH , !

In!i tial attempts by MIICV to determine the strength o f I

irregl! ars · resulted in an estimated figure of 197 , 000 . The

. . , total ,:was based mai nly on estimates and sector Intell i gence

I I

Advisor (RITZ) reports. This study has not been approv ed b y

MACV and has been returned to each respective Corps and sector

for review and substantiation of the e .stimates. Th~ subject

was also to be addressed in a conference held at MACV

April 5-8 , 19Q7 with both US and ARVN personnel in attendance .

A related problem to the acceptance of this figure or any

new total is that sufficient information on which to base a

retroactive adjustment of total irregular strength has not

as yet been uncovered . Due to· the lack of any definitive in-

formation, the original plan called for carrying any new total

on a straight line projection from December 1964 to the present .

This plan was unacceptable ·to DIA as well as to J-2 I';ACV ~;ho

has directed that a realistic retroactive readjustment o f any

new strength figure be developed in order to portray a meaningful

strength trend. When this study has been completed and approved

by MACV, it will be forwarded to DIA for comments prior to

release •

. ~ .

8-403

("-,.. ... - ... , 0 C .... · r- " ~r! ... ...... ,..-:;.

-,¢_..J .• _ I •• J .... .. _ . _ • • .. . ..,1- _ .•

TAB D

INCREASE IN TEE IN~R;STRUCTURE .

f ~CV's draft study on enemy 'Political order of battle,

along -with supporting documentation, was revie,,'ed by the DIA

Team. Although it is felt that a definite increase in the

infrastructure total of 40,000 presently being carried is

warranted, the draft study seemed to be based on tenuous

methodology and did not validly sUbstantiate the strength of

approximately 88,000 indicated therein. Because of a lack

of detailed country-wide information, extrapolation. and a num-

ber of assumptions were employed in the study. Documentation

substantiates infrastructure to hamlet level but does not

substantiate uniform application of the rationale and structure

employed in the study on a country-wide basis. Information

is scarce upon which any new totals can be retroactively ad-

justed. When a final MACV study is completed it will be for-

warded to DIA for comments prior to release. It is doubtful

that a Political order of battle strength increase will be

available in the near future.

--,,', --- -

, .. . ,. .. ~ O: ,'.: .L., , :, . ...... ,.. .... , i • !~

. .:. ... t' 0-~~ .

..

' .. , .

' . ~

8-404

TAB E

COMSA'i' EF!'ECTIV~~SSS

~ .. systC'I:! developed by }1ACV for evaluating the co:nbat ?o' • .

effeciti'/cness of enemy units has not been in existence long r ·

enou9h to make a valid judgment as to the validity of t~e I

ratings given each elem~nt. A check by the DIA team indicated

~t there are many areas in which the units are given rating

I upon \'!hich there is no available information .. By necessity

these areas can only be evaluated as "unknown." ~.syst,e;n

is so designed that a ~nit is never evaluated higher than its

lowest grii',de in a given area of evaluation. The Combat Effective-

ness ratings are a tool for the tactical commander in that

they give him some idea of what may be expected from the enemy

units in a given area of operation. The fact that a unit is

rated as "not combat-effective" (C-4) cannot always be a guide

to that unit's ability to fight. An example of this was recently

demonstrated during Operation JUNCTION CITY in Tay Ninh Province.

The 272 viet Cong Regiment, whose three subordinate battalions

~lere rated marginally combat-effective (C.,.3), not cor.1bat-effec-

tive (C-4) , and marginally combat-effective (C-3), respectively,

sustained a 24-hour contact with US elements during the operation.

The inherent danger in the Cor.1bat-Effectiveness system of

evaluating enemy units at the strategic level is that the system

--:::,. ,..,-.-----_._----------- ---

.. TAB E j- continued

.. ! ,

B·405

S,.."..,rr ~'t'l "",0:"""'"'' ''''is'Z.l-­-=tI'tceT hd ,."" .. 2::" W

could/lead to a gross underestimation of the enemy's ability I

to c'f:tinu·e the conflict. . ~. , ~e teams check of this system merely substantiated the

/ . original feelings expressed by DIA when the system was .first

developed. It is a tool for the tactical commander •. but

should not be used as a judgment of e~emy capabilities at

national level.

B-406

, , . TAB G

SE6r'\q :' .. 1.. • • .; •• L I ...... ~"I ,,0 ,.

BJ'.SE AREAS , I

tase areas can be considered denied to the enemy in whole

~-. or , iry _part, when they are penetrated by friendly forces in

"-T _

strength. In order to be completely neutralized, the area must

be p~rmanently occupied, as evidence shows that the enemy can be

expected to return to any -base area following the wi thdravlal of

friendly forces. Any installations which were des7royed are

then rebuilt and supplies which ,<ere captured or destroyed are

replenished. MACV J2 also holds a base area to be neutralized if

it has been abandoned, which in turn removes it from the base

area category. Before any area can be dropped from a "base

area update st-.ldy," the reaso_ns for doing so must be explained

to and be approved by the J2 MACV.

A friendly operation conducted in a base area environ will

cause temporary neutralization only for the length of time that

operation is being conducted in that area. These areas will

continue to be denied the enemy as long as superior friendly

forces occupy them or when any portion of an enemy base area

is included in the tactical area of responsibility of a friendly

operation.

Applying the above criteria, the percentage of base areas

denied the enemy may be computed for a given period in time •

.,...---SEeRR 1:0 FC~l:IGi'l DiSSEM _

--- . -- -- --- - ---- -- - .---;,.""~-----~ '. ~ ..... ,.-._,...'. ~~, ...".., .,- .- . '- , ..

8-407

TAB F

DROPPI NG UNITS FRm! ORDSR OF BATTLE / WATCH LIST

~_ the · past, the criteria fo! dropping units from order . of ba!>tle was one-year without contact . This criteria is no

longer being used, and in actuality there is no set time-frame

for a unit's existence without contact as a criteria for

elimination from order of battle.

The tool presently being used is the }~CV Watch List. Under

this syste~ if a unit is not contacted or reconfirmed dur~ng

a 90-day period it is placed on the Watch List. After placement

on the list the list is then sent to the field where an inten-

sified collection project is initiated. Any information un-

covered on the unit is then spot-reported to J2 ~CV. After

90 days on the Watch List without reconfirming information,

the unit is subject to elimination from order-of-battle; however,

such elimination is not automatic. A detailed evaluation of all

available information plus an analysis of the activity in the

unit's usual area of operation is conducted by the Corps analyst

before a recommendation is made for elimination of the unit or

retention in order-of-battle.

Since firm information is available on a unit before it is

picked up in order-of-battle, ~cv is reluctant to drop units

-based upon a lack of information or contact for a few months

once they have been added to order-of-battle.

SECRET 1\9 r6REIe;n e;~t:l.1 . .. ----------_ . . _'- .. . --- --.- ---. -_.---.. -,- _._--- -_.

-' .. ' TAB G continued

B-408

C'r""r'f "3 Fe'"I"'! " '"5''' ot:bn:t n .. ~ \; .• Do.., ... i,1

HO\·,evcr; this figure should not be used as a tool for measure-

ment of progress nor as a valid reflection of Allied combat

1: succe~': it may be raised or lowered depending upon the nunber

. .

of friendly operations currently being conducted in portions

of enemy base areas.

MACV J2 indicated that l·lACV J3 may be utilizing some invalid

statistics o~ the percentage of area neutralized. These =igures

could have been derived from the amount of equipment captured,

enemy combat fatalities, facilities and supplies destroyed etc,

rather than applying the rule of either permanent or temporary

occupancy of an enemy base area.

-SECRET l:e fC.,dGII DiSSG.1

-. -.- ----.----.--- --_. __ . . ----_ ... __ . - " - - ---.- -.--- . ~ .

B-409

-=SECR~1 l)() Fr ' [ I'" I:i ' ' '1 ",a .... 1. J.. .. ::Jctn-

TAB II

VC I N-COUNTRY RECRUIT;.;E NT

1rCV documentation for Annex F to the CINCPAC I n te l ligence

~. Confe~e nce Re port, as pertains to local recruitme nt, wa s

examined in detail. Of the six documents used as a b a sis for

the country-wide extrapolation process which MACV used in

arriving at their estimate of 7,000 local recruits per mo nth

during 1966, two related to goals during 1966, three rela ted

to actual recruitment during 1965, and one portrayed actual

recruitment for the 1st half of 1966. copies of the documznts,

or extracts/summaries thereof, were obtained from CICV for DIA

analysis. While it is now generally agreed that the enemy

made a concentrated effort in .recruiting early in 1966 and that

the recruiting rate of about 7,000 per · month may have been

relatively accurate, this rate does not seem realistic for late

1966 and 1967 in view of information indicating recruiting

difficulties. It is therefore considered that the 1967 recrui~ing

rate of 7,000 per month as projected by MACV in Annex F cannot

be substantiated by current evidence. Reevaluation by MACV has

been requested.

S£CRE1 1:0 FOF.a~;i u.~~e;;, - - . - - -----------_ ..... _-------.-._--. --- ---

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8-410

TAB I

I DIED OF ,':omms AND PERJ.!ANE!ITLY DISABLED

I leference para E 2a (2 ) and ,para E 2b, section V of the

l CINC~C Intelligence Conference and para C, section V of Annex

F th~reto, the DIA team discussed methodology and rationale for

I

the wounded in action (WIA) /Died of Wounds (D01'/) /permanently

Disabled statistical rates with repr~sentatives of the J2

Estimates Branch and US medical personnel of CICV ,.ho also pro-

vided copies of their updated study ST 67-018, ' "Nedical C<luses

of Non-Effectiveness Among VC and NVA Troops." It was noted

that the portion of this study which relates to DOW and Per-

manently Disabled was based on limited documentation and was

at some variance with the percentages for losses from wounds

as stated in Annex F. Copies of pertinent documentation for

the CIVC study were obtained for DIA analysis. Due to absence

of the originator of the percentages contained in Annex F, the

team was unable to obtain methodology upon which they were based.

J2 Estimates Branch personnel have stated they will follow-up

on the matter. Annex F states that DOW and permanently Disabled

are 35% of those KIA (body count). This is arrived at after

application of a 10% death during evacuation loss to the total

WIA, followed by a 2% death rate at the hospital, followed by

a 13% Permanently Disabled or long-range loss rate from those

remaining. To construe the above percentages as totaling 25%

-. -. ~---.----.-~-----""~------.-

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L • .. .

8-411 - '

S£S;;Z7 ".; ~"'.""I.-'"'' .. . ( • '-. ' . 0 .• _._ .• LI ......... ~j.J

TAB I continued

of' the WIA is erroneous because the percentages for each step

are if'pplied to a decreasing number; the overall DOI,/ permanently r·o ..

Disabled percentage of WIA then amounts to 23~~. Accepting a

I

1.5 WIA to 1 KIA rate, the DOw/permanently Disabled percentage

of 35% of total KIA equates to 23% of the total WIA.

!

-"0 __ -IIN-- _-'-_-.~------__ --------.. o-- .. _ .. .. ",r"

B-412

JX 769

8/19/67, CABLE FROM GODDING1l0 ;PETERSON (DB.2el 050)

.. .-. ..... _ .. __ .:-_ .... . _ .- , -- B-413

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F!GU?ZS ARE STILL BEING- ARG'L3::J AT TEE HOrtKI~,rG WFEIt.

PEOPLE A:iD IT IS ~:O'l' COi'!'.l'u·IPLATED UNTIL SUCH T!1·!E AS Pol;

AG?:2:::D FI0l?::: IS P.REIV"'LD AT BY TEE PR3:!:CIPAIS. .r..T T?TS

TIME IT i,ILL BE STRESSED TEAT AlTi RErZASE BE COO?.DIi:"l.'3D

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?aOGR~·[ A:m LOCAL SURVEYS AS BEInG L'iC01·~L3TE AIrn PROPCSE

HUGE: r.'G2:R ~GUP.ES EASED ON THE E:"~'r AVAIIJ..BLE ENEHY

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