Judgment Day: April 12 th 2015 The Internet of Things: Who is in Control? Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. [email protected] @johullrich 1

Judgment Day: April 12th 2015The Internet of Things: Who is in Control?

Johannes B. Ullrich, [email protected]

@johullrich

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About Me

• Dean of Research, SANS Technology Institute

• SANS Internet Storm Centerhttps://isc.sans.edu

• Created DShield.org• Instructor for SANS• Past: Physicist, Web Developer• Living in Jacksonville, FL

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Are We in Control?

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Quantified Self

Data

Internet of

Things

Devices

Quantified Self: Dawn to Dusk

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Photo: Withings.com


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Photo: thevesl.com


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Photo: Progressive


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Photo: Fitbit

Hello Barbie

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Home / Small Business

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Enterprise Networks

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Municipal/Gov Networks

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The “Internet of Things”

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New Protocols: IPv6

• Easier to Scale then IPv4• Auto configuration• Extensible• Integrated with various Layer 2

options

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New Protocols: 6LoWPAN / IEEE 802.15.4

• IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network

• Easier network management• Low Power• Low Hardware Requirements• Security

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Risks: New Wireless Protocols

• IEEE 802.15.4 / 6LoWPAN• AES identified as encryption

algorithm• Key Management challenge: Auto

configuration / on-boarding at scale• IPSec (IKEv2) may not work due to

power constraints

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Example: LIFX Light Bulbs

• Light Bulbs communicate via 6LoWPAN with each other (mesh)

• One light bulb acts as router/controller to connect to Wi-Fi (802.11)

• Pre-shared AES key hardcoded. Same for all bulbs

• 6LoWPAN is used to exchange WiFi credentials (which are now at risk)

• Solution: Derive 6LoWPAN key from Wi-Fi Password.

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Risks: New Attack Platforms

• Many devices use customized versions of commodity operating systems (Linux/Windows)

• Wide range of architectures, not just x86

• Embedded systems can even be found inside conventional systems

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SciFi

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Photo: Warner BrothersPhoto: Paramount Pictures

Photo: tailgrab.org

ISC Mission

• Global Network Security Information Sharing Community

• We share fast, ask readers for insight• Expanding diverse sensors for

automatic data collection• Built around DShield platform• Raw data available for others to

analyze

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ISC: The big picture

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ISC Handlers

• Currently about 30 volunteer handlers

• Located worldwide and working in different industries

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How to use our data

• Threat Intelligence– Diaries– IP Address Feeds– Domain Feeds

• Data is free to use for your own network (Creative Commons License)

• Share back!

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Case #1 – Compromised Routers

• E-Mail + phone call from ISP in Wyoming– Affects Linksys E1000/1200– Scanning for Port 80/8080– Latest firmware not affected– Reset of router clears malware

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Case #1: Verification

• Check DShield Logs: No spike in port 80/8080, but they are always busy

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Case #1: Honeypot Data

Seeing “interesting” requests:

GET /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.1Host: a.b.c.d:8080

But nothing else…Something seems to be going on, publishing first “Diary”

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Case #1: Experiment

wget http://routerip/HNAP1/

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/…”><soap:Body><GetDeviceSettingsResponse ... >

<DeviceName>Cisco40033</DeviceName><VendorName>Linksys</VendorName>…<ModelName>E4200</ModelName>…</GetDeviceSettingsResponse></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>

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Case #1: Honeypot

• Setting up a simple Honeypot to simulate router (reply with correct HNAP response)

• Scanning routers now send exploit:POST /tmUnblock.cgi HTTP/1.1Host: [ip of honeypot]:8080Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46JmkxKkBVJDZ4dmNH

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Case #1: The Moon Worm

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Case #1: Challenges

• MIPS Architecture• No common virtual environments

available• Most reverse analysis tools are x86

centric• Exploit requires specific firmware

versions• NO PATCH?!!

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Case #2: Port 5000 Traffic

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Case #2: Compromised DVRs

• Security Camera DVRs• Exposed to Internet for remote

monitoring

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Case #2: Exploit

• Very simple exploit: default username/password (root/12345) used to telnet

• Various binaries copied to DVR– Bitcoin miner– Scanner for Synology Vulnerability– wget / helper tools

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Case #2: Why Vulnerable?

• Simple Password Dialog• Not possible to turn off telnet

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Case #2: Who Did it?

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Case #2: Who did it?

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Case #2: Why Vulnerable?

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Echo File Transfer

echo -ne '\x00\x00\x00\x2f\x00\x00\x00\x1a\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x1b\x00\x00\x00 \x14\x00\x00\x00' >> /var/run/rand0-btcminer-arm && echo -e '\x64\x6f\x6e\x65'

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Case #3: Synology Disk Stations

• Vulnerable web based admin interface• Exposed on port 5000• Allows remote code execution• Exploited before patch

became available• Difficult to patch devices

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Case #3: Synology Vulnerability History

• CVE-2014-2264: Hardcoded VPN Password

• CVE-2013-6955: webman vulnerability allows appending to arbitrary files

• CVE-2013-6987: read/write/delete files via directory traversal

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Case #3: Iowa State Breach

• Iowa State stored student data including SSNs on Synology devices

• Devices got breached by Bitcoin miner campaign

• 5 devices breached• 29,780 SSNs exposed

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Case #3: Continuation … Synolocker

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https://www.facebook.com/events/birthdays?extra_data%5Bstart_date%5D=2015%2F04%2F11

Case #4: Handheld Inventory Scanners

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Case #4: Targeted Attack

• 12 of 40 scanners delivered to a robotics/logistic company came with malware pre-installed

• Malware attacked network “from the inside”

• Targeting accounting systems• Exfiltrating data• Firmware downloaded from

manufacturer site was infected as well

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Case #4: Malware Details

• Scanner runs Windows XP Embedded• Malware only detected due to

network monitoring• Not possible to install standard AV or

Whitelist tools on scanner

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Defensive Strategies

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We need solutions that scale!

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Network Segmentation

• Target: Air Conditioner network not sufficiently segmented, allowed for breach of “business” network.

• How many segments can we manage?• Do all devices fit into the same

segment?• How do they talk to the rest of the

network?

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Onboarding Devices

• Accounting for devices / inventory• Configuring security parameters

(passwords, keys)• Establishing baseline configuration• Develop/Procure tools to provision

devices at scale securely

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Patching

• How are patches distributed / validated?

• Can automatic patching be used?• Centralized patch management

solutions?• Inventory/Onboarding first. Needs to

integrate with Patching

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Logging / Monitoring

• What logs to collect and how?• Flooded by meaningless logs?• Setup “satellite collectors” that

aggregate and pre-filter before sending to central log management system

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Solution 1: Don’t buy crap

• Ask the right questions before purchasing devices:– Onboarding tools?– Logging standards?– Support contracts?

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Solution 2: Scalable & Repeatable Processes

• Take what you learned from your desktop/server environment

• Automation!

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Conclusion

Are we still in control?

Probably not… but not clear who is in control… the machines? The cloud? The miscreant pw0ning your machines?

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Thanks!

[email protected]

http://isc.sans.edu

Daily Updates * Daily Podcast * Data FeedsTwitter: @johullrich / @sans_isc

LinkedIn

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Documents

Judgment Day: April 12 th 2015 The Internet of Things: Who is in Control? Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. [email protected] @johullrich 1