Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research ISSN NO: 0022-1945jicrjournal.com/gallery/77-jicr-january-1962.pdf · Smith, 2010). Further North Korean regime’s aggressive posture,

JAPAN-US SECURITY ALLIANCE: NORTH KOREAN FACTOR

Anupam Shukla

PhD Scholar

JNU, New Delhi

Abstract

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis is one of the most debated issues of the contemporary

world order. North Korea’s nuclear programme has raised security concerns world over,

following which North Korea has also been the target for several sanctions over the past one

decade and more. While the security concerns over the issue in global context seems

relevant, the immediate threat that lies for Japan is a matter of grave concern for the

Japanese. Historical evidence is a proof that the two nations i.e. Japan and Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), have not been in the best of terms since the Korean

occupation by the Japanese and the historical animosity between the two is yet to be

resolved. The Fragile relation between the two nation sustained after the defeat of Japan in

the Second World War, however, the nuclear programme generated by North Korea serves as

one of the key threats for the Japanese security in the contemporary era.

Japan is the only country in the world to have experienced the devastation caused by atomic

bombing and has since renounced the development of the nuclear weapon on the Japanese

soil. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has also factored in influencing Japan’s decision

on forgoing nuclear weapon as an option to ensure Japan’s national security. However, the

changing global political scenario which is witnessing the rise in China’s military activism

and the perpetual growth of North Korea’s nuclear programme has led several to believe that

Japan’s consideration of a nuclear weapons programme will be witnessed in the near future.

One must evoke the fact that, Japan is one of the most technologically advanced nations of

the world and prior to the infamous Fukushima Daiichi incident of 2011, Japan was the one

of the largest consumer of nuclear generated power in the world. This evidence brings in the

fact that Japan’s technological advancement is already at par with the nuclear weapons state

in the world, namely, the United States, France, United Kingdom, China and Russia and

should Japan choose to become a nuclear power it wouldn’t be a very big challenge for

Japan. This argument however, does not imply that Japan would not face the challenges by

other existing institutions such as the United Nations, United Nations Security Council etc.

Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research

Volume XII, Issue I, January/2020

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it simply means to bring in the fact the Japan is one of the most technologically developed

nation the world but it has consciously decided not to opt for nuclear weapons. However, the

stringent non-nuclear policy of Japan now, faces the immediate threat of China’s growing

militarism and North Korea’s nuclear programme.

The United States is one of the fore most players with regards to North Korea’s nuclear

regime. It has been vocal throughout the decade in condemning the Kim dynasty and their

authoritarian regime in North Korea. The United States is also Japan’s strongest ally and

Japan has consensually surrendered its security under the United States Security ‘Umbrella’.

The Korean peninsula crisis which has not witnessed any positive progress over decades now

has only factored in strengthening the Japan-US alliance. Japan is aware of its vulnerable

positioning in the matter and it would not be false to assume that Japan’s security (internal

and external) rests upon the Japan-US security alliance. The purpose behind choosing this

particular topic came with the interest in exploring North Korea’s nuclear programme and

also to analyse the impact it has served in the Japan-US relationship.

Introduction

Cold war has come to end in 1991 with the disintegration of USSR. However, politics of

North East Asia especially Korean crisis continued to feature cold war characteristics. Korean

peninsula, Japan - China relationship, crisis over Chinese dream of One-China keep op

propping up various crisis’s time and again. Continuing interference of United States in the

geo politics of North East Asia adds new dimension to these issues. US engagement in the

region despite the end of Cold war continued in the form of military alliances, arms supply,

political mediations etc. In this context role of USA and its close ally Japan is very critical in

addressing the security challenges of North East Asia.

Korean peninsula continued to be in the shadow of military conflict. Regional security

condition is continued to be influenced by unrelenting war between both Korea’s. One lakh

fifty thousand army belonging to both North Korea and South Korea are still facing each

other across the Demilitarized Zone reminding us of critical condition of the region . (Sheela

Smith, 2010). Further North Korean regime’s aggressive posture, continuous militarization

culminating in Nuclearization is a rising threat. US and Japan both consider this as a security

challenge of high proportion.



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Security and political alliance with South Korea is another factor drawing US attention.

Recent developments in Korean peninsula such as Change of leadership, Nuclearization,

Chinese nascent support to North Korean regime, Japanese antagonism to North Korean

armament all drew revived US – Japan attention. However major cause of concern to the

Japan and U.S. in specific is still the attitude of North Korea towards her security and her

continued reliance on nuclear weapons which provided a formidable foreign policy challenge

for Japan and US alliance.

Existing regional security structure underwent a radical change with the economic, political

and military rise of china and her growing animosity with United States. Chinese assertion

over North East Asia in matters of South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan widened the

gulf between China and US. US being the resident power in Asia Pacific is now facing stiff

competition from rising China.

China emerged as a great military power in the region by mobilizing huge army, progress in

air defense technology and naval strength. It also amassed huge nuclear arsenal and diverse

launch vehicles over a period of time. China began to pose serious security challenge for the

entire region over maritime territorial disputes with other littoral states of South China Sea

leading to the possibility of direct military conflict. Islands in the South China Sea Spratly

islands, Paracel islands were subjected to the claims and counter claims of China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China till date did not involve in any direct

confrontation or attack but it took various measures to assert her control over these islands

leading to complications. 1992 Territorial Waters Law proclaimed that the disputed islands

belonged to China historically and in 1995 China constructed structures on ‘Mischief Reef’

of Palawan islands which were claimed as their territory by Philippines.

Further, China is escalating her maritime disputes with Japan, Philippines, both being

traditional alleys of US. Japan China dispute over Senkaku island of East china Sea has

resulted into many crises. Japan being traditional ally of USA and USA being security

guarantee of Japan, Sino – Japan rivalry has become key issue for US foreign policy. In this

context 2016 defence white paper released by Japan upgraded Chinese threat to Japan from

“Concern” to “Strong Concern” essentially due to Chinese aggression over maritime disputes

and her aggression in air space. Revived US militarization in the area is driven by this

phenomenon.



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Taiwan is another key issue in the North East Asia where Japanese and US interests converge

conflicting with that of China. One China Policy i.e. integration of Taiwan with Mainland

China is still the cornerstone of Chinese Foreign Policy. In this context China is still upset

with the U.S. and Japan that though they derecognized Taiwan yet are still continuing

political and economic relations. China considers this as main obstruction in persuading

Taiwan to join mainland China.

Taiwan is very important not only to US but also to Japan because of its booming economy

and strategic location. Japan is on heavily dependent upon the fuel oil supplies from the

Middle East which provides more than three fourths of its oil demand. Oil imports of Japan

largely by means of oil tankers follow the lanes across Southeast Asia i.e. passing via the

Malacca Straits, the South China Sea, and finally through Taiwan Straits. Any conflict across

this maritimeroute would become a serious threat to Japanese economy. In this context

independence of Taiwan is strategically very crucial for Japan as if Taiwan joins mainland

China, Chinese assertion in the maritime region would become grave threat to Japanese sea

bourn trade. Japan is still considering that Taiwan independence would serve Japanese

interests in a better way.

Russia has always been an important player in this region and emerged as a grave security

threat during the cold war. However, after the end of Cold war Russian threat lost importance

to the Japan and other north East Asian nations. However, no peace treaty was signed

between Japan and Russia after the end of World War leaving them technically at war. Japan

Russia relations were cornered around the issue of Northern territories i.e. Kuril Islands.

During a bilateral summit meeting in Moscow on April 27 2017, Japanese Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to make concrete progress toward

deepening trust, resolving the issue of the disputed Northern Territories (also known as the

Kuril Islands), and concluding a peace treaty. (Mina Pollmann, 2017)

Japan - Russia relations made considerable headway in the recent decade where in efforts

were made to keep aside the controversial northern territories issue aside and to go ahead

with economic times. Japan and Russia recently agreed to survey the disputed Northern

Territories using public private cooperation so that they can focus on economic cooperation.

Japan and Russia have great potential for cooperation in the areas of aqua culture, urchin

farming and ecotourism.



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In fact, with respect to the issue of North Korean Nuclearization Japan is trying to become

less U.S.-centric by actively pursuing Russian cooperation. In the joint press conference after

the bilateral summit Japan and Russia gave a call for the international community not to

resort verbal threats which may instigate North Korean regime on the matter of nuclear

weapons and declared to work together towards denuclearization of Korean peninsula.

However, it is to be noted that Japan Russia relationship is always kept hostage on Russian

relations with US and her western allies. One crisis such as Russian annexation of Crimea or

the U.S. missile strike on Syria regime has the potential to derail Japan Russia relations. In

fact Japan Russia relations provide classic example for Japanese over -dependence on US for

her diplomacy.

3.2 Japan-Us Security Ties: a Background

Japan was peacefully occupied by US after the world war. Thus, US military presence in

Japan began. “The US military presence in Japan began at the end of World War II.

Okinawa’sproximity to potential hot spots determines its strategic importance in the security

and defense policy of Japan – US relationship.” (Lachowski, 2007; p: 39). Alliance of United

States with Japan began with the signing of the Treaty of Peace in the year 1951. It restored

full sovereignty of Japan over its land and territorial waters. It stated that Japan as a nation is

entitled for individual and collective self-defense. By this agreement Japan came from the

occupation of US and was allowed to enter into alliances and collective security treaties.

Japan signed such a treaty with the United States on the same day. “The essence of bilateral

relationship that developed between Japan and US in the aftermath of Word Was II was one

in which Japan relied on the US to underwrite its security while maintaining a low diplomatic

profile and concentrating on the reconstructing the Japanese economy” (Beeson,2007; p:74).

As Beeson analyzed security alliance with US provided Japan with opportunity to unleash an

economic miracle.

In 1954, Japan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with US, which facilitated

US supply of military equipment and technology to Japan. Japan began to develop military

strength with this support. ‘Defense Agency Establishment Law’ and the ‘Self-Defense

Forces Law’ enacted by Japan provided the legal base. All these developments finally led to

the establishment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces in order to protect Japan from external

aggression on land, air and water. US military supplies played the key role in the setup of

SDF.



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However, Japan Us alliance did not sail through without opposition. Japanese left parties

always opposed Japan’s military subordination to US and expressed fear becoming US

satellite state. Treaty faced major opposition in 1960 when it was attempted for renewal.

However growing security challenges in the North East Asia due to the rise of Communist

China, Korean conflict, Taiwan issue continued interdependence of Japan and US. Under

these circumstances Japan tried to revive the security treaty but began to demand explicit

commitment from the United States on various matters such as commitment to protect Japan

from any external threat, removal of provisions dealing with internal security, more proactive

consultations, and a definite date of termination for the treaty. US also began to demand

explicit Japanese commitment to participate proactively in the in the defense of the region,

Including Guam.

Finally, Japan and US concluded the ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ in 1960,

which largely confirmed to the position of Japan. The new document eliminated the passage

in the 1951 treaty (Introduction) that assigns the United States responsibility for Japan’s

defense; omitted a provision permitting the US military to assist in putting down internal

disturbances; and clarified the duration of the treaty. In so doing, it rectified the legal

inequalities built into the 1951 arrangements. (Nakashima, 2016). Japan achieved her goals in

the new treaty, while the United States again did not succeed to convince Japan to play larger

role in regional security.

3.2 (i) Reversion of Okinawa: Sea change in Japan - US partnership Vietnam War 1965 brought sea change in Japan US alliance in which US utilized Okinawa

bases for her war effort raising tensions in Japan. The Japanese government was also

concerned about domestic opposition to the war and international criticism of Japan’s role.

These developments led to a movement within Japan to remove inequalities of 1960 treaty

and also to take over control of Okinawa prefecture. On the other hand, US began to demand

concessions beyond the purview of 1960 treaty such as free usage of Okinawa bases and to

place nuclear weapons in the prefecture .US demand to place nuclear weapons in Okinawa

archipelago directly violated Japan’s nuclear policy. These issues brought back long pending

problems of Japan US alliance to the fore such as the issue of Self Esteem, National pride,

etc. Finally, US compromised with Japan on the matter of Okinawa islands understanding

popular opposition for its presence and agreed to return the islands in 1969 and were handed

over physically by 1972.US even withdrew her nuclear weapons from Okinawa bases.



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Initial perception of 1970’s that the U.S. would gradually withdrew from Asia owing to

humiliation in Vietnam but various political developments of Asia felicitated continuation of

US military presence. Political crisis in China during the last phase of Mao’s rule, border

conflict between China and Russia political crisis in Cambodia leading to Vietnam’s invasion

of Cambodia in 1978, helped US continued presence in the region.

By the beginning of seventies Japan US relationship underwent dramatic change especially

due to US accommodation of PRC against her established opposition to communist regime.

On the other hand, oil crisis of 1973 due to Yom Kippur War brought about economic crisis

in Japan which began to think beyond alliance with US. Japan gradually began to lose full

confidence on US security guarantee. Under these circumstances Japan took up to revise her

defense thinking and brought about a comprehensive ‘National Defence Program Outline’. It

was the first comprehensive defense plan prepared by Japan. Its main objective was to

strengthen defense potential of Japan beyond the purview of alliance with US. It also brought

new legal framework for military cooperation with US by bringing about “Guidelines for

Defense Cooperation” with the US by formulating the roles between the two forces. Japan

and US launched joint military exercises and began to improve interoperability. Japan’s SDF

(Self - Defence Forces) gained strength during these days.

Japan US defense relations were impacted by developments such as US Soviet relations,

Iran-Iraq war, growing tensions in East Asia leading to build up of US forces in area. Japan

strongly stood by US in all these issues and also focused on building her SDF. Japanese PM

Nasakone and US president Reagan maintained very good personal relationship as well.

However, tensions did not escalate into a major was especially due to the coming of Michal

Gorbachev as head of USSR. His accommodative policies and reforms led to the reduction of

tensions and smoothened US Soviet rivalry. Decline of communism in Europe, change in

world outlook on China and her economic relations with USA reduced the intensity of Cold

war. Despite these developments U.S. continued her military presence in the north East Asia.

“The Japanese Foreign minister Shintaro Abe on the occasion of Japan US alliance

celebrations in Washington emphasized the treaty role as a ‘framework for security, stability

and development in the Asia Pacific region”. (Charles Smith, 1990)



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End of cold war, shift in US defense policy, and removal USSR threat brought sea change in

Japanese defense thinking and her security partnership with US. On one hand while Japan

continued to support the US military presence in the region, on the other hand it faced

tensions with US on bilateral front. Under these circumstances Gulf war of 1991 lead to a

new debate over Japan’s defense policy.US did not take Japan into confidence before

declaring war over Iraq and neither did appreciate Japan’s assistance. Japan suffered heavily

due to post war oil shock. These developments brought a shift in foreign policy. Japan began

to think of playing an assertive and independent role at in international matters. In 1992

Japan adopted a bill by which Self Defense Forces can participate in UN peace keeping

operations. Japan also began to take independent stands on some important issues. Japan was

first lifted economic sanctions on china which were imposed by international community

after the Tiananmen Square incident before any other nation could do. “Though alliance with

U.S. continued to be the ‘cornerstone’ of Japan foreign policy yet Japan also tried to move

towards a more ‘UN centred’ foreign policy” (Lalima Verma,1993 P: 78)

Disintegration of USSR led to swift changes in the regions security architecture,

characterized by rising China alongside a rise of nuclear weapons in North Korea. North

Korean missile crisis of the mid-1990’s and withdrawal from NPT brought Japan and US

again closer. Tensions in the region were aggravated by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis where in

China tested her missiles over Taiwan straits. As a response U.S. sent two of her aircraft

carriers into the region.

In response to the burgeoning security instability, the alliance adopted the new U.S.-Japan

Defense Guidelines in September 1997 that expanded the allowance of Japan’s military

operations from its home islands to “surrounding areas” a move some perceived as Japan

taking greater responsibility for its own defense. “These crises reminded us in Washington

and Tokyo that we weren’t really quite out of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. The flash

points (in the 1990s) continued to challenge the alliance and its response.” (Beina Xu, 2014)

Early 2000‘shas provided much defined security threat for both Japan and US in the form of

assertive China and belligerent North Korea. On the other hand, US foreign policy during

Bush era alienated some of the allies there by US dependence on Japan increased.



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Japan deployed her troops in Iraq part of US led alliance. Same time Japan US joint

development of anti-missile defense systems started. These developments created an

assumption that Japan is gradually emerging as key and pivotal ally of the U.S. in the Asia

pacific.

Japan US defense partnership began under the influence of cold war politics due to the threat

of USSR continued under the influence of development of security challenges of north East

Asia. In the due course of time with the weaning away of communist bloc especially in late

80’s and 90’s, the alliance lacked motivation due to definite security threat. Rise of China in

post liberalization first threatened the economy of Japan. Chinese assertion in South China

Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan crisis created much needed impetus to Japan US security

alliance. However, rise of nuclear weapons in North Korea, withdrawal from NPT, ability to

develop launch vehicles provided direct existential threat to Japan. A view to hold nuclear

weapons also rose up in Japan political spectrum. In this context Japan US relationship in the

recent times largely focused around containing North Korea.

3.2 (ii) North Korean Nuclear Assertion and the move in Japan US Alliance:

Existential threat for Japan in the 21’st century surprisingly did not come from the rising

economic and military power of the region i.e. Peoples republic of china but from

economically crippled, politically isolated North Korea. North Korea under dynastic rule of

Kim II Sung adopted belligerent nature and carved her identity based on threat and fear

especially as it is surrounded by rising economic giants. Acquiring nuclear weapons was the

culmination of its militarism. Though North Korea joined NPT in 1985 yet it was not sincere in its commitment to peaceful

use of nuclear technology. From the day one itself it did not fully comply with IAEA

regulations. Meanwhile North Korea pursued missile development despite US sanctions and

international opposition. In 1993 it denied access to her nuclear waste lines for IAEA even

threatened to withdrew from NPT. However, this crisis was averted by Jimmy Carter’s

negotiations which resulted into the signing of an “Agreed Framework” with US.

US North Korean agreement had many positive elements. ’Agreed Framework’ stipulated

that North Korea will give up her nuclear activities and finally destroy her nuclear

installations. It meant that North Korea would dismantle one already existing and two under

construction facilities.



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North Korea would accede to ‘Special Inspections’ under IAEA regime also would remove

already spent fuel rods to another nation. In return, North Korea would receive two Light

Water Reactors and supply of fuel oil annually to supplement her energy demand. North

would also be benefited by full normalization relations with US. Agreed Framework called

for the beginning of trilateral talks involving Japan-US-North Korea to discuss North Korean

controversial missile development program.

Japan positively responded for US North Korea negotiations. In fact, they corresponded with

Japan’s negotiations with North Korea over normalization of ties, support for UN

membership, in fact took a great leap forward with Japanese apology over her colonial rule.

However, issue of compensation demanded by North Korea, issue of abductions above all

continuing missile program of North Korea remained major trouble spots. On these matters

Japan and US supported each other and maintained unity of thought.

However, the thaw was not very effective and proved temporary. North Korean efforts to

develop and even export missile technology posed grave security challenge for Japan and US.

In 1998 in order to counter North Korean medium range missile test, US dispatched her

reconnaissance air craft and ship to Japan. For the time being North Korea withdrew from the

test but continued her missile development programs which lead to launch of a ‘Taepo Dong-

1 missile (1,500-2,000 km range)’ that crossed over Japan’s native islands before falling onto

the sea. North Koreas aid it was an attempt to launch a satellite into orbit which was not

accepted by US experts. Japan also reacted by suspending her economic support for the LWR

development for some time period i.e. till November 1998. “The real reason for the North

Korean missile is its target, which is Japan, and the reason the target is Japan, is that the

American military bases are here.” (Toshiyuki Shikata, 1998). Same time intrusions into

Japan’s territorial waters by North Korean spy boats also aggravated the threat. Japan US

alliance responded by strengthening their ballistic missile defense systems.

9/11 attacks and consequent aggressive posture by USA brought about the collapse of the

thaw with North Korea. Relations underwent a drastic turn with the Bush’s axis of evil

speech where in North Korea was branded along with Iran and Iraq as threat to world peace

due to hoarding of WMD. He also criticized North Korea for spending too much money on

WMD development where in neglecting basic needs of people including food. Following the

news that U.S. nuclear posture review is thinking of using nuclear weapons against North

Korea, North Korea issued a counter threat of abrogating all agreements with US and also to

attack mainland US.



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Despite these rising tensions Japan tried to tame North Korea in the first ever Japan-North

Korea summit. North Korea agreed to extend its moratorium on missile tests, in place since

1999 in return to economic assistance, low-interest long-term loans from Japan. However,

tensions continued with North Korea exporting her missile technology, US imposing

sanctions and North Korea defying IAEA regulations. Finally, all these developments

culminated in North Korea unilaterally withdrawing from NPT by January 11 2003. Japanese

security policy and her dependence on US protection underwent a major transformation with

nuclear clouds surrounding Korean peninsula.

However, negotiations began in 2003 itself among North Korea, US and China. First time

North Korea reportedly admitted to possess nuclear weapons sending shock waves to

neighbouring nations especially Japan. Further these trilateral talks were enlarged to Six

Party Talks by including all important stake players i.e. Japan, South Korea and Russia. Six

Party talks gave temporary respite to tensions but did not yield any concrete results. North

Korea pursued her nuclear mission unrelenting alleging treat from US.

Japan’s dealing with North Korean nuclearization was a mix of internationalism and bilateral

activism. Before 1998 missile crisis Japan was not very much concerned about her being

side-lined on the North Korean matter, not being participant of Trilateral Coordination and

Oversight Group (TCOG) but there after began active interaction. However, Japan could not

completely focus on nuclearization alone due to her demands over abductions. Japan tried to

engage with other stake holders i.e. South Korea, Russia and China. Though Japan believed

in multilateral format such as TCOG yet it always stressed to deepen bilateral relationship

with, China, South Korea, and even Russia to “create a stable environment” to deal with

North Korea. (KNI 1999)

Tokyo’s belief in bilateral channels led to direct negotiations with to the Kim Jong-Il

government where ministerial meetings were conducted leading to summit level negotiations.

There emerged intense diplomatic activity between Japan and North Korea in the next four

years. North Korea took it in another way where it believed that these crises are helping her

diplomatically attracting the attention of Japan which became ready to discuss all the bilateral

issues.

Logical culmination of these negotiations was the visit of Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi to

North Korea in Sep 2002. This summit led to sea change in Japan–North Korea key problem

of adductions where Kim Jong IL admitted to these abductions.



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Koizumi also positively called for the end of international alienation of North Korea and gave

a call for multilateral dialogue involving all stakeholders of the region. Japanese bilateral and

multilateral initiatives to deal with North Korea outside the framework of association with

US were very unique and are an expression of Japan’s dissatisfaction with US side-lining

Japan on the matter. However, Japan’s repeated calls for multilateral negotiations to address

North Korean nuclearization did not find much impact over international community. It is

only after 2003 Bush administration started throwing weight against multilateral forum.

During the six-party talks, during 2003-2008, Japan participated actively but had its own

agenda and focus areas beyond the scope of six-part talks. Japans participation in the talks is

influenced by resolving the abductions issue and achieving de nuclearization of Korean

peninsula. However, owing to her domestic pressures Japan could not provide leadership to

negotiations in fact was diplomatically isolated. In a way it could not focus on the core and

long term strategic issue of de-nuclearization. Japan’s excessive focus on abductions issue

denied her the opportunity to lead six-party talks. Japan did not adhere to the collective

emergency energy assistance decided during “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the

Joint Statement.”

Policies of successive prime ministers of Japan played important role in Japanese role.

Koizumi adopted conciliatory approach by bilateral negotiations, first ever summit and

Pyongyang Declaration. On the other hand Abe Shinzo of his own party who was even part

of Koizumi’s cabinet began to use the issue of the abductees for his political ascent in fact he

made the issue of abductions his pet-project Shinzo Abe took over the reins of Japan as a

successor of Koizumi in September 2006, began to take up the issue with North Korea

demanding quick actions. Japan secured international support for abductions issue not only

from US but also from G8 and UNO. However later on international community began to criticize Japan’s over

insistence on abductions issue there by trying to hijack six-part talks which are intended to

deal with North Korean nuclearization.

Abe resigned in September 2007 owing to health issues and the power passed into the hands

of Prime Minister Fukuda. Fukuda believed in conciliatory approach towards North Korea

but his predecessor’s elevation of abductee issue in the Japanese public domain came in way

of his approach.



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He was forced to thread the relations in careful manner so as to satisfy Japanese public

aspirations. However, Fukuda was categorical is giving Nuclearization of North Korea more

important than the issue of abductions. Fukuda believed that the Six-Party Talks as an

important forum to discuss larger issues of regional security. However, on the side-lines of

multilateral negotiations he began to organize bilateral talks with North Korea. By June 2008

improvement came in Japan North Korea relations partly due to Fukuda’s initiatives and

partly due to US diplomacy where in North Korea agreed to reopen investigation into the

matter of abductees and Japan began to lift some economic sanctions. However, much

progress was not achieved due to failure on part of North Korea in adhering to the agreement.

However, Japan took proactive steps as a member of international community on the issue of

Nuclearization of North Korea. Japan was stubborn in acting against North Korea whenever it

did not fulfil her international obligations under United Nations framework. In this context

Japan worked very closely with United States, though it was not a permanent United Nations

Security Council member, “Japan was an active, driving force in proposing and negotiating

for the three Security Council resolutions (1695, 1718, and 1874) adopted with regard to

North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear tests, and Japan drafted Resolution 1695 and

cosponsored Resolution 1874. Japan worked especially closely with the US to push for a

reference to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that authorizes the use of force or economic

sanctions. Moreover, Japan was also quick to implement these sanctions, directly through

new domestic legislation, the North Korea Human Rights Law (June 2006) as well as

indirectly through laws such as the Law on Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (amended

March 2005). Japan also showed no hesitation in extending sanctions in April 2008 when

there had been no concrete results. Japan’s strong stance against North Korean missile and

nuclear development is a direct reflection of Japan’s awareness, in both the government and

public opinion, of its vulnerability in the face of such weapons “(Nicole M. Finnemann,

Sarah Howe, Abraham Kim and Florence Lowe-Lee, 2011). However, UN sanctions did not have much impact upon North Korea due to various issues.

Major problem was opposition from PRC and Russia, as owing to their concerns over US

policies in the region, they did not fully cooperate. Another issue was lack of uniform

compliance among member nations in cutting down aid to North Korea. Japan was

disappointed with this Luke warm approach of other nations and went ahead with her focus

on military alliance with US. Since 2008 Japan US alliance focus over anti-ballistic missile

technology increased greatly resulting in three successful anti-missile tests.



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Japan strengthened her SDF by incorporating a fleet of Aegis-capable destroyers, land-based

PAC-3 antimissile batteries, and by incorporating advanced X-band radar systems. In a way

Japan and US also began to follow the pressure tactics of North Korea where they began to

use their anti-missile technology to pressurize North Korea to give up her nuclear program

and to join negotiations.

Democratic Party of Japan dethroned LDP in 2009 in a dramatic election and brought an end

to long conservative rule. Initially, DPJ did not completely deviate from the earlier policy of

Japan towards North Korea and took strong view of the issues like Nuclearization and

abductions. However, as the time progressed DPJ bought in new ideas. It contemplated

‘Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone concept’ and proposed the same to both Koreas

along with US, Russia and China. DPJ believed if entire region is out of nuclear presence

North Korea won’t be needing nuclear weapons and also Japan would not consider them as

an option of security. DPJ rule marked a departure from earlier policy of dependence on US

for Asian diplomacy. DPJ leaders tried to build up East Asian community by improving

relations with China, South Korea and even Russia. However, none of these measures took

headway essentially due to political instability under DPJ rule.

3.2 (iii) Abe’s assertive foreign policy and drift in Japanese policy over North Korea

Shinzo Abe was famously called as “First Abduction Prime Minister “when he first took over

his first term. Abe’s hard line against North Korea gained the support of the Japanese public,

and when he became Prime Minister, Abe inevitably relied mostly on sanctions against North

Korea, leading to stalled progress on the abduction issue. He even launched a headquarters

for the abduction issue with an “Abduction affairs Minister”. North Korea’s reaction

remained relatively consistent throughout the first Abe administration, and toning down of its

confrontational rhetoric occurred only toward the end of the regime. Furthermore, under the

first Abe administration, North Korea claimed that the abduction issue had been “resolved”

with the repatriation of five abductees and their seven children back to Japan, as well as the repatriation of the purported remains of Megumi Yokotain accordance with the wishes of her

parents.

However, when Abe returned as Prime Minister five years later, he took on a different

approach toward North Korea marked by “Dialogue and Pressure”. Abe made his plan very

clear in his first general policy speech to the Japanese Diet. “Above all else is the resolution

of the abduction issue.



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My mission will not be finished until the day arrives that the families of all the abductees are

able to hold their relatives in their arms. Under a policy of ‘dialogue and pressure’ with North

Korea, I will do my utmost to achieve the three points of ensuring the safety and the

immediate return to Japan of all the abductees, obtaining a full accounting concerning the

abductions, and realizing the handover of the perpetrators of the abductions. I will

comprehensively resolve the issues of abduction as well as (Pyongyang’s) nuclear and

missile programs in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration. We want to fulfil our

responsibilities in cooperation with international society. If the issue is not resolved, pressure

must naturally be maintained.”(Abe Shinzo, Jan 2013)

By the time Abe came back to power North Korean problem got aggravated. North Korea

with her repeated nuclear and missile tests emerged as a grave threat for not only Japan but

also to South Korea and US. Six Party talks did not yield any concrete results. However, Abe

gave again abductions prime importance. He appointed Isao Iijima, his advisor as special

envoy and arranged his quick visit to North Korea in May 2013. It was a surprise for both US

and South Korea. This sudden visit of Abe created sensation in the diplomatic circles of both

US and South Korea as they believed that it would subvert their diplomacy over North Korea

to denuclearize it. However, Abe was able to convince that this was only related to the issue

of abductions and he is not going against international strategy on the nuclear matter.

3.2 (iv) Escalation dynamics under Kim Jong-Un

Parallel to Abe’s rise in Japan, North Korea underwent a political transformation by the end

of 2011 with King Jong-un coming to power in place of his deceased father. He adopted an

aggressive foreign policy where in every warning by international community was responded

with display of armed strength. North Korea aggressively pursued missile and nuclear

technology tests under the new regime. In Feb 2012 Kim Jong UN agreed to halt nuclear and

missile tests but in April 2012 he tested a long-range missile in the guise of satellite launch

which failed. However, in December 2012 North Korea successfully launched a satellite into

orbit which Japan and US considered as an attempt to test long range missile. Kim Jong-Un gave a grave threat to the peace of East Asia in 2013by conducting another

underground nuclear test. International community led by US severely criticized the act and

unleashed stringent sanctions to deter Kim to further pursue tests. However, this strategy did

not work. Kim Jong UN adopted a twin strategy on displaying military strength and

simultaneously calling US for negotiations.



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He wanted to cement himself as powerful leader not only in his nation but in the entire

region. In fact, in the first two years under Kim Jong-un, North Korea continued to test her

major weapons strength repeatedly in quick intervals. Even before the third nuclear test he

unleashed his missile tests in April and December 2012. Further he strongly objected to the

regular Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises of US and South Korea. In 2013 Kim Jong-Un

displayed his aggressive posture in response to yearly military exercises of US and South

Korea by declaring the armistice agreement which ended the 1950-53 war as “invalid”.

United States also responded by showcasing her potential by unleashing Long range nuclear

capable B-2 bombers over the region.

In 2013, response of North Korea against the Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises was

unexpected where North Korea closed down Kaesong Industrial Complex(a joint venture

with South Korea), and nuclear threats to Japan and US. North Korea responded in the same

manner to the 2014 Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises by launching many Soviet supplied

Scud missiles over Sea of Japan. The 102nd anniversary of Kim IL- Sung’s birth marked

another test of strength of North Korea which launched another version of Taepodong

missile. Again, the milestone passed without incident. Tensions reached such a level that

many believed that North Korea would violently react to the President Barak Obama’s trip to

Japan and South Korea (April2014). However, belying all expectations Kim did not respond.

3.2 (v) Response of Japan US alliance to the escalation of North Korean aggression

Japanese military and political alliance with US emerged in the aftermath of World War II.

Over a period of time it emerged as the most important pillar of U.S. military presence in

Asia.US forces use more than 80 military facilities is Japan housing around 50000 forces. In

1991 Japan US alliance underwent a dramatic shift with the disappearance of Soviet threat

and US rapprochement with PRC. 9/11 attacks on US and rise of terrorism as a global

security challenge rejuvenated US military ties with Japan where in some believed that Japan

will give up her pacifist posture. In the beginning of 21st century Japan US relations

underwent some turbulence due to various issues such as Bush administration reach out to

Nuclear North Korea, Japans delay in base location shift in Okinawa etc., Coming of Democratic Party of Japan to rule brought some policy changes. Japan attempted

to pursue Asia-centric foreign policy outside the purview of alliance with US and even

opposed relocation of the Futenma air base in Okinawa.



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However North East Asian security situation further degraded due to North Korean

aggression and Chinese maritime assertion there by again brought back the importance of

Japan US alliance. US ‘Pivot to Asia policy” attempting at rebalancing the Asia and Shinzo

Abe’s twin strategy of strengthening SDF along with forging much stronger alliance with US

reinvigorated Japan-US alliance. In fact, lack of strong political opposition back home,

encouragement by US facilitated Abe in pursuing his idea of strengthening Japanese armed

forces.

“Specifically, Abe has adjusted Japan’s interpretation of its constitution in a way to allow the

exercise of right to collective self-defense, passed a package of security legislation with a

legal framework for the new interpretation, modestly increased Japan’s defense budget,

relaxed Japan’s previous ban on arms exports, established a National Security Council to

facilitate quick decision making, passed a ‘State Secrets’ bill that allows for more intelligence

sharing with the United States, and tried to implement the Japan-US agreement to relocate a

controversial marine airbase in Okinawa.“ (Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, 2016:

17). Rising existential threats from North Korea, maritime disputes with China are the main

factors that facilitated this transformation.

3.2 (vi) Frame work of Japan-US security alliance:

The Japan-US alliance developed from the times of US occupation of Japan based on many

bilateral agreements beginning with 1960 Mutual Defense Treaty and the supplementary

1960 Status of Forces Agreement, which explains the position, roles, and responsibilities of

US forces in Japan. Later on Japan and U.S drafted detailed guidelines for their cooperation

referred to as “The Bilateral Mutual Defense Guidelines (MDG)”, in 1978 and which was

revised from time to time lastly in 2015 provided policy framework for the alliance:

“MDG outlines how the U.S. and Japanese militaries will interact in peacetime and in

war as the basic parameters for defense cooperation based on a division of labor.

Japan-US dialogue on the Roles, Missions, and Capabilities (RMC) of the two

militaries derives from the MDG and gives actual manifestation to the policy

guidelines” (Rinehart E Ian,2015).

Security Consultative Committee (SCC) formed at the level of cabinet ministers is very

important body for US Japan alliance and defense cooperation. “SCC is formed with the U.S.



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Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts, and thus known as the

‘2+2’, the SCC meets roughly annually and issues joint statements that reflect present

alliance concerns and provide concrete guidance for the near-term Cabinet-level Security

Consultative Committee(SCC). 2011 joint statement of SCC listed 24 common strategic

objectives, with focus on acute security challenge coming from North Korean

aggression.”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011).

SCC joint statement following the rise of Abe in 2013 is a landmark document in Japan US

alliance. It gave a framework for elevated U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. Through this

statement both nations declared to revise and reinvigorate the bilateral MDG in order to meet

the challenges coming from new threats especially from North Korea, and in accordance with

Japan’s defense reforms. US expressed her support for Japan’s idea of establishing ‘National

Security Council’ on the lines of its NSC and its idea to exercise the right of collective self-

defense. This statement also declared the intention to deploy most advanced U.S. military

systems to Japan in the near future.

As a continuation of these developments, Japan and US issued revised Bilateral Defence

Guidelines in June 2015 where in Japan US alliance was sought to strengthen by

development of defense technology, and by improving interoperability of the both nation’s

forces. These guidelines also accounted for the complex security threats of the 21st century

such as Nuclearization, Cyber Security etc. New defense guidelines addressed Japan US

cooperation on cyber security, the use of space for military defense, and the ballistic missile

defense system. These areas were newly introduced in the bilateral guidelines. “Bilateral

Defence Guidelines of 2013 expanded the scope of Japan US alliance into the defense of sea

lanes and, potential Japanese contributions to U.S. military operations outside East Asia. The

guidelines established a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), as the main

body for coordinating a bilateral response to contingencies.” (Tatsumi Yuki, 2015)

U.S. Army Japan (USJ) had setup ‘Camp Zama’ as headquarter of forward operations in the

year 2010at a distance of 25 km from Tokyo. It was designed to function as a ‘Bilateral joint

headquarters to provide command leadership for any contingency operations. In 2013 Japan

also corresponded to this move by moving the headquarters of “The Japanese Ground Self-

Defense Force (GSDF) Central Readiness Force” to Camp Zama. There by Camp Zama

emerged as location of both nations’ service headquarters which greatly enabled coordination

between Japanese and the U.S. militaries.



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These structural changes provided support for the joint training exercises and joint use of

facilities there by led to the improvement in the interoperability of the forces of both nations.

“The SDF conducted its first joint drill overseas in a large amphibious assault exercise with

the U.S. military in California in June 2013. Japan got access to new training facilities on

Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands as well” (Ashton Adam 2015)

3.2 (vii) Japan US alliance on maritime security The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MDSF) is a standout amongst the most

competent naval forces on the planet working intimately with its U.S. partners where just

about 100 joint activities are directed every year. MSDF and US naval force secures ocean

lines of correspondence and under new thought of aggregate self-preservation began ensuring

even unified vessels.

“MSDF assisted US in various operations such as: refuelling coalition vessels in the

Indian Ocean active in Operation Enduring Freedom and, at times, an Aegis

destroyer escort; the dispatch of several ships, helicopters, and transport aircraft to

assist in disaster relief after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami; participation

in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises; and the

deployment of MSDF vessels for anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia. The

MSDF has been engaged in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden since March

2009.Japanese vessels and P-3C patrol aircraft have escorted over 3,600 commercial

ships and conducted over 1,300 surveillance flights.” (Emma Chanlet Avery, Ian E.

Rinehart, 2016: 22). MSDF also setup her base in Djibouti where around 200 personnel were stationed. Rise of

MSDF coordination with US is extremely important in the wage of rising China and North

Korea especially in the maritime arena.

US aircraft carrier has been based at Yokosuka, Japan, near Tokyo since 1970’s, along with

the other ships that constitute its strike group. However, US is contemplating stationing of

second air craft carrier in the western pacific in association with Japan. However in recent

times this demand gained momentum owing to rising threat from China and North Korea.

‘Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)’report of 2015 advocated this

measure which was later supported by ‘Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’



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3.2 (viii) Japan US Alliance Ballistic Missile defense cooperation: North Korean Factor Japan - U.S efforts on developing ballistic missile defense (BMD) is one of the most

important aspects of bilateral security cooperation wherein they conducted joint research

projects as early as in 1980’s. However real breakthrough was achieved in 2003 when

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi decided to procure BMD systems for national

security especially from growing nuclear missile threat from North Korea. Under the

initiative of Koizumi, Japan purchased BMD technologies and interceptors from US

emerging as the ‘second-most potent BMD capability’ of the world.

“Japanese Self Defence Forces have 17 PAC-3 units deployed across the Japanese

archipelago and six vessels with Aegis air/missile defense software, four of which are

equipped with SM-3 Block IA interceptors. The U.S. military has also deployed PAC-3 units

at its bases in Japan and Aegis BMD-capable vessels in the surrounding seas. To complement

the array of advanced Japanese radars, the United States has two AN/TPY-2 X-band radars in

Japan” (Takashahi Sugio 2012). Japan–US BMD partnership acted as a key driver for

improvement of overall interoperability of forces of the both nations.

A Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report of June 2012 stated that “the

United States and Japan ‘have essentially created a joint command relationship from the

perspective of any possible adversary.’ Japan US have setup a Joint Operating Command

Centre at Yokota Air Base, located outside Tokyo which receives information from 28

nations to create a common operating picture. This information-sharing arrangement

improved the effectiveness of target identification, tracking, and interceptor cueing. In fact,

North Korea’s long-range missile launches in 2009 and 2012 provided opportunities for the

US and Japan to test their BMD systems in real-life circumstances” (David J. Berteau and

Michael J. Green 2012).



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Map of US military facilities in Japan

Source: US Congressional Research Service report no 17 on Japan US alliance



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3.2 (ix) Extended Deterrence of US to Japan

The developing worries in Tokyo about development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and

Chinese modernization of its nuclear stockpile in the 2000s incited restored consideration

regarding the U.S. strategy of ‘Extended Deterrence’, also known as the ‘Nuclear

umbrella.’(Brad Roberts, 2013). In 2010, Japan and US began a new wave of dialogue

referred to as‘ Extended Deterrence Dialogue’ there by recognizing that US credibility as

security guarantee of Japan depends upon the effectiveness of nuclear umbrella. Coming of

Abe and his renewed emphasis on defence strengthened Japanese association with US on the

matters of nuclear protection. Japan’s dependency over US nuclear protection can be

understood by its opposition to the US declaration that her nuclear weapons are only meant to

deter attack. Japan wanted US to adopt more assertive nuclear policy. Japan also focused on

development of BMD capabilities through which tried to gain protection from nuclear attack.

“The number of U.S. and Japanese BMD interceptors is judged to be sufficient for deterring

North Korea without affecting strategic stability with China. In the future, Japan even

developed potential to go for conventional strike capability with the intent to augment

extended deterrence” (Ariana Navarro Rowberry, 2014).

3.2 (x) U.S. Arms Sales to Japan: Rise after 2013 Japan is one of the main purchasers of U.S military equipment as it has lot of privileges in

this regard owing to her ‘NATO plus Five country’1 status. During the five-year timeframe of

2010-2014, ‘U.S. foreign military sales’ (FMS) of military weapons and other supplies to

Japan averaged around $1.19 billion per year. These military sales enabled SDF to hold US

military equipment more than any other ally of US. “Japanese companies domestically

produce some equipment under license, including sophisticated systems like the F-15 fighter

aircraft, and other equipment is purchased “off the shelf” from U.S. companies” (Gavan

Gray, 2013).

Beginning with 2013 Japan began to buy high profile military equipment of U.S such as“F-35

Joint Strike Fighters,RQ-4 “Global Hawk” unmanned aerial vehicles , V-22 “Osprey” tilt-

rotor aircraft, KC-46A “Pegasus” aerial refuelling tankers, E-2D “Hawkeye” airborne early

warning and control aircraft , upgrades for BMD-capable Aegis combat systems to Japanese

destroyers”. (Emma Chanlett Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, 2016: 24). Japan is also aspiring to 1 NATO Plus five Country status is accorded by US to her important ally beyond NATO members. It provides privileges in defense contracts with US department of defense, defense loan guarantees, participation in NATO military training exercises etc.



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purchase further BMD systems from US namely ‘Aegis Ashore and the Terminal High

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)’ system. Of late, the Japan and US started to focus on

stronger defence cooperation especially in the form of industry level cooperation and joint

research, development and production of security systems. Revised MDG of 2015 comprised

of part titled “‘Bilateral Enterprise,’ which describes the two allies’ intention to cooperate in

joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual

provision of components of common equipment and services.”

3.3 Changes in Japan’s defence policy: Security assertion under Abe: Shinzo Abe took over reins of Japan for the second time at an era of existential threat to

Japan arising from North Korea. He strengthened alliance with US in all aspects. He also

tried to increase the international standing of Japan by reinvigorating Japanese relationship

with emerging nations like Australia, India and many other south East Asian nations.

However, he was clear that Japan cannot completely rely upon other nations support for her

security forever especially with the rise of new security orders in East Asia. Thus, he took

various measures within the pacifist constitutional framework of Japan to elevate Japans

defence policies and systems. In fact, coming of Restoration Party in 2012 elections opened

up a domestic debate on Japan’s pacifism which largely endorsed Abe’s ideas. (Crystal Pryor

2012)

3.3 (i) Ideas of Collective Self Defence and Pro-Active Pacifism Maybe the most emblematically noteworthy security change of the Abe Administration has

been Japan's potential cooperation in aggregate self-protection i.e. ‘Collective Self Defence’.

During his first term itself, Prime Minister Abe displayed an intention to bring symmetry in

alliance with US where Japan is protected by US but Japan is not needed to help U.S. defence

from any state and not state actor. “According to the existing interpretation of Japan’s

constitution, Japan possessed the right of collective self-defence, which is the right to defend

another country that has been attacked by an aggressor; however exercising that right would

have violated the constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9”(Takao Sebata,2016). In the

beginning of the year 2013, Shinzo Abe established an ‘expert advisory panel’ on the matter

of collective self-defence within constitutional framework.



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Based on these efforts in July 2014, Abe Cabinet brought about a new interpretation of the

provisions of constitution, “under which collective self-defence would be constitutional as

long as it met certain conditions such as

when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with

Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to

fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness;

when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure

Japan’s survival and protect its people;

if Japan limits the use of force to the minimum extent necessary.” (Shunji Yanai et.al,

2014). The idea of ‘proactive pacifism’ came into prevalence. “‘Proactive Pacifism’ is understood as

expanded interaction under fewer restrictions with more nations’ armed forces in more far-

flung international conflicts” (Michael Hoffmann, 2015). These ideas led to the rise of

Japan’s standing among international community with Japan beginning to play bigger role on

international scene.

3.3 (ii) Revised National Defence Program Guidelines: Concept of Dynamic Defence

Force “National defence Program Guidelines (NDPG)’ which was first introduced in 1976 is a

comprehensive strategic document which covers every aspect of Japan’s military defence; it

reflected the Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War. Formulated against the backdrop of the détente of the 1970s, the 1976 NDPG were based on

awareness that (1) In general, a full-scale military clash between East and West would be unlikely to occur, and (2) In the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet

Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security alliance would continue to play a

substantial role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan.

In addition, with regard to Japan’s defence capabilities, the NDPG stipulated that it should

give considerations so that it can (1) Be furnished with the various functions required for defence (2) Be in a balanced posture in organization and deployment, including logistic support,



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(3) take adequate surveillance posture in peacetime, (4) Effectively cope with situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, and (5) Be capable of shifting smoothly to a new setup when an important change occurs in the

situation and a new posture is necessary with regard to defence capability.

The ‘Basic defence Force Concept’ introduced by the 1976 NDPG attached importance to

deterrence, emphasizing measures to prevent an invasion of Japan.” (Defense of Japan white

paper, 2014)

They were revised in 1995 and 2004 formalizing strategy for post-cold war era. However, in

short time it was again updated in year 2010 essentially considering the threat coming from

North Korean as main concern. North Korea repeatedly conducted nuclear tests during this

time both in 2006 and 2009. North Korean aggression went on to another level in 2010, when

it sunk South Korean naval ship ‘Cheonan’ and did shelling on the ‘Yeonpyeong Island’.

These actions posed a grave threat to both South Korean and Japan. In this background, Japan

brought out its new NDPG (2010) which highlighted the weapons of Mass destruction,

ballistic missile threat, expanding Special Forces, and the recent armed provocations of North

Korea as immediate and grave threat to region’s peace.

NDPG 2010 provided comprehensive strategy to deal with potential threats to Japan.

“National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 proposed a three-level posture that includes

Japan’s enhancement of defence capabilities, cooperation within the Japan – U.S. alliance

and multi-layered security cooperation with the international community. It is highlighted the

importance of building a symmetrical alliance with the United States. However, the NDPG

2010 states that the United States is a nation contributing the most to peace and stability in

the world, and that Japan will enhance its alliance with the United States for a stable regional

order” (Young-June Park, 2010). For the first time under NDPG 2010 Japan highlighted need

to enhance defence partnership with Australia and South Korea.

Evolution of Japanese Defence Capability



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Source: Defence of Japan White paper 2014

On Japan’s defence capability building NDPG 2010 to deal with rising threats it stated that

Japan is going to develop a ‘Dynamic Defense Force’ replacing ‘Basic Defense Force

(BDF)’, a basic idea of the earlier defence plans. “The BDF concept refers to a ‘minimum

level of defence capabilities’ in deterring threats in the region. Constructing a ‘Dynamic

Defense Force’ will deviate from old ideas of defence by calling for increased promptness,

mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and multi-force capabilities to secure a more practical

deterrence and effective response. It is understood that the idea of ‘dynamic defence’ largely

originated from ‘dynamic deterrence’”. (Adam P Liff, 2010) NDPG 2010 brought basic

changes to Japanese military posture. It called for reduction of personnel on ground forces,

number of tanks and increase in destroyer units and sub marines of maritime Self Defence

Forces with greater flexibility in area of operation. Under NDPG 2010 Japan focused on

modernization of her defence capabilities ‘Aegis destroyers’, useful in missile defence are

increased from 4 to 6, planned to acquire one more ‘Helicopter-Carrier’. Japan also sought to

strengthen her Air Self Defense Force, by bringing in new fleet of F-4 fighter jets, C-1

transport aircrafts, and to deploy new air force squadron to Okinawa prefecture.



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“These changes reflected the idea of ‘dynamic defence,’ a shift of focus from rigid ground

forces to a more flexible defence based on air and naval units. ‘Dynamic defence’ further

calls for the reinforcement of missile defence and special forces, and also called for the

development of a Joint Chiefs of Staff office that will collect information, improve command,

control, and integration of each branch of the Self Defense Forces for combined operations”

(Sebastian Maslow, Ra Mason, Paul O'Shea, 2016). It is highly notable that NDPG 2010

mostly focuses on threat originating from North Korean Nuclearization and acquisition off

ballistic missile technology with marginal reference to rise of China.

In 2014 Japan under new Abe administration again issued a new National Defense Program

Guidelines (NDPG) 2014 which first time brought about National Security Strategy (NSS)

document. It contains several key phrases such as ‘proactive contribution to peace’, ’Dynamic

Joint Defense Force,’ and ‘Seamless response to various situations including so-called grey

zone situations’.(Yamaguchi Noburu,2014). NDPG 2014 has initiated the process of setting

up ‘National Security Council’. “NSC would play the role of a control tower, while

maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned. It also talked

about development of a highly effective dynamic joint defence force with operational

cooperation among the air, naval, and ground force as core elements”( Defense of Japan

white paper, 2014).

The 2013 NDPG strengthened the pattern of changing the SDF towards greater versatility and

flexibility upholding to put more in amphibious capacities to safeguard its remote islands and

also in Ballistic Missile Defence to shield itself from missiles. “SDF would accelerate

reforms to become more joint, strengthen ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance), and develop more capabilities in the domains of outer space and cyber

space. The SDF continues to bolster its force posture in Japan’s southwest island chain,

notably with an additional ASDF air wing on the main island of Okinawa and a new radar

base on Yonaguni Island” (J. Berkshire Miller,2014).

3.3 (iii) Grey Zone Contingencies and “Alliance Coordination Mechanism”

Preparation for “Grey Zone” Contingencies has evolved in Japanese security strategy with

this new NDPG. Japanese establishment was increasingly becoming concerned about North

Korea or China that they could try to assert their claims over disputed territories by using

paramilitary forces, like Coast Guard of China, in order to take islets under their control.



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Grey Zone Contingency is meant to address this kind of situation i.e. “the use of force

between a state of war and a state of peace” (Louise Wiuff Moe, 2018). Idea of Grey Zone

Contingency gave renewed focus on Japan US alliance. A new mechanism called “Alliance

Coordination Mechanism (ACA)” was established through the new bilateral defence

guidelines. ACA provided the much-needed organizational support for Japan and US in order

to facilitate forces coordination without escalating any minor crisis into a full-scale war.

3.3 (iv) Rise of importance for amphibious warfare in Japan

Amphibious warfare i.e. ‘projecting military force from the sea onto land’ has become very

crucial for Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) over a period of time. Before the formulation

of NDPG 2010, potential to launch amphibious defence was not considered very important

for Japanese defence. However territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, disaster

relief challenge after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami brought to the fore the

importance of these capabilities. “Japan has therefore increased Ground Self Defence Forces

(GSDF) training exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps, as it begins to develop a Marine

Corps-like function within the GSDF. The GSDF is building a pan Amphibious Rapid

Deployment Brigade of 3,000 personnel to be the main response force for attacks on Japan’s

remote islands. The newest Maritime SDF flat-top destroyer ‘Izumo’ reportedly can carry up

to 14 helicopters, with 9 in operation at the same time. In the near future, the SDF is trying to

acquire amphibious assault vehicles, V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, and other air- and sea-lift

assets to boost mobile deployment capabilities” (Ayako Mie and Mizuho Aoki,2013). US

military assistance and training support are critical for Japan to develop these capabilities.

3.4 Increased Defence Spending under Abe: Rise in Defence Budget

One of the main constraints for Japan in order to strengthen her defence infrastructure is

finance. Japan’s military budget is limited to 1 percent of GDP there by crippling

administration. Japan under her pacifist constitution gave very less importance to defence

spending mostly depending upon US for her security. Japan in the cold war era was not much

focuses on military build-up where along with annual budget they started formulating

Defence Build-up Plans which provided clear cut task capabilities and targets for

procurement of defence equipment.



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In the first three defence build-up plans of 1958-60, 1962–66, and 1967–71 funding priorities

were merely to setup potential to counter limited aggression. However, economic difficulties

following the Oil Crisis of 1973 caused major problems in achieving the Fourth Defence

Build-up Plan (1972–76) and forced cut in funding. In 1976 the government suggested a

‘standard defence concept’ focusing on improvement of quality of the Japanese SDF more than the

quantity of SDF equipment. “Defence spending started to focus on achieving a basic level of

defence as set forth in the 1976 National Defence Program Outline. Thereafter, the

government gave up build-up plans which had open-ended nature and switched to reliance on

single fiscal year formulas that offered explicit, attainable goals” (Axe L Berkofsky,2012).

This tendency of low spending on defence continued in Japan even in post-cold war era.

However, Rise of China moreover Nuclearization of North Korea and rising threat to Japan

bought sea change in defence spending of Japan in 21’st century. (Rich, Motoko, 2017),

Japan’s Rise in military expenditure from 2008

Source: Tradingeconomics.com

Changes in Japan’s defence policy beginning with 2010 NDPG, where in defence fiancé

requirement went up drastically brought Japanese defence spending to the core. Beginning

with 2008 there was a steady improvement as represented in above figure. However, Shinzo

Abe in his second term removed a big obstruction of the tradition of spending only about 1

percent of GDP on security.



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“On March 3, 2017 Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced to the Diet, with little

accompanying fanfare, an official break with his predecessors’ policy of restricting defence

spending to 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This break is notable for a variety

of reasons and is a decisive step toward achieving the Liberal Democratic Party’s defence

revitalization goals. 1 percent policy (which is not law) was, next to the constitution itself,

one of the most tenacious obstacles restricting meaningful defence reform in Japan. Like the

glacial



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five-year Midterm defence Plan system Japan currently utilizes for defence spending, the

1percent restriction was an antiquated feature that needed to go”(John Wright,2017).. 1976 is

considered to be the beginning of one percent policy, which reflected Japanese intention to

reduce defence expenditures during Cold War. It greatly helped Japan’s peculiar condition in

that era. Japan during these times started to lean towards U.S. forward presence in Japan as a

main deterrent to the USSR thereby chose to abstain from expensive native armies and costly

nuclear weapons. Times have clearly changed by the turn of the 21st century. “Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Cabinet on 22 December 2017 approved Japan's biggest $46

billion defence budget to bolster ballistic missile defence capability amid escalating tensions

on the Korean Peninsula. Under the plan, Japan's 2018 defence budget rose 1.3 percent from

the current year. It was the sixth annual increase under Abe, who ended a decade of military

budget cuts after taking office in 2012. The defence spending is part of Japan's $860 billion

national budget for 2018, also the biggest. The Cabinet also approved an additional $208

million defence spending through March for next-generation missile interceptors — an initial

cost of advanced US missile combat systems Aegis Ashore and other equipment.” (Mari

Yamaguchi, 2017)

Japan consistently began to increase her military budget consistently five times with the

current annual increase. It is very crucial as the country's SDF are seeking to strengthen

fighting capabilities in the middle of arising Chinese military presence in the South China

Sea and an aggressive North Korean ballistic missile development program along with

nuclear weapons. It is planned to develop two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), first being

the’ surveillance-only device’, may become operational in 10 years. Another drone would

feature an unmanned fighter jet and will also be developed over the next ten years”. (Shirai

Ryoji,2014). A deep analysis of rising Japanese defence spending gives idea of its focus on

missile defence, amphibian war fare all endorsing the idea of “Dynamic Defence Force”.

(Sugio Takahashi,2012)

3.5 Recent Developments:

Under these turbulent times in North East Asia US witnessed the rise of new leadership with

new vigour and orientation. Coming of Donald Trump as president of US brought sea change

in the strategic environment of East Asia. As a candidate for President Election itself Trump

posed aggressive posture in foreign relations. He tended to give more important to the

interests of US than the interest of its allies. His policies after election largely conformed to

his poll time



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agenda. US long term security alliance with Japan underwent radical change due to his

policies. On the other hand, his aggressive posture towards North Korea and retaliatory

response from Kim Jong-Un further complicated the regional security environment.

North Korean aggressive posture, with the coming of new leadership continued in fact

aggravated by the end of Obama’s presidency which culminated in her fourth nuclear test in

September 2016. It shook the foundations of Japan and US alliance which believed it to be

the biggest ever by North Korea. More alarming was the announcement by North Korea that

it actually tested a nuclear war head. Japan's Prime



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Source: Forbes Statista

Minister Shinzo Abe declared that Japan cannot allow any such test and would ‘protest

adamantly’ to North Korea. "North Korea's nuclear development is becoming a grave threat

to Japan's safety and severely undermines the peace and safety of the region and the

international community," he said. (Shinzo Abe 2017) Japan US alliance responded by

unleashing a new wave of sanctions however without much impact over North Korean

belligerence.

Trump’s presidency began with much aggressive note where he heavily criticized earlier US

policies on North Korea and advocated much aggressive posture (Donald Trump, 2017). He

openly criticized Chinese failure to control North Korea. Moreover, he started public insult of

Kim Jong –UN as “little rocket man” and made crude threats on various occasions to attack

North Korea. He adopted the policy of “Maximum Leverage “on North Korea i.e. by

pressurizing to the maximum extent to give up nuclear weapons. However, it did not work

that way. (Beauchamp, Zack (2018)

North Korea responded with a series of aggressive moves beginning with ballistic missile test

in Feb 2017 towards Japan and even claimed that it was targeted towards US bases in Japan.

It was a first public announcement of North Korea directly challenging Japan’s alliance with

US. In fact, it came out at a time when Abe was in meeting with Trump. However, Japan and

US responded by installing missile defence systems in South Korea. However, these

measures did not deter North Korea which continued with missile tests. In May 2017, North

Korea unleashed another important weapon for her deterrence i.e. intermediate range missile,

‘Hwasong-12’, which according to North Korea was intended to carry a heavy nuclear

warhead and later test fired Pukguksong-2 declaring that it is ready for mass production and

operational deployment. (BBC News May 2017),

In July 2017 North Korea conducted its first ever ICBM (Hwasong-14) which was claimed to

have the capability of carrying nuclear war head. North Korean leader Kim Jong UN openly

stated his happiness over the success of the test that “United States would be displeased by

the North’s ‘package of gifts’ delivered on the U.S. on its Independence Day”. (Justin Mc

Curry,2017) These tests led to a war of words between Trump and Kim Jong - UN initiated

by Trump who said “further provocation against the U.S. will be met with ‘fire and fury like

the world has never seen’”.( Borger Julian, Mc Curry Justin,2017) Kim Jong-un responded by

threatening to lead North Korea’s missile test towards Guam. Trump further aggravated the

rhetoric on his ‘fire and fury’ warning, "Maybe that statement wasn't tough enough" and



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announced that if North Korea attacks Guam, ‘Things will happen to them like they never

thought possible’. Japan strongly criticized this display of arms by North Korea and strongly

supported US stance.

In September 2017, North Korea carried out its sixth and most powerful nuclear test till date,

claiming it was a hydrogen bomb designed for use on ICBMs. This was most powerful and

most successful nuclear test of North Korea till date. North Korea declared after thi s test that

it is now capable to striking anywhere in the US and all of Japan. Trump and Abe again

responded by tightening sanctions and stressing the importance of missile defence. However,

US tensions with North Korea started taking down turn in 2018 with proposed meeting

between Trump and Kim Jong-Un.

3.5 (i) Japan US alliance under Trump: issue of Defence Burden Sharing

Candidate Trump was very aggressive towards US alliance partners especially on the issue of

sharing defence burden and responsibilities. He was categorical that US alliance partners

should pay for the US forces stationed for their security. Japan was shocked when Candidate

Trump argued that Japan should pay 100 percent cost of stationing US forces in Japan. He

even suggested withdrawal of US forces from Japan if it is not adhered to. It appeared like

with coming of Trump Japan US alliance may weaken over this issue. However Defence

budget sharing did not escalate after Trump victory as a major issue partly due to rise in

Japanese defence budget in which large percentage is dedicated to Host Nation Support

(HNS) and mainly due to diplomatic initiatives of Shinzo Abe.

It is difficult to determine overall cost of US forces in Japan as various different definitions

and calculations are involved, but it is higher than what is paid by other US alliance partners,

including those in NATO. It is estimated that Japan pays around of 75 percent of cost against

30 to40 percent borne by ATO members. In financial year 2017, Japan spent more than 5

billion dollars from its Defence budget towards the cost of US forces in Japan. This was a

substantial contribution, making it cheaper to keep forces in Japan than in the US. The main

reason Japan has increased HNS over the years has to do wis her inability to contribute to

share US burden in other areas, such as contributing troops to US-led operations and other

more operation-oriented activities, due to its Peace Constitution. It has been argued that the

alliance has been based on exchange of cooperation between material and personnel in which

Japan making forward bases available and providing HNS, with the US providing troops. The

Trump administration appears content with the level of Japan’s burden-sharing within the

alliance.



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Secretary of Defence Jim Mattis said in a press conference with his Japanese counterpart in

Tokyo in February 2017 that “Japan has been a model of cost sharing, of burden sharing”,

and went on to argue that “we can point to our Japanese-American cost-sharing approach as

an example for other nations to follow”.

It was very important for Japan to strengthen her alliance with US in the wake of North

Korean aggressive missile and nuclear tests after the coming of Donald Trump. Shinzo Abe’s

proactive gestures greatly helped the alliance. Tokyo cannot afford to distance itself from the

United States in the midst of degrading security environment of North East Asia most

importantly in the wake of North Korean Nuclearization and ballistic-missile developments

and China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the East and South China Seas. Upon

returning from a series of meetings with Trump in February 2017, Abe argued in a Diet

debate that “only” the United States would help defend Japan and retaliate “in the event that

North Korea were to launch a ballistic missile” and “there is no other choice than to cultivate

a close relationship to Mr. Trump and display it to the world.” Abe sounded quite candid

about the matter.

Shinzo Abe tried to cultivate personal relationship with Trump despite his aggressive posture

even before his formal assumption of presidency. His visited Trump Tower in New York to

see the president-elect less than two weeks after his election victory though there was danger

of offending the sitting president

Thereby Abe became the first foreign leader to see Trump after the election, believing that it

would pay off. Following the meeting, a buoyant Abe declared Trump “a leader who can be

trusted” and stated that the meeting “gave me confidence that the two of us can build a

relationship of trust”.

The first official summit meeting between Abe and Trump of February 2017 went well

exceeding expectations. The fact that Trump referred to the issue of North Korea’s abduction

of Japanese citizens in his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in

September 2017 was also a testimony to the close personal bond between him and Abe as it

was pet issue of Shinzo Abe. It is remarkable to note that first act of aggression by North

Korea after coming of Trump happed parallel to his first official meeting with Abe.

In the wake of existential threat coming from North Korea, deterrence depends upon the

strength of Japan’s alliance with US. Japan was very clear under Abe administration that it

cannot allow Japan Us alliance to decline owing to small issues like defence burden sharing,

shifting of US bases etc. as it happened under DPJ rule. In fact, Shinzo Abe was not very



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comfortable on personal terms with Obama unlike most of the European allies. It is

interesting to know that Japanese leadership was always comfortable with republican

president unlike Europe’s liking for democrats. There is a notion that “Europe is blue and

Asia is Red” whereby Europe likes Democratic presidents and Asia Republican ones, seems

more or less true. Japans former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s relationship with the

Bush administration was often described as the best in Japan’s modern history. It seems that

Abe is trying to build the similar level of partnership with US.

Japan and United States have this way reacted to the growing instability in the region

surrounding the North Korea under the regime of Kim Jong-Un. “They have multiplied their

strength on readiness, counter-provocation plans, exercises, deployments and missile

defences. These are important and welcome steps. But at some point, the alliance needs to

understand that North Korea is capable of posing more asymmetrical threats than the alliance

can afford to counter with even 100 percent effectiveness. Instead of trying to counter each

specific threat, Tokyo and Washington need to balance deterrence by denial with deterrence

by punishment. Such an active defence strategy has should have some essential defence

components. The first would be an upgraded intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

(ISR) network, capable of early detection of ballistic missiles, as well as low-altitude cruise

missiles and UAVs” (Patrick M Cronin). Further Japan upgraded its MDS (Missile Defence

Systems) by deploying more efficient ‘point defence systems (PAC-III)’ and ‘wider-range

defences that include not only Standard Missiles on Aegis-equipped destroyers but also land-

based Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries’. Finally, Japan need to

develop an efficient offensive capability, with capability to launch pre-empting missile

attacks. Japan should not aim to actually launch pre-emptive attacks but should pose ‘the

threat of pre-emption’, which will actually force the North Korea to behave responsibly rather

than to threaten to turn Japan into a ‘sea of fire’.

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Documents

Journal of Interdisciplinary Cycle Research ISSN NO: 0022-1945jicrjournal.com/gallery/77-jicr-january-1962.pdf · Smith, 2010). Further North Korean regime’s aggressive posture,