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DOI: 10.1177/00471178030172002 2003; 17; 135 International Relations

Bryan Mabee Context

Security Studies and the `Security State': Security Provision in Historical

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International Relations Copyright © 2003 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 17(2): 135–151[0047–1178 (200306) 17:2; 135–151; 033131]

Security Studies and the ‘Security State’: SecurityProvision in Historical Context

Bryan Mabee, Oxford Brookes University, UK

Abstract

The role of historical change in international relations has been an important issue,especially regarding the ‘ahistoricism’ of mainstream theories. In this context, securitystudies has suffered from a lack of analysis of the state and its relation to historicalchange. When this attitude is challenged, it can be seen that the particular ‘state’ ofsecurity studies fits into a particular historical logic that structured states which issusceptible to change. A historical sociological analysis of the development of the state–society complexes surrounding security can provide a historical analysis of the state, inorder to better articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, itsrelationship with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporarycitizenship. The 20th century saw the development of the ‘security state’, where thewestern state became the centre of security provision, the protector against externalthreat and provider of domestic well-being.

Keywords: historical sociology, security state, security studies, state theory, statetransformation

One of the most important concerns of international relations has been the issue ofchange. The long-standing debate concerning the role of historical study in thedevelopment of theories of international relations has progressed steadily through-out the 1980s and 1990s.1 However, this growth has not had much of an impact onthe debates in security studies. The end of the Cold War sensitized theorists andpractitioners of security to the existence of a diversity of threats, and muchattention has been paid to the expansion of the issue areas of security studies andthe deepening of the conception of referents of security.2 The major changes thathave impacted the international system as a result of the end of the superpowerconflict, and the increasing recognition of the importance of globalization ininternational politics, provide an opportunity for a re-examination of the basis ofpost-Second World War security, especially in terms of the major security actor:the sovereign state.

Though much notice has been recently paid to notions concerning a changingenvironment of security, little of this has been connected explicitly to global-ization, and even less to changes in contemporary western states.3 This lack can beexplained by the relative inattention those studying security (and internationalrelations more generally) have spent dealing with theories of the state and itshistoricization.4 The state is given an implicit definition that is used trans-historically. The problem with the avoidance of state theorization manifests itself

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in the inability to incorporate change, and the state takes on an isomorphiccharacter. When the state is seen as a static, transhistorical institution, change iseither ignored or only postulated in terms of a radical break from normal practices.This can be seen, for example, in the often-polarized debates concerning theimpacts of globalization on the state, between those who deny change, and thosewho claim radical transformation.5 The possibility of a change in the state and itsfunctions becomes difficult to hypothesize, and the only possibility for statesfaced with change is the ‘end of the state’.6

As Hobson has noted, the mainstream of international relations theorizing,especially that of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, has been susceptible to anahistorical attitude: that history only exists in so much as it reflects presentconditions, and as such denies novelty and change.7 When this attitude ischallenged, it can be seen that the particular ‘state’ of international relations – i.e.the Westphalian state, with its discrete separation of inside and outside – fits into aparticular historical logic that structured states which is susceptible to change.This is not to deny the reality of the Westphalian paradigm, but to highlight itsorigins and suggest that it is not the case that it has been existent since the birth ofthe ‘Westphalian’ system,8 and that it may lead to somewhere else, by conditionsof its own making.9

Security studies has suffered from similar problems with regard to the state andhistorical change. In the traditional realist approach to security studies, the statehas been unquestioned in its historical structure.10 Symptomatic of this, securitystudies has mainly focused on changes in issue areas caused by globalization andthe end of the Cold War, ignoring possible changes to the state and securityprovision itself.11 While critical scholars have done much to interrogate theassumptions of traditional approaches to security, their views on the state havemainly questioned its role as the object of security (i.e. a criticism of the nationalfocus of security studies) and the state as a security provider (i.e. against theassumption that states act in their citizens’ best interests).12 This questioning hasbeen valuable in denaturalizing the state as the provider of security, but hasignored to some extent the formation and historical role of states in the securityprocess.13

The debates that the critical agenda have developed, such as where securityresides, and who the ‘subject’ of security is, are important. However, there remainsa crucial question concerning how the provision of security has historicallychanged with the development of the state. A historical sociological analysis ofthe development of the state–society complexes surrounding security will assist inthis process, by supplying a historical analysis of the state, in order to betterarticulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its relationshipwith individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary citizenship.14

During the period of total war at the beginning of the 20th century, a particularconfiguration of state–society security relationships developed in western stateswhere the state increased its power over society, but also in return gave a bundleof social goods to its citizens as a means of providing security. This model is here

136 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 17(2)



referred to as the ‘security state’.15 Though this is often divorced from discussionsof security, as ‘domestic’ concerns have been relegated to the margins of securitystudies, this development indicated a particular change in state–society relations.The increase in domestic security provision was a compromise for a greaterinternationalization of the state, and provided a distinctive separation of externaland internal security. Security was very much linked to the idea of ‘external’threat, and the divide between discrete internal and external realms became verymuch reified in thinking about international relations.

A move towards examining state–society security complexes requires anattempt to historically situate the role of contemporary states as security providers.This is particularly important in investigating the rather undeveloped impacts ofglobalization on security studies.16 While in other areas, particularly theeconomic, globalization has been linked explicitly to changes in the state, it is inthe realm of security that these impacts have been most neglected. A focus on thechanging nature of security provision will help to analyse where the security statehas come from, and its prospects for the future.

This will be accomplished by demonstrating the historical development of theEuropean model of state and society security compacts, and show the specificdevelopment of the security state. However, there is a problem in generalizingabout the security state, as there is a tension between its use as a theoreticalconcept and the geographical scope of its existence. In this regard, the discussionwill focus on the development of the western model of the security state.17 Thisgeographical neglect is necessary in order to focus clearly on the main theoreticalproblem: the historical analysis of security provision.

In order to accomplish this analysis, three steps will be taken. First, anintroduction to the possible contribution of neo-Weberian historical sociology tosecurity studies will be given, in order to show how security provision isembedded in the state–society complex, through the concept of citizenship.Second, an overview of the development of a security relationship between stateand society in the European state-building process will be given, demonstratingthe increasing intensity of state–society bonds that were partly maintained by thegranting of protective rights to citizens. Third, an analysis of the development ofthe security state in the 20th century will provide the background for a historicallyconstituted state–society security complex, with the possibility to incorporatechange.

Security and the neo-Weberian state

The problem that is most apparent in the way the state is utilized in internationalrelations (and, by extension, security studies) is that of transhistoricism, where thecontemporary state is seen as unchanged from its ‘emergence’ in 1648 (or,perhaps better put, the modern state is seen as the same as the contemporarystate).18 This tendency both overestimates the coherence and capacity of early

SECURITY STUDIES AND THE ‘SECURITY STATE’ 137



European states, as well as ignoring the tendency for the state to evolve.19 This isa symptom of the general reluctance of scholars of international relations todevote much effort in analysing the state itself. The state has generally beenviewed as a national-territorial totality, where, as Halliday notes, ‘the stateprovides in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map’.20 The state ininternational relations is, due to this, often under-theorized, and often con-ceptualized in a static manner.

In security studies, the state has primarily been discussed, if at all, in terms ofits relevance as an actor in the security process.21 Though these debates areimportant, the terms of the debate encompass the security provision by westernstates in the latter half of the 20th century. There is little sense that states havedeveloped particular security relationships with their constituent societies, otherthan those that embrace notions of the state and a liberal social contract. The resultof this is a situation where the arguments have mainly hinged around thepromotion or dismissal of states as security actors.22 Though this is not a problemin the sense that the questions that these debates have raised are indeed important,it does seem to limit the possibilities of examining the future of both the state andsecurity provision.

The international context of security must presume some kind of relationshipwith states and their domestic societies, as states have a domestic (societal) role inaddition to their international commitments.23 This could, theoretically, go along acontinuum from the idea that states themselves act completely in their owninterests, without regard to their domestic constituencies, to the idea that nationalsecurity is primarily determined by domestic constituencies, at least in the abstractsense that the ‘national interest’ embodies the collective interests of domesticsociety. As McSweeney points out: ‘It is implicit in most studies of national andinternational security . . . that the ultimate reference is people. . . . It is from thehuman need to protect human values that the term “security” derives itsmeaning.’24

Contemporary state theory has relevance in this context, for it has struggledwith the problems of examining the state historically, the relevance of state–society relations and developing a model of how changes in state structures andstate–society relations occur. Sociologists, and especially those working withinneo-Weberian historical sociology, have done much to help clarify the state as aninstitution.25 These approaches separate the state (as a socio-political institution)and society (as social relations in general), for the purpose of examining thecontext of relationships between the two.26 The merits of this approach are that ithelps to clarify state–society relations, and importantly, allows for and sub-stantively examines the state as a historically constituted and dynamic institution,providing for the possibility of change in the institutional framework of the stateitself.27

The crucial idea that derives from such an approach is the concept of stateautonomy. Though in realist international relations thought autonomy hasgenerally been placed in the context of the international realm, in that states are




autonomous from one another, in this context it also refers to the way the staterelates to society. The state should be seen, as Poggi notes, ‘as itself constituting adistinctive social force, vested with interests of its own, which affect autono-mously, and sometimes decisively, the state’s own arrangements and policy’.28

This is important because it describes a relationship between states and societiesthat goes beyond the fiction of the state as a mere outgrowth of individualdesires.29 However, the autonomy of the state from society is never total, as statesoften rely on their constituent societies for certain types of social action,exemplified by the role played by extraction.

These ideas concerning autonomy come out clearly in Mann’s importantdistinction between the despotic and infrastructural power of the state.30 Theformer refers to the ability of the state to act freely, without regard to society,while the latter refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society and organizesocial relations.31 Despotic power thus concerns the state elite, and its ability totake action without regard to civil society. As Mann puts it, despotic power refersto ‘the range of actions the elite is empowered to undertake without routine,institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups’.32

The autonomous powers of the state do not amount to much, however, as Halland Ikenberry have pointed out, if the ‘orders do not translate into reality’.33

Infrastructural power is a crucial part of state power, as it concerns the ability tostructure and organize civil society through the institutions of the state. As Manndescribes it, infrastructural power refers to ‘the capacity of the state to penetratecivil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout therealm’.34 Infrastructural power, however, should not be seen just as power in thesense of ‘power over’ – referring to the state’s domination of civil society. It is aform of what Mann describes as ‘collective power’, which is a type of ‘enabling’power that is not a zero-sum game.35

An increase in infrastructural power means that civil society is subject to morecontrol by the state, but also has the reciprocal affect of enabling civil society toaffect the state itself. As Hall and Ikenberry suggest: ‘The state can be too distantfrom society as well as too constrained by it: gaining, exercising and maintainingstate capacity is an extremely complicated matter, in which there is a perpetualdialectic between the state seizing and being granted authority.’36 This is animportant feature of Mann’s theory, as the rise of infrastructural power is one ofthe key features of the contemporary state, and helps to develop a securityrelationship between state and society.

In the contemporary state, the concept of citizenship should be seen asspecifying a type of compact between state and society, as a part of increasinginfrastructural power. Citizenship is both relational and reciprocal, and it thereforeis not simply the case of a beneficent state giving rights to citizens. It also outlinesthe obligations of the individual within civil society to the state, and individuals’legitimate claims and expectations of the state. As the state increases infra-structural power, the possibilities and potentiality of civil society rise, and this isexpressed through the duties and benefits of citizenship.37




Citizenship is the key to examining security relationships between state andsociety, in that citizenship rights and duties describe the necessary functions of thestate in order for it to legitimate itself. Much security studies literature has takenthe western security state for granted as the model of security provision, with itsrigid demarcations of internal and external security, and ignores the way suchprovision developed over time. This is not only because citizenship rights wererather looser than they are in the contemporary state (i.e. they mainly related to themaintenance of internal order, perhaps a very basic or minimal form of security),but also because societies were not as bounded by the state as they became in the19th and 20th centuries.

The problem with taking the ‘security state’ for granted is that it createsdifficulty in analysing the possibility of change in the state, both because the stateis taken as a static institution, and because the array of contemporary securityfunctions and relationships are taken for granted. The slow development ofcitizenship rights and duties is an important part of the growth of securitycompacts between state and society, demonstrating the dynamic nature of the stateitself, and also pointing to the possible further evolution of the state. The benefitof a historical sociological approach to the state is found in the recognition of thefunctional autonomy of the state itself, manifested both in despotic and infra-structural power. The development of infrastructural power goes along with thedevelopment of citizenship, and therefore provides a crucial corrective to theanalysis of the state in both security studies and international relations.

The evolution of western security provision

The history of the development of the European state is one that has been told anumber of times from various angles, but primarily in the context of how elite warmaking eventually necessitated the development of states, both for the advance-ment of order and the need for the formation of an infrastructure for extraction tofinance the ever more costly means of warfare.38 The development of Europeanstates, therefore, was as a means to power – it was not an end in itself.39 In thecontext of citizenship and infrastructural power, there had to be the arrival ofthe state as an end in itself, something that was not properly seen until after theFrench Revolution, in order for the kind of security provision associated withthe contemporary state to develop. Around this time, citizenship and the statebecame intimately connected, and the infrastructural power of the state increasedenormously, through a slow process of development of material infrastructure.

Along with the eventual development of the rights of citizenship, we see agradual change in what those rights and duties consist of, that moves from therelative disinterest that early states and rulers saw in their subjects to the relativelycompassionate governance seen in contemporary western states. An accom-panying change in the scope of state security provision is also apparent: from theearly state emphasis on social order and lack of violence (at least against the state)




to the contemporary welfare/warfare state. Although this story can be told indevelopmental terms – i.e. a switch from mere state despotism to enlighteneddemocratic forms of governance – it is essential to examine this through thecontext of infrastructural power, where benefits were trade-offs in some sense forthe further penetration of state into society.

Tilly provides an example of an early variant on the development of securityrelations between states and at least one class actor in civil society, the newbourgeoisie, and the role it played in the development of the state in westernEurope. Tilly describes the growth of the state as a consequence of the develop-ment of a ‘protection racket’, where the pursuit of power and control caused elitesto monopolize the control over violence within their territories, while,furthermore, the pursuit of war caused rulers to set up systems of extraction inorder to raise capital for these endeavours. The extraction process, though notexcluding outright pillage, importantly included taxation, through the making ofpromises of protection (of a particular social class). This led to the entrenchmentof substantial bureaucracies to regulate taxation, police forces, courts, and accountkeepers, therefore solidifying the existence of exclusive territorial states.40

Therefore, one of the factors in the consolidation of states was the unintendedconsequence of the rulers’ search for power – that the need for capital to invest inwar making inadvertently led to the elimination of rivals within a given territory,in order to have a greater capacity to extract resources.41

The development of such a relationship is borne out by the two majorwatersheds in the state: its increase in size in the 18th century, and the increasingextent of its civil functions in the 19th century.42 This can be seen in a number ofareas, but one of the most important was the increasing level of bureaucraticmanagement of the state, which came to be seen more and more as the actuallocation of rule in the state. As van Creveld points out: ‘By the beginning of thenineteenth century the point had been reached where the bureaucracy itselfbecame the state, elevating itself high above civil society and turning itself intothe latter’s master.’43 This was also accompanied by the development of infra-structures, both material and symbolic, exemplified by the development of roads,railways, postal services, telegraphy and mass education; civilian functions thatincreased the prosperity of society but further politicized society in the sense thatit could not ignore the state’s influence its members.44

In terms of civilian expenditures, the average over the course of the 19thcentury was about a 50 percent increase. At the beginning of the 20th centuryabout 75 percent of state expenditure was channelled towards civilian purposes.45

In the 19th century, the state’s commitment to educating its subjects became animportant aspect of its increased civil role. This, of course, was connected to theeconomic needs of the states, and also to the rise of nationalism, and receiving the‘correct’ education; education was a product of further democratization, but alsocontained a strong element of ‘parading, flag-saluting, anthem-singing, and hero-worshipping’.46 Over the course of the 19th century, states also started to focus onthe conditions of the poor, the sick, and on the conditions of workers. In Britain,




this can be seen through a number of developments, such as the Factory Acts andthe eventual establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1919.47

The development of a state monopoly of organized violence also proceededover this time period. The state gained increasing control over organized violencewithin its territory, which was accompanied by a shift in the status of the military,from a situation where the military was essentially ‘embedded’ within society, towhere the military itself became separate to the state and civil society.48 It was inthe 18th century where the distinction between civilians and soldiers becamecommonplace.49 Along with this came a switch in the purpose of armed force,where it became more an instrument of an abstract state, and less an instrument ofthe rulers. This, however, also went along with the increased presence of forceinternally, though eventually through the establishment of police forces as distinctfrom the military, as the needs of the internal maintenance of order (e.g. con-trolling mobs) required different techniques than external conflicts.50

These watersheds of the state were accompanied by the increased politicizationof society in the late-18th and 19th centuries. As Mann notes: ‘As statestransformed into national states, then into nation-states, classes became caged,unintentionally “naturalized” and politicized’.51 The word ‘caging’ is of impor-tance, as it describes how the development of nation-states in the period was partof a process of the state bounding social relations within its political territory. Therise of infrastructural power developed the boundedness of the state so taken forgranted in traditional accounts of international relations; as Hobden points out:‘Traditional international relations theory has portrayed borders as hard shells. Asocio-historical construct has become reified into a physical attribute of socialrelations’.52

This boundedness also contributed to the expansion of citizenship, as thecombination of nationalism (the result of the process of ‘caging’) and sovereigntyled to the demand for greater national rights for the subjects of the state.53 Associeties were clamped ever tighter within states, the state politicized societiesthrough nationalism and sovereignty. Modern societies therefore reinventeddemocracy because the state could not be escaped; as Mann puts it: ‘In the earlymodern period people became trapped within national cages and so sought tochange the conditions within those cages’.54

This tendency can also be seen in conjunction with the changing nature ofarmed force. The shift from armed force as principally an instrument of the rulingelite to being an instrument of the abstract state was noted above, but with the riseof nationalism, this connection became even stronger. As Howard notes: ‘War wasno longer considered a matter for a feudal ruling class or a small group ofprofessionals, but one for the people as a whole. The armed forces were regarded,not as a part of the royal household, but as the embodiment of the Nation.’55

The overall increase in civilian expenditure and the changing nature of armedforce, combined with the increased politicization of society through the develop-ment of citizenship rights, point to the development of more advanced forms ofsecurity provision. The combination of nationalism and warfare meant that, to a




large extent, war was becoming more about the national interest of the population,and therefore could be expressed as providing a form of security. Regardingcivilian expenditure, the development of mass infrastructures was all part ofincreased living standards as part and parcel of citizenship, which should be seenas another aspect of security provision. These two dimensions provide the basisfor putting the state at the centre of an internal and external divide that haspervaded the literature on security ever since.

Though this is obviously a generalized model of the process, it still providesimportant insights. The rise of European states was thus founded not only on thedevelopment of a powerful state elite and governing apparatus, but also through thedevelopment of infrastructural power. This was put in the context of protection,which can be seen as a precursor to the more advanced kind of security provisionseen through the increased involvement of the state in civil activities. As Hobdenpoints out: ‘States did not emerge in terms of contractual arrangement with society,but because of their effectiveness in extracting resources from society, to protectthe state as an institution and the population under its jurisdiction. State survivalwas very closely linked to the protection of a local population.’56 The end of the19th and beginning of the 20th centuries heralded a more intensive relationshipbetween state and society regarding security provision.

The security state

The state–society relationship in the 20th century has been one of a dramatic risein the infrastructural power of the state, unprecedented in previous eras. The‘security state’ represents a situation where the increased penetration of the stateinto civil society has provided the basis for not only more co-ordination of societyby the state, but the reciprocal effect of increased rights and expectations of thecitizens of states. Though this is often ignored by security analysts, as it is seen asa ‘domestic’ development associated with the rise of the welfare state, it is in factan important change in the structure of states, and also requires a transformation inthe conceptualization of security. The security state is, basically, a relationshipbetween state and society where the state provides insurance against the impact of‘external’ contingencies.57

The increase in infrastructural power and rights in 20th-century states hadmuch to do with the rise of industrialized total wars. The need for massivepenetration into civil society in order to organize the total wars of the 20th centuryhad a major impact on the structure of the state, which continued after the end ofthe Second World War. The First World War, of course, provides the precedent forthis, where the state managed to organize a vast array of market forces in thedomestic economy for its own purposes. As McNeill states: ‘Innumerable bureau-cratic structures that had previously acted more or less independently of oneanother in a context of market relationships coalesced into what amounted to asingle national firm for waging war’.58




During the Second World War, all of the industrialized nations involved had toorganize their economies around mobilization for the war effort.59 This wasusually done through the use of specialized state bureaucracies which organizedtheir economies. In Nazi Germany, economic planning had been divided amongthe three branches of the armed services and the SS, but under ArmamentsMinister Albert Speer was centralized to a large degree.60 In Britain, a greatlysuccessful war economy was achieved under the auspices of Sir John Anderson,the head of the Lord President’s Group, responsible for co-ordination of the war-time economic effort. The planning introduced many compromises in terms ofcivil liberties, and introduced measures to deal with wartime manpower shortages:by the middle of 1944, one-third of Britain’s labour force was involved in civilianwork in the war effort.61 In the USA, though in many ways a special case due toits relative isolation from the conflict, wartime production was co-ordinatedthrough a number of organizations, including the War Production Board, theManpower Commission, and the Office of War Mobilization. These organizationsproved an outstanding success, and by the end of 1942, the USA was out-producing all of the enemy powers combined.62

The extensive mobilization of society in the war effort led to a post-warsituation where society demanded more from the state, and there was anopportunity for states to meet such demand.63 As Mazower states: ‘It seems asthough the war had created – or intensified – a demand for social solidarity, whilethe economic upswing created the resources to support this change.’64 However,not only did the total wars affect the structure of the post-war states, they alsoaffected the relationship between state and society in terms of citizenship. AsGiddens points out, in the example of the United Kingdom: ‘The wartimeexperience quite early on stimulated programmes for widespread social reformfollowing the cessation of hostilities. The need for a thorough-going set ofeconomic citizenship rights was accepted by groups from both major parties.’65

The rights that came out of the Second World War – rights of full employment,unemployment insurance, housing benefits and the like – developed out of the wareffort itself, and the increased pressures put on societies by the war, as well as anumber of compromises made by political parties after the war.66 The develop-ment of the security state hinges on this elaboration of citizenship and rightswhich were seen as part of the trade-off in the increased penetration of the stateinto civil society. The rise of infrastructural power over the last two centuries notonly increased the state’s involvement in civil society, but increased theexpectations of civil society through its politicization, and the recognition of suchexpectations can be seen in the expansion of citizenship rights.67 The ‘security’that states provide has changed dramatically in the 20th century, through extendedideas of citizenship in the beginning of the century, to the post-Second WorldWorld War development of the welfare state and social (or economic) citizenshiprights.

The domestic compacts, however, were not made in isolation from theinternational. Just as the war effort had shaped domestic society through




increasing infrastructural power and through compromises in welfare provision,the war had also fundamentally changed international relations as well. Thoughthe effects of the new nuclear technology have been much commented upon,68 theinternationalized nature of wartime planning had a profound effect on theorganization of the international system. The internationalism in the war was moststrongly seen in the case of the joint US and British mobilization for the wareffort.69 As McNeill notes: ‘Thanks to the increasing complexity of armsproduction, a single nation had become too small to conduct an efficient war. Thiswas, perhaps, the main innovation of World War II.’70 The legacy of such organiz-ation can be seen in the promotion of economic and political internationalism andintegration in the post-war period, often seen as the beginnings of an intenseperiod of globalization.71

The extension of social rights and provision was in part a recognition that thestate would have to extend its benefits to citizens in order to participate moreintensely in a new international and global environment. The development ofmore extensive forms of security after the Second World War was part of the post-war consensus of embedded liberalism, the compact giving citizens more securityfor the trade-off of the state being more integrated into the world economy andmilitary security system.72 When this account is put in the context of the end of aperiod of total war, which involved the mobilization of society on an unprece-dented level, the importance of post-war bargaining as a state strategy becomesclearer. The security state was a result of the war and the need to participate moreintensely at the global and international scale, both by the provision for domesticintervention and the protection from external threat.

This is emphasized in the way that the term ‘national security’ came toprominence in the period following the Second World War. As Dalby states: ‘Itwas only in the middle of this century that security became the architectonicimpulse of the American security polity, and, subsequently, of its allies.’73 Thestate had become the prime focus of security, with the USA taking the lead in thisdevelopment. As McSweeney puts it: ‘The concept of “national security” serves tofocus on the autarky of the state.’74 Though the stress in these accounts concernsthe peculiarity of the state being at the centre of security,75 at that historicalmoment, the state did become the centre of security: the expansion of infra-structural power and its reciprocal effects had seen both the caging of civil societyinto the bounded territory of the state, as well as the development of the state asthe main security provider, an insurance policy against contingency.

The ‘security state’ should be seen as a specific arrangement between state andsociety, where the state acts as a form of insurance against contingency. Thecombination of the strongly militarist state as a form of external protection, andthe extension of rights through further enfranchisement and the development ofsocial rights led to the situation where the state was at the centre of security.Protector against external threat and provider of domestic well-being, the statebecame the prime guarantor and provider of security.




Conclusion

An engagement with state theory, particularly that provided by proponents of neo-Weberian historical sociology proved useful in elaborating the state as aninstitution, and a historically constituted actor. The incorporation of a morecomplex idea of state–society relations demonstrated that the security relation-ships between state and society have developed over the course of severalcenturies as the result of a rise in the infrastructural power of the state. In the 20thcentury, a further rise in infrastructural power was obtained by the involvement ofwestern states in two total wars, which led to the development of the ‘securitystate’. This represented a situation where the trade-off for further penetration intocivil society was compensated for through increased citizenship rights, whichencompassed a large gamut of the provision of social goods, in which should beincluded not only basic welfare provision, but the whole range of securityprovision, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’.

The development of the state as the mediator between these two realms, as aprotector from external military threats, and as insurer against domestic malaisecame at a cost. This was the other transformation that was a development of thetotal war era: the need to amalgamate more fully into the international realm. In asense, this is the development of a more integrated international system, wherewestern industrialized states begin to have an increasingly interdependentrelationship. This is not only the result of the European allies’ position at the endof the Second World War, where they were in need of American financialassistance to overcome the hardships incurred in conflict, but also the recognitionof the importance of the international economy. This is the essence of the post-warcompromise: aspects of the dual development of the security state, social welfareitself provided the ground for the increased internationalization of the state.

This reappraisal of the western state in security studies serves a number ofpurposes. First, it challenges the complacency concerning the impact of change onthe state, enabling the state to both be resilient to change, and to incorporatechange and come out transformed. This is an increasingly salient point, especiallyin relation to the often sterile debates on the supposed ‘end of the state’ in the faceof forces of globalization. The increasing need for interdependence and inter-nationalism among western states in the post-war period supplied the groundingfor globalization and state restructuring itself. The creation of a rigid internal–external division was therefore problematic from the start. The recognition thatthis divide is historically contingent shows that challenges to the state’s domesticrole do not necessitate its demise.

Second, it places the development of western security states into a historicaldynamic, which challenges a second complacency towards history, the trans-historical attitude that equates contemporary states with those of the 17thcentury.76 Crucial here is the gradual adding of security competences to the state,in terms of the areas that the state is responsible for, and an increasingresponsibility towards its citizenry.




Finally, it challenges the idea prevalent in security studies which presumes thatthe state is either the ultimate security actor, or an insufficient actor. There is infact a middle ground, when the state is both examined historically as a securityprovider, and security is seen as encompassing more than just the ‘external’military dimension. The recognition of the historical contingency of the internal–external divide in security studies helps to connect security more robustly with therights of people as citizens. The contingency of this divide also adds to the critiqueof traditional security studies, by showing a more ambivalent view of the state’srole in the security process, also contributing to the agenda of a more humanizedsecurity studies by linking security squarely with the needs of people.

These three purposes all contribute to an agenda for security studies that ismore historically attuned, in order to better consider changes to both the securityagenda of states and challenges to the competence of the state itself as a securityprovider under conditions of globalization. Although the scope of the enquiryhas been geographically limited, and in some ways complicit with ignoring theglobal–regional variations in state formation,77 it is intended as a first foray into ahistorical sociology of international security studies, and a challenge to commonassumptions about state security.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Ian Clark, Paul Williams and the two anonymous reviewers forcomments on the various drafts of this article.

Notes

1 See especially the debates in Robert Keohane (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and its Critics. New York:Columbia University Press.

2 For a good overview, see Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (eds) (2000) Critical Reflections onSecurity and Change. London: Frank Cass.

3 There have been a few attempts to deal with the issue of security in the context of globalization,though primarily from a military standpoint. See Victor D. Cha (2000) ‘Globalization and theStudy of Security’, Journal of Peace Research 37 (3): 391–403; Ian Clark (1999) Globalizationand International Relations Theory, chap. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jean-MarieGuéhenno (1998–9) ‘The Impact of Globalization on Strategy’, Survival 40 (4): 5–19; DavidHeld et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, chap. 2. Cambridge:Polity; and Martin Shaw (2000) Theory of the Global State: Globality as an UnfinishedRevolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4 This was noted over a decade ago by Halliday, and has continued to be an important point ofcontention, especially seen in the current interest in the historical sociology of internationalrelations. Fred Halliday (1987) ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’,Millennium 16 (2): 215–29; and Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.) (2002) TheHistorical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5 See Held et al., Global Transformations, Introduction (see note 3). Thanks to Paul Williams forreminding me of this point.

6 Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall (1994) After the Nation State. New York: HarperCollins; Kenichi Ohame (1990) The Borderless World. London: Fontana.




7 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in “Bringing Historical Sociological back into InternationalRelations”? Transcending “Chronofetishism” and “Tempocentrism” in International Relations’,in Hobden and Hobson, pp.3–41 (see note 4).

8 There is an irony here, that contemporary sovereign states are seen as being the products of thenew Westphalian order, but most theorists of the state, and many with a more historicallynuanced approach to international relations, argue that the modern nation-state is of more recentorigin. For a good overview of the myths of Westphalia, see Stephen Krasner, ‘Westphalia andAll That’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (eds) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy,pp.235–64. London: Cornell University Press; and Andreas Osiander (2001) ‘Sovereignty,International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55 (2): 251–87.

9 This is to suggest that it is a ‘structurated’ process.10 Representative examples of traditional realist and neo-realist approaches can be found in Barry

Buzan (1991) People, States and Fear, 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Hans J.Morgenthau (1978) Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. New York: Knopf; Stephen Walt (1991)‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35: 211–39; KennethWaltz (1979) Theory of International Politics. Boston: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth Waltz (1959)Man the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press; and Arnold Wolfers (1962)Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

11 Charlotte Bretherton (1996) ‘Security After the Cold War: Towards a Global Paradigm?’ inCharlotte Bretherton and Geoffrey Ponton (eds) Global Politics: An Introduction, pp.126–51.Oxford: Blackwell; Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (eds) (1996) International Security in theModern World, rev. edn. London: Macmillan.

12 See especially Ken Booth (1991) ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies17 (4): 313–27; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations ofCritical Security Studies’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds) (1997) CriticalSecurity Studies: Concepts and Cases, pp.33–59. London: UCL Press; Steve Smith (1991)‘Mature Anarchy, Strong States, and Security’, Arms Control 12 (2): 325–339; and Richard WynJones (1999) Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

13 This is perhaps less true of recent constructivist work on security, which has examined theconstructed and contingent nature of the development of various facets of security. For a goodoverview, see Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’,International Studies Review 4 (1): 49–72.

14 Such approaches are gaining prominence in international relations. For examples, see, StephenHobden (1998) International Relations and Historical Sociology. London: Routledge; Hobdenand Hobson, Historical Sociology (see note 4); Special Section (1998) ‘Debate: The “SecondWave” of Weberian Historical Sociology’, Review of International Political Economy 5 (2): 284–361; John M. Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of InternationalEconomic and Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

15 There is some overlap here with the idea of the ‘national security state’, as conceptualized in theliterature on the history of US security policy, with particular reference to the early Cold Waryears, and the founding of the National Security Act in 1947. This is of importance because ofthe way this ‘militarized’ the concept of security and merged domestic concerns with those offoreign policy, the connotations of which are still being felt both in the context of academic IR,and policymaking. For more on the ‘national security state’ in the context of security studies, seeBill McSweeney (1999) Security, Identity and Interests, Chaps. 1 and 2. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. For the historical literature, see, for example, Michael J. Hogan (2000) A Crossof Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press; and Daniel Yergin (1977) Shattered Peace: The Origins of the ColdWar and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. For the policymaking impacts,see Michael McGwire (2001) ‘The Paradigm that Lost its Way’, International Affairs 77 (4): 777–803; and Michael McGwire (2002) ‘Shifting the Paradigm’, International Affairs 78 (1): 1–28.

16 On this point, see Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, chap. 6 (see note 3).17 There is also some justification, as the western state has remained a model for state-building

worldwide, for a legacy of the domination (and imperialism) of European states. See MohammedAyoob (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and theInternational System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

18 This problem is especially seen in neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to IR, where states arenot generally seen in their own historical context. For a good overview, see Hobson, ‘What’s atStake’ (see note 7).




19 Michael Mann (1993) ‘Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing,Not Dying’, Daedalus 122: 115–40.

20 Halliday, ‘State and Society’, p.217 (see note 4).21 This is especially clear in the work of Buzan and Waever, who have devoted a great deal of

analysis to the role of the state in the security process. See Buzan, People, States and Fear (seenote 10); and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Frameworkfor Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner.

22 This is mainly a debate between traditional or realist scholars and critical security studiesscholars. The former prioritize national security, or the security of the state, while the latter (inthe main) focus on the relevance of individuals and other social groupings. For an overview, seeKrause and Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security’ (see note 12).

23 An exception in security studies can be found in the work of Deudney, who has examineddomestic forces as being important for security. Daniel Deudney, ‘Political Fission: StateStructure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States’, in Ronnie D.Lipschutz (ed.) (1995) On Security, pp.87–123. New York: Columbia University Press.

24 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.33 (see note 15).25 Representative examples of this literature can be found in the following works: Anthony Giddens

(1987) The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press; John A. Hall andG. John Ikenberry (1989) The State. Milton Keynes: Open University Press; Michael Mann(1993) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; GianfrancoPoggi (1990) The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Cambridge: Polity; CharlesTilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, andT. Skocpol (eds) (1985) Bringing the State Back In, pp.169–91. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press; and Charles Tilly (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States: ad990–1990. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. For a succinct statement of Weber’s position on the state,see Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs(eds) (1994) Weber: Political Writings, pp.309–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.This essay is more commonly known as ‘Politics as a Vocation’.

26 The approach followed most closely here is that of Mann. See Mann, Sources of Social Power,Vol. II, Ch. 3 (see note 25).

27 There are of course other theoretical approaches to the state. For overviews of competingapproaches to the state, see Colin Hay (1996) Re-Stating Social and Political Change.Buckingham: Open University Press; and John M. Hobson (2000) The State and InternationalRelations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The neo-Weberian approach associated withhistorical sociology is preferred here, primarily because it both well integrates an historicalapproach into its overall framework of analysis, and incorporates an international dimension intoits theorizing from the outset. The role of the international in historical sociology has, however,been criticized by some international relations scholars for being crudely realist. On this point,see Stephen Hobden (1999) ‘Theorising the International System’, Review of InternationalStudies 25 (2): 257–71.

28 Poggi, The State, p.98 (see note 25).29 This is common in pluralist theories of the state, in which the state is actually seen as a fiction, a

bureaucratic manifestation of collective political decisions, and not an institution in its own right.For overviews, see Hall and Ikenberry, The State, pp.3–6 (see note 25); and Mann, Sources ofSocial Power, Vol. II, pp.46–7 and Ch. 3 passim (see note 25).

30 Michael Mann (1988) ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms andResults’, in States, War and Capitalism, pp.1–32. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Mann, Sources ofSocial Power, Vol. II, pp.59–61 (see note 25).

31 Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25).32 Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State’, p.5 (see note 30).33 Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25).34 Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State’, p.5 (see note 30).35 Giddens has also importantly added the role of more invasive forms of surveillance that have

developed in the modern state, and these should be seen as part of the infrastructural power.Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, Chap. 7 (see note 25). Giddens’ notion of surveillance over-laps suggestively with the one developed by Foucault, although Giddens is keen to disentanglethem. See Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.185–6 (see note 25); and Michel Foucault(1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage.

36 Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.14 (see note 25).




37 Hay, Re-Stating Social and Political Change, p.67 (see note 27).38 A good sampling of these perspectives can be found, though sometimes tangentially, in the

following works: Martin van Creveld (1999) The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press; Paul Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.London: Fontana; Michael Howard (1977) War and European History. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (see note 25); William H.McNeill (1982) The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000.Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Michael Mann (1986) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II (see note 25).

39 This is pointed out by van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, Ch. 3 (see note 38). There issome contention in this matter over the role of ideational factors in historical sociologicalanalysis, which has primarily (though not exclusively) looked at material motivations for thedevelopment of states and the states system. See the critique from a sympathetic theorist inChristian Reus-Smit, ‘The Idea of History and History of Ideas’, in Hobden and Hobson,Historical Sociology of International Relations, pp.120–40 (see note 4).

40 Tilly outlines an ‘ideal sequence’ of the classic European state-building experience: Tilly, ‘WarMaking’ p.183 (see note 25).

41 Ibid., p.181; Howard, War and European History, p.49 (see note 38).42 Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.370 and p.375 (see note 25).43 van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, pp.142–3 (see note 38).44 Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.479 (see note 25).45 Ibid., p.375.46 van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p.217 (see note 38).47 Ibid., pp.218–19.48 Ibid., p.155.49 Howard, War and European History, Chap. 4 (see note 38).50 Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.410 (see note 25).51 Ibid., p20.52 Stephen Hobden (1999) ‘Can Historical Sociology be Critical?’, Alternatives 24 (3): 406.53 See Giddens for an account of the connection between these three dimensions of the state.

Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.212–21 (see note 25).54 Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.251 (see note 25).55 Howard, War and European History, p.110 (see note 38).56 Hobden, ‘Can Historical Sociology be Critical?’, p.403 (see note 52).57 This description has been borrowed from Giddens, though with a slightly different purpose in

mind. As Giddens states: ‘The welfare state originated as a “security state” and was actuallycalled such in some countries. It was the socialised, public counterpart to private insurance’.Anthony Giddens, ‘Affluence, Poverty and the Idea of a Post-Scarcity Society’, in Ken Booth(ed.) (1998) Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, p.314. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

58 McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p.317 (see note 38). Also see Mark Roseman, ‘War and the People:The Social Impact of Total War’, in Charles Townshend (ed.) (2000) The Oxford History ofModern War, pp.284–5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

59 Eric Hobsbawm (1995) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, pp.44–9.London: Abacus; Roseman, ‘War and the People’, pp.283–5 (see note 58).

60 Brian Bond (1998) War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970, 2nd edn, p.174. Stroud, Gloucester-shire: Sutton Publishing.

61 Ibid., p.175–6.62 Ibid., p.178.63 Roseman, ‘War and the People’, pp.285–287 (see note 58).64 Mark Mazower (1999) Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, p.304. London: Penguin

Books. In the case of Britain, the Beveridge report, outlining Britain’s post-war social welfareprovision, was received with a great enthusiasm, and became the best selling bureaucraticdocument in British history, selling over 500,000 copies. Hay, Re-Stating Social and PoliticalChange, p.29 (see note 27).

65 Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.242 (see note 25).66 For more on the latter, particularly in terms of the decreased demands of both left and right, see

Charles S. Maier (1981) ‘The Two Postwar Eras and Conditions for Stability in TwentiethCentury Western Europe’, American Historical Review 86 (2): 328–333.




67 Also see Mann’s account of the different kinds of state strategies pursued to this end, whichdemonstrates well that the ‘trade-off’ played differently in different types of state regimes, butwas important in all of them. Michael Mann (1988) ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, inStates, War and Capitalism, pp.188–210. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

68 See, for example, Bernard Brodie (1965) Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press; Robert Jervis (1989) The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press; and Michael Mandelbaum (1981) The Nuclear Revolution: InternationalPolitics Before and After Hiroshima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

69 This is given brief outline in McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp.354–6 (see note 38).70 Ibid., p.356.71 Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.240 (see note 25); and Ian Clark (1997) Globalization and

Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.115. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. This is not to say that nationalism and the nation-state were principles that wereabandoned in the post-war period, for it is more accurate to say that the war promoted bothnationalism and internationalism, creating some of the main problems of the latter half of the20th century. See Ibid., p.117.

72 John Gerrard Ruggie (1982) ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: EmbeddedLiberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization 36 (2): 195–231.

73 Simon Dalby, ‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in ContemporarySecurity Discourse’, in Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies, p.21 (see note 12). Yerginnotes that the term ‘national security’ had only become utilized in policymaking circles duringthe 1940s. Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp.194–5 (see note 15).

74 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.28 (see note 15).75 In a sense it was peculiar, after the relative failure of the nation-state in the inter-war period.76 And indeed with the ‘states’ of any other historical period which happens to resemble the present;

e.g. Renaissance Italy, Ancient Greece, etc. On this point, see Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake’, pp.9–11(see note 4); and Justin Rosenberg (1994) The Empire of Civil Society, Ch. 3. London: Verso.

77 There is some recognition of the different accounts of state-building and state power structures inother regions of the world, despite the continued reliance on western models of statehood as thebasis of international society. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst’s work on state-building in Africa:Jeffrey Herbst (2000) State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.Princeton: Princeton University Press.




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