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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Justice, Happiness, and Self-Knowledge Author(s): Laurence Thomas Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 63-82 Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231455 . Accessed: 12/06/2014 20:26 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Canadian Journal of Philosophy is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 185.2.32.109 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 20:26:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Justice, Happiness, and Self-Knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Justice, Happiness, and Self-KnowledgeAuthor(s): Laurence ThomasSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 63-82Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231455 .

Accessed: 12/06/2014 20:26

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toCanadian Journal of Philosophy.

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Page 2: Justice, Happiness, and Self-Knowledge

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 16, Number 1, March 1986, pp. 63-82

Justice, Happiness, And Self-Knowledge*

LAURENCE THOMAS The University of North Carolina

Chapel Hill, NC 27514

No man can, for any considerable time, wear one face to himself and another to the multitude without finally getting bewildered as to which is the true one

- Nathaniel Hawthorne

The Platonic view that every just person is, in virtue of being such, hap- pier than any unjust person, since all among the latter are unhappy, strikes a most responsive chord in the hearts of a great many persons.

* I am indebted to many: To conversations with Terrance McConnell, Howard McGary, Jr. and, especially, Stephen Darwall, Christopher Gill and Holly Smith during the early stages of this paper; to my philosophical colleagues at the Na- tional Humanities Center: Thomas Hill, Jr., Lance Stell, and Carl Wellman; to John Deigh for his very forthright and penetrating comments as my commen- tator at the meetings of the American Philosophical Association (Western Divi- sion, 1983); to audiences at the Universities of Illinois (at Chicago), Maryland,

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But it would seem that this idea has less of a foothold in reality than it does in our hearts. It is far too difficult to deny that there are unjust per- sons who are happy. Indeed, some even seem to be happier than many a just person.

So I shall lower my sights. Rather than attempting to defend as sound the Platonic view, I shall argue that the just person is favored to be hap- pier than a certain kind of unjust person whom I shall simply call a mas- querader - this is, an individual who is frequently concerned to mas- querade as a deeply caring person.1 To this end, I shall defend two theses. One is the Justice /Self -Knowledge (JSK) thesis: when it comes to interpersonal relationships the just person has more self-knowledge than a masquerader. The other is the Happiness /Self-Knowledge (HSK) thesis: other things equal, a person's happiness is more secure if it stems from the self-knowledge which he possesses with respect to the realiza- tion of his endeavors. Though obviously weaker than what Plato was after, I take it that the view which I am concerned to defend is very much in keeping with the spirit of his thought. As I shall argue (§1), the JSK thesis, while perhaps not implied by what Plato says in the Republic, owes its inspiration to his views; and the HSK thesis is certainly worth considering once the JSK thesis is entertained. Before getting underway, some preliminary remarks are in order.

1. In this essay, I can only claim to be arguing for a view concerning the connection between justice, happiness, and self-knowledge which bears an affinity to Plato's and which draws upon his insights. My aim is not to defend his views as such. I do not claim that, in the last analysis, what I say can be made to square with his view.

Nebraska, Virginia, Waterloo, and Vanderbilt University; and to Robert Audi and James Lesher for extensive written comments which both encouraged me and sent me back to the drawing board.

A special word of thanks goes to my psychologist friend Robert Gilmore. My intellectual debt to Kurt Baier is greater than words can tell. So is my gratitude.

Support from the National Humanities Center and an off -campus grant from the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), both for 1982-83, is gratefully acknol wedged.

1 Recall Philippa Foot's argument against the unjust person in her essay Moral Beliefs,' Essay 8 in her Virtues and Vices (Los Angeles: University of California Press 1979). Philosophically, this essay is very much akin to her essay. However, the conclusion I am concerned to establish is weaker than the one she sought to establish when she wrote the essay, since she thought that perhaps she could make good Plato's claim. See note 6 of that essay.

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2. I assume that if a person has a high degree of self-knowledge when it comes to interpersonal relationships, then she has roughly an equally high degree of self-knowledge in other areas of her life such as career goals and so on. Given the complexity of interpersonal relationships, this assumption seems reasonable enough.2

3. Since the wholly just or unjust person is a mere philosophical fic- tion, this essay is about neither. Throughout, it is to be understood that I am talking about only the basically just or unjust person. I take the former to be one for whom treating others justly is among her deep- seated aims, though she may act unjustly from time to time because the temptation is too great or because bitterness or anger, say, gets the better of her. Unjust behavior of hers generally occasions shame and guilt on her part; and she is greatly disturbed when this is not so. I shall under- stand the basically unjust person in a somewhat narrow way. He is one who has no qualms about treating anyone unjustly when it is in his self- interest to do so, save those whom he regards himself as caring deeply about - his loved ones and friends, let us say. As I am using the expres- sion, a person cares deeply about another only if he has feelings of affec- tion for that person. It is generally supposed that anyone who is com-

pletely incapable of caring this way about anyone, as the wholly unjust person is often made out to be, is psychologically unhealthy.3 If this is right, then even if it can be shown that any (wholly or only basically) just person is happier than any wholly unjust person, one is still left rather empty handed. A most shallow victory has been achieved. This con- sideration clearly warrants our focusing upon only the basically unjust person.

4. As the preceding remarks make clear, my concern in this essay is with the virtue of justice as an attribute of persons rather than social in- stitutions. So for the purposes of this essay, the virtue of justice is that aspect of morality which limits the way in which we may go about ad- vancing our own self-interests; the vice of injustice is that aspect of im-

2 Cf . Harold H. Kelly and John W. Thibaut, Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1978), and Harold H. Kelly, Personal Relationships (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1979).

3 Cf. discussions in the psychological literature on the psychopath, e.g., Norman Cameron, Personality Development and Psychopathology (Boston: Miflin Com-

pany 1963), 651-59 and K. T. Strongman, The Psychology of Emotion, 2nd edn (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1978), 96-8. The psychopath is regarded as a per- son who is psychologically unhealthy because he is emotionally shallow.

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morality which embraces the idea that there are moral restrictions on what we may do to others as we advance our self-interests. Thus, understood, justice does not comprise all of morality nor injustice all of immorality. As I am conceiving of the unjust person, he may be viewed as a circumscribed egoist; for he is prepared to take advantage of anyone except those few about whom he cares deeply.4

5. The claim that the just person is favored to be happier than the un- just person who is a masquerader (in the sense delineated above) is to be understood in an intuitive way. Consider an analogous example. Other things equal, a child born into a well-educated family is favored to do better in the academy than a child born into a poorly educated one. This is so although it may very well turn out that a child from a poorly educated family does considerably better than a child from a well- educated one. The claim that the just person is favored to be happier than a masquerader is to be understood in an analogous way.

I

As is well known, Plato advances a view which goes rather like this: (i) The soul has three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite; (ii) a person has a just soul if and only if each of its parts is functioning properly; and (iii) it is only in the soul of the just person that the spirit part of the soul is an al- ly of reason. We may suppose that for Plato the spirit part of the soul is the seat of the emotions and feelings.5 (While I do not think that emo-

4 As often conceived, the egoist is thought to be concerned only with advancing his own interests. He is a selfish, calculating individual who reminds one of a psychopath. Cf . my 'Ethical Egoism and Psychological Dispositions,' American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980) 73-8. It has not been supposed by everyone, however, that the egoist must be a selfish creature. See Jesse Kalin, 'In Defense of Egoism,' in David Gauthier, ed., Morality and Rational Self-Interest (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1970) 64-87

5 My understanding of the Republic owes much to the following writers: John Cooper, The Psychology of Justice in the Republic, 'American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1977) 151-57; Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press 1977); and Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1973), especially Vlastos' essay 'Justice and Happiness in the Republic'

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tions and feelings come to the same thing, I shall, for the sake of conve- nience, generally use the latter term to refer to both.)

Now, by implication (iii) gives us: (iv) it is not the case that for the unjust person the spirit part of the soul is an ally of reason, which can be understood in several ways. For the unjust person: (iva) the spirit part of the soul is never an ally of reason; (ivb) sometimes the spirit part of the soul is an ally of reason, sometimes it is not and the unjust person does not, at least not often enough, know which is the case; or (ivc) sometimes the spirit part of the soul is an ally of reason and sometimes it is not and the unjust person can always discern which is the case. I take (ivfo) to be the correct reading of (iv), since on this reading the unjust person is clear- ly at a disadvantage when it comes to whether or not he should regard his feelings as being in the service of reason. On the (iva) reading, it is ob- vious that the unjust person should ignore his feelings entirely; for it is impossible that he should come out the worse for doing so, since on this reading the spirit part of the soul is never an ally of reason. Hence, he should train himself not to rely on his feelings at all. (ivc) is akin to (iva); for if the unjust person knows when the soul will not be an ally of reason, then he can simply prepare himself, through rigorous training, for those cases when the spirit part of the soul is not an ally of reason. On the (ivb) reading, it is clear that the unjust person can come out the worse for ig- noring his feelings, since some, but not all, of them will be in the service of reason. His problem lies in just the fact that, on the one hand, it would be a mistake for him to act as if none of his feelings is ever in the service of reason; but, on the other, he cannot discern when they are and when they are not.

From the foregoing considerations we can, provided that we under- stand self-knowledge in the usual way, arrive at the conclusion that the

just person has more self-knowledge than the unjust person. The more of a handle a person has on what his aims and ambitions are and on what motivates him and why, then the more self-knowledge he has. In view of the fact that the just person knows that all of his feelings are in the service of reason, whereas the unjust person cannot distinguish between those which are and whose which are not, then surely the JSK thesis holds.

I trust that I have said enough to warrant my claiming that the JSK thesis is inspired by Plato's views. I have been concerned to do no more than that in this section. The JSK and the HSK theses are defended in the sections which follow.

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II

Unjust treatment being what it is, willing targets of injustice are hard to come by. Thus, an unjust person can carry out his unjust exploits only if he is sufficiently powerful that he can simply beat into submission all who stand in his way or he is fairly good at catching people off guard. Given the latter, it in no way follows that every or any unjust person must be what I have called a masquerader. For we can imagine an ex- ceedingly clever and craftty unjust person who always manages to catch his targets of injustice unaware and then to escape without detection. Presumably, anyone who possessed Gyges' ring could do these things (Republic, bk II [359-361]). We can even imagine that this person is wide- ly known to be unjust, but nonetheless successfully thwarts all attempts to apprehend him. Again, a person with Gyges' ring could presumably pull this off. So, we can imagine a viciously unjust person who never has to give the impression that he will act unjustly.

But so much for what we can imagine. In the actual world, no unjust person possesses anything remotely resembling a Gyges' ring. According- ly, an unjust person could not be within striking range of some of his targets of injustice but for the fact that he gives them every reason to believe that he will not treat them unjustly. That is, in general an unjust person cannot carry out his unjust exploits without, upon occasion, hav- ing to deceive some others into thinking that he will not treat them un- justly. Again, from none of this does it follow that every or any unjust person must be a masquerader. However, once it is seen that deceiving people can very much facilitate leading an unjust life, it becomes obvious that it will suit the purposes of some unjust persons to be masqueraders, since a person can have no better reason to think that she will not be treated unjustly by another than that she has reason to believe that the person cares deeply about her. But one pays an enormous price for being a masquerader.

For, if we believe that we genuinely care deeply about a person, then we do not want it to turn out, at least not too often, that the primary ex- planation for our displaying caring behavior toward him is other than that we genuinely care about him. And as we shall see, if an unjust per- son is a masquerader, then on that account alone, he cannot help but be less certain than the just person as to why he is moved to display caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones. This is what we must establish if we are to establish the JSK thesis. (It will be remembered that this essay is about the basically unjust person, among whom the mas- querader is to be countenanced, and that the basically unjust person does

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regard himself as caring deeply about some individuals, namely his friends and loved ones.)

Ill

There are two reasons cum explanations why the masquerader will be moved to display caring behavior toward someone: (a) an intrinsic one, that is, he cares deeply about the person or (b) an extrinsic one, that is, he stands to gain some benefit which is not simply that of taking delight in displaying caring bahavior toward the person in question. More precisely, in the latter case the behavior is not motivated by love or con- cern for the person in question. Respectively, we have genuine and simulated caring behavior. It goes without saying that these two explana- tions are not mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, because having close ties with some person or the other is essential to our psychological well-being and displays of caring behavior serve to maintain such ties, then it is clearly to a person's advantage to display such behavior from time to time towards those with whom he has close ties. In other words, a person always has an extrinsic reason for displaying caring behavior towards those with whom he has close ties. As I have said, though, if we take ourselves to care deeply about a person, then we want the fact that we care deeply about him to be the primary explanation, if not the only explanation, for our displaying caring behavior toward him. We do not want the explanation to be that we will benefit in return, even if we know this to be so, as in the maintenance of close ties. We want the reason for our displaying caring behavior to be an intrinsic one rather than an ex- trinsic one.6

6 In writing this section, I have profited considerably from the recent literature in

psychology on self-monitoring behavior and self-presentational strategies. See,

among others, Mark Snyder, 'Self-Monitoring of Expressive Behavior,' Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology 30 (1974) 526-37; Priscila R. Danheiser and William G. Graziano, 'Self-Monitoring and Cooperation as a Self-Presentational

Strategy,' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42 (1982) 497-505; Ed- ward Jones, et. al., 'Effects of Strategic Self-Presentation on Subsequent Self-

Esteem,' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 41 (1981) 407-21; Harry T. Reiss, 'Self-Presentation and Distributive Justice,' in James T. Tedeschi, ed.,

Impression Management Theory and Social Psychological Theory (New York:

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Now, in view of the fact that it is a characteristic feature of the unjust person who is a masquerader that, except when it comes to those about whom he cares deeply, he is moved to display caring behavior toward others precisely because it is to his extrinsic advantage to do so, the ob- vious question is this: How can he be sure that this is not also the ex- planation for why he is moved to display caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones? How can he be sure that his caring behavior toward them is genuine rather than simulated? Or, to put the question in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic reasons: How can he be sure that it is for intrinsic rather than extrinsic reasons that he displays caring behavior towards his friends and loved ones? At first blush, it might seem natural

Academic Press 1981) 269-91. The literature suggests that high self-monitors, that is, people who are remarkably adept at creating the social images of themselves for which the occasion calls, tend to be exclusively concerned with maximizing their own outcomes. Of tremendous significance is that 'the social world within which high self-monitoring individuals live are characterized by greater partitioning, differentation, and segmentation than those of low self- monitoring individuals,' Mark Snyder, The Self in Action' (in press).

For support, of a very different sort, for the claims of psychology made here, I refer the reader to Bruno Bettleheim's essay 'Remarks on the Psychological Ap- peal of Totalitarianism,' in his collection of essays Surviving (New York: Vintage Books Edition 1980) 317-32. I quote two passages:

... modern totalitarian society ... demands spontaneous assent and total conformity in all life activities, even the most private. It is relatively sim- ple to keep one's mouth shut. But it is much more difficult, when one is in opposition to the society in which one lives, to go through the motions of living as though one were in accord with it (330).

As these dreams show, in totalitarian societies opponents live in the continuous anxiety that they may make a slip, that they may reveal their inner feelings and risk total destruction of themselves and maybe their families. Therefore, opponents have to become perfect actors. But in order to be a perfect actor one not only has to act, but to feel, to live the role (331).

Bettleheim's observations receive support from the black experience in the United States. See Bernard Boxill, Blacks, and Social Justice (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld 1984). In explaining the importance of protest even when it would seem to be of no avail, Boxill writes: '... only consummate artistry can enable a person to continuously and elaborately pretend to be servile and still know that he is self-respecting. Unless this strategy is executed by a master, the evidence of servility will seem overwhelming and the evidence of self-respect too ambiguous' (193).

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to suppose that the masquerader can simply rely upon the difference in the way he would feel when, on the one hand, displaying caring behavior toward those whom he cares deeply about and, on the other, displaying caring behavior toward his targets of injustice. But can he? I think not.

Obviously enough, the best substitute for something is one that is all but indistinguishable from the genuine article. Now, the fact of the mat- ter is that in general human beings are fairly good monitors of human behavior. Over time, especially, we become quite good at sizing up the depth of a person's sincerity. And the key element in our assessment is a person's non-verbal behavior,7 which refers to all bodily behavior in- cluding how a person says what he says. So, by verbal behavior alone what is meant is simply the words which a person utters. Given that ut- terances of the appropriate sort can be produced at will,8 it should come as no surprise that non-verbal behavior plays a fundamentally important role in our assessment. Moreover, among friends and loved ones, especially, much of the non-verbal behavior is spontaneous and affec- tive.9 If Jones and Smith are close friends and Jones tells Smith that she,

7 In this connection, the work of Erving Goffman must come quickly to mind. See. e.g., his The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday Books 1963)., I have also profited from the writings of Michael Argyle, 'Non- Verbal Communication in Human Social Interaction' and I. Eibl-Eibesfeld, 'Similarities and Differences Between Cultures in Expressive Movements,' both in Robert A. Hinde, ed., Non-Verbal Communication (New York: Cambridge University Press 1972) 243-69; 297-314, and Robert A. Hinde, Biological Basis of Human Social Behavior (New York: MacGraw-Hill Book Company 1974) Ch 10. Of late, much attention has been paid to non-verbal behavior in male-female interaction. See, e.g., Clara Mayo and Nancy M. Henly, Gender and Nonverbal Behavior (New York: Springer- Verlag Inc. 1981) and Erving Goffman, Gender Advertisements (New York: Harper and Row 1979).

8 Thus, observe that a person needn't feel sorry for having harmed someone in order for it to be true that he has apologized for having done so. Hence, we

distinguish between sincere and insincere apologies, the mark of the former being that they are accompanied by the appropriate non-verbal displays. I have argued this at length in my Morality, The Self, and Our Natural Sentiments,' in I.D. Irani and Gerald Myers, eds., Emotion: Philosophical Studies (New York: Haven Publications 1984).

9 In the Nichomachean Ethics (Bk IX, Ch. 12), Aristotle asks: 'Is it ... true of friends that the most desirable thing for them to do is to live together?' (1171b31), it being clear that the question is to be answered affirmatively. The relevant point here is that because of the spontaneity of interaction that comes with living together, friends who live together have the greatest vantage point from which to observe one another's life.

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Jones, has just won a Nobel Prize or has just lost her son, then Smith should respond with joy in the first case, sadness in the second, and spontaneously in either case. That he should so respond is not really a matter open for discussion. Smith's attitude toward Jones should be such that the appropriate feelings (emotions) are automatically engaged, as it were, depending on the news conveyed to him. He does not need to deliberate about whether to have them. Hence, the feelings he displays are, and come across as being, a natural outcome of what he actually feels. Putting the point this way allows for the fact that we do not always deem it appropriate to display our feelings, though presumably the story I have just told is not one where this holds.

As the preceding remarks should make clear, a person is best able to simulate deeply caring behavior, and will be most successful at passing himself off as a close friend or loved one if, simply upon cue, he is actual- ly able to bring himself to experience the feelings that are appropriate for the occasion. For only then will his simulated caring behavior have the spontaneity and naturalness to it that is characteristic of behavior among those who are close to one another when one party informs the other of either his good fortune or his misfortune.

Now, to be sure, on the view which I have presented if a person is simulating deeply caring behavior, then his experiencing the appropriate feelings constitutes an act on his part, since he brings it about that he ex- periences them, whereas this is not the case for the person who ex- periences feelings on account of actually caring deeply about a person. Here, only an event occurs; for the person's attitude toward the in- dividual in question is such that the appropriate feelings automatically come about upon learning what has happened to that individual.10 So it might be thought that a person who is adept at simulating deeply caring behavior should have no difficulty in distinguishing such behavior from that which is genuine. But, for the following reasons, this surmise is mistaken.

A person is adept at simulating deeply caring behavior only if his be- ing able to bring it about that he has the appropriate feelings is second nature to him. Now, if doing A under circumstances C is second nature to us, then our desires, intentions, and the like to do A given our belief that C obtains, are so firm and settled that upon perceiving that C ob-

10 This point is given greater expression in my Morality, The Self, and Our Natural Sentiments.'

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tains we do A automatically.11 Thus, not only do we no longer de- liberate about doing A in C, in any given instance, the pattern of doing A given (the belief) that C obtains is sufficiently well entrenched that unless we do not want to do A given C and attend to this want, we will find that we automatically do A in C. Consequently, while our doing A is the upshot of our desires, intentions, and so on and, therefore, is an act, we experience our doing of A more as something which happens than as something which we do. And all I need for the argument is that our doing A comes close enough to feeling like something which happens to us that we actually have difficulty distinguishing the simulated behavior from the genuine behavior.

After all, our automatically experiencing the appropriate sorts of feel- ings towards a person is what serves as the bedrock of our belief that we care deeply about him. We cannot become adept at simulating deeply caring behavior without causing a severe fault to run through this bedrock. For precisely what this adeptness comes to is our being able to bring it about that we will automatically experience the appropriate feel- ings though we do not, in fact, care deeply about the person. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot be adept at experiencing the feelings we want to experience toward others and not have an erosion in our con- fidence to judge correctly whether our deeply caring behavior is simulated or genuine. And the feelings which we automatically ex- perience cannot serve as the bedrock of our belief that we care deeply about a person if we are not confident that we would not experience them but for the fact that we have the appropriate attitude toward that person.

The masquerader has no immunity in this regard. An inevitable con- sequence of his adeptness at simulating deeply caring behavior is that he will find eroded his confidence in his judgment that his displays of caring behavior toward those whom he takes himself to care about are indeed genuine rather than simulated.

We can make the argument tighter. What is characteristic of the mas- querader is that extrinsic reasons for displaying caring behavior can cause him to experience spontaneously, in the appropriate circum- stances, the very feelings that intrinsic reasons of this sort can cause him

11 My thinking here is much influenced by John Cooper's discussion of perception and the practical syllogism in his Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1975), 46-58.

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to experience spontaneously. He has come to be this way on account of his concern to be able to pass himself off as a deeply caring person from time to time. But it will be remembered that there is always an extrinsic reason why a person should display caring behavior toward those with whom he has close ties. The problem for the masquerader, then, is this: Since (1) there is always an extrinsic reason for him to display caring behavior toward those with whom he has close ties, (2) he can easily enough be moved to display such behavior for extrinsic reasons, Since he is a basically unjust person, and (3) extrinsic reasons for displaying car- ing behavior can result in his experiencing spontaneously, in the ap- propriate circumstances, the very same feelings that intrinsic reasons of this sort can cause him to experience spontaneously, then it follows that (4) the masquerader cannot simply rely upon his feelings as evidence that his displays of caring behavior toward those with whom he has close ties is genuine. Now, if (5) the just person can rely upon such feelings whereas the masquerader cannot or, at any rate, the former can do so to a significantly greater extent than the latter, then it follows that the mas- querader cannot be as confident as the just person as to why he (the mas- querader) is moved to display caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones. It is not a characteristic feature of the just person that, because he desires to treat others justly, he will be moved to pass himself off as one who cares deeply about others when actually he does not. The just life does not require that one be adept at simulating deeply caring behavior; nor, a fortiori, does it require that one be adept at simulating just behavior.

Hence, leading a just life does not require a skill the very having of which casts an enormous shadow of doubt upon why one is moved to display caring behavior toward a person. It can even be allowed that the just person masks his feelings upon occasion. Parents who have just been dismissed from their jobs might manage to hide, at least for the moment, their situation from their daughter, who has received word that she has won a Rhodes Scholarship, since they do not wish to detract from her moment of glory. Notice, however, that this masking on their part can- not in any way be considered a constitutive part of leading a just life; whereas for the masquerader, simulating caring feelings is a constitutive part of his leading an unjust life. If these remarks are sound, then the JSK thesis holds.

Before considering some objections to the claims of this section, I should note that I have not argued that the just person can never be in the dark about why he is moved to display caring behavior toward someone. The claim that the just person is at an advantage with respect to the mas-

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querader, when it comes to being sure about why he (the just person) is moved to display caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones, hardly requires that the just person be flawless in this regard. All that is needed is for the disadvantage to be enough to be undersirable. This, I believe, has been shown. For as I have claimed, the feelings which we automatically experience cannot serve as the bedrock of our belief that we care deeply about a person if we are not generally confident that we would not experience them but for the fact that we have the appropriate attitude toward the person.

Below, I consider several objections to the arguments of this section.

IV

It may be thought to follow from my claim that the just person is not

adept at simulating caring behavior that no actor can be a just person and conversely. But not so. The very best of actors rehearse their perfor- mances.12 For when an actor displays angry behavior, say, she is display- ing it on account of someone or something; and she rehearses so as to get the timing of her response right. Actors rehearse so as to become attuned to both one another and their stage surroundings. Now, as I have described the masquerader, he turns out to be better than an actor, since he does not have to rehearse in order for the timing of his responses to mirror reality successfully. And that is just the rub for him.

The second objection I wish to consider has it that, because a just per- son is disposed to treat everyone justly and, therefore, is to this extent

favorably disposed toward everyone, the just person must like everyone; accordingly, the just person will often deceive himself into thinking that he likes a person; hence, he will be good at simulating deeply caring behavior after all. It is obvious, I trust, that this objection rests upon a false premise. Justice does not require that we like anyone.13 Thus, there

12 I am indebted here to Jonathan Miller, Plays and Players/ in Robert A. Hinde, ed., Non-Verbal Communication (New York: Cambridge University Press 1972) 359-72.

13 Brian Barry makes this point most forcefully in his review of Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1978). See The Yale Law

Journal 88 (1979) 629-58. For a development of this point in a different direction, see my 'Law Morality, and Our Psychological Nature,' in Michael Bradie and

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is nothing to the idea that the just person must go around pretending that he likes others when, in truth, he does not. On the contrary, being a just person is perfectly compatible with making it clear to a person that one does not like him. Believing that others like us is not a prerequisite for believing that they will treat us justly. I conclude, then, that there is nothing to this objection.

The third, and final, objection I wish to consider will no doubt ap- pear to be the most substantial one. This objection has it that because the just person is favorably disposed toward everyone, given that he is disposed to treat everyone justly, it is not possible for the just person to be confident in his judgment that his displays of caring behavior toward his loved ones and friends is genuine. If sound, this objection is telling. For, I will not have succeeded in showing that the masquerader cannot help but be less certain than the just person as to why he is moved to display caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones, even if I have managed to show that the unjust person will be plagued with uncertainty regarding such matters. Fortunately, this objection is not sound, which becomes quickly evident upon the realization that it does not differ in substance from the preceding objection.

Caring deeply about a person involves identifying with a person's in- terests to a far greater extent than does simply being a just person, and so being disposed to treat him justly. Accordingly, that we care deeply about a person suffices to make us susceptible to experiencing feelings on account of what happens to him which we are not susceptible to ex- periencing simply in virtue of being a just person, though the very same thing should happen to him. (The converse does not hold.)14 It is not in virtue of being a just person that we are prone to experience grief over a

David Braybrooke, eds., Social Justice (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 1982) 112-23.

14 It would seem that there is no feeling to which we are susceptible to experiencing on account of being a just person which we are not also susceptible to experienc- ing in virtue of the fact that we deeply care about a person. Taking the sentiment of love as a natural sentiment, this observation gives us a very nice way of understanding John Rawls' remarks that 'the moral sentiments are a normal part of life. One cannot do away with them without at the same time dismantling the natural sentiments as well,' A Theorly of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971), 489. 1 have tried to show the importance of love, taken as a natural sentiment, to morality in my 'Love and Morality: The Possibility of Altruism,' in James H. Fetzer, ed., Sociobiology and Epistemology (Boston: D. Reidel 1985) 115-29.

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person's death, rather, it is in virtue of the fact that we care deeply about him that we are so prone. Again, simply being a just person does not make us to experience either joy or sadness upon learning that a complete stranger to us did or did not receive the important post for which he had applied, whereas we are quite prone to experience either one or the other if the person is a close friend of ours. This point is not vitiated by the fact that if we have a stake in or, in any case, want the best person to win the job, then we can experience joy or sadness depending upon who gets the job. The upshot of these considerations is that being favorably disposed toward others admits of a continum. The favorable disposition of love and the favorable disposition of justice simply do not occupy the same points. And there is nothing about the just life, as such, which requires being adept at simulating deeply caring behavior. Thus, unless the just person happens to be in the business of simulating deeply caring behavior, he can be confident in his judgment that his displays of caring behavior toward his friends and loved ones are indeed genuine.

We have considered three objections to the arguments of the preceding section and have found none of them to be well-taken. I thus conclude that we do not have any reason to suppose that the Justice/Self- Knowledge thesis does not hold. The following observation should strengthen this claim.

Not all displays of caring behavior toward a person involve ex- periencing some caring feeling; that is, not all displays are visceral. This is so even when a person deeply cares for another, as the case of parental love shows. It is hardly the case that every time parents display caring behavior toward their child, they also experience some caring feeling. Some instances of caring behavior, then, are non-visceral. And as the parent example is meant to show, I do not mean to suggest that non- visceral caring behavior is, on account of being such, not genuine. Needless to say, this sort of caring behavior is considerably easier to simulate than visceral caring behavior. And if a person can simulate well non-visceral caring behavior, it does not follow that he can simulate visceral caring behavior well.

Now, if being a basically unjust person of the sort that I have des- cribed involves being adept at simulating non-visceral caring behavior only, then our argument for the JSK thesis would be less compelling than we would like. To be sure, it would hold that the masquerader cannot be as confident as the just person that his displays of non-visceral caring behavior are genuine, since the masquerader, unlike the just person, is moved easily enough by considerations of self-interest to display caring behavior. But, if it is only non-visceral caring behavior that is being

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simulated, then the masquerader can remain as confident as the just per- son that the caring feelings which he experiences toward his friend and loved ones are genuine. And if he can remain confident about that, then the price that he must pay for leading an unjust life (namely that of being less confident than the just person that his non-visceral caring behavior is genuine) may very well not be great enough to concern him. However, I have tried to show that that it is confidence about his visceral caring behavior that is eroded. And this has to concern him greatly. These con- siderations bring into sharper focus the arguments of the preceding sec- tion.

V

Let us turn now to the Happiness /Self -Knowledge thesis: other things equal, a person's happiness is more secure if it stems from the self- knowledge which he possesses with respect to the realization of his endeavors. The truth of this thesis can be easily made out.

Occasional luck can truly be a wonderful thing; too much of it, though, will destroy our self-confidence. For the more it turns out that the explanation for our successes is luck the less our successes reflect positively upon us, since the more it turns out that luck is the explanation for our successes the less they can be credited to our own abilities, skills, and ingenuity. So, for the overwhelming majority of cases, we want the explanation for our successes to be none other than that we have proper- ly and skillfully employed our natural assets. We want to be the author of our successes, let us say. These remarks are not meant to be an aside. On the contrary, they make it abundantly clear that we do not wish to be plagued with self-doubt as to whether or not we are the author of our successes. This is significant for the simple reason that, other things equal, the less a person is plagued with self-doubt in this regard, the hap- pier he is. Needless to say, it matters not whether the endeavors are con- stitutive of our interpersonal relationships. These remarks should suffice to show that the Happiness /Self -Knowledge thesis is sound.

It should be obvious how the HSK thesis bears on the unjust person who is a masquerader. As I have said, whether we are basically just or

unjust, we want our displays of caring behavior toward those whom we deeply care about to be genuine. The problem for the masquerader is just that in this regard he is plagued with significantly more self-doubt than the (basically) just person. In this very important respect, then, the mas-

querader is favored to be less happy than the (basically) just person.

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The task of this essay is near completion. The conclusion that the (basically) just person is favored to be happier than the (basically) unjust person who is a masquerader is forthcoming given the following addi- tional premise, which I shall call the certainty of caring principle (CC): Because it is sufficiently important to us that our displays of caring behavior toward those whom we take ourselves to care deeply about be genuine rather than simulated, we will more than likely be significantly less happy than we would be otherwise, regardless of our other sources of happiness, if we are uncertain as to whether or not our caring behavior toward them is genuine. All along I have assumed that the (CC) principle is true.

While I think that the truth of the principle can be satisfactorily demonstrated, I shall make no attempt to do so in this essay. This is because the principle is not controversial in that no party to the debate concerning the connection between justice and happiness would be con- cerned to deny it. In fact, those who insist that the unjust person need not be wholly unjust, and so not care about anyone, or that the ethical egoist need not be such that he does not care about anyone, clearly embrace the view that, regardless of other sources of happiness, having close ties is essential to human flourishing and, hence, human happiness.15 They regard the unjust person or the ethical egoist who cares about no one to be merely a philosophical fiction. Now, it goes without saying that one cannot insist that being able to form close ties is essential to human hap- piness and, in the same breath, deny that the CC principle is true.

We have, then, an argument for the conclusion that the just person is favored to be happier than the unjust person who is a masquerader. It is, I should like to think, an argument which is as plausible as any argument to the contrary is likely to be. Formally, the argument is as follows.

(PI) The just person has more self-knowledge than the unjust per- son who is a masquerader, at least when it comes to interper-

15 Jesse Kalin, 'In Defense of Egoism/ argues that the egoist need not be a complete- ly selfish being. I do not how non-selfish a person might be and yet be an egoist, but I take it that a masquerader is a minimally non-selfish egoist. And I have tried to show that the egoist has to be further along the continuum of non-selfish- ness than perhaps Kalin has been inclined to suppose if the egoist's lifestyle is not to give him trouble.

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sonal relationships. In particular, the just person will be more certain than the unjust person who is a masquerader as to why he is moved to display caring behavior toward those whom he takes to be his friends and loved ones (the JSK thesis)

(P2) Other things equal, a person's happiness is more secure if it stems from the self-knowledge which he possesses with respect to the realization of his endeavors (the HSK thesis)

(P3) Because it is sufficiently important to us that our displays of caring behavior toward those whom we take ourselves to care deeply about be genuine rather than simulated, we will more than likely be significantly less happy than we would be other- wise, regardless of our other sources of happiness, if we are uncertain as to whether or not our caring behavior toward them is genuine (the CC principle)

(C4) The just person is favored to be happier than the unjust person who is a masquerader.

Whether what I have argued concerning the connection between justice, happiness, and self-knowledge can, in the last analysis, be made to square with Plato's views regarding such matters, I do not know. I trust, however, that there is enough affinity between his views and what I have argued, especially in connection with (Pi), to warrant my using his good name.

VII

My concern in this essay has been to provide an argument which makes it plausible to hold that the just person is favored to be happier than the unjust person who is a masquerader. I have tried to provide one which has a foothold, not only in our hearts, but reality as well. I have sup- posed that in order to do this, we must make our case against the basical- ly unjust person rather than the wholly unjust person, since the latter would appear to be merely a philosophical fiction. This move is fun- damental. For whereas the wholly unjust person is not thought to care deeply about anyone, I assumed that there are some about whom the

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basically unjust person cares deeply and, therefore, that it very much matters to him that his displays of caring behavior toward them are ge- nuine. And a key premise in the argument has been that to the extent that the basically unjust person achieves consummate mastery at simulating deeply caring behavior, his confidence is undermined that he is genuine in his displays of caring behavior toward those about whom he takes himself to care deeply. A person who is less confident in this regard will pay for it in terms of happiness. To suppose otherwise, one would have to maintain that although it matters dearly to a person that he behaves in a certain way toward others, his happiness will not be adversely affected should his confidence that he is doing so be shaken. And this simply can- not be right. It is in this respect that the basically just person is favored, but not guaranteed, to be happier than the basically just person. I have not shown that the basically just person is happier than any basically un- just person. Nor have I shown that any kind of basically unjust life is subject to the sorts of difficulties which I have raised. If, as it would seem, the Godfather is not in the business of simulating caring behavior, then the kind of unjust life which the Godfather exemplifies is untouched by the arguments of this essay.16 There are many ways of leading an un- just life; and there is no reason to think that they all have the same drawbacks. I have focused upon a particular kind of unjust life, one which has a long tradition in moral theory, and I have even embellished it somewhat. Thus, if the arguments of this essay are sound, then not- withstanding their limited scope, the idea that living a just life is a good thing will have a more secure hold in reality as well as in our hearts.

Still, it may be objected that the conclusion for which I have argued is so weak as to be uninteresting because either (a) the class of unjust per- sons who are masqueraders is incredibly small or (b) if the just person is only favored to be happier than the unjust person, then the advantage does not come to much. As to (a) suffice it to say that a disappointing answer is here not an unimportant one. Better to know that the just per- son is favored to be happier than some unjust people than none at all. As to (b), a guarantee would, of course, be better. But guarantees in life are hard to come by; and in their absence, that one outcome is favored over another can be of great significance, as being the favorite in a game or race makes clear.

16 Recall Mario Puzo's The Godfather (New York: Putnam Books 1969). A person who is always in the position to be able to make someone an offer which cannot be refused needn't be much concerned with simulating caring behavior.

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A final comment: The arguments of this essay give us a handle on why leading a just life can hold an attraction even for the impoverished. Whatever our economic or social standing might be, it generally matters to us, surely, that our displaying caring behavior toward our friends and loved ones is genuine. If we can be confident that they are, then we have something very significant going for us in terms of the connection be- tween justice and happiness. I do not take this to be a mere aside. It is, I should think, a most significant upshot of what I have aimed to show.

Received April, 1984

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