SECTION 9

 ATTY. RANDY P. BARENG, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3219-RTJ)- versus - JUDGE ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA,Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,Manila,Respondent.

Promulgated: June 1, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x   

FACTS:Atty. Bareng is the counsel of Romulo Awingan, one of the accused for double

murder, entitled People of the Philippines v. Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Lloyd Antiporda, Romulo Awingan and Richard Mecate. These two murder cases were consolidated before the RTC, Manila, Branch 29 but Grulla voluntarily inhibited herself from the case, and did not resolve the motion for reconsideration and the motion to transfer the cases. The consolidated cases were subsequently re-raffled to the RTC, Manila, Branch 19, presided by Judge Daguna.

 In her December 9, 2005 Resolution, Judge Daguna granted the private

complainants motion for reconsideration and set aside Judge Grullas October 26, 2005 Order. Accused Awingan, through Atty. Bareng, filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Daguna denied the motion in her Order of February 3, 2006. Awingan, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Daguna.

 During the pendency of the CA petition, Judge Daguna issued warrants of

arrest against all the accused. The CA granted Awingans petition for certiorari and prohibition in

its November 10, 2006 Decision.[7] The CA found that Judge Daguna acted with grave abuse of discretion because she arbitrarily and whimsically disregarded the guidelines for acting on the Peoples motion to withdraw informations and practiced unreasonable and inexplicable selectivity by not considering all the records available to her in order to make her independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the cases before her.

Since the warrants of arrest against all the accused were still in force, Atty. Bareng filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion, on November 15, 2006,[9] to inform the RTC of the CA Decision and to ask for its immediate implementation. He attached a certified copy of the CA Decision.

 Judge Daguna denied the motion for lack of merit in her December 4,

2006 Order.In the Order[18] issued, Judge Daguna stated that she resolved Atty. Barengs

motion for reconsideration on July 31, 2007, but her Order might not have been

released; hence, she directed that the Order be reprinted and the parties be furnished with copies. Since Judge Daguna denied his motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,[19] Atty. Bareng filed his notice of appeal[20] on May 20, 2008, after receiving his copy of the order on May 6, 2008.[21]

 On July 8, 2009, Atty. Bareng filed with the Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA) his complaint-affidavit,[22] charging Judge Daguna with gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office, based on the following allegations:

 1. That Judge Daguna, in her December 4, 2006 Order, insinuated that there

was pecuniary estimation attached to the manifestation and motion filed by Atty. Bareng; this, according to Atty. Bareng, was unfair and tainted with malice;

2. That despite Atty. Barengs explanation, Judge Daguna found him guilty of contempt of court;

3. That he filed a motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for reconsideration;

4. That after the lapse of almost one year, he filed his first motion to resolve;5. That after more than one month, he filed a manifestation and second

motion to resolve;6. That Judge Daguna claimed that she had resolved the motion for

reconsideration as early as July 31, 2007 but apparently the order had not been released; and

7. That he filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2008 but Judge Daguna had not acted on the appeal despite his motion to resolve and/or elevate appeal dated June 19, 2009.

 In her July 31, 2009 Comment, Judge Daguna denied that the delays

attributed to her were her fault. She blamed her staff for the delay.  While the administrative case was pending, Judge Daguna applied for

disability retirement in late 2009. She was allowed to retire, but because of the two (2) pending administrative cases against her, the amount of P50,000.00 was withheld from her retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may later impose on her.

 In its submission dated February 24, 2010the OCA found no evidence to

sustain the charges of gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office against Judge Daguna. The OCA, however, found Judge Daguna guilty of gross inefficiency. 

ISSUE: WON Judge Daguna is liable for gross deficiency for failing to adopt a system of record management in her court.

HELD: We agree with the OCAs finding that Judge Daguna is liable for gross

inefficiency for failing to adopt a system of record management in her court. Judge Daguna violated Rule 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides:

 Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,

maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions or other judges and court personnel.

 Rule 3.09 A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to

ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

 On July 31, 2007Judge Daguna also resolved Atty. Barengs motion for

reconsideration which was filed on January 31, 2007, or way beyond the required period. There was also a delay in sending the records of the appealed case to the CA. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include: 1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records

of a case;xxx SECTION 11. Sanctions. xxx B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following

sanctions shall be imposed: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than

one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In addition to gross inefficiency, we find Judge Daguna guilty of delay in

rendering an order, as well as delay in transmitting the records of a case. Based on Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty for a less serious charge is either suspension or a fine. Considering Judge Dagunas retirement, we consider a total fine of P15,000.00 to be the appropriate penalty. This fine shall be deducted from the P50,000.00 withheld from her retirement benefits.

 

MARIETTA DUQUE,Complainant, - versus - JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L.

GARRIDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City[presently assigned as Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Carigara,Leyte],

Respondent. 

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027   Promulgated:  February 27, 2009

 FACTS:

 Complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.

 Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the

aforementioned case. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.

 Respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case

No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.

 He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the

Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States.

 Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity

in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of the

promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him.

 OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision

beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 26. 

ISSUE: WON respondent is administratively liable for gross inefficiency.

HELD:

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.

 Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to

decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as

follows: Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide

cases within the required periods. Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are

indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.

 As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the

Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005 ]. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been submitted for decision.

 Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code

of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts. 

 Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the

prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.

 

Under Section 9(1, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

  For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-

10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

 Respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26 [24] because he

filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used bears his station and the words FREE FROM POSTAGE. We concur with the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation.

 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY

of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.

 

 CIRILA S. RAYMUNDO,Complainant,  - versus -  JUDGE TERESITO A. ANDOY,

Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Cainta, Rizal,

Respondent. 

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2033-

MTJ)  Promulgated:  October 6, 2010 

FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in 2000, she filed six counts of violation

of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) against Hermelinda Chang (accused) before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta, Rizal. The respondent judge presided over the court.

 Respondent judge declared that the accused had waived her rights to present

further evidence for repeated failure to appear in court despite due notice. On September 2, 2004, the complainant received a notice from the MTC, setting the cases for trial anew on November 17, 2004. The date was later moved to December 20, 2004.

 On December 20, 2004, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in

court, prompting the private prosecutor to move for the reinstatement of the MTCs August 4, 2004 order. The respondent judge granted the motion and declared the cases submitted for decisionThe accused moved to reconsider this order; the MTC granted the motion in its order of February 9, 2005. Accordingly, the cases were again set for hearing on October 12, 2005.

 On October 12, 2005, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in

court despite due notice. The MTC, thus, ordered the direct testimony of the accused to be stricken off the record, and again declared the cases submitted for decision.

 On June 23, 2006, the complainant filed with the MTC an urgent ex parte

motion to render decision. Almost two years later, or on March 12, 2008, the complainant filed a second ex parte motion to render decision. The respondent judge did not act on these motions.

 Respondent judge, in his defense, stated that he had prepared his decision in

the subject cases, dated July 19, 2008, and had set the same for promulgation on August 18, 2008, at 8:30 in the morning and that although the undersigned is aware that heavy caseload is not considered by the Supreme Court as an excuse for delay in rendering decisions, the undersigned humbly begs this Honorable Offices utmost consideration, understanding and compassion in evaluating the subject IPI. The undersigned is due to retire on October 3, 2008.

  The OCA found respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a

decision, explaining that while the Court is not unaware of the heavy caseload of judges, nothing in the records shows that the respondent judge asked for an extension of time to decide the subject criminal cases. In addition, the respondent judge failed to consider that the subject cases required a quicker resolution as they were covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

HELD:

Yes. We stress at the outset that the subject criminal cases violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are indeed covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC (Re: Amendment to the Rule on Summary Procedure of Criminal Cases).

 The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated by the Supreme Court to

achieve an expeditious and inexpensive disposition of cases. Section 17 of this Rule requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than thirty (30) days after termination of trial. Trial in the present case originally ended on August 4, 2004.

From this sequence of events, we find it clear that the respondent judge failed to observe the mandated period of time to decide cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Following Section 17 of this Rule, he should have rendered a decision within 30 days from the termination of trial on August 4, 2004. His failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into account and had disregarded the Rule on Summary Procedure.

 At any rate, even if we adopt a liberal approach and consider the subject

cases to be outside the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the respondent judge still cannot escape liability.

 The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower

courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision.

In the present case, the subject cases had been submitted for decision since October 12, 2005. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, while the respondent judge attributed his failure to render a decision to the heavy caseload in his sala, he did not ask for an extension of time to decide the cases. This failure to decide within the required period, given that he could have asked for an extension, is inexcusable; it constitutes neglect of duty as well as gross inefficiency that collectively warrant administrative sanction.

  Under Rule 140, Section 9(1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-

10-SC, the respondent judges undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. It carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary

and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

 Since the respondent judge had been previously found guilty in Blanco v.

Andoy of gross ignorance of procedure and undue delay in the resolution of a motion (for which he was imposed a P25,000.00 fine with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely), we impose on him the maximum allowable fine of P20,000.00. This amount shall be deducted from respondent judges retirement benefits as the record shows that he had already retired from the service on October 3, 2008.

 WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Judge Teresito A. Andoy is hereby

found GUILTY of (1) undue delay in rendering a decision and (2) violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINEof twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits

SECTION 10

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, respondent.

FACTS:On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the respondents court.1[2] On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.2[3] However, the Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.3[4] Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication. The respondent granted the motion in his Order4[5] dated March 7, 2001, with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue.5

[6]Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons

during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.6[7] However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.

1

2

3

4

5

6

On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.7[8] After the scheduled hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision.8[9]

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein. Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.

Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision9[15] is valid and prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.

In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.

ISSUE: WON respondent jusge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

HELD:The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals Decision which

states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.

What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.10[23]

In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.11[24]

Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal

7

8

9

10

11

separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.

Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence.12[26] When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.

Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.

WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits.

12