JTMUN 2019

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Letter from the Secretary-General

Dear Delegates,It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the fifth session

Lahore Grammar School Johar town Model United Nations, to be held from Thursday, October 10 to

Sunday, October 13.JTMUN is one of the toughest and most prestigious

conferences in Pakistan, hosting over 500 delegates each year. JTMUN is much more than just four days

of debate. It is a coterie, uniting delegates from over 10 cities in Pakistan to solve some of the world’s most daunting problems. You will be guided and

moderated at this conference by some of the best Directors in Lahore, all of whom are deeply

impassioned about the educational power and significance of MUN.

In our fifth year, we are immensely honoured to continue JTMUN’s proprietary focus on diplomacy,

collaboration and social change. We pride ourselves on providing you the most thorough delegate

experience possible, ranging from our extensive study guides to individualized feedback.

On behalf of the JTMUN secretariat, I invite you to join us in Lahore for JTMUN 2019.

Yours,

Wasay Yar Khan

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

Introduction

The South China Sea crisis relates to the territorial disputes over the islands that reside in the South China Sea. These territorial disputes primarily reflect China PRC’s relationships with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and furthermore pertains to international relations with Japan, the United States, and the European Union. China claims authority over the region encapsulated by the nine-dash lines, which is an ambiguous boundary set by China mostly over Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, as well as Macclesfield Bank, and the Pratas Islands, of which are virtually the entirety of the South China Sea. However, many other South East Asian countries have also lain claims to these islands, thus creating overlaps. Not only does China claim sovereignty, they also hold strong resistance toward handling the disputes that have arisen as a result of the nine-dash lines, which have contributed to the rising stakes of the crisis and the intensity of the disputes.

Each country is granted an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the United Nations Convention of the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), which grants them special rights to marine resources and energy exploration or production. The countries in question all have economic interests within the South China Sea that override the diplomatic relations expected between them. Thus, much of the issue relates to the disputes over natural resources, fishing, trade, and military.

China’s claims of autonomy over the South China Sea have sparked international criticism and backlash from countries such as United States, Japan, and France. Japan has recently begun building influence within the South China Sea in order to halter China’s expansion, as well as for their own military and economic benefit. The Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) will play a vital role in mitigating crises and issues regarding the South China Sea.

For What the Sea is Worth?

The islands themselves are home to invaluable biodiversity and are rich with untapped natural resources: natural gas, crude oil reserves, troves of aqua cultural treasures, and trade routes indispensable to the global economy, all of these fall beneath the umbrella of the sea’s wealth.

Black Gold

Of the most precious resources known to be found within the region, possible crude oil and natural gas deposits rank as some of the most highly valued and sought after.

Figure 2: The graphic above shows several key quantifications of the economic significance of the South China Sea, from annual cash-flow via commerce, to natural resource projections.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

Though exploration of the region is not complete, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the South China Sea holds around 11 billion barrels of oil— roughly equivalent to Mexico’s current reserves—and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Among the Spratly Islands, a mean estimate of 2.5 billion barrels of oil are theorized to exist in stores in underwater stores, making the area potentially invaluable in our current petro-centric energy paradigm. If such estimates are indeed accurate, then the South China Sea offers a solution to the “Malacca dilemma” – heavy, unavoidable dependence on the Strait for Malacca Middle Eastern oil. (Kaplan, 2014)

The map above illustrates oil reserves within the South China Sea in millions of barrels; take notice of where these stores overlap with conflicting claims as well as how large some unexplored areas are.

Source: Energy Information Administration

Development of the reserves known to exist in the region is controversial amongst claimant nations, and has been the cause of tensions in several cases. These conflicts will be elaborated upon in further detail in successive sections, but the table below from 2011 gives some insight into the relative breakdown of hydrocarbon production by each nation and their related respective private entities.

Commerce

Aside from islands, though, the South China Sea is also home to several key straits and waterways integral for international and domestic trade. The region plays an immense role in the budding economies of nearby nations and the globe overall; it is estimated that $5.3 trillion USD worth of commerce travels through the South China Sea annually. In regards to the utter significance of the waterways of the region for the

Figure 4: The figure above shows the estimated hydrocarbon production potential of the South China Sea

Source: Energy Information Administration

Global economy, according to Robert D. Kaplan’s Asia’s Caldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Asia Pacific:

“The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans - the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rim land, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal.”

From crude oil, to commercial products, to foodstuffs, the goods that pass through these major trade routes are multitudinous and of incredibly high importance for

food and energy security, as well as the global economy.

Definition of key terms

South China Sea

A marginal sea that is in the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area of around 3.5 million square kilometres. Nations located around this sea include: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and other countries. The sea carries immense importance, considering a third of global shipping passes through it, carrying 3 trillion USD in trade annually. It also contains crucial fisheries for food security in Southeast Asia, as well as large oil and gas reserves.

Nine-dash Line

A dashed line drawn on a 1940’s map that represents China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. At times, it has also been referred to as the 10-dash and 11-dash line. The area loops around a point approximately 1800km south of Hainan Island, China’s southern most province.

Paracel Islands

A group of around 130 islands, reefs, banks, and other maritime features in the South China Sea, that is controlled by the People’s Republic of China, and also claimed by Taiwan (Republic of China) and Vietnam. The archipelago is approximately equidistant from the coastlines of China and Vietnam. The French colonial government of Vietnam set up a weather station on an island in the Paracel Islands in the 1930s, Taiwanese forces landed on Woody Island, another island, in 1946 then abandoned it 4 years later. In 1974, the Battle of the Parcel Islands led to China expelling the Vietnamese from the Parcel Islands.

Spratly Islands

A disputed group of islands, islets, cays, and more than 100 reefs in the South China Sea. It lies off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and southern Vietnam. Approximately 45 islands, cays, reefs, and shoals are occupied and contain military structures and forces from Malaysia, Taiwan, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Brunei has also claimed an exclusive economic zone in the south-eastern part of the Spratleys. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ): An area of up to 200 nautical miles around a state’s territory in which the state has the sole right to exploit resources, but must allow the innocent passage of foreign vessels.

Innocent Passage

A measure codified in the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNLOS) which allows vessels to pass through territorial waters and EEZs so long as they do not violate the peace and security of the area. This includes all shipping and certain military vessels.

Island

A naturally formed landmass that can sustain human habitation and economic activity. Islands are given both EEZs and territorial seas. Uninhabitable islands, known as rocks, are given territorial seas but not EEZs.

Territorial Sea

A 12 nautical mile area extending from a state’s coast. A state owns any land and resources, discovered or not, within the area. The measurement is taken at the low water mark of the coastline.

Exclusive Economic Zone

An area of coastal waters 200 nautical miles from shore, as prescribed by the UNCLOS. It refers to the rights that a country has regarding maritime exploration and use of marine resources. In the EEZ, a country has sovereign rights, jurisdiction regarding the establishment and use of artificial islands and related infrastructure, and the protection of the marine environment.

Case study: THE DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKU-DIAOYU ISLANDS

The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands remained uninhabited and officially unclaimed until 1895 when Japan incorporated them into the Okinawa Island Province and established a Japanese factory on the largest island. After China lost the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, both parties signed the Treaty ofShimonoseki, under which China was to cede the Island of Taiwan and all islands belonging to it to Japan. After the Second World War, these islands and several others were occupied by the Allied Powers, but remained formally under Japanesesovereignty until 1951. In 1949 Taiwan officially became the Republic of China(ROC) and in 1951 the United States began to exercise control over several other islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In 1971, through the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, numerous islands were recognized as part of the Okinawa territory and the sovereignty was returned to Japan.

Today both China and Taiwan claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and China disputes the 1971 transfer, arguing that the islands were not part of that

treaty and therefore belonged to China. This dispute results from the fact that, later in 1971, the U.S. Senate explained that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not part of that contract. Yet, over time, the U.S. reconsidered that statement and is now arguing that the islands did fall under the treaty. Over time, the conflict has always been marked by tension and diplomatic confrontations, sometimes even with military involvement. In 2012, Japan bought parts of the Senkaku-Diaoyu from a private Japanese owner, which triggered protests and rebellions on both sides.

On the 23th November 2013, China took the controversial step of establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), encompassing the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands. An ADIZ requires aircrafts entering the zone to contact the national authority of the sovereign territory they intend to cross to submit flight plans. This airspace, demarcated outside the territorial airspace, allows a country to identify and monitor aircraft. It sets aside time for early warnings and helps to defend the country's airspace. The Chinese ADIZ extends over the East China Sea and has a significant overlap with the Japanese ADIZ declared in 1969, with both zones covering the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands.

Chinese government explains the establishment of an ADIZ as a measure to guard against ‘potential air threats’. The Chinese government argued that it had only followed common international practices by establishing the zone, with aims of protecting its state’s sovereignty as well as its territory and airspace. It would be a necessary measure in China's exercising of self- defence rights. It had no particular target and would not affect the freedom of flight in airspace. The declaration raised international criticism. Western nations accused China of seeking to increase regional tension. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on China to revoke any measures that could infringe upon the freedom of flight in international airspace. The former US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel declared that the policy is a ‘destabilising attempt’ to alter the status quo in the region, and would aggravate underlying tensions. The Chinese response remarked that Japan shall acknowledge the sovereignty of China and demanded that the U.S. should respect China’s national security issues.

Case study: PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS

In 1939, Japan established military bases on both the Paracel and Spratly Islands; during the Second World War, France (on behalf of its then-colony Viet Nam) and Japan coexisted on both islands. At the Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1951, Japan formally abandoned its claim to all islands in the SCS. The Spratly Islands, due to their suspected low economic value, were left under the supervision of the Commonwealth. In 1956, the Philippines, dissatisfied with the control of the islands by other nations, occupied a number of them and established a new micro nation

called Freedom land in the Spratly Islands. During the mid-1950s, British and US oil companies started to express their own interest in the area due to potential oil fields.

In 1969 the International Court of Justice adjudicated the North Sea Continental Shelf case by enunciating the natural prolongation principle, which resulted in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea being convened in 1973 (UNCLOS III, 1973-82). Motivated by the prospect of oil, the Philippines officially claimed the Spratly islands in 1971, whilst the unified Socialist Republic of Viet Nam took over the South Vietnamese claims over the Paracel islands in 1975. Over time, the Spratly islands were claimed by Viet Nam from the west, the Philippines from the east and Malaysia from the south.

The first military confrontations occurred when China occupied the Vietnamese part of the Paracel Islands in 1974, which it has been holding ever since. In response to this loss, Viet Nam moved their troops onto the Spratly islands. After the Vietnamese war, Viet Nam became dependent on the Soviet Union, which led to the SCS playing an important role in the Soviet-American naval- rivalry. With Gorbachev withdrawing from costly Soviet deployments and Viet Nam lacking a powerful ally, the PRC used Viet Nam’s isolation and occupied the Spratly Islands in 1988, triggering a battle between Chinese and Vietnamese ships, during which three Vietnamese ships were sunk and 70 troops killed.

In 1989, Viet Nam withdrew its troops from Cambodia and subsequently a moreharmonious relationship amongst the SCS nations. During the 1990s, frequentformal and informal talks were initiated to reach a resolution. At the start of the 21th century, the USA increased its involvement in the dispute, which is evident through the collision of U.S. navy intelligence aircraft and Chinese fighter jets mid-air killing one Chinese pilot and resulting in the detainment of the U.S. crew in 2001. In 2009, several confrontations occurred between Chinese fisheries vessels and a US navy vessel. In addition, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s navy submarine almost collided with an US destroyer causing damage on the ship’s sonar equipment. Viet Nam, Malaysia and Brunei made the claim that the continental

shelf attached to their land should be extended in order to widen their economic rights further into the SCS. In August 2013 Malaysia proclaimed it might cooperate with China in order to support Chinese claims.

TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Goal 9 stipulates the need to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and promote innovation. Goal 9 includes a set of additional points encouraging governments to build long lasting infrastructure nationally and transnationally.

The on-going tensions in the South China Sea may lead to destruction of infrastructure and threats to sustainable industrialization. These tensions have their origins in the creation of artificial islands and also contribute to legal contention between nations. It is doubtful that this is the kind of resilient infrastructure intended by the creators of goal 9.

Goal 10 calls for reducing inequality within and among countries. With increased military spending the finances available for governments to invest on educational campaigns and job creation will decrease, hence making it more difficult to achieve goal 10 by 2030 and reduce inequality within and among countries; war only increases injustice in the world.

Goal 11 recommends ensuring the safety of cities and human settlements. However, with the current tensions around the region of the South China Sea, it is possible that inhabited zones would be damaged if war were to break out. Tension between nations reduces the possibility of achieving goal 11.

Goal 17 relates to the revitalization of global partnerships and multi-stakeholder approaches, which is pertinent given the current level of conflict. If the stakeholders agreed to revitalize partnerships and seek new ones, an escalation in tension could be avoided.

LEGAL ISSUES

In order to effectively discuss the following matters, it is important to fully understand sovereign maritime territories and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) began to implement EEZs and received support from nations in the vicinity of the SCS. Despite objections from the USA, the Convention was signed in 1982, entered in to force in November 1994 and has been ratified by all states with claims in the SCS48.

In accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the sovereign maritime territory extends 12 nautical miles (nm) from the nation’s coast, and grants full jurisdiction to the nation in question. Put briefly, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nm from the coast but only allows exploitation of marine resources, such as fishing or energy production, and is classed as international waters.

Islands, defined as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide’’, are entitled to have an EEZ, yet rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on their own do not have an EEZ. Within a nation’s EEZ, the respected state can establish artificial islands and installations. Since the artificial islands built by China are located in disputed waters, the question whether these artificial islands are illegal should also be examined, as it may be argued by some that the islands were not built within China’s EEZ.

Tally of Tit for Tat: Military Action

In recent years, development has only exacerbated the pre-existing tensions over the conflicting territorial claims. Between 1970 and 1990, military action employed by China to assert ownership over the Spratly and Paracel Islands caused over 130 Vietnamese casualties. Since then, China has engaged in increasingly tense maritime standoffs with other claimant nations as a result of its development, and has increased its general military presence in the region exponentially. According to the United States Department of Defence (USDOD):

“At all of its reclamation sites, China either has transitioned from land reclamation operations to infrastructure development, or has staged construction support for infrastructure development. As infrastructure development is still in its early stages, it remains unclear what China ultimately will build on these expanded outposts. However, China has stated publicly that the outposts will have a military component

to them, and will also be used for maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine scientific research, meteorological observation, ecological environment conservation, navigation safety, and fishery production.”

The PRC has increased aircraft carrier and vessel capabilities, and with recent updates to general military base infrastructure, its claimed territories continually inch closer to being equipped for a full on maritime conflict, and increase the PRC’s argumentation of de facto claimancy.

Despite international arbitration and increasing tensions between China and the rest of claimant nations, contested development continues. In early 2016, China announced plans for the construction of nuclear reactors on disputed territory within the Spratly Islands to “speed up the commercial development” of the region.

Considering the highly temperamental nature of the seas, floating reactors pose huge engineering and safety challenges, not to mention the innate danger in increasing already tense militaristic relations with Vietnam and the Philippines. Specific developmental notions aside, though - the mind-set of each claimant being as dogged and unrelenting as they increasingly are is frightening for the rest of the nations involved.

However, the PRC is not alone in its militaristic development. Mischief Reef, an area within the Spratly Islands currently co-claimed by Vietnam, was reported to have been the target of Vietnamese mobile rocket launchers in August of 2016. Vietnam’s weaponization of part of the Spratly Islands proves to be the most aggressive step of any of the claimants thus far. Even considering these dangers, though, conflict in the region isn’t solely the responsibility of the remaining claimants; the majority of developed G-20 nations dually play a role in the politics of the region and influencing how the power dynamics of the conflicting claims will play out.

Figure: The graphic above (courtesy of the United States Department of Defence’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy) visualizes the comparative combatant fleets of each that are currently present in the disputed territories.

For instance, the United States has increased its military presence in the region nearly exponentially as well (despite its complete lack of any claim to the contested waters) to match that of the PRC’s, using its naval bases with Philippines and other regional allies. In a USDOD report titled “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,” the planned efforts of the U.S. military include “enhancing [...] force posture and persistent presence in the region, [...] to maintain a higher pace of training, transits, and operations.” Specifically, the U.S., since October 2015, has launched three freedoms of navigation operations (FONOPS) within the region – in waters near the Spratly Islands, the Paracels, and the Fiery Cross Reef, all three of which were condemned by Chinese authorities.

Likewise, Australia has vested interests in these differentially claimed territories as well, in terms of wishing to preserve freedom of navigation as well as trade within the region. According to the Lowy Institute, “[the nation] has been conducting its own airborne surveillance operations in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, called Operation Gateway, since 1980.” Though active in surveillance and preparatory measures in the region, Australia does not participate in the same level of defence activity within the South China Sea as does the United States, despite being the nation’s largest ally in the region.

With increased military action and effort in the region on the behalf of removed parties like the United States and Australia for reasons beyond the direct dispute at hand, and rather the ramifications geopolitically of its progression, the international community is even further at risk of a larger conflict resulting from the alliances that would be implicated if tensions were to reach a boiling point.

Final Thoughts

If the disputed territories in the South China Sea remain so, and pre-existing tensions bubble to becoming larger military confrontation, the world might look like a drastically different place. Given the value of the South China Seas for the global economy, international food security, and the energy economy, our current frameworks for international arbitration and territorial conflict resolution are in dire need of reconsideration.

Important Questions to Consider:

How does the involvement of non-claimant nation states like the United States either dictate or fail to influence the dynamics of the international dispute?

Given the language of the UNCLOS and the previous reactions of claimants (namely China) to what the international community agrees as being fair third- party arbitrations, what can the UNSC do to prevent the escalation of current tensions?

Considering the wealth of possible oil and natural gas reserves, as well as aqua cultural biodiversity in the region, how do we combat the tragedy of the commons in a scenario where claimant nations not only act out of self-interest, but dually out of competitive, militaristic zeal – taking into consideration the usage of EZ protections as seen in the Chagos Islands dispute?

How do the intricacies of the economic situations of the involved nations play into their geopolitical stances and interpretations of and reactions to international legislation and arbitration?