Justice Peralta Cases

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G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ, Petitioners,vs.SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are theCourt of Appeals Decision 1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated November 14, 2006 inCA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitionerMichelle Ybaez (Ybaez).

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of CebuPacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor ofRobinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a

blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00 .4 Respondentallegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receip t5 issued by the store .6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robin sons and Mercury Drug Store(Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she

failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee thereceipt issued in her favor .7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Officelocated at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees asagreed upon .8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her tohumiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the

black jeans .9 They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had,followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home .10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air

narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and thesame took place while respondent was off duty .11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and wassupposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused toreceive it .12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) ofRobinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposesof canceling respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was notgiven a copy of said damaging letter .13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to havesuffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension,
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besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation .14 She thus filed the Complaint forDamage s15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing),Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez. She demandedthe payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attor neys fees and litigationexpenses .16

In their Answer ,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the officialreceipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there wasmiscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of thereceipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which theformer believed to mean that the item has already been paid .18 Realizing the mistake,Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her togo back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made.Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the CebuPacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they

talked to respondent .19

They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondentcould not recall whom she gave the payment .20 They emphasized that they were gentle and politein talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions .21 Ascounterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplarydamages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses .22

On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaimof the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and theother defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering thatno motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that whenthey demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest beliefthat no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when theconfrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who

put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to CebuPacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees, because they merelyasked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTCfound no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award ofdamages .23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court ofCebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybaez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to

pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amountof Fifty Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty ThousandPesos (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED .24
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While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when theyconfronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA,however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending thedemand letter to respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the officialreceipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment .25 Contrary to the findings of the

RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics director was sent to respondentsemployer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but tosubject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay .26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of badfaith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not privy to the transaction.This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a narrative of theincident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment .27 Theappellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent tocollect moral damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liablefor its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees;while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondents

employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalos good faith, however, they were exoneratedfrom liability .28

Ybaez moved for the reconsideration 29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in theassailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.

Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTERSENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREINRESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGESAND ATTORNEYS FEES .30

The petition is without merit.

Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeansshe purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receiptissued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verifyfrom respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not.However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such
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right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under theCivil Code. The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmont e31 is noteworthy:

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whetherdone willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the

damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring fromthe fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. Firstof these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" underArticle 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rightsand in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honestyand good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right orduty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuringanother .33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the

invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized themistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the priceof the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to makesuch payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed

paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such rightwas exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action againstthem.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in theexercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in badfaith, with intent to prejudice another .34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is

manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain fromtaking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another .35 Malice or bad faith, on theother hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest

purpose or moral obliquity .36

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not.The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. Theconfrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties.As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties withconflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent wasin possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of paymentissued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of amere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the properforum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to forcerespondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance,

petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing it of theincident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. 1wphi1 Petitioners claimed
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that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted tohurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely beinghonest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:

x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the

store. x x x

When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and toldme, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2

pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have nosuch denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change andif she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After askingthese simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. Infact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refusedsaying that shes in a hurry and very busy .37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not onlydid she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were madedespite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to

petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realizedthe supposed non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish

respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantialevidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearlyimpermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,otherwise, he opens himself to liability .38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established andmust not be excessive or unduly harsh .39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of theCivil Code which read :40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contraryto morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney sfees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the
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proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury inthe cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code .41 Moraldamages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. Theyshould, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong

done .42

They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means,diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone .43 Wefind that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under thecircumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest,attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court ofAppeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R.CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 184318 February 12, 2014

ANTONIO E. UNICA, Petitioner,vs.ANSCOR SWIRE SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courtseeking to set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.CEB-SP No. 01417, which annulled and set aside the Decision of the National Labor RelationsCommission, Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. OFW V-000031-2005 (RAB Case No. Vl-OFW-(M) 02-12-0083).

The antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Anscor Swire Ship Management Corporation is a manning agency. Since the late1980s, petitioner was employed by respondent under various contracts. In his last contract,

petitioner was deployed for a period of nine (9) months from January 29, 2000 to October 25,2000. However, since the vessel was still at sea, petitioner was only repatriated on November 14,2000, or twenty (20) days after the expiration of his contract of employment. Petitioner averredthat since he was allowed to stay in the vessel for another twenty (20) days, there was an impliedrenewal of his contract of employment. Hence, when he was repatriated on November 14, 2000without a valid cause, he was illegally dismissed.

Due to the foregoing, petitioner filed a case against the respondent for illegal dismissal, paymentof retirement, disability and medical benefits, separation and holiday pay. In its defense,respondent argued that petitioner was hired for a fixed period, the duration of which dependsupon the mutual agreement of the parties. Petitioners employment was, therefore, co -terminuswith the term of his contract. Hence, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed mustfail, because he was repatriated due to the completion of the term of his contract.

On May 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioner .3 The LA ruled that since petitioner was not repatriated at the expiration of his contract on October 25, 2000, and wasallowed by respondent to continue working on board its vessel up to November 14, 2000, hiscontract with respondent was impliedly renewed for another nine months. The LA directed

respondent to pay petitioner his salary for the unexpired portion of his impliedly renewedcontract, his medical benefits and attorney's fees.

Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to the NLRC. On August 24, 2005, the NLRCaffirmed with modification the LA's decision .4 Like the LA, the NLRC ruled that the contractdid not expire on October 25, 2000, but was impliedly extended for another nine months. This is

because it was only on November 14, 2000 when petitioner was told by respondent to disembark because he would be repatriated. Since there was an implied extension of the contract for another
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nine months, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to payment of the unexpired term of his impliedcontract. The NLRC, however, deleted the award of medical benefits and reduced the amount ofattorney's fees.

Undaunted, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA, in its Decision 5 dated

August 15, 2006, annulled and set aside the decision of the NLRC. The CA ruled that there wasno implied renewal of contract and the 20 days extension was due to the fact that the ship wasstill at sea. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in aResolutio n6 dated August 11, 2008. Hence, the present petition.

The main issue in this case is whether or not there was an implied renewal of petitioner's contractof employment with respondent.

The petition is not meritorious.

In the case at bar, although petitioner's employment contract with respondent ended on October

25, 2000 and he disembarked only on November 14, 2000 or barely 20 days after the expirationof his employment contract, such late disembarkation was not without valid reason. Respondentcould not have disembarked petitioner on the date of the termination of his employment contract,

because the vessel was still in the middle of the sea. Clearly, it was impossible for petitioner tosafely disembark immediately upon the expiration of his contract, since he must disembark at aconvenient port. Thus, petitioner's stay in the vessel for another 20 days should not be interpretedas an implied extension of his contract. A seaman need not physically disembark from a vessel atthe expiration of his employment contract to have such contract considered terminated .7

It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered contractual employees. 1wphi1 Theiremployment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their

employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed fora certain period of time .8 Thus, when petitioner's contract ended on October 25, 2000, hisemployment is deemed automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal orextension of the expired contract.

However, petitioner is entitled to be paid his wages after the expiration of his contract until thevessel's arrival at a convenient port. Section 19 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governingthe Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels is clear on this point:

REPATRIATION. A. If the vessel is outside the Philippines upon the expiration of the contract,the seafarer shall continue his service on board until the vessel's arrival at a convenient portand/or after arrival of the replacement crew, provided that, in any case, the continuance of suchservice shall not exceed three months. The seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages and benefitsas provided in his contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01417, dated August 15, 2006 and August 11, 2008, respectively, areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondent is DIRECTED to PAY petitioner his salary
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from October 26, 2000 until November 14, 2000. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiterfor the purpose of computing the aforementioned monetary award to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 188539 March 12, 2014

MARIANO LIM, Petitioner,vs.SECURITY BANK CORPORATION,* Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prayingthat the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), promulgated on July 30, 2008, and theResolutio n2 dated June 1, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, bereversed and set aside.

Petitioner executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of respondent to secure "any and all types

of credit accommodation that may be granted by the bank hereinto and hereinafter" in favor ofRaul Arroyo for the amount of P2,000,000.00 which is covered by a CreditAgreement/Promissory Note .3 Said promissory note stated that the interest on the loan shall be19% per annum, compounded monthly, for the first 30 days from the date thereof, and if the noteis not fully paid when due, an additional penalty of 2% per month of the total outstanding

principal and interest due and unpaid, shall be imposed.

In turn, the Continuing Suretyship 4 executed by petitioner stipulated that:

3. Liability of the Surety. - The liability of the Surety is solidary and not contingent upon the pursuit of the Bank of whatever remedies it may have against the Debtor or the collaterals/liens it

may possess. If any of the Guaranteed Obligations is not paid or performed on due date (at statedmaturity or by acceleration), the Surety shall, without need for any notice, demand or any otheract or deed, immediately become liable therefor and the Surety shall pay and perform the same .5

Guaranteed Obligations are defined in the same document as follows:

a) "Guaranteed Obligations" - the obligations of the Debtor arising from all creditaccommodations extended by the Bank to the Debtor, including increases, renewals, roll-overs,extensions, restructurings, amendments or novations thereof, as well as (i) all obligations of theDebtor presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records ofthe Bank, whether direct or indirect, and (ii) any and all expenses which the Bank may incur in

enforcing any of its rights, powers and remedies under the Credit Instruments as definedhereinbelow. 6

The debtor, Raul Arroyo, defaulted on his loan obligation. Thereafter, petitioner received a Notice of Final Demand dated August 2, 2001, informing him that he was liable to pay the loanobtained by Raul and Edwina Arroyo, including the interests and penalty fees amounting toP7,703,185.54, and demanding payment thereof. For failure of petitioner to comply with saiddemand, respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against him and the Arroyo
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spouses. Since the Arroyo spouses can no longer be located, summons was not served on them,hence, only petitioner actively participated in the case.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Davao (RTC) rendered judgment against petitioner .7 Thedispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Lim to pay the following sums.

1. The principal sum of two million pesos plus nineteen percent interest of theoutstanding principal interest due and unpaid to be computed from January 28, 1997 untilfully paid, plus two percent interest per month as penalty to be computed from February28, 1997 until fully paid.

2. Four hundred thousand pesos as attorney's fees.

3. Thirty thousand pesos as litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED .8

Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated July 30, 2008,affirmed the RTC judgment with the modification that interest be computed from August 1,1997; the penalty should start only from August 28, 1997; the award of attorney's fees is set at10% of the total amount due; and the award for litigation expenses increased to P92,321.10 .9

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated June 1,

2009.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, where themain issue is whether petitioner may validly be held liable for the principal debtor's loanobtained six months after the execution of the Continuing Suretyship.

The other issues, such as the proper computation of the total indebtedness and the amount oflitigation expenses are factual matters that had been satisfactorily addressed by the CA, to wit:(1) the CA ruled that respondent should recompute the total amount due, since the proceeds fromthe foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages were deducted only on June 20, 2001,when the public auctions were conducted on August 26, 1998 and September 7, 1999,respectively, thus, the amount of the proceeds from the foreclosure of the mortgaged propertiesshould have been deducted from the amount of indebtedness on the date the public auction was

held; and (2) the CA likewise pointed out that as can be seen from the Legal Fees Form ,10 thelitigation expense incurred by respondent was P92,321.10, the amount it paid as filing fee. It ishornbook principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, hence, such issues will not be revisited

by this Court in the present petition. With regard to the propriety of making petitioner a hostilewitness, respondent is correct that the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus,the Court will no longer address these issues which had been improperly raised in this petitionfor review on certiorari.
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The main issue deserves scant consideration, but the matter of the award of attorney's feesdeserves reexamination.

The nature of a suretyship is elucidated in Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. PetroleumDistributors & Service Corporation 11 in this wise:

A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking infavor of another party, called the obligee. Although the contract of a surety is secondary only to avalid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although it

possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefittherefrom. This was explained in the case of Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation, where it was written:

The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, butmerely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless,

although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, hisliability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; inother words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal.

x x x x

Thus, suretyship arises upon the solidary binding of a person deemed the surety with the principal debtor for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation. A surety is considered in law as beingthe same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of thelatter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. x x x .12

In this case, what petitioner executed was a Continuing Suretyship, which the Court described inSaludo, Jr. v. Security Bank Corporation 13 as follows:

The essence of a continuing surety has been highlighted in the case of Totanes v. China BankingCorporation in this wise:

Comprehensive or continuing surety agreements are, in fact, quite commonplace in present dayfinancial and commercial practice. A bank or financing company which anticipates entering intoa series of credit transactions with a particular company, normally requires the projected

principal debtor to execute a continuing surety agreement along with its sureties. By executingsuch an agreement, the principal places itself in a position to enter into the projected series of

transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship agreement, there would be no need to executea separate surety contract or bond for each financing or credit accommodation extended to the principal debtor .14

The terms of the Continuing Suretyship executed by petitioner, quoted earlier, are veryclear. 1wphi1 It states that petitioner, as surety, shall, without need for any notice, demand orany other act or deed, immediately become liable and shall pay "all credit accommodationsextended by the Bank to the Debtor, including increases, renewals, roll-overs, extensions,
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restructurings, amendments or novations thereof, as well as (i) all obligations of the Debtor presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records of theBank, whether direct or indirect, and

(ii) any and all expenses which the Bank may incur in enforcing any of its rights, powers and

remedies under the Credit Instruments as defined hereinbelow. "15 Such stipulations are validand legal and constitute the law between the parties, as Article 2053 of the Civil Code providesthat "[a] guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is not yetknown; x x x." Thus, petitioner is unequivocally bound by the terms of the ContinuingSuretyship. There can be no cavil then that petitioner is liable for the principal of the loan,together with the interest and penalties due thereon, even if said loan was obtained by the

principal debtor even after the date of execution of the Continuing Suretyship.

With regard to the award of attorney's fees, it should be noted that Article 2208 of the Civil Codedoes not prohibit recovery of attorney's fees if there is a stipulation in the contract for payment ofthe same. Thus, in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Cathay Pacific Steel

Corporation (CAPASCO) ,16 the Court, citing Titan Construction Corporation v. Uni-FieldEnterprises, Inc. ,17 expounded as follows:

The law allows a party to recover attorney's fees under a written agreement. In Barons MarketingCorporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:

[T]he attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor isaptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravenelaw, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorney's fees so providedare awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.

On the other hand, the law also allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where theobligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to paythe stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damagescaused by the breach .18

However, even if such attorney's fees are allowed by law, the courts still have the power toreduce the same if it is unreasonable. In Trade & Investment Corporation of the Philippines v.Roblett Industrial Construction Corp. ,19 the Court equitably reduced the amount of attorney'sfees to be paid since interests and penalties had ballooned to thrice as much as the principal debt.That is also the case here. The award of attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the

principal debt, plus interest and penalty charges, would definitely exceed the principal amount;thus, making the attorney's fees manifestly exorbitant. Hence, we reduce the amount of attorney'sfees to ten percent (10%) of the principal debt only.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,dated July 30, 2008, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00462, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in thatthe award of attorney's fees is reduced to ten percent (10%) of the principal debt only.
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SO ORDERED.


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A.M. No. P-12-3043 January 15, 2014[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2953-P]

ATTY. MARCOS R. SUNDIANG, Complainant,vs.

ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from the complaint filed by Atty. Marcos P. Sundiang ,1 charging respondent Erlito DS. Bacho, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,Branch 124 RTC), with extortion, neglect of duty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019.

The antecedents are as follows:

Plaintiffs spouses Rene Castaneda and Nenita P. Castaeda filed a complaint for accion publiciana against defendants Pedro and Rosie Galacan, Vicente Quesada, Pablo Quesada,Antonio and Norma Bagares for allegedly depriving them of the use and possession of a parcelof residential lot registered in their name, located in Camarin, Caloocan City.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision 2 on October 8, 2001 in favor of the plaintiffs. The RTCruled, among other things, that as owners of the subject property, plaintiffs have a better rightover the property as against the defendants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs andagainst the defendants and all persons claiming right under them, directing the latter to:

1. Vacate and surrender peaceful possession to the plaintiffs of the subject property,described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4844, located at Lot 7, Block 26,Maligaya Park, Barangay 177, Zone 15, Purok 4, Camarin, Caloocan City;

2. Pay the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00;

3. Pay attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos ( P10,000.00); and

4. Costs of suit. Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED .3

Defendants appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision of the RTCin its Decision dated August 5, 2003. Defendants then sought recourse before the SupremeCourt, but the Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated January 28, 2004. In a Resolutiondated March 29, 2004, the Court denied defendants motion for reconsideration with finality.
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On October 20, 2004, a Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC in favor of the plaintiffs.However, since the defendants refused to vacate the premises and remove the structures therein,the writ was not implemented. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion praying for the issuance of writ ofdemolition. On November 12, 2004, the RTC issued the Writ of Demolition 4 prayed for.Complainant avers that prior to the issuance of the writ of demolition, respondent sheriff

demanded One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for the implementation of the writ.Consequently, respondent sheriff received the following amounts: Sixty Thousand Pesos(P60,000.00) on November 23, 2004; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on December 10, 2004;and Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) on or about August 15, 2005. Despite receipt of theamounts, however, respondent sheriff failed to place the plaintiffs in possession of the subject

property because he failed to remove the structures inside and in front of the subject property;hence, ingress and egress to the property was hindered.

On the other hand, respondent sheriff averred that he received the amount of Sixty ThousandPesos (P60,000.00) from the complainant. However, he denied that he demanded such paymentfor his personal benefit. He explained that the amount was used to pay for the food and fees of

the laborers, who were hired to undertake the demolition of the concrete structures on the subject property and those contracted to provide security for the workers during the demolition. Hefound it difficult to evict the defendants because the latter employed various means to preventthe implementation of the writ of demolition issued by the RTC. Nevertheless, respondent sheriffclaimed that he was able to fully implement the writ and that the subject property was deliveredto the possession of the plaintiffs on December 10, 2004, as evidenced by his Sheriff's Return.After the demolition and turn-over, however, some of the defendants and unidentified persons re-entered the subject property and reconstructed their houses thereon. Hence, the RTC found themguilty of indirect contempt and were meted the penalty of fine. Respondent sheriff furthercontended that the task of removing the shanties erected by the defendants outside the subject

property is the function of the local government concerned and no longer the duty of respondentsheriff.

In a Resolution 5 dated November 23, 2009, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge ofthe RTC, Caloocan City, for investigation, report and recommendation. In her Report andRecommendation 6 dated September 22, 2010, Investigating Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-PeAguirre recommended that the complaint against respondent sheriff be dismissed for want ofevidence. Judge Trinidad-Pe Aguirre's Report was referred to the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a Memorandum 7 dated November 10, 2011, the OCA recommended that respondent sheriff be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and that he be suspendedfor a period of one (1) year. The OCA found that respondent disregarded the procedural stepslaid down by Section 9 (now Section 10), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court regarding the sheriff'sexpenses in executing the writ. The OCA's recommendation provides:

x x x In view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended for Your Honor'sconsideration that:
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1. The instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative caseagainst respondent Sheriff ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,Branch 124, Caloocan City; and

2. Respondent Sheriff Erlito DS. Bacho be found GUILTY of CONDUCT

PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and that the penalty ofSUSPENSION from work for a period of ONE (1) YEAR be imposed upon him.

Respectfully submitted .8

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the conclusion of the OCA that respondent sheriff violated Section 10, Rule 141of the Rules of Court, but do not agree with the recommended penalty.

In the implementation of writs or processes of the court for which expenses are to be incurred,

sheriffs are mandated to comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended byA.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, the pertinent portion of which reads: Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process serversand other persons serving processes.

x x x x

With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisionsor safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for eachkilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall paysaid expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Uponapproval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk

of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned toeffect the process, subject to liquidation with the same period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded tothe party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned withhis return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor .9

It is clear from the Rule that before an interested party pays the expenses of a sheriff, the lattershould first estimate the amount which will then be submitted to the court for its approval. Uponapproval, the interested party deposits the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff.The latter then disburses the amount to the sheriff assigned to execute the writ. Thereafter, theamount received shall then be liquidated and any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party

making the deposit. From there on, the sheriff shall render a full report .10 The failure of the sheriff to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to beincurred in executing the writ; (2) ask for the court's approval of his estimates; (3) render anaccounting; and (4) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgmentdebtor ,11 makes him administratively liable.
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In the instant case, none of these procedures were complied with by respondent sheriff. He neversubmitted an estimate to the court for approval, but, on his own, demanded and received sums ofmoney from the complainant. Neither did he advise the complainant that the sheriff's expensesapproved by the court should be deposited with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff.Furthermore, no liquidation was ever submitted to the court.

It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties inthe course of the performance of their duties. Nor can a sheriff request or ask sums of moneyfrom a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming that such

payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel thesuspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Neither will complainant'sacquiescence or consent to such expenses absolve the sheriff for his failure to secure the priorapproval of the court concerning such expense .12

Any amount received by sheriffs in excess of the lawful fees allowed in Section 10 is anunlawful exaction. 1wphi1 It constitutes unauthorized fees. This renders them liable for grave

misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service .13

Section 52 (A) (20), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CivilService classifies conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as a grave offense, whichis punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offenseand by dismissal for the second offense. The Court, however, deems it appropriate to impose the

penalty of suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day, which is within the range of the penalty,instead of the maximum penalty of one (1) year, as recommended by the OCA in light of thecircumstances surrounding the case and prevailing jurisprudence on first-time offenders of thisnature.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Erlito DS. Bacho, Sheriff IV, Regional TrialCourt, Branch 124, Caloocan City, is found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interestof the Service and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from service, without pay, for a periodof six 6) months and one (1) day. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same orsimilar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 195243 August 29, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,vs.RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRY BERIBER

@ BONG @ RAUL FUENTES,Appellant.D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR-H.C. No. 01623, which affirmed with modification the Judgmen t2 dated July 7, 2005 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City, finding appellant Raul Beriber yFuentes @Jerry Fuentes y Ignacio@ Gerry Beriber@ Bong@ Raul Fuentes, guilty of the crimeof Robbery with Homicide.

On March 22, 2001, a Second Amended Information 3 was filed before the RTC of San PabloCity charging appellant of Robbery with Homicide .4

The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about October 3, 2000, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with intent to gain, didthen and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the premises of SPOUSES HENRYand MA. LOURDES VERGARA, located at Brgy. San Cristobal, this city, and once inside andfinding an opportune time, did then and there take, steal and carry away cash money amounting

to P 2,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Spouses Henry and Ma. Lourdes Vergara, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons and by reason of or on the occasion ofsaid robbery, said accused attacked and stabbed to death his immediate employer Ma. LourdesVergara with a bladed weapon with which the accused was then conveniently provided, therebyinflicting wounds upon the person of said Ma. Lourdes Vergara which caused her immediatedeath.

CONTRARY TO LAW .5

When arraigned on April 17, 2001, appellant, with the assistance of a counsel de oficio , entered a plea of not guilty .6

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution is aptly summarized by the Solicitor General in the AppelleesBrief as follows:

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, as well as documentary evidence to prove its case.
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The first witness for the prosecution was Dr. Lucy Andal Celino (Celino), the physician whoexamined the remains of the victim, Lourdes Vergara. Celino is the Health Officer of San PabloCity. She testified that she conducted a necropsy of the victim on October 3, 2000 at 4:15 p.m.,and that she prepared a Necropsy Report which states that the victim died of shock andhemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds all over her body, some of which damaged her

heart, lungs, and liver. Celino also stated that the location of stab wounds, abrasions andlacerations on the victims body indicated that the latter struggled against her killer. The physician added that the perpetrator used two kinds of instruments in inflicting wounds on thevictim: a sharp-pointed instrument and a pointed rounded instrument.

On cross-examination, Celino confirmed that the wounds sustained by the victim were inflictedusing two different pointed instruments.

The prosecution also presented police officer Armando Demejes (Demejes), who testified thatwhile he was on duty on October 3, 2000, he went to the house of Henry Vergara (Henry) inBarangay San Cristobal, San Pablo City to investigate a stabbing incident which occurred

thereat.

When Demejes arrived at the scene of the crime, Vergara informed him that his wife, Lourdes,was stabbed to death. Demejes entered the house and saw a cadaver lying on a bamboo bed. Healso looked around the house and saw that the place was in disarray. In the sala, about five to sixmeters away from the corpse, was an open drawer containing coins, and on the floor near thesaid drawer were more coins. Another drawer was pulled out from its original location and lefton a couch. Demejes likewise found a blue tote bag on top of the center of the table and a

passbook on top of the bed. He also saw that the door leading to the stairs was open. Demejes prepared a sketch of the crime scene to document what he saw during his investigation.

Thereafter, the prosecution presented Neville Bomiel (Bomiel), a resident of Barangay SanCristobal, San Pablo City. Bomiel testified that he had known the appellant for less than a month prior to October 3, 2000. He knew that the appellant was working for the Vergaras and resided atthe latters rice mill. Bomiel recalled that while he was standing in front of his house in themorning of October 3, 2000, at around 10:00 a.m., he saw the appellant leave the house of theVergaras and walk towards the direction of the school. When appellant passed by Bomielshouse, he asked appellant where the latter was going. Appellant replied that he was on his way toBatangas for medical treatment. Bomiel noticed that appellant was wearing a yellow collared t-shirt, blue denims, and shoes. Later, he saw appellant return to the house of the Vergaras andenter the place. Afterwards, appellant left the house and passed by Bomiels residence a secondtime. Bomiel again greeted the appellant and asked him why he (appellant) had not yet left forBatangas. Appellant replied that he was still waiting for Henry. Appellant again proceeded to thedirection of the school. Subsequently, Bomiel saw the appellant return to the house of theVergaras a third time. That was the last time Bomiel saw him. Bomiel observed that on that day,appellant looked restless. ("balisa at hindi mapakali.")

The fourth witness for the prosecution, Rolando Aquino (Aquino), likewise a resident ofBarangay San Cristobal, San Pablo City, testified that he had known appellant for less than a


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month on October 3, 2000. He knew the appellant was hired by the Vergaras as a helper in theirrice mill.

In the morning of October 3, 2000, Aquino was able to talk to the appellant at the house of acertain Lola Rosy, the victims moth er. Appellant told Aquino that he was going to Batangas that

day for medical treatment. Thereafter, appellant, then wearing short pants and a t-shirt with cut-off sleeves, left the house of Lola Rosy to go [to] the rice mill. At around 8:30 a.m., Aquinoagain saw appellant at Lola Rosys house, but appellant was already wearing a mint green -colored shirt and khaki pants. Aquino asked appellant why he had not yet left, but the latter didnot answer and appeared restless. Later that morning, at around 11:30 a.m., Aquino learned thatLourdes had been killed. He rushed to the house of the Vergaras and saw the victim lying on a

bamboo bed, drenched in blood. Aquino then noticed that the appellants personal belongingswhich were kept by the appellant underneath the bamboo bed were no longer there. He furthertestified that he did not see appellant return to San Cristobal after October 3, 2000.

Henry Vergara also testified before the trial court. He said that he and the victim hired appellant

as a helper in their r ice mill in September 2000. Appellant slept in the house of Henrys mother -in-law, Rosy, but kept his personal belongings in their house (the Vergaras house), specificallyunder the bamboo bed where Lourdes corpse was discovered on October 3, 2000 at past 11:00a.m.

At around 5:30 in the morning of October 3, 2000, appellant asked Henry for permission to go toBatangas. Henry asked appellant to fetch a certain Junjun to be his replacement as Henryshelper in their store in Dolores, Quezon that day. Henry left their house in San Cristobal at 6:00a.m. to tend their store in Quezon and stayed in the store until 11:00 a.m. before heading backhome.

When he arrived at their house in San Cristobal, he noticed that the door was slightly open. Hecalled for Lourdes, but nobody answered. He immediately entered their house and saw that thedoor of their rice mill was closed. This caused him to suspect that something was wrong. He thennoticed that coins were scattered on the floor. He proceeded to the kitchen and saw Lourdeslying on the bamboo bed, lifeless and bloodied in the chest and stomach areas.

Henry thereafter ran to the house of his brother-in-law, Wanito Avanzado (Avanzado), who alsoresided in San Cristobal. Henry told Avanzado that Lourdes was already dead. Avanzado thenran to the house of the Vergaras.

Henry recalled that before he left for their store in Quezon that day, he left appellant, his wifeand their children in their house. He also remembered that cash amounting to Two ThousandPesos (P 2,000.00) was left inside the drawer in their rice mill. However, when he looked for themoney after he discovered that his wife was killed, he could no longer find it.

Henry also testified that he did not see the appellant in their house when he went home fromQuezon and that appellants personal effects were no longer under the bamboo bed whereappellant used to keep them. He did not see appellant anymore after he left their house onOctober 3, 2000.


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Lastly, the prosecution presented as witness Avanzado, the brother of the victim. Avanzadotestified that at around 11:00 a.m. on October 3, 2000, he saw his brother-in-law, Henry, runningtowards his (Avanzados) house and shouting "Si Aloy", the victims nickname. He ran to thehouse of the Vergaras and saw his si sters bloodied body on the bamboo bed.

Avanzado tried to lift her body, but her neck was already stiff. After he was sure that Lourdeswas indeed dead, he called up the police and requested them to investigate the incident. Whenthe police arrived, they took pictures of the crime scene and conducted an investigation.

Avanzado further stated that he knew that the appellant was a helper of the Vergaras. He saidthat he was told by several residents of San Cristobal that they saw appellant leaving the scene ofthe crime with a bag.

He also narrated that as Barangay Chairman of San Cristobal, he coordinated with the police forthe apprehension of the appellant. Avanzado went with some police officers to Talisay, Batangasto search for appellant in the house of his uncle, but appellant was not there. Later, Avanzado

received information that appellant was apprehended in Capiz, but was released by policeauthorities because the latter were worried that they would be charged with illegal detention.Avanzado then sought the assistance of the staff of Kabalikat, a program aired by the ABS-CBNBroadcasting Company. Appellant was subsequently apprehended and brought back to San PabloCity to face the charge against him .7

Except for Dr. Celino, the defense waived its right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.Appellant's counsel further waived the presentation of evidence .8 Both parties failed to file theirrespective memoranda despite being ordered to do so; thus, the RTC resolved the case on the

basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

On October 22, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision ,9

the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court findsaccused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRYBERIBER @ "Bong", @ "Raul Fuentes" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofRobbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code andhe is hereby sentenced the supreme and capital penalty of DEATH, with costs.

He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased:

a) the sum of P 50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b) the sum of P 2,000.00 representing the stolen cash;

c) the sum of P 200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and

d) the sum of P 100,000.00 representing burial and other incidental expenses of thevictim.
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SO ORDERED .10

The case was then elevated to us on automatic review. However, in a Decision 11 dated June 8,2004, we had set aside the Judgment of the RTC and remanded the case to the same court forfurther proceedings. The fallo of our Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, inCriminal Case No. 12621-SP (00), is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the caseREMANDED to said court for its proper disposition, including the conduct of further appropriate

proceedings and the reception of evidence. For this purpose, the proper law enforcement officersare directed to TRANSFER appellant RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES from the New BilibidPrison where he is presently committed to the BJMP Jail in San Pablo City, with adequatesecurity escort, where he shall be DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trialcourt.

The Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32 is directed to dispose of the case with

dispatch.

SO ORDERED .12

In compliance, the RTC scheduled the case for hearing. On July 27, 2004, appellant's samecounsel submitted a Manifestation that the defense is again waiving its right not to adduceevidence and with appellant's conformity. On August 10, 2004, appellant's counsel reiterated hermanifestation. The RTC then ordered to place appellant on the stand, wherein appellant stoodfirm not to present any evidence for his defense .13

The RTC then forwarded to us the transcripts and the records of the proceedings held on August

10, 2004. In a Resolution14

dated January 18,2005, we ordered the RTC to render its decision onthe case based on the evidence that had been presented.

On July 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting appellant of the crime of Robberywith Homicide based on circumstantial evidence, the dispositive portion which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court findsaccused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRYBERIBER @ "Bong," @ "Raul Fuentes" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofRobbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, andconsidering the absence of any aggravating circumstance which merits the imposition of the

maximum penalty of death, and conformably with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Codewhich provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and there are neithermitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall

be applied, accused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @GERRY BERIBER @ "Bong," @ "Raul Fuentes" is sentenced to suffer the penalty of

RECLUSION PERPETUA with costs.

He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_195243_2012.html#fnt10


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a) the sum of P

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