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Running head: Analysis of the Jones Act 1
The Jones Act:
An Analysis of It’s History and Effects on the American Maritime Industry
Luke Minicucci
Old Dominion University
Analysis of the Jones Act
Abstract
This paper explores multiple published articles and reports on the history of the Jones Act, the
U.S.-flag fleet, and corresponding economic impacts. The historical discussion involves the act’s
conceptual origins, associated reforms and major events driving reformation from the start of the
twentieth century through 2014. Observations throughout the analysis incorporate shipping
industry market share analysis in relation to cost comparisons of U.S. and foreign-flag vessels.
Referenced sources will also include data on the economic impacts of the Jones Act, implications
of the U.S.-flag fleet, and governmental intervention throughout. Notable sources include the
United States Maritime Commission (MARAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
Transportation Institute, and the Capital Research Center among others.
2
Analysis of the Jones Act
The Jones Act:
An Analysis of it’s History and Effects on the American Maritime Industry
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly known as the Jones Act, is a United
States federal legislation that was created with the intention of strengthening national defense
and fostering the growth of foreign and domestic trade. The Jones Act states that any vessel
transporting cargo between U.S. ports must be built, repaired, overhauled, and registered in the
U.S., and must be owned and operated predominantly by U.S. citizens. Nearly a century later,
this statute has become a highly debated topic involving national security, economic vitality,
special interests, the future of the U.S.-flag, and the future of the American shipping industry.
Background and Revisions
Conceptual Origins
The United States’ principle that a strong naval fleet is a critical component of national
defense can be traced back to an 1890’s literature authored by former president of the Naval War
College, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. This writing, titled The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History 1660-1783, assessed the importance of having a powerful navy in the rise of the British
Empire. Mahan contended that with the combination of weak navies surrounding Great Britain
along with having their own strong navy, they were able to become a premier world power.
“Whoever rules the waves rules the world,” Mahan wrote. He has been called “the most
important American strategist of the 19th century,” and is often credited for shaping the current
naval strategies of the United States.
World War I (1914-1918). Nearly two decades after it’s publishing, Mahan’s teachings
became relevant during the First World War. The U.S. entered the war controlling less than 9%
of the total U.S. foreign maritime trade, and owned only 4% of the world’s steamships
3
Analysis of the Jones Act
(Transportation Institute, 2010). It was a nation critically dependent on the availability of foreign
vessels, and at the start of World War I, vessels were all but available. Freight rates had
increased up to 1000% and vessel operators were buying ships for nearly five times their cost
before the war (Riordan, 1954). The government was forced to step in. Legislation was passed
allowing American owners of foreign-flagged ships to register them in the United States.
Congress also approved the Shipping Act of 1916. This act created the U.S. Shipping Board,
which authorized spending of over $3 billion into emergency shipbuilding programs
(Transportation Institute, 2010).
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920
The actions of the U.S. government during WWI were a success. By 1920, roughly 52%
of American maritime commerce was carried on U.S. ships (Transportation Institute, 2010). The
nation now looked to institute a policy that would sustain the success of the U.S.-flag during
peacetime in the global market. In addition, the U.S. sought to prevent desperate shipbuilding
measures in the future times of war or national emergency, and establish itself as the world’s
premier naval power. The result was the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 1 of this act,
Purpose and Policy, states:
“It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its
commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national
emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United
States; and it is declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be
necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and, in
4
Analysis of the Jones Act
so far as may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation shall, in the disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereinafter
provided, in the making of rules and regulations, and in the administration of the
shipping laws keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be
attained.” (United States Government Publishing Office)
This Act authorizes government funding for construction of the U.S.-flag in order to
improve both the U.S. shipping industry and national defense, largely through indirect
subsidization. The most notable portion of this legislation appears in Section 27. This section
refers to the regulation of cabotage, or the movement of cargo between two domestic ports. In
accordance with Section 27, a vessel transporting cargo between two U.S. ports must be built,
documented, and maintained in the U.S., owned by a U.S. citizen, and operated by a crew of at
least 75% U.S. citizens (MARAD, 2013). These vessels receive subsidies from the U.S., and in
return the U.S. will have access to these vessels during times of war or national emergencies,
while also preserving shipbuilding tactics and technologies within the nation. In addition to
preserving national defense, requiring all U.S.-flagged vessels be built in the U.S. would also, in
theory, stimulate and maintain shipbuilding jobs in the U.S.
Mandating that the majority of foreign trade be transported by U.S. vessels and manned
by U.S. crews raised initial concerns. United States mariners demanded higher wages and the
U.S. requires more regulation than most foreign countries. Thus, U.S.-flag ships have higher
operating costs than other developing foreign countries who have crews that work for a fraction
of the cost, and do not require nearly as many regulations or tariffs. The U.S.-flag could not
compete with its foreign counterparts on the free market, so the size and performance of the
merchant marine began to decline.
5
Analysis of the Jones Act
The Jones Act also authorized the American government to divest in the extreme surplus
of ships left after the war, and help fund the construction of newer vessels. While the Shipping
Act of 1916 aided American victory, an estimated one-third of the ships built by the program
were not begun until after the Treaty of Versailles and the war’s end (Transportation Institute,
2010). Consequentially, the U.S. was left with a large supply and no corresponding demand, a
problem that is inherent to the shipping industry. To fix this issue, the Jones Act allowed the U.S.
to sell off the large fleet to U.S. vessel operators, and use the funds gained from selling the older
vessels to award construction contracts of newer and more modern vessels.
The immediate result of selling off the old fleet proved to be all but beneficial to
America. The U.S. was not the only country with a surplus of ships; the shipping boom brought
by the war was on a global scale. European and Asian countries were also left with thousands of
vessels that were no longer needed. As a result, ships were being sold for just a fraction of what
was paid to build them just a few years earlier. There were vessels that the U.S. paid as much as
$400 per ton for, and sold for $14 per ton just a few years later (Transportation Institute, 2010).
The ships that were not sold were burned for their steel and scrapped for parts.
Furthermore, the cost of building ships in the United States was considerably higher than
doing so in foreign countries. The U.S. had higher wages, higher steel prices, as well as higher
costs of other shipbuilding materials. The subsidies offered by the American government were
not enough for shipping firms to want to build vessels. Combine that with the incredibly cheap
prices that the U.S. government was offering for vessels, and there was no longer incentive to
build ships in America. In fact, between 1922 and 1928, not a single ocean-going vessel was
built in American shipyards (Riordan, 1954).
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928
6
Analysis of the Jones Act
In an effort to stimulate the shipbuilding industry, Congress passed the Merchant Marine
Act of 1928. This legislation authorized an expansion in the construction loan budget and
reduced interest rates on construction loans. The Act served its purpose as new ships started to be
built, and many old ones were restored. Though similar to the 1920 Act, its insufficiencies were
uncovered over time, and were magnified by the effects of the Great Depression. Its flaws are
observed in a report published in 1950 by the U.S. Government Printing Office discussing five
issues:
“First, the compensation granted to American lines was not based upon actual condition
encountered on the particular route served, so that some lines got more than they needed, while
others competing with subsidized foreign companies were given too little aid.
Second, the ship replacement provisions were somewhat too laxly enforced.
Third, loans for ship-building were made at varying rates, so that lucky lines got money
at almost nominal interest charges, while others paid several times as much, creating an element
of unfairness. This, however, was not due to favoritism, but to legal interpretation of carelessly
worded section of the Act….
Fourth there was inadequate supervision over the use to which subsidy money was put by
liners, officers or one or two companies paying themselves huge bonuses and dividends when
their companies were almost going bankrupt.
Fifth, there was a complaint that, in violation of law, contracts were so worded that
public bidding was frustrated and only a predetermined line could comply.” (United States
Government Printing Office) (Riordan, 1954)
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936
7
Analysis of the Jones Act
The performance of the United States Merchant Marine continued to decline and the
nation sought further change. The next revision came in form of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. This bill replaced the U.S. Shipping Board with the U.S. Maritime Commission. It also
authorized both direct and indirect federal subsidies with the use of Operational Differential
Subsidies (ODS) and Constructional Differential Subsidies (CDS). These programs would
provide contracts to domestic operators and shipbuilders in order to bridge the growing gap
between U.S. and foreign prices. This was a more direct way for the federal government to
subsidize the industry and close the gap between foreign and domestic costs.
Despite this effort, the U.S. fleet continued to shrink. When the Jones Act was established
in 1920, registered vessels carried roughly 16 million tons and 52% of America’s seaborne trade.
By beginning of 1939, the carrying capacity shrunk to 12 million tons and accounted for 22% of
the nation’s commerce (Transportation Institute, 2010).
World War II (1939-1945). When the United States entered World War II, the demand
for ships skyrocketed once again. Similar to the World War I, heroic shipbuilding efforts were a
necessity for American survival. The U.S. shipbuilding industry reached its peak in 1944 when it
produced 19.3 million gross tons of shipping capacity, representing well over 90% of the world’s
shipbuilding market share (Stopford, 2009). When the war ended in 1945, there were over 5,500
U.S.-flagged vessels with a combined carrying capacity of roughly 40 million tons, representing
60% of the world’s seaborne carrying capacity (Transportation Institute, 2010). Though the U.S.
was once again among the leaders in world trade, nearly a decade had passed since the ODS and
CDS programs were established, and lack of a steady demand pattern prevented any accurate
determinations of their impacts during peacetime.
8
Analysis of the Jones Act
The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. The U.S. was once again left with thousands of
unwanted ships, and once again wanted to divest. In order to do so, Congress passed the
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. This legislation placed thousands of unwanted ships into what
is known as the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The NDRF’s purpose is to act as a
protective measure in the case of another war or a national emergency. Roughly 2,000 of the
vessels that survived WWII were placed in harbors on the east and west coasts and in the gulf.
The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 also authorized the selling and disposing of the
wartime fleet to foreign countries. Due to the severe imbalance of supply and demand identical
to the post-WWI shipping boom collapse, these vessels were sold at a fraction of their production
cost. Yet this time, foreign countries with much lower operating costs now owned nearly one
million tons of shipping capacity. As a result, the American fleet soon faced more intense
competition.
In 1950, Congress eliminated the U.S. Maritime Commission, and created the Federal
Maritime Board (FMB) and the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). Despite the Maritime
Commission’s critical efforts during World War II, President Truman felt that this would allow
for the two organizations to better specialize in their responsibilities. The FMB now handled the
subsidies, and MARAD oversaw the shipping interests for the American government.
Korean War (1950-1953). Though not nearly as substantial of a war as World Wars I
and II, very minimal shipbuilding efforts were needed during the Korean War. The U.S. still had
a strong enough fleet left from WWII, and the newly formed National Defense Reserve Fleet
also proved useful. According to the Transportation Institute, an estimated 31.5 million tons of
war materials were transported out of the United States, 95% of which were transported by ship,
and 80% of which were carried by privately owned U.S.-flag vessels. The U.S. activated 540
9
Analysis of the Jones Act
NDRF vessels to ship the remaining 15% of war material (Transportation Institute, MARAD).
However, the size of the U.S. Merchant Marine has declined ever since. In 1950, the number of
the NDRF reached its highest mark of 2,277 vessels. In 1951, the number of U.S. privately
owned vessels stood at 1,288 vessels, a figure that has not since been reached (MARAD, 2015).
At the start of the 1960’s, U.S.-flagged vessels carried roughly 20% of foreign trade, and carried
only 5.6% by the end of decade.
Vietnam War (1965-1973). By the start of the war in Vietnam, the U.S.-flag privately
owned fleet had shrunk to 948 vessels. As a result, these vessels could only carry 65% of the war
materials needed, which left the rest to be carried by government owned or foreign-flagged
vessels. However, much of the National Defense Reserve Fleet was outdated, and many foreign
countries did not allow their vessels to be used to help the Unites States’ war efforts. According
to the U.S. Maritime Administration, just 172 NDRF vessels were activated for the Vietnam
War. The shipping industry was rapidly growing and changing, meanwhile the American
Merchant Marine continued to age and decline.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970
This new legislation served as virtually an update of the 1936 Act. With industry changes
such as containerization and specialized cargo, the U.S. sought to provide further constructional
subsidies, but in a more efficient way. The act increased the variety of vessels qualified to be
subsidized, but reduced the total percentage of allowed funding for individual vessels. Another
addition was the establishment of the Commission of American Shipbuilding, which was created
to observe the results of the revision and report the findings with recommendations to the
President and Congress (Cohn, 1983).
10
Analysis of the Jones Act
Operational efficiencies of the transportation industry in the U.S. as well as around the
world were improving and world trade continued to grow faster than ever. Despite the help of the
federal government, the performance of the U.S.-flag continued to decline. By 1990, just 4% of
American commerce was carried by U.S.-flagged ships (Transportation Institute, 2010).
The Maritime Security Act of 1996
The Merchant Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970 were replaced by the Maritime Security Act
of 1996 in the form of the Maritime Security Program (MSP). Described by the U.S. Maritime
Administration, the MSP “provides a fixed retainer payment to U.S.-flag vessel owners in
exchange for providing the Department of Defense with assured access to their vessels and
related transportation services and infrastructure during times of war, national emergency, or
when otherwise deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defense”. The MSP was authorized to run
for 10 years and allow up to 47 vessels to participate. In 2003, the program was extended for 10
more years and allowed for the participation of 60 vessels. When the 10 years was up, the
President passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA), which extended the
MSP through 2025 (MARAD, 2015).
The U.S.-Flag Today
As of 2014, there are a total of 179 U.S.-flag privately owned vessels (Figure 1)
(MARAD, 2014). Of those, 110 engaged in foreign commerce, 60 of which are a part of the
Maritime Security Program (Lincicome, 2015. The number of U.S.-flagged ships has decreased
by an average of 18 for the last 63 years. Due to the construction of larger vessels throughout the
decades, these numbers slightly exaggerate the American performance. While the number of
U.S.-flag vessels was basically cut in half from the 1950s-1990s, the overall carrying capacity of
the U.S. fleet slightly increased over that time (Figure 2). In fact, throughout the 1980’s and
11
Analysis of the Jones Act
1990’s, the U.S. privately owned fleet had a carrying capacity of around 13 million gross tons
per year, the most since the post World War II vessel surplus. However, the 179 vessels that
remain carry a total of roughly 7 million gross tons, the lowest since 1946.
Since 1948, the World Trade Organization estimates the value of worldwide merchandise
trade imports grew by a factor of 95 times (P.F. Johnson, M.R. Leenders, and A.E. Flynn, 2011).
In 2013, the U.S. accounted for 12.4% of the total value of world merchandise imports, the most
of any country (Figure 3) (WTO, 2013). Despite these numbers, the U.S.-flag has become
virtually non-existent in the global market (Figure 4). In fact, the U.S. Maritime Administration
stopped tracking its performance in 2003, when the percentage of the U.S.-flag privately owned
fleet in waterborne foreign trade dipped below 2% (Figures 5, and 6). Over the lifespan of an
average person, the U.S.-flag went from carrying nearly two-thirds of the world’s merchant
tonnage, to a now estimated 1% (Arizona Small Business Association, 2012).
Comparison of Industry Costs
Operating Costs. The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) conducted a report
comparing the operating costs of U.S.-flag and foreign-flag vessels. According to the report, the
total average operating costs for a U.S. vessel in foreign trade in 2010 was $20,000, roughly 2.7
times higher than foreign-flag vessels (Figure 7). As of January 2015, the MSP can provide $3.1
million in retainer payments to a qualified vessel per year, which is roughly $8,500 per day
(MARAD, 2015). Nonetheless, the gap between foreign and domestic operating costs was at its
highest point, and the retainer payments are not enough. After the retainer payment, there
remains roughly a $4,100 per day unfunded gap in operating costs (Figure 8), which is about
$1.5 million per year.
12
Analysis of the Jones Act
The U.S. Maritime Administration recognizes labor costs as the single leading driver of
the high operating costs of American vessels. Due to the Jones Act restriction that U.S.-flag
vessels must be crewed by 75% U.S. citizens, powerful labor unions have been able to leverage
incredibly high wages over the years. As of 2010, American crews average wages over five
times higher than foreign crews. According to MARAD’s report, crew costs represent 68% of the
total cost to operate a U.S.-flag ship, compared to 35% of the cost of foreign-flags. These high
operating costs are too unattractive for shipowners, and are largely responsible for the U.S.-flag
now representing 1% of the market share of foreign commerce. Recall that this number reached
60% in 1945, as previously mentioned.
Shipbuilding Costs. As of 2013, Asian countries dominate the shipbuilding industry,
representing roughly two-thirds of the market share. In terms of gross tonnage of vessels
produced, China led all nations, followed by South Korea and Japan (Statista, 2013). These
countries have been able to efficiently produce vessels at the cheapest prices. China and South
Korea have made a jump ahead of Japan due largely to the abundance of cheap labor. In China
the average ship costs $34 million, $36 million in South Korea, $38 million in the small Japanese
yards, and $43 million in the big Japanese yards (Stopford, 2009).
Similar to operating American ships, there is a significant gap between shipbuilding costs
in America versus foreign countries. Building a new ship in the U.S. is nearly three times the
cost doing so in Japan or South Korea (Lincicome, 2015). Despite millions of dollars being
available in grants, U.S. shipyards produce just 1% of the global shipbuilding market share
(Walker, 2011). Keep in mind that it was in the United States that much of the world’s
shipbuilding technology originated, and as previously mentioned, represented over 90% in 1945
(Stopford, 2009). Figure 9 illustrates the U.S.-flag fleets decline in market share.
13
Analysis of the Jones Act
The Jones Act Debate
As many arguments as there are in opposition of the Jones Act, there are just as many in
favor. To name a few, discussions regarding national security, availability of jobs, cost of living,
and emergency response all involve completely opposing opinions.
National Security
At its height in 1950, the NDRF consisted of 2,277 ships, but as of March 31, 2015,
there are just 100. While its possible that the Jones Act is at least partially responsible for the
decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine, it is possible that without the Jones Act, the U.S. Merchant
Marine would cease to exist. History has shown the importance of having a viable fleet in
preserving national defense. As the world’s largest importer by volume, the U.S. economy is
largely dependent on foreign countries. As seen in the recent events on the west coast, this
dependence leaves the American economy vulnerable. So while the Jones Act could be partially
blamed for the small remaining fleet and current dependency, it does in fact preserve a bit of
independency.
Availability of Jobs
According the MARAD, the total direct, indirect, and induced employment associated
with the American shipbuilding and repairing industries accounted for .2% of total jobs in the
United States in 2011. These industries also directly provided $7.9 billion in labor income and
$9.8 billion in GDP. The Jones Act is able to sustain these jobs. However, others would argue
that protecting these jobs takes away any incentive for the industry to grow. If a U.S. vessel
operator can still profit from using an old and inefficient ship, and does not have to worry about
foreign competition, there are fewer motives to build a newer vessel in the overpriced American
14
Analysis of the Jones Act
shipyards. This methodology is used by many economists to explain the lack of market share
held by the U.S. shipping industry.
Cost of Living
Hawaii State Senator, Sam Slom, stated that the cost of living in Hawaii is 49% higher
than the U.S. mainland because of the Jones Act. According to Slom, “it costs about $790 to ship
a 40-foot container from Los Angeles to Shanghai, but it costs $8,700 to ship the same container
from Los Angeles to Honolulu” (Bussewitz, 2014). Studies done by the General Accounting
Office of the United States done in the 1990’s found that the Jones Act costs Hawaii, Alaska, and
Puerto Rico between $2.8 billion and $9.8 billion per year (CRC, 2013). In 1995, the U.S.
International Trade Commission reported that the Jones Act costs the American economy at least
$2.8 billion per year, or $4.37 billion adjusted for inflation, and if removed, shipping prices
would drop by 26%. (CRC, 2013). However, for almost every report in opposition of the act,
there is one in favor. In an excerpt from the Journal of Commerce, Gary Ferrulli stated, “Assume
a price of $2,500 per 40-foot container for loads of soda, beer or canned fruits and vegetables.
Each 40-footer holds about 2,000 cases of 24 cans per case. The additional cost of 20% equates
to about one cent a can.” (CRC, 2013).
Emergency Response
The government has been criticized for not temporarily relieving the Jones Act during
times of emergency. A small example occurred in 2013, during one of New Jersey’s worst
winters. Some of New Jersey’s major cities were unable to function and were desperately in need
of more road salt. The state’s last hope was sitting on a foreign vessel in Maine that had 40,000
tons of salt on board. Unfortunately, the Jones Act prevented the vessel from traveling directly
from Maine to New Jersey, and no salt was ever delivered (Meyer, 2014).
15
Analysis of the Jones Act
A more impactful example of the Jones Act slowing disaster relief occurred in 2010
during the Gulf Coast BP oil spill. There were approximately 1,500 vessels that were able to help
the relief effort, but could not due to Jones Act restrictions. Senators of both Texas and Florida
reportedly both filed for a temporary Jones Act waiver, but were unsuccessful. However, there
have been many cases where the Jones Act has been waivered temporarily in order to respond to
disasters. During Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, President Bush and President Obama
signed such waivers to allow emergency supplies to be shipped to the devastated areas.
Special Interest Support
Speculations of special interests involving the Jones Act date back to when it was written.
The author, Wesley Jones, was a Senator from Washington State, a state that holds many jobs in
the shipping industry. In addition, as Alaska’s economy was developing, and being Alaska’s
closest neighbor, Washington could benefit greatly from not having to compete with foreign
shipping firms. Inevitably, onlookers formed their assumptions about Jones’ true intentions.
Labor unions have been able to leverage political power over the years. According to the
Capital Research Center, between 2006 and 2012, merchant mariner and longshoremen unions
have contributed over $2.4 million to the House and Senate. One of the biggest critics of the
Jones Act, Senator John McCain, spoke on these special interests during his floor statement on
his proposed amendment to repeal the Jones Act on January 22nd, 2015:
“And yet, as clear as the benefits of free trade are, actually taking action to remove trade
barriers and open markets can be almost impossible here in Congress. Special interests
that have long and richly benefited from protectionism flex their muscles and issue
doomsday warnings about the consequences of moving forward on free trade. And,
16
Analysis of the Jones Act
judging from the hysterical reaction by some of the special interests to my simply filing
this amendment, the debate over the Jones Act will be no different.”
McCain’s amendment was a part of a bill attempting to authorize the construction of the
Keystone XL oil pipeline, from Canada to the United States. McCain’s amendment to the bill
sought to repeal the section of the Jones Act requiring U.S.-flag ships be built in the United
States. Senate passed the bill 62-26 without McCain’s amendment, however it was later vetoed
by President Obama, a long time supporter of the Jones Act.
Conclusions and Future Study
You can find Captain Alfred Mahan’s picture hanging in nearly every U.S. Navy training
building, but his lessons were never fully embraced by the United States. Whether it was during
the two World Wars, or through the trends of world power centuries before, history has
demonstrated the importance of a strong merchant fleet in maintaining world power time and
time again. This is something that the U.S. undoubtedly has learned and understands, however,
has not implemented the necessary measures. What are the right measures?
Repealing the Jones Act would allow the shipping industry to flow freely. Economists
agree that allowing the free flow of markets provides the best long-term benefits. After all, that is
a broad way to describe how America became a world power in the first place. However, what
would happen without the Jones Act? Hundreds of thousands of American jobs could be lost to
the cheaper foreign labor. Repealing the Jones Act could be the end of the U.S.-flag, intensifying
vulnerability of the world’s most powerful nation. The U.S. Merchant Marine, left smaller than
ever almost solely because of the Jones Act, now clings to it like a life-ring.
17
Analysis of the Jones Act
References
Arizona Small Business Association (ASBA). “In Defense of the Jones Act”. 26-28 September 2012. http://www.asba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/bruce-richards-2012-asba-conference.pdf
Bussewitz, Cathy. "Hawaii, Alaska, Territories Team up on Jones Act." The Big Story. N.p., 14 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hawaii-alaska-territories-team-jones-act
Cohn, Michael B. “Maritime Subsidies: Overregulation.” The Freeman. March 1, 1983. http://fee.org/freeman/detail/maritime-subsidies-overregulation
CRC Staff. "The Sinking Ship of Cabotage: How the Jones Act Lets Unions and a Few Companies Hold the Economy Hostage." Capital Research Center. Capital Research Center, 7 Apr. 2013. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. http://capitalresearch.org/2013/04/the-sinking-ship-of-cabotage-how-the-jones-act-lets-unions-and-a-few-companies-hold-the-economy-hostage/
"Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on Amendment to Repeal the Jones Act." John McCain Senate. John McCain Senate, 22 Jan. 2015. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/1/floor-statement-by-senator-john-mccain-on-amendment-to-repeal-the-jones-act
Lewis, Justin. “Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Flag” (n.d.): n. pag. Issues in Political Economy, Vol 22 2013, 77-107. Tulane University, 2013. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/students/ipe/volumes/Lewis%202013.pdf
Lincicome, Scott. “If You Like Higher Prices, Enriched Cronies, and Weak National Security, Then You’ll Love The Jones Act.” The Federalist, 22 Jan, 2015. http://thefederalist.com/2015/01/22/if-you-like-higher-prices-enriched-cronies-and-weak-national-security-then-youll-love-the-jones-act/
Meyer, Jared. "How A 96-Year-Old Law Has Jeopardized America's Ports." Townhall.com. Town Hall, 2 Dec. 2014. Web. 1 Mar. 2015. http://townhall.com/columnists/jaredmeyer/2014/12/02/jones-actwest-coast-ports-article-n1925917/page/full
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Analysis of the Jones Act
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Statista . “ Largest shipbuilding nations in 2013, based on completions in gross tonnage (in
1,000s).” The Statistical Portal. March 2014. http://www.statista.com/statistics/263895/shipbuilding-nations-worldwide-by-cgt/
Slattery, Brian, Bryan Riley, and Nicolas Loris. "Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America's Competitive Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries." The Heritage Foundation. The Heritage Foundation, 22 May 2014. Web. 2 Mar. 2015. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/sink-the-jones-act-restoring-americas-competitive-advantage-in-maritime-related-industries
Trans-Atlantic Ghost Busting: The Failed Attempt to Dispose of the Chesapeake “Ghost Fleet” in the United Kingdom. (2008, January 31). Retrieved April 12, 2015, from http://lawreview.richmond.edu/trans-atlantic-ghost-busting/
"Transportation Institute: Jones Act." Transportation Institute: Jones Act. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 Mar. 2015. http://www.trans-inst.org/jones-act.html
United States Government Accountability Office. Washington: Office, 1970. GAO Report to Congressional Requesters. United States Government Accountability Office, Mar. 2013. Web. 2 Mar. 2015. http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653046.pdf
United States Government Publishing Office, 46 U.S.C. 2101 - General definitions.Retrieved on March 31, 2015, from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title46/USCODE-2011-title46-subtitleII-partA-chap21-sec2101/content-detail.html
United States Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1950). Merchant Marine Study and Investigation; S. Report 2494, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess., pg. 109. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/13304/towardmodernizat00rior.pdf?sequence=1
United States Maritime Administration. 2015, January. US Fleet Summary Table 1946-2014.
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Analysis of the Jones Act
U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Merchant Fleet, 1946-Present. U.S. Department of Transportation. Retrieved March 10, 2015, from http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Appendix
Figure 1: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Merchant Fleet, 1946-Present*
*Oceangoing Self-Propelled Vessels of 1,000 Gross Tons and Above*Tonnage in thousands *Data retrieved from MARAD’s U.S.-Fleet Summary Table, 2014
Year
Total
No. GT Dwt
1946 644 4,627 6,989
1950 1,087 8,797 13,197
1955 1,075 9,177 13,597
1960 1,008 9,610 14,088
1965 948 10,149 14,650
1970 793 9,780 14,406
1975 580 10,103 15,028
1980 578 13,467 21,103
1985 477 13,490 21,195
1990 408 13,306 20,771
1995 316 10,563 14,982
2000 282 9,583 12,408
2005 231 7,920 9,597
2010 221 8,014 9,547
2014 179 6,912 7,802
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 2: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet*1946-2014
*Ocean-Going, Self-Propelled, Cargo Carrying Ships over 1,000 GT*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 3: The World’s Leading Exporters and Importers, 2013
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Analysis of the Jones Act
*$bn and %*Retrieved from the World Trade Organization’s 2014 Press Release
Figure 4: U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1946-2012U.S.-Flag Share 1946-2003*
*Data discontinued in 2003*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 5: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet Share of Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1946-2003*
*Data discontinued in 2003*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 6: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet Share of Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1961-2003*
*Data discontinued in 2003*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 7: Average Daily Operating Costs by Flag, 2009 and 2010*
*U.S.-flag costs are weighted by the number of vessels in each operator’s U.S.-flag fleet*Retrieved from MARAD’s Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, 2011
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 8: Average Daily Operating Costs by Flag, 2009 and 2010*
*U.S.-flag costs are weighted by the number of vessels in each operator’s U.S.-flag fleet*Retrieved from MARAD’s Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, 2011
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Analysis of the Jones Act
Figure 9: U.S. Shipbuilding Market Share, 1902-2002*
*Retrieved from Chapter 15 of Maritime Economics 3rd Edition, (Stopford, 2009)
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Analysis of the Jones Act 30