judicial ethics Canon 2 Full Text Cases

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2. G.R. No. L-9050 July 30, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner , vs. JUAN L. BOCAR,Vacation Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay CityBranch and OSCAR CASTELO,Respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose H. Bautista, City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and City Attorney FranciscoH. Salva for petitioner.Mariano H. De Joya, Estanislao A. Fernandez, Roberto Guianzon,Felicisimo Ocampo, Alejandro De Santos, Constancio M. Leuterio, Lauro S.Esteban and Vicente Francisco for respondents.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunctionfiled by the People of the Philippines against Juan L. Bocar, acting asvacation judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,and Oscar Castelo. The facts in the case are not disputed; only questionsof law, but important ones areinvolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Criminal Case No. 3023-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, PasayCity Branch, Oscar Castelo and Rogelio Robles with 14 others werecharged with the crime of murder for the death of Manuel P. Monroy. On

motion of the prosecution defendant Rogelio Robles was discharged fromthe information with his consent to be utilized as witness for theGovernment as he did in fact testify for the prosecution. After a prolongedtrial, Judge Emilio Rilloraza in a decision promulgated on March 31,1955,found eight of the accused including Castelo guilty of the charge andsentenced all of them to suffer the death penalty. After promulgationrespondent Castelo filed a motion to be released on bail. In the meantimerespondent Judge Bocar had been detailed to the Court of First Instanceof Rizal, Pasay City Branch since February 1, 1955. In the absence ofJudge Rilloraza who, presumably had gone on vacation after promulgatinghis decision, Judge Bocar took his place. Acting upon this motion for bailand over the objection of the City Fiscal of Pasay City, Bocar granted thesame upon filing a bond in the sum ofP30,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 11, 1955, respondent Castelo filed a motion for new trial withnotice of hearing on April 14th, based mainly on the affidavit of RogelioRobles, one of the original accused who as already stated, was excludedfrom the information and who testified for the prosecution, recanting histestimony given during the trial against respondent Castelo, stating insaid affidavit that all his testimony was false but that he had so testified

because of alleged force, intimidation or violence exerted uponhim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


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On April 13, 1955, the petitioner People of the Philippines filed a motionfor reconsideration of the order granting bail to respondent Castelo. Itwas denied by respondent Judge on April 20,1955.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As originally scheduled, the hearing on the motion for new trial was heldon April 14th at which hearing City Attorney Salva of Pasay City appearedfor the prosecution. In the course of the hearing which lasted until April20th, Manila City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles also appeared for theprosecution. In support of the motion for new trial, the affidavit ofrecantation of Robles was presented and he himself testified extensively;so did Judge Hermogenes Calauag, Mrs. Felicidad Manuel, Atty. Alejandrode Santos and Liceria Siasoy, mother of Robles. For the prosecution,seven affidavits were presented, marked as Annexes H, H-1, H-2, H-3, H-4, H-5 and H-6, made by public officials such as Judge Luis B. Reyes who,

during the main trial of the case before Judge Rilloraza, acted as assistantManila City Fiscal, Hon. Arsenio H. Lacson, Mayor of Manila and somemembers of the Manila City Police Department, all denying the acts ofviolence, force or intimidation attributed to them by Robles. Immediatelyafter the last hearing on April 20, Judge Bocar in an order of the samedate granted the motion for new trial and set aside the decision ofconviction rendered by Judge Rilloraza as regards Castelo, and he set thenew trial for April 25th. The same order denied the petitioner's motion forreconsideration of the order granting bail. Thereafter, Solicitor GeneralAmbrosio Padilla filed the present petition forcertiorari and prohibition

with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the orders of respondentBocar granting bail and granting new trial to respondentCastelo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a hearing held before this Court in Baguio on April 23, 1955, on theprayer in the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,at which hearing the Solicitor General and counsel for Castelo appearedand orally argued for the petitioner and respondents, respectively, a writof preliminary injunction without bond was issued, enjoining respondentBocar not to proceed with the new trial as set by him for April 25th.

Another hearing was held before this Court in Baguio on May 5, 1955, atwhich hearing Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant SolicitorGeneral Jose Bautista appeared and argued for the petitioner and SolicitorTroadio Quiazon also appeared for the petitioner, and Attys. Mariano H.de Joya and Estanislao Fernandez appeared and argued for respondents,and Attys. Roberto A. Gianzon, Alejandro de Santos, Constancio M.Leuterio and Felicisimo Ocampo also appeared for respondents, andrespondent Oscar Castelo himself appeared and addressed the Tribunal onhis own behalf. Thereafter, the case was submitted fordecision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


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The theory of the petitioner as may be gathered from the pleadings andthe oral argument of its representatives, is that respondent Bocarpresiding over the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain, much less togrant the motion for new trial because the case involves a deathsentence, and that even if he had said jurisdiction, he gravely abused his

discretion in granting it, considering the circumstances surrounding thecase. On the other hand, counsel for respondents maintain thatrespondent Bocar had jurisdiction to grant the new trial as in ordinarycriminal cases, and that in the exercise of that jurisdiction he did notcommit any abuse of discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

The case is without established judicial precedent; it is one of firstimpression, and realizing the importance and far-reaching effects of adecision on the matter we have given it special attention and considerable

study and thought. In ordinary criminal cases where the penalty imposedis life imprisonment or less, there is no question that the trial courtimposing the sentence may grant a motion for new trial. Not only this, butunder section 1, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, the trial court even on itsown motion but with the consent of the defendant may grant a new trial.The legal provision which has sown doubt or effected conviction in themind of counsel for petitioner is section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Courtwhich provides as follows:

SEC. 9. Transmission of record in case of death penalty .-The records of all

cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court ofFirst Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall beforwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to theclerk of the Supreme Courtwithin twenty days, but not earlier than fifteendays, after rendition of sentence. The transcript shall also be forwardedwithout unnecessary delay.

The Solicitor General argues that under the above-quoted section, afterthe rendition of a death sentence the trial court is completely divested of

all jurisdiction over the case which, regardless of whether the accusedsentenced to death appeals or not, automatically goes to the SupremeCourt for review of the sentence, the records of the case to be forwardedto it within 20 days. He further claims that a defendant under a deathsentence is not deprived of his right to file a motion for new trial but thatany such motion should be addressed to and resolved by the SupremeCourt, all this, because of the extreme importance of the case, thedefendant's life being at stake. On the other hand, counsel forrespondents maintain that there is absolutely no reason why an accusedunder a death sentence, whose life is in the balance should be deprived ofthe rights enjoyed by defendants in ordinary criminal cases such as the


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right to file a motion for new trial before the trial court to be resolved bythe same court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The automatic review by this Tribunal of a decision or sentence imposingthe death penalty is intended primarily for the protection of the accused

(U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 520). It is to insure the correctness of thedecision of the trial court sentencing him to death. The Supreme Courtunder this automatic review is called upon to scrutinize the record andlook for any errors committed by the trial court against the defendant. Insuch review this Tribunal may find errors committed in his favor but sucherrors are not exactly the object of the said review because even if foundto be such, their correction by this Tribunal would be vain and of nopractical utility because the sentence cannot be made more severe; thepenalty of death already imposed is the extreme, the highest penalty ofdeath already imposed is the extreme, the highest penalty imposable

under the law. We repeat that the whole purpose of the automatic reviewby this Court of a death sentence is to find and correct errors committedby the trial court against the accused such as finding him guilty of thecrime deserving the death penalty when in fact the offense committedwas less serious, or a finding against him of the existence of aggravatingcircumstances or a qualifying circumstance, not supported by the record,or failing to compensate proven aggravating circumstances with equallyproven mitigating circumstances. In other words, the law providing forautomatic review of a death sentence seeks to favor the defendant. If thisis the case, then such defendant should and must be accorded at least

the same rights, privileges and opportunities for acquittal or reduction ofhis sentence, enjoyed by other accused sentenced to penalties lower thandeath.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It might be argued as does the Solicitor General that a defendantsentenced to death is not being deprived of the right to move for newtrial, only that said motion for new trial must be addressed to theSupreme Court and resolved by it instead of being addressed to anddecided by the trial court. That is but partly correct, for should suchmotion for new trial before this Tribunal be denied, for the defendant-

movant, that is the end of the trial. He cannot and may not pursue hisremedy to a higher court because there is none. The Supreme Court isthe highest Tribunal of the land, where all roads of relief and legalremedies lead to an end. In other words, he has only one chance for thegranting of new trial. On the other hand, a defendant in an ordinarycriminal case sentenced to say,reclusion temporal or arresto mayor, maypetition the trial court for a new trial. If it is denied there, he appeals hiscase to the proper appellate court and there renews his petition for newtrial. In other words, he has two chances and opportunities to be granteda new trial, while one sentenced to death, fighting for his life has only onechance and one opportunity. That would be unreasonable and illogical.Since as we have already stated the purpose of an automatic review of a


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death sentence is to favor the accused involved, it stands to reason thathe should be given if possible more rights, remedies and opportunities tohave any errors committed against him by the trial court corrected; atleast the same rights, opportunities and privileges accorded a defendantsentenced to a lesser penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

In an ordinary criminal case involving a mere prison sentence, the trialcourt is given a period of 15 days after rendition of judgment within whichto mull over or ponder his decision, unless of course, within that period oftime, the accused waives his right to appeal, begins serving the sentenceor takes the case on appeal to an appellate court. Within that period, asalready stated, the trial court may on its own motion with the consent ofthe defendant, grant a new trial. Within that period the trial court maymodify its judgment by reducing the penalty or find, or even set it aside

altogether and acquit the accused. But under the theory of the petitioner,all these rights and prerogatives of the trial court in an ordinary criminalcase, are swept away in a case involving the death penalty withconsequences tremendously, even fatally prejudicial to the accused. It isclear that every curtailment or reduction of the rights and prerogatives ofa trial court to grant a new trial, to modify its sentence or even to acquitthe accused, within the 15-day period during which it retains jurisdictionand control over its decision correspondingly and in equal measureabridges and diminishes the rights and chance of the defendant himself tohave the penalty reduced or to be acquitted altogether. It is evident that

the abridgement and diminution, whether of the jurisdiction, powers andprerogatives of a trial court, or of the rights, opportunities and chances ofthe defendant, in a death sentence case, is incompatible with and runscounter to the purpose and the intention of the law which as we havealready stated, is to favor a defendant sentenced by the trial court todie.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A defendant in an ordinary criminal case sentenced to a mere prisonterm, fighting only to gain his freedom, is allowed by the law to invokeand take advantage of and exhaust all the legal remedies and

opportunities available to him in the trial court such as asking for amodification of the sentence, even for his outright acquittal, or to file amotion for new trial. Does and will the same law deny the same legalopportunities and remedies to one who is sentenced to the death penalty,who needs said remedies and opportunities most, for the reason that heis fighting not only for his liberty but his very life, specially when as wehave already said, it is the policy of the Government as shown in the legalprovision providing for automatic review of a death sentence to give thedefendant thus sentenced every protection from any judicial errorcommitted against him? Both reason and justice give and must give theanswer in the negative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary


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It might be contended that to modify a death sentence or to pass upon amotion for new trial and to grant it, is such a delicate and serious matterthat said task is reversed only to the Supreme Court, and that,consequently, a trial court is denied the jurisdiction and the power tomodify a death sentence rendered by it or to grant a new trial. But if the

law itself considers a trial court good enough and wise enough, and in allother respects fully qualified to try an accused for a capital offense andimpose capital punishment on him, reason dictates that said trial courtshould be good and wise enough and fully qualified to modify the deathsentence imposed by itself, or grant a new trial. Besides, even if a motionfor new trial in a death sentence is granted by the Supreme Court itself,for lack of facilities and of material time, the new trial is almost invariablyordered to be conducted by the trial court itself and thereafter the casedecided anew by the same trial court, proof, positive that a trial court isregarded by this Tribunal as possessed with sufficient wisdom and

integrity to modify a death sentence, even to acquit the defendant shouldthe evidence at the new trial so justify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this connection we might digress a little and say something about theresponsibility of a trial court in imposing the death penalty. To sentence afellowman to die is a serious matter. The law calls for the imposition ofthe death penalty only in rare and extreme cases, where the evidence isvery strong, even conclusive, and extraordinary and aggravatingcircumstances attended the commission of the particular offense. The trial

judge imposing the death sentence must be morally convinced andcertain that the accused committed the crime and under the aggravatingcircumstances charged in the information, and to arrive at this moralcertainty and conviction the trial judge must be sure that the witness orwitnesses testifying on the commission of the crime and linking theaccused to it, were sincere, truthful and credible. The tremendousresponsibility of the trial judge may therefore be easily imagined,especially when we consider that he is alone on the Bench with nocompanions as in a collegiate court with whom to share the greatresponsibility. Why, therefore, should not a trial judge rendering a death

sentence be allowed as he is allowed in ordinary cases involving a mere aprison term or fine to retain control over his fateful decision within thereglementary period of 15 days, to ponder the sentence, think anddetermine whether he had committed any error against the accused, as inthe finding and consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstancesor in according credence to important witnesses, in order to modify andreduce the penalty if necessary, or to consider and grant a motion for newtrial when said motion is justified?chanrobles virtual law library

It may again be contended as in fact it is contended by the SolicitorGeneral that any error committed by the trial court in a death sentencecase will be duly considered and corrected by this Tribunal in the


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automatic review.That is generally and theoretically correct. But there areerrors that may be committed by a trial court which may not appear inthe record and so are beyond the reach of this Tribunal to consider andcorrect. Take the case of credibility of witnesses. The rule is that theSupreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the lower court in

passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses unless thereappears in the record some fact or circumstances of weight and influencewhich has been overlooked or the significance of which has beenmisinterpreted. Supposing that the trial judge after rendering a deathsentence and within the period of 15 days, after pondering and reviewingin his mind the momentous sentence imposed by him, begins to entertaindoubts about the motives and sincerity of the star prosecution witness,and recalls that the said witness' behavior on the witness stand or thetone of his voice was unnatural or otherwise suspicious? As contended bythe Government the trial judge could do nothing about it because the

case has been taken out of his hands the moment the sentence waspromulgated. The trial judge cannot inform or advise the Supreme Courtof his doubts and of the error he had committed on this point because heis not a party in the automatic review, and any effort on his part to informthe high Tribunal of his doubts and of his conviction that he had erred inaccording credibility to an important witness for the prosecution, would beregarded as mere meddling and officious interference. In other words, thetrial judge in such a case can do nothing to ease his troubled conscience.We believe that is not and cannot be the meaning and intention of thelaw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The 20 days mentioned in Rule 118, section 9, within which the records ofa case involving a death sentence should be forwarded to the SupremeCourt is not rigid or absolute, much less jurisdictional. It may beshortened or it may be extended. That period of 20 days was intended fora case wherein the accused sentenced to death says nothing and doesnothing within the period of 15 days within which the case remains withinthe jurisdiction of the trial court, as for instance, he does not file a motionfor new trial, he does not appeal, or does not waive his right to appeal.But should he say, on the same day the death sentence is promulgated,

file his notice of appeal, then there would be no need to wait for the 20days to expire; the Clerk of Court will immediately or at the latest withinfive days thereafter transmit the record to the Supreme Court. Should thedefendant sentenced to the death penalty within the period of 15 days filea motion for new trial, then the trial court may entertain said motion,grant or deny it, and if the consideration of the motion for new trial or thenew trial itself take many days or even weeks, including the rendering ofthe new decision, then the 20 days mentioned in the Rules of Court mustnecessarily be extended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary


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There is and there must be a reason for that portion of section 9, Rule118, that provides that the records in a case of death sentence should beforwarded to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court within 20 days butnot earlier than fifteen days after rendition of sentence. Why thisprohibition of not sending up the records before the expiration of 15

days? It is because within those 15 days, despite the automatic reviewcontemplated by law the trial court retains complete jurisdiction andcontrol over the case and over its decision. Within that period, as inordinary cases, the trial court may modify its decision by decreasing butnot increasing the penalty or acquit the defendant, or grant motion fornew trial filed by the defendant, or even on its motion with the consent ofthe accused, grant a new trial. A motion for new trial automaticallysuspends the running of the period of 15 days and so the sending up ortransmission of the records to the Supreme Court for automatic review isnecessarily suspended. There is also a relation between the period of 20

days and the 15 days mentioned in section 9, Rule 118. The differencebetween 20 and 15 days is 5 days. In other words, after the expiration ofthe 15 days, the Clerk of Court must transmit the records to the SupremeCourt within 5 days. This period of 5 days is also found in section 8 of thesame Rule 118 which provides that upon an appeal being taken in acriminal case (ordinary criminal case involving no death sentence), theClerk or Judge of the court with whom the notice of appeal had been filed,must within 5 days from the filing of the notice, transmit to the Clerk ofCourt of the appellate court the complete record of the case. The samething must be done in a case involving a death sentence if the accused

files his notice of appeal; the Clerk of Court must send up the recordwithin 5 days thereafter. He need not wait for the expiration of the 20days mentioned in section 9, Rule 118. But one may ask, why doessection 9, Rule 118 provide for 20 days but does not do so in section 8 ofthe same rule? It is because in a death sentence case the records go upto the Supreme Court anyway whether or not the accused appeals, butwithin the period of 15 days after the promulgation of the sentence, thetrial court will not know until the 15 days have expired whether or not theaccused appeals, and so cannot send the record to the Supreme Courtwithin that period, unless of course the accused himself files his notice of

appeal or does nothing and let the period of 15 days lapse in which casethe Clerk of Court will within 5 days thereafter send up the records of thecase to the Supreme Court. But in ordinary criminal cases where thesentence is less than death, covered by section 8 of Rule 118, if thedefendant does not do anything within the period of 15 days, then thesentence becomes final and the records remain with the trial court; so,there is no occasion, much less the necessity of providing for the period of20 days as is done in section 9. We therefore believe and hold that thetrial court in a case involving the death penalty has the right to entertainand grant a motion for new trial in case it finds the motionmeritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


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Now comes the other question. Did respondent Judge Bocar in grantingthe motion for new trial gravely abuse his discretion to such an extentthat his action is equivalent to an excess of jurisdiction? In support of themotion for new trial filed before him, there was an affidavit of recantationby Rogelio Robles. Instead of accepting this affidavit as sufficient to

justify the granting of a new trial he set the same for hearing on April14th at which hearing Pasay City Fiscal Salva appeared for prosecution.The hearing was continued until April 18th and again continued on April20th and during the last two hearings Manila City Fiscal Eugenio Angelesappeared in collaboration with Fiscal Salva. At the hearing, besidesRobles, his mother Liceria Siasoy and Atty. Alejandro de Santos testified.Rogelio Robles gave extensive testimony but the prosecution waived itsright to cross-examine him. Judge Hermogenes Calauag, Judge of theCourt of First Instance of Quezon City and Mrs. Felicidad Manuel alsotestified for the defense. Both were cross-examined by Fiscal Angeles.

During the hearing there was prolonged argument by the prosecution anddefense counsel. In the absence of proof to contrary, we must presumethat Judge Bocar after listening to the testimonies and arguments musthave been convinced of the sincerity of Rogelio Robles not only in hisaffidavit but also in his testimony given before him and that based on thisconviction Judge Bocar granted the motion for newtrial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But the petitioner maintains that in order to be in a position to considerand pass upon the motion for new trial Judge Bocar should have reviewed

the entire record including the testimony of the witnesses and this hecould not have possibly done for the reason that at the time, thestenographic notes taken of the testimonies of the witnesses during thehearing which lasted about one year had not yet been transcribed, andthat even if and when transcribed, they would cover from eleven totwenty thousand pages. As we understand the case, and after reading thepleadings filed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction and listening to the oral argument during the twohearings held before us in Baguio, we do not agree with petitioner that itwas necessary to go over the whole records of the case, including the oral

and documentary evidence. We must bear in mind that of the eightdefendants sentenced to death by Judge Rilloraza, only one, OscarCastelo, was filing a motion for new trial; so only the evidence for andagainst him introduced during the trial was material and relevant to themotion for new trial. It was then the consensus that the only directevidence linking Castelo to the killing of Monroy was the testimony ofRogelio Robles. Counsel for respondents informed this Court during theoral argument that Fiscal Salva himself made this statement ordeclaration to Judge Bocar could and when Fiscal Salva was asked by usto verify this assertion, he assured us that it was true. In a potion of hisdecision Judge Rilloraza reviewed and analyzed the testimony of Robles.Not being very long, Judge Bocar could have easily read and studied this


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portion of the decision to apprise himself of what Robles had said duringthe hearing about the alleged participation of Castelo in the killing.Furthermore, and this is important, where the newly discovered evidenceclaimed and sought to be presented during a trial is entirely different andindependent of the evidence introduced during the main hearing as for

instance, the newly discovered evidence is the testimony of one witnessintended to contradict the testimony of another witness who testifiedduring the main hearing, then it would be necessary to review and studysaid testimony during the main hearing, consider it in relation to thenewly discovered evidence and see whether it was probable that the latterif presented and admitted would outweigh or offset the testimony in themain hearing to such an extent that it would change the judgment. But inthe present case, the facts are different. The witness sought to beintroduced at the new trial, Robles, is the same witness who testified inthe main hearing directly implicating Castelo in the commission of the

offense charged, and the theory of respondents is that Robles isrepudiating his previous testimony and recanting it on the ground that hegave it not voluntarily but due to intimidation, duress, and violence. Sothat, if the respondents can prove during the new trial sought that Robles'testimony in the main hearing was all false and that at the new trial hewould testify freely and voluntarily and truthfully that Castelo had noparticipation whatsoever in the killing of Monroy, then the main concernof Judge Bocar is passing upon and considering the merits of the motionfor new trial was not so much what Robles said at the main hearing but asto his sincerity and truthfulness in his affidavit in support of the motion

for new trial and in his extensive testimony during the hearing on themotion for new trial. If Robles was sincere and truthful in his testimony onthe motion for new trial, then there was reason to believe that histestimony at the main hearing linking Castelo to the killing of Monroy wasof doubtful value, and therefore, the motion for new trial could properlybe granted as in fact it was granted by JudgeBocar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that as was said by this Tribunal in the case of U. S. vs. Dacir,26 Phil., 507, as a rule a motion for new trial is not granted when the

motion is based on an affidavit of recantation whose effect is to free theappellant from participation in the commission of the crime; but it wasalso held in that case that there are exceptional cases as where it is madeto appear that there was no other evidence sustaining the judgment ofconviction other than the testimony of the recanting witness and thisCourt actually granted a new trial in said case altho the motion was basedon mere affidavits of the main prosecution witness changing his story oraccount of the commission of the crime, after the trial. As already stated,Judge Bocar was not satisfied with the mere affidavit of Robles but set themotion for new trial for hearing and required the defense to presentevidence in support of the motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library


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To avoid any misapprehension and to explain why we entertained thepresent petition forcertiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunctionover an order granting a motion for new trial, it should be stated that incivil cases the granting of a new trial is considered a mere interlocutoryorder not subject to appeal or special civil action. The reason is that the

party dissatisfied with the order granting a new trial may, after judgmentappeal from the same and include in his appeal the supposed errorcommitted in the issuance of the interlocutory order. However, in acriminal case like the present, that theory or procedure of appeal in duetime may not be practical or satisfactory for the reason that at theconclusion of the new trial, the trial court in deciding the case anew, mayacquit the defendant and thereafter the prosecution would have no moreopportunity of bringing before the appellate court the question of thelegality or illegality of the order granting a new trial because thedefendant acquitted may plead double

jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Before concluding, the Tribunal wishes to unburden itself of what it thinksabout the propriety of the actuations of Judge Bocar. While we believethat in entertaining the motion for new trial, granting it, and setting it thenew trial for the introduction of evidence before him, particularly thealleged newly discovered evidence, respondent Judge acted within thelaw, the majority of the members of the Court feel, and strongly, that heshould not have taken action on the motion for new trial but should haveleft it to the regular Judge of the sala or one presiding over the trial court

more or less permanently. Anyway, inaction on his part would not andcould not have prejudiced the rights of the movant for the reason that themere filing of the motion for new trial interrupted the running of theperiod of 15 days within which the trial court retained control over thecase. Respondent Judge was on a mere temporary detail in the trial court.The motion for new trial was filed before him on April 11th and his detailwas expiring at the end of the month. While he might have had thenecessary time as we think he had of passing upon the merits of themotion for new trial and granting it, he should and must have realizedthat he was in no position to conduct and finish the new trial and decide

the case as regards Oscar Castelo, anew. The main trial took about a yearto finish, not only because of the extensive testimony and voluminousdocumentary evidence submitted but also due to the numerous incidentsthat featured the hearing. Said incidents were prominently, evenexhaustively publicized in the papers, giving the impression that JudgeRilloraza presiding over the trial had his hands full, controlling counsel forprosecution and defense, their enthusiasm, mutual accusations andaggressive attitude against each other, and at time he had to resort tocontempt proceedings in order to restore and have some semblance oforder and decorum at the trial and protect the dignity of the court. It istrue that there were then eight defendants on trial while in the new trialgranted only Castelo is involved. However, one should not lose sight of


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the fact that under the theory of the prosecution, Castelo is themastermind who decided and directed the killing and in fact saidprosecution would appear to have more or less concentrated its attentionand efforts on him as regards the presentation of evidence. As we havealready said, the main hearing besides being protracted, was far from

peaceful and pleasant. At times it was turbulent. Judge Bocar should andmust have known all this, and also that there was no assurance that itwould not be repeated at the new trial, at least as regards the time to beconsumed to conduct and terminate it. This, specially when Robles in hisaffidavit and in his testimony given in support of the motion for new trial,he openly accused of having practices and committed acts of violence andintimidation on him, or tampering with his testimony government officialslike Mayor Lacson of the City of Manila, Fiscal Luis B. Reyes, now Judge ofthe Court of First Instance, and officers of the Manila Police Department,and these officials would perhaps if not probably, take the witness stand

to explain if not to deny the accusations against them, as they havealready done by means of affidavits. It might be said figuratively thatrespondent Judge, as it were, rushed in where angels fear totread.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We repeat that Judge Bocar should have known that he could not possiblyconduct the new trial up to its termination considering that his temporarydetail to the trial court was expiring at the end of the month, unless heunduly rushed it and did not accord the parties sufficient time andopportunity to present their evidence. In fact, there is reason to believe

that it was his action in ordering the new trial on April 25th before him,with only about six days to go, that alerted and alarmed the prosecutionand gave it the impression and inspired the belief which it expressed andalleged in its present petition and in support thereof, that respondentJudge would most probably render another judgment acquitting OscarCastelo,- sort of railroading his case to an acquital. We are not sure thathad Judge Bocar merely granted the motion for new trial and not decidedto conduct said new trial himself, intending to finish it within the verylimited time of about five or six days, or should the new trial have beengranted by Judge Rilloraza who rendered the decision of conviction, the

herein petitioner would have filed this petition to question the jurisdictionand power of a trial court to grant a new trial in a case of deathsentence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In justice to respondent Judge, however, we should also say that there isnothing in the record nor in any incident in relation with his actuations inthe case that would reasonably warrant the suspicion, much less thebelief, that he was out to acquit Oscar Castelo. We presume all judges tobe honest and men of integrity unless proven otherwise. It is said thatrespondent Judge stated or manifested in the presence of counsel, whileconsidering the motion for new trial that it were better if the motion hadbeen presented before another judge because he (Bocar) had very little


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time for it because of his temporary detail. And as to his seeming hurry inissuing the order granting the motion for new trial on April 20, 1955,almost immediately after the termination of the hearing, it should bestated that he as well as the lawyers had the impression that under Rule118, section 9, he had only 20 days from the rendition of the judgment

within which to decide the motion for new trial, and April 20th was thelast day. Of course, as we have already said, this period of 20 days is notrigid, inflexible, much less jurisdictional; if defendant files a notice ofappeal, say the first day of second day after the promulgation of thedecision, then the record will be elevated to the Supreme Court within 5days therefrom without having to wait for the expiration of the 20 days;and that the filing of a motion for new trial not only interrupts and evendoes away with the 20-day period mentioned in section 9, Rule118.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In conclusion, we hold that in a case where the death sentence isimposed, the trial court as in ordinary criminal cases may entertain andgrant a motion for new trial, conduct the same and thereafter decide thecase anew as regards said defendant to whom the new trial wasgranted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the legality and propriety of theorder granting bail to respondent Castelo, considering the questioninvolved as moot. Upon the granting of the motion for new trial thedecision of Judge Rilloraza as regards Oscar Castelo was automatically set

aside and as to him, the case reverted to its original status before judgment. We understand that he was then under bail. Unless there arereasons to the contrary, he should be accorded his original status of beingout on bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing , the petition for certiorari and prohibition ishereby denied. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued isordered dissolved. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

3. [G.R. No. L-55808. August 28, 1984.]

LEANDRO ALAZAS, Petitioner , v. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, GUMERCINDOJIMENEZ, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cebu, and ROSARIOMERCADER, Respondents.

Jose Batiquin & Associates for Petitioner .


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Hilario G. Davide, Jr. for Private Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petition for" Certiorari ", "Prohibition," and "Mandamus" withrestraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction seeks to set asidethe order of execution pending appeal dated November 11, 1980, and thewrits of execution dated November 14, 1980 and December 19, 1980issued by the respondent court in Civil Case No. R-15492 entitled "Rosario

(Charito) Mercader, plaintiff, versus Leandro Alazas, Defendant ."cralawvirtua1aw library

On July 28, 1976, respondent Mercader filed a complaint againstpetitioner Leandro Alazas for the recovery of property and damages withreplevin. In her complaint, Mercader alleged that she is the owner-proprietor and manager of the Sultan Express Tours, a duly licensed localtour operator with office at the Magellan Hotel, Cebu City; that in saidoffice she kept her personal properties; that on July 19, 1976, at about8:45 o’clock in the morning, Alazas together with eight hired men illegally

entered the said office and once inside ransacked her properties andcarried away a steel filing cabinet and various other personal propertiesworth P97,700.00.

On August 4, 1976, the respondent court granted the prayer for theissuance of a writ of replevin. By virtue of this writ of replevin some of theproperties taken by Alazas were returned to Mercader.

On August 24, 1976, the defendant filed his answer with counterclaim. Inhis answer he alleged that he is the owner and proprietor of the Sultan

Express Tours and that plaintiff was appointed by him as manager of thefirm; that he owned the furniture and fixtures claimed by the plaintiffincluding the steel filing cabinet and its contents; that he admitted takingthe filing cabinet but denied that its contents worth P97,700.00. Thecounterclaim was subsequently dismissed on a finding that the ownershipof Sultan Travel and Tours was the subject of litigation between the sameparties in Civil Case No. 15355 in another branch of the court.chanrobleslaw library : red

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the issuesbeing litigated to the question of who owns the personal properties listedin paragraph 5 of the amended complaint.


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On December 27, 1979, the respondent court promulgated a decision infavor of plaintiff Mercader. The dispositive portion of the decisionreads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Rosario ‘Charito’Mercader and against defendant Leandro Alazas: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Commanding the defendant to return to the plaintiff the propertieswhich were not recovered or taken by the Provincial Sheriff or which werenot turned over to said Sheriff by the defendant pursuant to the writ ofreplevin, which are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a) The sum of P50,000.00 in cash;

"b) The balance of P450.00 out of P800.00 representing petty cash left atthe office of Sultan Express Tours;

"c) The diamond ring or in the alternative, its value: P35,000.00;

"d) The gold wrist watch costing $200.00, or in the alternative its valueP1,500.00 ($200.00);

"e) Deeds of sale of plaintiff’s two parcels of land;

"f) Deed of sale covering her TORANA car;

"g) Registration papers of her cars;

"h) Cash receipts;

"i) Vouchers for 1974 and 1976 relative to the operation of local tourbusiness;

"j) Evidentiary papers and documents against defendant and his wife,

together with other papers related thereto;

"2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 the latterpaid to the First Integrated Bonding and Ins. Co. for the issuance of areplevin bond, representing the reimbursement thereof; and the amountof P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

"Costs against the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library

On January 25, 1980, Alazas filed his notice of appeal and deposited withthe clerk of court his cash appeal bond.


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On February 4, 1980, Mercader filed a motion for execution pendingappeal.

On February 7, 1980, the respondent court issued an order granting theaforesaid motion for execution pending appeal. Upon receipt of the said

order, the defendant on the same day, February 8, 1980 filed an urgentmotion for stay of execution pending appeal upon supersedeas bond. Themotion was not acted upon by the respondent court. Hence, thedefendant filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction andrestraining order before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-10395) tochallenge the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.

On February 14, 1980, the appellate court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining the respondent court from implementing the February 7,1980 order of execution pending appeal.chanrobles virtualawlibrary

chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On August 6, 1980, the appellate court promulgated a decision grantingthe petition and set aside the February 8, 1980 questioned order on theground that the required notice to the adverse party of the motion forexecution pending appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt was not given. The court had granted the motion for executionpending appeal on February 7, 1980 one day before the date of thehearing on that motion on February 8, 1980.

In the meantime, on February 9, 1980, Alazas filed his record on appealand set the hearing and approval thereof for February 14, 1980.

On October 7, 1980, apparently after the decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-10395 had become final and executory, Mercader filed before therespondent court a notice resetting the hearing of her motion forexecution pending appeal. The trial court then set the motion for hearingConsequently, defendant Alazas filed before the appellate court an urgentex-parte motion to restrain the respondent judge from issuing a writ ofexecution pending appeal in CA-G.R. No. SP-10395, alleging that the re-

setting of the hearing would only effect an exercise in futility since therespondent judge had practically pre-judged the case and that at any ratesaid respondent court will finally or ultimately grant the privaterespondent’s motion with or without presentation of evidence, imputing ineffect bias and prejudice of the respondent court against hereinpetitioner. The appellate court in a resolution dated October 10, 1980dismissed the motion on the ground that the defendant was given." . . fullopportunity to oppose the private respondent’s motion for executionpending appeal and whether or not respondent court will grant or not saidmotion is beyond the domain of the Court in this Certiorari case."cralawvirtua1aw library


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On October 20, 1980, Alazas filed an opposition to the resubmission ofthe February 4, 1980 motion for execution pending appeal before therespondent court.

On October 27, 1980, a hearing was held in connection with the February

4, 1980 motion for execution pending appeal. Both parties wererepresented by their respective counsel. During the hearing Alazasbrought up the delay in the approval of the record on appeal, hence therespondent court directed him to file a memorandum thereon. Thus,Alazas on November 6, 1980 filed "defendant’s memorandum on approvalof record on appeal", pointing out that his record on appeal had beenpending before the court for nine (9) months without any action beingtaken on it.

On November 11, 1980, the respondent court issued an order granting

the motion for execution pending appeal on the ground." . . it clearlyappearing that there are special and good reasons for such executionpending appeal . . ." (Order, respondent court, November 11, 1980, p.87, Rollo)

On November 14, 1980, the assistant clerk of court of the respondentcourt issued a writ of execution in compliance with the order of execution.The writ was served by the provincial sheriff on the defendant in themorning of November 15, 1980 which was a Saturday. On the same day,the defendant Alazas filed before the respondent court a motion for

reconsideration of the writ of execution alleging that the order ofexecution was not yet received by him, hence the writ was prematurelyissued, He prayed that." . . the issuance of the writ and itsimplementation be suspended until the issuance and service of the orderof execution."cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 19, 1980, the writ of execution was re-issued by the clerkof court of the respondent court.

On December 24, 1980, the deputy sheriff enforced the writ of execution

and seized two motor vehicles belonging to defendant Alazas.

On December 29, 1980, the deputy sheriff continued to enforce the writof execution and seized another motor vehicle allegedly belonging to thedefendant. On this same day, the deputy provincial sheriff issued a noticeof sale. The deputy provincial sheriff scheduled the sale of the threemotor vehicles at public auction on January 5, 1981. Hence the instantpetition.

Acting on the petitioner’s ex-parte motion for issuance of restrainingorder and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, we issued on January7, 1981 a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from


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enforcing the writs of execution dated November 14, 1980 and December10 (should be December 19) 1980 and from further proceeding with orcarrying out the auction sale of the levied properties. On January 16,1981 we issued a preliminary mandatory order ordering the respondentsdeputy provincial sheriff and/or the clerk of court as ex-oficio sheriff of

the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I to release or restorepossession of the three (3) cars to herein petitioner or to the ParamountFinance Corporation. The Paramount Finance Corporation made a demandon respondent deputy provincial sheriff for the return of two of the threecars scheduled to be sold by public auction as the ownerthereof.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The pivotal issue raised in the instant petition centers on the respondentcourt’s November 11, 1980 order granting execution pending appeal.

The petitioner contends that the respondent court abused its discretion innot approving the record on appeal despite no objections from the privaterespondent, in violation of Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Thepetition also states that the respondent court’s various acts in relation tothe withholding of approval of the record on appeal clearly show partialitytowards the private Respondent .

There is no dispute that the petitioner took steps to perfect his appealwithin the reglementary period. Thus, on January 25, 1980, the petitionerfiled his notice of appeal and deposited with the clerk of court his cash

appeal bond. On February 9, 1980, he filed his record on appeal and setthe hearing and approval thereof on February 14, 1980.

While it is true that initially the respondent court may not be faulted forwithholding the approval of the record on appeal in view of a petitionfor certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals by the petitioner challengingthe respondent court’s initial order granting the motion for executionpending appeal, the same does not hold true when after the appellatecourt granted the petition and set aside the execution pending appeal, therespondent court still withheld any action on the record on appeal.

Parenthetically, it was the court’s own fault that its order had to be raisedto the appellate court.

Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hearing and approval of record. — Upon the submission for approval ofthe record on appeal, if no objection is filed within five (5) days, the trial judge may approve it as presented or, upon his own motion or at theinstance of the appellee, may direct its amendment by the inclusion ofany matters omitted which are deemed essential to the determination ofthe issue of law or fact involved in the appeal. If the trial judge orders theamendment of the record, the appellant, within the time limited in the


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order, or such extension thereof as may be granted, or if no time is fixedby the order within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, shall redraft therecord by including therein, in their proper chronological sequence, suchadditional matters as the court may have directed him to incorporate, andshall thereupon submit the redrafted record for approval, upon notice to

the appellee, in like manner as the original draft."cralaw virtua1aw library

The records of the case show a pattern of bias and partiality on the partof the respondent court against the petitioner, a deliberate procrastinationand withholding of required action in order to keep the appeal from beingperfected thus enabling the court to order execution pending appeal nine(9) months after the record on appeal was filed and set for approval.

As earlier stated, the court granted on February 7, 1980 the motion forexecution pending appeal which motion was supposed to be heard on the

following day. The Court of Appeals set aside the February 7 order on afinding that the petitioner was deprived of his day in court. Moreover, therequired three-day notice had not been furnished. The petitioner was notgiven the opportunity to oppose the motion or even appear at the date ofhearing.

Before the petitioner could go to the Court of Appeals, the sheriff hadalready garnished his accounts in four commercial banks, thus calling fora restraining order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The second writ of execution was issued late on a Friday afternoon onNovember 14, 1980 and served on the defendant on Saturday morningthe following day. At this time, the petitioner had not even received theNovember 11, 1980 court order forming the basis of the issued writ.Because the petitioner objected, the writ had to be reissued on December19, 1980. On the day before Christmas, two motor vehicles were seized.On December 29, 1980 another vehicle was seized and simultaneously, anotice of sale at public auction on January 5, 1981 was issued.

If the trial court noted any omission of essential matters, in the record on

appeal, it should have ordered their inclusion in an amended record andthereafter approved the record within the period provided by the Rule.

Without in any way passing upon the merits of the pending appeal, wealso see no obvious or palpable basis for the trial court’s finding that thepetitioner’s appeal is "clearly frivolous and delatory (sic) and a delay inthe final disposal of the article (sic) and money sought to be recoveredwould cause grave, serious and irreparable damage and injury to theplaintiff", thus warranting execution pending appeal. As a matter of fact,the court itself stated that most of the properties sought to be recoveredwere already in the possession of Mercader by virtue of a writ of replevinit had earlier issued.


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The respondent court ignored without comment the petitioner’s pleas fordue process. Alazas questioned the resubmission of the February 4, 1980motion after the Court of Appeals had set aside the order granting itbecause of the circumstances surrounding its issuance. The court was also

silent on the memorandum discussing the nine (9) months inaction whenthe memorandum was filed pursuant to the court’s order.

Premised on the foregoing concatenation of circumstances clearly showingnot only grave abuse of discretion but also improper judicial conduct, thisCourt is constrained to censure the respondent judge. A judge’s officialconduct and his behaviour in the performance of judicial duties should befree from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that private respondent filed

objections to the record on appeal.chanrobles law library : red

WHEREFORE, the order of execution pending appeal dated November 11,1980 and the writs of execution dated November 14, 1980 and December19, 1980 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Judge of the Regional Trial Court towhom the case below has been assigned is directed to give due course tothe petitioner’s appeal and to elevate the records to the IntermediateAppellate Court. The Temporary Restraining Order and the PreliminaryInjunction enjoining the enforcement of the writs of execution and thepublic auction sale are made permanent. Costs against the respondents.

For the reasons abovestated, the respondent judge is also censured forimproper judicial conduct.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De laFuente, JJ., concur.

4. A.M. No. RTJ-93-944 July 20, 1994

RIZALIA CAPUNO AND THELMA VILLANUEVA, complainants,vs.JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-959 July 20, 1994


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PSM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND CELIA PAMPLONA,vs.JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.

Salonga & Associates for complainants in AM RTJ-93-944.

Nelson A. Loyola for complainants in AM RTJ -93-959.

Manuel Singson for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge

Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, SanPablo City, is charged with various corrupt practices detrimentalto the administration of justice.

Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 wasreferred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court ofAppeals, 1 and Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy CourtAdministrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, 2for investigation, report andrecommendation. In the meantime, we directed respondent judgeto go on leave. 3 On 27 October 1993, we ordered the

consolidation of the complaints.

4

Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarezsubmitted their reports. We shall deal with respondent'sadministrative liability on the basis of the investigators' findingsand recommendations. 5

I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944

The complaint in this case was initiated by a "SinumpaangSalaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia Capunoand Thelma Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus —

(1) Na si Pedro Calara, Jr. ay nagdemanda ng "writ ofpossession" laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala ni JudgeAusberto Jaramillo ng RTC-San Pablo City.

(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng "writ ofpossession" si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia Capunosa nasabing kaso, ay nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho

sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi kay Rizalia nagusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.


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(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang anakna si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa sala ni JudgeJaramillo, mga alas 10:00 ng umaga at pinapasok silasa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo.

(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung gustonghindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay magbigay nghalagang P200,000 cash na kung maa-ari ay purodadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng P150,000 na postdated30 days.

(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay naganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo kayThelma na subukan na maghanap ng nasabing halagaat bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.

(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si Thelmaat si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillopagkatapos ng dalawang araw, at sinabi ni Thelma kayJudge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na halagangtakda ni Judge. Sabi ni Judge na kung hindi kaya niThelma ang P200,000 cash ay kahit na P150,000 nacash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng P150,000 napostdated 60 days, pero dapat ang mga ito ay maibigayni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng hapon noong araw

na iyon din.

(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na walasilang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi ni JudgeJaramillo na kung ganoon ay wala na siyangmagagawa.

(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay PedroCalara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang pagkabenta at pagka-ilit ng kanyang lupa ay bumagsak din sa sala ni JudgeJaramillo, kaya siya ay nakikiusap kay Judge Jaramillona ilipat ang nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman. 6

Required to comment, respondent judge denies the chargesagainst him. He maintains that this complaint was filed out ofpure harassment. 7

On 19 November 1993, after due investigation of the case, JusticeIbay-Somera submitted her report the pertinent portions of whichfollow —

During the testimony of complaint Thelma Villanueva,she only identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay she


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executed with her mother Rizalia Capuno, and affirmedthe truth of the contents thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

On cross-examination, complainant Thelma Villanuevaadmitted that her mother, complainant Rizalia Capunoborrowed the amount of P15,000.00 sometime in 1987from one Pedro Calara, Jr., for which the questionedproperty consisting of 85 sq. m. and originally coveredby Tax Declaration No. 34-1260, was mortgaged as asecurity thereof (pp. 9 & 12, tsn, July 28, 1993). It wasalso shown that despite partial payments on said loan(Exhs. B, B-1 to B-6), the mortgaged property wasextrajudicially foreclosed on August 21, 1990 and a

certificate of sale was issued by the respondent judgeon the same date of August 21, 1990, and registeredwith the office of the Register of Deeds on October 12,1990 (Tsn p. 16, July 28, 1993; Exh. 6), and that thebuyer of said property was Pedro Calara, Jr., in theamount of P47,021.00 (Exh. 2-A, p. 17, tsn, July 28,1993). Subsequently, an affidavit of consolidation ofownership and deed of sale were made and executed byPedro Calara, Jr., and were registered with the Registerof Deeds on December 9, 1991, which caused the

cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 541260 and a newone was issued, Tax Declaration No. 34-2753, in thename of Pedro Calara, Jr. (Exh. 6). A petition for theissuance of a writ of possession filed by said PedroCalara, Jr., on February 24, 1992 was assigned to theBranch of respondent Judge (p. 25, tsn, July 28, 1993),who issued the corresponding Decision on May 15,1992 granting the said petition (Exh. 11), and orderingthe issuance of the corresponding writ of possessionand was implemented by Sheriff Aranguren (Exh. "15").

Said complainant met the respondent Judge for the firsttime sometime in March 1992, "to know how muchmore" the complainants were to pay Pedro Calara, Jr.(TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 2 & 15), upon advice of theSheriff Ho (tsn, p. 9, July 29, 1993). Complainants,together with one Gregorio Capistrano, went to see therespondent Judge sometime in May or June 1992 forthe second time, who, in one of those meetings, askedwhether said complainants "could pay P350,000.00",P200,000.00 of which should be in cash, all in P100-bills, to be displayed on his table "so that PedroCalara's eyes will bulge and I will take care of


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everything", and P150,000.00 in postdated check (pp.16-17, tsn, July 29, 1993). Complainant ThelmaVillanueva informed the Judge that she could not affordthe amount, thus the Judge reduced the proposal toP150,000.00 in postdated check, which amount should

be brought to him at 2:00 p.m., and that they(complainants) "should not talk to anybody" (p. 20,tsn, July 29, 1993). Because the complainant failed tocomply with the demand, complainant Rizalia Capunowas evicted from the questioned premises and herhouse was demolished. The testimony of the otherwitness for the complainants, Gregorio Capistrano, was just corroborative of the testimony of ThelmaVillanueva, that he met the respondent Judge on thosetwo (2) occasions when Thelma Villanueva went to see

the respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., testifiedthat he has been the Presiding Judge of Branch 30,Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, since January 30,1987; that he came to know Thelma Villanueva whenshe testified in Sp. Proc. Case No. 852 in a prayer forissuance of a writ of possession over a parcel of land

filed by one Pedro Calara, Jr.; that he issued the writprayed for. Respondent Judge further testified that he,in his effort to settle the parties' differences, as perrequest of Deputy Sheriff Leonardo Ho, tried to mediatein order to help them settle for the purchase price (tsn,p. 5, Aug. 30, 1993). He likewise testified that it wascomplainant Thelma Villanueva who voluntarily offeredto pay Pedro Calara the amount of P200,000.00 cashand to pay the balance in P150,000.00 in postdatedchecks (tsn, p. 6, Aug. 30, 1993). Another case was

filed by the complainant against Pedro Calara, Jr.,before the Branch of respondent Judge, where thecomplainant moved for respondent's inhibition, whichmotion he granted. Respondent Judge vehementlydenied that he demanded money from thecomplainants.

xxx xxx xxx

From the testimonies and documentary evidenceadduced by both parties, and considering their (sic)demeanor of the parties during the hearings, this Courtconcludes that there was indeed a color of truth in the


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complaint. The complainants are simple and ordinarypeople, who prefer to live a simple life than engagethemselves in complicated and perplexed lives. Andshould they become part of complexed court battles, itis not of their own choosing but because of

circumstances. It may not be amiss to stress that "thecourts exist to promote justice; and thus to aid insecuring the contentment and happiness of the people.Their administration should be speedy and careful.Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulingsand in the conduct of the business of his court so far ashe can, to make it useful to litigants and to thecommunity. He should avoid unconsciously falling intothe attitude of mind that the litigants are made for thecourts instead of the courts for the litigants." (Adm.

Order No. 162, Canons of Judicial Ethics). Thecomplainants failed to get the justice they arerequesting from the respondent Judge for their failureto deliver the amount asked of them.

Hence, the complainants' allegation that therespondent Judge demanded from them money whenthey were trying to seek his assistance in amicablysettling their case and which demand, when not met bythem resulted to their eviction from the premises, is

meritorious and credible. It is well-settled rule that"acts of the respondent judge of demanding . . . moneyfrom a party-litigant before his court constitute seriousmisconduct in office" (Office of the Court Administratorvs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508). Likewise, under theCanons of Judicial Ethics, "a judge's official conductshould be free from the appearance of impropriety, andhis personal behavior, not only upon the bench and inthe performance of judicial duties, but also in hiseveryday life, should be beyond reproach."

Finding respondent judge guilty of the charge, the InvestigatingJustice recommended his suspension for one (1) month withoutpay with admonition and reprimand. 8

The Investigating Justice is correct in finding respondent judgeguilty of the charge. As judge, respondent knows fully well that heshould avoid such actions as would subject him to suspicion ofinterest in a case in his court. Yet, he threw all caution to thewinds, so to speak, and left nothing but telltale evidence of hisguilt.


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The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852allegedly to settle the differences between complainants andPedro Calara, Jr., was highly questionable. Firstly, the mediationwas initiated not by the parties themselves nor their lawyers butby respondent's sheriffs, Leonardo Ho and Regalado Aranguren,

whose words were heavily relied upon by respondent. 9 Secondly,the meetings were unrecorded and unattended by counsel of theparties. 10 Respondent's excuse that "in the (p)rovince, wemediate the differences of the parties, especially at that particulartime the parties have (sic) no counsel," is faulty and unacceptablepractice. Unless a judge is conducting a pre-trial under Rules 20and 118, his role in the administration of justice is to decidecontentious cases with finality. In the absence of their lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in issues confronting the parties evenon the pretext of settling their cases. For to do so would

compromise the integrity of his office which he is mandated touphold. 11 Once more, judges are strongly reminded that the officeof a judge is a public office and, as such, it is a public trust. 12 A judicial office demands that the incumbent should conduct himselfin such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence andconfidence of the people. 13

Respondent's defense that the parties have no lawyers fails toconvince us. We gather from his testimonies that the intended tosee the parties, alone, thus —

Justice Somera:

Q During the first meeting you said theparties were not represented by counselthen there was a request for a first meetingwith you by the parties.

A They have no more lawyers at that time,Your Honor.

Q But they were represented by a lawyerduring the hearing?

A During the hearing.

Q Why did you not require Calara to bringwith him his counsel?

A Because I do not have time to talk toCalara, Your Honor.


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Q When Villanueva and Capuno appearedbefore you during the hearing of the petitionfor issuance of the writ of possession, werethey also represented by counsel?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q During this first meeting, why did you notrequire the lawyers to appear before you forthe arrangement?

A The lawyer of the Capunos withdrew ascounsel, Your Honor .

Q Why did you not advise them to get

another counsel ?

A According to my Sheriff, I told my sheriff"I want their counsels to be present" mylawyer (sheriff) told me "ayaw na ho wala naraw silang abogado dahil wala na daw silang pambayad."

Q Who was always in contact with Capunoand Villanueva?

A My Sheriff, Your Honor . 14

Yet, respondent in his earlier testimony revealed that complainanthad a lawyer —

Justice Somera:

Q After they (complainants) left, did youhave any occasion to meet them eitherCalara or Rizalia Capuno and her daughter,Thelma Villanueva, altogether?

A There was a hearing of a motion to dismissthat is the time I realized a new case wasfiled by the complainants mother anddaughter. In that hearing, the Calaras wereabsent, Rizalia Capuno was absent butThelma Villanueva was present.

Q Before whom?


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A Before me, Your Honor. I talk(ed) toThelma asking her was it not that you arethe same person who failed to meet theother party? She answered in theaffirmative, I ask(ed) her what is your

pleasure now? Shall we wait for the Calarasbecause she has a motion to dismiss and totalk it over with the spouses and she reply(sic) that she will just consult her lawyer andask for time to fileopposition. 15

Significantly, the rendezvous between respondent andcomplainants took place in his chambers without the attendanceof his staff. Considering that there was still the question as to

whether complainants could come up with the repurchase price ofthe lot, the meetings conducted inside the chambers ofrespondent were uncalled for. We have cautioned judges to avoidin-chambers sessions without the other party and his counselpresent, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct tothe end that they not only act impartially and with propriety butare also perceived to be impartial and proper. 16

Further, respondent judge insists on his good intention to help theparties agree on the repurchase price of the lot. But, we find that

his meetings were always with complainants and not once didPedro Calara, Jr., participate therein. Such situation gives us theimpression that Pedro Calara, Jr., did not have any notion at all ofthese conferences. This suspicion is bolstered by (a) respondent'stestimony 17 that ". . . I likewise told them (complainants) thataccording to may sheriff they have been promising cash to Calaraand further told them that if they have cash they have to bringit during an arranged meeting to Calara and show the money toCalara so that they will know they are negotiating in good faith."His statement clearly signified that he had not as yet set up an

appointment with Calara, Jr., and, (b) the contradictory standamong respondent judge and his witnesses regarding thepresence of Pedro Calara, Jr., in the alleged conferences of theparties.

In his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 16 February 1993, SheriffRegalado M. Aranguren confirmed the presence of Calara, Jr., inall the conferences. 18 He stated that "(n)a sa lahat ng beses ngconferencia ay palaging dumarating si Pedro Calara, Jr., at lagingnaghihintay kay Thelma Capuno." For his part, Sheriff Leonardo L.Ho, in his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 15 February1993, 19 declared that "(a)t nang malaman ng mga naghabla ang


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kahilingan ng mga Capunos tungkol sa pagbaba ng presyo ngbilihan, ako ay pinakiusapan ng mga naghahabla na sabihin samga Capunos na sila ay magkita sa hukuman para sa isangconferencia upang mapagusapan ang tungkol sa presyo ngbilihang mabibiling muli; (n)a, hindi nakatupad ang mga Capunos

sa una nilang tipanan kung kaya ang conferencia aynakansela," thus implying that Calara, Jr., was present during thefirst meeting. However, respondent judge rebutted thesestatements when he testified that nobody appeared in bothmeetings except complainants who came two days after theappointed date of the second meeting. 20

Admittedly, the amount of P350,000.00 was the subject ofconversation between respondent judge and the complainantThelma Villanueva. Respondent judge denies that he demanded

such sum but that complainant volunteered the information thatshe had a checking account and that she was ready to payP200,000.00 in cash and the balance of P150,000.00 in postdatedchecks. 21 He asserts that he could not have demanded moneyfrom complainants as they did not strike him as moneyed. 22

We note with interest that respondent then had a contrary opinionabout the economic condition of complainants. He unwittinglydisclosed in his comment that "[f]or whatever it is worth,according to reliable sources, Thelma Villanueva was given by her

sister abroad to pay the repurchase price of the Calaras; thatThelma Villanueva used the money instead in constructing herown house . . . " 23 The reliable sources referred to were noneother than his sheriff and the latter's wife. According to SheriffAranguren, "[h]abang ang kaso ay nabibinbin pa sa hukumanhanggang sa ito ay natapos na, si Thelma Capuno (Villanueva) ay palagi pa ring pumupunta sa aking upisina upang siya ay bigyan pa ng kaunting panahon dahilan sa iniintay pa lang niya ang perang padala ng kanyang kapatid na nasa America. Sinabi pa rinniya na may hinihintay pa ring pera siya galing sa kanyang asawa

na sabi niya ay hindi nagtatrabaho sa San Pablo."

24

Concepcion L.Aranguren, utility worker assigned to respondent's court,supported her husband's statement by saying that ". . . Siya(Thelma Villanueva) ay umiiyak habang nakikipagusap na kungmaari daw ay bigyan siya ng palugit dahil may dadating daw siyang pera galing sa kanyang kapatid sa Amerika." 25 With suchinformation, it is not farfetched for respondent judge to demandmoney from complainant. Evidently, he was led by his sources tobelieve that complainant had the money to buy back the propertyfrom the Calaras.


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Verily, the act of respondent in meeting with complainantswithout the presence of counsel and warning them not to tellanyone, and demanding money under the guise of forging peacebetween her and Pedro Calara, Jr., constitutes grave misconduct.Additionally, his failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary has

undoubtedly diminished the faith of our people in theadministration of justice. Given these serious indiscretions, amore severe penalty than one (1) month suspension without payshould be imposed. A judge who established a common fundpurportedly for his low income employees and who himselftogether with his employees solicited contributions from litigantsand visitors for such fund was dismissed from the service. 26 Wecan do no less in this case.

II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959

This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judgeto disciplinary action or to dismissal from office for violation of:(1) Sec. 3, pars. (b), (c) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars.(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3) Arts. 206 and 210 of TheRevised Penal Code.

Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM DevelopmentCorporation and the duly designated and appointed Executrix ofthe Last Will and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that on 6

April 1992, a decision was rendered by respondent judgedismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92), "IN THE MATTER OF THEGUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S. MARINO," for lack of merit; thatduring the pendency of the case, respondent ordered JesusAzores, nephew of Pastor S. Marino, to surrender, among otherproperties, a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car to the court; thatafter the car had been surrendered to the court, respondentrequested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation toissue a resolution to have the luxury car at his disposal duringweekends and to use it as he pleased; that the corporation

appropriated the sum of P10,000.00 to pay for the reconditioning,adjustment and tune-up of the engine of the car; that respondenthad the custody of the car from April 1992 to 5 May 1993; that healso demanded and received food, money, valuable properties(jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the laterPastor S. Marino; that further, respondent judge requested favorsfrom complainant in securing an exemption from the Gun Banduring the election period; that, in this regard, respondent calledup complainant using the name "E. Pilapil" and further extortedmoney; that, upon the death of Pastor S. Marino, complainant fileda "Petition for the Probate of the Will of the Late Pastor S.Marino," docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 859(92); that the petition was


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raffled to the respondent's sala; that one of the basic issues raisedin the petition was the mental capacity and the sound dispositionof the testator; that this issue was already passed upon byrespondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 849(92); that during thependency of the probate proceeding, respondent judge called the

parties to a conference at Roño's Place, a public restaurant in SanPablo City; that the meeting started at eight o'clock in the eveningand lasted until midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was todiscuss possible settlement of the probate case; that shares andother properties were discussed except the car; that respondentintentionally omitted to include the car in the list of propertieswhich he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car;that despite the fact the complainant was named executrix in thewill, respondent appointed Rosevelinda Calingasan and AntonioAzcarate as joint special administrators; that such order was

issued without notice and hearing; that her motion forreconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly after,respondent judge ordered complainant to produce stockcertificates in the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books ofthe corporation, and other papers; that she moved forreconsideration of this order but the same was denied; that the joint special administrators filed a motion to cite complainant incontempt for her refusal to obey the order of respondent; that inview of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing theprobate proceedings, complainant moved for the inhibition of

respondent judge; that respondent threatened to cite complainantin contempt because of her statement that respondent hadcustody, possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of thecorporation; that he set the hearing for the contempt proceedingon 29 January 1993 at eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as aresult, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petitionfor certiorari .

In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no validcause of action against him. He explains that the car was in the

possession of the court, although on few occasions, he drove itmerely to inflate the tires or to recharge the battery. The car alsoneeded minor repairs and the expenses were paid for by thecorporation which appropriated P10,000.00 for the purpose.However, he insists, there was not instance that he demandedmoney, food for valuables from complainant.

With regard to the telephone call using the name "E. Pilapil,"respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with hiscalls. 27 He only wanted to get the names of the two (2) personswhom complainant mentioned earlier who could help him secureexemption from the Gun Ban. He never called up complainant to


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extort money. He got the exemption on his own efforts. Besides,complainant also used "E. Pilapil" when she called him up at hisresidence.

Lastly, respondent contends that his orders in the probate

proceedings were just and properly issued without bias. Headmits that he set the pre-trial conference of the probateproceedings at Roño's Place because it was the site selected bythe parties.

On 8 July 1993, after due investigation, Deputy CourtAdministrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his report —

The complaint is an aftermath of the adverse Ordersdated November 27, 1992, December 22, 1992 and

January 25, 1993 issued by respondent Judge againstCelia Pampolina relative to SP 859(92) In the Matter ofthe Petition to Approve the Will of Pastor S. Marino,appointing Antonio Azcarate and RosevelindaCalingasan as Joint Special Administrators instead ofthe named executrix in the will which (sic) is thecomplainant herein.

Most of the issued raised by complainant in thisadministrative complaint are the very errors assigned

by complainant in her petition filed before the Court ofAppeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30073 entitled "PSMCorporation and Celia Pampolina vs. Hon. JudgeAusberto Jaramillo (in his capacity as Presiding Judgeof RTC, San Pablo City). (Rollo, p. 35-57) Thus, theundersigned cannot properly rule on complainant'sassertions that respondent herein knowingly renderedan unjust interlocutory order because of the casebeing sub judice on appeal.

xxx xxx xxx

However, in A.M. No. RTJ-92-859 (Natividad CalauanUy, et al. vs. Judge Florentino M. Alumbre, AssistingJudge, RTC, Las Piñas, Metro Manila), respondent JudgeAlumbre was imposed a FINE of one thousand pesos(P1,000.00) for appointing a special administratorwithout a hearing.

Admittedly, however, there were mistakes or omissionsin the acts of respondent Judge in his handling of some

incidents in the case. One mistake he made wasconducting a pre-trial conference of SP 859(92) at the


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Roño's place, a public place (Restaurant), rather thaninside his chambers and/or the Courtroom. While theRules of Court does not specifically provide for thevenue of pre-trial conferences, propriety demands thatit should be confined within the four (4) walls of his

sala to avoid impropriety and appearance ofimpropriety in all his activities (Iglesia ni Kristo vs.Judge Geronilla, July 25, 1981 and Canon 2, Rule 2.01,Code of Judicial Conduct).

Strangely, likewise, is (sic) the actuations ofrespondent in the matter of the custody of the SuperSaloon Car. He has demeaned himself and compromisedhis position as a Judge when he obligated upon himselfthe recharging of its batteries and the inflating of its

tires.

Thus, it is difficult to conceive how a Judge wouldwillingly go out of his way to recharge the batteries andinflate the tires of a vehicle in custodia legis by drivingthe car himself to the battery shop unless there is thatintent on his part to use the car.

Against the testimonies of his witnesses, there is nodoubt that indeed he used the car if not on all occasions

that he went home to Parañaque where he residescoming from his Court in San Pablo but at least onsome occasions.

The appearance in the glove compartment of the carreceipt of a beauty parlor located within the vicinity oftheir house admittedly patronized by the wife of therespondent is a glaring proof that the car must havebeen used and ope

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