Judgment Aggregationand

Moral Responsibility

Frank Hindriks

University of Groningen

LSE-Groningen Workshop 2009Models of Value and OpinionFebruary 12-14, 2009

2

The Doctrinal Paradox & the Discursive Dilemma

Employee Safety

p q r p q rSerious danger?

Effective Measure?

Bearable Loss?

Pay Sacrifice?

A No Yes Yes No

B Yes No Yes No

C Yes Yes No No

Majority Yes Yes Yes No

3

Theorem (List and Pettit 2002)

Let the agenda contain at least two distinct atomic propositions and their conjunction, or their disjunction, or their material implication. Then there exists no aggregation rule satisfying the conditions of ‘universal domain’, ‘collective rationality’, ‘systematicity’ and ‘anonymity’.

4

Pettit

• Groups have minds of their own

• Corporate responsibility (CR) cannot be reduced to individual responsibility (IR)

5

Corporate Responsibility. Myth or Reality?

Contents

1. Pettit’s Argument

2. An Observation

3. A Critique

4. Towards an Alternative

6

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Irreducible Corporate Responsibility Thesis:

[ICRT] It is sometimes impossible to fully distribute the responsibility of a corporate agent to the individual members of that agent.

7

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Excuse Condition:

[E] An individual member of an organization cannot be blamed for a decision made by that organization if s/he disagrees with it.

8

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

The premise-based and conclusion-based procedures are strategically equivalent

Pettit’s argument fails for the case of outcome-oriented preferences

9

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Reasons for disagreement

[E*] An individual’s disagreement with the decision the organization of which s/he is a member affects the extent to which s/he can be blamed for that decision only if s/he disagrees with it for the right reasons.

10

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Reason-sensitive control

Culpable quality of will, faulty self-governance

Normative reasons

11

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Friend in distress examples:- “busy”- “reputation”- “school play”

Information requirements

From the individual to the collective level

12

Dictatorship

Preemptive War

p q r

(p q) s

s

WMDs? Sufficient Power?

Just War? Preemptive War?

A No Yes Yes No

13

Dictatorship

Preemptive War

p q r

(p q) s

s

WMDs? Sufficient Power?

Just War? Preemptive War?

B Yes No Yes No

14

Dictatorship

Preemptive War

p q r

(p q) s

s

WMDs? Sufficient Power?

Just War? Preemptive War?

C Yes Yes No No

15

Oligarchy

Preemptive War

p q r

(p q) s

s

WMDs? Sufficient Power?

Just War? Preemptive War?

A No Yes Yes No

B Yes No Yes No

C Yes Yes No No

Majority Yes Yes Yes No

16

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

A recipe for distributing responsibility• Check the fault(s) of the corporate agent• Trace them to individuals

17

1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative

Collectivizing reason

Member and role responsibility

Corporate Responsibility (CR)- (ir)reducibility

a false dilemma

18

Conclusions

1. Information about normative reasons and faulty self-governance can be used for “tracing back” CR to IR.

2. A bottom-up approach to CR