Jolting the NPT

WNU – Summer Institute 2008– Bruno Pellaud 1

Jolting the NPTIraq, North Korea, Iran and

the Non-Proliferation Regime (NPT)

Bruno Pellaud, Switzerland

WNU – Summer Institute 2008– Bruno Pellaud

Iraq: background• Early activities: in the 70s, Osirak reactor (bombed in

1981); then a 10 billion $ programme with 10’000 persons.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1972; sharpened controls after the 1991 Gulf War by decision of the Security Council. No IAEA inspections between 1998 and 2002.

• Violations: totally clandestine weapon programme.

• Danger level: very high; in 1990, two years from a first device; reduced to nil in the 90s; not resumed 1998-2003.

2


The Tuweitha Research Centre

3


What did the IAEA?Did not see the clandestine programme setup by Iraq in the 80s and 90s.

Intelligence services did not see as well (or did not inform theIAEA…)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then, 30 inspection campaigns between 1991 and 1998:

> 5,000 person-days of technical resources> 50,000 m2 of factory space destroyed~ 2,000 equipment items destroyed> 600 tonnes of special alloys destroyed

All HEU material removed from Iraq-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Confirmed in 2002-03 the absence of a nuclear weapon programmeIn 2003-2004 was proved to have been right

4


Calutron destroyed in 1991

5


Russian research reactor destroyed

..... and inspected by international inspectors


Iraq: the lessons learned• The IAEA failed to deter and detect the Iraqi weapons

programme. Not that the inspectors failed; it’s the political institution as such that did.

• Reason? The constraints imposed to inspectors, which limited verification to declared facilities.

• Iraq led in the 90s to a major revamping of the IAEA safeguards system, with strengthening measures targeted at undeclared clandestine activities, especially with the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997.

7


North Korea: background• Early activities: in the 80s, 5 MWe research reactor,

followed by two unfinished “power plants” of 50 and 200Mwe with gas-graphite reactors.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1992; no inspection since 2002. Stepped out of the NPT without sanctions !!

• Violations: undeclared plutonium separation detected by the IAEA in 1993; then denial of international inspections.

• Danger level: very high; has separated 30-50 kg of Pu. Has exploded a nuclear device on October 9, 2006 (it misfired at a fizzle yield, but was nuclear...). Enough Pu in store to assemble many more nuclear devices/weapons.

8


The Yongbyon nuclear sites


The 5 and the 50 MWe reactors

10

Reactor

Fuel storage


Discharged fuel in baskets


Yongbyon’s reprocessing facilities


North Korea: the outlook• The weak 1994 Framework Agreement

with the US did not stop weapon activities towards the 2006 test.

• China has finally used its leverage to force North Korea to the negotiating table.

• The “six-party negotiations have made progress. Beginning of the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, likely to be continued, but...

• The risk remains high: with the hidden store of good quality weapon grade Pu

13

July 2008: destruction of the cooling tower


• Early activities: thousands of scientists and engineers were trained in Western countries under the Shah in the 60s and 70s; an American 20 MW research reactor bought in 1961 and diverse fuel cycle facilities.

• Safeguards: agreement since 1972 (under the NPT).• Interruption of nuclear programme between 1979 and 1981. • Violations : undeclared purchase from China of 1800 kg of UF6, UF4and

UO2, undeclared Pu separation; undeclared equipment and facilities; work with metallic uranium and polonium sources; etc. In the 80’s and 90’s, an embryonic, unsuccessful, but real weapon programme.

• Facilities: labs, uranium conversion, heavy-water reactor, pilot centrifuge facility and large-scale enrichment plant in Natanz.

• Risk level now: low; only milligrams of plutonium separated and some 150 kg low-enriched U. Continuous on-going IAEA inspections.

Iran: nuclear history


TRIGA Mark II – purchased from the US General Atomics in 1961


US Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad in 1979…


Entrance to the underground industrial facility. Some 3000 P1 centrifuges are installed.

Pilot facility: Where the new IR-2 centrifuges are now being tested.

ISIS


Centrifuges - Model P1

18

Installed in Natanz (Iran) From Pakistan, seized in Libya


Natanz industrial facility

19

Entrance to the underground industrial facility designed to receive 50’000 P1 centrifuges. Each centrifuge is capable of producing 2 SWU per year, yielding altogether 100’000 SWU, that is the yearly requirement of ONE 1000 Mwe LWR!


On April 8, 2008, the President visitedNatanz. Its Office released 48 photographs of the tour, providing a broad look inside the research facility (New York Times – 29 April 2008). Why show all these details?

The new IR-2 centrifuges


Esfahan: conversion plant

21


Iran: the outlook• NPT: Iran is entitled to domestic uranium enrichment.• IAEA: All nuclear materials are said to be accounted for.• US intelligence services: No credible evidence of a weapon

programme after 2003; not enough LEU/HEU produced until 2013.• No sense at all in bombing facilities, as rumoured... “Room for

negotiations” said US Adm. Mullen, Chrm Joint Chiefs of Staff.• Yet, the cart before the horse: Disturbing mismatch in Iran between the

enrichment and the power plants programmes. Legitimate question: A drive towards acquiring a “virtual capability”, with enrichment first?

• Not to be forgotten - blatant past violations: Iran should temporarily limit its enrichment capability and suspend all other sensitive fuel cycle activities until its nuclear power plant capability will justify them, until confidence restored.

22


Have the NPT/IAEA failed?• No, in general not; don’t forget President Kennedy who in

1963 predicted some 25 Weapon States by 1990.• Iraq was indeed a failure (IAEA verification constrained to

declared facilities).• North Korea was a success. The IAEA detected the

concealments through chemical analysis.• Iran was not a failure (conventional safeguards were too

weak to expose the concealments in the 80s and 90s).• Trafficking: IAEA is not mandated and equipped to detect

trafficking of nuclear equipment.

23



The NPT has failed, in a sense

• Discriminatory, yes. Nuclear weapons States have an unhealthy influence on world affairs.

• No significant disarmament efforts.• Not universal – the three non-NPT States (India,

Israel and Pakistan) will sooner or later all enjoy the full benefits of nuclear trade.

• No sanctions on North Korea, which left the Treaty and “went nuclear” unhampered…

25


How to firm up the NPT?• No to prohibitions imposed from outside the NPT (e.g.

that all enrichment activities be provided by an inner club of mostly nuclear weapons States).

• Yes to Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements (MNA) and to regional facilities replacing one-nation facilities.

• Yes to predictable guidelines to handle violations of the Treaty in the IAEA Board of Governors and in the UN Security Council (where permanent members shelter their protégés rather than helping non-proliferation)

26

Documents

Jolting the NPT