Julian and the Limits to Growth Neo-malthusianism

8/13/2019 Julian and the Limits to Growth Neo-malthusianism

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Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development

Te Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development () ()

Abstract

Julian Simons work on population, environmentand technology is best seen against the rise o Neo-Malthusianism in the second hal o the th century asembodied in the limits to growth movement. Simon

went beyond criticizing various components o the neo-Malthusian paradigm. His work articulated the elementso a complex alternative social philosophy in which evo-lution, social exchange, and creativity play pivotal roles.Human creativity enables human beings to be differentthan the rest o the animal world and to create complexorders based on ideas and exchange. Te institutionshumans set up allow them to avoid natures (Malthusianor neo-Malthusian) traps. Consequently the notion thatnature puts a clear-cut, limiting condition on growth is asimplistic and misleading premise or public debates andgovernmental decisions.

By the time o his death in at age , Julian Simon

had already established or himsel the reputation odoomslayer, one o those people who took on thethankless task o talking sense on a subject where non-sense is all the rage and o a man set out to explain

what happened in the real world, not what happensin abstract models or popular hysteria (Sowell ).His crusade against the conventional wisdom was ea-tured in the New York imes, the Washington Post andthe Boston Globeand he was considered the man whothoroughly and oen single-handedly capsized the pre-

vailing Malthusian orthodoxy by routing nearly every

prominent environmental scaremonger o our time andby reraming the central debate o our time: whether

people are good or our planet or not (Moore ).

Whether one agrees with his views or not, an overviewo his key arguments is an important step towards a

clearer understanding o the intellectual history and sig-nificance o one o the most salient and sensitive themesemerging on the public agenda during the second hal othe th century.

Julian Simon, who wrote on resources, environment,and population (Te Ultimate Resource, Population

Matters, Te Economics of Population Growth, Population

and Development in Poor Countries) but also on othersubjects, including statistics, research methods, andmanagerial economics (Basic Research Methods in SocialScience, Issues in the Economics of Advertising, Te Man-

agement of Advertising, Applied Managerial Econom-

ics), oen complained that his work never received therecognition it deserved. Yet, contrary to his own belie,his arguments seem to have had an immense impact byany standards. In act, he was considered one o thesmartest people in Washington by Te Washingtonianmagazine whileFortunemagazine listed him among the Great Minds o the s. His views on popula-tion i.e. that people are resource creators, not resourcedestroyers influenced world leaders such as Ronald

Reagan and Pope John Paul II and prooundly shapedthe public debate on the issue or years to come (Moore). O the many virtues he possessed, it was his atti-tude toward truth and acts that impressed most o hiscontemporaries (Sowell ; Moore ). Tere wasnothing more irritating to him than people who knowin advance what the truth is, who dont need to availthemselves o any acts. elling in this respect is thestory o the evolution o his position. He recalled againand again the act that when he originally got interestedin population issues he had exactly the opposite belie ,

a card-carrying antigrowth, anti-population zealot. Butwhen he ound that the data did not support that origi-nal belie his thoughts changed. And, he wrote, I was

Julian Simon and the Limits to GrowthNeo-Malthusianism

Paul Dragos Aligica** Paul Dragos Aligica is a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center, a aculty ellow at the James Buchanan Center or Political

Economy at George Mason University, and an adjunct ellow at the Hudson Institute.

Email: daligica=a=gmu.edu (replace =a= with @)


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JULIAN SIMON AND THE LIMITS TO GROWTH NEOMALTHUSIANISM

not disposed to close my eyes to the evidence because itdid not square with my original belies. Rather, it was mybelies that had to change (Simon , xxviii).

Indeed, the best way to approach Simons work onpopulation, environment and technolog y is to see it

against the background o his dialogue and debate withthe ideas inspiring the rise o Neo-Malthusianism in thesecond hal o the th century as part o the limits togrowth movement. Tis movement, which was a newchapter in the long running dispute between Malthu-sians and Cornucopians (Desrochers and Hofauer,this issue) can be construed as having commenced withthe publication o Rachel Carsons Silent Spring()and Paul Ehrlichs Population Bomb (), and, bymany accounts, reached maturity with the publicationo Te Limits to Growth() and its success and huge

circulation.. With it a new tradition was born. And inthis respect it is no exaggeration to say that Simon wasone o the key figures that, together with authors suchas Herman Kahn, created a critical counter-tradition byreacting systematically to what they considered to bethe errors and even abrications o works like Te Limitsto Growth(), Global (), and Beyond the

Limits() works that were pivotal in defining themain tenets o the neo-Malthusian revival. Te Ultimate

Resource(Simon , ) and Te Resourceful Earth(Simon and Kahn ) were thoroughly argued anddocumented reactions to the questions addressed by thelimits to growth rhetoric advanced in those works. Bymirroring that rhetoric and by responding to it, Simonoffered not only a different interpretation to the actsbut also he positioned himsel as an architect o an alter-native vision. Tis paper will outline the main directionso Simons criticism o the limits to growth school othought as well as some o the key eatures o the alterna-tive vision he advanced.

Te Resourceful Earth

Te Resourceful Earth, a work jointly coordinated anddesigned by Herman Kahn and Julian Simon, is prob-ably the best vehicle to introduce the alternative pro-growth paradigm, advanced as a counter-reaction tothe doomsday neo-Malthusian limits to growth ideas.o understand its circumstances and significance oneshould keep in mind that Te Resourceful Earth was a

point-by-point response to the Global Report to the

President. Global was supposed to be more than amaniesto and alarm bell. President Carter subsequentlyasked several government agencies to identiy solutions

to the problems identified by that Report. Tus Global enjoyed a wide circulation and significant policyinfluence, marking one o the highest tides o the limitsto growth neo-Malthusian movement.

Te difference between Te Resourceful Earth and

Global is drastic, and the outline o these di-erences constitutes one o the best introductions tothe two schools o thought. Quite unsurprisingly, theMajor Findings and Conclusions o Global restated the standard themes o the radical environmen-talist movement:

I present trends continue, the world in willbe more crowded, more polluted, less stable eco-logically, and more vulnerable to disruption thanthe world we live in now. Serious stresses involving

population, resources, and environment are clearlyvisible ahead. Despite greater material output, theworlds people will be poorer in many ways thanthey are today. For hundreds o millions o thedesperately poor, the outlook or ood and othernecessities o lie will be no better. For many it

will be worse. Barring revolutionary advances intechnology, lie or most people on earth will bemore precarious in than it is now unless thenations o the world act decisively to alter currenttrends. (, p. )

aking as a reerence point precisely these conclu-sions, Kahn and Simon rewrote this summary in their

Resourceful Earth rom the perspective o their ownanalysis and conclusions:

I present trends continue, the world in will be less crowded (though more populated),less polluted, more stable ecologically, and less

vulnerable to resource-supply disruption than the

world we live in now. Stresses involving popula-tion, resources, and environment will be less in theuture than now Te worlds people will be richerin most ways than they are today Te outlook orood and other necessities o lie will be better lie or most people on earth will be less precariouseconomically than it is now. (Simon and Kahn, p. )

Overall, Te Resourceful Earth was an exercise inpoint-by-point dismantling o the arguments put orth

by Global . Te global amine was just a myth. In act,the ood supply measured by grain prices and produc-tion per consumer had constantly grown in the second


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THE ELECTRONIC J OURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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hal o the century. Land availability was not a problemor world agriculture. Water scarcity or disappearance

was not an imminent global danger although the worldand U.S. situations do call or better institutional man-agement through more rational systems o property

rights. Mineral resources scarcity was a pseudo-prob-lem as their availability increased rather than decreased.Treats o air and water pollution and climate change

proved to be exaggerated. Lie expectancy did in act risethroughout the world, and that was a symptom o tech-nological and economic progress. Finally, the birth ratein less developed countries did not explode; rather, it ell a symptom o modernization and o decreasing childmortality. Te Resourceful Earth concluded that a lacko empirical data, misinterpretations, aulty trend analy-sis, and sloppy analytics and generalizations abounded

in Global . Moreover, rom the conceptual stand-point, its authors relied upon the same old discreditedMalthusian theorizing that has led one aer another othese studies to make orecasts that were soon alsified byevents (Simon and Kahn , p. ).

In brie, Te Resourceful Earthchallenged in the mostorceul and proound way the validity o Global .Te strategy was to ollow closely step by step theclaims made by that report and to rebut them:

Our conclusions are reassuring, though notgrounds or complacency. Global problems due to

physical conditions (as distinguished rom thosecaused by institutional and political conditions)are always possible, but are likely to be less press-ing in the uture than in the past. Environmental,resource, and population stresses are diminishing,and with the passage o time will have less influ-ence than now upon the quality o human lie onour planet. Because o increases in knowledge,the earths carrying capacity has been increasing

throughout the decades and centuries and millen-nia to such an extent that the term carrying capac-ity has by now no useul meaning. Tese trendsstrongly suggest a progressive improvement andenrichment o the earths natural resource base,and o mankinds lot on earth. (Simon and Kahn, p. )

o sum up, Te Resourceful Earthchallenges the basicassumptions and conclusions o the Presidential Report.But the most important thing to note is that Simon and

his associates did more than elaborate a point by pointrejection o the main actual claims and projections madeby neo-Malthusian doomsayers. In act they synthesized

in this work the basic elements or an entire theoreticaland normative alternative to that offered by the limitsto growth movement. Te oundations o that approach

were firmly in place by then in Simons book on theeconomics o ertility, his book on the econom-

ics o population growth, and, most especially, in his book, Te Ultimate Resource. Did Simons analysisproceed rom his strongly held moral convictions, or didhis convictions arise rom his analysis? Most probably a

parallel process took place in which analysis reinorcedmoral convictions and moral convictions ueled analysis.He started by developing a line o criticism that ocusedon the acts and their interpretation but he went beyondthat, to the very oundations o the neo-Malthusian

paradigm. In doing that, he articulated the core assump-tions and concepts o an alternative paradigm a social

philosophy based on evolution, exchange, knowledgeproduction and creativity. A corollary o this effort wasSimons constant concern with the place o values and

principles in arguments about population and economicgrowth. Te rest o the paper will briefly outline thesedimensions o his work seen as building blocks o analternative to the limits to growth perspective.

Te critique of Neo-Malthusianism and of theLimits to Growth logic

One o the main problems with the limits to growthmovement was in Simons view what he called the lack ohistorical perspective. Te neo-Malthusian doomsayers,he explained, usually avoid conronting historical experi-ence by saying that their interest is the uture rather thanthe past. But neglect o the past is utterly unscientific. obe valid, science must be based on experience oundedon empirical data; all sound theories ultimately deriverom experience and must be tested against it. Simon

was keen to note that most people do not know the rel-evant acts about the trends they are talking about. Yet,the state o the present-day situation cannot be compre-hended i one has no idea o what the terms o compari-son with the past are.

A good example is the problem o the real price oresources, a problem implicit in many neo-Malthusianarguments. Te historical reality is that these prices

were higher in the past than now. Or to be more precise and in the spirit o Simons approach , the realityis that, more oen than not, the assumption that the

prices will be lower over time, and that the longer thetime period examined, the more likely that will be thecase, has been correct. But to construct and validate


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that piece o knowledge requires not only data but alsocomplicated operations like adjusting or inflation. Tatmakes the opinions about resource scarcity susceptibleto misinormation because o the difficulty o checkingthe ongoing rhetoric against the real trends. Te lack o

historical perspective is revealed also by the practice oextrapolating rom conjunctural trends. Tis is the prac-tice o looking only at a limited time horizon and thenextrapolating rom a conjunctural or accidental down-turn a bleak uture. However, i one looks at the long-run historical trends used typically or that purpose,the downturn is only a blip on the line. Tus, the lacko historical perspective is amplified by the inability tomake the distinction between the long run and the shortrun. Yet, that distinction is crucial or the understandingo trends and global phenomena. For instance, a nega-

tive on the short run may be a positive in the long run.What on the short run may look like overpopulation, inthe long run may be a condition or a deeper division olabor and consequently or a higher standard o living.Te lack o historical perspective leads to the misun-derstanding o both the present and the uture (Simon, p. ).

Another conceptual error identified by Simon at thecore o the limits to growth ideology was the result oa deeply engrained but highly deective way o thinkingabout resources. More precisely, the tendency to thinko resources as given, autonomous o human produc-tive and creative orces, as i they were independento human action, and impervious to transormationthrough technology, choice, and inventiveness (Simon). Tis closed system perspective prepares the wayto seduction by neo-Malthusian logic. Te limits togrowth discourse about resources and population hasbeen dominated by the concept o fixity or finiteness oresources. In intellectual history terms, one may say thatthat is a Malthusian notion. But whether these are ideas

that defined Malthus own thought is up or dispute.Most Malthus scholars would probably argue that neo-Malthusianism evolved rom some core ideas developedby Malthus but pushed those ideas beyond thresholdsthat would have been crossed by Malthus himsel. More-over, wrote Simon, the concept o fixity or finiteness oresources is probably an anthropological constant a

way o thinking that comes naturally to humans. Becausemost o the things humans like, desire, or need are fixedin the short run, this logic becomes a natural way othinking. One additional reason or the bias toward the

closeness assumption might be a combination o epis-temic and psychological actors. Many people may findit preerable to adopt a closed-system vision because o

a natural abhorrence o the loose-endedness o an opensystem (Simon , p.).

Irrespective o origins, there is a temptation to con-sider resources in terms o closed systems. From there,a sense o doom and gloom is inevitable. Simon notes,

however, that once resources are seen not in isolation butin relationship with humans and as part o an open anddynamic system, the apparent problem dissolves (Simon, p. ). A sound approach to the problem oresources should be ramed in terms o open not closed systems. Te open-system approach implies optimism.Yet the closed-system vision is tempting because it givesthe illusion o easy, calculable, and uncontroversial sci-entific results. As a parenthesis one should note thatan excellent example in this respect is the I = P A equation, i.e. the ormalization o the notion that

the Human Impact (I) on the environment equals theproduct o population (P), affluence (A consumptionper capita) and technology ( environmental impactper unit o consumption). But assessing such closed-system models, Simon asked, Where is the relevantboundary or our material world? Te ontology impliedin creation and discovery in a universe populated notonly by matter but also by ideas is different rom theontology assumed by the standard neo-Malthusian logic.

Usually the misunderstanding o the nature oresources, wrote Simon, comes hand in hand with amisunderstanding o the demographic basis o eco-nomic development. More people create more tech-nical knowledge and, implicitly, more efficient wayso producing, exchanging, and consuming goods andservices, such as economic growth. Indeed one may saythat Simon took upon himsel a crusade to deeat theneo-Malthusian view o the relation between demogra-

phy, technology and economic growth. One o his maintargets was the widely believed idea that new technicalknowledge occurs spontaneously. His point was that

the link between needs, social conditions, and growtho knowledge is misunderstood or totally neglected. Alarger population is associated with more knowledge and

productivity, because there are more potential inven-tors and adopters o new technology (Simon , pp.). But making this argument is not easy becauseshort-run costs seem so obvious, while benefits are longterm, and look rather uncertain. A special problem arisesrom the act that the increase in knowledge createdby more people is nonmaterial and easy to overlook.Writers about population growth usually mention a

greater number o mouths coming into the world, andsometimes note more pairs o hands, but never mentionmore brains arriving (Simon , ). His central


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theme was that people are the ultimate resource. Humanbeings, he wrote, are not just more mouths to eed, butare productive and inventive minds that help find crea-tive solutions to mans problems, thus leaving us betteroff over the long run. He challenged the governmental

economic and social statistics tendency to treat people asi they are liabilities and not assets: Every time a cal isborn, he observed, the per capita GDP o a nation rises.Every time a human baby is born, the per capita GDPalls. (Moore ).

Another impediment to clear thinking identified andcriticized by Simon was a nave and utopian vision ohuman nature. More precisely, it was a belie that loveand altruism should be the main motivational source ohuman action, and that amily should be considered theultimate models or all orms o social arrangements. But

this mode o social organization cannot work nearly aseffectively outside the kinship bonds, when the parent-offspring type o hierarchical relationship does not existand when the complexity o choices and the uncertaintyrelated to them go beyond a certain threshold. In thesecircumstances impersonal mechanisms like markets arethe best means o social coordination. Nonetheless,many people resist the idea that markets are the bestmode o coordination and social distribution. Imper-sonal markets lack love and caring. For people that stickto the love and amily view o social order, the idea thatimpersonal institutional and market orces solve global

problems in the long run and do not increase thembecomes difficult to accept (Simon , p. ).

Tat ties in well with a misplaced aith in planningand control. Tat aith, wrote Simon, usually comes romear o anarchy in the absence o a strong central author-ity. Te temptation to dismiss these ears as mere atavis-tic needs or control should be resisted. Fear o anarchyis a very powerul orce in social lie. Most o the timeit is embodied in the dream o organizing an economy

through a simple hierarchical system o central plan-ning, in which all the problems are miraculously solved.Tat is why, argues Simon, the fight against the mirageo central planning starts with understanding the com-

plexity o patterns o social coordination, cooperation,and collective action. Following Hayek (), one couldbetter understand how centralized control in societyaffects social order. Both Hayeks logic and the histori-cal evidence o socialist experiments demonstrated thelimits o the central planning and monocentric socialsystems. Market arrangements, imperect as they may

be, are more unctional and better problem solvers. Butthe arguments that lead to this conclusion are subtle,and difficult to deend, so it is not surprising that even

well-educated laypersons oen have not thought themthrough and do not understand them (Simon , pp.).

Te notion o a centrally directed social order bringswith it an implicit elitism. Simon rejected the notion

that social elites should act as central planners or theless-educated masses who need guidance in their dailylives because they are unable to make sense o the great

picture by themselves. He suspected that this implicitassumption ueled the attitude o many intellectualsand educated people. Yet, these people are rarely openenough, while being politically astute enough, to admitto their belie that trained intellects should have anassured position o control in society. Teir lack o con-fidence in the abilities o the poor to run their own livesis a unction o their own ignorance o daily resource-

ulness, creativity, and ingenuity o people in day-to-daybusiness, and that the uneducated and poor can reallycreate resources by way o creating new ideas. Failingto understand these simple acts betrays a flawed under-standing o society and becomes yet another powerulimpediment to clear thinking about population andresources issues (Simon , pp. ).

Among the catalog o errors that acilitate the spreado gloom and doom ideas, Simon identified a set ocommon allacies in policy thinking and institutionalimpact assessment thinking. For instance, althoughexternalities are widely mentioned as a reason o worriesand governmental intervention, people have a verylimited understanding o the multiple acets o externali-ties. Te unintended by-products o economic activitiescould be malignant or benign. Te unintended conse-quences principle works both ways. Seen rom a different

perspective and using alternative standards, a negativeexternality may appear as a positive one: humans activi-ties tend to increase the order and decrease the random-ness o nature . Humans perceive order, and create

it. While on the short run an externality may look allbad, on the long run things may look differently. Tatmeans that impact assessment is more complicated thanand not as straightorward as the common externalityequals bad thing equation implies (Simon , p. ).

Simon was among the first to criticize radical environ-mentalism or basing its conclusions only on argumentsthat neglected the logic o opportunity costs, trade-offs,and easibility. In doing that, he inaugurated a traditiono responding to its proponents and their radical solu-tions with arguments regarding the costs and easibility

o those solutions and by pointing to the possible trade-offs. Cost-benefit, efficacy, efficiency, and effects-assess-ment become a part o the debate. In addition, a sound


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analysis takes into account not just the obvious andimmediate effects o an economic event, but also the indi-rect and long-run effects as well (Simon , ).In their view, this is the master element in policy analy-sis. Simon was in agreement with the economist Henry

Hazlitt, who considered that the mark o good appliedwork was to look not merely at the immediate but at thelonger effects o any act or policy and to trace the con-sequences o that policy not merely or one group butor all groups (Simon , p. ). Simon used the caseo population economics to illustrate this principle. ounderstand the real dimensions o the phenomenon oneneeds to enlarge the time span not only by pushingthe historical record back to earlier times than are usuallyadduced in the discussion but also by lengthening thehorizon within which analyses o the uture are made.

Tis enlargement is an example o the logic at work.Te ultimate goal is to understand not only the immedi-ate action actors and their cost-benefit ratio, but also totake into account the slower-moving yet undamentalorces that generate them (Simon , pp. ).

A final example o what Simon considered to be majorerrors at the core o the neo-Malthusians paradigm wasthe lack o understanding o the importance o the dis-tinction between local and general, between the dynam-ics o specific areas and general trends, between globalconfigurations and the accidental. Acknowledging theinevitability o local problems, he emphasized the hugedifference between the global situation and local, specificareas and issues. One needs to keep things in perspectiveand not exaggerate the nature and significance o localmismanagement situations. Tey are a misleading baseor generalizations in any global assessment:

Sometimes temporary large-scale problems arise.But the nature o the worlds physical conditionsand the resilience in a well-unctioning economic

and social system enable us to overcome such prob-lems, and the solutions usually leave us better offthan i the problem had never arisen; that is thegreat lesson to be learned rom human history.(Simon and Kahn , p. )

Science, values, environmentalism andhumanism

Simon was very unhappy with the way the authority

o science was used by many environmentalists. In thisrespect he identified as one o the most common con-usions the belie that some value judgments could be

scientific (Simon , p. ). In other words, thatscience validates normatively specific ideas or proposi-tions. A typical example was the belie that a recommen-dation such as that some countries have to reduce their

population growth could be based purely on rigorous

scientific assessment. And indeed, the claim that suchjudgments-recommendations are ully scientific wasan important part o the doomsayers portolio (Simon, p. ). Simon observed, however, that the notiono over-population (or under-population) is hardly a sci-entific concept.

Science, in the measure it deals with acts and notwith values, can hardly decide where there is a caseo overpopulation or one o under-population.Science alone does not, and cannot, tell us whether

any population size is too large or too small, orwhether the growth rate is too ast or too slowSocial and personal decisions about childbearing,immigration, and death inevitably hinge upon

values as well as probable economic consequences.And there is necessarily a moral dimension tothese decisions over and beyond whatever insightsscience may yield. (Simon , p. )

By implication, population policies and policiesin general cannot be based on scientific studies alone.

Values play an important part in this type o decision asin all other cases. Tis raises the question o how those

values are incorporated in policy decisions. Are theysmuggled in deliberately, do they insert themselves sur-reptitiously, or are they decided based on an open dis-cussion and a clearly structured decision process? But amore undamental question is which specific values arerelevant or specific situations.

In his ongoing debate with the limits to growthrhetoric, Simon drew attention to two values that, while

they oen pass unnoticed, create in act the most basicramework o the debate: the value o progress and the

value o human lie. Both are as important as they aretaken or granted. Te idea that progress is desirableis based on the belie that people should have greateraccess to economic opportunity, better health and mate-rial goods and in general to a better standard o living(Simon , p. , ). But the value o progress is obvi-ously derived rom the value o man. I human beingshave no inherently greater value than any other speciesand thus in the end are axiologically worthless, then their

well-being which is implied in the notion o progress is a non-issue.

Tereore, even a cursory examination reveals not


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only the deepest normative parameters o the debate butalso a hierarchy o values. And in this respect the valueo humankind plays a top position. Simon identified thenormative positioning on the issue o the value o manas one o the most undamental issues separating his per-

spective rom the limits to growth worldview. Fromhis perspective, the environmentalist movement repre-sented a radical turning point in the history o the waythe value o humans and human lie was seen.

Te radicalism o the environmentalist approachcould be ully perceived, he explained, only when putin historical perspective. raditionally the problem othe numbers o the human population and its norma-tive implications was neither a major philosophical ortheological issue nor a matter o general concern. Te

value o humans was defined on parameters other than

the quantitative and the demographic ones. Beore theth century, the biblical precept that people should beruitul and multiply and have dominion over nature

was the deault belie. Neo-Malthusianism changed that.Aer it, even the utilitarian philosophy o the great-est good or the greatest number wasnt able to stop anew tradition that questioned the value o more peopleand openly raised the problem in quantitative terms. Aradical departure rom the tradition that placed man atthe center o the universe and the value o human lie atthe top took place. Te neo-Malthusianism o the envi-ronmentalist movement reflected in doctrines such asthe deep green philosophy radically altered the valueand place accorded to humanity: Ecology teaches usthat humankind is not the center o lie on the planet.Ecology has taught us that the whole earth is part o ourbody and that we must learn to respect it as we respectlie the whales, the seals, the orests, the seas (Simon, pp. ).

One thus could see a sharp shi in values rom oneattitude human centered to another nature cen-

tered. Tat transormation took place in less than onecentury actually in only a ew decades.

Conventionally, in the Western tradition, nature wasseen as something created by God or man, that is, nature

was instrumental. It was meant to serve peoples needsand to be an arena or context in which people were sup-

posed to exercise the virtues they were endowed with.Understanding nature was a way to understand the gloryo God. As a result o the shi, today the perspective hasbeen transormed radically: nature is supreme. Peoplehave been relegated to a secondary role when not con-

sidered a downright danger or cancer or nature. Simonound vivid illustrations o this transormation by goingback to old textbooks and comparing them to new ones.

In doing that Simon makes, indeed, a key value judg-ment: humans have special value. In the past, he stated,the descriptions o many birds included evaluationso their effects on humanity in general and on armersin particular; a bird that helped agriculture was more

highly valued than a bird which harmed it. By contrast,the current textbooks oen evaluate humankind orits effect upon the birds rather than vice versa (Simon, pp. ).

But while that example may be amusing, the trans-ormation was also marked by more troubling changeso perception. A glance at the more undamentalistenvironmentalist rhetoric could easily detect not just achange in the hierarchy o values but also a downrightattack on humankind. Te likening o the human speciesto cancer and other virulent diseases has been legiti-

mized as a common piece o rhetoric: the humanspecies, have become a viral epidemic to the earth theAIDS o the earth and thus its extinction may not onlybe inevitable, but a good thing. Simon, quoting RobertNelson (), pointed out an interesting contradiction.On the one hand, Homo sapiens is said to be no differ-ent than other species; on the other hand, it is the onlyspecies whom the environmentalists ask to protect otherspecies. Tat is to say, they attribute to humans a specialduty, but no special privilege (Simon , p. ).

But, in the end, the problem is not that a transorma-tion has taken place and a rearrangement o the valuesystem has been instituted. Te real problem is that thenew system is incoherent and that in the absence o aminimal consistency, it descends into arbitrary anti-humanism. Tis is illustrated by a resurgence o thedoctrine o lives that are not worth living. Tat is, areturn to a tenet o the old eugenics and populationcontrol tradition (Simon , p. ). Eugenics encom-

passes not only the belies that the human race can, andshould, be improved by selective breeding but also an

implicit concept o lives that are not worth living. obe sure, eugenics comes in many guises and varieties: as

population control in the poor countries and amongpoor persons, as a tenet o the Nazi ideology, in policiesencouraging reproduction among high-income, high-education groups and discouraging it among others, inMalthusian and neo-Malthusian programs, and in variousorms o preemptive eugenics (Simon , p. ). Tisidentification o a hard core eugenics element touchedon one o the deepest and most sensitive points in thedebate about the limits to growth, population control

authors: what is the value o a persons lie? I preemptiveeugenics is practiced, what is to be lost? (Simon , pp.). Te problem was reormulated by Paul Ehrlich


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as a version o Pascals Wager: I population control isundertaken and is successul in preventing births, but itturns out to be unnecessary, then what is lost? (Ehrlich, pp. ). Once the issue is ramed this way,

values get a renewed salience because ones answer to

Ehrlichs question obviously depends upon ones values.I you value additional human lives, and some livesare unnecessarily prevented rom being lived, that is anobvious loss (Simon , pp. ).

Simon went urther. For him, the Ehrlich argumentboils down to an inverted (or perverted) Golden Rule:do unto others prevent their existence what you areglad no one did to you (Simon , p. ). Simonsanalysis also reveals a structural identity between theeugenics position and the compassion shown byspecial interest groups and legislators when they use the

government to take taxpayers money in order to giveit to some other persons or activities whom they thinkdeserving. Tis is charity on the cheap doing good

without having to sacrifice rom your own pocket to payor it. Te saving the environment, population-controlapproach seems to be based on the same logic. Tat is tosay that developed to its final conclusion, the argumentalso reveals something that looks like a deep hypocrisyon behal o the promoters o preemptive eugenics (irre-spective o the way the concept is operationalized in

practice: marriage restriction, compulsory sterilizationetc.). Sacrificing lives that might be lived and enjoyedwithout first showing the way by sacrificing their ownlives, which most probably they would claim are too

valuable to be sacrificed, sounds like a hypocritical andimmoral position (Simon , p. ).

It seems that a troublesome egocentrism inuses theattitude and reasons o precisely those who claim to beanimated by the most selfless and generous sentiments.Yet, in most cases there is a method in madness. o getits clue it is necessary to look at how the risk actors are

perceived and defined by the limits to growth authors.It is clear that they see dangers rom the unique perspec-tive o their own persons and interests. In the end, theepistemics o risk assessment becomes secondary. Eve-rything is a story about sel-preservation and well-beingo their own persons (Simon , p. ). People withthat attitude are prepared to sacrifice massive benefits toothers in order to reduce low-probability risks to them-selves. Te act that doomsayers are prone to make out o

proportion risk evaluations, in which the dangers tend tobe exaggerated, might not be a problem as long as those

exaggerations affect only them. However, the exaggera-tions affect other groups in ways the doomsayers do notseem to care about. One thing leads to another and an

exaggerated gloomy orecast o natural resources avail-ability may lead to eugenics implications or groups thathave nothing to do either with the resources or the evalu-ation. Tis lack o proportion in thought, resulting romegocentrism doubled by an incorrect assessment o the

trends and the resulting hysteria, were always just stepsaway rom advocating eugenics. Te justification that itis good or the unborn not to live, especially i at birththe child will become part o a poor society or under-

privileged group, is a very troubling argument because itleads to slippery slopes with all sorts o implications orhumanity and lie on Earth.

An alternative vision: evolution, socialexchange, and creativity

Julian Simons argument went beyond criticizing variouscomponents o the neo-Malthusian paradigm inspiringthe limits to growth movement. His work articulatedthe elements o a complex social philosophy in which evo-lution, social exchange, and creativity play pivotal roles.His starting point was the standard economic historyobservation that in two centuries, daily lie changedmore than in the seven thousand years beore (Mokyr, in Simon ). Simons analysis concentrated onthis break with the past starting about or . Forhim the study o the leap above the previous centuriesand millennia in mortality rate, household consump-tion level, literacy rate, speeds o travel and communica-tion was the key in understanding not only past socialchange but also the current predicament o the world.Te answer to the question o what orce(s) caused thissudden breakthrough to occur precisely when it did and not earlier or later in history is essential.

Elaborating the argument, Simon agreed that thetechnology level resulting rom the accumulation o

knowledge played an important part. But what producedthe accumulated knowledge? In his view the necessaryconditions o change was the total quantity o humanity.Utilization o technology had to wait on the accumula-tion o the nexus o human numbers and knowledge.New knowledge doesnt mean automatic progress. Newand innovative knowledge can remain dormant or along time i demographic conditions are not appro-

priate or its adoption, hence the gain in knowledgewould not necessarily be converted into an increase inprogress. Sudden Modern Progress depended on the

number o people endowed with intellect and trainingwho lived thereaer, together with the amount o tech-nology in existence at the particular moment (Simon


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, pp. ). Te technology level and the stand-ard o living would have stayed low i the total popula-tion had remained at the ew hundreds o millions thatexisted at that time (Simon , p. ).

Simon takes as an axiom the act that the historical

evidence is unambiguous in showing how in the past,new knowledge, new inventions, and human ingenuityhave increased the access to resources, the saety and thecomort o humans. Tat bolsters the legitimacy o theargument that sees humankind and social order as parto the long evolutionary chain dating rom the simplest

plants and animals a history o increasing complex-ity o construction and greater capacity to deal actively

with the environment (Simon , pp. ). Butwhat i the convergence o various areas o improvement(security, comort, lie expectation, knowledge) is just an

accident? Is the improvement trend in social evolution amere coincidence? Simon realized that a general theoryexplaining these correlated phenomena would be a deci-sive argument against an accidental explanation. He

was confident he had such a theory: the uniting threadwas the dynamic relationship between an evolving andadapting social order and the environment. Te generaltheory could be ound in applications o evolutionarysocial theory. Humankind has evolved sets o rules and

patterns o living which are consistent with survivaland growth rather than with decline and extinction.As such, they are an aspect o the evolutionary selec-tion or survival among past societies. Specific rules,institutions, and living patterns that increase chances orsurvival get selected and thereore the patterns we haveinherited constitute a machinery or continued survivaland growth (Simon , pp. ). Among them areuncertainty coping institutions, institutions o coor-dination and cooperation, institutions that create andmanage knowledge, and the institutions o voluntaryexchange. Te market system is part o that evolution,

o course. But it is not the whole o it (Simon , pp.).

In other words, humanity has developed institutions,rules, and patterns o behavior that lead to an increase oavailable resources. Te extension o the resource baseand the improvements resulting rom that were not theresult o accidents but a response to a survival challenge.I that challenge had not been met, either humankind

would have stalled in a stationary state or the increase inhuman population would have led to a crisis and perhapsits extinction. Instead, population growth was accompa-

nied by a growing mastery o nature and its resources. Tetwo reinorced each other and thus, humans managedboth to increase both their population and their quality

o lie. In this process, human numbers and institutionsare key in making knowledge and technology work tocreate wealth and prosperity.

One cannot disentangle rom human numbers

the effects o the human brain and its contents call it human capital any more than one candisentangle the effects o the human digestive or

procreative anatomy rom human numbers. Itis a crucial element o the model that popula-tion growth and density affect the structures omarkets, law, tradition, and political institutions. Ithis had not been so, structures incompatible withan improvement in technology and the long-runstandard o living could have remained in placeindefinitely, thereby preventing urther progress.

(Simon , pp. )

While knowledge is the driver, the role o institu-tions and demographics is critical. Institutions createincentives: they may encourage the production o newknowledge or they may hamper it. But the gains oknowledge are not necessarily converted to economicgrowth. New knowledge can remain dormant or a longtime i demographic conditions are not appropriateor its adoption at the time and i institutions hamperthe initiative that would put that knowledge to work orthe benefit o the population. It is not only the humanmind and the human spirit that are crucial, but also theramework o society. In act, the political-economicorganization o a country has the most influence uponits economic progress (Simon , p. ).

Tereore, a double creativity is at work in humanhistory: the creativity o technical inventions and thecreativity leading to institutional inventions that shapesociety in ways that encourage the production and suc-cessul application o knowledge. I that perspective is

correct, then two main conclusions come orward. Tefirst is that humans should be seen as undamentally cre-ators rather than destroyers. Tis propensity toward cre-ative adaptation is spontaneous and intrinsic to humansas social beings. Humans continuously alter the abric othe universe and o nature, bringing to lie new combina-tions o elements and new things. Our whole evolutionup to this point shows that human groups spontaneouslyevolve patterns o behavior, as well as patterns o train-ing people or that behavior, which tend on balance tolead people to create rather than destroy. Humans are,

on balance, builders rather than destroyers. Te evi-dence is clear: the civilization which our ancestors havebequeathed to us contains more created works than the


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civilization they were bequeathed. In short, humankindhas evolved into creators and problem solvers (Simon, p. ).

Te second conclusion is a corollary o the thesisemphasizing what a distinct and special ontological

realm human society is. Te complex social order involv-ing language and institutions is the background condi-tion o human creativity and growth o knowledge isthe ultimate new thing created by humankind. Socialexchange creates, maintains and extends this order.Identiying social exchange as a central principle was arelatively easy task, since that conceptual territory hadalready been charted by F. A. Hayek () and Simonully acknowledged his debt and incorporated Hayekslanguage. Division o labor, comparative advantage andother similar phenomena are all captured by an analytical

ocus on social exchange: exchange mechanism evolveseverywhere as a way o handling differences in abilitiesamong persons, in order to improve our capacities toconstruct and create new goods as well as to distributeexisting goods (Simon , pp. ). In a word,social exchange is the uel and acilitator o human crea-tivity. And thus creativity and social exchange are twoelements brought into existence by humankind that i

properly taken into account, change the way we under-stand the universe and our relationship with it. Tis

perspective contains simultaneously a social theory, ananthropology, and a philosophy all o them in directcontradiction with the social theory, anthropology, and

philosophy implied in the views o the limits to growthdoomsayers. As a social philosophy, Simons perspectiveemphasizes the dynamic and creative nature o socialorder seen as a complex set o problem-solving institu-tional and social devices growing on an intricate systemo social exchange relationships. As an anthropology, itrebuts the view o the average human as destroyer andemphasizes the intrinsic creativity o the human species.

Finally, as a social theory it explains why the construc-tive patterns o behavior must have been the dominant

part o our individual-cum-social nature in order or usto have survived to this point (Simon , pp. ).

And thus, we have reached the point that allows usto identiy one o the major ironies o Simons views:the human capacity to be creative and to create a dis-tinct ontological realm somehow escapes the evolution-ary account o institutional development. Everythingis evolution: except human creativity, which enableshuman beings to be different than the rest o the animal

world and to create complex orders based on ideas andexchange. One could easily agree that humans are di-erent, and that their specific difference enables them

to set up institutions that allow them to avoid natures(Malthusian or neo-Malthusian) traps. However it is di-ficult not to notice the tension between the argumentthat the development o the institutions was the producto evolution (not o human planning and control) and

the argument that human creativity in technology is thepivotal actor that allows humans to escape those traps.

Conclusions

Julian Simons criticism o neo-Malthusianism targetedthe conceptual, empirical and philosophical flaws o thelimits to growth paradigm. His critique led him todevelop the elements o an alternative paradigm incor-

porating a radically different vision. And thus, we end

up by being conronted with two competing perspec-tives. On the one hand is the pessimism o neo-Malthu-sianism. On the other is the confidence that the natureo the physical world permits continued improvementin humankinds economic lot in the long run, indefi-nitely. Simon wanted the public to adjudicate betweenthe two based not on emotions and mass media cam-

paigns but on acts and analysis. Whether his view wasthe correct one was, is and most probably will continueto be a matter o debate. Yet he was convinced that his

was a more realistic perspective and that sooner or laterpeople would embrace it. Its appeal was not, however,to utopian optimism. In act, Simon distanced himselrom the charge o utopian thinking:

o describe those who believe that the naturalresources are available in practically limitless abun-dance, someone has coined the phrase cornuco-

pians, to contrast with doomsdayers. But pleasenotice: Te school o thought that I represent hereis not cornucopian. I do not believe that nature is

limitlessly bountiul. I believe instead that the pos-sibilities in the world are sufficiently great so that

with human imagination and human enterprise we and our descendants can manipulate the ele-ments in such ashion that we can have all weneed and desire. (Simon , p. )

o sum up, Julian Simon strongly believed that thenotion that nature puts a clear-cut, limiting condition ongrowth is a simplistic and misleading premise or publicdebates and governmental decisions. He was convinced

that both acts and theory were on his side. But ulti-mately his views were rooted in deep moral convictions.Simon was always eager to denounce the anti-humanism


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o those who think that additional poor persons in thisgeneration do make others poorer in this and uturegenerations, that human lives matter less than lives oanimals or that humans are the cancer o the Earth. Butmore than anything, he wanted to demonstrate that

altruism is not the monopoly o any particular politi-cal economic philosophy and that staunch supporterso ree markets, like himsel, are true altruists. Simontook pride in his own altruism, a cosmopolitan view ohuman beings: Te lives o people o other countries,ethnicities, and religions matter to me, he wrote, irre-spective o the ates o the groups to which they belong.I take pride and pleasure in the human race () (Simon, p. ).

Acknowledgements

Te author would like to thank the two anonymousreviewers or their very constructive eedback andcomments.

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Documents

Julian and the Limits to Growth Neo-malthusianism