Joseph Kahiga Kiruki, Moi University

Jason T. Eberl, IUPUI

Communalistic Predominant among African communities Confined to specific communities bounded by… Tribe Culture Race Gender Religion Class

Transcendentalist Predominant among Western traditions Individual personal identity transcends

aforementioned boundaries Persons have infinite moral value – literally, “without

boundaries” Persons as … Self-conscious Rational Autonomous

In the Gikuyu language, “human being” is expressed by the term “mundu” ‘Mu’ = being ‘undu’ = reason or rationality Hence, a human being is “a being with reason”

Aristotle: human beings are “rational animals”

From the African perspective, personhood may be diminished or lost in two ways: Lessening or loss of connection with other diverse beings

– Kiswahili: “Mtu duni” Being devoid of reason – Gikuyu: “kindu”

From the western perspective, personhood is an “all or nothing” affair… Hence, it cannot be diminished by lack of interrelations

with other beings or diminishment of rationality. Although, complete loss of reason may result in loss of

personhood.

Performance theorists, including Peter Singer, Michael Tooley, and Mary Anne Warren, argue that a human being is a “person” only if they actively instantiate capacities such as: Self-consciousness Rationality Autonomous volition Ability to communicate using language

Other theorists, such as John Finnis, John Kavanaugh, Patrick Lee, and Eric Olson, argue that a human being is essentially a “living animal of the species Homo sapiens.” For Kavanaugh, Lee, and Finnis, all living human animals

count as “persons” due to their intrinsic potentiality for self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition, even if one cannot yet, or can no longer, actualize that potentiality.

For Olson, personhood is a phase of a living human animal’s existence. You and I are essentially living human animals, but not essentially persons.

From both African and western perspectives, human consciousness arguably transcends the limitations of matter. From the African perspective, consciousness attains

transcendence through human communion. Self-consciousness is achieved through recognition

within a specific community Lack of recognition of “others” results in discrimination

and diminishment of personhood

From the western perspective, consciousness is argued to be an inherently transcendent property of persons.

Jackson’s “knowledge argument” Chalmers’s “zombie argument” – property dualism Swinburne’s “disembodiment argument” – substance dualism

Aquinas: The intrinsic ontological nature of a person as a

self-conscious rational and autonomous being metaphysically precedes the expression of this nature in extrinsic relationships.

This leads to the moral obligation to recognize the presence

of consciousness, and other essential qualities of persons, in all human beings, including those outside of one’s specific community.

African communalistic concept of personhood: “I am, because we are, and since we are, therefore I am.” An individual person does not and cannot exist

alone, only corporately. An individual’s existence is owed to past

generations, as well as contemporaries. Self-communication is essential to an individual

person’s existence as they are involved in a dynamic give-and-take relationship with their community.

Western solipsistic concept of personhood: “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes) An individual person’s existence as a self-conscious

rational and autonomous being is not essentially dependent upon there being any other persons.

Yet, according to Aristotle, human beings are inherent “social animals.” There is an inherently relational dimension to human

personhood, as noted also by Aquinas, even if one’s bare existence is not dependent on that of others.

Alasdair MacIntyre: Human beings are “dependent rational animals,” which entails complementary virtues of “acknowledged dependence” and “acknowledged responsibility.”

Hence, there can be both an ‘I’ that is metaphysically unique, and a ‘Thou’ to whom the ‘I’ naturally gravitates.

Distinction between “ontological” and “moral” concepts of personhood: Person as “being” Person as “agent”

Persons as agents, premised upon their basic existence as self-conscious and rational beings, actualize their capacity for autonomous volition – freedom. This entails moral responsibility for one’s freely willed actions. The “moral self” is shaped over time by one’s freely willed

interior and exterior actions. The ultimate goal of the “moral self” is to enter into meaningful

and quality relationships with the “other” in community.

To be is to be “substance-in-relation.” Invokes the metaphysically prior bare existence of an

“individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius) influential in western ontology,

as well as the inherently communal dimension of personhood common to African ontology.

Self-realization beyond bare existence requires mutual

recognition within an interconnected web of ‘I-Thou’ relationships (Buber).

Such self-realization allows for the construction of a

person’s authentic “moral self” (Taylor) and the exercise of true “freedom” within, and not in isolation from, one’s community.

Buber, Martin (1970), I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann. Simon & Schuster. Chalmers, David J. (1996), The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. Clarke, W. Norris (2008), Person and Being: The Aquinas lecture, 1993. Marquette

University Press. Eberl, Jason T. (2004), “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings” Review of Metaphysics,

Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 333-65. Eberl, Jason T. (2006), Thomistic Principles and Bioethics. Routledge. Eberl, Jason T. (2013), “Persons with Potential” in Potentiality: Metaphysical and Bioethical

Dimensions, ed. John P. Lizza. Johns Hopkins University Press. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (1997), Insights Into African Philosophy. Gicama Insight Publications. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2010), “Education for Transformation” AFER – Reconciliation Through

Justice and Peace-3, Vol. 51, No. 4 & Vol. 52, No. 1, Gaba Publications, pp. 484-92. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2011), “The Challenges of Political Authority and Governance in

Africa” in Thoughts in the Humanities, ed. R. A. Akanmidu, Keffi, pp. 137-63. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2011), “Philosophical Fundamentals for Sustainable Development in

Kenya” Current Research Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 28-33. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2012), “Liberation of The African Mind” in Africa is not Destined to Die,

ed. Ambrose John Bwangatto, Pauline Publications Africa, pp. 75-87. Kahiga, J. Kiruki (2012), “Making a Difference to Patients: Perspectives of Health Care

Ethics” Current Research Journal of Social Sciences Vol, 4, No. 2, pp. 93-8. Kavanaugh, John F. (2001), Who Count as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing.

Georgetown University Press.

Kenyatta, Jomo (2004), Facing Mount Kenya. Kenway Publications. Kirkpatrick, G. Frank (1986), Community: A Trinity of Models. Georgetown University

Press. Lee, Patrick and Robert P. George (2008), Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and

Politics. Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1999), Dependent Rational Animals. Open Court Press. Mbiti, S. John (1969), African Religions & Philosophy. East African Educational Publishers. Olson, Eric T. (1997), The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford

University Press. Singer, Peter (1994), Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. St.

Martin’s Griffin. Swinburne, Richard (1997), The Evolution of the Souls, rev. ed. Oxford University Press. Taylor, Charles (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity. Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles (1989), The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Harvard

University Press. Tempels, Placide (1969), Bantu Philosophy. Presence Africaine. Tooley, Michael (1983), Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford University Press. Warren, Mary Anne (1997), Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things.

Oxford University Press.

What implications do you see of these differing views of personhood for the ethical conduct of research, particularly when western researchers are working within the African context?

How might the African concept of personhood inform the manner in which, e.g., informed consent is obtained from potential research participants, or attendant risks and benefits are evaluated?

Is there a danger that a communal concept of personhood may lead to the sublimation of individual rights in favor of the community’s interests? If so, how could this danger be avoided in the research context?

Does a communal concept of personhood entail ethical obligations on the part of individuals to voluntarily agree to participate in research that may benefit their community, even if doing so involves some individual risk?

To what extent should researchers attempt to embed themselves within the communities in which they are conducting research to ameliorate their being perceived as “other” or potentially viewing research participants as such?