Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2 …upm.pps.ipdn.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/3.-Sabil...political dimensions can be seen, such as the use of the reconstruction and

Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015

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THE STATE ROLE AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE NATIONAL AND

SUB-NATIONAL RELATIONS ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT

POLICIES: CASE STUDY ON ACEH’S RECONSTRUCTION AND

REHABILITATION AGENCY (BRR) POST-TSUNAMI (2005-2009)

Sabil Rachman1

Abstract

This study discusses the State Role and the Dynamics of the central and regional

relations on the Disaster Management Policies which specifically organized an

analysis on Aceh’s Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency after the 2005-2009

tsunami. The perspective that will be seen centers on the state role in managing

the Aceh Tsunami and its implication when connected with the relations of Aceh’s

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi

Aceh / BRR) that represents the state or the central government with the local

government that has been harboring problems. The position and the perspective

of the central government or its mindset towards Aceh and how Aceh views the

central government post-tsunami will be discussed in this study as well.

Key Word: State Role, Disaster Management Policy, National and sub-national

relation.

INTRODUCTION

The Aceh Tsunami that occurs on the 26th of December did not only

affect the lives in Aceh, but it is also an interesting topic to read from a political

perspective. The tsunami pushed the regime of Susilo Bambag Yudhoyono and

Jusuf Kalla and the United Indonesia Cabinet to publish the Government

Regulations in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang /

PERPU) as the political coverage and constitution to form the Aceh’s

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR) after the tsunami. Various

political dimensions can be seen, such as the use of the reconstruction and

rehabilitation process as a method for the elites to gain a respectable image.

The effect of the tsunami in Aceh can be seen by its incalculable number

of casualties. The devastating natural disaster caused the death of approximately

two-hundred and twenty thousand lives, the disappearance of more than thirty-

seven thousand people, and the evacuation of approximately five-hundred and

twenty-seven people. The damage done the infrastructure and public facilities is

appalling. It destroyed roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals, immobilizing the

public services. The facilities and infrastructure of the government was

demolished in almost every regency, with the addition of the casualties from the

1 Sabil Rachman is a Political lecture in Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia.

Can be contacted by email: [email protected]


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bureaucratic apparatus. This condition resulted in the immobilization of the

government and the reconstruction to the point that the central government

declared the Aceh tsunami, through the President in December 27th in 2004, as a

national disaster.

Constitutionally, the state has a clear role and authority in giving services

to the people who are affected by the natural disaster without looking at their

social background, economy, politics, and religion, as well as their culture. In

various theories, like Budiardjo said, every nation, regardless of their ideologies

should establish its functions, such as: (1) implementing law and order, (2) fight

for the people’s welfare, (3) attempt to have stronger defense, (4) enforce justice,

and (5) make room for freedom.2 When the President has declared the tsunami in

Aceh as a national disaster, then it should be the responsibility of the state and the

central government. This means that the state should be the most active in

managing Aceh post-tsunami. In implementing the roles of the state, the

government, with the support of the People’s Representative Council, formed the

BRR that is responsible for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process post-

tsunami through cooperation with various parties from both domestic and

international communities.

Affiliated domestic institutions comes from Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung,

Yogyakarta, Makassar, Lampung, Medan, Padang, Banda Aceh, and other cities.

The categorization of the domestic institutions consists of the constituents of the

local government, non-governmental organizations, the strength of the civil

society, both the constituents of the people’s organization and political parties.

The international communities consists of non-governmental organizations,

institutions of international donors that represented the United Nations, corporate

institutions, and religious institutions.

Although the numerous parties involved in the reconstruction and

rehabilitation process in Aceh post-tsunami has shown solidity and empathy

towards issues concerning humanity, it needed to be directed and coordinated so

that these institutions do not overlap each other with their agendas so that they

will not lose their focus. The state represented by BRR must synchronize they

agendas towards the institutions so that the politics concerning its aid will be

avoided.

To comprehend the institutions from the domestic and international

communities that participated in the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh

post-tsunami, a table is shown below:

Tabel 1

International Agencies

ADB Asia

Americans Foundation United States

AUS-AID Australia

2Miriam Budiardjo,The Foundations of Political Science, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama,

1966, hal 46


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Australian Government Australia

CIDA Canada

Caritas Austria Austria

Caritas CZECH Republic Czech Republic

Caritas Germany Germany

Caritas Switzerland Switzerland

Catholic Relief Service United States

JICA Japan

JBC Japan

LEAP United Kingdom

Italian Cooperation Italy

Mercy Malaysia Malaysia

Save the Children United States

Unicef United Nations

UNHCR United Nations

USAID United States

USINDO United States – Indonesia

UNDP United Nations

UNESCO United Nations

ARABSAUDI Arab

Sumber: BRRNAD-NIAS (2005)

Tabel 1.2

Domestic Agencies

No Name of Institution

1 LSM Silfa Indonesia

2 Aceh People Forum

3 LPSMD

4 Yayasan Bina Aneok Nangroe

5 Yayasan Sosial Kreasi

6 YBS

7 PMI

8 Yayasan Bunda Tzu Chi Indonesia

9 Yayasan Forum Bangun Aceh

10 World Vision Indonesia

11 AMDA Indonesia

12 Honda Astra Motor

13 Walhi

14 Bakrie Group

15 IBM

16 EXXON Mobil

Source: BRR Report Book, 2005 / BRR Report Book, 2005


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This data shows that in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in

Aceh, aids from the BRR which is the institution that represents the state in the

process, aid that are given by groups, and by the communities of the casualties,

are accepted in Aceh, especially the aid given by volunteers during the response

time which lasted for six months from December 26th 2004 until April 26th 2005.

The high number of donors and institutions from various areas and states, like the

ones mentioned above, have arise questions such as whether the presence of these

donors and institutions can replace the role of the BRR and how the BRR can

coordinate with the institutions, such as the one mandated by Perpu No. 2 year of

2005 concerning the formation of the BRR.

After the emergency response time, the government stopped the activities

of the volunteers from abroad and the international communities with the

exception of foreign volunteers consisting of doctors and medical teams. These

medical aids were given a one year extension in Aceh. However, the

government’s actions have brought numerous reactions. Due to the government’s

limitations, the People’s Representative Council and non-governmental

organizations requested the government to delay stopping the aid from by the

international communities because Aceh was still in serious need of help. The

non-governmental organizations that doubted the government’s capability to

handle the issues in Aceh is included in in the Kelompok Masyarakat Peduli Aceh

(KEMAPA) which states the doubt of the people of Aceh concerning the

government’s capability to handle the issues that arises after the tsunami by

demonstrating in front of the United Nations office in Jakarta on January 25th

2005.The government’s limitation, as mentioned above, demands and requires the

government to build synergy and cooperation with other parties. In this context,

the formation of a new institution that will represent the state in the building of

synergy and cooperation that has excellent coordination and communication skills

with domestic and international institutions. It should also have credibility and

technical proficiency that is supported by the authority and political legitimacy.

Based on this, the government forms an institution through Perpu No.2 of 2005,

Aceh’s Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency.

As an institution that represents the state and the central government, the

BRR has a difficult task. After the tsunami, the situation is not conducive if seen

from a political perspective and security because of GAM and their demand that

Aceh should be autonomous from the central government. In this context, the

BRR will move in two kinds of orientation, carrying out the rehabilitation and

construction duties and act as a mediator between the central government and

Aceh. Therefore, the BRR could also take part in strengthening the relations

between the central government and Aceh because it is an important factor in the

implementation process of the autonomous region, or in this context, the

implementation of special autonomy that occurs consistently.


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THEORY

The BRR, its authority and its political position As a state representative, the BRR have direct responsibility to the

president, their authority is quite considerable. One of its authorities is the ability

to coordinate with domestic institutions (central government, business world,

people’s organization, and non-governmental organization), international

communities, donor countries, and non-governmental organization that

participates in aiding the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh post-tsunami.

If seen from the perspective of the central government, then the

formation of the BRR was very urgent because the damage the Aceh tsunami has

done is appalling. This situation requires the responsibility of the state with its

considerable amount of authority to handle the problems that arise. However, the

formation of the BRR and its commitment to the state in dealing with the damages

of the tsunami through rehabilitation and reconstruction has to be carried out

according to the political policies of the state, which is the implementation of

special autonomy.

This means that the authority of the BRR cannot be faced with the

political regulation of the state that has been applied in Aceh as the solution to the

dynamics and political contextualization between the central government and

Aceh with its very deterministic historical resistance where the state or central

government views Aceh as a foe, especially GAM. Therefore, the BRR needs to

be put in a political landscape that is wider than re-actualizing its presence based

on Perpu without observing the political dynamics occurring.

One of the important aspects the BRR needs to do is to carry out its task

according to the Perpu number 2 of 2005, but avoid the weakening of the role and

participation of the local government as an important local power to carry out the

reconstruction as an implementation of passion and commitment that is build on

Aceh’s special autonomy. Provided that the commitment is implemented, the

BRR will show its coherence and its capability to synergize with the instruments

of the local authorities, instead of weakening one another.

However, the BRR became a weakening factor or a limitation to the role

of the area’s size which is more ideal with local Aceh stakeholder, especially the

central government. The BRR does not give the proper role to the local

government although the ones who understand the geography and culture of Aceh

is the local government. Consequently, the people of Aceh started having a

skeptical view towards the relations between the central government which is

represented by the BRR and the local government of Aceh, as well as the civilians

in Aceh.

When the BRR’s domination started to increase, it is said to be

detrimental and destructive because the roles of the locals will be abolished. One

of the aspects that has been an issue, if seen from the effort to strengthen and give

the roles of local human resources which has been criticized the the people of

Aceh, is the process and the staff recruitments, as well as the leaders on the

manager level which does not use local human resources. Hence, they demand

that there should be at last a sixty to seventy percent number of locals when they

recruit.


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The policies of the BRR which tend to give off the impression that they

are ignoring the position and importance of the area is actually contradicting its

motivation of the whole process of the state’s political policy that demands the

fulfillment of the importance of all parties because the polices made are not

directed to a certain party but it is applied to all and is liberal. This matter is in

accordance with the liberal idea about the purpose of taking policies that is

theoretically carried by Wayne Parsons (2005)3 which is based on the belief that

the state role is to manage the public and its issues and also handle the aspects of

social life and the economy that can longer he handled by the market.

This points to Parsons’ theory. In this context, the government has no

choice but act, and a state intervention becomes important. However, considering

the politics related with the political relations of the central government and Aceh

with is strengthened and supported by political regulations and approach in the

form of special autonomy and the conditions in its implementation. Therefore, the

states represented by the BRR cannot forget the important dimensions of special

autonomy where Aceh is placed in a strategic level and decides, or in other words,

Aceh has political privilege before the central government.

However, the realization of their ideals seem to meet a dead end. This is

caused by the failure of the BRR to project a strong commitment to synergize with

the provincial authorities. In its relationship with the local government, the BRR

does not take into account the condition and role of the local government, both

provincial and regency. It has already been proven by the deficient coordination

done by the BRR and the local government, especially in the implementation or

realization of the program. This often makes the BRR as the sole actor in the

rehabilitation and reconstruction process after the Aceh tsunami.

Considering the conditions and the affect of the tsunami, the steps the

BRR took, as shown above, is understandable, especially during the early stages

of implementation where the local government’s consolidation after the tsunami,

especially in 2005-2007, is not yet well-arranged. However, after 2007, when the

election of the head of the area, especially the governor and vice-governor was

materialized and chosen directly with strong political legitimacy. The

consolidation of bureaucratic agencies has also functioned and deemed capable of

carrying out its duties and the construction. The BRR should have been able to

transfer part of its authority to the head of the Aceh government, both provincial

and regency.

The expectations towards the devolution of part of the BRR’s authority to

the local government without strong reasons, according to Ryaas Rasyid, is

evidence that as president and the one responsible towards the structure of the

BRR, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono does not have a good vision towards

provincial autonomy or special autonomy in Aceh. The implication towards the

choice of the BRR to nullify the transfer of authority to the province is the low

level of Aceh’s local stakeholder’s trust that the BRR could make a difference and

3 Wayne Parsons: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis, Jakarta: Kencana

Prenadamedia, 2005


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contribute to the relations of the central government with Aceh which is

increasingly improving.

METHOD

This research is using contructive approach with qualitative method

where it is using qualitative data. This research try to collect data from people

with direct interview and secondary data like appropriate document in order to fill

and complete this research. Thus, this research could give an explanation and

summary about central and local relation in managing disaster.

DISCUSSION

The Realization and Implementation of the BRR Program

According to Perpu Number 2 of 2005, the BRR is obligated to focus on

the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Aceh after the tsunami. However,

the priorities must have a scale depending on the demands and needs of the

victims and it should be manifested according to the results of the research which

leads to the four top priorities which are the sectors of education, healthcare,

housing, and infrastructure. These choices does not mean that the other aspects are

unimportant, but these four sectors are the most important ones.

The increasing pressure and volitions as well as different demands from

both the victims of the Tsunami and the Aceh stakeholder requires the BRR to

coordinate and communicate with all the parties so that the implementation of the

BRR’s priority program will function well. Therefore, the BRR must prioritize the

coordination with the local government because the local government understand

all the aspects related with the people of Aceh, both their culture and their needs.

This is crucial because the choices BRR makes should conform to these aspects.

Hence, the urgency of good coordination and communication between the BRR

and the local government lies on these importance.

The theoretical analysis is that conceptually, polices need to accentuate

how far all the policies that has been defined can be implemented consistently

based on the original panning. The implementation of the policies is hard because

it depends on the condition of the surroundings, externally and internally.

Theoretically, the challenges in the implementation of the policies will affect the

process of reaching the goal of the program.

Based on this view, the coordination factor with the local government is

important in explaining the implementation of the BRR’s policy concerning the

four sectors which consist of education, healthcare, housing, and infrastructure, as

a priority. The accentuation of the four priority programs of the BRR will give

the solution to the other issues that is faced by the victims, both long-term and

short-term. However, the outside sectors outside of the ones mentioned above is

also important.

The implementation of the priority program comes from the BRR’s

policies and authority uses the most budget. In the four priority sectors, other than

being the central of the BRR activity, it also became the focus of interest of


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various groups that participates and act in the reconstruction in Aceh post-

tsunami, such as governmental organizations and the people’s organizations, both

domestic and international.

To explain publically the results of the BRR’s works that points to the

priority sectors for rehabilitation and reconstruction is, as Kuntoro

Mangkusubroto (Head of the BRR) said, which is as many as 134.000 houses

were built, 3600km of new road, 12 air fields, 20 docks, 1500 schools, 39.000

teachers who have received training, 1000 healthcare facilities, 987 governmental

buildings, 195.000 small and medium-sized enterprises, and 70.000 acres of land

for farming is back on production. The program came to realization with the

financial support of approximately seventy-two trillion rupiahs from the budget

given by APBN as well as from domestic and international institutes and donor

countries. Therefore, the BRR’s success, as Kuntoro Mangkusubroto said, is not

because of itself but because of others as well.

However, it is hard to deny the fact that the BRR is not as accomplished as

we have seen or has not reached its goals. The end of the BRR in 2009 has

resulted in various issues due to the fact that the program which has been

categorized into four parts cannot be achieved by the BRR. In fact, the percentage

of failure is quite large, causing the program to be given to the The Aceh

Reconstruction Sustainability Agency (Badan Kesinambungan Rekonstruksi Aceh

/ BKRA) by using the remaining budget, which sums up to approximately 5,6

trillion Rupiah.

The failure of the BRR in doing its tasks are caused by two factors. First,

the BRR elites are overly dominant in the process of decision making and

determination of programs. The leaders of the BRR does not take into

consideration the local authorities in making the decisions and determining the

programs, although the local authorities hold formal offices within the BRR.

Furthermore, the BRR does not include public figures and local activists who is

familiar with Aceh in a more detailed level. ON the contrary, the BRR tends to

involve international institutes and foreign non-governmental organizations.

Second, the BRR is weak in its coordination with the local government. The BRR

prefers to run independently and only involves other parties in the field.

By not involving the local government and seeing the weak coordination

between BRR and the local government during the rehabilitation and

reconstruction program shows that the relations between the central government

and Aceh is weak. Aceh, in this context, can be taken as an example of how the

central government can dominate a region. Although Aceh appeared to be a

special region with its own special autonomy, it doesn’t have much power or

influence during the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the face of the

BRR which is the representation of the government.

This reality contradicts with the principles of decentralization and

regional autonomy that is formulated in the law of the local government as well as

the will to strengthen the relationship between the central government and the

local government. From the perspective of decentralization and regional

autonomy that is applied in Indonesia presently follows the money follows

function and no mandating without funding principles. However, in the


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rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Aceh, the relations between the

governments and sub-government tends to neglect the principles. The central

government is the main actor that dominates the regions with the BRR as the

representation of the ruler’s regime.

International Aid: Motivating, Importance and its Implications

The flow of foreign aid into post tsunami Aceh could not escape the

attention and provocation of the international as well as domestic news.

Furthermore, the catastrophe in Aceh could have replaced Africa as the top source

disaster related news. The tsunami in Aceh was the turning point of the world’s

attention to the occurrence of disaster in Asia, as said by Vanderbilt. If Africa was

previously the main focus of the world regarding disasters, then the 2004 tsunami

made Asia the main focus, replacing Africa in the process. This is caused by the

domination of the news in the international mass media canopy, namely ever since

the natural disaster that happened on the 26th of December until the beginning of

2005. The natural disaster was in the news for a considerable amount of time,

lasting more than any other natural disasters that have ever occurred. In average,

the tsunami is covered by various international televisions and is broadcasted 43,5

minutes every day for six weeks.

The global media’s tendency to strengthen is beneficial to the state

because then there will be volunteers and international aid. According to Van

Belle Douglas (2008)4, the Aceh tsunami is a disaster that manifested in three

forms which is the disaster, the extended media coverage, and the international aid

that flowed to the region. However, Van Belle denies the opinion that media

becomes a controlling factor that drove the motivation to provide post-tsunami

aid. Basically, Belle rejects media determination in the output in the policies of

foreign humanitarian assistance. According to Belle, the policies of international

aid is determined by three factors: humanitarian motivation, strategic motivation,

and capitalistic-economy motivation.

The presence of donors and international institutions in aiding Aceh post-

tsunami will strengthen the rise of global solidarity for Aceh. This appears to be a

global will that started from the assumption that the world’s civilization is one, so

if an entity experience gradation, then it will affect and threated the degradation of

the world’s civilization.

The explanation above is important for when it is relate to the motivation

of the presence of donor institutions, from both the state as well as from the non-

governmental organizations present in Aceh post-tsunami because of

humanitarian reasons, like Kuntoro Mangkusubroto said, if a state is experiencing

a disaster, especially a tsunami that has caused numerous casualties and destroyed

the public facilities, the primary action to take is to open up and welcome

volunteers. The state should not reject help from anyone as long as it is for

humanitarian reasons. The same thing is done in Aceh during the early post-

tsunami period and during the rehabilitation and construction period.

4 Van Belle, Douglas: Agenda Setting and Donor Responsiveness to Humanitarian Crisis and

Development Aid, Harvard World Bank Workshop, 29-31, May 2008


47

Several countries that came during the rehabilitation and reconstruction

period were Japan, Malaysia, Australia, Mexico, United States, Saudi Arabia,

Germany, United Kingdom, Korea, China, Holland, Italy and others. They came

to show their empathy and concern, as well as their aid. I see that everything is for

the good of Aceh post-tsunami, and that is my view as someone who has met all

the representative of the donor countries and international institutions during the

early post-tsunami period and during the rehabilitation and reconstruction in

Aceh.

To give faith towards the institutions that participates, Kuntoro flew to

Stockholm in Sweden to meet with all the states and international donor

institutions to discuss important matters, the agendas and comprehensive planning

of the BRR. Kuntoro ensures the donor countries and international institutions that

the state or the BRR guarantees that no unwanted event causing the lives of

people will happen while they are in Aceh when doing humanitarian activities

with the BRR. Kuntoro’s visit was done very discretely before performing the

task as the head of the BRR that is probably unknown to many parties, including

the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional / BIN).5

International communities and foreign institutions are more active and

involved than domestic institutions, which shows that nationalism has been

ignored and that there is there is dependence on international communities. In the

international aid theory that is expressed by Morgentau, where part of the

objectives of international aid policies, which are military, prestige, humanitarian,

economy, and subsistence has shown a significant effect.

According to Morgenthau (1962: 302-309)6, the vast majority of

international aid is identified to be political and economical in nature, and only

some is due to humanitarian foreign aid because things that are supposed to be

non-political can turn into something political when it is present in a political

setting. Therefore, the foreign aid motivation from donor countries, can only be

divided into two categories which are economical and political. In the post-

tsunami Aceh, this theory can be used to measure how far the aid from other

countries and donor institutions has political motivation to do a policy

intervention that could disturb the sovereignty and identity of the region.

In this context, the aspect of globalization is influential. Globalization

dismisses the limitations of countries. The issues faced by a country, such as the

Aceh tsunami can easily become a cross-country problem, and can even become a

global issue.

According to Tabb (2006: 31-32)7, it is not always easy to understand

that globalization is a political and debate process about how globalization is often

conveyed in a good and bad dichotomy.

Because of that, within the context of building or the rehabilitation and

the reconstruction of Aceh post-tsunami, BRR acts as a representation of the

5 Interview with Ahmad Human Hamid on December 27th 2014 in Banda Aceh 6 Morgenthau: “Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, The American Political Science Review L VI

1962, Pg. 302-309 7 William J. Tabb: Tabir Politik Globalisasi, translated by Uzair Fauzan and others, Yogyakarta:

Lafadi Pustaka, 2006, Pg. 31-32


48

nation in a dominant manner, but it is ironically unable to carry out tasks

concerning globalization. This matter then forces the national institution to be

present politically as BRR exposes itself towards global elements, including

various aids and grants along with international loans. If this subject were to be

placed within the context of the internal reconstruction of Aceh, then BRR, as it is

faced with local governments and stakeholders in Aceh, will truly perform and

reveal itself as a super body foundation in carrying out its authority and role,

despite its nature of being an ad hoc national institution to rehabilitate and

reconstruct Aceh post-tsunami. On the other hand, it will be distinctively different

if BRR were to face international institutions, primarily those that have the

commitment to participate in the process of rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh

with considerable funding.

Therefore, the power relations between BRR and the local governments

of Aceh often take place in a “hot and cold” atmosphere. It is then understandable

that it is uncommon for the local governments, of both provinces and regencies, to

protest the demeanor, manner, and performance of BRR. The leaders of this local

government repeatedly criticize the attitude of BRR to be “uncompromising” and

tending to be selfish, yet ironically, they are unable to do much concerning the

behaviors of BRR themselves.

There are at least two causes to this problem. First, these regional leaders

of Aceh heavily depend on BRR economically. Second, BRR facilitates the

resources, mainly the funds and manpower—two issues in which the local

governments in Aceh lack. These are the reasons that the power relations in Aceh

during its period of rehabilitation and reconstruction post-tsunami are dominated

by BRR. This explanation is deliberately brought up for it is crucial to compare

and contrast the behaviors of BRR with the local governments and domestic

powers on one side and on the other side, the international institutions and

external donors, along with NGOs.

However, it is evident that BRR is being publicized in how the institutions that

represent this country place the involvements and international aids as a variable

or factor that is essential in the processes of rehabilitation and construction. The

strength of the collaboration between BRR and the international institutions and

donors sets aside the role and potentials of domestic and local Aceh. Although

BRR does not violate this collaboration, it is assessed to be stagnant in supporting

the participation of domestic and local governments in Aceh.

CLOSING

The rehabilitation and reconstruction agency (BRR) of Aceh post-

tsunami, as an ad-hoc institution that represents the central government of Aceh

with a great and vast authority, to a certain level reveals its potentials and success

in rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh post-tsunami; yet in a more substantial

level, the targets and plans of BRR cannot be deemed entirely successful, not to

mention BRR’s passing down of the problems in Tanah Rencong that could

potentially be “time bombs” themselves. A number of policies and programs

designed by BRR in the fields of education, health, estates, settlements, and


49

infrastructure are yet to be completed entirely. Consequently, BRR did not truly

have a happy ending when its term in Aceh had ended in 2009.

In practice, BRR’s attempts of rehabilitation and reconstructions appears

as if it had been done by a dominant single actor, failing to include local

governments in deciding policies and arranging programs, also in the realization

of the mentioned policies and programs. Hence, it is reasonable that the local

governments and non-government organizations, along with the leaders of the

people of Aceh often criticizes the performance of BRR. BRR even fails to

coordinate with the local governments and other stakeholders. Although formally

a number of regional leaders (Governor/Regent/Mayor) gain significant roles in

the structure of the implementing agency of BRR, in the same time, BRR leans

towards the international institutions and donors along with the foreign NGOs.

Within the context of central-region relations, rehabilitation and

reconstruction programs tend to avoid the principles of territorial decentralization

and autonomy. The minimalism of the role given by the central government

necessitates the local governments to be present as but limited to a supporting

system in the program of rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh post-tsunami

when in fact, in the context of the relations between central and regions where

autonomous regions possess considerable authority in the process of rebuilding in

its area, it is mandated by the constitution of the local government.

Consequently, this matter leans towards the central-region relations

theory that the central government prioritizes the centralistic aspect of power, as

opposed to the effort to push and put into practice the principles of

decentralization and autonomy. In addition, the endeavors of the rehabilitation and

reconstruction has coincidentally become a political “blessing” itself for Presiden

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the field of politics and also an advantage for the

leaders of BRR to be able to gain significant political positions and offices in the

regime of SBY-Budiono in the election of 2009.

REFERENCE

Budiardjo, Miriam. The Foundations of Political Science, Jakarta: Gramedia

Pustaka Utama, 1966, Pg. 46

Parsons, Wayne J. An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis,

Jakarta: Kencana Prenadamedia, 2005

Van Belle, Douglas. Agenda Setting and Donor Responsiveness to Humanitarian

Crisis and Development Aid. Harvard World Bank Workshop, 29-31,

May 2008

Morgenthau. “Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, The American Political Science

Review L VI 1962, Pg. 302-309

Tabb, William J. Tabir Politik Globalisasi, translated by Uzair Fauzan and others,

Yogyakarta: Lafadi Pustaka, 2006, Pg. 31-32

Interview with Ahmad Human Hamid on December 27th 2014 in Banda Aceh

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Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2 …upm.pps.ipdn.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/3.-Sabil...political dimensions can be seen, such as the use of the reconstruction and