Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal to Francisco vs House of Representatives Digest

7/27/2019 Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal to Francisco vs House of Representatives Digest

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Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto

on September 3, 2011

De Jure vs De Facto President

Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems

that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October

4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his

family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately

ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared

inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that

General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,

respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his

fall from the pedestal of power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases

previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his

leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged

the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about

its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sakeof peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving

the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as

soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the

opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him

to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge

that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future

challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on

his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if

he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of

farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign,

still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely

unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision



that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government

cannot be reviewed by this Court.

DE LEON vs ESGUERRA Case Digest

ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA

G.R. NO. 78059

AUGUST 31, 1987

FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay

Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by

Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners.

On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1,

1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the

Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution.

The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP

Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and

shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7,

1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC

Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials

were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision:

“All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue

in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation

or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a

period of one year from February 25, 1986.”

... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the

Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be

deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the

Provisional Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized? Whether

or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actualplebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement?

HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has

been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.

Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace

petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977,



should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which

it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline,

the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been

overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:

"Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,

the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become

inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to

designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the

clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of

ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that

"the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was

done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of

facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in

adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

Therefor, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of the

voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution.

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC Case Digest

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-44640

OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public

respondent Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits

of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the

COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on

the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;



3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners

and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the

purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's

Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize peoplepower; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the

power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article

XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings

under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution

No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of

municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories;

that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the

time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the

COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is

likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be

affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and

supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and

7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution.

Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10

embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited

sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and

after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the

country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander

Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the

following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be

implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill

No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's

Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before

the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.



(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the

Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on

initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically

provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of

people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator

Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before theSenate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as

implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have

been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media.

This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the

latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of

initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra

vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC

has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend

the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing

law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.

Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of

the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC

nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum

and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments

to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations

Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on

National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitutionis valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such

initiative.

HELD:

Issue 1 – Whether R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to c over the people’s initiative to propose

amendments?



R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM. Curiously,

while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the

implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving

them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative onamendments to the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in

essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is

concerned.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to

promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5

above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the

delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein

the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard

— the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate

must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines

legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to

apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735

miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the

power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

Issue 2 – Validity of Comelec Resolution 2300

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations toimplement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.

Reliance on the COMELEC's power is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein

are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,

or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness"

and the "sufficient standard" tests.

TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001

(“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No.

01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005

proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while

Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in



Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines,

the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill thevacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May

14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The

resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of

votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which

ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates

as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and

the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio

Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant

petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend

that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the

electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA

6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy

whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under

Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet

the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly

required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of

these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14

May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate electionsheld simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino

and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their

petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to

Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the

instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally

disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of

Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and

(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.



Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers

some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the

statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so willrender the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice

of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number

of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a

substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill

vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted

the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to

document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special

election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of

R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others,

the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May

14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84.

Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no

mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled.

However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the

resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th

highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto

Giongona, Jr.”

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared

the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that,

with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he

was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for

Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing

nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to

the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator

Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was

in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected

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Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally

recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad

filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully

holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to

them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition

(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of a case is determined by

the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to

the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has

jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire

whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely

abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the

Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The

term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means

the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution

mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than

one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for

him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No

law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become

the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a SenatePresident and a House

Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both

chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House

shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will



be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the

said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,

not by the Court.

Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:

The HR on its 12th

Congress adopted a different rule on impeachment from that of the

11th

Congress. On June 22, 2002, the HR adopted a resolution to investigate the disbursement

of funds of the JDF under Hilario Davide. In June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution,

betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice ruled that

the impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"but voted to dismiss the same on October

22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. A day after dismissing the first impeachment

complaint, a 2nd

complaint was filed against Davide based on the investigation of fund

disbursement of JDF under Davide. Petitions were filed to declare the 2nd

impeachment

unconstitutional for it violates the provision that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated

twice against the same official. Petitions also claim that the legislative inquiry into the

administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional doctrine of

separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy

of the judiciary. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene

and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of

the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,

authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide

impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized

and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." In summary, petitionersplea for the SC to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second

impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:

WON judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings

HELD:

Power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable. Judicial review is indeed an integral component

of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of

separation of powers, forms the bedrock of republican form of government and insures that its

vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Separation of

powers is not absolute. The SC is the final arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the

executive is in violation of the Constitution. Moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly

stated in the Constitution.



*2nd

Impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is unconstitutional.

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Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal to Francisco vs House of Representatives Digest