Judiciary Notes 2

7/30/2019 Judiciary Notes 2

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TITLE: PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

CITATION: 97 Phil. 806

FACTS:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition

that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection

and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for

the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No. 3075

and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the

grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as

well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process

of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty

to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred

on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to

prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of

Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public

Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private

schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish

adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class

and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said

Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to

advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to

determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of

Education before opening a school is not originally included in the

original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners

they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to

own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental

approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On

the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitteda memorandum

contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhi

biting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional

question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the

said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for

prohibition was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and

Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?

RULING:

The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs norelief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable

controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle

that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a

direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial

power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he

must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the

public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law

unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use

of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As

such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and

controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is

incident alto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under

the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the

constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be

necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants.

Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual

positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic

question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds

the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the

petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law

because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials

entrusted with the

execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the

unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the

court conclude that there

has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners

appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department

of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was

constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.

Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

TITLE: TAN VS. MACAPAGAL

CITATION: 43 SCRA 678

FACTS:

Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino

people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the

deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under

Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to

consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present

Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than

the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being]

merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution

without altering the general plan laid down therein."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi.2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction overthe case.

RULING:

1. NO.Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the

validity of a statute must have a personal and substanti al interest

in th e case such that he has sustained , or will sustain , dire ct

injury as a result of its enforcement. "Pascual vs. The

Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be

contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in

consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have

standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public

funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the

purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes

a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjo

at the request of a

2. NO.At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolu

radically alter the 1935constitutio n the refore not yet r ipe for judicia l re

The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does

already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdictio

body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to

as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not boun

for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfe

it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the

time comes ripeness.

TITLE:DUMLAO VS. COMELEC


FACTS:

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of B

Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal

protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Seprovides that any retired elective provincial or municipal officia

received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been

of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he

be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective lo

office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the pro

amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan J

assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which

that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the

including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellio

similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices cove

act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided t

judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evsuch fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such

before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investig

be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions

violate the Constitution and thus and will be declared null and void

RULING:

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP B lg.

52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee

of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One

class can be treated differently from another class. In this case,

employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger

employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new

blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it

should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional

presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the

constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy

the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973

Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not

synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the

constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified

from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have

been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns

before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of

proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of

disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts,

as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person

disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been

filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person

already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries

with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office

during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie

evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet there is "clear and present

danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints

will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary

proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be

aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such

as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two

government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will

thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative

determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a

judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity

of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the

first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 which

can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby

declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of

BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the

constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

TITLE:NORTH COTABATO VS. REPUBLIC

CITATION:G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008

FACTS:

The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum

of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-

MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The GRP-MILF agreement is the result of a formal peace talks between

the parties in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The pertinent provisions in the MOA-

AD provides for the establishment of an associative relationship

between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the Central

Government. It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the

Philippine government as associative, thus implying an international

relationship and therefore suggesting an autonomous state.

Furthermore, under the MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel guarantees

that necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will

eventually be put in place.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said MOA-AD constitutional?

RULING:

No. The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the

present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the

very concept underlying them, namely, the associative

relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are

unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity

is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it

said. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the

necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually

be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself

is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would

amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested

only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves

through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can

ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue

influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not

amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding

on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of

guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation

that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains

provisions which are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result

in the virtual surrender of part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty.

She further said that had the MOA-AD been signed by parties, wouldhave bound the government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro

state having its own territory, government, civil institutions, and armed

forces. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would

have been compromised.

Notes: In this case, The Court explained that the Presidential Adviser

on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he

failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by

EO No. 3, RA 7160, and RA 8371.

EO No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both

national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-

building.

R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national

offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to

the environment and human ecology including those that may call for

the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is

implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program th

unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territo

Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically r

the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants

total environment.

R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) provid

clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ance

domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of

and prior informed consent (FPIC) of the Indigenous CulturalCommunities/Indigenous Peoples.

TITLE:KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO

CITATION:G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipme

Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equi

accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of

least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receiptsto charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to emplo

personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiratio

PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 2

petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the sa

Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was sam

Contract of Lease. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is v

the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art.

1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned beca

become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is diff

the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The

determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of D

PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to fumoral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing bec

were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?


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RULING:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the

standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real

parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually

involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present

case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.

Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law

of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON

CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directlypassed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in

question in any future action between the same parties involving a

different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at

least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the

second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with,

but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding,

the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent

examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different

contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the

petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and

here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more

appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in

INTEREST.

TITLE:KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA JR.


FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as

amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and

conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar

activities, the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for

the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources

of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO

was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group

Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten largest public

companies in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and

resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through

its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March

1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming

Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the

medium through which the technical and management services required

for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal

(RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO.

On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21

October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had giventhe respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-line

lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would

be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance and

approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President

Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery

system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.

Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and

the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that

only a court injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imminent

implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994,

KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this

petition.

Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of

civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of

the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada

and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as

members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers

and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and

Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of

Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.

The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no

standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Courts resolution in

Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2.Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No.

1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from

holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint

venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether

domestic or foreign. is legal and valid.

RULING:

We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the

public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,

economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotestbarangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive

effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the

billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the

petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound

discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which

the respondents tried to take advantage of.

The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The

PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration,

association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such

franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether

the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided

on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of

the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract

itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the

soul of the instrument.

Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC

mutually understood that any arrangement between them would

necessarily leave to the P GMC the technical, operations, and

management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO

would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease

is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions

which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in

or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and

maintenance of the on-line lottery system.

We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the

exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as

amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to

law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion o

other issues raised by the petitioners.

TITLE: JOYA VS. PCGG

CITATION:G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered inta Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling

Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacan

the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill

wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prio

auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, t

already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it procee

scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned ov

Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter in

agreement with Christies of New York for the sale of the artwo

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review

- The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutiona

validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decide

court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for

judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by th

party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that th

question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; an

the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be ne

the determination of the case itself. But the most important are

two (2) requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

- On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right o

to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-p
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an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court

which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in

the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having

interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded

shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial

review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal

standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"

means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the

party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of

the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" ismaterial interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,

as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be

personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional

right of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers

Suit

- There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed

exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case

for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the

fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a

taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the

disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply

concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic

wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive

Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to

conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution,

particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846

known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"

governing the preservation and disposition of national and important

cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise

that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned

by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works

of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the

art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public

property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in

law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private

persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of

Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations

established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman

was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was

Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings

legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof,

although the public has been given the opportunity to view and

appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware

were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries

from foreign countries on their silver w edding and anniversary, an

occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was

toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware

were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila

and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these

properties by the Aquino administration however should not be

understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has

automatically passed on the government without complying with

constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just

compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the

government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and

their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties

the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from

their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the

Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the

artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned,

petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question

their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

- Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by

concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that

a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right

to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably

set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after

the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under

the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act

because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the

continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at

most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this

action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

- Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every

action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official

acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if thegovernmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public

funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer

of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act

constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the

request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any

expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege

to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the

paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources

and not with public money.

Actual Controversy

- For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an

actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal

rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial

resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-

legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become

stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for

prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the

auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991

which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot

and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the

discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the

requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public

interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in

the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

TITLE:CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

CITATION:G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing age

to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over t

and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or a

reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporatio

ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA a

to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay t

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public do

transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross viola

constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring aalienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of

lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by cer

title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public do

592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain

natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended J

to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.3

of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being c

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohib

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of

domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged

Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Sectio

XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation

resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.


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Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,

fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural

resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural

lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,

development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full

control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake

such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or

production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or

associations at least sixtyper centum of whose capital is owned by suchcitizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-

five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under

such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water

rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than

the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure

and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic

waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use

and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with

priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays,

and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-

scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,

and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions

provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and

general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall

promote the development and use of local scientific and technical

resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in

accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

TITLE:GONZALES VS. NARVASA

CITATION:G.R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,

assails the constitutionality of the creation of thePreparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the

positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of E O 43 in order to

study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the

Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

RULING:

In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest

as a citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered

some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal

conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable

action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of

sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR

and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in

danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties

or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the

standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public

funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the

Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is

an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation

of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of

its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the P resident

by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the

PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds

used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the

President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer

funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to thecreation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to

enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in

this particular issue.

TITLE: SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB


FACTS:

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by aREM, which was to mature 5 years later.

15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by

prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction

against the sheriff.

PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if theperiod from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when

RA 342 was issued should be deducted.

E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt

moratorium The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an

extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.

Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32,suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers.

However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think

what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law

declared unconstitutional because it violates the n

impairment of contractual obligations clause in the

constitution).

PNB claims that this period should be deducted frprescriptive period since during this time the bank

legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, t

has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action is prescribe.

RULING:

NO.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act be

suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duti

the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitutio

former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged

act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This

until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its inva

entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in o

and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted th

its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned wit

merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the jud

the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a

act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can ex

power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity

e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if

no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudicatio

The past cannot always be erased by judicial dec

(OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute p

being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal conseq

are attached.


6/7

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in

force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in

the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

TITLE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN

REFORM COUNCIL

CITATION:G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted

unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and

AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking

HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in

Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution.

Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred

in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court

declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the

operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296

qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they

want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution].

It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and

explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical

implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to

manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their

signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their

printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for

reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is available in this

case.

2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

3. Whether or not the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of

Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA

6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),

and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?

4. Whether or not the date of the taking (for purposes of determining

the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC

approved HLIs SDP?

5. Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of

awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda

Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme

on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed

to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether

they have fully paid for the lands or not?

6. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the July 5, 2011

Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as

stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

RULING:

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact

doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the

minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional

laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the

administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to

the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts

and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that theoperative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that

resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the

SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative

fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact

favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the

benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution

scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves

whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to

rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it

was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof

is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been

rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes

of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5,

2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec.

31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave

violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of

constitutionality.

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of

Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75

hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety

of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 of agriculturalland and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as

regards the 4,915.75 of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not

prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from

subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands

originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but

were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the

July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are

roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are

considered commonly-owned by farm workers, and these may

necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded

per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the

DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case

the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the

proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per

qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the

administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian ref

are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shal

determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awa

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated

holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that h

validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by

intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) an

Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 8

hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be exc

from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court

ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale o

hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for

SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PA

approved HLIs SDP.

For the purpose of determining just compensation

of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC appro

SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to

possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be prec

lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage throug

distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is

November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of cover

ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the conten

minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverag

PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is

determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to re

Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this

involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do no

apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it be

stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and

any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The land

can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agr

to determine just compensation. The court has the right to rev

finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a

function.
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7/7

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands

under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified

FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda

Luisita to third parties.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be

transferred or conveyed after 10 years from

the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or

certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or

CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant

case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly,

the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the

placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover,

should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey

their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform

would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands

will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under

CARP.

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs

be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be

reconsidered.

The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified

FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,

inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control over the

subject lands]given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The

Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is just

33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote

to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in

the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at

least one share of the common shares and other voting

shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of

shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares

(590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI

share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by

PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the

FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

TITLE: LAUREL VS. GARCIA

CITATION:G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi

Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by

the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter

to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is

property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men.

Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall

apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit

that the principle of lex situs applies.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated.2. Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

RULING:

1. The answer is in the affirmative.Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion

unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become

patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of

public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It

cannot be alienated.

2. The answer is in the affirmative.We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no

conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only

when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable,

such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of

conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the

interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2)

A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to

conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to

determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is

no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the

authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property

belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to

effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs

does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on

the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not

tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations

nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In

discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely

explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can

acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition

of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly

owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Documents

Judiciary Notes 2