Judge Marsh Opinion Revoking Release

7/28/2019 Judge Marsh Opinion Revoking Release

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,P l a i n t i f f ,v.

EZEQUIEL CASTRO-INZUNZA,Defendant.

S. AMANDA MARSHALLUnited Sta t e s AttorneyDis t r i c t of OregonMICHELLE HOLMAN KERINAss i s t an t United Sta t e s Attorney1000 S.W. Third Ave., Sui te 600Port land, OR 97204-2902

Attorneys fo r Pla in t i f fFRANCESCA FRECCEROFedera l Publ ic Defender101 S.W. Main S t ree t , Sui te 1700Port land, OR 97204

Attorney fo r DefendantMARSH, Judge

Case No. 3:11-cr-00418-MAOPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Ezequie l Cas t ro - Inzunza prev ious ly moved fo rp r e t r i a l re l ea se pursuan t to 18 U.S.C. 3142 pending t r i a l on onecount of unlawful ly reen te r ing th e United Sta t e s in v io la t ion o f

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:11-cr-00418-MA Document 33 Filed 05/30/12 Page 1 of 19 Page ID#: 205


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8 U.S.C. 1326(a) . The Immigration and Customs Enforcementd iv i s ion of the Department of Homeland Secur i ty (ICE or DHS) hasgiven not ice by means o f an ICE de ta ine r t ha t defendant ' s removalhas been ordered under 8 U.S.C. 1231. Due to the ICE de ta ine r ,if defendant i s re leased from custody by th e U.S. Marshal, h iscustody wi l l be t rans fe r red to ICE, and removal proceedings w i l lbegin . 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (2 ) .

Following a de ten t ion hear ing , Magis t ra te Judge John V. Acostagranted defendant ' s motion fo r p r e t r i a l re l ease . (ECF #24.) OnMay 14, 2012, the government moved to s tay the Release Order, whichI granted . Current ly before me i s the government 's Motion fo rReview and Revocation o f the Release Order . (ECF #28.) Aftercare fu l cons idera t ion of the par t i e s ' br ie f ing and the record as awhole, I reverse Judge Acosta 's Release Order , and order defendantto remain in custody u n t i l t r i a l now se t fo r August 14, 2012.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYDefendant came to the United Sta tes from Mexico in the l a t e

1980s as a temporary r es iden t under the Specia l Agricul tura l WorkerProgram. Under t h a t program, defendant automat ica l ly became al awfu l permanent r e s id en t as of December 2, 1990.

In March of 1989, defendant , who was then l iv ing in Nevada,was charged with possess ion of heroin with i n t e n t to s e l l , anaggravated fe lony. On the advice o f counsel , defendant pled gu i l tyto the charge. Based on the t r a ns c r ip t of t ha t proceeding, it




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appears t ha t ne i the r h i s a t torney nor the cour t advised defendantt ha t pleading gu i l ty would l i ke ly r e s u l t in h is removal from theUn i ted Sta tes . On January 20, 1990, the t r i a l judge accepteddefendant ' s p lea and he received a four year sen tence .

Following h is convict ion , the Immigration and Natura l i za t ionService (INS, the predecessor agency to ICE) began immigrationproceedings. I t appears t ha t the re were two se t s o f immigrationproceedings, occurr ing in 1993 and 1994. In the 1993 proceedings,INS sought to depor t defendant due to h is fe lony convic t ion , butthose proceedings were dismissed because h is s ta tus was adjus ted to" lawfu l permanent res ident" a f t e r h is conv ic t ion . Thus, th e properproceeding was r esc i s s ion of h is lawful permanent r es iden t s t a tus .In December of 1993, INS rescinded h is lawful s ta tus . In Januaryof 1994, defendant asked an immigration judge to recons ider theOrder of Resc iss ion . The judge denied the reques t , and defendantwas removed fo l lowing expira t ion o f h is sentence on January 19,1994.

On August 17, 1994, with th e ass i s tance of Nevada counsel ,defendant f i l ed a Pet i t ion fo r Writ o f Error Coram Nobis in s t a t ecour t seeking to withdraw h is gu i l t y plea based on his counsel ' sf a i l u r e to advise him of the immigration consequences of h is p lea .The cour t denied h is p e t i t i o n . Defendant ' s appeal from t ha tdec is ion was re j ec ted by the Nevada Supreme Cour t on December 19,1995, based in p a r t on then ex i s t ing Ninth Circu i t preceden t .




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Torrey v. Este l l e , 84 2 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir . 1988); Fruchtman v.Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir . 1976), ce r t . denied, 429 U.S.895 (1976); (Defendant 's Memo. of Law Supporting Release (ECF #20),p. 51-52).

On February 26, 2003, defendant reappl ied for admission in tothe United Sta tes . On September 11, 2003, DHS denied defendant ' sreques t . Defendant was permi t t ed 30 days to appeal t h a t dec is ion ,but did not do so .

In September of 2011, defendant was found in Umati l la , Oregon,and ar res ted . On September 28, 2011, DHS provided defendant a"Notice of In t en t /Dec i s ion to Reins ta te Pr io r Order . " TheReins ta tement Order ind ica tes t h a t the government in tends tor e ins t a t e i t s previous depor ta t ion order and remove defendant fromthe United Sta tes . ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion fo r Review (ECF #22-3) p.1 .) The Reins ta tement Order provides t ha t to con te s t theReins ta tement Order, defendant would need to provide a sta tement toan immigrat ion of f i c e r . Defendant d id not provide a s ta tement .The Reins ta tement Order also provides t ha t the re i s no r igh t tohear ing before an immigrat ion judge. Therefore , pursuant to th eReins ta tement Order , ICE has re ins t a t ed i t s previous depor ta t ionorder . 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (5) ; 8 C.F.R. 241.8.

In October of 2011, defendant was charged in the Dis t r ic t ofOregon with unlawful reentry in to the United Sta tes withoutpermission o f the Attorney General , v io la t ing 8 U. S.C. 1326.




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Because defendant was deported fo l lowing a convict ion fo r anaggravated felony, he faces a maximum pena l ty of 20 years . 8u.S.C. 1326(b) (2). At defendant ' s arraignment and pre l iminaryde tent ion hear ing , defendant was deta ined as a f l i gh t r i s k .

On December 1, 2011, defendant ' s Nevada counsel f i l ed anact ion in s t a t e d i s t r i c t cour t again a t tempting to withdraw h is1990 gu i l ty plea and r e ins t a t e h is lawful permanent r es iden t s t a tuson the bas i s of the u . s . Supreme Cour t ' s ru l ing in Pad i l l a v. Sta teof Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). In Pad i l l a , the SupremeCour t determined t ha t counsel ' s fa i lure to advise a defendant o fposs ib le removal upon ente r ing a gu i l t y plea to a cr imina l chargecons t i tu t es ine f fec t ive ass i s tance . The s t a t e cour t deniedde fendan t ' s motion on March 12, 2012, and h is appeal i s pendingbefore the Nevada Supreme Court .

On May 3, 2012, defendant f i l ed a Motion fo r Request fo rRelease Pending Tr i a l . (ECF #20.) Defendant submit ted l e t t e r sfrom family and f r iends and was in te rv iewed by Pre t r i a l Services .Defendant informed Pre t r i a l Serv ices t ha t he had moved to Oregontwo weeks before h is a r r e s t to f ind work. Defendant has beenl i v ing in the United States for near ly 20 years , and h is wife andth ree ch i ld ren are u.S. c i t i z e ns . Defendant also has family l iv ingin Cal i fo rn ia and Arizona who are l eg a l res iden ts . In i t s r epor t ,P r e t r i a l Services recommended t ha t defendant be deta ined because




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t he re were no condi t ions which wi l l reasonably assure defendant ' spresence a t t r i a l due to the ICE de ta ine r .

Judge Acosta held a de tent ion hear ing on May 9, 2012. On May14, 2012, Judge Acosta i ssued an Order r e leas ing defendant p r i o r toh is t r i a l . (ECF #24.) Judge Acosta concluded t ha t t he re were nofac t s demonstra t ing t ha t defendant was a f l i gh t r i s k , apa r t fromh is ICE deta iner , and t ha t f ac to r alone was i n s u f f i c i e n t to preventh is p r e t r i a l re l ease . On the government 's motion, I stayed ther e lease order pending review. (ECF #25, 26.) On May 22, 2012, Iconducted ora l argument on th e government 's motion, and ora l lyreversed Judge Acosta ' s Release Order. I also ordered defendant toremain in custody pending h is t r i a l , and advised counsel t ha t Iwould i ssue t h i s Opinion and Order separa te ly . (ECF #31.)

DISCUSSIONIn i t s cur ren t motion, the government makes two arguments:

(1 ) the cour t should not have reopened the de tent ion hear ing; and(2 ) defendant i s a f l i gh t r i s k , and the re a re no cond i t ions t ha t

would reasonably assure h is presence a t t r i a l . Defendant arguest ha t because he poses no r i sk of f l i gh t , th e ICE de ta ine r andre ins ta tement of removal order a re i n s u f f i c i e n t to prevent h isp r e t r i a l r e lease .

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3145 (a ) (1), the government may seekreview of a magis t ra te judge 's order of r e lease . The d i s t r i c t




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cour t ' s review of a magis t ra t e ' s order i s de novo. United Sta tesv. Koenig, 912 F.2dI190 , 1191 (9th Cir . 1990).I . The Detent ion Hearing Was Properly Reopened.

Under 18 U.S.C. 3142( f ) , the cour t may reopen a de ten t ionhear ing a t any t ime p r i o r to t r i a l i f :

the j ud i c i a l o f f i c e r f inds t ha t information e x i s t s t ha twas not known to the movant a t the t ime of the hear ingt ha t has a mate r i a l bear ing on the issue whether the reare condi t ions of re lease t ha t w i l l reasonably assure theappearance of such person as requi red and the sa fe ty ofany o ther person and the community.Courts have in terpre ted t h i s provis ion s t r i c t l y . United

Sta tes v. Ward, 63 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1206-07 (C.D. Cal. 1999); UnitedSta tes v. Dil lon , 938 F.2d 1412, 1415 (1s t Cir . 1991); UnitedSta tes v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796 (5th Cir . 1989). Thus, the movingpar ty must show: "1) information now e x i s t s tha t was not known tothe movant a t the t ime of the i n i t i a l de tent ion hearing, and 2) thenew informat ion i s mate r i a l to r e lease cond i t ions regarding f l i gh tor dangerousness ." United Sta tes v. Tommie, 2011 WL 2457521, *2(D. Ariz . June 20, 2011); accord United Sta tes v. Flores , 856F.Supp. 1400, 1405 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

During the May 9, 2012 hearing, Judge Acosta noted t ha tdefendant ' s i n i t i a l de tent ion hear ing was pre l iminary only, andt ha t cons i s ten t with the prac t i ce in the D is t r i c t o f Oregon,i n i t i a l de ten t ion i s provided with leave to reopen.




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As defendant cor rec t ly argues , some of the discovery was notava i lab le a t th e t ime of th e i n i t i a l de tent ion hear ing.Spec i f i ca l ly , the lengthy informat ion provided by P r e t r i a l Serv icesconcerning h is t i e s to th e community was no t ava i lab le prev ious ly .The in fo rmat ion provided by defendant ' s Nevada counsel concerningthe s t a t u s of h is s t a t e cour t proceedings r a i s ing Pad i l l a argumentsalso was not ava i lab le prev ious ly . For a l l of these reasons , Ir e j e c t th e government ' s argument and conclude t h a t the de ten t ionhear ing was proper ly reopened.II . There Are No Conditions Which Will Reasonably Assure

Defendant's Presence for Tria l .This case invo lves the vexing i n t e r p l ay of t h ree s t a t u t e s :

(1 ) th e Bai l Reform Act , 18 U.S.C. 3142, which provides theprocedure fo r p r e - t r i a l re l ea se ; (2) 8 U.S.C. 1326, whichp r o h ib i t s th e reen t ry o f an a l i en who has been removed subsequentto an aggravated fe lony conv ic t ion ; and (3) 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (5) ,which provides fo r the re ins ta tement of prev ious removal ordersaga ins t a l i en s who have i l l e g a l l y reen te red the United Sta tes .

As discussed i n g r ea t e r d e t a i l below, defendant argues t h a t hemust be re leased under the Bai l Reform Act because he does not posea f l i g h t r i sk , and the re fo re , I need not reach the i s sue of whethert he re are cond i t ions I can impose which w i l l assure h is presencefo r t r i a l . The government main ta ins t h a t because defendant ' scustody w i l l be t rans fe r red to ICE and h is removal w i l l make him




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unavai l ab le fo r t r i a l , the re a re no condi t ions which w i l lreasonably assure h is presence fo r t r i a l .

It i s c l e a r t ha t the prac t ica l e f fec t s of t h i s case presen tthe cour t with a l eg a l conundrum: if defendant i s re leased , hewi l l l i ke ly be removed and evade prosecut ion; if defendant i s notre leased , the presence of an ICE de ta ine r and Reins ta tement Ordermake it near ly impossible fo r a l i ens such as defendant to obta inp r e t r i a l r e lease under the Bai l Reform Act. As I see i t , my t a ski s to harmonize these s ta tu te s in a manner which gives e f fec t toa l l th ree , in l i gh t of the fac t s on the record before me.

A. Standards.The Bai l Reform Act of 1984 " requires the re lease of a person

facing t r i a l under the l e a s t r e s t r i c t ive condi t ion or combinat iono f cond i t ions t ha t wil l reasonably assure the appearance of theperson as requi red and the sa fe ty of the community." United Sta tesv. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir . 1991); 18 U.S.C. 3142 (c) (2); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9thCir . 1985). Only in rare circumstances should re lease be denied,and doubts regard ing the propr ie ty o f r e lease should be reso lved inthe defendant ' s favor . Motamedi, 767 F.2d a t 1405; United Sta tesv. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir . 1990).

Sect ion 3142(f) requi res the cour t to hold a de tent ion hear ingif the defendant poses a f l i gh t r i sk o r i s a danger to thecommunity. The government bears the burden o f showing by a9 - OPINION AND ORDER



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preponderance of the evidence t ha t the defendant poses a f l i gh tr i sk , and by c l e a r and convincing evidence t ha t the defendant posesa danger to the community. Gebro, 948 F.2d a t 1121. In t h i scase , there i s no dispute t ha t defendant i s not a danger to thecommunity; only the r i sk of f l i gh t i s a t i s sue . 18 U.S .C. 3142 (f) (2) (A) .

Under 3142(g), ce r t a in fac tors must be considered indetermining whether there are condi t ions o f r e lease t ha t wi l lreasonably assure the appearance of the person and the sa fe ty ofthe community. Gebro, 948 F.2d a t 1121. Those fac to rs include:(1) the nature and ci rcumstances of the offense charged; (2) theweight of the evidence agains t the defendant ; (3) the h i s to ry andc ha ra c t e r i s t i c s of the defendant ; and (4) the nature andse r iousness of any danger to persons or the community i f thedefendant i s re leased . 18 U.S.C. 3142(g). When consideringthese fac tors , the evidence agains t the defendant i s the l e a s timportant . Gebro, 948 F.2d a t 1121.

Under 3142(e), i f the cour t determines t ha t no condi t ion orcombination of condi t ions wi l l reasonably assure the appearance ofthe person, the defendant must be deta ined . 18 U.S.C. 3142(e);Townsend, 897 F.2d a t 993.

B. Analys i s .Defendant argues h is r e lease i s requi red because he i s not a

f l i gh t r i sk , and t ha t I need not reach the i ssue of whether




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condi t ions w i l l assure h is presence . According to defendant , th econcern t h a t he w i l l be removed by ICE i s specu la t ive because he i se l ig ib l e fo r r e lease , c i t ing 8 U.S.C. l226(a) and (c ) . Moreover,defendant main ta ins t h a t the government has th e ab i l i t y to lift th eICE de ta ine r . Addi t iona l ly , defendant argues h is removal by ICE i snot a voluntary a c t , and he should not be deta ined on t h a t b as i s .

The government argues t h a t t he re are no cond i t ions which w i l lreasonably assure defendan t ' s presence fo r t r i a l under the Bai lReform Act. According to the government, h is p r i o r removal hasbeen admin i s t ra t ive ly r e in s t a t ed , and th e Reinsta tement Order i snot subjec t to f u r th e r review. The government maintains t h a t thede ta ine r requ i re s defendant to be t r an s f e r r ed to ICE custody ifre leased and t ha t defendant ' s removal wil l in a l l l i ke l ihood makehim unavai l ab le fo r t r i a l .

I f t h i s were a case wi thout an ICE de ta ine r and Reinsta tementOrder , eva lua t ing the 3142(g) f ac to r s could r e s u l t i n de fend an t 'sre l ea se . The offense charged here i s fo r i l l e g a l reent ry , and i snot a crime of v io lence . The weight of th e evidence in t h i s casei s s t rong from the s tandpoint t h a t defendant was deported in 1994subsequent t o h i s felony conv ic t ion , and t h a t he has re tu rnedwi thout permiss ion . This fac to r , however, i s to be given the l e a s tweight in t h i s ana lys i s . Townsend, 89 7 F.2d a t 994. Addi t iona l ly ,th e government does not argue t h a t defendant i s a t h r e a t to th ecommunity.




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The h is to ry and c h a ra c t e r i s t i c s o f defendant show t h a t he hass t rong t i e s to Las Vegas, where h is wife and most o f h is immediatefami ly re s ide . The P r e t r i a l Serv ices r ep o r t show t h a t d e fen d an t ' swife has a bus iness t h a t has been opera t ing fo r 10 years . Also,d e fen d an t ' s only c r i mi n a l h is to ry i s th e 1990 aggravated felonyconv ic t ion . Indeed, a t th e May 22, hear ing , the government agreedt h a t absen t th e ICE d e t a i n e r and va l id removal o rd e r , cond i t ionscould l i ke ly be imposed which would reasonably assure h is presence ,such as e l ec t r o n i c monitoring.

However, I cannot ignore th e fac t t h a t defendant i s sub jec t toan ICE de ta ine r and a Reinsta tement Order which makes t h i s casecons iderab ly more compl ica ted . And, n e i th e r pa r ty sugges t s t h a t Ishould not cons ider the ICE de ta ine r and Reinsta tement Order in mya n a l y s i s . See Townsend, 897 F.2d a t 994-95 (considering a l i endefendan t s ' t i e s to th e community and count ry when assess ing t h e i rh i s to r y and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) ; uni ted Sta tes v. Hir , 517 F.3d 1081,1088-89 (9th Cir . 2008) (cour t may cons ider danger a defendant posesto a fo re ign community under 3142(e) ) ; see a lso United Sta tes v .Lozano, 2009 WL 3052279, *1 (Sept . 21, 2009), a f f ' d 2009 WL 3834081(M.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2009) (co l l ec t ing ca se s ) ; but see United Sta tesv. Marinez-Pat ino, 2011 WL 902466, *5-6 (N. D. Ill. March 14,2011) (ICE de ta ine r and removal o rd e r not among 3142 (g ) f ac to r s ,and co l l e c t i n g case s ) .




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Defendant mainta ins t ha t h is removal i s not as imminent as thegovernment por t rays because he wi l l seek r e lease on bond during h isremoval proceedings , c i t i ng 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) and (c) . Defendanthas not demonst ra ted t ha t he has the a b i l i t y to pos t a bond under 1226. Furthermore, defendant o f fe r s no suppor t fo r h iscontent ion t ha t the government has the a b i l i t y to lift thede ta ine r .

In t h i s case , defendant ' s previous removal order has beenadmin is t r a t i vely re ins t a t ed pursuant to 8 U. S. C 1231. SeeMorales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 491 & 494 (9th Cir .2007) (en banc) (d iscuss ing the d i s t i nc t ion between removal andre ins ta tement , and t ha t re ins ta tement orders a re genera l lyfo rec losed from d isc re t ionary r e l i e f ) . And, 1231 provides t ha tthe a l i en s ha l l be deta ined while awai t ing removal, and t ha tremoval w i l l occur within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (1) (A)(providing t ha t Attorney General sh a l l remove the a l i en "wi th in aper iod of 90 days") ; Id . 1231(a) (2) (dur ing removal per iod ,Attorney General " s ha l l de ta in the a l i e n" ) . Last ly , the ab i l i t y tocha l lenge re ins ta tement appears extremely l imi ted . See Ixcot v.Holder , 646 F. 3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir . 2011) (a l iens seeking asylumwho have a fear of persecut ion or t o r tu r e may seek withholding ofremoval under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b) (3) (A) and 8 C.F.R. 241 .8 (e) ,208.31) .




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Therefore , on the record before me, I conclude t ha t defendanthas not demonstrated t ha t he wi l l have an oppor tun i ty to seekr e lease on b a i l under 1226 o r by some other means once he i st rans fe r red to ICE custody. 1 Accordingly, I agree with thegovernment t ha t if defendant i s t rans fe r red to ICE custody, h isremoval may render him unavai l ab le fo r t r i a l on August 14, 2012.

As the par t ie s accura te ly i nd ica te , varying i n t e rp re t a t i o n s ofthe Ba i l Reform Act have emerged from the handful of d i s t r i c tcour ts nationwide who have squarely addressed whether p r e t r i a lr e lease should be granted in l i g h t of an ICE de ta ine r and removalorde r . In shor t , some cour ts have determined t ha t a defendant ' si nvo lun tary removal pursuant to an ICE de ta ine r does not crea te aser ious r i s k of f l i gh t under 3142, and does not prevent r e lease .See, e .g . , uni ted Sta tes v . Joco l -Al fa ro , 2011 WL 6938349, *2 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 31, 2011) . Judge Acosta fol lowed t h i s l i ne of cases .Other cour ts have determined t ha t a defendant ' s ICE de ta iner i ssimply not among the 3142 f ac to r s to consider . United Sta tes v.Barrera-Omana, 638 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1110 (D. Minn. 2009) . And still

lIn re j ec t ing an argument t h a t due process requi red ahear ing in the re ins ta tement con tex t under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (5)and 8 C.F.R. 241.8, the Morales-Izquierdo cour t noted: "Whilea l i ens have a r igh t to f a i r procedures , they have noc o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to force the government to r e -ad jud ica te af i na l removal order by unlawfully reente r ing the country.I f Morales has a l eg i t imate ba s i s fo r chal lenging h is pr io rremoval order , he wi l l be able to pursue it a f t e r he leaves th ecountry, j u s t l ike every othe r a l i en in h i s pos i t ion . " 486 F.3da t 498.




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o ther cour ts have recognized t ha t an ICE de ta ine r c rea tes a r i s ktha t the defendant w i l l not appear , thus the re a re no cond i t ionst ha t could reasonably assure the defendant ' s presence fo r t r i a l .United Sta tes v. Ong, 762 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2010);United Sta tes v. Lozano, 2009 WL 3834081 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2009);see also United Sta tes v. Vencomo-Reyes, 2011 WL 6013546 (D. N.M.Nov. 18, 2011) (d iscuss ing the various i n t e rp re ta t ions of the Bai lReform Act in l i g h t of ICE de ta iners ) .

I have reviewed the cases c i ted by the pa r t i e s and have givencons iderab le thought to the pra c t i c a l impl ica t ions of the in terp layo f 18 U.S.C. 3142, 8 U.S.C. 1326, and 8 U.S.C. 1231. In sodoing, I am especia l ly persuaded by the ra t iona le of the d i s t r i c tcour t in uni ted Sta tes v. Lozano. 2009 WL 3834081. I f ind t ha tthe Lozano opinion gives the most reasoned, pra c t i c a lin te rpre ta t ion of the Bai l Reform Act, which a t bottom i s designedto assure a defendant ' s presence fo r t r i a l while presuming adefendant ' s innocence. As the Lozano cour t discussed, thegovernment 's i n t e r e s t in securing a de fendan t ' s appearance fo rt r i a l i s discussed in the body o f numerous subsect ions o f the Bai lReform Act, inc luding 3142( f ) . Lozano, 2009 WL 3834081 a t *2; 18U .S .C .3142(c ) , ( e ) , ( f ) , (j).

Thus, I disagree with defendant and Judge Acosta ' s argumentt ha t t h i s cour t should not reach the i ssue o f whether condi t ionscan be imposed which wi l l reasonably assure h is presence fo r t r i a l ,




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without f i r s t es tab l i sh ing t ha t h is r i sk of f l i g h t i s volun tary .To read the s t a tu t e in t h i s manner undermines the broader purposethe Ba i l Reform Act as a whole, and simultaneously overlooks thepra c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of defendant ' s removal under 1231. As notedabove, I must i n t e rp r e t the Bai l Reform Act to avoid t ha t r e su l t .

Thus, I am drawn to the ana lys i s of Lazano, which I f indappropr ia te ly t akes in to account the e f fec t s of de fendan t ' s ICEde ta ine r and the va l id , enforceable removal order under 1231, andh is prosecut ion for i l l e g a l r een t ry under 1326. Like thedefendant in Lozano, defendant here , if re leased , would be placedin to ICE custody and awai t h is removal, and l i ke ly avoidprosecut ion for h is i l l e g a l r een t ry . And, once removed, the re areno condi t ions which wi l l reasonably assure defendant ' s presence fo rt r i a l . The Lozano cour t reasoned as fo l lows:

Although the re i s no fac tua l scenar io under which Mr.Lozano could f l ee during h is de tent ion pursuant to theICE de ta ine r (absent escape from ICE's custody) , the re i ss imi la r ly no f ac tua l scenar io under which the cour t canreasonably assure Mr. Lozano's appearance a t t r i a l a f t e rh is depor ta t ion . Essen t ia l ly , by applying Mr. Lozano'si n t e rp r e t a t i on , the cour t would give defendants chargedwith i l l e g a l reent ry under 8 U.S.C. 1326 a "ge t out o fj a i l f ree" card . Congress could not poss ib ly havein tended the Bail Reform Act to nul l i fy a subs tant ivecr imina l s t a tu t e . Lozano, 2009 WL 3834081 a t *4( footnote omit ted) .I respec t fu l ly disagree with defendant and Judge Acosta t h a t

by denying p r e t r i a l re lease in t h i s in s tance , I have e f fec t ive lygiven de f in i t i ve weight to the presence of ICE de ta ine r s in 3142




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hear ings. In t h i s case, it i s not exclus ively the presence of anICE de ta ine r , but also the val id , enforceable removal orderpursuant to 1231, t ha t informs my decis ion.- I f defendant ' sremoval was not f ina l , I may have reached a di f fe ren t conclusion.See United Sta tes v. Montoya-Vasquez, 2009 WL 103596, *1 (D. Neb.2009) (ICE deta iner did not prevent re lease because defendant hadopportuni ty to pos t ba i l and would appear before an ImmigrationJudge who would determine removal).

At the May 22 hearing, defendant attempted to fac tua l lydis t inguish Lozano, contending t ha t defendant Lozano presented adanger to the community, and may otherwise have been deta ined.Addi t iona l ly , defendant argued t ha t Lozano prefer red re lease toavoid prosecut ion because he was facing a lengthy sentence , unlikedefendant here. I disagree . In the magis t ra t e ' s ru l ing in t ha tcase, the cour t determined t ha t the government had not met thec lea r and convincing s tandard fo r showing dangerousness. Lozano,2009 WL 3052279 a t *4. The d i s t r i c t cour t did not dis turb thedangerousness f inding on review, nor did the d i s t r i c t cour tpremise i t s denia l of p r e t r i a l re lease on Lozano's al legeddangerousness.

I also have considered defendant ' s co l l a t e ra l Nevada s t a t ecour t chal lenge to h is under lying gu i l t y plea and 1994 removalorder under Pad i l l a . Padi l la was announced in 2010; defendant ' sconvict ion became f i na l in 1995. To da te , defendant ' s chal lenges




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have been unsuccessful . At the May 22 hearing, defendant concededt ha t he i s not at tacking h is 1994 removal in th i s proceeding. And,defendant conceded t ha t the e a r l i e s t the Nevada Supreme Court mayresolve h is appeal ra i s ing Pad i l l a arguments would be the end o f2012.

As the pa r t i e s have indica ted , the re i s a s p l i t in the Circu i tCourts of Appeal as to whether Pad i l l a wi l l be re t roac t ive lyappl ied to cases t ha t have become f i na l p r i o r to the date of t h a tdec is ion . Compare United Sta tes v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 635 (3rdCir . 2011) (Padi l la r e t roac t ive ) with United Sta tes v. Arner, 2012 WL1621005 (5th Cir . May 9, 2012) (Padi l la not r e t ro a c t i v e ) , UnitedSta tes v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir . 2011) (same), andChaidez v. United Sta tes , 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir . 2011) , c e r t .gran ted , 2012 WL 1468539 (Aprel 30, 2012) (same). The U.S. SupremeCour t has gran ted cer t iorar i and w i l l decide the case next term.An answer from the Supreme Court i s l ike ly many months away. I fr eso lu t ion of defendant ' s l eg a l cha l lenge was more ce r ta in ort imely , I may have reached a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t .

This case presents an unfor tuna te mix of f ac t s and law. Yet,under defendant ' s i n t e rp re ta t ion o f 3142, an a l i en who has ava l id , f i na l removal order who i s not a danger to the communitycould never be deta ined and would avoid prosecu t ion fo r i l l e g a lr een t ry . I simply cannot i n t e rp r e t the Bai l Reform Act in a mannert ha t nu l l i f i e s the reent ry s t a tu t e . Lozano, 2009 WL 3834081 a t *4.




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Accordingly, fo l lowing the reasoning presen ted in Lozano, If ind t ha t the government has demonst ra ted by a preponderance of theevidence t h a t the re are no condi t ions which wi l l reasonably assuredefendant ' s presence fo r t r i a l . Judge Acosta ' s order of re lease i sreversed , and defendant i s ordered to remain in custody un t i lt r i a l .

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, I f ind t h a t the government hasdemonstrated t h a t no condi t ions or combination o f condi t ions wi l lreasonably assure defendant ' s presence fo r t r i a l . Accordingly,Magist ra te Judge John V. Acosta ' s Release Order (ECF #24) i sREVERSED, p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion fo r Review and Revocation of ReleaseOrder (ECF #28) i s GRANTED, and defendant i s to remain in custodypending t r i a l .

IT IS SO ORDERED.DATED t h i s 30 day of MAY, 2012.

~ ~ . ; 7 W ~Malcolm F. MarshUnited Sta tes Dis t r i c t Judge



Documents

Judge Marsh Opinion Revoking Release