7 September 1999

Joint Deployment andRedeployment Operations

Joint Publication 3-35

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PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides overarchingguidance and principles governing thedeployment and redeployment of the ArmedForces of the United States in response tomission taskings. It explains the deploymentand redeployment process, deployment andredeployment phases, and planning andexecution considerations that may impact USforce projection operations. In addition, itdiscusses the responsibilities and commandrelationships for supported and supportingcombatant commands and Services, as wellas their interaction with Defense agencies,host nations, and multinational andinteragency components. Finally, thispublication discusses deployment andredeployment enablers and the importance ofincorporating aspects of deployment andredeployment operations in all joint forcetraining and exercise programs.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military command

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United States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine CorpsDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

should follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by the

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

• Introduction.............................................................................................................. I-1• National Security Strategy and Force Projection........................................................ I-1• Projecting the Joint Force.......................................................................................... I-3• The Role of Mobilization.......................................................................................... I-5• Mobility Options....................................................................................................... I-7• Deployment............................................................................................................ I-10• Redeployment......................................................................................................... I-17

CHAPTER IIRESPONSIBILITIES

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• Secretary of Defense................................................................................................ II-1• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........................................................................ II-2• Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command................................. II-5• Geographic Combatant Commands.......................................................................... II-6• Functional Combatant Commands.......................................................................... II-13• Joint Task Forces.................................................................................................... II-17• Military Departments and Defense Agencies.......................................................... II-19• Other Federal Agencies.......................................................................................... II-24

CHAPTER IIIDEPLOYMENT

• Introduction........................................................................................................... III-1

SECTION A: PLANNING........................................................................................ III-1• Mission Requirements............................................................................................ III-1• Preparation for Deployment................................................................................... III-4• Deployment Concept.............................................................................................. III-9• Intelligence Preparation......................................................................................... III-15• Force Protection.................................................................................................... III-17

SECTION B: EXECUTION.................................................................................... III-20• Requirements Validation....................................................................................... III-20• Movement Scheduling.......................................................................................... III-23• Movement Control................................................................................................ III-23• Force Tracking...................................................................................................... III-26

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• Management of Change........................................................................................ III-28• Sustainment Considerations.................................................................................. III-29• Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.............................. III-32

CHAPTER IVREDEPLOYMENT

• Introduction........................................................................................................... IV-1

SECTION A: PLANNING....................................................................................... IV-1• Mission Requirements............................................................................................ IV-1• Preparation for Redeployment................................................................................ IV-4• Redeployment Concept.......................................................................................... IV-7• Intelligence Preparation.......................................................................................... IV-8• Force Protection..................................................................................................... IV-9

SECTION B: EXECUTION................................................................................... IV-10• Requirements Validation...................................................................................... IV-10• Movement Scheduling......................................................................................... IV-11• Force Tracking..................................................................................................... IV-11

CHAPTER VENABLERS

• Introduction............................................................................................................ V-1• Interoperability....................................................................................................... V-1• Force Projection Facilities and Infrastructure........................................................... V-2• Systems and Communications................................................................................. V-3

CHAPTER VIOTHER DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS(EXPANDED MILITARY MISSIONS)

• Introduction........................................................................................................... VI-1• Multinational Operations........................................................................................ VI-1• Military Operations Other Than War...................................................................... VI-8• Interagency Support Operations........................................................................... VI-10

CHAPTER VIIJOINT TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND ASSESSMENTS

• General................................................................................................................. VII-1• Core Competencies and CJCS Commended Training Issues.................................. VII-2• Joint Training........................................................................................................ VII-3• Joint and Multinational Exercises.......................................................................... VII-4• Assessments.......................................................................................................... VII-5

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APPENDICES

A Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Processes............................................... A-1B Joint Deployment, Redeployment, and JRSOI Process Map Description............ B-1C Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Refinement....................................... C-1D Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, Redeployment Orders,

and Request for Forces.................................................................................. D-1E References......................................................................................................... E-1F Administrative Instructions................................................................................ F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-6

FIGURES

I-1 Processes for Projecting the Joint Force........................................................ I-4I-2 Mobilization and Deployment and/or Redeployment.................................... I-6I-3 Mobilization Resource Areas........................................................................ I-7I-4 The Strategic Mobility Triad......................................................................... I-8I-5 The Deployment Process............................................................................ I-12I-6 Strategic Deployment Planning and Execution........................................... I-13II-1 Responsibilities of Supported Combatant Commanders............................... II-7II-2 Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders............................ II-12II-3 Defense Logistics Agency Responsibilities................................................ II-24III-1 Force Tracking is Part of Force Closure..................................................... III-4III-2 Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force................................... III-8III-3 Joint Movement Control Architecture....................................................... III-24V-1 Global Transportation Network.................................................................. V-5VI-1 Multinational Deployment and Redeployment Considerations................... VI-4VI-2 Multinational Logistics Considerations...................................................... VI-6VII-1 Exercise Planning Considerations............................................................. VII-6A-1 JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning Process

Functional Alignment.............................................................................. A-1A-2 Joint Planning Summary............................................................................. A-3A-3 Comparing Crisis Action Procedures With Deliberate Planning

Procedures............................................................................................... A-4B-A-1 Joint Force Deployment Process.............................................................. B-A-2B-B-1 Joint Force Redeployment Process.......................................................... B-B-2B-C-1 Force JRSOI Process............................................................................... B-C-2D-1 Deployment Order Matrix.......................................................................... D-2

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Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Joint force operations must have the capability to deploy orproject forces and materiel from the home station to the crisisarea in response to mission taskings. The deployment of forcesand materiel means they must be relocated to subsequentoperational areas, or returned to home or their point of originupon completion of the mission. Deployment andredeployment operations support the full range of militaryoperations. Since both operations have several stakeholders,commands, agencies, and functional processes, unity of effortis critical. As with deployment operations, redeploymentoperations are characterized by timely and efficient recovery,reconstitution, and relocation of forces and materiel to the homeand/or demobilization station, to their point of origin, orsubsequent operational areas.

The National Security Strategy of the United States is supportedby the Armed Forces with a National Military Strategy whichhas two military objectives; promote peace and stability and,when necessary, defeat adversaries. This is done through powerprojection and force projection. Power projection is theability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements ofnational power — political, economic, informational, ormilitary — to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence,and to enhance regional stability. Force projection is themilitary element of national power that systematically andrapidly moves military forces in response to requirements ofwar or military operations other than war. Enabled by forward

Deployment andredeployment operationssupport the full range ofmilitary operations and area function of the jointforce mission.

Fundamentals of Deployment and Redeployment

Provides Guidance for the Deployment and Redeploymentof the Armed Forces

Details the Deployment and Redeployment ProcessIncluding its Phases, Planning, and Execution

Discusses Combatant Command and ServiceResponsibilities and Relationships

Considers Incorporating Deployment and RedeploymentOperations in Training and Exercise Programs

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Executive Summary

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Deployment andredeployment operationsare critical to themobilization process.

Articulatingresponsibilities is the firststep in fully synchronizedand coordinateddeployment andredeployment operations.

presence and rapid global mobility, it allows a joint forcecommander (JFC) to position forces and materiel for missionsuccess.

Mobilization involves the preparation of personnel andmateriel to a state of readiness for war and other nationalemergencies. Timely response to crisis situations is criticalto US success in military operations. This timeliness is afunction of rapid global mobility and adequate operational andintratheater mobility assets and overseas presence.

The joint deployment process begins when planning isinitiated for force projection operations, in response to an actionor event that requires protection of US national interests.Redeployment process involves the transfer of individuals,units, and/or materiel, but is not necessarily the reversal ofthe deployment process. Redeployment may includemovement of forces or materiel from one area to another, orto another location in the same area, or to the zone of interiorfor further employment, or home.

The deployment and redeployment of the joint force involvesnumerous commands and agencies that have several roles andresponsibilities in these operations. The Secretary of Defenseis responsible for the assignment of forces and lift resources tothe combatant commands to perform missions assigned to thosecommands and also for strategic interagency coordination atthe national level. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff has supervisory and joint operation planningresponsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategicplanning, and joint operation planning. The geographiccombatant commanders are responsible for the developmentand production of joint operation plans and operation plans inconcept format. They deter war and prepare for war duringpeacetime, and plan and conduct campaigns and militaryoperations during war.

Responsibilities

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Executive Summary

Deployment

During deploymentoperations, supportedcombatant commandersmust build and validaterequirements, determinepredeployment standards,and balance and regulatethe transportation flow.

Redeployment operationsare dependent on thesupported combatantcommander’s defined endstate, concept forredeployment, orrequirement to supportanother joint forcecommander’s concept ofoperations.

Deployment operations involve four phases:predeployment activities; movement to and activities atport of embarkation (POE); movement to port ofdebarkation (POD); and joint reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration (JRSOI) activities. These phasesare the major deployment activities of a joint force. Planningfor and execution of these phases is based primarily on missionrequirements and the time available to accomplish the mission.

The primary objective of deployment is to provide personnel,equipment, and materiel when and where required by theJFC’s concept of operations. In terms of execution, movementrequirements developed during deployment planning must bevalidated prior to deployment execution. Intertheater air, land,and sea transportation is then scheduled to support the approvedconcept of operations. Force tracking throughout thedeployment process is necessary and made possible by theinnovative and integrated use of command and control systemsand information technology.

Redeployment operations encompass four phases.Recovery and reconstitution and preredeploymentactivities, movement to and activities at POE, movementto POD, and JRSOI describe the major activities inherent inmoving deployed forces and materiel. Redeployments areplanned and executed based on mission requirements and areconducted to reposture forces and materiel in the same theater,to transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC’soperational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment,and materiel to the home and/or demobilization station uponcompletion of the mission. One difference between deploymentand redeployment is that redeployment operations focus onreestablishing joint force readiness in addition toredeployment mission requirements. Force protection isimportant during redeployment operations, and the operationalenvironment is a key indicator in determining the level of forceprotection measures required for an uninterruptedredeployment flow.

Redeployment

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Effective deployment and redeployment of personnel,equipment, and materiel to support joint operations dependson the ability to train and exercise the way the United Statesintends to employ a joint military force. The universal jointtask list provides a common frame of reference and outlinesbasic mission tasks for training combatant commands and jointforce components. Joint exercises offer an opportunity forjoint forces personnel to plan and execute deployment andredeployment operations. Assessment is a vital componentof joint force training and exercise programs.

This publication establishes a detailed understanding ofdeployment and redeployment operations. It provides doctrine,principles and concepts on the fundamentals of deploymentand redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States inresponse to mission taskings. The concepts of the deploymentand redeployment process are extensively addressed, withemphasis on planning and execution. It discusses theresponsibilities and command relationships for supported andsupporting combatant commands and Services with regardsto these operations. Finally, consideration is given to theimportance of incorporating aspects of deployment andredeployment operations in all joint force training and exerciseprograms.

CONCLUSION

To focus joint training,joint operational tasks —including deployment,redeployment, andsupporting tasks — arelisted in the universal jointtask list.

Training

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

I-1

1. Introduction

The focus of this publication is thedeployment and redeployment of a jointforce to support joint operations.Deployment and redeployment is anoperational imperative planned and executedby the supported commander. Fundamentalto joint force operations is the capability todeploy or project forces and materiel fromorigin or home station to the crisis area inresponse to mission taskings. Inherent in thedeployment of forces and materiel is therequirement to relocate forces and materiel tosubsequent operational areas or return themto their home and/or demobilization stationsor points of origin upon completion of themission. Deployment and redeploymentoperations support the full range of militaryoperations and are functions of the joint forcemission. Mission requirements define thescope, duration, and scale of both deploymentand redeployment operations. Bothoperations have several stakeholders andinvolve numerous commands, agencies,and functional processes. Unity of effort isparamount. Redeployment planning and

DEPLOYMENT: DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

“Although deployment of US forces in the operation ultimately was successful,it identified several weaknesses in US rapid deployment capabilities. As theUS moves to implement a national security strategy based on the projectionof power from the United States and forward bases, these deficiencies mustbe addressed. Deployment planning systems must be reviewed in light ofchanging priorities in response to regional contingencies; the need forstructured, but flexible deployment schedules; and the requirements fortransportation feasibility studies to ensure assets are sufficient and able toaccommodate unit requirements. Equally important is the continued emphasison improving worldwide mobility — airlift, sealift, land movement, and pre-positioning — necessary to ensure that the United States can deploy andproject power credibly.”

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

execution requires the same focusedpreparation and intensity as deployment andemployment operations. Successfulredeployment operations are characterizedby the timely and efficient recovery,reconstitution, and relocation of forces andmateriel to their home and/or demobilizationstation, point of origin, or subsequentoperational area.

2. National Security Strategyand Force Projection

a. National Security Strategy and theNational Military Strategy (NMS). TheNational Security Strategy of the United Statescalls for advancing the interests of the UnitedStates through an integrated strategicapproach embodied by the terms “shape,”“respond,” and “prepare now.” The UnitedStates will endeavor to shape the internationalenvironment and respond to a wide range ofmilitary operations while it also prepares nowfor an uncertain future. The Armed Forces ofthe United States support the NationalSecurity Strategy with an NMS that describestheir critical role in achieving US objectives.

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It establishes two national military objectives;promote peace and stability and, whennecessary, defeat adversaries. The ArmedForces of the United States promote peaceand stability through deterrence, peacetimeengagement, regional cooperation, andconstructive interaction. Adversaries aredefeated by applying military power asdirected to overwhelm the adversary,establishing new military conditions , andachieving a political solution favorable toUS national interests. Four strategicconcepts support these objectives: strategicagility, overseas presence, powerprojection, and decisive force. Strategicagility, overseas presence, and rapid powerprojection provide the means to quickly anddecisively respond to crisis situations andachieve national objectives.

“. . . America’s Armed Forces areorganized, trained, equipped,maintained, and deployed primarily toensure that our Nation is able to defeataggression against our country and toprotect our national interest. . .Terrorism, weapons of massdestruction, illegal drug-trafficking, andother threats at home and abroad mayexceed the capacity of other agenciesand require the use of military forces,depending upon applicable law, thedirection of the NCA, and the nationalinterest involved. In addition, militaryresources will continue to support civilauthorities in executing missions suchas civil works, disaster relief, anddomestic crisis.”

Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: AMilitary Strategy for a New Era

b. Power Projection. Power projectionis the ability of a nation to apply all or someof its elements of national power — political,economic, informational, or military — torapidly and effectively deploy and sustain USforces in and from multiple dispersed locationsto respond to crises, to contribute todeterrence, and to enhance regional stability.Peacetime engagement of US military forces

could require the deployment of forces andmateriel to provide security assistance andforeign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or torespond to natural disasters or other peacetimeemergencies. On occasion, rapid projectionof US military forces may be required to deterthreats and prevent conflict. When deterrencefails, US military forces may be deployed todefeat its adversaries. All of thesecircumstances require a credible US militarycapability to rapidly project forces andmateriel to provide for the common good,demonstrate US resolve, impose US will, orprotect US interests.

c. Force Projection. Force projection isthe military element of national power thatsystematically and rapidly moves militaryforces in response to requirements of waror military operations other than war

Intertheater deployment and redeployment of thejoint force enables the United States to remainglobally engaged to protect and promote its vitalinterests.

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Overview

(MOOTW). Force projection allows a jointforce commander (JFC) to strategicallyconcentrate forces and materiel to set theconditions for mission success. Forceprojection, enabled by forward presence andrapid global mobility , is critical to USdeterrence and warfighting capabilities. TheNational Command Authorities (NCA) coulddirect combatant commanders to resolve acrisis quickly by employing immediatelyavailable forward-presence forces. However,when this response is not enough, the rapidprojection of forces from the continentalUnited States (CONUS) or outside thecontinental United States (OCONUS) may benecessary. Alternatively, responding to therange of military operations may involve themovement of forces and materiel withinCONUS or OCONUS for humanitarian ordisaster relief purposes. Normally on asmaller but no less important scale thanstrategic deployment, the requirement remainsto provide US forces and materiel in a timelyand efficient manner consistent with the jointforce mission.

3. Projecting the Joint Force

Operations to project the joint forceencompass a range of processes, as shown inFigure I-1. The scope of these processes is

dependent upon the joint force mission.Planning for and execution of theseprocesses normally occurs in a continuous,overlapping, and iterative sequence for theduration of the joint force mission. However,each joint operation or campaign usuallydiffers in both sequence and scale. Thefollowing paragraphs briefly describe eachprocess.

a. Mobilization. Mobilization is theprocess of assembling and organizingnational resources to support nationalobjectives in time of war (and for MOOTW)or other emergencies. Each Service isresponsible for maintaining its ownmobilization plan and planning system.Mobilization includes bringing all or part ofthe industrial base and the Armed Forces ofthe United States to the necessary state ofreadiness to meet the requirements of thespecific contingency. Mobilization mayinclude activation of all, or part, of the ReserveComponents (RCs), as well as assemblingand organizing personnel, supplies, andmateriel. Once assembled, personnel willundergo predeployment checks and trainingas needed.

See JP 4-05.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization

Force projection operations are sustained through flexible, assured sealift.

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and Demobilization Operations: ReserveComponent (RC) Callup.”

b. Deployment. Deployment ismovement of forces and their sustainmentfrom their point of origin to a specificoperational area to conduct joint operationsoutlined in a given plan or order. The typeand nature of deployments vary widelyaccording to scenario and circumstances.Occasionally, strategic deployment mayinvolve the intertheater movement of forcesand materiel using national and allied and/or coalition deployment capabilities.Deployment will be described more fully laterin this chapter.

c. Employment. Employment prescribeshow to apply force and/or forces to attainspecified national strategic objectives.Employment concepts are developed by JFCsand their component commands during theplanning process. These concepts provide thefoundation and determine the scope ofmobilization, deployment, sustainment, andredeployment processes. Employment

encompasses a wide array of operationsincluding but not limited to, entry operations(opposed or non opposed), decisive operations(combat or support), and postconflictoperations (prepare for redeployment or forfollow-on mission).

d. Sustainment. Sustainment is directedtoward providing and maintaining levels ofpersonnel and materiel required to sustainthe levels of combat or mission activity forthe appropriate duration and at the desiredlevel of intensity. Sustainment is ongoingthroughout the entire process of deploymentand redeployment. Key decisions made earlyin force projection operations concern basingand sustaining the force. Force projectionoperations may involve the establishment ofsupport facilities in multiple sites OCONUS,including the crisis area. Logistic support willalmost always be split-based between severaltheaters and CONUS. The location and sizeof the base or bases supporting theoperation is a key factor in operationalreach. CONUS bases supporting adeployment or redeployment will normally be

Figure I-1. Processes for Projecting the Joint Force

PROCESSES FOR PROJECTINGTHE JOINT FORCE

MOBILIZATION

DEPLOYMENTEMPLOYMENT

SUSTAINMENTREDEPLOYMENT

"FOCUS OFTHIS

PUBLICATION"

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Overview

selected or designated by the Services andDefense agencies participating in theoperation in consultation with United StatesTransportation Command (USTRANSCOM)or its component commands. Supportingcombatant commanders will select baseswithin their theaters to support a specificoperation. The supported combatantcommander will select or designate theaterbases to support the joint reception, staging,onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)of arriving forces.

e. Redeployment. Redeploymentinvolves the transfer of units, individuals,or supplies deployed in one area to another,to another location within the area, to the zoneof interior for the purpose of furtheremployment, or to CONUS and/or OCONUShome and/or demobilization stations for thepurpose of further operational employment ordemobilization. Postconflict missions mayaffect the redeployment flow. Commandersmust plan and execute redeployment in amanner that optimizes readiness ofredeploying forces and materiel to meet newcontingencies or crises. Redeployment willbe described more fully later in this chapter.

4. The Role of Mobilization

Deployment and redeployment operationsare integral to the mobilization processbecause they are the vital link betweennational resources and national objectives.Deployment and redeployment operationsallow the JFC to meet the requirements of aspecific contingency and set the conditionsfor mission success (see Figure I-2).

a. Graduated Response (GR). Aflexible decision making process referredto as GR controls the pace and extent ofmobilization. GR triggers readiness andresponse actions incrementally to providetimely, yet reversible, steps that increasethe US national security emergencypreparedness posture. The levels ofmobilization response include: selectivemobilization; Presidential Selected ReserveCallup; partial mobilization; fullmobilization; and total mobilization.When planning, commanders shouldunderstand that while levels ofmobilization are progressive in nature, theprocess does not always progress from alower level to a higher level.

Employment of the joint force may include foreign humanitarian assistancemissions or peacekeeping operations in austere, underdeveloped countries outsidenormal operational areas.

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See JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine forMobilization Planning.”

b. Support Planning. Supportedcombatant commanders are tasked in the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or by otherjoint operation planning authority, to preparespecific plans in their respective areas ofresponsibility (AORs). They specify thelevel of mobilization needed to support theplan and they identify time-phasedrequirements for RC forces. They alsoidentify the RC forces needed fordeployment in operational and support roles,and for backfill of deployed units. Thisplanning establishes the requirements forforces and sustainment upon which supportingmobilization plans are based. Supportingcombatant commanders, Services, anddefense agencies are tasked in the JSCP, orby other joint planning authority, to provide

augmentation forces and other support to adesignated supported combatant commanderor commanders. In this role, they may alsorequire mobilized assets to accomplish theirrespective support missions; their supportingplans include appropriate mobilizationrequirements. Detailed coordination isrequired to ensure the timely arrival of forcesand materiel essential to the JFC’s concept ofoperation. Mobilization and sustainmentcontinue until the joint force completes itsmission and redeploys as directed.

c. Resource Areas. Joint force operationsrequire assured capability to support andsustain the nation’s military forces.Deployment operations support the initialprojection of forces and, once they aredeployed, link the deployed force with theirhome station and the CONUS sustainmentbase. Ready supplies are stocks available

Figure I-2. Mobilization and Deployment and/or Redeployment

MOBILIZATION ANDDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REDEPLOYMENT

"SURGE AND EXPANDTHECONUS SUSTAINMENT BASE"

"PROJECT AND SUSTAINTHEJOINT FORCE GLOBALLY"

CONUSPOEPOD

Continental United StatesPort of EmbarkationPort of Debarkation

POEDEPLOYMENT

REDEPLOYMENT

POD

FORT

FACTORY

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Overview

for issue pending additional procurement orexpansion of the industrial base to supportanticipated requirements. Militarymobilization requires the assembly andorganization of resources in 12 interdependentresource areas (see Figure I-3). Planners andcommanders should understand thatmobilization decisions occurring in any onearea may have an influence on each of theother areas.

d. Demobilization. The personnel,equipment, and industrial infrastructuremobilized to support an operation will bedemobilized when they are no longerneeded to support the mission.

Demobilization usually results inredeployment requirements for gettingpersonnel and equipment back to homestation. Demobilization planning, ifrequired, must occur concurrently withredeployment planning. Demobilizationplans must reflect joint force post-operationsmission requirements and be synchronizedwith plans for recovery and redeployment.Although the overall focus of demobilizationgenerally is on units and individuals, thedemobilization of logistics also requiressignificant resources such as materiel andsupport activities.

5. Mobility Options

Rapid force projection with robust strategicmobility is the keystone to US NMS. Timelyresponse to crisis situations is critical to USdeterrent and warfighting capabilities. Thetimeliness of US response is a function ofrapid global mobility augmented byadequate intratheater lift assets andoverseas presence. Overseas presence,tailored to regional requirements, facilitatesforce projection by providing neededflexibility through prepositioning of assets andinfrastructure to support strategic mobilityoperations. The combination of rapid lift andprepositioned assets provides the supportedcombatant commander with flexible mobilityoptions that can be tailored to meet anycrisis situation. Transportation and mobilityassets are not a limitless resource. Supportedcombatant commanders must make prudentuse of transportation and mobility assetsapportioned or allocated for their use becausewasted lift is an opportunity lost forever.Squandering finite transportation andmobility resources including intertheaterand intratheater lift assets may lead toineffective employment of the joint force andmission failure.

For additional information, see JP 4-01,“Joint Doctrine for the DefenseTransportation System.”Figure I-3. Mobilization Resource Areas

MOBILIZATIONRESOURCE AREAS

MANPOWER

MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

TRANSPORTATION

FACILITIES

INDUSTRIAL BASE

TRAINING BASE

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

ENVIRONMENT

LEGAL AUTHORITIES

FUNDING

MOBILIZATIONRESOURCE AREAS

MANPOWER

MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

TRANSPORTATION

FACILITIES

INDUSTRIAL BASE

TRAINING BASE

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

ENVIRONMENT

LEGAL AUTHORITIES

FUNDING

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a. The Strategic Mobility Triad.Deployment and redeployment operationsnormally involve a combination of land (roadand rail), sea, and air movement augmented,as necessary, by prepositioned assets.Successful response to the range of militaryoperations depends on the availability ofsufficient mobility assets to rapidly deploycombat forces, sustain them in anoperational area as long as necessary to meetUS military objectives, and reconstitute andredeploy them to meet changing missionrequirements or to return to home and/ordemobilization stations upon completion oftheir mission. To meet this challenge,USTRANSCOM’s transportation componentcommands (TCCs) (Air Mobility Command[AMC], Military Sealift Command [MSC],and Military Traffic Management Command[MTMC]), exercise operational control(OPCON) of government-owned or-chartered transportation assets for use by allDepartment of Defense (DOD) elements and,as authorized, other agencies of the USGovernment or other approved users.

Common-user airlift, sealift, andprepositioned force, equipment, or supplies(PREPO) constitute the strategic mobilitytriad shown in Figure I-4.

• Common-User Airlift. The pool ofcommon-user airlift consists ofdesignated airlift assets from some orall of the following sources: activemilitary forces; RC military forces (AirForce Reserve, Air National Guard, andNaval Reserve); civil air carriers undercontract to AMC; the Civil Reserve AirFleet (CRAF), when activated;contracted commercial assets; andmultinational contributions and foreigncivil carriers, either donated or undercontract.

For additional information, see JP 3-17,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Theater AirliftOperations,” and JP 4-01.1, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forAirlift Support to Joint Operations.”

Figure I-4. The Strategic Mobility Triad

THE STRATEGIC MOBILITYTRIAD

SEALIFT

AIRLIFT

PREP

OSI

TIO

NING

I-9

Overview

• Common-User Sealift. The pool ofcommon-user sealift is composed ofdesignated shipping assets from someor all of the following sources: activegovernment-owned or controlledshipping; government-owned reserve orinactive shipping; US privately ownedand operated commercial shipping;Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement,when activated; US privately owned,approved foreign flag commercialshipping; and approved foreign-ownedand operated commercial shipping.

For additional information, see JP4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations.”

• Prepositioned Force, Equipment, orSupplies. To augment the deploymentof forces, prepositioned equipment forcombat and logistics units are storedaboard large ships or positioned instorage facilities ashore. These PREPOprograms may accelerate deploymentsby reducing closure times of combatand support forces needed in the earlystages of a crisis. The afloat prepositioningforce consists of the maritimeprepositioned ships and afloatprepositioned ships to support the needsof all four Services. Afloat PREPO,which involves the forward deploying ofequipment and supplies aboard ships,improves response time in a crisis whileadding flexibility and security. Shore-based PREPO, along with afloatprepositioning, is critical to reducingwartime demands on the DefenseTransportation System (DTS). The DTSis the portion of the nation’stransportation infrastructure that supportsDOD common-user transportation needsacross the range of military operations.Several war reserve stockage sites withunit equipment sets are available to

support the rapid deployment of forcesin response to crisis situations.

b. Other Lift Sources. The strategicmobility triad may be augmented by othertransportation and mobility sources whenrequired by mission requirements. Airliftsources include: strategic transportationassets that are not designated as common-user, such as theater airlift forces under thecombatant command (command authority)(COCOM) of designated geographiccombatant commanders; organic airliftforces providing specialized lift to specificusers; and donated or contracted third-party airlift assets. Surface transportationsources include: combat ships madeavailable for transport of ground and airforces; strategic applications of road, rail, andinland waterway transportation whereopen land routes between theaters areavailable for use; and donated or contractedthird-party surface transportation assets.Normally, the additional military airlift forcesexist as elements of Service or componentaviation arms and are assigned directly to theirprimary user organizations. Additionalmilitary airlift forces not designated ascommon-user, if assigned to a combatantcommand, usually operate under the COCOMof that combatant commander.

See JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).”

c. Operational and Tactical Mobility.There are numerous transportation andmobility resources available to a JFC tosupport deployment and redeploymentoperations within the AOR and/or jointoperations area (JOA). The type and numberof sources vary by theater and by missions.Normally, operational and tactical mobility isprovided through a combination ofresources including: organic assets assignedto the commander of a unified command forcommon transportation service; host-nation

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support (HNS) negotiated through bilateralor multilateral agreements; multinationalcivil transportation support organizations;or third-party logistics operations. Whenneeded, theater airlift forces may beaugmented by either assigning or attachingadditional airlift assets or, on an as neededbasis, under an appropriate tactical control orsupport relationship. Theater common-userland transportation is normally availablethrough the combatant commander’s ArmyService component command.

6. Deployment

The joint deployment process begins whenplanning is initiated for force projectionoperations. Normally, joint force deploymentis in response to an action or event thathappens in the world requiring the UnitedStates to respond by deploying forces andmateriel to protect US national interests.Actions or events which could trigger thedeployment process include naturaldisasters, civil support , FHA , UnitedNations (UN) actions and support toregional organizations (e.g., North AtlanticTreaty Organization [NATO] operations), orjoint force deployments in response to threatsto national interests such as OperationDESERT SHIELD. Some elements of thejoint force can conduct deployment operationswith organic or attached lift, and self-deployin support of the joint force mission. Themajority of the joint force, however, requiresa combination of organic and common-usertransportation assets to deploy in response tomission requirements.

a. Operational Environment. Deploymentsare a combination of dynamic directedactivities to support the JFC’s concept ofoperations for employment of the joint force.Employment and deployment planningdecisions are based on the anticipatedoperational environment to be encounteredin the AOR or JOA. The operationalenvironment is a composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect theemployment of military forces and bear onthe decisions of the JFC. The anticipatedoperational environment dictates the type ofentry operations, deployment concept, andmobility options needed to supportemployment of the joint force. Theoperational environment is generallydescribed by three conditions; permissive,uncertain, or hostile.

• Permissive Environment. A permissiveenvironment is an operationalenvironment in which host countrymilitary and law enforcement agencieshave control and have the intent andcapability to assist operations that a unitintends to conduct. In this situation, entryoperations during deployment areunopposed and the host country issupporting the deployment.

• Uncertain Environment. An uncertainenvironment is an operationalenvironment in which host governmentforces, whether opposed to or receptiveto operations that a unit intends toconduct, do not have totally effectivecontrol of the territory and populationin the intended area of operations. In thissituation, entry operations duringdeployment are generally unopposedbut could be opposed at any pointduring the deployment by forces orindividuals not under host governmentcontrol.

• Hostile Environment. A hostileenvironment is an operationalenvironment in which hostile forceshave control and the intent andcapability to effectively oppose or reactto the operations that a unit intends toconduct. In this situation, the deployingforce must conduct forcible entryoperations to secure a lodgment fordeployment of the joint force to ensurethe continuous landing of forces and

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Overview

materiel and provide space forsubsequent operations.

b. Scope of Deployment Operations.Deployment operations can generally beclassified as either movement (operations tomove forces and materiel from one point toanother) or maneuver (operations to gain apositional advantage with respect to an enemyforce) conducted at the strategic andoperational levels of warfare.

• Movement. During strategic deploymentsto support movement of the joint force,operational as well as tacticalconsiderations should be analyzedrelative to mission requirements andmovement efficiencies.

• Maneuver. Deployments supportingmaneuver of the joint force focus on thestrategic, operational, or tacticalconsiderations necessary to gain apositional advantage with respect to theenemy to accomplish the joint forcemission. Planning for these deploymentsis based primarily on the commander’sconcept of operations for employmentof the force in the AOR and/or JOA, thethreat, and the anticipated operationalenvironment. These factors helpdetermine the entry operations,deployment concept, and mobilityoptions required to successfully posturea joint force to accomplish the assignedmission. Strategic maneuver couldinclude the deployment of forwardpresence forces from one theater foremployment in another theater to createor exploit a strategic advantage.Deployments supporting operationalmaneuver could include operations toenvelop an enemy force, to compromisetheir current operational disposition, andplace the enemy force at a positionaldisadvantage.

c. The Deployment Process. Thedeployment process begins when forceprojection planning is initiated, often withthe NCA’s directive to accomplish a missionrequiring deployment of forces, and endswhen an integrated force arrives at theprescribed destination ready to conductoperations (see Figure I-5). In simple form,the deployment process encompasses fourprimary nodes (point of origin, port ofembarkation [POE], port of debarkation[POD], and destination) and three majormovement “legs” (point of origin to POE,POE to POD, POD to destination).

• Joint force deployment is a dynamic andcomplicated process with numerousprocess stakeholders and processseams, resulting from the multitude oforganizations and functional processesinvolved in deployment planning andexecution. Deployment stakeholdersinclude the supported commanderresponsible for mission accomplishment,operational commanders of forcesdeploying to execute a joint forcemission, and supporting commandersof forces and organizations supportingthe deployment portion of a forceprojection mission. Ideally, all processstakeholders should endeavor to strikea balance between operationaleffectiveness (defined by successfulmission accomplishment consistent withthe supported commander’s forceprotection concerns) and deploymentefficiency (optimal and economical useof deployment resources). Operationaleffectiveness, however, will normallytake priority over deployment efficiency.

• Process seams may occur at functionalor organizational interfaces whenphysical resources or information istransferred. Friction between operationaland supporting stakeholders or

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process seams reduces the operationaleffectiveness and efficiency of thed e p l o y m e n t p r o c e s s . M o r eimportantly, friction impedes overallmission accomplishment. Supportedcommanders reduce the impact ofdeployment f r ic t ion by: fu l lyunderstanding the deployment process;coordinating effectively with otherprocess stakeholders; ensuring thatsubordinate organizations maintaincurrent and accurate movement data;controlling changes to validated forcedeployment data; and followingestablished deployment proceduresduring training exercises, contingencies,or war.

d. Deployment Phases. For joint forceoperations, four major phases comprise thedeployment process: predeploymentactivities; movement to and activities atPOE; movement to POD; and JRSOI.These phases describe the major activities ofa joint force from point of origin (post, base,fort, home port, or camp) to a prescribeddestination (intermediate staging base [ISB],forward operating base, or tactical assemblyarea [TAA] in theater). These phases arecontinuous and iterative and are dependenton the JFC’s concept for employment andchanges in mission (see Figure I-6).

• Predeployment Activities. Predeploymentactivities include planning for and

Figure I-5. The Deployment Process

THE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

COMBATANT COMMANDS, SERVICES, AND/ORAGENCIES

(SOURCE to POE)

COMBATANT COMMANDS AND/OR SERVICECOMPONENTS

(POD to OPERATIONAL AREA)

USTRANSCOM(POE to POD)

APOE

AIRLIFTSEALIFT

PREPO

CONUS ORWORLDWIDE

APOD

SPODOPERATIONAL

AREA

STRATEGIC MOVEMENTOR MANEUVER

GLOBAL SUSTAINMENT

MOOTW

FULL RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

APODAPOECONUSMOOTWPOD

PREPOSPODSPOEUSTRANSCOM

Prepositioned Forces, Equipment, or SuppliesSeaport of DebarkationSeaport of EmbarkationUnited StatesTransportation Command

Aerial Port of DebarkationAerial Port of EmbarkationContinental United StatesMilitary Operations OtherThan WarPort of Debarkation

WAR

STRATEGICMOBILITY

TRIAD

SPOE

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Overview

preparation of forces to meet a missionneed. Predeployment activities are thoseactions taken at home station or point oforigin to prepare individuals, units,and materiel for deployment.Predeployment activities must becoordinated among the supportedcombatant command responsible foraccomplishment of the assigned mission,the Services, and the supportingcombatant commands providingforces for the joint force mission.Normally, supported combatantcommanders, their subordinatecommanders, and their Servicecomponents are responsible forproviding mission statements, theatersupport parameters, strategic liftallocations, applicable host nation (HN)

environmental standards, andprepositioned equipment planningguidance during predeploymentactivities.

•• Supported combatant commandersmust identify specific predeploymentstandards necessary to meet missionrequirements. The Services areresponsible to recruit, organize, train,and equip interoperable forces forassignment to combatant commands andto prepare plans for their mobilizationwhen required (see DOD Directive5100.1, “Functions of the Department ofDefense and Its Major SubordinateComponents”). Supporting combatantcommanders are responsible forproviding trained and mission-ready

Figure I-6. Strategic Deployment Planning and Execution

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

CRISIS OR EVENTREQUIRING DEPLOYMENT

OF MILITARY ASSETS

FUNCTION

DEPLOYMENTPROCESSPHASES

DEPLOYMENTPROCESSOWNER(S)

LOCATION OFDEPLOYMENT

PROCESSINTERFACES

PLANNINGSEQUENCE

(collaborativeand concurrent)

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

4EXECUTIONSEQUENCE

(iterative andcontinuous)

PREDEPLOYMENTACTIVITIES

SOURCINGCOMMAND

HOME STATION

MOVEMENTTOAND ACTIVITIES AT

PORT OFEMBARKATION

SOURCING COMMANDAND/OR

USTRANSPORTATIONCOMMAND

HOME STATIONTOPORT OF

EMBARKATION

MOVEMENTTOPORT OF

DEBARKATION

USTRANSPORTATION

COMMAND

PORT OFEMBARKATIONTO

PORT OFDEBARKATION

JOINT RECEPTION,STAGING, ONWARD

MOVEMENT, &INTEGRATION

SUPPORTEDCOMMAND

PORT OFDEBARKATIONTO

FINALDESTINATION

ACTIVITY

MISSION CAPABLEFORCE ARRIVES AT

DESTINATION

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forces to the supported combatantcommand. Service predeploymentactivities should be coordinated withsupporting combatant commandpredeployment activities to ensure thatpredeployment standards specified bythe supported combatant commander areachieved, supporting personnel andforces arrive in the supported theaterfully prepared to perform their mission,and deployment delays caused byduplication of predeployment efforts areeliminated.

•• Predeployment activities couldinclude: continued refinement of unitoperation plans (OPLANs); preparationof personnel and equipment formovement; preparation of unitized loadsof ammunition, supplies, and equipment;establishment of command relationshipsbased on the supported combatantcommander’s organization of forces;rehearsal of mission-essential tasks;conduct of mission-specific training;es tab l i shment o f sus ta inmentrequirements; time-phased force anddeployment data (TPFDD) refinementand sourcing; and focused awareness ofthe impact of threat, climate, andgeography in the AOR or JOA onplanned joint force activities.

•• Normally during predeployment,commanders echelon their units based onoperational considerations, movementschedules, and the type of strategic liftprojected. This process organizes andprioritizes movement within the jointforce to accommodate the available lift.For example, the movement plan mayechelon units into an advance party, mainbody, and rear party.

• Movement to and Activities at POE.POEs include seaports of embarkation(SPOEs) and aerial ports ofembarkation (APOEs). USTRANSCOM

is the DOD-designated singleworldwide manager for common-userports of embarkation and debarkation.

•• Because CONUS deploying unitsgenerally require a combination oforganic and common-user (includingcommercial and allied and/or coalitionassets) transportation assets to moverequired personnel and equipment toPOEs, movement to POEs withinCONUS is a shared responsibilitybetween the Services, other supportingcombatant commands (e.g., United StatesSpecial Operations Command[USSOCOM]), and USTRANSCOM.Organic lift movements are normallyexecuted under unit control andcoordinated by the deploying unit’st ranspor ta t ion managers w i thdesignated movement control agencies.Commercial movement to a POE withinCONUS is arranged by a unit’sinstallation transportation officer (ITO)or transportation management office(TMO) under the authority of theDefense Travel Regulation (ascoordinated through USTRANSCOM’sMTMC) to meet the timelines in the POEcall forward message.

•• Movement to OCONUS POEs is theresponsibility of the geographiccombatant commander whose theaterPOEs are being used to support thedeployment operation. In the eventtheater movement requirements exceedtheater capability, theater airlift assets canbe augmented with USTRANSCOMcommon-user assets at the request of thegeographic combatant commander.

•• Activities at POEs focus on staging,marshalling, and loading individuals,units, equipment, and materiel ondesignated transportation assets priorto movement to PODs. Load planningis driven by the deployment concept and

I-15

Overview

lift assets supporting deployment, theanticipated operational environment, andthe anticipated situation at the POD toreceive, offload, and reassemble missioncapable organizations. Forces andmateriel may be combat loaded, unitloaded, or administratively loaded fordeployment. Combat loading arrangespersonnel and equipment in a mannerdesigned to conform to the anticipatedtactical situation and is significantly lessefficient than unit or administrativeloading. Unit loading allows troop unitsto move with their equipment andaccompanying supplies on the sameconveyance. It is more efficient thancombat loading and maintains unitintegrity better than administrativeloading. Administrative loading givesprimary consideration to achievingmaximum utilization of troop andca r go space without regard totactical considerations. Equipment andaccompanying supplies must be sortedbefore they can be used.

•• During deployment, units areecheloned, configured, and scheduled for

movement based on TPFDD thatsynchronizes arriving personnel,equipment, and materiel with missionneeds. Time phasing allows for rapidtheater reception and onwardmovement of arriving personnel,equipment, and materiel.

•• In a typical deployment, commanderstemporarily lose direct control of unitpersonnel and equipment when theyembark on common-user transportationassets at the POE and while intransit. USTRANSCOM, through itssubordinate TCCs, assumestransportation and reportingresponsibilities (but not commandauthority) for embarked personnel,equipment, and materiel until they arriveat the POD and unload from common-user transportation. Transportation andreporting responsibilities includetransporting, accounting for, tracking,and guiding deploying personnel,equipment, and materiel from the POEto the POD. Accounting for and trackingof personnel and cargo is accomplishedusing the current and accurate

Detailed coordination is required between strategic and theater movement systemsto facilitate the expeditious reception and onward movement of forces and materielarriving at ports of debarkation.

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movement data using allocated spacesystems and assets provided by the forcesbeing moved. Joint total asset visibility(TAV) is critical to command and control(C2) of equipment and personneldeployment operations. Commanders ofthe deploying force have the inherentcommand responsibility to reassembletheir forces after movement consistentwith their mission requirements and taskorganization.

• Movement to POD. PODs includeseaports of debarkation (SPODs) andaerial ports of debarkation (APODs).Movement to PODs can be conductedusing common-user and organic orassigned and/or attached lift assets.

•• Movement to PODs on common-usertransportation is planned andexecuted by USTRANSCOM inconsultation with the supported andsupporting combatant commanders.USTRANSCOM’s primary responsibilityis to ensure operational effectivenessin support of the JFC’s deploymentrequirements while striving to attain themost efficient utilization of transportationresources. Alternatively, movement toPODs on organic or assigned and/orattached lift is the responsibility of thedeploying unit commander, in responseto mission guidance from the supportedJFC.

•• Successful deployments arecharacterized by careful planning andflexible execution. Careful and detailedplanning ensures that only requiredpersonnel, equipment, and materiel arescheduled for movement, unit movementchanges are minimized, and the flow ofpersonnel, equipment, and materiel intotheater does not exceed lift availabilityand the theater reception capability.

•• USTRANSCOM coordinates en routesupport, such as refueling, escort, andclearances, based on mutual supportagreements and foreign clearance guides.

• JRSOI. The last phase of deployment,in-theater JRSOI, is the responsibilityof the supported combatantcommander. Deployment is notcomplete until the deploying unit is afunctioning part of the joint force intheater.

•• Based on the supported combatantcommander’s movement control andJRSOI plan, transportation and reportingresponsibilities for deploying unitpersonnel, equipment, and materiel areinitially provided by designated theatersupport personnel. Complete control isreturned to the deploying unitcommander when personnel, equipment,and materiel arrive at and transitionthrough the marshalling area.

•• Units deploying on organic or externallift assets must coordinate in-theaterarrival with the supported combatantcommand to facilitate terrainmanagement and in-theater reception.Again, in the event additional lift assetsare needed in theater to support onwardmovement of arriving forces andmateriel, theater lift assets may beaugmented by various means ascoordinated by the supported combatantcommander’s movement control elementwith supporting commands or the HN.

•• JRSOI is the critical link betweendeployment and employment of thejoint forces in the AOR or JOA. Thetime between the initial arrival of thedeploying unit and its operationalemployment is potentially the period ofits greatest vulnerability. During this

I-17

Overview

transition period, the deploying unit maynot fully sustain itself, defend itself, orcontribute to mission accomplishmentbecause some of its elements have notattained required mission capability.JRSOI planning is focused on therapid integration of deploying units toquickly make them functioning andcontributing members of the joint force.The JRSOI objective is to create aseamless flow of personnel, equipment,and materiel from offload at PODsthrough employment as reassembled,mission-capable forces.

For additional information on JRSOIsee JP 4-01.8, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for JointReception, Staging, Onward Movement,and Integration.”

7. Redeployment

Redeployment activities are directed at thetransfer of individuals, units, and/ormateriel and can begin at any point duringjoint force operations. For this reason,redeployment planning should occur early

in the joint operation planning process soplanned redeployment operations reflect exitor transition strategy concerns developedduring mission analysis. Redeployment isnot merely reversing the deploymentprocess. Redeployments are planned andexecuted as discrete, mission-based operationswithin the overall context of the joint forcemission. Redeployment may includemovement of individuals, units, and/ormateriel deployed in one area to another, toanother location within the same area, to thezone of interior for the purpose of furtheremployment, or to CONUS and/or OCONUShome and/or demobilization stations forreintegration and/or out-processing. Someelements of the joint force may conductredeployment operations with organic orassigned and/or attached lift and redeploy ontheir own without external assistance. Themajority of the joint force, however, requiresa combination of organic and common-user transportation assets to redeploy.Force protection is as important duringredeployment as during any other stage of thejoint operation. The time betweenredeployment preparation and operationalemployment at the new destination or return

The objective of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is theexpeditious assembly of mission-capable forces.

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to the home and/or demobilization station ispotentially a period of great vulnerability forthe redeploying unit. During this transitionperiod, the redeploying unit may not be ableto fully sustain or defend itself because someor all of its elements are configured formovement and may not have full missioncapability. Equally important in theredeployment process is a complete reviewof the environmental considerationsapplicable in the HN environment. Failure totake the HN requirements for environmentalcompliance into account may delay theefficient redeployment of units to a follow-on location while substantially increasing thecost of the deployment.

a. Operational Environment. Redeploymentoperations are normally conducted toreposture forces and materiel in the sametheater, to transfer forces and materiel tosupport another JFC’s concept of operationsfor employment, or to return personnel andmateriel to home station and/ordemobilization stations upon completion oftheir mission. Similar to deploymentoperations, redeployment planningdecisions to reposture, transfer, or returnforces and materiel are based on theoperational environment in the AOR or JOAat the time of redeployment. The operational

environment dictates the level of forceprotection measures required to ensure anuninterrupted redeployment flow, theredeployment policy of the supportedcombatant commander, and the mobilityoptions needed to support the redeployment.

• Permissive Environment. A permissiveenvironment for redeploymentoperations is generally characterized bya cessation of hostilities and minimumthreat or risk . The host country militaryand law enforcement agencies havecontrol and the intent and capability toassist unit transition and redeploymentoperations.

• Uncertain Environment. In anuncertain environment redeploymentoperations are generally unopposed,but could be opposed at any pointduring the redeployment by forces orindividuals not under host governmentcontrol. Typical redeployment operationsin this situation could include theretrograde of personnel and materiel toreshape the force (e.g., exchanging anarmored force for a light infantry forcebecause of changing missionrequirements), or unit and/or individualrotations (exchange of same type RC

Redeployment may occur at any point during joint force operations.

I-19

Overview

units, volunteers or individual readyreserves) out of theater.

• Hostile Environment. Redeploymentoperations may have to be executed whilehostile forces have control and the intentand capability to effectively oppose orreact to the operations conducted by thejoint force. In this environment, theredeploying force can conduct the sameredeployment missions outlined abovebut may have to do so while activelyengaged with the enemy, while facingan imminent threat, or while operatingin a high risk environment.

b. Scope of Redeployment Operations.Redeployment operations can generally beclassified as the movement of forces andmateriel either from a theater back to homestation or to another location within the areafor the purpose of further employment.

• Movement. During redeployments tosupport movement of the joint force,tactical considerations may be sacrificedfor speed, control, and efficiency duringmovement. These redeployments are:conducted when little or no threat isanticipated that could impede or interdictthe transportation flow; seeking the mostexpeditious means to rapidly move forcesand materiel; and focused on the simplemovement from one location to anotherof forces and materiel in support ofthe joint force mission. Tacticalredeployment could include movementof a force from a sector in the JOA notin contact with the enemy to the jointrear area for later deployment as part ofan operational maneuver. Movement atthe strategic or operational level couldinclude redeployment of the joint forceupon completion of its mission withinthe AOR and/or JOA.

c. Redeployment Process. Likedeployment, the redeployment process

encompasses four primary nodes (point oforigin, POE, POD, and destination) and threemajor movements (point of origin to POE,POE to POD, POD to destination). Theredeployment process has the same processstakeholders and seams as the deploymentprocess. Again, friction between operationaland supporting stakeholders or process seamsreduces the operational effectiveness andefficiency of the redeployment processand could impede overall missionaccomplishment. Supported commandersreduce redeployment friction through thesame means used during deployment.

d. Redeployment Phases. For joint forceoperations, four major phases comprise theredeployment process: recovery andreconstitution and preredeployment activities;movement to and activities at POE; movementto POD; and JRSOI activities. These phasesdescribe the major activities of the jointforce from point of origin (tactical location)to a staging area in another theater or homeand/or demobilization station and aredependent on the supported combatantcommander’s defined end state, concept forredeployment, or requirement to supportanother JFC’s concept of operations.

• Recovery and reconstitution andpreredeployment activities. Aftercompletion of or a change in operationalrequirements, forces recover andreconstitute for redeployment. Recoveryand reconstitution is a Serviceresponsibility and should be based onService doctrine and procedures forrestoring combat capability.

•• Units move to designated stagingareas (SAs) to assemble personnel,equipment, and materiel and focus onaccounting for, assuring readiness of, andpreparing individuals, units, and materielfor redeployment. Operationalrequirements may have necessitatedalteration to the organization of some

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units after their arrival in the AOR and/or JOA. These units should be reunitedprior to redeployment to facilitate optimalreadiness and deconflict predeploymentactivities.

•• Preredeployment activities are thoseactions redeploying units must executeto prepare for movement anddeparture from their current location .These activities are generally a unit orService responsibility, but may involvecoordination with theater staff elementsor the joint force headquarters. Thesupported combatant commander isresponsible for the redeploymentTPFDD. Redeployment activities couldinclude the following: refinement of unitredeployment plans; preparation ofpersonnel and equipment for return toCONUS (e.g., US Customs and/or USDepartment of Agriculture inspections)or other movement; settlement of HNSaccounts; spill response and site clean-up; proper disposal of hazardous andother wastes; validation of movementrequirements and priorities for backhaulof combat forces and materiel; andaccountability and turn-in of PREPOequipment and materiel.

• Movement to and activities at POE.Movement to a POE within the theater isthe responsibility of the supportedgeographic combatant commander.Redeploying units will comply with thesupported combatant commander’spolicy for redeployment, movementcontrol plan, and the orders provided bytheater movement control agencies.

•• Some units may conduct movementto POE with organic lift assets. However,the majority of redeploying unitsgenerally require a combination oforganic and theater transportationassets to assemble the required personneland equipment at POE. Organic liftmovements are normally coordinated bythe redeploying unit’s transportationmanagers and controlled by theestablished theater control architecture.Again, theater lift assets to supportassembly of a joint force at POEs maybe augmented by various means ascoordinated by the supported combatantcommander’s movement control elementwith supporting commands or the HN.

•• Redeployment planning andexecution is also based on a TPFDD.

Redeployment operations focus on the expeditious return of personnel andequipment to restore unit readiness and maintain mission capability.

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Overview

TPFDD development and movementscheduling should optimize the availablecargo capacity in allocated lift assets andthe reception capacity of the POD.During strategic movement to anotherAOR, the TPFDD will be developed bythe gaining combatant commander.

•• USTRANSCOM is responsible formanagement of common-user POEs.Activities at the POE focus onmarshalling, capturing in-transitvisibility (ITV) data, and loadingindividuals, units, equipment, andmateriel on designated transportationassets prior to movement to the POD.Again, commanders temporarily losedirect control of unit personnel andequipment when they embark oncommon-user transportation assets atthe POE and while in transit.USTRANSCOM’s TCCs assumet ranspor ta t i on and repor t i ngresponsibilities for in-transit personnel,equipment, and materiel until they arriveat the POD and unload from common-user transportation.

• Movement to POD. Movement toPODs can be conducted using common-user and organic or assigned and/orattached lift assets. Movement byorganic or assigned and/or attached liftis the responsibility of the redeployingunit commander in accordance withmission guidance from the supportedJFC.

•• Tactical cross-loading and echeloningof forces is required for redeployment tosupport the mission of employment of ajoint force in another operational area.

•• Again, USTRANSCOM’s primaryresponsibility in supporting movement tothe POD is to ensure effective supportfor the JFC’s redeployment requirements,while striving to attain the most efficient

utilization of transportation resources.USTRANSCOM coordinates en routesupport, such as refueling, escort, andclearances, based on mutual supportagreements and foreign clearance guides.

• JRSOI. JRSOI is the final phase ofredeployment. Responsibility forreception, staging, onward movement,and integration from a POD duringredeployment operations is determinedby the post-redeployment mission of theredeploying force and the mode oftransportation. Redeployment for furtheremployment will involve JRSOI in thenew AOR and/or JOA. Redeploymentto the home and/or demobilization stationor point of origin for return to peacetimepositioning or demobilization willinvolve POD JRSOI coordinated andexecuted by the Services andUSTRANSCOM for common-userPODs and by the respective Service orunit for forces redeploying by organicassets to non common-user PODs.

•• Onward movement by common-useror commercial lift from a common-usersurface POD to the home and/ordemobilization station or point of originis arranged by MTMC in conjunctionwith Service and/or the force-designatedmovement control center (MCC).Onward movement from AMC APODsis the responsibility of AMC, and fromcommercial and/or non-AMC militaryAPODs onward movement is theresponsibility of the personnel assistancepoints or ITO and/or TMO responsiblefor the geographic area of those ports.

•• Recovery and reconstitution activitiesnot completed in theater beforeredeployment may continue at anintermediate staging site, either en routeto the next theater or after the unit’sarrival at the home and/or demobilizationstation. Materiel stockage levels must

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satisfy war reserve materiel requirements.Immediate recovery and reconstitution offorces and materiel parallels integrationefforts by ensuring that the Armed Forcesof the United States are prepared for thenext action or event requiringdeployment of US resources.

•• Demobilization of RC forces, ifrequired, is considered duringredeployment planning and shouldprovide for the expeditious return,reintegration, and outprocessing of RCpersonnel based on Service demobilizationplans and pol ic ies. However,consideration must be given to thesupported commander’s immediatepost operations requirements. Thesupported commander’s post operationsmission and priorities should takeprecedence over all other redeploymentplanning.

•• When units or individuals redeploy,reintegration processing must be doneprior to returning active duty Servicemembers to their permanent duty stationsor demobilizing RC Service members.Reintegration includes medical andsecurity debriefs, clothing and equipmentturn-in, and update of personnel andfinance records.

“Operation DESERT SHIELD was thefastest build up and movement ofcombat power across greater distancesin less time than at any other time inhistory. It was an absolutely giganticaccomplishment, and I can’t give creditenough to the logisticians andtransporters who were able to pull thisoff.”

General H. Norman SchwarzkopfCommander in Chief, US Central

Command

CHAPTER IIRESPONSIBILITIES

II-1

1. General

a. The strategic deployment andredeployment of the joint force involvesnumerous commands and agencies, theprocess stakeholders discussed earlier. Thischapter identifies the responsibilities, roles,and relationships of the primarycommands and agencies involved indeployment and redeployment operations.Force projection can not occur without well-planned, fully coordinated, and well executeddeployment and redeployment operations.

b. Basic responsibilities for JFCs and othersupporting agencies are outlined in JP 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” andJP 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the DefenseTransportation System.” Clearly articulatingresponsibilities is the first step in fullysynchronized and coordinated deploymentand redeployment operations supporting thefull spectrum of joint force missions.

“All over the ship the tension that had been slowly building up since ourdeparture was now approaching its climax. Even the Yellow Sea rushingpast the ship’s sides seemed to bespeak the urgency of our mission. Thatnight, about half past two, I took a turn around the deck. The ship wasblacked out from stem to stern. At their posts and battle stations the crewmembers were alert and silent, no longer exchanging the customary banter.At the bow I stood listening to the rush of the sea and watched the fierysparklets of phosphorescence as the dark ship plowed toward the target,the armada of other craft converging on the same area, all now past thepoint of no return. Within five hours, 40,000 men would act boldly, in hopethat 100,000 others manning the thin defense lines in South Korea wouldnot die. I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadfulresults would rest on judgment day against my soul.”

Thoughts of General Douglas MacArthur in the predawn hours prior to theInchon landings, Reminiscences, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

2. Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is responsiblefor the assignment of forces and liftresources to the combatant commands toperform missions assigned to thosecommands and for strategic interagencycoordination at the national level. Inaddition, the Secretary of Defense isresponsible for transportation planningand operations within the Departmentof Defense. The Secretary of Defense hasdesignated the Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense (Logistics) to establish policies andprovide guidance to DOD componentsconcerning the effective and efficient useof the DTS. The Secretary of Defense hasdesignated the Commander in Chief,United States Transportation Command(USCINCTRANS) as the DOD singlemanager for transportation (other than forService-unique or theater-assignedtransportation assets) during times of peaceand war.

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3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff

a. As the principal military advisor to thePresident, National Security Council, and theSecretary of Defense, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is assignedspecific supervisory and joint operationplanning responsibilities in the areas ofstrategic direction, strategic planning, andjoint operation planning. The Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities mostdirectly related to deployment andredeployment operations include thefollowing.

• Prepares joint logistics and mobility plansto support strategic plans andrecommends the assignment of logisticsand mobility responsibilities to theMilitary Services in accordance withthose plans.

• Provides for the preparation and reviewof joint OPLANs that conform to policyguidance from the President and theSecretary of Defense.

• Prepares joint logistics and mobilityplans to support joint OPLANs,recommends the assignment of logisticsand mobility responsibilities to theArmed Forces in accordance with thoselogistics and mobility plans, andascertains the logistic support availableto execute the general war and jointOPLANs of the combatant commanders.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffalso will review and recommend to theSecretary of Defense appropriatelogistics guidance for the MilitaryServices that, if implemented, will resultin logistics readiness consistent withapproved plans.

• Advises the Secretary of Defense oncritical deficiencies and strengths in forcecapabilities (including manpower,logistics, and mobility support) identifiedduring the preparation and review ofOPLANs and assesses the effect of noteddeficiencies and strengths on meetingnational security objectives, policies, andstrategic plans.

• Prepares integrated plans for militarymobilization.

The Secretary of Defense has designated the USCINCTRANS as the DODsingle manager for transportation during peace and war.

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Responsibilities

• Participates, as directed, in thepreparation of multinational plans formilitary action in conjunction with thearmed forces of other nations.

• Oversees the activities of the combatantcommands.

• Reviews the plans and programs ofcombatant commanders to determinetheir adequacy, consistency, acceptability,and feasibility for the performance ofassigned missions.

• Provides guidance and direction to thecombatant commanders on aspects of C2that relate to the conduct of operations.

b. For deployment and redeploymentoperations, as part of joint operation planningand execution, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff is responsible for the following.

• Provides oversight management ofdeployment systems used in thedeployment process.

• Develops a standardized jointdeployment planning and execution

process, with common data elements andterms, supported by clearly delineatedprocedures for implementationthroughout the Joint Planning andExecution Community (JPEC).

• Establishes procedures (in coordinationwith the Assistant Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense [TransportationPolicy], the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments, and the Defense LogisticsAgency [DLA]) for the submission ofmovement requirements by DOD usercomponents to USTRANSCOM and forthe submission of evaluated requirementsand capabilities by USTRANSCOM andthe TCCs to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.

• Prescribes a movement priority systemin agreement with Uniform MaterialMovement and Issue Priority System thatwill ensure responsiveness to meet theneeds of the using forces.

• Moni tors the capabi l i t ies ofUSTRANSCOM common-usertransportation resources to provide airlift,sealift, CONUS land transportation,

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for monitoring the capabilityof common-user transportation to ensure it meets the requirements of DODcomponents.

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common-user ocean terminal service, andaerial port service based upon therequirements of DOD components.

• Monitors the capabilities of United StatesSpace Command (USSPACECOM) toprovide military, civil, commercial, andinternational space systems support todeployment and redeployment operations.

• Assigns movement priorities in supportof DOD components based uponcapabilities reported by USTRANSCOM.

• Apportions strategic lift assets throughthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffInstruction (CJCSI) 3110.01A, “JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),” andCJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplementto Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

• Allocates strategic lift assets through theCJCS execute order to the supportedcombatant commander.

• If required, acts on the recommendationsof the Theater-Joint TransportationBoard (T-JTB) with respect to theestablishment of priorities andapportionment for the use of airlift, sealift,

and surface transportation capability.The T-JTB monitors the balancebetween DOD transportationrequirements and capabilities throughclose liaison with the combatantcommanders and USTRANSCOM.Once armed with CJCS priorities,USTRANSCOM closely collaborateswith the combatant commander(s) andother CJCS-designated agencies to meetNCA objectives while keeping Joint Staffdirectorates informed. Serviceparticipation and considerations intransportation decision making areappropriately raised through supportedService components to the combatantcommander. USCINCTRANS refersproblems with recommended courses ofaction (COAs) to the T-JTB forresolution or adjudication if a balanceof transportation requirements andcapabilities cannot be maintained.

• Develops, implements, monitors, andassesses joint education and trainingprograms to improve deployment andredeployment planning and execution.

• Ensures tha t dep loyment andredeployment planning and execution is

Military Traffic Management Command coordinates all common-user landtransportation for forces based in the continental United States.

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Responsibilities

assessed during all joint force operationsas well as CJCS and combatantcommand-sponsored joint exercises.

c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffissues deployment preparation orders,deployment orders, and redeploymentorders for execution of deployment andredeployment operations after authorizationby the Secretary of Defense.

See Appendix D, “Deployment PreparationOrders, Deployment Orders, RedeploymentOrders, and Request for Forces,” andChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual(CJCSM) 3122.01, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning Policies and Procedures),” forexamples.

4. Commander in Chief, UnitedStates TransportationCommand

a. USCINCTRANS responsibilities areassigned by the Unified Command Plan(UCP) and include the following.

• Provide air, land, and sea transportationand common-user port management atair and sea POE and/or POD for theDepartment of Defense across the rangeof military operations. Also provide airtransportation to numerous non-DODagencies at the direction of the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff.

• Exercise COCOM of all assigned forces.(RC forces only when mobilized orordered to active duty for other thantraining. This includes CRAF andNational Defense Reserve Fleet liftassets).

• Exercise responsibility for global air,land, and sea transportation planning(deliberate and crisis action).

• Act as the DOD focal point for items inthe transportation pipeline. Continuedevelopment and integration of the globaltransportation network (GTN) into theGlobal Command and Control System(GCCS) and the Global Combat SupportSystem (GCSS).

• Exercise responsibility for strategic(non-theater assigned) aeromedicalevacuation.

b. Further, USCINCTRANS will overseethe following.

• Provide geographic combatantcommanders with coordinatedtransportation planning expertiserequired during the deliberate planningprocess. This includes reviewing theJSCP tasking, analyzing supportedcombatant commander requirementsregistered in the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System (JOPES) fortransportation feasibility, and advisingthe combatant commander of changesrequired to produce a sustainable forcedeployment concept. In addition, provideplan maintenance support to thesupported combatant commander asrequired or directed by the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Provide deployment estimates and totallift asset availability to the NCA andsupported combatant commanders fordevelopment of alternative COAs andoptimal flow of forces during crisis actionplanning (CAP). USTRANSCOM willalso advise supported combatantcommanders and the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff concerning use ofor changes to lift allocations.

• Assist the supported combatantcommander and ensure that validatedmovement requirements are routed andscheduled for maximum support during

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deployment, sustainment, andredeployment. This will ensure the mostefficient use of strategic lift resources.USTRANSCOM will assist theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff byrecommending reallocation of strategiclift assets to optimize their use andsupport plan execution duringdeployment, employment, sustainment,reconstitution, and redeployment.

5. Geographic CombatantCommands

a. Combatant commanders are responsiblefor the development and production of jointOPLANs, OPLANs in concept format(CONPLANs), and functional plans(FUNCPLANs). During peacetime, they actto deter war and prepare for war byplanning for the transition to and from warand MOOTW . During war , combatantcommanders plan and conduct campaignsand military operations to accomplishassigned missions. Their joint operationplanning responsibilities are described in theUCP, JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF),” and JP 5-0, “Doctrine forPlanning Joint Operations,” and includeconducting deployment and redeployment

operations within assigned geographic orfunctional areas. Commanders of geographiccombatant commands are responsible forcoordinating with USTRANSCOM andsupporting combatant commanders to providean integrated transportation system fromorigin to destination during deployment andredeployment operations.

b. Responsibilities of SupportedCombatant Commanders. Supportedcombatant commanders are responsible fordeployment and redeployment operationsplanned and executed during joint forcemissions in their AOR. This responsibilityincludes identification of the movement,timing, and sequence of deploying forces inTPFDD, reception and integration ofsupporting units and materiel arriving intheater to support the operation, and assistingthese units in recovery and reconstitution priorto redeployment. Working through the USDepartment of State, supported combatantcommanders negotiate HN diplomaticclearances and reception POD access for alldeploying forces. For air movements,supported combatant commanders mustensure that overf l ight and landingclearances are secured prior to the departureof forces from POEs. Supported combatant

In addition to common-user transportation, the Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command is responsible for strategic aeromedical evacuation.

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Responsibilities

c o m m a n d e r s h a v e f o u r m a j o rresponsibilities relative to deployment andredeployment operations: build and validatemovement requirements; determinepredeployment standards; balance andregulate the transportation flow; and manageeffectively (see Figure II-1).

• Build and Validate MovementRequirements. Supported combatantcommanders must ensure thatUSTRANSCOM and its TCCs clearlyunderstand the strategic and theatertransportation requirements to supportthe commander in chief ’s (CINC’s)strategic concept. Understanding beginswith supporting commands and agenciesproviding accurate (unit verified)movement data for use in planningand execution. To facilitate this process,the supported combatant commanderpublishes a letter of instruction (LOI)providing specific guidance forsupporting combatant commanders,Services, and agencies. The supportedcombatant commander validates

movement requirements for all forcesand agencies deploying or redeployingin support of an operation. Expeditiousand thorough validation of joint forcemovement requirements requirescomprehensive and coordinatedvalidation procedures that arecontinuously evaluated and refined withcomponent commands and supportingagencies during training. The supportedcombatant commander providesvalidated movement requirements toUSTRANSCOM for planning andexecution of strategic movement. Inaddition, supported geographiccombatant commanders also designatelatest arrival dates and required deliverydates to USTRANSCOM. Thesupported combatant commanderspecifies key employment informationregarding when, where, and how forceswill be employed. Service componentcommanders play a key role in advisingthe supported combatant commanderregarding the appropriate types of andmissions for forces in theater.

Figure II-1. Responsibilities of Supported Combatant Commanders

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPORTEDCOMBATANT COMMANDERS

Build and Validate Movement Requirements

Determine Predeployment StandardsPreparation for Overseas MovementPredeployment Training

Balance and Regulate the Transportation Flow

Manage Effectively

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPORTEDCOMBATANT COMMANDERS

Build and Validate Movem

Determine Predeploymen

Balance and Regulate the

Manage Effectively

RESPONSIBCOMBAT

Build and Validate Movement Requirements

Determine Predeployment StandardsPreparation for Overseas MovementPredeployment Training

Balance and Regulate the Transportation Flow

Manage Effectively

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Employment information provided bythe supported combatant commanderhelps to ensure that USTRANSCOMplanners schedule movement consistentwith the concept of operations.

• Determine Predeployment Standards.Supported combatant commandersestablish predeployment standards foraugmentation or replacement personneland forces supporting their operations.Predeployment standards outline thebasic command policies, training, andequipment requirements necessary toprepare supporting personnel andforces for the tactical, environmental,and/or medical conditions in theater.The Services’ and Commander in Chief,United States Special OperationsCommand’s role is to ensure thatdesignated forces for combatantcommands are trained, maintained, andready in accordance with thesepredeployment standards. Predeploymentstandards help ensure that all supportingpersonnel and forces arrive in theaterfully prepared to perform their mission.

•• Preparation for OverseasMovement. Preparation for overseasmovement is a Service responsibility.Specific responsibility for preparation foroverseas movement rests with thedeploying unit or losing organization inthe case of individual augmentees orreplacements. Preparation for overseasmovement can include review ofpersonal Service records and legaldocuments, medical processing toinclude updating inoculations, receipt oftheater-specific organizational clothingand equipment, theater-specific culturalor environmental protection training, andrefresher weapons training prior tomovement. Conducting this trainingprior to deployment movementnormally facilitates rapid assimilationand integration of arriving forces andpersonnel in theater. Usually, thedeploying unit commander mustacknowledge completion of specifiedpreparation for overseas movementrequirements to the supported commandduring predeployment activities. Insome instances, legal constraints may be

PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION: TWO PERSPECTIVES

“Prior to a unit’s initial deployment, there was usually time for some finaltraining and organization, but not always. Haste often undermined a unit’sreadiness. . . Although the 1st Cavalry [Division] had been training for twoyears as the 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, its members had receivedno jungle training and the division was issued M16 rifles only ten days prior toits departure, resulting in a hurried familiarization program.”

“Marines, prior to shipping out to ‘WestPac,’ returned from leave to a stagingbattalion. Staging battalions provided a final bit of pre-Vietnam refreshertraining and was a catchall for shots and paperwork before departure. EvenMarines who had previously been to Vietnam went through a staging battalionbefore returning for another tour. . .Marine replacements went through a stagingregimen that included three weeks of refresher infantry training, instruction intopics relating to Vietnam — such as booby traps — and the bureaucraticpaper-pushing that accompanies all military moves.”

SOURCE: A Life in a Y ear: The American Infantryman in V ietnam1965 - 1972 by James R. Ebert

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Responsibilities

materiel into theater with missionrequirements.

“Decisions made on the front endconcerning what to send will directlyaffect fighting effectiveness on theother end. Not enough stevedores andship-handling equipment forward earlyenough in building the theater mightdelay the unloading of combat vehiclesand ultimately defeat the intendedpurpose of putting the vehicles on theground first.”

Certain V ictory: The US Army inthe Gulf W ar by Brigadier General

Robert H. Scales

•• Supported combatant commandersbalance the transportation flow of thejoint force through effectiveemployment planning. Balance isprimarily a function of force compositionand transportation flow but must alsoconsider planned theater distribution(TD) and JRSOI capabilities. Forcecomposition and transportation flowmust accommodate mission requirementsproviding the supported combatantcommander with the operationalflexibility and freedom of action requiredfor successful mission execution.Operational environment, availableinfrastructure, force protection riskassessment considerations, and theconcept of operations are major factorsin determining how to balance thetransportation flow and sequence oftheater arrival of combat and supportforces.

•• Supported combatant commandersregulate the transportation flow byensuring that adequate support andreception assets, effectively coordinatedthrough a theater reception plan, areeither available at the POD ordeployed early in the movementschedule to facilitate TD and JRSOI.

in place that affect personnel readinessif specific training requirements have notbeen completed.

•• Predeployment Training. Inaddition to preparation for overseasmovement activities, supportedcombatant commanders may identifymission-specific training requirementsthat supporting individuals or unitsmust complete before operationalemployment. This training may beconducted at home station prior todeployment or en route to the operationalarea, depending upon the supportedcombatant commander’s deploymentconcept. The supported combatantcommander should, at a minimum,specify theater-unique clothing andequipment requirements and mission-essential tasks to be trained prior to arrivalin theater.

• Balance and Regulate the TransportationFlow. While developing requirementsand priorities, supported geographiccombatant commanders coordinate withUSTRANSCOM to ensure that theplanned theater movement controlsystem will be ready to manage thethroughput from strategic movement.At a minimum, the theater receptioncapability must accommodate joint forcemission requirements. Ideally, the theaterreception capability will accommodatemission requirements and provide thesupported combatant commanders withsome operational flexibility for missionexecution. Often, force protectionconcerns cause the supported combatantcommander to accelerate the deploymentof combat units ahead of supportelements. This situation may degradeactual combat effectiveness. To precludethis, supported combatant commandersshould balance and regulate thetransportation flow of forces and

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This will expedite the reception ofcombat unit personnel and materiel inthe operational area. Effective controlof theater reception operations includesestablishment of a theater movementcontrol organization with adequatecommunications capability and priorityto coordinate strategic movement andestablishment of POD support activities.POD support activities may includearrival/departure airfield control groups(A/DACGs), port support activity (PSA),port operations group (POG), or othermovement control activities that receiveand manage the onward movement offorces and materiel. To further eliminatemovement flow problems, transportationnodes should not be used as joint forcestaging areas and POD support activitiesshould not be responsible for life supportof transient forces.

• Manage Effectively. In order to moreefficiently manage and control logisticsand transportation support at the theaterlevel, combatant commanders mayorganize functional boards or centersto centrally manage critical assets andmore effectively react to unforeseencircumstances. The overall objective isto effectively support joint forceoperations while striving to attainefficient support operations.

See JP 4-0, “Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations,” for furtherinformation.

The following functional boards orcenters may have key roles in theplanning and execution of deploymentand redeployment operations:

•• Use of T-JTB and/or Joint MovementCenter (JMC). Transportation is acritical asset in any operation requiringthe movement of military forces.Combatant and subordinate commands

need the capability to rapidly changetransportation resource allocation toadjust to changing circumstances orimmediately react to emergency orunant ic ipated s i tuat ions. Onerecommendation for effective control oftheater transportation assets is theestablishment of a T-JTB. Proceduresfor establishing the T-JTB are developedduring peacetime to facilitate rapid stand-up and execution under emergency orwartime conditions. The T-JTB’s role isto resolve contentious transportationissues within their command, such asallocating transportation apportionmentamong components for unit movement,non-unit movement, and resupply.Another effective transportation controloption is the establishment of a JMC. TheJMC is responsible for coordinating theemployment of all modes of theatertransportation (including that which isprovided by allies, coalition partners, orthe HN) to support the theater conceptof operations. When used, the JMCshould be the single coordinator for allmovement into, through, and out of thetheater. Specifically, it is the supportedcombatant commander’s focal point forstrategic movements and should overseethe execution of theater transportationpriorities.

For additional information on the JMCand theater movement control, refer toJP 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Movement Control,”Appendix A, “Joint Movement CenterOrganization.”

•• Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).Combatant commanders and subordinatecommands may form LRCs to monitorand coordinate the theater logisticseffort. At the theater level, the LRC isoperated by the combatant commandlogistics staff to monitor the overalllogistics status by commodity in

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Responsibilities

theater. The LRC receives reports fromService components and externalsources, distills information forpresentation to the combatantcommander, and responds to questions.Within the LRC, the combatantcommand logistics staff performs fourkey functions: monitors current andevolving theater logistics capabilities;coordinates logistic support withupcoming operations; advises thecombatant commander on the logisticssupportability of proposed operations orCOAs; and acts as the combatantcommander’s agent and advocate to non-theater logistics organizations.

•• Director of Mobility Forces(DIRMOBFOR). The DIRMOBFORworks directly for the Air Forcecomponent commander or joint force aircomponent commander as the designatedcoordinating authority for air mobilitywith all commands and/or agencies, bothinternal and external to the combatantcommand. The DIRMOBFOR providesdirection to the air mobility divisionin the air operations center and willnormally be a senior officer withextensive air mobility expertise andfamiliarity with the AOR. TheDIRMOBFOR may be sourced by thetheater Air Force component commanderor nominated by USCINCTRANS; whenUSTRANSCOM intertheater airmobility forces are employed in supportof a JFC, the DIRMOBFOR should haveexperience in intertheater air mobilityoperations.

• Environmental Stewardship. Supportedcommanders are ultimately theenvironmental steward to their theater.As such, they are entrusted with theresponsible protection of resources intheir theaters. Environmentalstewardship is embodied in theprevention of pollution, compliance with

applicable laws, regulations, executiveorders, and policy, and conservation ofnatural, cultural, and historic resources.

c. Responsibilities of SupportingCombatant Commanders. Certainsituations may require that one combatantcommander support another combatantcommander. Support is a commandrelationship obligating the supportingorganization to aid, protect, complement, orsustain the supported organization.Supporting missions during deployment andredeployment of the joint force could include:the deployment or redeployment of forces toor from a supporting combatant command;sponsorship of en route basing or in-transitstaging areas; or providing sustainment fromtheater stocks. Regardless of the supportingmission, the primary task for supportingcombatant commands is to ensure that thesupported combatant commander taskedto achieve national objectives receives thetimely and complete support needed toaccomplish the mission. Among manyrequirements, supporting combatantcommanders have three major deploymentand/or redeployment responsibilities:verify supporting unit movement data;regulate the support flow; and coordinateeffectively (see Figure II-2).

• Verify Supporting Unit MovementData. Supporting combatant commandersare responsible to the supportedcombatant commander for the accuratereporting of their movementrequirement data. Unit verification ofmovement data must begin at thedeploying unit level since the deployingunit is most familiar with what it isdeploying for the operation. Verifiedmovement requirement data and ITVdata in electronic format is compiled ateach successive level of command untilreceived by the combatant commandfrom its components. Verified movementrequirement data is then provided to the

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supported combatant command forplanning and execution.

NOTE: TPFDD validation is only performedby the supported combatant commander.Verified data from supporting commands,supporting agencies, and subordinate jointtask forces (JTFs) is officially validated forUSTRANSCOM movement scheduling bythe supported combatant commander.

• Regulate the Support Flow. Supportingcombatant commanders should establisha movement control system capable ofinterfacing with USTRANSCOM’s andthe supported combatant commander’smovement control systems. Thesupporting combatant commander’smovement control system shouldregulate the transportation flow ofsupport personnel, forces, equipment,and materiel originating in the AOR andfacilitate the flow of transient forcesby securing overflight and landingdiplomatic clearances and en routebasing rights and support (aircraft

services, fuel). Supporting combatantcommand movement control systemsmust be able to respond to changes orunforeseen circumstances that developduring mission execution. Fordeployments to another theater, thesupporting combatant commandershould also establish POE supportactivities, which could include A/DACG, PSA or POG, or othermovement control organizations tofacilitate the deployment.

• Coordinate Effectively. The key tosuccess in supporting operations iseffective and responsive coordination.Supporting combatant commands mustremain cognizant of the needs of thesupported combatant commander.Situational awareness is accomplished bysupporting combatant commandsmaintaining a broad operational focus,anticipating requirements, and resolvingsupport issues before they negativelyimpact joint force operations. Successfulcoordination by supporting combatant

Figure II-2. Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPORTINGCOMBATANT COMMANDERS

Verify Supporting Unit Movement Data

Regulate the Support Flow

Coordinate Effectively

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Responsibilities

commands facilitates the supportedcombatant commander’s requirementto synchronize deployment andemployment needs of the operationalmission.

d. United States Atlantic Command(USACOM). USACOM is one of fivegeographic combatant commands and is theeveryday facilitator for building jointcapabilities on the existing Service structures.In addition to combatant functions in its AORand its mission to provide assistance to civilauthorities within CONUS when needed,USACOM is heavily involved in deploymentand redeployment operations under itscharter to provide trained and readyCONUS-based joint force assets toforward-deployed geographic combatantcommanders as they require them.USACOM fulfills this responsibility byperforming three distinct functions with itsassigned CONUS-based forces. USACOMis the joint force trainer, integrator, andforce provider for JTFs organized from theseassets.

• As the joint force trainer for CONUSbased forces, USACOM provides JTFstaff training through joint operationsstaff training programs and simulation-driven JTF command post exercises.

• USACOM serves as an integrator ofcapabilities from the five Services, RC,and interagency sources. Additionally,USACOM’s integration effort isprimarily focused on developing andmaintaining technological interoperabilityamong Service systems employed byjoint headquarters and staffs.

• USACOM also serves as the CONUS-based joint force provider. Joint forceassets needed to support forward-deployed geographic combatantcommands are provided by USACOM’sfour component commands, US Army

Forces Command (FORSCOM), MarineForces, Atlantic, US Atlantic Fleet, andAir Combat Command.

6. Functional CombatantCommands

Supported combatant commanderscapitalize on the power inherent in jointoperat ions by synchron iz ing thecomplementary warfighting capabilities ofall the Services and supporting commandsinto a unified effort. Moreover, CINCs areresponsible for unified actions that aresynchronized in time, space, and purpose withactions of other military forces andnonmilitary organizations. Because of thenumerous process stakeholders, successfuldeployment and redeployment operationsrequire unity of effort. Normally, severalfunctional combatant commands areinvolved in every phase of a joint operation.Four functional combatant commands couldbe involved in deployment andr e d e p l o y m e n t o f the jo in t force;USSOCOM, USSPACECOM, USStrategic Command (USSTRATCOM),and USTRANSCOM.

a. United States Special OperationsCommand. USSOCOM is responsible forproviding trained and ready specialoperations forces (SOF) in response tomission taskings. These forces areorganized, trained, and equipped specificallyto accomplish nine principal missions:direct action, special reconnaissance, foreigninternal defense, unconventional warfare,combatting terrorism, psychologicaloperations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA),counterproliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD), and informationoperations (IO). In addition, SOF frequentlyconduct the following collateral activities:coalition support, combat search and rescue,counterdrug activities, countermine activities,FHA, security assistance, and specialactivities.

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See JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations,” for additional information.

• USSOCOM and Deployment and/orRedeployment. USSOCOM involvementin deployment and redeploymentoperations is two-fold: USSOCOM-assigned assets may be deployed orredeployed as a result of SOF missiontaskings or USSOCOM may provideSOF mission support to conventionaljoint force deployment andredeployment operations. On occasion,USSOCOM may require common-usertransportation assets to deploy orredeploy SOF forces. Compared toconventional force operations, SOFdeployment and redeploymentoperations are relatively small in scale.However, given the nature of most SOF

missions, either time constraints,planning considerations, or specialmission requirements may place uniquedemands on common-user transportationassets utilized for deployment andredeployment of SOF forces.

• SOF Mission Support. Several SOFmissions areas could directly supportjoint force deployment andredeployment operations. Based onmission requirements and operationalenvironment, SOF could provide the JFCwith the capability to set the conditionsfor entry operations, conduct directactions to support deployment orredeployment of the force, or provideincreased battlespace awareness throughspecial reconnaissance. PSYOP can bea significant force multiplier through theconduct of mass communicationactivities that reduce the efficiency ofadversary forces and create disaffectionwithin adversary ranks. Use of CA assetscan mitigate the extent to which civilianmatters negatively impact militaryoperations, provide the JFC with asensing of HN attitudes and capabilities,and enhance economy of force byreducing the need to divert combat forcesfrom essential duties by planning for andusing local resources.

b. United States Space Command.USSPACECOM is responsible for providingspace operations forces trained and readyto support joint force operations. Spaceforces provide a means to exploit and, ifrequired, control space to assist in thesuccessful execution of joint force operations.

• Space Support to Deployment and/orRedeployment Operations. TheCommander in Chief, USSPACECOMserves as the single point of contact formilitary space operational matters.Accordingly, during strategic and theaterdeployment, sustainment, or redeployment

Special operations forces possess uniquecapabilities to help set the conditions for entryoperations or provide special reconnaissanceduring joint force deployments.

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operations, USSPACECOM employsits assets to provide force enhancementto supported combatant commands.These enhancements include theaterballistic missile warning, weathersupport, satellite communicationssupport, and positive navigation support.Space operations are vital to thecombatant commander’s battlespaceawareness, TAV, and precisionengagement. Space control operationsserve to ensure the combatantcommander’s access to such support,while denying it to the enemy.USSPACECOM, as a supporting CINC,will conduct a review of space assetsnecessary to support deployment andredeployment operations. Generallyspace assets are continuously deployed,but prioritization of effort may changetheir support.

• Deployable Space Support Forces.USSPACECOM provides joint spacesupport teams comprised of several spaceoperations specialists whose mission isto support the range of militaryoperations. These teams provide tailoredspace support to JFC operations. Arange of other deployable space support

assets are also available to the supportedcommander upon request, usuallypertaining to a specific forceenhancement mission.

c. United States Strategic Command

• USSTRATCOM is responsible forposturing strategic forces in a manner todeter a military attack on the UnitedStates, US forces, or its allies. Shoulddeterrence fail, strategic forces will beemployed when directed by the NCA andauthorized by the President. Theposturing or employment of strategicforces may require the redeployment offorces from a theater to CONUSlocations to prepare for future operations.

• Deployable Nuclear Support Forces.The USSTRATCOM theater planningresponse cell (TPRC) provides advisorsfor the supported combatant commanderor their designated joint force aircomponent commander. The TPRC willbe provided by USSTRATCOM uponsupported CINC request and will reportas designated by the geographic CINC.The geographic CINC or designatedplanning authority should rely on this

Space support teams provide the supported combatant commander withready access to space based assets to support the joint force mission.

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team to assist in the preparation ofnuclear request and execution messages,unique targeting, and consequenceanalysis of military options. The TPRCcoordinates with the mission-planningfacilities of USSTRATCOM for theutilization of nuclear weapons.

d. United States TransportationCommand. USTRANSCOM is thefunctional combatant command responsiblefor common-user air, land, and seatransportation, as well as portmanagement for the Department ofDefense across the range of militaryoperations. It has COCOM of the threeTCCs, AMC, MSC, and MTMC. In additionto DOD customers, USTRANSCOMprovides air transportation to numerous non-DOD agencies at the direction of the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.

For additional information onUSTRANSCOM see JP 4-01, “Joint Doctrinefor the Defense Transportation System.”

• Single Port Management. In additionto its other responsibilities,USTRANSCOM was designated by theSecretary of Defense as the singleworldwide manager for common-userPOE and POD. Recent operationalexperience has shown that the single portmanager (SPM) is necessary to improvethe planning and execution of portmanagement operations and ensure theseamless transfer of cargo and equipmentin any given theater. Development ofthe SPM concept is an effort toeliminate the reduced efficiencies andconfusion that characterized recentjoint force deployment andredeployment operations. Under theSPM concept USTRANSCOM, throughAMC, operates strategic aerial ports intheaters where forces and infrastructureare permanent and in theaters where

forces and infrastructure are temporary.Additionally USTRANSCOM, throughMTMC, manages seaports ofembarkation and debarkation in anygiven theater. Key aspects of the SPMconcept are that MTMC will: provideplanners to supported combatantcommands to develop seaportmanagement and operations requirements;at the request of the supportedcombatant commander, conduct seaportassessments, establish contact with localseaport authorities, and determineavailability of HNS; and deploy a seaportmanagement cell into theater, whenrequired, to act as seaport managerthroughout the operation.

• Liaison. USTRANSCOM providesliaison officers to all geographiccombatant commanders to assist incoordination of strategic mobilityissues that may arise. USTRANSCOMand its components may provideadditional technical experts to facilitateplanning and execution on an as neededbasis as requested by the supportedcombatant commander.

• Joint Mobility Control Group(JMCG). The JMCG serves as the focalpoint to orchestrate and optimize DTSoperations in support of the combatantcommanders and other customers. TheJMCG provides visibility of movementrequirements and C2 of global mobilityforces and other assets.

•• The JMCG consists of eightelements: USTRANSCOM’s MCC;command center elements of thethree TCCs; the MTMC Joint TrafficManagement Off ice; the Jo in tIntelligence Center for Transportation(JICTRANS); the Global PatientMovement Requirements Center; and theJoint Operational Support Airlift Center.The JMCG provides improved customer

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s u p p o r t t h r o u g h t e a m i n g o fUSTRANSCOM and the TCCsorganized to support specific combatantcommand clients.

•• The MCC, organized under theOperations Directorate and LogisticsDirectorate (J-4) of USTRANSCOM, isthe nucleus of the JMCG. The MCC isthe single focal point for all combatantcommand and major shipper customers,including the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, Joint Staff, Army and Air ForceExchange Service, DLA, and theServices. The MCC monitors thestatus of planned and ongoingmovements in the DTS through GTN.GTN provides the central data base forall scheduled transportation movements.The central data base for alltransportation requirements is theTPFDD. Once a mission is allocated toa validated TPFDD requirement, GTNwill post this mission number into theTPFDD. USTRANSCOM uses severalsystems (discussed in Chapter V,“Enablers,”) to provide the decisionsupport tools needed to determine the bestway to move requirements.

• Joint Intelligence Center forTransportation. The mission ofJICTRANS is to provide decisivetransportation and operationalintelligence to enhance planning,movement, and force protection. Itprovides transportation intelligenceproducts and services to USTRANSCOM,its subordinate component commands,supported combatant commanders, andother operational organizations.JICTRANS supports the JMCG byreceiving intelligence productionrequirements, providing assessments ofthe current military and politicalsituation at en route and destinationcountries, and providing

USCINCTRANS, supported combatantcommanders, and other operationalorganizations with transportationinfrastructure information (e.g.,capabilities of foreign airfields, ports,rail, road, and inland waterways) thatmay be used to support routine, crisis,or contingency operations. JICTRANSintelligence products assess threats toongoing, scheduled, and projectedstrategic air, land, and sea movementsand provide basic transportationplanning information on the physicalfeatures and operational status of foreigntransportation infrastructures. Theseanalyses factor facility, country, andthroughput data to help determine themodes and required weights of effort ofstrategic lift forces allocated toaccomplish USTRANSCOM globalmissions.

7. Joint Task Forces

a. Forming a JTF. A JTF is a joint forceconstituted and designated by a JTFestablishing authority. The JTF establishingauthority may be the Secretary of Defense orthe commander of a combatant command,subordinate unified command, or existing JTF.In most situations, the JTF establishingauthority will be a combatant commander.JTFs are established on a geographical areaor functional basis when the mission has aspecific limited objective. Normally, a JTF isdissolved by the proper authority when thepurpose for which it was created has beenachieved or when it is no longer required.Some recent JTFs have evolved into semi-permanent forces that stay behind to maintainend state conditions or accomplish a specificfollow-on or modified mission for anundetermined period.

See JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force PlanningGuidance and Procedures” for additionalinformation.

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b. JTF Deployment and/or RedeploymentPlanning Responsibilities. Formation of aJTF may complicate deployment andredeployment planning and execution becauseof the diverse elements that may cometogether to form the JTF. A significantchallenge in JTF deployment andredeployment operations is in building theTPFDD. This is particularly true during crisisaction situations when limited planning timeprompts the development of a fullycoordinated deliberate plan with TPFDD ortime-phased force and deployment list(TPFDL). For effective management ofchange, JTFs should have the authority andcapability to make TPFDD adjustments on siteat the point of execution. See Appendix A,“Deliberate and Crisis Action PlanningProcesses,” for information on the jointplanning process.

• Deliberate Planning Responsibilities.If sufficient planning time is availableprior to mission execution, the JFC andstaff should determine specific forcerequirements, logistics requirements,and personnel replacements withrecommended time-phasing based ontheir concept of operation developedduring mission analysis. Once the

concept of operation is approved,planning can continue with thedevelopment of the TPFDD or TPFDLas required, supporting JTF operationsbased on subordinate unit verifiedmovement requirements received fromthe Service and functional componentcommands. JTF-verified TPFDDrequirements are provided to the JTFestablishing authority or supportedcombatant command for sourcing ofshortfalls, validation, and forwardingto USTRANSCOM for transportationfeasibility analysis and movementscheduling. Movement information iscontinually evaluated and updated toensure that the JTF establishing authorityor supported combatant commandp lanners and USTRANSCOMtransportation planners are using the mostcurrent and accurate TPFDD informationfor scheduling transportation resources.Redeployment planning should beginearly in the JTF planning process andfocus on defining the end stateconditions, drafting the transitionconsiderations, and developing theredeployment TPFFD necessary to beginredeployment of the force whenauthorized.

When sufficient time is available prior to mission execution, the JFC and staffshould determine specific force requirements and time-phasing.

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• CAP Responsibilities. For crisis actionsituations, the JTF establishing authority(normally a combatant command) isusually required to initiate developmentof the TPFDD supporting JTFoperations. The JTF establishingauthority provides forces for planningwhile the JFC, supported by the JTFcomponent commanders, determines theconcept of operation and outlines thesequence of arrival for deploying units.The commands sourcing the JTFcomponents are responsible for inputtingunit deployment data in the supportingTPFDD. This is necessary because eitherthe JTF headquarters and/or thedeploying JTF components may not haveaccess to the GCCS to provide unitdeployment data input or the JTFheadquarters and/or the deploying JTFcomponents may not have time tomake TPFDD adjustments becauseoperational time constraints havecaused the JTF to focus on immediatemission execution. In some instances,combatant command planners may haveto build the initial TPFDD supportingJTF operations based on their bestassessment of JTF needs to support themission for the first several days of theoperation. This initial increment offorces and support should allow the JTFto perform its mission for a period oftime, until the JFC and staff arrive at thecrisis scene and can assess the situationmore thoroughly and begin makingTPFDD adjustments based on actualrequirements. In this situation, the JFCmust understand that during the firstseveral days of the deployment the JTFmust work within the constraints of theinitial TPFDD forces and supportincrement planned by the combatantcommand. JTF planners should limitadjustments to this initial TPFDDinc rement because TPFDDadjustments may have an operationalimpact by slowing or interrupting the

deployment flow. Instead, JTF plannersshould focus on making adjustments tothe TPFDD beginning with the day afterthe initial combatant command-plannedTPFDD increment. During the earlydays of the operation, combatantcommand planners must focus oncoordinating for uninterruptedsupport to the JTF until it is ready toassume full planning responsibility forthe operation.

8. Military Departments andDefense Agencies

The Military Departments retain theresponsibility for organizing, training,equipping, and providing logistic support(including Service-unique transportation) fortheir respective forces. These forces and otherDefense agencies must depend on common-user military transportation services forunit and individual deployment andredeployment operations between POEs andPODs. In the role of common-user militarytransportation services, the Army, Navy(including US Coast Guard whenappropriate), Air Force, Marine Corps, DLA,and other Defense agencies are all genericallycalled shipper services. Each Service isresponsible for administrative support andperformance of transportation operationsassigned by combatant commanders at eithertheir local shipping installations or throughoutthe theater. The Services are also responsiblefor maintaining personnel trained in jointoperation planning that can participate injoint planning and provide JOPES inputs. Inaddition to these responsibilities, logisticselements of the Services that provide keysupport and enable the operations staff toexecute the commander’s requirements fordeployment and redeployment operations arenoted below.

a. US Army. The Department of the Army(DA) is responsible for the assignment,preparation, and support of land forces

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necessary for employment across the rangeof military operations. For deployment andredeployment operations, DA is responsiblefor training, mobilizing, modernizing,admin is te r ing , o rgan iz ing , anddemobilizing Army forces. DA alsoestablishes policy and procedures forreconstitution of the Army and is the DODexecutive agent for repatriation operations.OCONUS, DA is responsible for making landtransportation available in overseas areas(normally under the combatant command’sArmy Service component commander) for theother Military Services and for coordinatingall planning and requirements for the use ofDOD-controlled land transportationequipment and facilities. In some overseasareas, the Army Service component has beenassigned common-user land transportation(CULT) responsibility for peacetime landtransportation. Wartime CULT requirementsare the responsibility of the combatantcommander, and normally the JMC or thecomponent assigned the mission willconsolidate planned wartime movementrequirements of all component commands.

• Secretary of the Army. The Secretaryof the Army is responsible for the dailyaffairs of DA. In addition to headingthe Army, the Secretary of the Army alsoserves as the DOD executive agent formilitary support to civil authorities(MSCA). As executive agent for MSCA,the Secretary of the Army exercisesOPCON over all DOD component forcesprovided for MSCA, including theServices and Defense agencies. Specificresponsibilities include developingplanning guidance, plans, and proceduresfor military support; tasking componentsto plan for and commit resources inresponse to requests from civilauthorities; and developing (and taskingDOD components to develop) genericand incident-specific support plans. TheAssistant Secretary of the Army forInstallations, Logistics, and Environment

is responsible for oversight of MSCA.The Director of Military Support(DOMS) is the DOD action agent forplanning and coordinating this supporton behalf of the Secretary of the Army.

•• DOMS is led by the Army generalofficer who is also the Director ofOperations, Readiness, and Mobilizationin the Office of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Operations and Plans, Headquarters,DA. DOMS and its designated staffelement, the Military Support Division,may function as a joint staff whenconducting MSCA response. TheDOMS staff has the responsibility toplan, coordinate, and manage the fullrange of MSCA operations. The DOMSroutinely coordinates with the FederalEmergency Management Agency(FEMA) and the other Federaldepartments and agencies and alsoparticipates in interagency disaster reliefexercises.

•• The executive agent has designatedthe combatant commanders ofUSACOM, United States PacificCommand (USPACOM), and UnitedStates Southern Command as the DODoperating agents for MSCA for states,territories, and possessions in theirAORs. USACOM assigns leadoperational authority to its Armycomponent, FORSCOM, whichaccordingly can task other USACOMcomponent commands. Moreover, incoordination with DOMS and the JointStaff, it can task supporting combatantcommands such as USTRANSCOM andsupporting Defense agencies.

•• Both USPACOM and FORSCOMhave designated defense coordinatingofficers (DCOs) for states and territoriesin USPACOM’s and USACOM’s AORs.When deployed, the DCOs are the DODrepresentatives on the ground with the

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authority to validate all requests formilitary support. They forward validatedrequests to either a JTF or response taskforce, if constituted, or to higherheadquarters. DOMS will then staff therequest and, if appropriate, task a defenseelement to provide the support.

•• All requirements approved by DOMSwill then be passed to the designatedcombatant commander for sourcing andbuilding of a TPFDD. The combatantcommanders or their component willbuild force elements in the proper formatfor this requirement once it is sourcedand pass this validated requirement toUSTRANSCOM for scheduling andmovement.

• US Army Theater Support. Within theArmy component, the Theater ArmyArea Command (TAACOM) is the keylogistics operator and is routinelyinvolved in deployment or redeploymentoperations occurring in a theater. TheTAACOM functions as a majorsubordinate command under theNumbered Army. A TAACOM isorganized to provide direct support tounits located in, or transiting through,

its assigned area. Additionally, whendirected by the Theater Armycommander, it can provide specifiedgeneral and direct support to all Armyand other units in the theater. Formovement control in theater the Armyrelies on a movement control agency.

b. US Marine Corps. For deployment andredeployment operations, the Marine Corpscomponent has a strategic mobility officer(SMO) and an embarkation officer organicto their Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) staffs. SMOs coordinate MarineCorps movement requirements with thesupported geographic combatant command,the theater JMC, and USTRANSCOM. TheMarine Corps activates a force movementcontrol center (FMCC) within theater tocoordinate and provide transportationservices to all land-based elements of theMAGTF. As the Marine Corps primarymovement control agency within the theater,the FMCC is responsible for establishingliaison and communications with andforwarding all transportation shortfalls to thetheater JMC or its equivalent, or to thecomponent commander. If Marine Corpsforces are afloat and part of an amphibioustask force, the command relationships

Defense coordinating officers can authorize the deployment of militaryresources in support of civil authorities when disaster strikes.

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established between the commander,amphibious task force and the commander,landing force take precedence.

c. US Navy. The majority of Navy combatassets self-deploy in support of joint forceoperations. However, Navy sustainmentstocks, shore-based logistic supportaugmentation personnel, fleet hospitalpersonnel and equipment, and engineeringpersonnel and equipment must be time-phasedto support Navy component operations. Thesesustainment, equipment, and personnelrequirements will be entered on the joint forceTPFDD by supported combatant commandplanners for scheduling of common-usertransportation assets. The Navy componentcommanders for the geographic combatantcommands (Commander in Chief, PacificFleet, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Europe,and Commander in Chief, Naval ForcesCentral Command) are responsible for Navytheater deployment and logistics. Withinthe Navy component, in large mobilizationscenarios, naval advanced logistic supportsites (NALSSs) may serve as the primaryshore-based reception and transshipmentpoints for personnel, equipment, and materiel.In lesser mobilization scenarios, the Navycomponent commander may designateanother established naval activity to act in thiscapacity. In either scenario, the Navycomponent commander will coordinate andmonitor personnel deployment andredeployment activities for units andindividuals. They have full capability toreceive, consolidate, transfer and stowsupplies and equipment. The naval forwardlogistic sites (NFLSs) in theater receivepersonnel, equipment, and materieltransshipped through the NALSS for finaldelivery to the supported forces. The NALSScoordinates with NFLSs, which are positionedas far forward in the operating area aspossible to support Navy forces. NALSSsand NFLSs also support shore-based aviationunits, fleet hospitals, air and surface cargo

handlers, naval mobile constructionbattalions, and other shore-based logisticunits. The size and composition of NALSSsand NFLSs are dependent upon the supportrequired and are tailored by Navy logisticplanners for the specific operation orcontingency. The Fleet NumericalMeteorology and Oceanographic Center(FNMOC) at Monterey, California, canproduce the majority of centralized weatherproducts and data to support planning fordeployment and redeployment of US forces.Related products, including climatologicaldata, are available through the Air ForceWeather Agency (AFWA) at Offutt Air ForceBase (AFB), Nebraska.

d. US Air Force. Deployment andredeployment of Air Force combat assetsprimarily occurs through self-deployment.However, the Air Force has a requirement forcommon-user transportation to movesupport forces and sustainment. Within theAir Force forces (AFFOR) component, thenumbered air force is the principalcoordinator of Air Force logistics. Thedirector of logistics is responsible forproviding logistics expertise and support,to include contracting, maintenance,munitions, supply, fuel, and transportationservices. The director of logistics ensures thatAFFOR component forces are sustained tomeet the capability tasked by the JFC. Thedirector of logistics ensures the adequacy ofsupplies, storage, and bed-down facilities inthe operational area and interfaces with theair operations center, through the AFFORLRC, to provide analysis of logisticsrequirements in support of the daily air taskingorder. The director of logistics directs theformation of an AFFOR LRC , whenrequired, and ensures that the director of theAFFOR LRC (who works directly for thedirector of logistics) provides centralizeddirection and control of deployment,reception, employment, and redeploymentof logistics and support assets. Through thetheater LRC, the director of logistics is the

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Responsibilities

Air Force component commander’s advocatewith the JFC, the J-4 staff, the Joint PetroleumOffice, and JMC to ensure that priorities aresurfaced and accommodated within the JFC’scapability and force objectives. The AFWAat Offutt AFB, Nebraska, can produce themajority of weather products, includingclimatological products, and data to supportplanning for deployment and redeploymentof US forces. Related products are availablethrough the FNMOC at Monterey, California.

e. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).The mission of the DIA is to satisfy the fullrange of foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements insupport of joint military operations inpeacetime, crisis, contingency, and war. Inaddition, DIA provides intelligence supportfor Service weapons acquisition; defensepolicy making; and the full range of currentand long term military intelligence products.DIA provides military intelligence forcounterintelligence, manages and operates theDefense Human Intelligence Service(including the Defense Attaché System),manages all-source DOD collectionrequirements, serves as national functionalmanager for measurement and signatureintelligence and provides functionalmanagement of military intelligencethroughout the Defense IntelligenceCommunity.

f. Defense Information Systems Agency(DISA). DISA is responsible for planning,developing and supporting command,control, communications (C3) andinformation systems that serve the needs ofthe NCA under all conditions of peace andwar. It provides guidance and support ontechnical and operational C3 and informationsystems issues affecting the Office of theSecretary of Defense, the MilitaryDepartments, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the unifiedand specified commands, and the Defenseagencies. DISA ensures the interoperability

of the GCCS, the defense communicationssystem, theater and tactical C2 systems,NATO and/or allied C3 systems, and thosenational and/or international commercialsystems that affect the DISA mission. Inaddition, DISA supports nationalsecurity emergency preparednesstelecommunications functions of theNational Communications System.

g. Defense Logistics Agency. DLA is acombat support agency of the Departmentof Defense and is controlled and directed bythe Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition and Technology. DLA providesworldwide logistic support to the MilitaryServices, combatant commands, other DODcomponents, Federal agencies, foreigngovernments, and international organizations.DLA responsibilities are enabled by jointtotal asset visibility (JTAV) initiatives.JTAV will provide users with timely andaccurate information on the location,movement, status, and identity of units,personnel, equipment, and supplies duringforce projection operations. DLA controlsover 80% of existing stockage of militaryequipment and nearly all of the fuel andpetroleum products for military usage. Duringdeployment and redeployment of the jointforce, DLA requires common-usertransportation to move, stage, and recover itslogistics resources in support of joint forceoperations. Supported combatant commandplanners are responsible for validating andentering DLA movement requirements intothe TPFDD for scheduling byUSTRANSCOM. DLA has the logisticsresponsibilities shown in Figure II-3.

h. National Imagery and MappingAgency (NIMA). NIMA, a DOD combatsupport agency, is a source for imageryintelligence and geospatial informationduring planning and execution of deploymentand redeployment operations. NIMAprovides geospatial information and servicessupport (including safety of navigation and

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safety of flight information), imagery andgeospatial system technical guidance, and staffassistance to the Military Services, combatantcommands, and other DOD components andis the focal point for imagery, imageryintelligence, and geospatial information.

9. Other Federal Agencies

a. Department of Health. During naturaldisasters or civil emergencies, theDepartment of Health assists FEMA andother national agencies in caring for theaffected personnel. Department of Healthmovement requirements and deployment and/or redeployment support will be coordinatedby FEMA.

b. Department of State (DOS). The DOSand Department of Defense are responsiblefor the operation of the noncombatantevacuation program. Deployments andredeployments executed as part of anoncombatant evacuation will requirecoordination with DOS representatives. DOS

representatives may have access to embassyevacuation, marshalling, and security plansfor the objective country. DOS embassypersonnel should have an estimate of thenumber of US citizens in the country and theirlocations for noncombatant evacuationredeployment planning. Additionally, DOScoordinates OCONUS overflight and landingrights, diplomatic clearances, and visa and/orpassport requirements for all deployment andredeployment operations.

c. Department of Transportation(DOT). During national defense emergencies,the Secretary of Transportation has a widerange of delegated responsibilities, includingexecutive management of the nation’stransportation resources in periods ofcrisis. The Office of EmergencyTransportation is the Secretary’s peacetimestaff element responsible for emergencytransportation planning. Additionally, DOTmanages, through the Federal AviationAdministration, the Wartime Air ServiceProgram. The Maritime Administration is

Figure II-3. Defense Logistics Agency Responsibilities

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCYRESPONSIBILITIES

Integrate materiel management and supply support for subsistence;clothing and textiles; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; constructionmaterials; medical materials; repair parts; and map distribution

Property and hazardous waste disposal

Contract administration services

Deploy Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) Contingency Support Teamfor command and control of DLA personnel and streamlinecustomer support to supported combatant commander

Additional support, as required

Integrate materiel management and supply support for subsistence;clothing and textiles; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; constructionmaterials; medical materials; repair parts; and map distribution

Property and hazardous waste disposal

Contract administration services

Deploy Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) Contingency Support Teamfor command and control of DLA personnel and streamlinecustomer support to supported combatant commander

Additional support, as required

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also managed by the DOT. Under nationaldefense emergency conditions and incoordination with DOD agencies andcommands, DOT:

• Develops systems for control of prioritiesand allocations for moving passengersand materiel by civil transportation;

• Provides clearance authority for movingout-sized, over-sized, and hazardousmilitary cargo;

• Apportions militarily planned andrequired civil transportation resources;

• Ensures through the US Coast Guard thesafety, security, and control of US ports;and

• Transfers the operational control of theCoast Guard to the Department of theNavy upon declaration of war by NCAdirection.

d. US Coast Guard (USCG). The USCGis the primary US maritime agency forwaterway safety and security. The USCG,a branch of the Armed Forces of the United

States, supports the geographic combatantcommands in implementing the NMS. TheUSCG is unique among US military forcesbecause it has statutory law enforcementauthority . The USCG core competenciesinclude national defense, maritime safety,maritime law enforcement, and maritimeenvironmental protection. Duringdeployment and redeployment operationssupporting joint force operations, the USCGprotects military shipping at US SPOEs andOCONUS PODs by conducting port securityand harbor defense operations. MajorUSCG cutters may be deployed to participatein maritime interception operations, enforcesanctions against other nations, and to conductpeacetime engagement activities. The majorcutters of the USCG, like Navy combatants,are self-sustaining during deployments insupport of joint force operations. However,deploying port security units and stocks forsustainment must be time-phased to supportNavy component operations and scheduledfor movement on common-user transportationassets. Movement data from port securityunits and sustainment stocks is validated bysupported combatant command planners andentered on the joint force TPFDD. Port safetyresponsibilities in CONUS include the

The US Coast Guard, part of the Department of Transportation in peace and theDepartment of Defense during war, is the US maritime agency primarily responsiblefor port security and safety.

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worldwide aeronautical data available andis capable of providing backup weatherservices in the event that both the FNMOCand AFWA are out of service.

g. US Customs Service. US CustomsService is responsible for maintainingsurveillance of illegal goods entering theUnited States through DTS PODs. All forcesand materiel redeploying to CONUS willrequire US Customs inspection.

“. . . at long last, and after months ofstruggle . . . we are all definitelycommitted to one concept of fighting!If we can agree on major purposes andobjectives, our efforts will begin to fallin line and we won’t just be thrashingaround in the dark.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower,then Chief, Operations Division,

War Department General Staffcommenting on the success of

General George C. Marshall andMr. Harry Hopkins in obtaining

British concurrence for a“Germany first” strategy during

World War II.

establishment, certification, and supervisionof ammunition loading operations. Inaddition, the USCG’s role in licensingadditional merchant mariners to serveexpanded defense shipping needs is integralto the mobilization process.

e. Federal Emergency ManagementAgency. FEMA coordinates the executionof emergency preparedness actions of allFederal agencies, including deployment andredeployment of military support for MSCAmissions. It is the key agency for emergencyassistance to civil authorities andcoordinates all military support directly withthe Military Support Division in DOMS. Themodern authorization for Federal support tocivil authorities is based on the Robert T.Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act (Public Law 93-288) and theEconomy Act. By executive order, thePresident appointed FEMA as the lead Federalagency for disaster and emergency assistanceand as the proponent for the Federal ResponsePlan published in 1992.

f. National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA). The NOAA has

The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates allmilitary support for disaster relief.

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h. United States Department ofAgriculture (USDA). USDA is responsiblefor maintaining surveillance of agriculturalproducts and guarding against potentialplant or animal infestations entering theUnited States through DTS PODs. All forcesand materiel redeploying to CONUS willrequire USDA inspection.

i. US Postal Service (USPS). The USPSsupports joint force operations throughmovement of essential military mail,including small class IX repair parts.Depending on the scope of the deployment,USPS may require a significant amount ofcommon-user airlift to support forward-deployed forces.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIDEPLOYMENT

III-1

1. Introduction

Deployment operations involve fourphases: predeployment activities; movementto and activities at POE; movement to POD;and JRSOI activities. These phases describethe major activities of a joint force frompoint of origin to a prescribed destination intheater and are dependent on the JFC’s conceptfor employment. Planning for and executionof the four phases of deployment is basedprimarily on mission requirements and thetime available to accomplish the mission.During deployment operations, supportedcombatant commanders are responsible forbuilding and validating requirements,determining predeployment standards, andbalancing, regulating, and effectivelymanaging the transportation flow. Supportingcombatant commands and agencies sourcerequirements not available to the supportedcombatant commander and are responsiblefor: verifying supporting unit movement data;regulating the support deployment flow; andcoordinating effectively during deploymentoperations. This chapter discusses severalother factors that may impact deploymentplanning and execution. Section A outlinesdeployment planning considerations andSection B discusses factors impactingdeployment execution.

SECTION A. PLANNING

2. Mission Requirements

The primary objective of deploymentplanning is to provide personnel,equipment, and materiel when and whererequired by the JFC’s concept of

“We must be the world’s premier deployer!”

General John M. ShalikashviliChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

operations. Planning for joint forceoperations is guided by the procedures in thejoint planning process (see Appendix A,“Deliberate and Crisis Action PlanningProcesses”). Both deliberate and CAPprocedures require detailed analysis of theassigned mission to determine missionrequirements for employment of the jointforce. Employment planning considerationsthat directly impact deployment operationsinclude: identification of force requirements;commander’s intent for deployment; time-phasing of personnel, equipment, and materielto support the mission; and closure of theforces required to execute decisive operations.These factors guide deployment planning andhelp determine mission requirements.

a. Identification of Force Requirements.Force requirements are initially identified inthe planning process during mission analysisand COA development. Normal planningprocedures should be used by the staff inanalyzing the deployment mission. Anexample of a staff planning procedure that theArmy and Marine Corps use to help them inmission analysis is one that looks at mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available, time available(METT-T). Force composition is derivedfrom the troops available for employment andthe JFC’s need for a particular unit capabilityor function to accomplish the joint forcemission.

• The supported combatant commanderbegins preparation of COAs as required.Normally commanders receive NCAguidance through the CJCS warningorder or other type directive issued by

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the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The directive establishes commandrelationships, identifies the mission,and provides any planning constraints.In addition, this directive will eitheridentify forces and strategic mobilityresources and establish tentative timingfor execution, or request the supportedcombatant commander to develop thesefactors.

• Force requirements are the joint forcecapabilities required to accomplish aparticular mission. COAs outline thegeneral ways (scheme of employment)and means (force requirements) toaccomplish the assigned mission. Asforce requirements are identified,TPFDD development commences foreach COA (time permitting).USTRANSCOM reviews proposedCOAs and, in coordination with thesupported combatant commander,prepares deployment estimates. TheServices monitor development of COAsand begin planning for support forces,sustainment, and mobilization, ifrequired. The supported combatantcommander analyzes the COAs andsubmits the combatant commander’s

estimate to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and NCA. This ends theCOA development phase of CAP.

• Initially, selection of forces for COAdevelopment is done in a very generaland unconstrained manner. As detailedplanning continues after COA selection,force refinement begins withconsideration of the forces and timeavailable, identification of neededunsourced force capabilities,understanding of the anticipatedoperational environment, andconsideration of the actual constraints(e.g., political, geographic, or resource)imposed as part of the assigned mission.

b. Commander’s Intent for Deployment.The supported combatant commander’s intentfor deployment may be detailed in theOPLAN, deployment preparation order,deployment order, or operation order(OPORD). The supported combatantcommander’s intent for deployment maydirect the sequence for deployment of units,individuals, and materiel; identify immediateforce protection concerns; articulate specificforce disposition requirements to supportfuture operations; or identify general

The primary objective of deployment planning is to provide forces andmateriel when and where required by the JFC’s concept of operations.

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deployment timeline requirements needed foroperational success. The supportedcommander’s intent for deployment should,at a minimum, clearly articulate the JFC’svision for how the deployment can bestposture the joint force for decisive operationsor operational success.

c. Time-Phasing of Forces. Once forcerequirements are identified, selected forcesmust be organized and time-phased tosupport the concept of operations.

• Time-phasing is the sequencing of thedeployment and arrival andemployment of forces based on theorganization of forces to accomplish themission, the commander’s intent, theestimated time required to deploy forcesfrom their point of origin to theoperational area, and actual liftavailability and port throughput fordeployment. In addition to forces,support personnel, equipment, andmateriel are time-phased to support thecontinuous operation of the joint forceuntil the mission is accomplished.

• Finding the proper balance betweenprojecting the force rapidly andprojecting the right mix of combatpower and materiel for the ultimatemission is critical. The commander mustseek a balance that provides protection,efficient deployment, adequatesupport, and a range of responseoptions to enemy activity. Theavailability of mobility assets is mostoften a constraining factor, so difficulttrade-off decisions continuouslychallenge supported commanders.

• All movement priorities and phasingare based on the supported combatantcommander’s required date for thedeploying force capability. Movementdata on the required delivery date, time-phasing of forces, and materiel is

documented in the TPFDD. Ideally,forces and supporting materiel are time-phased in a manner that allows the JFCto conduct decisive operations as quicklyas possible. Closure of the minimumessential force required to accomplish themission is a major factor in determiningwhen decisive operations can beconducted.

d. Force Tracking. Force tracking is theprocess of gathering and maintaininginformation on the location, status, andpredicted movement of each element of aunit (including the unit’s command element,personnel, and unit-related supplies andequipment) while in transit to the specifiedoperational area. Force tracking isfundamental to effective force employmentand C2 (see Figure III-1). It providesinformation on transportation closure orphysical moves of forces. JFCs must be ableto continuously monitor execution of the jointforce deployment operation and quicklyrespond to changing situations and unforeseencircumstances. Timely JFC response is afunction of informed decision making andeffective control. Once basic missionrequirements have been decided, joint forceplanners must review force tracking optionsto provide the supported combatantcommander with the requisite C2 means tomonitor and control execution of the jointforce deployment.

e. Force Closure. Force closure is thepoint in time when a supported JFCdetermines sufficient personnel andequipment resources are in the assignedoperational area to carry out assigned tasks.As a planning factor, force closure is importantbecause decisive operations can not begin untilsufficient personnel, equipment, and materielis available to execute the mission. Forceclosure includes force tracking, riskassessments, force readiness, and METT-T.The supported commander’s force closuredecision must take into account the above

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factors and the commander’s ability tointegrate forces. Force closure is a functionof several elements, most notably lift capacity,C2, POE and/or POD transshipmentcapability, port capacity, transit time forstrategic lift, receipt of overflight and landingdiplomatic clearances, and the effectivenessof theater JRSOI execution. Decisionsaffecting transportation mode or routing madeprior to and during the early stages of adeployment may have a dramatic impact onjoint force closure timelines. For this reason,planners must give careful consideration tothe selection of POE and/or POD, schedulingof strategic lift modes, movement control, andJRSOI planning. Inherent in this complexprocess is the management of change and the

ability to respond with accuracy and flexibilityto dynamic mission conditions.

3. Preparation for Deployment

Preparation for deployment includestailoring, task organizing, and echeloningforces and materiel for deployment as well asdocumenting the sequence of deploymentand movement requirements on theappropriate TPFDD. Tailoring focuses on thevertical integration of the force, ensuring thatcapabilities are matched in the propercombinations and sequence at the variousechelons of command. Task-organizingaddresses horizontal integration, distributingcombat, support, and C2 capabilities to the

Figure III-1. Force Tracking is Part of Force Closure

FORCE TRACKING IS PART OF FORCE CLOSURE

FORCE TRACKING is part of FORCE CLOSURE

Mission Capable atDesignated Site

APODAPOECONUSJOA

METT-T

SPODSPOE

Mission, Enemy,Terrain and Weather,Troopsand Support Available,Time AvailableSeaport of DebarkationSeaport of Embarkation

Aerial Port of DebarkationAerial Port of EmbarkationContinental United StatesJoint Operations Area

CONUS orWorldwide

APOEFactory

FortSPOE

SPOD

AIRLIFT

SEALIFT

FOXHOLE

APOD

JOA

Arrival atDesignated Site

Origin

RiskAssessment

Readiness

METT-T

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components of the force. Generally,commanders tailor a subordinate force andtask-organize their own force. Echeloningorganizes the force for movement.

a. Tailoring. Tailoring is the process ofmatching the force mix and sequence ofdeployment to the supported combatantcommander’s operational requirements.The factors of mission analysis drive the initialtailoring of the force. The tailoring processreplaces the predicted conditions used duringOPLAN development in the OPLAN TPFDDwith actual, up-to-date information to producea more accurate TPFDD. The purpose of forcetailoring is to generate effective, timelycapability, given mission requirements and liftconstraints. When done properly, forcetailoring promotes deployment efficiency.

• Tailoring includes force allocation,augmentation, and refinement.Tailoring begins with the allocation ofbasic force capabilities to the combatantcommander. Basic force capabilities maybe augmented with additional capabilitiesnot normally assigned to the basic forceand based on mission requirements.Commanders not only tailor units, theyalso tailor staffs. The standard peacetime

staff may undergo significant changes,both in size and organization, in order tomeet the mission requirements of acontingency. Once this is complete, thebasic force and general augmentationmust be refined to reflect the multipleconstraints and realities of the projectedoperation.

• Force refinement is an iterative,continuous process of adjustmentconducted by supported and supportingcombatant commanders as well asService component commanders. Theobjective is for the resulting tailored forceto represent the best possible balancebetween missions, optimum force,actual forces available, time and liftavailable, and theater supportability.

b. Task Organizing. Force tailoringallocates and sequences capabilities for amission. Task organizing distributesthose capabilities at each C2 echelon.The commander ’s purpose in taskorganization is to optimize subordinatecommanders’ abilities to generateappropriate mission capability consistentwith the concept of operations to meet thestated needs.

Sealift closure is an important planning factor because over 90% of all jointforce materiel will move by sealift during most deployment operations.

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• Commanders and staffs work to ensurethat the appropriate combat, support, andC2 capabilities are distributed to theappropriate components of the force. Therelationship between units within a task-organized force is described in terms ofcommand relationships. Commandre la t ionships def ine commandresponsibilities and authority. Supportis a command authority. Supportrelationships are defined in anestablishing directive that is normallyissued to specify the purpose of thesupport relationship, the effect desired,and the scope of the action to be taken.

• Task organizing is the process of formingan operating force of specific size andcomposition to meet a unique task ormission. For most joint force missions,task organization is centered aroundcombat units and is a predeploymentactivity. However, for some MOOTW,disaster relief, or humanitarian assistancemissions, joint force capabilities are task-organized around support forces. Ifsufficient time is available prior tomission execution, task-organized forceswill conduct interoperability training tofacilitate deployment and employment.

c. Echeloning. Echeloning is organizingunits for movement. Like task organizing,echeloning is a predeployment activity thatestablishes a priority for movement withinthe deploying force to meet operationalrequirements and maximize available lift.For example, echelons may be divided intoadvance parties, main bodies, and rear parties.

d. Time-Phased Force and DeploymentData Development. TPFDD developmentis based on three main processes: forceplanning, support planning, and transportationplanning. The resulting TPFDD is both aforce requirements document and aprioritized transportation movementdocument. It is the supported combatant

commander’s statement of requirements byunit type, time period, and priority for arrival.Further, the TPFDD defines the supportedcombatant commander’s time-phased liftrequirements for supplies, equipment, andreplacement personnel needed to sustain theforces specified during force planning. Thesupported combatant commander decides onthe phasing, prioritization, and validation ofall movement requirements documented in theTPFDD.

For additional information on crisis actiontime-phased force and deployment datadevelopment, see CJCSM 3122.01, “JointOperation Planning and Execution SystemVol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),”CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution,”and CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning Formats and Guidance).”

• The ultimate objective of deploymentoperations is the arrival of the rightforce at the right place and at the righttime. The supported combatantcommander’s required date to have forcesat their destinations is the end goal fromwhich all transportation must be planned.The supported combatant commandermust resolve the sequence in which unitsdeploy in relation to the other deployingforces and alliance and/or coalition forcesas early as possible. This sequence isthe basis for the prioritized transportationmovement outlined in the TPFDD. Earlyresolution of the sequencing of forces intothe theater will facilitate determiningforce closure and provide the basis forinitiating the theater distribution plan.

• Following their evaluation of thesupported combatant commander’sconcept of operation, supportingcombatant commands and agencies mustclearly and quickly articulate their

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mobility requirements. Concurrently,supporting combatant commands andagencies establish milestones for loadingand transporting units and theiraccompanying supplies to the POE,embarking them aboard strategic lift, andtransiting them to the POD to arrive intheater by the supported combatantcommander’s required date. Propersequencing of forces into the AOR and/or JOA promotes the rapid buildup ofcapabilities that permit the supportedcombatant commander to seize theinitiative and conduct successful decisiveoperations as early as possible.

e. Time-Phased Force and DeploymentList Development. The TPFDL is to serveas a list which identifies types and/or actualunits required to support the OPLAN andindicate origin and ports of debarkation orocean area. Typically this list is provided toaid the CAP that occurs when a deliberate planis executed. The early identification of theunits required aids in the ability of thesupporting combatant commanders andagencies in responding to the supportedcombatant commanders’ requirements.

f. Assignment and Transfer of Forces.All Service forces (except as noted in title 10,Section 162, US Code) are assigned tocombatant commands by the Secretary ofDefense “Forces for Unified Commands”memorandum (see Figure III-2). A forceassigned or attached to a combatant commandmay be transferred from that commandonly as directed by the Secretary ofDefense, and under procedures prescribedby the Secretary of Defense and approvedby the President. Establishing authorities forsubordinate unified commands and JTFs maydirect the assignment or attachment of theirforces to those subordinate commands asappropriate. OPCON of assigned forces isinherent in COCOM and may be delegatedwithin the combatant command by thecommander in chief of the combatantcommand or between combatant commandsby the Secretary of Defense.

For additional information see JP 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)”.

• Except as otherwise directed by thePresident or Secretary of Defense, allforces operating within the geographic

The railroad is the preferred means of moving equipment that must movemore than one day’s driving distance to and from POEs and PODs.

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area assigned to a combatantcommander shall be assigned or attachedto and under the command of thatcombatant commander. Forces directedby the President or the Secretary ofDefense may conduct operations fromor within any geographic area asrequired for accomplishing assignedtasks, as mutually agreed by thecommanders concerned or as directed bythe President or the Secretary of Defense.

• Transient forces do not come under thechain of command of the areacommander solely by their movementacross AOR and/or JOA boundaries.

During deployment operat ions,USTRANSCOM intertheater mobilityforces operating within the geographicarea ass igned to a combatan tcommander are not transferred fromUSTRANSCOM to the OPCON of thatcombatant commander. For example,supporting aircraft and crews, tankerairlift control elements (TALCEs) and airmobility elements remain OPCON toUSTRANSCOM. However, transientforces within the assigned AOR of acombatant commander are subject to thearea commander’s orders in someinstances, e.g., coordination for emergencydefense or allocation of local facilities.

Figure III-2. Assignment and Transfer of Forces to a Joint Force

ASSIGNMENT ANDTRANSFER OFFORCESTO A JOINT FORCE

Forces, not command relationships, are transferredbetween commands. When forces are transferred, thecommand relationship the gaining commander willexercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) overthose forces must be specified.

When the transfer of forces to a joint force will bepermanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) theforces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders willexercise combatant command (command authority) andsubordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exerciseoperational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.

When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary,the forces will be attached to the gaining command andJFCs will exercise OPCON or tactical control, asappropriate, over the attached forces.

Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commandsand joint task forces direct the assignment or attachmentof their forces to those subordinate commands asappropriate.

Forces, not command relationships, are transferredbetween commands. When forces are transferred, thecommand relationship the gaining commander willexercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) overthose forces must be specified.

When the transfer of forces to a joint force will bepermanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) theforces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders willexercise combatant command (command authority) andsubordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exerciseoperational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.

When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary,the forces will be attached to the gaining command andJFCs will exercise OPCON or tactical control, asappropriate, over the attached forces.

Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commandsand joint task forces direct the assignment or attachmentof their forces to those subordinate commands asappropriate.

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4. Deployment Concept

Mission analysis determines therequirements for joint force employmentto achieve the stated military objectives.The deployment concept to supportemployment of the joint force is initiallyoutlined during COA development asdeployment estimates to support variousCOAs during the joint planning process. Thefollowing paragraphs explain severalplanning considerations that can impact thedeployment concept to support joint forceoperations.

a. Lines of Communications. Lines ofcommunications (LOCs) are the land, water,and air routes which connect an operatingmilitary force with a base of operations andalong which supplies and military forces moveto support operations. LOCs must beidentified early in the planning processbecause the associated links (e.g., land, sea,or air routes) and nodes (e.g., home station,ports, staging areas, destination) impact everyaspect of deployment planning. The numberof LOCs needed to support deploymentoperations varies with the scope and scale ofmission requirements. Large scale strategicdeployments can have three LOC segments

(CONUS or OCONUS [based on the pointof origin for deploying forces and materiel],strategic [i.e., air and sea LOCs], and theater),with numerous POEs and/or PODs supportingdeployment of the joint force. Conversely,smaller scale humanitarian assistance ordisaster relief deployments could involvemaintaining only a single LOC from one POEto a POD in the crisis area. Diplomaticclearances and HN agreements have a majorimpact on LOCs and the ability to deployforces.

b. Ports. The most critical nodessupporting most deployment operations arethe air and seaports of embarkation anddebarkation. Port selection decisions madeduring planning determine the force closuretimeline for execution. Port efficiency orthroughput is a function of the operationalenvironment, capability of the port workforce(stevedores, cargo handlers, and PSA [Army]and/or POG [Marine Corps]), and the levelof port modernization (fully developed,marginally developed, or undeveloped). Insome instances, the existence of no portfacilities (e.g., bare beach or austere landingstrip) will significantly hinder deployment andsustainment operations until temporary orfixed infrastructure can be constructed. Joint

Port efficiency and throughput are the primary factors affecting force closure.

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logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS)operations provide the capability toestablish port facilities over bare beach tobegin deployment operations or to augmentexisting port facilities with insufficientthroughput. The worst case deploymentscenario for deployment planners isconducting forcible entry operations in an areaof the world with undeveloped or nonexistentport facilities.

See JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for ForcibleEntry Operations” for additional informationon forcible entry operations.

• Port Operations. Successful portoperations require detailed planning,disciplined adherence to procedures,and purposeful execution of individualand unit responsibilities. Whenpossible, port operations responsibilitiesshould be articulated in commandarrangement agreements (CAAs)between supported and supportingcombatant commands to clearly fixresponsibility for specific functionswithin the port. For example, functionalaspects of port operations that may beoutlined in CAAs include: commandarrangements, command relationships,

and reporting requirements for portsupport operations; responsibilities forlife support of transient units; crisis actionpolicies and procedures for portoperation; and frustrated cargoprocedures. Deploying units must bemade aware of and comply with alllocal policies and port operationprocedures. In general, large portoperations have terrain managementplans with designated local dispersal,staging, marshalling, and call forwardareas as well as restricted traffic patternsto regulate the movement in, around, andthrough the port. However, everyoneinvolved in the port operation mustremember that the deploying unit is thesupported unit in port operations. Unitsand organizations that support portoperations are supporting units. Detailedcoordination with the agency responsiblefor port management will ensure thatdeploying units are in compliance withlocal port operating procedures.

• Aerial Ports of Embarkation and/orDebarkation. Aerial port squadrons(APSs) and TALCEs, provided by AMC,furnish the airlift interface foroperation of APOEs and APODs.

Normally aerial port squadrons and tanker airlift control elements providefacilities support and airlift interface for deploying forces.

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Navy Overseas Air Cargo Terminal(NOACT) units are employed by theNavy to load and unload aircraft andoperate air cargo and passenger airheads.A/DACGs are used by the Army and theMarine Corps for the same function.Both NOACTs and A/DACGs maysupplement APS and TALCEcapabilities, or perform stand-aloneAPOE and APOD operations. Airterminal movement control teams(ATMCTs), when deployed, providemovement control and the airportmanagement interface for Army units atAPOEs and APODs. A/DACGs may beused for specified periods of time (untilATMCTs arrive) or for specified missions(when ATMCTs are not available).Movement control for Marine Corpsunits at APOEs and APODs is providedby the logistics movement control center(LMCC), a standing organization of theforce service support group. Normally,deploying units coordinate theirmovements directly with the ATMCT(Army) or LMCC (Marine Corps). Boththe ATMCT and A/DACG (MarineCorps) coordinate facilities support fordeploying units with the APS and callforward times, airlift schedules, cargo

documentation, and passenger manifestswith the TALCE representatives.

• Seaports of Embarkation and/orDebarkation. USTRANSCOM,through MTMC, is the DOD-designatedSPM for all common-user seaportsworldwide. As SPM, MTMC performsthose functions necessary to support thestrategic flow of the deployment forces’equipment and sustainment supply fromSPOEs through SPODs. MTMC is alsoresponsible for providing strategicdeployment status information to thecombatant commander and to workloadthe SPOD port operator based on thecombatant commander’s priorities and/or guidance. MTMC has managementresponsibility through all phases of thetheater port operations continuum, froma bare beach (i.e., JLOTS) deploymentto a commercial contract fixed-portsupported deployment. Regardingdesignation of a port operator, thegeographic combatant commander hasseveral options available including useof a deployable active componenttransportation group or a RCtransportation terminal group. Thegeographic combatant commander may

Supported and supporting combatant commanders have several options for theoperation of common-user seaport operations outside the continental UnitedStates.

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also opt to enter into a CAA withUSTRANSCOM to allow MTMC tooperate some or all water terminals in thetheater.

• Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.JLOTS are operations in which Navyand Army logistics over-the-shore(LOTS) forces conduct LOTSoperations together under a JFC.JLOTS operations can be conducted overunimproved shorelines, through fixed-ports not accessible to deep draftshipping, or through fixed-ports that areinadequate without the use of JLOTScapabilities. For this reason, JLOTSoperations should be considered whenport throughput, capacity, or receptioncapability is inadequate to supportplanned joint force operations or toaugment port reception capability to

handle the surge of major combatformations during the early stages oflarge force deployments.

For additional information of JLOTSoperations, see JP 4-01.6, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forJoint Logistics Over-the-Shore(JLOTS).”

c. Staging. Staging is the process ofconcentrating troop units, transientpersonnel, and materiel betweenmovements over LOCs for mission-relatedpurposes. Purposes for staging may include,but are not limited to, any of the followingmission related activities: operational pausefor rest, reorganization, or reconstitution ofthe force; reconfiguration of unit loads ormovement echelons for employment;predeployment training; rehearsal of unitmissions; marshalling of forces; or to changethe mode of transportation. The stagingprocess may occur in various areas along theLOCs. Marshalling areas, staging areas, andintermediate staging bases are all used to stageunits. Use of these areas during deploymentincreases the operations security (OPSEC)indicators of deploying units. The OPSECrisk associated with the use of SAs duringdeployment should be examined during COAanalysis and development of the deploymentconcept. If SAs are used, OPSECconsiderations must be addressed in forceprotection and IO planning.

d. Mobility Considerations. Mobilityconsiderations for deployment planningbegins with an assessment of the mobilityassets available for employment. Tactical oroperational deployment operations normallyrequire a combination of organic unit, CULT,HN, and/or theater-assigned mobility assetsto fulfill all movement requirements. Forstrategic deployment, the capabilitiesprovided by the strategic mobility triadform the basis of any deployment plan. Inaddition, several mission variables drive the

Forcible entry operations over bare beach is theworst case deployment scenario for joint forceplanners.

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type and quantity of mobility assets neededto support the deployment effort and canimpact the concept of operations foremployment of the joint force.

• Several planning variables quantify thescale of the deployment in terms of thegross quantity of strategic mobility assetsthat may be required to deploy andsustain the joint force within the timeavailable for execution. Other variablesimpact the deployment concept and/or

the concept of operation. The conceptof operations integrates these variableswith other mission requirements toproduce a coherent employment planwith supporting deployment concept.These planning variables include:warning time; mobilization level; forcesand materiel to be deployed (may includeRC and sustainment); enemy forces tobe encountered in the operational area;delivery schedules and distancesinvolved in the deployment; options for

STAGING IN WORLD WAR II

“Logistic considerations heavily favored both the general strategy ofconcentration against Germany and the specific plan of invading northwesternEurope from a base in the British Isles. Because the target area was close tothe main sources of British and American power, two to three times as manyforces could be hurled against northwestern Europe, with a given amount ofshipping, as could be supported in operations against Japan. Britain itselfwas a highly industrialized country, fully mobilized after two and a half yearsof war, and well shielded by air and naval power — a ready made base for aland invasion and air attacks on Germany’s vitals. While invasion forces wereassembling, moreover, they could garrison the British Isles. Finally, an attackacross the English Channel would use the only short water crossing to theContinent from a base already available and would thrust directly at the heartof Fortress Europe by the main historic invasion routes.”

SOURCE: American Military History, Army Historical Series

Staging locations include intermediate staging bases, forward operatingbases, and tactical assembly areas.

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HNS or assistance; the potential forcombined operations; and national willand political risk.

• Deployment planners will becontinuously challenged to project theproper balance of combat forces,support forces, and materiel within thetime constraints imposed by themission and with the mobility assetsprovided for deployment execution.This is particularly true for large scalestrategic deployments. Moreover, afterthe initial deployment of forces,sustainment begins to require anincreasing amount of mobility assets.After the initial deployment surge, theJFC must continue to monitor thedeployment flow and recognize theopportunity costs associated withstrategic lift operations. As the operationprogresses, requirements for sustainmentlift to support the joint force begin tocompete with initial deployment liftrequirements for movement priority. Forthis reason, the JFC must continue tomonitor the deployment and sustainmentof the force to ensure that the utilizationof strategic mobility assets is consistent

with the current tactical oroperational situation, the overallconcept of operations, and missionobjectives.

e. Container and Pallet Managementand/or Recycling. Increasingly, deploymentconcepts include intermodal shipping as themeans for timely and efficient deploymentoperations. Intermodal shipping operationsrefers to the efficient interchange ofstandardized shipping containers betweenocean and land carriers, sophisticated systemsof container handling and storage in marineterminals or container freight stations, andcomputerized tracking of shipments. Inaddition, pallets, nets, and cargo tie-downequipment are crucial components of airliftoperations. Pallets maximize available airliftcapability and reduce aircraft ground time byallowing for load planning and pallet buildupprior to aircraft arrival. The advantagesrealized from intermodal operations and palletuse in airlift operations during deploymentsare expedited transit times and, often, reduceddelivery costs. Container and palletmanagement is critical to effectiveintermodal and airlift operations.Container and pallet control becomes

Container and pallet accountability is critical to effective andefficient deployment operations.

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increasingly difficult as deploymentoperations progress. The tendency ofreceiving units and the Services to retaincontainers and pallets negates the advantagesof intermodal operations, increasesrequirements for chassis or trailers to movecontainers, significantly reduces airlifteffectiveness and efficiency, and causesincreased deployment costs throughreplacement of “lost” containers and pallets.In addition, in-theater container movementand handling assets are normally not sufficientto accommodate excess containers and pallets.To avoid such costs or container and palletmisuse, a system must be established duringall phases of employment to report, accountfor, and retrograde the containers andpallets in use by the deploying force.

For additional information, see JP 4-01.7,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Use of Intermodal Containers in JointOperations.”

f. Environmental Considerations. Thepotential impact of national, HN, andinternational environmental laws, regulations,conventions, and treaties on deploymentoperations should be considered early in theplanning process. The requirements may havean impact on POE and/or POD selection andoperation, selection and management of SAs,and other deployment decisions.

For detailed information on environmentalconsiderations during operations, refer to JP4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil EngineeringSupport.”

5. Intelligence Preparation

Deployment planning and execution, likeall operations, is guided by joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (JIPB) forthe full range of military operations. Theimpact of the operational environment and theadversary must be assessed in relation to theassigned mission. For deployment

operations, JIPB must answer severalfundamental questions. Is there a potentialthreat that can disrupt, interdict, or block thedeployment of the joint force at any point inthe deployment process? What infrastructureis available en route to and inside of the hostcountry to support deployment of the jointforce? What is the throughput capacity ofvarious ports and airfields to supportdeployment operations? As discussed earlierin this publication, JICTRANS providesready resources and information data basesto assist JIPB for deployment operations.

a. Threat Assessment. JIPB consists offour basic steps; define the total battlespaceenvironment, describe the battlespace’seffects, evaluate the adversary, and determineand describe probable adversary COAs. Thisprocess is used to systematically analyze theenvironment and adversary in a specificgeographic area. The JIPB process iscontinuous and cyclic, with the most currentinformation available regarding the adversarysituation and the battlespace environmentintegrated into the JIPB cycle. JIPB supportsmission analysis by enabling the JFC and jointforce staff to visualize the full extent of thebattlespace, to distinguish the known fromthe unknown, and to establish workingassumptions regarding how adversary andfriendly forces will interact within theconstraints of the battlespace environment.JIPB assists the JFC in formulating planningguidance by identifying significant adversarycapabilities and by pointing out criticalbattlespace factors, such as the locations ofkey geography, attitudes of indigenouspopulations, and potential land, air, and seaavenues of approach.

For more information on JIPB see JP 2-01.3,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Joint Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace.”

• JIPB analysis for deployment operationsincludes a broader geographic

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perspective than normal because thisanalysis must consider the threat todeployment operations from each pointof origin to each TAA. More specifically,JIPB analysis must include the fourprimary nodes and three movementlinks of the deployment process as wellas all supporting nodes and links.Assessment beg ins w i th thedetermination of the local threat toCONUS or OCONUS home stationlocations, transportation links from homestations to POEs, and the individualPOEs selected for marshalling forces andmateriel alerted for deployment.Assessment continues with considerationof the threat to the selected mode androute for strategic lift and in-theaterPODs. In te l l igence col lect ion,production, and assessment for a specificdeployment operation is a collaborativeeffort between JICTRANS, the defenseintelligence organizations, Services, andthe supported and supporting combatantcommand joint intelligence centers(JICs). JICTRANS is responsible forintelligence collection and production forTCC strategic lift route planning outsideof CONUS to the POD. Supported andsupporting combatant command JICs areresponsible for intelligence collectionand production for in-theater POEs,PODs, assembly or staging areas, andmovement planning for the deployingforce.

• Each node and link in the deploymentprocess represents a potential target foran adversary. Deployment nodesrepresent particularly lucrative targets forWMD or terrorist activity because of thelarge concentrations of forces andmateriel. Based on the assessed threat,the JFC must determine where to acceptrisk, where to focus force protectionefforts, and how much of the deployingforce should be dedicated, at leastinitially, to force protection. Effective

threat assessment is the first step inunderstanding the operational risk todeployment operations and developingrisk controls to mitigate or reduce theperceived threat and execute thedeployment without interference.

b. Infrastructure Assessment. JICTRANSand the geographic combatant command JICsmaintain infrastructure data for variousgeographic areas of the world. Specific andcurrent infrastructure data is critical todeployment planning. Infrastructure dataincludes, for example, detailed informationregarding air and seaports, road networks,railroads, sea lanes, and storage facilities tosupport operations planning.

• Infrastructure assessment is keyt o understanding deploymentthroughput. Throughput is the averagequantity of cargo and passengers that canpass through a port or airfield on a dailybasis. Moreover, deployment throughputmay be limited by reception and storagecapacity at any node or by otherrestrictions such as the availability ofmaterials handling equipment (MHE),stevedores, or cranes. Depending uponthe scope, scale, and geographic locationof the operational area, throughputcapacity can become a significantoperational constraint, impacting closureof the force and, ultimately, missionaccomplishment. Careful analysis ofavailable deployment nodes or plannedaugmentation to offset port and airfieldshortcomings by deployment plannerswill ensure that the selected modes andnodes have the capacities required fortimely deployment of the joint force tomeet mission requirements.

• Collection of infrastructure informationis a continuous intelligence effort.JICTRANS is responsible for developingdistributed functional data bases foraccess by deployment planners and for

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Handbook 5260, “Commander’s Handbookfor Antiterrorism Readiness,” and JP 3-07.2,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Antiterrorism” for additionalinformation.

“When invading an enemy’s country,men should always be confident inspirit, but they should fear, too, and takemeasures of precaution; and thus theywill be at once most valorous in attackand impregnable in defense.”

Archidamus of Sparta: Speech tothe Lacaedaemonian expeditionary

forces departing against Athens,431 B.C.

a. Local Security. Local security is nevera given, even in CONUS. From alertnotification to redeployment to home station,unit commanders at all levels must neverassume they are operating in a secureenvironment. The JFC’s foremost forceprotection concern should be maintaininglocal security to preserve tactical andoperational flexibility and freedom ofaction. Force protection begins with assuredlocal security.

b. Information Operations. IO are thoseactions taken to affect adversaryinformation and information systems,while defending one’s own information andinformation systems. Joint force deploymentoperations must be coordinated with plannedIO, which are conducted through theintegration of many capabilities and relatedactivities. Major IO capabilities include, butare not limited to, OPSEC, PSYOP, militarydeception, electronic warfare, physical attackand/or destruction, and computer networkattack. IO-related activities include, but arenot limited to, public affairs (PA) and CAactivities. Planned improvements indeployment planning and execution arefocused on the integration and developmentof robust information systems and automateddata processing (ADP) equipment. This

coordinating collection and productionpriorities within the intelligencecommunity.

6. Force Protection

Force protection is a critical element ofall joint force operations. It is an inherentcommand responsibility. Fluid battlefieldsand the potential ability of adversaries toorchestrate asymmetric threats against USforces require that every means be sought toprotect those forces. Commanders areresponsible for ensuring that requisite forceprotection measures are enforcedconsistent with the threat. Early warningsystems must be part of all plans. They mustbe known by all personnel, tested, and used.A thorough intelligence estimate will assistthe commander in providing force protectionagainst known threats. The threat of enemyinterdiction during deployment operations,particularly for forward presence forces,presents a special challenge to the JFC. Thechallenge is to protect geographically-dispersed deploying forces (which will havelimited self-protection capability whileconfigured for deployment) and materieltransiting the various links and nodes of thedeployment process. Risk must be assessedand comprehensive force protection plansdeveloped to address vulnerabilities andcounter potential threats to forces, materiel,infrastructure, and information systems.Comprehensive force protection requires theemployment of a full array of active andpassive measures and the integration andcoordination of intelligence and securityprograms, IO, risk management (RM)techniques, and safety programs to increaseindividual awareness of potential threats.Planning for WMD threats should also beconsidered. In addition, it is also critical toinclude preparations protection for the civilianwork force and/or HNS workers.

See DOD Directive 2000.12, “DODCombating Terrorism Program,” CJCS

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increasing dependence on informationsystems and ADP equipment presentspotentially enormous vulnerabilities thatmay be exploited by adversaries intent ondisrupting US force projection.

For additional information, see JP 3-13,“Joint Doctrine for InformationOperations.”

Typical IO capabilities and related activitiesaddressed during a deployment are as follows.

• Information Assurance. Informationassurance is defined as IO that protectand defend information systems byensuring their availability, integrity,authentication, confidentiality, andnonrepudiat ion . This includesproviding for restoration of informationsystems by incorporating detection,protection, and reaction capabilities.Planning and execution of deploymentoperations is heavily dependent uponassured information systems.Corruption of deployment movementdata, transportation scheduling, or C2systems would have a major, andpotentially mission threatening, impacton deployment operations.

• Military Deception. Military deceptionis a tool used by JFCs to assist them inaccomplishing their missions. Militarydeception may be employed during allphases of military operations to assist theJFC in attaining surprise, security,mass, and economy of force. Militarydeception supports military operationsby causing adversaries to misallocateresources in time, place, quantity, oreffectiveness. Deceptions duringdeployment operations are intended toincrease the potential for successfulinitiation of friendly operations bymisleading the adversary as to the timeand location of the introduction of forcesinto the operational area, the location ofthe main effort, and the command’soperational objectives.

For additional information, see JP 3-58,“Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception.”

• Psychological Operations. PSYOPinfluence the emotions, motives,objective reasoning, and ultimatebehavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individualsin such a way as to support achievement

Asymmetric threats against our forces require constant vigilance.

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of the overall joint force mission.PSYOP can be a significant forcemultiplier through the conduct of masscommunication activities that reducethe efficiency of adversary forces andcreate disaffection within adversaryranks. Properly planned and executed,PSYOP can be an extremely effectivepopulation control measure. PSYOPefforts in support of deploymentoperations may include activitiesemphasizing noninterference bynoncombatants, providing criticalinformation to noncombatants or UScitizens in the AOR and/or JOA, assistingin deception operations, or inducingdesertion and surrender within enemyunits.

See JP 3-53, “Doctrine for JointPsychological Operations.”

• Operations Security. OPSEC isconcerned with denying criticalinformation about friendly forces tothe adversary. Deployments,particularly strategic deploymentoperations, generally have large, distinctsignatures. This fact makes masking themovement (or purpose of the movement)of forces and materiel to staging bases orto the AOR and/or JOA a critical pieceof the OPSEC plan. Deploymentsignatures probably cannot be totallyhidden; however, US OPSEC mayconceal such details as the compositionof the forces or the time and location ofthe introduction of forces into a theater.

For additional information see JP 3-54,“Joint Doctrine for OperationsSecurity.”

• Public Affairs. PA are publicinformation and community relationsactivities directed toward the generalpublic by the various elements of the

Department of Defense to expedite theflow of accurate and timelyinformation to internal (ownorganization) and external (the public)audiences. PA activities create anawareness of the military goals duringa campaign or operation and satisfy thedesires of the internal and externalaudiences to be kept informed about thecampaign or operation. The intent forPA activities is to encourage a favorableattitude about the campaign or operationand inform internal and externalaudiences of significant developmentsaffecting them. During deploymentoperations, PA activities allow a JFC toinfluence an adversary’s (or a potentialadversary’s) perception about thefriendly force’s intent, capability, andvulnerability. At the same time, PAactivities will not be used as a militarydeception capability or to providedisinformation to either internal orexternal audiences.

See JP 3-61, “Doctrine for PublicAffairs in Joint Operations,” for furtherdetails.

• Civil Affairs. Lessons learned fromrecent operational deployments havehighlighted that timely andcomplementary use of CA assets canmitigate the extent to which civilianmatters impact military operations as wellas identify and coordinate the use of in-country facilities and resources. CAelements can provide liaison to localagencies and civilian authorities,provide information on the political,cultural, and economic situation in theAOR and/or JOA, and advise the JFCon cultural and moral considerations.

See JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations,” for additionalinformation.

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c. Risk Management. Uncertainty andrisk are a fundamental part of all militaryoperations including deployment operations.A time-tested tenet of successful jointoperations is taking bold, decisive actionaccompanied by the willingness to accept theassociated risk. Risk is the probability andseverity of loss linked to various hazards.Carefully determining the risks, analyzing andcontrolling as many hazards as possible, andexecuting a supervised plan that accounts forthose hazards contributes to the successfulapplication of military force during joint forceoperations. RM is a process that assistsdecision makers in reducing or offsettingrisk . The RM process provides leaders witha systematic mechanism to aid inidentifying and choosing the optimumCOA based upon risk for any situation.

For additional information on RM, see JP5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidanceand Procedures.”

d. Safety. JFCs make safety an integralpart of all joint training and operations.Sustained, high-tempo operations putpersonnel at risk. Command emphasis,discipline, and training lessen those risks.Safety in training, planning, and operationsis crucial to successful joint force operationsand the preservation of combat power.

e. Force Health Protection (FHP) is thestrategy that provides focus for a unity of effortfor the entire military health system to providehealth service support to US forces. This isaccomplished in part by a proactive healthsurveillance and preventative medicineprogram. The desired outcome is a healthyand fit force that provides maximumprotection to Service members across the fullrange of military operations.

Refer to JP 4-02, “Doctrine for HealthService Support in Joint Operations,” formore information.

• Deployment Health Surveillance. Arobust health surveillance system is acritical component of FHP. Deploymenthealth surveillance includes identifyingthe population at risk (through, but notlimited to, pre- and post-deploymenthealth assessments), recognizing andassessing hazardous exposures (medical,environmental, and occupational),employing specific countermeasures,and monitoring health outcomes(through weekly disease and non-battleinjury reporting).

• Individual Health Readiness. Soldiers,sailors, airmen, and Marines are the mostvaluable, most complex weapon systemsin the US military field. To ensure theirreadiness from a health perspective, theJoint Staff has developed individualdeployment readiness requirements.

Specific baseline requirements fordeployment health surveillance andindividual health readiness are detailedin the Joint Chiefs of StaffMemorandum, “Deployment HealthSurveillance and Readiness.”

SECTION B. EXECUTION

7. Requirements Validation

Movement requirements developed duringdeployment planning must be validated priorto deployment execution. Validationconfirms the need for the movementrequirement, shipment configuration,dimensions, and routing and ensures that allparties, including the chain of command, arecognizant of the requirement. Movementrequirements are validated during executionplanning by the supported combatantcommander who validates all joint forcemovement requirements for USTRANSCOMmovement scheduling. During executionplanning, the NCA approved COA or

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OPLAN is transformed into an OPORD bythe supported combatant commander. Actualforces, sustainment, and strategic mobilityresources are identified and the concept ofoperations is described in OPORD format.TPFDD refinement that began duringdeployment planning continues with updatedinformation entered into JOPES.Concurrently, the supported combatantcommander directs supporting combatantcommanders, component commanders, andproviding organizations to source applicableforce requirements and verify personnel andcargo details to ensure that the TPFDD reflectsaccurate OPORD movement requirements.Changes to joint force movementrequirements occurring after the supportedcombatant commander validates the TPFDDmust be coordinated through the supportedcombatant commander, who revalidates theapproved changes prior to any action byUSTRANSCOM.

a. TPFDD Refinement. The TPFDD is adynamic document that supported combatantcommand planners must continuously refinethrough the entire deployment process toreflect current deployment information andmonitor achievement of deployment

objectives. TPFDD adjustments becomenecessary for a variety of compelling andvalid reasons. Managing changes to theTPFDD is critical to maintaining control ofthe deployment. Some factors that maygenerate TPFDD adjustments include:

• Changes to mission requirementsbased on changes to the overall jointforce mission, mission objectives, orthe threat;

• Nonvalidated forces and/or sustainmentadded to the deployment flow;

• Validated forces that have a new latestarrival date;

• Available-to-load date or ready-to-loaddate adjustments to deploying forces;

• Delayed POE and/or POD arrivals anddepartures that affect subsequent strategiclift;

• Airlift rerouting or delays resulting fromdenial of overflight diplomaticclearances or natural or manmadedisasters; and

All movement requirements, including all changes to the time-phased force anddeployment data, must be validated by the supported combatant commanderprior to movement scheduling.

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• Emergency needs for forces orsustainment in the theater.

b. TPFDD Letter of Instruction. TheTPFDD LOI provides planning andexecution instructions to the supportedcombatant command’s components,supporting combatant commands, andsupporting agencies as they refine, verify, andmanifest their portion of the joint forceTPFDD. The intent of the supportedcombatant commander’s TPFDD LOI is toeliminate confusion, facilitate parallelplanning, and expedite TPFDD refinementby providing component commands,supporting commands, and agencies with asingle set of instructions for TPFDD inputand management. Prudent use of the TPFDDLOI ensures that actual OPORD movementrequirements are properly documented andvalidated for transportation scheduling.

For additional information see CJCSM3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies,and Procedures).” This manual outlines thestandard TPFDD LOI that will be used bythe joint planning and execution communityfor all planning and execution scenarios.Supported combatant commanders provideadditional supplemental guidance for theirAOR.

c. Actions of the Supported CombatantCommander. Firm force requirements andpriorities are identified during planningfollowing COA selection. Once this occurs,the supported combatant commander notifiesthe JPEC and supporting commands andagencies to source the unsourced forcerequirements. This signals force-providingorganizations and supporting commands andagencies to provide or update specific unitmovement data in JOPES for the firstincrement of movement (normally, the first 7days of air movement and the first 30 days ofsea movement). It also prompts Servicelogistics and personnel offices to adjust and

update sustainment requirements based onthe latest and most accurate staff estimates.During this process, the supported combatantcommander also requests that the Joint Staffand supporting commands and agencies assistin resolving any critical sourcing orresource shortfalls or limitations. Whenthe above actions have been completed, thesupported combatant commander reviewsand validates the lift requirements withinthe specific TPFDD movement window andnotifies USTRANSCOM that the movementrequirements are ready for lift scheduling.USTRANSCOM develops transportationschedules to accommodate theserequirements after verifying transportationfeasibility. Accuracy of TPFDD movementrequirements and data is critical to the liftscheduling process because it directlyimpacts force closure. Errors in lift schedulingor late changes to the validated TPFDDrequiring a change in transportation mode(e.g., airlift to sealift) could significantlyreduce the supported combatant commander’soperational capability or flexibility.

d. Actions of Supporting Combatantand Service Component Commanders.Supporting commanders providing forces willidentify and task specific units foremployment and provide unit movementrequirements in JOPES to allow liftscheduling for all elements involved in thedeployment. Accuracy is imperative toensure effective support and to optimizeefficiency of lift. It is also very importantduring this process that supporting combatantand Service component commanders ensurethe timely coordination of hazardousmateriel data with USTRANSCOM.Supporting commanders should alsodevelop OPORDs to support the approvedCOA and minimize the confusion inherent inrapid deployments. Service componentcommanders continue working with theirService and major commands to identify andupdate estimated sustainment requirements.Service components and supporting

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combatant commands also schedulemovements for self-deploying forces (organicmoves) so that the JFC has visibility of alldeploying forces.

The Invasion of Sicily - World War II

“Perhaps the most difficult problemwhich faced the subordinate formationsof the Army arose from continuallyvarying estimates of availability of craftand shipping.”

Field Marshal ViscountMontgomery of Alamein (onplanning for the invasion of

Sicily July 1943)

8. Movement Scheduling

USTRANSCOM schedules intertheaterair, land, and sea transportation to supportthe approved concept of operations aftervalidation of movement requirements by thesupported combatant commander.USTRANSCOM applies all availablecommon-user transportation assetsrequired to execute these movementrequirements. Feasible airlift and sealifttransportation schedules are prepared byUSTRANSCOM in the sequence requestedand validated by the supported combatantcommander. The level of detail in themovement schedule will correspond with theavailability of detailed information regardingmovement requirements and the timeavailable for planning. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM willfocus its entire planning effort on the firstincrement of the movement requirement.Additionally, USTRANSCOM establishes airand sea channels for movement of nonunitpersonnel and sustainment.

9. Movement Control

Successful employment of military forcesdepends on assured and timely deploymentand support. Movement control coordinatestransportation resources to enhance

combat effectiveness and meet thedeployment and support priorities of thesupported combatant commander (see FigureIII-3). Effective movement control duringdeployment operations provides the JFCwith the capability to monitor and managedeployment execution and adjust thedeployment flow as necessary. USTRANSCOMfacilitates this effort by providing movementsummaries of TCC and organic movementsfrom departure to arrival in theater.USTRANSCOM also maintains the JOPESdata base and provides analysis of deploymentexecution to the Joint Staff, supportedcombatant commands, and supportingcommands and agencies. This analysisincludes progress reports, status, problems,force closure, port workloads, daily movementstatistics, and resolution of problemsencountered with common-user transportationmeans. In addition, movement control mustbe coordinated and synchronized withJRSOI and a TD plan that describes the in-theater network and system for logisticsdistribution management. JRSOI focuses onbuilding mission-capable forces as quickly aspossible. TD focuses on establishing adistribution management structure andbattlefield architecture to maintain visibilityand control over forces and materiel arrivingfor employment in-theater. Effective JRSOIand TD eliminates bottlenecks and providesmission-capable forces and a seamlessdistribution system responsive to the needsof the JFC.

For further information on movementcontrol, see JP 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for MovementControl.” For additional information on TD,see JP 4-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Theater Distribution inJoint Operations.”

a. Organization for Movement Control.Movement control involves planning,routing, scheduling, and controllingcommon-user assets and maintaining ITV

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of forces and materiel moving through thedeployment process. Properly resourced andexecuted movement control will assistcommanders in force tracking. It alsoenhances JRSOI of personnel, equipment, andsupplies moving over LOCs in accordancewith command directives and responsibilities.The supported geographic combatantcommander has a wide range of options forperforming movement control. These optionsinclude directing subordinate JFCs andService components to perform their ownmovement control or creating a fullyintegrated joint organization. Regardless ofthe movement control option selected, thegeographic combatant commander shouldtask organize the movement controlfunction commensurate with the mission,scope of operations, and geography of theoperational area. Normally, the geographiccombatant commander delegates OPCON of

the various parts of the transportation systemto the most-capable Service components butretains the authority to set priorities andapportion and allocate resources. Thegeographic combatant commander exercisesthis authority through a T-JTB, JMC, orassigns the responsibility to a staff element(normally the command’s senior logistics staffofficer) who coordinates closely with theoperations staff.

b. Strategic Movement Control.Effective strategic movement control requiresthe coordinated efforts of USTRANSCOM,supporting combatant commanders, and thesupported geographic combatant commander.Strategic movement control begins withidentifying total joint force movementrequirements and translating thoserequirements into logistics terms (e.g.,barrels, short tons, square feet, passengers).

Figure III-3. Joint Movement Control Architecture

JOINT MOVEMENT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE

COMBATANTCOMMANDS

SUPPORTEDCOMBATANTCOMMANDER

US TRANSPORTATIONCOMMAND

SUPPORTINGCOMBATANTCOMMANDER

J3/JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER JOINT MOVEMENT CONTROL GROUP J3/JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER

COMPONENTS

DIRECTION

COORDINATION

MOVEMENT CONTROLAGENCY/CENTER(ARMY FORCES)

FORCE MOVEMENTCONTROL CENTER(MARINE FORCES)

ADVANCED LOGISTICSSUPPORT SITE / N4

(NAVY FORCES)

LOGISTICS READINESSCENTER / A4

(AIR FORCE FORCES)

AIR MOBILITYCOMMAND

(US AIR FORCE)

MILITARY SEALIFTCOMMAND(US NAVY)

MILITARY TRAFFICMANAGEMENT

COMMAND(US ARMY)

MOVEMENT CONTROLAGENCY/CENTER(ARMY FORCES)

FORCE MOVEMENTCONTROL CENTER

(MOVEMENT FORCES)

ADVANCED LOGISTICSSUPPORT SITE / N4

(NAVY FORCES)

LOGISTICS READINESSCENTER / A4

(AIR FORCE FORCES)

JOINT MOBILITY CONTROL GROUPUS TRANSPORTATION COMMAND'S MOBILITY CONTROL CENTERAIR MOBILITY COMMAND'S COMMAND CENTERMILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND'S COMMAND CENTERMILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND'S COMMAND CENTERJOINT TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICEJOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER FOR TRANSPORTATIONGLOBAL PATIENT MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS CENTERJOINT OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRLIFT CENTER

J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staff

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Logistically-described movement requirementsare documented on the appropriate TPFDDand scheduled for strategic deployment usingcommon-user transportation in the sequenceand priority validated by the supportedgeographic combatant commander.Deliberate planning focuses on time-phasing movements and assigningtransportation resources to support initialdeployments for a set period. Crisis actionstrategic movement control follows thebasic process of deliberate planning. Thefundamental difference is the reducedamount of time available to reach allocation,scheduling, identification of threats totransportation assets en route to thedebarkation ports, en route access or overflightstatus, and other execution decisions. Earlyidentification of the force and its movementrequirements are key to rapid crisis actionmovement planning and execution.

• USTRANSCOM uses the TPFDD toanalyze the flow of forces and cargo fromtheir points of origin to arrival in theater.They distribute the apportioned strategictransportation resources and makeadjustments, as necessary, to ensure theunimpeded flow of forces and materielinto theater. During this process,USCINCTRANS follows CJCSguidance and coordinates all majordecisions with the supported combatantcommander.

• Upon initial execution of an OPORD’sTPFDD, and until the situation stabilizesor the theater matures, USCINCTRANSand the supported geographic combatantcommander may have to exercise directcontrol of movement operations.Repetitive or cyclic validations ofprojected movement requirements (bothmode and destination) may be necessary.In addition, ascertaining transportationasset availability through an accurateTPFDD is critical to optimizing strategicmobility resources and keeping the chain

of command appraised of deploymentprogress.

c. Intertheater and IntratheaterInterface. The integration of intertheater andintratheater movement control systems is alsothe joint responsibility of USTRANSCOMand the supported combatant command.USTRANSCOM normally establishesforward elements within theater to coordinateintertheater transportation information withsupported combatant command agencies.However, intertheater movementinformation exchange occurs primarilyamong USTRANSCOM, Defense agencies,Service activities, and supportingcombatant commanders. These commandershave the responsibility for keeping thesupported combatant commander informed ofissues that require joint attention.USTRANSCOM may place elements fromeach of its subordinate TCCs in a theater toprovide management of intertheater mobilityoperations into and out of the theater incoordination with the geographic combatantcommander’s movement control element.

d. Theater Movement Control. Thesupported geographic combatant commandercontrols intratheater movement. Theatermovement control plans should provide thesupported geographic combatant commanderwith the highest practicable degree ofinfluence or control over movement into,within, and out of theater. The samemovement control options used for strategicmovement control should be applied toperform theater movement control.Regardless of the option selected, the theatermovement control system must allow thesupported geographic combatant commanderto plan, apportion, allocate, coordinate, anddeconflict transportation requirementsand track the forces and materiel intheater. Moreover, the theater movementcontrol plan must coordinate incomingstrategic movements with the TD plan andtheater JRSOI operations.

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e. Theater Distribution. TD is the act ofreceiving supplies and equipment in atheater and subsequently forwarding thatcargo to a designated point of need.Effective TD calls for a comprehensive in-theater distribution system for deployment thatis seamlessly integrated with strategic,operational, and tactical logistics systems.The intent of TD is to deliver criticalsupplies, under positive control and througha highly visible distribution pipeline, fromsource to ultimate user. The transition fromsupply to distribution-based sustainmentreduces the need for layered stockpiles,reduces logistics management personnel intheater, and provides more effective andresponsive support to deployed forces. Theend result is reduced costs and efficienciesrealized in the areas of transportationutilization, supply requisitioning, and theaterstockage.

f. CONUS Peacetime MovementControl. Peacetime movement control andexecution procedures for deploymentoperations are the same as those inwartime. Each Service coordinates itsCONUS DTS movements with theappropriate TCC. USCINCTRANS and thesupported combatant commander monitor andmanage the system to ensure that it meets theirpriorities.

• Organic convoy operations are animportant mode of transportation. Theyare not visible to USTRANSCOMduring peacetime movement. CONUSconvoy movements are the responsibilityof the respective Service and must bescheduled consistent with MTMC callforward instructions or AMC publishedstrategic lift schedules to ensure correctarrival times at assigned ports.

• AMC is responsible for providing allintertheater air movements. Users submitnon-TPFDD requirements for airlift toAMC through their Service or

combatant command air clearanceauthority.

• MSC is responsible for providing allintertheater sealift movements. Userssubmit requests for common-usersealift through their Servicecomponent to MTMC, who in turncoordinates with MSC for the requisitelift capability.

• CONUS commercial surface movementsare arranged by shipper services.CONUS commercial air movementsoutside ITO or TMO authority arearranged by AMC. A routing authorityis delegated by MTMC to ITO or TMObased on shipment weight and mode.Depending on shipment weight andmode, the ITO or TMO may arrange forthe movement or may request and receiverouting and rating from MTMC.

10. Force Tracking

Innovative and integrated use of C2systems and information technology makesforce tracking through the entire deploymentprocess possible. Visibility of deployingforces and materiel is established through thelogistics management concept of JTAV andthe GCCS common operational picture(COP). JTAV is an evolving capability thatprovides origin-to-destination forcetracking and industry-to-end user, in-theater asset visibility. JTAV is possiblethrough integration of the capabilitiesprovided by automatic identificationtechnology (AIT), ITV, and the informationsystems and decision support tools comprisingthe GTN and GCSS. Control of thedeployment process is exercised through theC2 capabilities of GTN and GCSS.

For additional information on the COP seeCJCSI 3151.01, “Global Command andControl System Common Operational PictureReporting Requirements.”

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a. Unit Movements. Unit moves involvevarious combinations of assets to transportpersonnel, unit-related supplies, andequipment. Except for very small units, it isusual for a unit to be transported as severalseparate shipments. Force tracking is focusedon maintaining visibility of separate unitshipments from origin to destination. Forcetracking includes monitoring the elements ofa unit until they are reassembled under thecommander’s control as a mission-capableforce and continues until all units thatconstitute the specified force assemble andtransfer of authority to the supportedcommander is effected.

b. Joint Total Asset Visibility. JTAV,when fully functional, will provide users with“one stop shopping” for timely andaccurate information on the location,movement, status, and identity of units,personnel, equipment, and supplies duringforce projection operations. It also willinclude the capability to act upon thatinformation to improve the overallperformance of the Department of Defense’slogistics practices supporting operations.JTAV is the foundation upon which DOD-wide asset visibility is based, requiringhorizontal integration of supply andtransportation activities and one-time datacapture. JTAV includes in-process, in-storage,and in-transit asset visibility. Through JTAV,commanders and staffs can determine whetherspecific items of supply are readily availablein the logistics system or must be deployedwith the unit. Total visibility results fromintegration of requirements andinformation systems from four areas;requisition tracking, visibility of assets in-storage or in-process, visibility of assets in-transit, and asset management within thetheater of operations. In each case, a specified“data repository” serves as a central hub forasset information and visibility.

• Requisition Tracking. The logistics on-line tracking system will provide

visibility over the status of requisitions.This system also provides statusinformation to GTN to enable it toprovide accurate status information whena requisition is in-transit.

• Assets In-Storage or In-Process. Theautomated information system of eachinventory control point (ICP) willprovide visibility of assets that are in-storage or in-process (defined as assetsbeing procured or repaired). Assetvisibility includes the followinginventory levels, as described in DODRegulation 4140.1-R “DOD MaterialManagement Regulation.”

•• US Army. Direct support authorizedstockage lists.

•• US Marine Corps. Installationsupply and Marine expeditionary forcesupport activities.

•• US Navy. Shipboard and major shorestation allowances.

•• US Air Force. Base supply.

• In-Transit Visibility. ITV refers to thecapability to track the identity, status,and location of DOD unit and nonunitcargo, passengers, and medicalpatients as part of the JTAV initiative.USTRANSCOM is the functionalproponent for ITV. ITV is a sharedresponsibility among the deployingforce, supporting commands andagencies, USTRANSCOM, and thesupported combatant commander.Accurate, disciplined adherence to forcevalidation and manifesting is essential forunit tracking. Accurate reporting beginswith the deploying force. Deployingforces are responsible, through theirappropriate component chains ofcommand, to the supported combatantcommander and USTRANSCOM for

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confirming accurate force data. Thesupported combatant commandervalidates the force flow and data toUSTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM isresponsible for tracking forces andequipment embarked on strategic liftusing unit line numbers andtransportation control numbers. GTN isthe central repository for visibility ofassets in-transit from origin todestination, including all military,government, and vendor documentedshipments. GTN’s data base will containshipment status information, bookinginformation, passenger reservationinformation, aircraft and ship manifests,personal property data, medical patientsinformation, and vessel and aircraftscheduling data. GTN integrates theautomated movement control systemsused by the Services, Defense agencies,and USTRANSCOM, providing thecapability to track unit movements andsustainment operations globally.

• In-Theater Asset Visibility. JTAV in-theater, when fully developed, willprovide geographic combatantcommanders, subordinate JFCs, anddeploying forces with materiel andpersonnel asset visibility. The in-theatersystem will interface with Servicelogistics data bases (to capture visibilityof assets held by theater componentforces) and with theater transportationinformation systems (to provide visibilityof shipments within a theater). Thissystem will use the Defense AutomaticAddressing System to exchangeinformation with the logistics on-linetracking system and ICPs on assets in-bound to the theater and available inCONUS. It will also obtain in-transitdata directly from GTN.

• Joint Personnel Asset Visibility(JPAV). JPAV gives users access to an

integrated data base containinginformation on units and individuals.JPAV, an integral part of JTAV, willprovide cross-Service integration ofvarious Service personnel data bases,giving the supported combatantcommand access to and visibility ofpersonnel resource data for individualsdeploying to, employed in, or leaving theAOR and/or JOA, through the use of C2systems, satellite communications(SATCOM), and information technology.The data base contains basic identifyinginformation on individuals, such as name,rank, social security number, and Servicecomponent. Military skill identifiers,qualifications, and other personnelresource data needed to supportpersonnel tracking and readinessassessments is also contained in the database. The integrated JPAV data base isupdated frequently from various sources,including TPFDD, Service componentpersonnel systems, transportationmanifesting systems, and casualtyreporting and tracking systems.

c. Automatic Identification Technology.AIT enables the capture of current andaccurate source data through the use of barcodes for individual items, optical memorycards for multipacks and containers, radiofrequency tags for containers and pallets, anda movement tracking capability using satellitelinks for convoys, trains, and barges. AITintegration with logistics information systemsis key to the JTAV effort.

11. Management of Change

Effective deployment execution involvessuccessfully coping with change. Morespecifically, timely and responsivedeployment operations are a directfunction of the executing command’sability to manage changes in joint forceorganization, phasing, employment sequence,

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or circumstance and maintain control ofdeployment execution. Whenever possible,efficient use of scarce resources should be thegoal. Optimizing the deployment process isa combat multiplier that enhances joint forceeffectiveness.

a. Deployment Changes. TPFDD andmovement schedule changes duringdeployment execution are inevitable.Changes in mission requirements,operating environment, or unanticipatedcircumstances may cause the JFC to modifythe organization of forces, commandrelationships, phasing, or sequence of forceemployment. More likely, changes duringdeployment execution are the result ofincomplete or erroneous movement datain the TPFDD. In general, the quantity ofdeployment TPFDD and movement schedulechanges is in direct relation to the quality ofJOPES movement data inputs and theaccuracy of validation, manifesting, andscheduling procedures. Changes may alsooccur because of deployment planningdecisions. Late decisions or changesregarding transportation modes or routing,LOCs, or POEs and/or PODs supportingdeployment may have a significant negativeimpact on the operation, and may causedelayed satisfaction of requirements, delayedmovements, bottlenecks at deployment nodes,and increased transportation costs. Moreimportantly, an impeded deployment processmay jeopardize mission success.

b. Managing the Impact. Since changesduring deployment execution are inevitable,planners must anticipate adjustments andmanage the impact of changes to avoiddisrupting or impeding the deployment flow.Prior planning is the key. Management ofchange is possible if changes are held to aminimum and require supported combatantcommand approval. Planners must also:

• Understand and anticipate changes;

• Provide resources at critical sites toensure timely reporting of changes;

• Develop flexible, responsive steps, at alllevels, to capture and properly documentchanges;

• Synchronize all aspects of the requiredchange (e.g., adjusted deployment flowmay require different staging or support);and

• Ensure that requested changes areconsistent with the commander’s intentand concept of operations.

12. SustainmentConsiderations

Sustainment is directed at providing andmaintaining levels of personnel and materielrequired to sustain planned joint forceactivity at the desired level of intensity forthe duration of the operation. It involves themovement of replacement supplies,equipment, personnel, and units. Thesupported commander establishes the policy,procedures, priorities, and LOCs forsustainment activities. The commander willimmediately begin to submit demand-basedor “pull” sustainment requirements forServices to resupply their forces in theater.In the absence of the commander’s specificguidance and requirements, each of theServices will sustain their forces using Servicemethodologies, which may include initially“pushing” sustainment to its forces.Sustainment supplies do not always followthe designated deployment LOCs since somesupplies (petroleum, oils and lubricants [POL]and ammunition) require special handlingfacilities and could result in significantdisruption of port activities. Optimizing portthroughput will be a primary factor inbalancing pull and push sustainmentprocedures.

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OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

“For the first few weeks of the deployment, the TPFDD changed an average of14 times per day. The result was confusion about what was to be loaded onthe aircraft at the aerial ports of embarkation. . .Army units showed upunexpectedly at the APOE for air transportation, and aircraft arrived at airfieldsfor units that were not there.”

SOURCE: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR —Description and Lessons Learned

(Planning and Deployment Phases)

a. Sustainment Movement. Sustainmentintertheater lift is handled differently thandeployment intertheater lift. Time-phaseddeployment requirements are developed,sourced, refined, and validated in JOPES forUSTRANSCOM movement scheduling.Intertheater airlift for the deploymentphase of an operation is requested throughthe JOPES process. Normally, somesustainment is planned as part of thedeployment TPFDD developed in JOPES.However, as the operation progresses,intertheater sustainment airlift becomes morerequirements-based. USTRANSCOMnormally supports strategic sustainment airliftfor high priority shipments through channelservice or express service. Prioritysustainment requirements will be moved onpredetermined channels validated by theService or supported combatant commander,as appropriate, and USTRANSCOM. Criticalcargo with definite delivery times might bepicked up by express carriers at depots orinstallations, moved by the carriers to either acommercial or military hub, and loaded onAMC organic, CRAF, or commercial airliftmissions for delivery to the AOR and/or JOA.Routine sustainment is accomplished bysealift and normally occurs at C+30.Intertheater sealift sustainment is generallyprovided by the US flagged merchant fleetand MSC-controlled ships, augmented asnecessary by ships from the Ready ReserveForce (RRF). The US flagged merchant fleetcontains many container ships capable ofefficiently transporting and discharging large

quantities of cargo. RRF augmentation isoften required to meet specific requirementsfor vessels with particular features orcapabilities. The priority for the movementof sustainment, once deployment hasfinished, is handled in accordance with theDOD Uniform Material Movement and IssuePriority System.

For additional information see JP 4-01,“Joint Doctrine for the DefenseTransportation System,” JP 4-01.1, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forAirlift Support to Joint Operations,” and JP4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations.”

b. Unit-Related and Non-unit-RelatedSupplies and Equipment. Supply andsupport requirements of deploying forcesconsist of two major categories: unit-relatedsupplies and equipment and non-unit-relatedsupplies and equipment. Unit-related suppliesand equipment include a unit’s organicequipment, basic load, and accompanyingsupplies. Unit-related supplies andequipment are configured (palletized orcontainerized) and documented fordeployment by the unit. Unit planners entermovement data for unit-related supplies andequipment in the TPFDD. Non-unit-relatedsupplies and equipment include all supplysustainment support requirements that arenot identified for a specific unit. Theyinclude prepositioned war reserve stock,

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sustaining supplies, and resupply. Non-unit-related supplies and equipment areconfigured and documented as cargoincrement numbers (CINs) for deploymentby the sourcing organization and providedfor distribution in theater by the supportedcombatant command’s logistics agencies.AMC uses CINs to allocate non-unit-relatedsupplies and equipment sustainment lift.

c. Non-unit-related Personnel (NRP).NRP are any active duty personnel from anyService (including RC Service membersaccessed onto active duty), DOD civilians,contract civilians, and Red Cross personnelwho deploy as individuals or as a smallgroup of individuals without a unit. NRPconsists of individual military manpoweralerted for deployment to serve as individualunit fillers to bring undermanned units toauthorized manning levels and casualtyreplacements in theater. NRP are normallymoved via commercial transportation fromlosing organizations to designated CONUSreplacement centers. Service personnelcommands coordinate strategic liftrequirements with USTRANSCOM formovement of NRP from CONUS into theaterbased on deployment shelf requirementsincorporated into the TPFDD during planning.Shelf requirements are integrated into

transportation and reception plans and usedto determine the number and location ofCONUS replacement centers and APOEsrequired to support the deployment.

d. Ammunition. MTMC provides routinginstructions for movement of all classes ofammunition entering the DTS. In acontingency operation, select units may bedesignated to deploy through selectcommercial ports with their ammunition basicload. A potential deployment constraint(particularly in HN ports) related to movementof ammunition is net explosive weight. Portsafety requirements may restrict the amountof ammunition or other hazardous materialsthat may move through the port at any giventime. Discharge of ammunition at theforeign PODs requires prior coordinationwith HN authorities to certify the port forammunition handling and storage, or toobtain the necessary waivers to dischargeammunition through commercial ports.Similar authorization may be necessary forstorage of ammunition at ISBs.

• For CONUS ports, MTMC will processnecessary DOD explosives safetywaivers and coordinate other requiredpermits or clearances. For OCONUSports, the geographic combatant

Deployment of ammunition requires special handling and documentation.

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commander will assign waiver andclearance responsibilities to one of thecombatant command’s componentcommands.

• For CONUS deployment situations, if aunit is scheduled to move through acommercial seaport with basic loadmunitions, MTMC must be notified earlyon to process the necessary DODexplosive safety waivers and USCGpermits. The following information mustbe provided for waiver and permitpurposes: DOD Identification Code;National Stock Number; DOT propershipping name; hazard class, storagecompatibility, and fragment distance;UN identification number; round count;net explosive weight; and shippingconfiguration (e.g., vehicle upload,

containerized). MTMC must alsoactivate DOT Exemption 3498 beforeactual movement of uploaded vehiclescan commence. Additionally, allhazardous materials (includingammunition) shipments must beprepared and documented in accordancewith DOD Regulation 4500.9-R,“Defense Transportation Regulation,Parts II and III” and other governingregulations.

13. Joint Reception, Staging,Onward Movement, andIntegration

JRSOI is the last deployment phase andcompletes the end-to-end deployment process.JRSOI forms the critical link betweenstrategic deployment and operational and/

DEPLOYMENT: WORLD WAR II

“To deploy these forces overseas was another great matter. Although the USmerchant marine ranked second only to Great Britain’s and the countrypossessed an immense shipbuilding capacity, the process of chartering,assembling, and preparing shipping for the movement of troops and militarycargo took time. Time was also needed to schedule and organize convoys,and owing to the desperate shortage of escort vessels, troop movement hadto be widely spaced. Convoying and evasive routing, in themselves, greatlyreduced the effective capacity of shipping. Moreover, vast distances separatedUS ports from the areas threatened by Japan, and to these areas went the bulkof forces deployed overseas during the months immediately following PearlHarbor. Through March 1942, as a result, the outflow of troops to overseasbases averaged only about 50,000 per month, as compared with upwards of250,000 during 1944, when shipping was fully mobilized and plentiful and thesea lanes were secure.

There seemed a real danger early in 1942, however, that German U-boats mightsucceed in reducing transatlantic deployment to a trickle — not so much byattacking troop transports, most of which could outrun their attackers, as bysinking the slow cargo ships on which the forces overseas depended forsupport. Soon after Germany’s declaration of war, the U-boats struck at thevirtually unprotected shipping lanes in the western Atlantic, and subsequentlyextended their attacks to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean areas and the mouthof the St. Lawrence. During the spring of 1942 tankers and freighters weretorpedoed in plain view of vacationers on east coast beaches. . . .”

SOURCE: American Military History, Army Historical Series

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or tactical employment of joint andmultinational forces in the operational area.JRSOI is reassembling unit personnel andmateriel deploying to an operational areainto mission-capable forces. The overallobjective of JRSOI is to build mission-capable forces as quickly as possible and

is the responsibility of the supportedcombatant commander receiving augmentingforces. The goal of JRSOI is to synchronizethe seamless flow of separately deployedpersonnel and materiel from offload atPODs to employment destinations asreassembled, mission-capable forces.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVREDEPLOYMENT

IV-1

1. Introduction

Redeployment operations encompassfour phases: recovery and reconstitution andpreredeployment activities; movement to andactivities at POE; movement to POD; andJRSOI. These phases describe the majoractivities inherent in moving deployedforces and materiel from their currentdeployed location through integration intoanother theater or to the home and/ordemobilization station. Redeploymentoperations are dependent on the supportedcombatant commander’s defined end state,concept for redeployment, or requirement tosupport another JFC’s concept of operations.This chapter discusses several other factorsthat may impact redeployment planning andexecution. Section A outlines redeploymentplanning and Section B discussesredeployment execution.

SECTION A. PLANNING

2. Mission Requirements

Redeployment of joint force assets may berequired at any point during missionexecution. Redeployments are planned andexecuted based on mission requirements andare normally conducted to reposture forcesand materiel in the same theater, to transferforces and materiel to support another JFC’soperational requirements or, most often, toreturn personnel, equipment, and materiel to

“Wars never end cleanly and this one was no exception. The cease-fireoccurred more quickly than anyone had expected. The postwar processthat had existed only in concept was now imminent. . . Even beforeSchwarzkopf and the Iraqi delegation had finished at Safwan on March 3,troops had begun ‘smelling the barn,’ while the media, politicians, and lovedones in the United States picked up the drumbeat to return soldiers home.”

Certain V ictory: The US Army in the Gulf W arby Brigadier General Robert H. Scales

the home and/or demobilization station uponcompletion of the mission. All systems andprocedures used during deploymentoperations apply to redeployment operations.One key difference is that redeploymentoperations focus on reestablishing joint forcereadiness in addition to redeploymentmission requirements. Redeploymentplanning to return a joint force to thathome and/or demobilization station uponcompletion of its mission must be anintegral and early part of joint forceemployment planning and should becoordinated with mission termination ortransition plans. Moreover, redeploymentsmust be planned and executed in a mannerthat provides for the timely and efficient returnof individuals, units, and materiel to facilitatetheir use in new contingencies. Recovery andreconstitution should begin immediately afteroperational employment in order to restoreforce readiness to the highest state possibleprior to redeployment. This ensures that thejoint force is fully prepared for the next crisissituation following redeployment.

a. Identifying Redeployment Requirements.Force redeployment requirements, likedeployment operations, are mission based anddeveloped during the joint operation planningprocess. The supported combatantcommander adjusts the basic TPFDD LOI asnecessary to plan and execute redeploymentoperations and determines redeploymentmovement priorities. Forces and materiel

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most often may not redeploy in the order usedfor deployment because of continuingoperational missions or transitionrequirements. Generally, unit movementrequirements for redeployment to the homeand/or demobilization station are based onactual deployment movements minus thoseitems of equipment that were destroyed,captured, lost, or transferred to in-theaterwar reserve materiel (WRM) stockage.Specific movement requirements aredetermined through the validation process.

b. Termination or TransitionConsiderations. Operational employmentnormally ends with termination or transitionof the joint force mission. Operationsterminate when stated national strategicend state conditions or objectives areachieved. Transition occurs when controlof the ongoing mission is transferred toanother organization or when a change ofmission is brought about by changingcircumstances or objectives. Regardless ofthe circumstance, deployed forces beginrecovery and reconstitution to preparepersonnel and materiel for redeployment aftercompletion of operational requirements.Transition from operational employment toredeployment requires detailed planning and

coordination. Deployed forces should striveto complete recovery and reconstitution on-site prior to redeployment, since theredeployment mission may involve supportof another JFC’s operational requirements orother contingencies. Cessation of hostilitiesor operations rarely occurs instantaneously.Either as part of the cease-fire or as a resultof political negotiations, decisions madeconcerning the termination of operations,separation of belligerents, withdrawaltimetable, and/or residual forces and reservestocks to remain in the host country will shapethe pace and nature of the redeployment.

• Transition considerations are based onthe current political and militarysituation when the JFC ordersredeployment. Preparation forredeployment is influenced by transitiondecisions concerning:

•• Requirements for a residual force orresponse capability;

•• Follow-on occupation, nation-building, or humanitarian missions;

•• Protection of the force;

Redeployment operations are planned based on mission requirements thatmay develop at any point during the joint force mission.

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•• Alliance and/or coalition forceconsiderations;

•• Availability of intertheater andintratheater mobility assets; and

•• Applicable HN environmentalstandards.

• After completion of operationalrequirements, forces move todesignated staging areas or APOEsand/or SPOEs to begin recovery andreconstitution and to prepare forredeployment. The priority forredeployment preparation is returningthe force to optimal readiness whilepreparing for redeployment.Redeployment preparation includesreorganizing and configuring personnel,equipment, and materiel for movement,including reestablishing unit integrity andaccountability of individuals andequipment prior to redeployment.Operational changes to unit organizationsafter arrival in the AOR and/or JOAshould be undone prior to redeploymentto facilitate return to peacetime activities.Redeploying units, or their parent

commands, are responsible for actions at,and support of, redeployment stagingareas. Staging area or APOE and/orSPOE actions include:

•• Identifying and separating excesssupply stockage;

•• Turning-in excess supply stockageand PREPO;

•• Reconstituting and cross-levelingsupplies and equipment for movement;and

•• Repacking and loading containers formovement.

c. Commander’s Intent forRedeployment. The commander’s intent forredeployment is normally detailed in theredeployment OPLAN. Additionally, all orpart of the supported combatant commander’sintent may also be articulated in the commandredeployment policy. The supportedcombatant commander’s redeployment policymay direct the sequence for redeployment ofunits, individuals, and materiel and provideguidance on responsibilities and priorities for

Movement of forces to designated staging areas to begin recovery andreconstitution and prepare for redeployment begins after the completion ofoperational requirements.

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recovery activities. The redeployment policymay also provide guidance on transitionrequirements, personnel actions, or HNS.

d. Identification of Support Activities. Inorder to conduct effective and efficientredeployment operations, specificindividuals, units, equipment, and suppliesmust be identified and allocated to supportthe redeployment operation. Additionally, thesupported combatant commander mustidentify an organizational structure earlyin the planning process to control and executethe redeployment. Medical care, life support,and other services, as well as supplies andmateriel, must be provided to redeployingunits and organizations until redeployment iscompleted. HN and contract support playa vital role in redeployment operations.Coordination must be made for varioussupport functions, to include convoy supportcenters, communications, MHE, POE support,and other key support functions. As theredeployment operation progresses, supportis incrementally scaled down as the size ofthe force awaiting redeployment gets smaller.Once all redeploying equipment has beenprocessed, the designated senior logisticsupport element ceases operations andredeploys by strategic airlift.

• Units redeploy in echelons; advanceparty, main body, and trail party. Thesize of the unit, the requirement tosupport sustainment operations, therequirement for equipment movementsupport actions, and transportationassets help determine the number ofredeployment echelons. The advanceparty prepares for the arrival of theredep loy ing fo rce a t PODs,demobilization sites, or final destination.The main body contains the bulk ofpersonnel and equipment redeployingwith the unit.

• Trail parties or rear detachments are oftenad hoc port support teams provided by

redeploying units to conduct finalpreparation and loading of unit vehiclesand equipment. Trail parties or reardetachments remain in theater to:

•• Maintain property accountability;

•• Perform unit maintenance;

•• Oversee supply support andreconciliation; and

•• Interface with the designated theatermovement control agency andredeployment support group as thebalance of unit equipment is processedfor strategic lift.

3. Preparation forRedeployment

Preparation for redeployment is the firststep in returning deployed forces to fulloperational readiness. Recovery andreconstitution prepares the force for the nextcrisis and begins in theater, immediately uponcompletion of operational requirements,during redeployment preparation. Preparationfor redeployment includes performing allrequired personnel, supply, and inspectionactivities necessary to redeploy personnel,equipment, and materiel and restore the jointforce’s capability to conduct future operations.

a. Redeployment Personnel Actions.After completion of operationalrequirements, personnel actions areinitiated. Required individual personnelactions may include: medical screening;processing decorations and awards;processing fitness or evaluation reports; andupdating or completing personnel and financerecords. Reservists who have a medicalcondition noted on their medical records,during their tour in theater may requireadministrative and/or legal actions based uponService policies and procedures. Particularattention should be paid to NRP, such as

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individual augmentees and replacements.Personnel actions for these individuals shouldbe completed prior to their departure fromtheir serving organization to ensure that theirjob performance is properly documented and/or recognized. At the organizational level,units may have to reorganize to increasetheir combat effectiveness until adequateresources are provided to return the unit tofull operational capability. Reorganizationmay include, for example, cross-leveling ofequipment and personnel, matchingoperational weapons systems with crews, and/or forming composite units or organizationsfrom attrited units or organizations.Completion of these actions must be plannedand coordinated with ongoing redeploymentactivities and executed in an expeditious andthorough manner because of their impact onmorale and unit readiness.

b. Redistributing Supplies and Materiel.Redistribution is a key factor in redeployingand reconstituting supplies and materiel forfuture operations. Significant nationalresources are invested in supplies and materielto support joint operations. Therefore,redistributing supplies and materiel duringrecovery and reconstitution is a criticaleffort . Non-unit redeployed equipment andsupplies are redistributed according to plansdeveloped by the Joint Staff and the Serviceswith input from the combatant commanders.Priority of effort is generally for forcescommitted to Joint Chiefs of Staff-approvedOPLANs. However, political agreements orcommitments in a combined operation mayalter redistribution efforts. Other recipientsmay include host countries, Service materielcommands, DLA, and Government ServicesAdministration distribution centers. In theredistribution process, equipment may beavailable for foreign military sales or grantprograms, such as Excess Defense Articles,to support national interests and policies.During this process, procedures should beestablished for the proper management ofhazardous and other waste products.

c. Terminating Sustainment. At theconclusion of operations, materiel is both onrequisition and en route in the supplydistribution system. Units continue torequire supplies, but some categories ofsupplies will not be required in the quantitiesrequisitioned. Forces waiting redeploymentshould consume theater stocks, and materielmanagement centers should ceaserequisitioning from the CONUS base. Thesenior theater logistics management center, incoordination with DLA and the Servicemateriel commands, determines when thesupply pipeline for the joint force should bereduced and eventually stopped or redirected.

d. Documenting Retrograde Cargo.Commanders must ensure that cargodocumentation, accountability, andaccuracy is as thorough as possible. Therush to return to the home and/ordemobilization station will bring about severeproblems unless command emphasis is placedon accurately marking and documentingretrograde cargo. Of particular concern arethe accurate identification, labeling, andhandling of hazardous material. Unitmovement data provided to TCCs must becorrect in order to properly document cargoto prepare ship manifests for redeployment.Maintaining unit integrity duringredeployment is as critical to readiness as it isduring deployment. When possible,containerized unit shipments should beshipped with noncontainerized unitequipment. If this is not practical,containerized unit equipment should bescheduled (and managed) to arrive at the PODor final destination on the same requireddelivery date as the noncontainerizedequipment. In either case, ITV of the cargomust be maintained to facilitate diversion enroute, if required.

e. Conducting Required Inspections.Supported combatant commanders areresponsible for establishing a militarycustoms inspection program (MCIP) to

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ensure that redeploying personnel,equipment, and materiel are in compliancewith customs and agriculturalrequirements for their redeploymentdestination. US Customs clearance andUSDA inspection and wash-down of allpersonnel, equipment, vehicles, andretrograde cargo redeploying to the UnitedStates is in accordance with DOD Directive5030.49-R, “Customs Inspections,” dated 27May 1977. Foreign requirements for forwardpresence forces returning to the home stationmust be determined and inspectionscoordinated with the HN. An approvedMCIP must be in place prior to redeploymentto clear not only redeployment personnel andcargo but also battle-damaged equipmentreturning to the United States for repair.

f. Retrograde of NBC-ContaminatedEquipment. The safe retrograde and long-term disposition of equipment with residualcontamination requires a thoroughunderstanding of the associated risks andthe minimum requirements necessary tomitigate those risks. Following thoroughdecontamination, residual contaminationrisks may remain on equipment and materielscheduled for redeployment. Thiscontamination risk could include potential

vapor hazards and contact hazards. Theserisks increase as residually contaminatedequipment is consolidated and personnelwork around this equipment for prolongedperiods of time, particularly in areas withlimited air circulation. Risks may alsoincrease as equipment is disassembled formaintenance or is containerized for shipment.Unit commanders are responsible forensuring that their personnel are protectedagainst gross and residual contaminationhazards while preparing equipment andmateriel for redeployment. Duringredeployment planning, unit commanderswill provide detailed listings of anycontaminated equipment and any suspectequipment through their chain of commandto the joint rear area coordinator. Thisinformation allows detailed planning forequipment consolidation sites anddecontamination assets required by the NBCretrograde support element. The safety of Servicemembers and transport personnel is of foremostconcern during the CONUS retrograde ofequipment with potential residual or low-levelNBC contamination.

For additional information, see JP 3-11,“Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Defense.”

Equipment returning from outside the United States will require USDepartment of Agriculture and US Customs inspections prior to redeployment.

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g. Time-phased Force and DeploymentData. Redeployment operations areexecuted using the TPFDD process.Normally, redeployment TPFDDs aredeveloped with the redeployment OPLANduring force employment planning andupdated and refined during redeploymentpreparations. Redeploying forces aretailored and prioritized for redeploymentbased on the supported combatantcommander’s intent expressed in the OPLANor redeployment policy. During redeploymentpreparation, unit movement data is updatedto reflect changes to the automated unitequipment lists caused by combat,maintenance, or supply losses. Unit-accountable officers should thoroughlydocument supply adjustments to unit-relatedequipment and materiel prior to departurefrom the theater. Subordinate organizationsand component commands must verify unitmovement data to the supported combatantcommander for redeployment TPFDDvalidation. USTRANSCOM develops theredeployment strategic movement scheduleafter receiving the validated TPFDD from thesupported combatant commander.

4. Redeployment Concept

The concept for redeployment is based onthe supported combatant commander’sintent for redeployment, missiontermination or transition requirements,and the post-redeployment mission of thejoint force. The redeployment concept forreturn of the joint force to the home and/ordemobilization station should be developedduring employment planning to ensure thatend state conditions and transition concernsare addressed during the planning process. Inaddition, the following paragraphs explainseveral other planning considerations that mayimpact the redeployment concept.

a. Priority and Guidance for RecoveryActivities. Priorities and guidance forrecovery activities are outlined in theredeployment OPLAN or in the supportedcombatant commander’s redeploymentpolicy. Recovery activities are focused onreturning the joint force to full readinesswhile preparing for redeployment andreturning control of HN territory andinfrastructure to civil or other authorities .

Recovery activities include assembling unit elements of the joint forcefor accountability and maintenance.

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Recovery activities may include: assemblingunit elements of the joint force foraccountability and maintenance; down-loading and repackaging ammunition andWRM; disposal operations, such asrecovery of battle-damaged equipment;decontamination; marking, recovering, anddisposing of battlefield hazards, such asunexploded ordnance; proper disposal of JTF-generated hazardous wastes; or repairingcritical HN life support infrastructure (e.g.,water purification, sewage treatment,electrical power, or medical). The supportedcombatant commander establishes prioritiesand provides guidance to accomplish thesetasks as expeditiously as possible, consistentwith other joint force mission requirements.

b. Mission Handover. Mission handoveroccurs prior to redeployment and is basedon termination or transition plans developedduring the joint operation planning process.Termination of joint force military operationsmay involve handover of continuinghumanitarian or nation-building operations tocivil authorities or other organizations.Alternatively, transition of military operationsmay involve transferring control of theongoing mission to another organization or achange of mission brought about by changingcircumstances or objectives. Regardless ofthe circumstance, mission handover shouldprovide for the seamless transfer ofresponsibilities to the appropriateauthorities or organizations prior toredeployment. Effective mission handoverrequires detailed planning, coordination,and rehearsals. Once handover is complete,the priority of effort is on recovery andreconstitution in preparation for redeploymentand the next joint force mission.

c. Movement Sequence. The sequence ofmovement for redeploying personnel,equipment, and materiel is determined basedon the following operational factors: theredeployment mission; the operationalenvironment and associated force protection

concerns; the supported combatantcommander’s intent or redeployment policy;and mission handover or recoveryrequirements. Effective joint operationplanning melds these factors into theredeployment concept to develop a movementsequence that is operationally sound,transportation feasible, and meets thecommander’s intent.

d. Environmental Considerations. Thepotential impact of national, HN, andinternational environmental laws, regulations,conventions, and treaties on redeploymentoperations should be considered early in theplanning process. The requirements may havean impact on the priority of recovery activities,mission handover procedures, movementsequencing, and other redeploymentdecisions.

For detailed information on environmentalconsiderations during operations, refer to JP4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil EngineeringSupport.”

5. Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence preparation for redeploymentshould follow the same JIPB process usedduring deployment planning and execution.Identification of the threats to forces as theyassemble and stage for redeployment andredeployment infrastructure are the immediateintelligence concerns. The JTF jointintelligence support element and the theaterJIC are ready sources of intelligenceinformation for redeployment planning.

a. Threat Assessment. The primaryintelligence objective during redeploymentplanning is to determine the threat toredeploying forces. Again, the nodes andlinks in the redeployment process representnumerous potential targets for an adversary.In addition, perceived threats to theredeployment mission must be evaluated interms of the existing operational environment

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and the results of any cease-fire or politicalnegotiations. These factors shape the paceand nature of the redeployment. Based onthe assessed threat, the JFC must determinewhere to accept risk, where to focus forceprotection efforts, and how many joint forceassets must be dedicated to the forceprotection mission.

b. Infrastructure Assessment.Depending upon the LOCs, ports, and airfieldsselected to support redeployment,infrastructure information such as detailedport and airfield facilities and throughputinformation should be readily available. Thisinformation must be updated to reflect anychanges to or loss of port or airfield facilitiesor throughput capacity based on acts of war,terrorism, or vandalism occurring duringoperations.

6. Force Protection

Force protection is as important duringredeployment operations as during any otherstage of a joint operation. The operationalenvironment is a key indicator in determiningthe level of force protection measures requiredto ensure an uninterrupted redeployment flow.The time between redeployment preparationand operational employment at the newdestination or return to the home and/ordemobilization station is potentially a periodof great vulnerability for the redeploying unit.Commanders should closely evaluate forceprotection measures during redeploymentplanning to provide for the security of thecommand and reduce the vulnerability ofredeploying elements to acts of violence,terrorism, or war.

a. Local Security. Local security remainsthe foremost force protection concern. Asthe joint force assembles for redeployment,commanders must continuously enforceactive and passive force protection measuresuntil the redeployment mission is complete.

b. Information Operations. Several IOcapabilities and related activities may berequired to support redeployment. TypicalIO capabilities and related activities addressedduring a redeployment are as follows.

• Operations Security. Redeployments,like deployments, have large, distinctsignatures. This fact makes masking themovement (or purpose of the movement)of forces and materiel to staging basesin the AOR and/or JOA a critical pieceof the OPSEC plan. Redeploymentsignatures probably cannot be totallyhidden; however, for force protectionreasons, such details as forcecomposition, movement schedules, troopand equipment concentration sites, andthe time and location of destinationarrival may be concealed.

• Military Deception (if required).Deception operations may be required tosupport redeployment, depending uponthe nature of the current operationalmission or the post-redeploymentmission. Deceptions during redeploymentoperations may be intended to disguisethe purpose of recent joint forceoperations or to increase the potentialfor successful friendly operations bymisleading the adversary as to the timeand location of the relocation of forcesin theater or their introduction intoanother theater.

• Public Affairs. PA activities provide themeans for the JFC to keep Servicemembers, their families, and theAmerican public informed about jointforce operations, particularly asredeployment and demobilization drawsnear. Previous experience has shown thatthe Armed Forces of the United Statesoften receive great pressure fromCongress, families of deployed Servicemembers, and the American public at

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large at the completion of operations torapidly return deployed Servicemembers to their home and/ordemobilization stations. Redeploymentand demobilization are a public relationsand Service member informationchallenge that requires creative planningand execution. PA activities targeted atthe appropriate audiences will reduceService member frustrations and publicrelations problems.

• Civil Affairs. CA elements facilitateredeployment operations by minimizingcivilian interference with US militaryoperations and planning andcoordinating with local civilianauthorities for the use of in-countryfacilities and resources. CA elementsmay support force protectionoperations by planning for and usingcivil police to augment security forcesor to provide a conduit for informationof intelligence value from the localpopulace.

c. Force Health Protection. The FHPconstruct provides life-cycle health supportto Service members throughout their militaryservice, to include comprehensive health

surveillance and services during theredeployment phase of operations.

Standardized procedures for conductingredeployment health surveillance aredetailed in the Joint Chiefs of StaffMemorandum, “Deployment HealthSurveillance and Readiness.”

SECTION B: EXECUTION

7. Requirements Validation

Requirements validation for redeploymentis conducted using the same process usedduring deployment operations. Redeployingunits confirm readiness, movementavailable dates, passengers, and cargodetails to their higher commands whoverify total unit movement requirementsto the supported combatant commander.The supported combatant commanderreceives component redeployment data,merges this data into the redeploymentTPFDD, and makes adjustments to theredeployment flow as necessary. Onceadjustments are complete, the supportedcombatant commander validates the liftrequirements within the specific TPFDDmovement window for USTRANSCOM

Units receive call forward messages directing movement to aerial portsof embarkation in designated time windows.

IV-11

Redeployment

movement scheduling by confirming that theTPFDD accurately reflects current movementrequirements. USTRANSCOM conducts atransportation feasibility review andcoordinates unresolved transportationconflicts with the supported combatantcommander for resolution. The end result ofthis process is a supported combatantcommander approved TPFDD thatredeploying units use to prepare formovement. Changes occurring duringredeployment or incremental changesaffecting units are implemented as required.

8. Movement Scheduling

Movement scheduling is an iterativeprocess conducted at every level of commandwith the objective of getting the rightpersonnel, equipment, and materiel to theright place at the right time. Once validatedTPFDD requirements are received from thesupported combatant commander, strategic liftassets are scheduled and registered in JOPES.These movement schedules are also utilizedby commands supporting redeploymentoperations for movement planning,coordination, and execution. After strategiclift schedules are developed, units and/orinstallations receive call forward messagesdirecting movement to APOEs and SPOEs indesignated time windows. Redeployingcommands assess their ability to meet strategiclift schedules, make adjustments, and plan unitmoves accordingly. Lift shortfalls andavailable lift are identified to the TCCs. Priorto redeployment, movement control elementsconfirm movement clearances with HN, state,and governmental agencies.

9. Force Tracking

Force tracking during redeploymentoperations is vital to joint force readiness.Reconstitution is not complete until the jointforce has completed movement through theredeployment pipeline and emerged at theprescribed destination as a fully mission-capable force. Unit integrity should bemaintained, to the extent possible, andcommanders must have the capability todetermine the exact location of unit personnel,equipment, and materiel in the event theredeploying force has to be diverted en routefor another mission. Redeployment forcetracking uses the same systems and proceduresdiscussed for deployment operations. Again,GTN and GCSS provide the informationsystems and decision support toolsnecessary to track the force during theredeployment process.

“After Germany’s surrender in May theUnited States embarked upon a hugelogistical effort to redeploy more thana million troops from Europe, the UnitedStates, and other inactive theaters tothe Pacific. The aim was to completethe redeployment in time to launch aninvasion of Japan on November 1, andthe task had to be undertaken in theface of competing shipping demandsfor demobilization of long-servicetroops, British redeployment, and civilrelief in Europe.”

American Military History,Army Historical Series

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VENABLERS

V-1

1. Introduction

Enablers are processes, systems, andequipment that facilitate accomplishmentof the assigned mission. Rapid forceprojection operations require enablers thatimprove deployment and redeploymentplanning and execution, thereby improvingoverall mission response time, and alsopossess the necessary flexibility to adapt tochanging situations. Deployment andredeployment enablers required to supportjoint force operations include interoperablejoint and Service systems and procedures,robust supporting facilities and infrastructure,and agile information management andcommunications systems.

2. Interoperability

Joint and Service systems and proceduressupporting deployment and redeploymentoperations must possess the interoperabilitynecessary to ensure success. Interoperabilityis the condition achieved when informationor services can be exchanged directly andsatisfactorily between user systems and

“In the future we must continue to review and refine our planning methods tomake sure that they enable us to adapt to unforeseen contingencies as quicklyand as effectively as possible. General Eisenhower once remarked thatwhile plans may not be important, planning is. The actual plans that aredevised ahead of time may not fit precisely the circumstances that eventuallyarise, but the experience of preparing them is essential preparation for thosewho will have to act when the unforeseen occurs. If we take this maximseriously, as our recent experience suggests we should, then severalconsequences seem to flow. Training must emphasize the speed with whichthese types of plans must be drawn up, as that is likely to be vital in anactual crisis. Management systems, such as those which support deploymentand logistics, must be automated with this need for flexibility in mind. Overall,planning systems must increasingly adapt rapidly to changing situations,with forces tailored to meet unexpected contingencies.”

Overview comments provided by Secretary of Defense Richard CheneyDOD Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

equipment. Forces must employ command,control, communications, and computers (C4)systems that are capable of supporting theentire range of military operations for jointand combined operations. In addition,standardization of C4 equipment andoperational procedures will facilitate the rapidinstallation, operation, and maintenance of thejoint C4 systems network.

See JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command,Control, Communications, and Computer(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations”for additional information oninteroperability.

a. Systems. Deployment and redeploymentof C4 systems must be compatible,interoperable, integrated, or standardized.Compatibility is the capability of two or moreitems or components of equipment or materialto exist or function in the same system orenvironment without mutual interference.Standardization of C4 equipment and systemsinstallation, operation, and maintenanceprocedures necessitates close cooperationbetween Services and Defense agencies

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during the requirements generation systemprocess and the development of all jointtactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. Procedures. Standardized proceduresfacilitate interoperability. Inherent inplanning and execution is the requirement todevelop common policies, procedures, terms,and data elements to facilitate rapid and timelydeployment and redeployment of the jointforce to support the range of militaryoperations. Standardized procedures andcommon data elements facilitate expeditiousinformation flow and ultimately promoteeffective and efficient operations. As acompanion to the joint standardization effort,the Services must develop comprehensive andcoordinated procedures to improve the overalleffectiveness, timeliness, efficiency, andaffordability of deployment and redeploymentoperations. Priority should be given tointegrating Service procedures that addressreporting and verifying deployment andredeployment movement data. Erroneous ormissing movement data, resulting from lackof standardized input or poor operator training,hampers effective TPFDD development,refinement, and validation, which negativelyimpacts deployment and redeploymentplanning and execution. Reporting andverification upgrades and integration must becoordinated among the Service staffs,combatant commands, and the Joint Staff toachieve the effectiveness and responsivenessrequired to support the national securitystrategy. Service procedures and automationsystems must effectively interface with jointC4 systems to prevent deployment andredeployment problems experienced in thepast.

3. Force Projection Facilitiesand Infrastructure

Force projection operations benefit fromrobust facilities and supporting infrastructureto support deployment and redeployment ofthe joint force. However, the capabilities of

US forces must be sufficient to provideforce projection and forward presenceworldwide, regardless of existing facilities.Facilities and infrastructure to support forceprojection operations routinely include the useof both military and civilian commercialassets. The immediate nature of forceprojection operations dictates that facilitiesand infrastructure to support the operationare those existing at the time the operationcommences. Quick expansion of facility andinfrastructure capacity for force projectionoperations may be possible through the useof preengineered building systems or otherrapidly erectable, temporary militarystructures and commercial servicescontracting.

a. CONUS Facilities and Infrastructure.CONUS military installations must have thefacilities and infrastructure to house, feed,train, deploy, and redeploy forces and theirrequired supporting materiel. Facilitiesinclude the real estate and physical plant, suchas buildings, equipment, and informationmanagement systems to support operations.Supporting infrastructure , including roads,airfields, railroads and railheads, warehousing,and staging areas, are also vital to forceprojection operations. Additionally, plannersmust identify commercial transportationsupport required and work closely with thecommercial transportation industry to ensuresuch support is available. Ongoing efforts toreengineer infrastructure through outsourcingand privatization must be closely evaluatedto determine the potential impact theseinitiatives may have on force projectionoperations.

b. OCONUS Facilities andInfrastructure. Forward presence forcesbenefit from access to facilities andinfrastructure comparable to that available toCONUS-based forces. However, US forcesare capable of worldwide deployment andlimited operations under austere conditions.Normally, land-based forward presence

V-3

Enablers

forces must rely on HN resources tosuccessfully execute deployment andredeployment operations. HN agreements,such as status-of-forces agreements andmultinational and/or bilateral agreementsnegotiated before crisis situations arise,facilitate needed access to HN resources. HNsmay provide a variety of services throughtheir national agencies in support ofdeployment and redeployment execution.Clearance for road convoys, air and railmovement, hazardous materiel, anddiplomatic purposes may be required andshould be coordinated in advance, if possible,of anticipated operations. US forwardpresence forces must be considerate of HNsensitivities in the areas of sovereignty,neutrality, timeliness, environmentalprotection, and public opinion while executingforce projection operations on foreign soil.HNs may become sensitive to, and place

restrictions on, military activities in theirterritory. The JFC should address all HNsensitivity issues as early as practicable toensure that joint force operations are notadversely affected.

4. Systems andCommunications

Management of force projection operationsrequires the integration of movement control,ADP, SATCOMs, and informationmanagement system enablers that facilitateexecution. While execution is decentralized,centralized management and integration ofsystems permits effective and efficientstrategic mobility operations by providingDOD users with the capability to make timelyand accurate execution decisions. The rapidadvance of web-based technology providescombatant and component commandswith potential worldwide access to variousreferences and information to enhancedeployment and redeployment operations.Information system development andinteroperability is guided by the visionsarticulated in the GCCS, GCSS, and GTNdevelopment efforts. To provide fullfunctionality, these planning and executionsystems must have a modeling andsimulation capability for exercises andtraining to enable forces to train as they willfight.

a. Global Command and ControlSystem. GCCS is a comprehensiveautomated command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence (C4I) systemdesigned to improve the JFC’s ability tomanage and execute joint operations.GCCS is the primary means of C2 for theNCA over all military forces. GCCSinteroperates with Service and agency C4Isystems, providing a global network ofmilitary and commercial communicationssystems that the JFC simply “plugs in” to sendand obtain critical information. GCCSsupports the exchange of information from

Force projection operations benefit from world-class support facilities and infrastructure.

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the NCA to combatant commanders andtheir components. GCCS, SECRET InternetProtocol Router Network and the DefenseInformation Infrastructure CommonOperating Environment form an informationgrid that incorporates procedures, reportingstructures, automated information processingsystems, and communications connectivity toprovide the information necessary toeffectively plan, deploy, sustain, employ, andredeploy forces. As with any automated system,the quality of the output directly correspondsto the accuracy of the data on file.

• GCCS provides combatant andsubordinate commands with the abilityto rapidly provide military informationto the NCA as well as to supportingcommands.

• The COP is a graphical display offriendly, hostile, and neutral units,assets, overlays, and/or trackspertinent to operations, and is a keytool for commanders in planning andconducting joint operations. TheGCCS COP may include relevantinformation from the tactical to the

strategic level of command. The systemcurrently includes geographically-oriented data with planning data fromJOPES and readiness data from the Statusof Resources and Training Systemenvisioned for future inclusion.

b. Global Combat Support System. Thegoal of GCSS is to provide universal secureaccess to information and interoperabilityof that information across combat supportand C2 functions. The GCSS visionencompasses six essential attributes: anybox; any user; one net; one picture; commonservices; and robust communications services.The end state is a secure, intranet environmentallowing DOD users to access shared data andapplications, regardless of location, supportedby a robust information infrastructure. Thiswill result in near real time C2 of the logisticspipeline; one fused picture of combat supportto the warfighter; and a closed link betweenC2 and combat support during criticalexecution of an operation. A host of logisticsinformation systems enablers are criticalto GCSS. Some of the major joint programsinclude JTAV, AIT, and Joint DecisionSupport System.

Supported and supporting commanders and staffs need robust and interoperablecommunications systems to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, employ, and redeployforces. SATCOM systems can assist in providing these systems.

V-5

Enablers

c. Global Transportation Network.GTN is an automated C2 informationsystem that supports the family oftransportation users and providers (both DODand commercial) by providing an integratedsystem of ITV information and C2capabilities (see Figure V-1). GTN collectsand integrates transportation information fromselected transportation systems. The resultinginformation is provided to the NCA,combatant commanders, USTRANSCOMand its component commands, and to otherDOD customers to support transportationplanning and decision making during peaceand war. The three major functional areasprovided by GTN are ITV, C2 operations,and C2 planning and analysis.

• In-Transit Visibility. ITV permitsvisibility into transportationmovements by obtaining visibility of arequirement when it is first initiated andcontinuing that visibility as the

requirement is satisfied throughmovement in the transportation pipeline.GTN collects, integrates, and distributestransportation information to the NCA,combatant commanders, USTRANSCOMand its component commands, and othertransportation information customers.GTN provides the schedules and actualtransportation movement information(itineraries and manifests) about units,forces, cargo, air refueling, passengers,and patients. In general, GTN satisfies auser’s ITV requirements through user-controlled views of the integratedtransportation data, which includescombinations of mode, locations, dates,and status with a variety of unit, force,cargo, passenger, and patient identifiers.

• C2 Operations. The C2 module of GTNorganizes and displays vitaltransportation asset and resourceinformation that assists USTRANSCOM

Figure V-1. Global Transportation Network

GLOBALTRANSPORTATION NETWORKGLOBALTRANSPORTATION NETWORK

APODAPOEGCCS

GTNISB

SPODSPOE

TC-AIMS II

USTRANSCOM

Aerial Port of DebarkationAerial Port of EmbarkationGlobal Command and Control SystemGlobalTransportation NetworkIntermediate Staging BaseSeaport of DebarkationSeaport of EmbarkationTransportation Coordinator's Automated Informationfor Movement SystemUnited StatesTransportation Command

USTRANSCOM

TC-AIMS II

MOVEMENT CONTROLIN-TRANSIT VISIBILITYMOVEMENT PLANNING

SPOD

APOD ISB

GTN

GCCS

INSTALLATION

SPOE

APOE

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to understand, identify, and implementvarious transportation options and COAs.Assets and resources include anythingused to move or support movement ofcargo and passengers.

• C2 Planning and Analysis. The C2planning and analysis module providesinformation and simulation models toimprove transportation feasibilitydetermination, plan refinement, andreplanning. Through a set ofcoordinated strategic transportationmodels and related tools, planningsupport provides capabilities to: developand analyze various transportationoptions; forecast total DOD movementrequirements; determine the best modes,channels, and shipment quantities;compare planned versus actualmovements; determine limitingconstraints; and identify potentialresource shortfalls.

d. Transportation Coordinator’sAutomated Information for MovementSystem II (TC-AIMS II). TC-AIMS II is ajoint automated information system andselected DOD migration system for unit moveand ITO or TMO functionality. TC-AIMS IIwill integrate fielded Service-unique systemsand select functions from systems to provideday-to-day traffic management capabilitiesand to support deployment, redeployment,and sustainment of US forces from within(and to) CONUS installations and overseastheaters of operations. Functionality fromvarious systems will be combined to producethe target TC-AIMS II system. Integrationof systems for TC-AIMS II include: theMarine Corps MAGTF Deployment SupportSystem II and TC-AIMS; the Air Force CargoMovement Operations System; and the ArmyTransportation Coordinator-AutomatedCommand and Control Information System,Management System-Redesign andDepartment of the Army MovementsManagement System-Redesign.

e. Global Decision Support System(GDSS). GDSS is the worldwide C2 systemfor execution of strategic airlift and airrefueling during peacetime, contingencies,and war. The only change in the system frompeace to war is the level of activity. GDSScontains essential information used tomonitor and manage all operational DODair mobility missions in progressthroughout the world, including all activeduty, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard,and commercial airline aircraft on AMC airliftmissions, plus all operational DOD airrefueling missions. During operations, thesystem directly supports force-levelmanagement. GDSS provides automatedtools to track aircraft and aircrewmovement and aid the decision makingprocess. In addition, the system provides thetanker airlift control center with C2information from the AMC DeploymentAnalysis System (ADANS) and Commandand Control Information Processing System,the wing-level C2 planning and executionsystem. GDSS provides the capability to viewmission information and, if required, to updateor modify the information.

f. Integrated Command, Control, andCommunications (IC3) System. Sealifttransportation management consists ofeffectively providing SPOE to SPODtransportation. IC3 is the MSC C2 system toefficiently manage this mission and to provideUSCINCTRANS, the Chief of NavalOperations, and other customers with reliable,comprehensive, and timely information. IC3supports MSC’s requirements for C2 andtracking of sealift assets, cargo, and POL.Additionally, it interfaces with other keyinformation systems, such as GTN, GDSS,and GCCS, to support the overall DTS andUSTRANSCOM mission during deploymentoperations.

g. Joint Flow and Analysis System forTransportation (JFAST). JFAST is asubsystem of the GTN future operations

V-7

Enablers

module and is an analytical tool for makingdetailed estimates of resources required totransport military forces (including cargo,personnel, and sustainment) during variousscenarios and situations. JFAST is used bythe combatant commands as a planning andforecasting tool for deliberate planning andCAP. The system determines thetransportation feasibility of the TPFDD (fromorigin through arrival at the POD) andgenerates summary data via charts, tables,maps, and other visual aids for use by seniorleaders. JFAST determines closure dates,congestion points, lift utilization, andshortfalls. JFAST products include deliveryprofiles and lateness analysis, required lift byday versus lift available, and port workloadby level of activity based on capacity.

• The notional requirements generatorportion of JFAST provides the capabilityto create notional movementrequirements when no plan currentlyexists. Force selection and concept ofoperations can be recorded along withexpected levels of activity, climate, anddays of supply. This functional capabilityallows a planner to execute ad hoc queriesand perform “what if” analysis.

• The transportation analysis function ofJFAST includes model setup, execution,and output analysis for land, air, and seamodes of military transportation. TheJFAST model contains separate air, land,and sea schedulers and operates in eithera stand-alone or networked environment.

h. Enhanced Logistics IntratheaterSupport Tool (ELIST). ELIST is afeasibility planning and modeling systemfielded by MTMC for deployment analysis.ELIST performs detailed intratheaterdeployment studies to analyze effects offorce modernization and new force structuresand changes to the DTS and to checktransportation feasibility of contingency

operations. ELIST enables planners toexplore and model the impact of theaterinfrastructure limitations (through combatloss, weather, or limited HN access) and makeadjustments to infrastructure and assets at anypoint in time in the flow. Through ELIST,planners now have the ability to accuratelydefine the infrastructure and consider thethroughput capability that will be availablefor a specific plan.

i. Consolidated Air Mobility PlanningSystem (CAMPS). CAMPS is an AMCmodernization program supporting AMCplanners with an integrated system to supportairlift and tanker planning, scheduling,analysis, allocation, and development ofmission support requirements. CAMPSprovides capabilities for deliberate and crisisaction planning, allocation management,and mission support. CAMPS integratestwo existing systems, ADANS and theCombined Mating And Ranging PlanningSystem, into a seamless planning, scheduling,analyzing, and allocating capability servingboth the airlift and tanker communities.

j. Asset Management System (AMS).MTMC has the mission of managing theDefense Freight Railway Interchange Fleetrailcars, the Army-owned ContainerizedAmmunition Distribution System fleet ofcontainers, and the tracking of commerciallyleased containers. AMS is the informationsystem that supports this mission by providingan automated capability for the control,utilization, maintenance, inventory, andreporting to optimize the use of these assets.

k. Transportation Analysis, Modeling andSimulation (TAMS). TAMS providesoversight and direction of transportationmodeling and simulation (M&S) capabilitiesthat support end-to-end transportation M&S.TAMS ensures integrated end-to-end M&Scapability for the entire DTS, to include supportfor execution, exercises, analysis, wargaming,

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and training. TAMS provides an integratedsource-to-destination capability for

LIMITS OF JOPES

“However, in the initial Operation DESERT SHIELD deployment phases, threefactors prevented full use of JOPES. First, information necessary fordeployment was not loaded into the TPFDD. Second, operationalconsiderations in the area of responsibility required CENTCOM [US CentralCommand] to repeatedly change the priority and the scheduling of unitmovements midstream. Given its current level of development, JOPES cannotreact quickly enough to changes of such frequency and magnitude. Third, theinfrequent use of JOPES in peacetime resulted in a shortage of JOPES-capableoperators during the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD.”

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

transportation feasibility analysis, programmaticanalysis, and wargaming.

CHAPTER VIOTHER DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT

CONSIDERATIONS (EXPANDED MILITARY MISSIONS)

VI-1

1. Introduction

Participation of the Armed Forces of theUnited States with organizations andagencies outside of the Department ofDefense requires special planningconsiderations in multinational operations,MOOTW, and interagency operations.Expanded military missions will be usedto refer to “other deployment and/orredeployment considerations”. In general,when factoring these into operational planningit is important to be sensitive to the politicalconsiderations and the reality that the USmilitary may not be the primary player.Deployment and/or redeployment andexecution planning is fundamentally the samefor most military operations. However,participation of various military forces,organizations, and agencies outside of theDepartment of Defense may increase thecomplexity and reduce the operationalflexibility normally found in US deploymentand redeployment operations.

2. Multinational Operations

The United States has often shared commonsecurity interests and participated inoperations with other nations. Combatantcommanders may confront a variety of factorsthat challenge the stability of countries andregions within their AORs, necessitatingmultinational response. Multinationaloperations is a collective term to describemilitary actions conducted by forces of two

“Our forces, therefore must fulfill a broader role — as a complement to ourdiplomacy — as an arm of our diplomacy — as a deterrent to our adversariesand as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.”

President John F. Kennedy to the United StatesAir Force Academy graduating class of 1962

or more nations, typically within thestructure of a coalition or alliance. Much ofthe information, guidance, and doctrineprovided for US joint operations is applicableto multinational operations. However,differences in allied doctrine, organization,weapons, equipment, terminology, culture,politics, religion, and language must alwaysbe considered when organizing amultinational force. These differences andthe legal restrictions on providing logisticsupport to foreign forces may increase thecomplexity and reduce the operationalflexibility normally found in unilateral USdeployment and redeployment operations.Success hinges on achieving unity of effort.Each participating nation must be willing toprovide the commander of the alliance orcoalition sufficient authority to achieve unityof effort in all operations.

For additional information on multinationaloperations, see JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine forMultinational Operations.”

a. Theater Engagement Planning (TEP).TEP is a planning process used bygeographic combatant commands totranslate National Security Strategyobjectives and NMS objectives into theaterstrategy. The products of this process are aclearly articulated theater strategy withsupporting country, regional, and theatercampaign plans, supporting annexes outliningstrategic activities, and preparedness guidancedocuments.

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commanders in the preparation andtraining of their forces to meet theatercontingencies. Deployment andredeployment training must beincorporated into component commandtraining objectives to ensure preparednessin executing the theater strategy.

• Assessments. Execution of thecampaign plans and preparednessguidance documents provide the meansto assess joint force readiness andtheater strategy. Feedback receivedfrom execution is reentered into the TEPprocess to refine theater strategy,campaign plans, and preparednessdocuments.

“We learned — and relearned — a lotof lessons from this partnership. Thefirst was that life is a lot easier whenyou’re not alone.”

Senior DESERT STORMparticipant, DOD Final Report to

Congress, Conduct of the PersianGulf W ar, April 1992

b. Mission Analysis and Assignment ofTasks. One of the most important tasks whenplanning multinational operations is toconduct a detailed mission analysis. This

For additional information, see CJCSM3113.01, “Theater Engagement Planning.”

• Campaign Plans. Theater campaignplans are based on country and regionalcampaign plans. Each campaign planfocuses the combatant commander’sguidance and approved theaterstrategy, prioritizes activities, andallocates resources for a given countryor region. Plan development is guidedby a geographic focus, the combatantcommander’s vision, theater goals andpriorities, an assessment of the localenvironment, and allocation of strategicactivities and resources. Joint forceoperations conducted in a given countryor region (including deployment andredeployment operations) will normallybe based on the applicable campaignplan.

• Preparedness Guidance Documents.Preparedness guidance documents aredeveloped based on the theater strategyand combatant commander’s guidancefor the following areas: RC, logistics, C4,personnel readiness, operation planning,training, medical, and force protection.These documents are the sourcedocuments that guide component

Success in multinational operations hinges on achieving unity of effort.

VI-3

Other Deployment and Redeployment Considerations (Expanded Military Missions)

analysis should result in a mission statementfor the multinational force as a whole and arestated mission for the US element of theforce. In addition to normal METT-Tanalysis, this analysis should include therespective capabilities, political will, andnational interests of the multinational forcecomponents. After determining the tasksnecessary to achieve the objectives thatsupport mission accomplishment, themultinational force commander (MNFC)should assign a specific task to the element ofthe multinational force most capable ofcompleting that task. If several elements cancomplete the task, the MNFC should considerassigning that task in a manner that ensuresall elements can make meaningfulcontributions to the desired end state. Thebasic challenge in multinational operations isthe effective integration and employmentof all assets provided toward theachievement of a common objective. Thisgoal may be achieved through unity of effortdespite disparate and occasionallyincompatible capabilities, rules ofengagement, equipment, and procedures. TheMNFC must be aware of the differences inthe political constraints and capabilities of theforces of various nations and consider them

when assigning missions and conductingoperations.

c. Deployment and/or RedeploymentConsiderations. Many US alliance partnershave standardization agreements or treatiesthat outline general multinational operationalprocedures. However, many potentialcoalition partners do not have establishedstandardization agreements or treatieswith the United States. Because of this,differences in procedures and capabilities maycomplicate multinational deployment andredeployment planning and execution.Among the disparities that supported andsupporting commanders may have toreconcile are dissimilar tactical methods andoperating procedures, varying organizationsand capabilities, and differences in equipment.Liaison, equipment exchanges, and trainingmay offset some of these problems.Movement control, operation of ports andairfields, logistics communications, andspecific supply and services functions aresignificant matters often coordinated abovethe level of national participants. To assurecoordination and prevent duplication,commanders of multinational forces needto establish clear responsibilities for such

Tasks assigned to multinational components must be relevant, clearlyunderstood, and within their mission capability.

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functions. Very often, multinationalspartnered with US forces will have little orno strategic or intratheater lift. Dependingon the length of the multinational force LOCs,US forces may be forced to shoulder themajority of strategic or intratheater liftrequirements to deploy, sustain, and redeploythe multinational force. This places additionalburdens on already finite US lift assets. Eachmultinational operation is unique, and keyconsiderations involved in planning andconducting multinational operations vary withthe international situation and perspectives ofthe participants. The following factorsshould also be considered duringmultinational deployment andredeployment operations (see Figure VI-1).

• Standardization of InformationRequirements. The first priority forplanners is establishment of standardizedprocedures and reporting formats forthe multinational force to begindevelopment, refinement, andverification of force modules andmovement requirements. Lift schedulingcannot occur until transportation plannershave accurate and detailed information

concerning the availability and capabilityof multinational lift assets, passengerdata and cargo descriptions formultinational force modules and materiel,and total multinational componentforce movement and sustainmentrequirements. As discussed earlier in thispublication, accuracy of movementrequirements and data is critical tomeeting force closure timelines.

• Determination of MovementRequirements. Since US forcesnormally provide the majority of thestrategic lift assets and informationmanagement systems, the US TPFDDprocess will be used to managedeployment and redeployment of allpersonnel, equipment, forces, andmateriel involved in US multinationaloperations. Determining movementrequirements for multinationalpartners may complicate deploymentand redeployment planning becausemovement data for allied nations maynot be described in logistics termscompatible with US TPFDDmanagement systems. Coordinationrequired for TPFDD refinement andverification may impede multinationaldeployment and redeploymentoperations unless particular attention ispaid to liaison, C2, and informationmanagement arrangements supportingthe operation. Communications andinformation exchange with multinationalpartners may be hampered by a limitedquantity of compatible ADP systems.Manual procedures may have to beimplemented to properly documentthe movement requirements ofmultinational force elements withoutadequate automation support.Identification, documentation, andscheduling movement requirements forthe multinational force remains theresponsibility of the supportedmultinational commander. Capturing

Figure VI-1. Multinational Deploymentand Redeployment Considerations

MULTINATIONALDEPLOYMENT ANDREDEPLOYMENT

CONSIDERATIONS

MULTINATIONALDEPLOYMENT ANDREDEPLOYMENT

CONSIDERATIONS

Standardization ofInformation Requirements

Determination of MovementRequirements

Liaison Considerations

Standardization ofInformation Requirements

Determination of MovementRequirements

Liaison Considerations

VI-5

Other Deployment and Redeployment Considerations (Expanded Military Missions)

multinational movement data will requiredetailed coordination with multinationalpartners to ensure the arrival of forcesand materiel consistent with the MNFC’sconcept of operations. Integration of avariety of data and systems will requireflexible and dynamic attention to detail.

• Liaison Considerations. Duringmultinational operations, US forcesshould establish liaison early with eachmember nation of the alliance orcoalition. This fosters understanding ofmissions and tactics, facilitates transferof vital information, and enhancesmutual trust and confidence. If thenations are very similar in culture,doctrine, training, and equipment or ifextensive cooperative experience exists,combined supporting organizations andheadquarters may be effectiveoperational alternatives.

d. Logistics Considerations. Generally,the responsibility for logistic support(including transportation support) to nationalcomponents remains with their nations.However, the concept that logistics isprimarily a national responsibility cannotsupplant detailed multinational logistics

planning. Varying degrees of mutual logisticsupport are prevalent in multinationaloperations. Logistics plans must addressmutual capabilities and ensure thatweaknesses are minimized. MNFCs mayhave directive logistics authority ifcoordinated in plan development or whenconsent is provided by participating nationalcommands. Requests will be made to nationalcommanders to assume organizationalmissions in support of multinational forces.In some cases, the MNFC may exercisecontrol over the various national logisticsunits. In other cases, the MNFC may haveonly coordinating authority. The degree ofauthority will depend upon existingagreements and ad hoc arrangementsnegotiated with participating nations.Funding guidance to support multinationalforces should be identified as early as possible.Once funding guidance is determined,procedures should be developed to ensurethere will be no adverse impact on operations.Transportation, construction services, medicalsupport, and some classes of supply may beavailable from the HN. Additionally, USforces may rely upon HNS to supplement orsubstitute for US services, supplies, andfacilities. Utilization of some or all of thefollowing sources of support may help

Effective liaison fosters mutual trust and confidence betweenmultinational partners.

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JP 3-35

reduce the multinational force logisticsfootprint and promote effective andefficient operations in an internationalenvironment (see Figure VI-2).

• Available HN Infrastructure. Analysisof the physical infrastructure in the HNis critical to understanding forcesustainability. Physical infrastructurein the HN should be evaluated both interms of what is there and what themultinational force will be allowed to use(e.g., government; law enforcement;sanitation; power, fuel, and medicalsupport; and environmental protectionrequirements). First, assess the abilityof the available HN infrastructure toreceive US and/or multinational forcepersonnel and equipment (e.g., ports andairfields). Second, determine thecapability of available transportationsystems to move forces once they arrivein theater. Third, evaluate availability oflogistic support. Quick evaluation ofthese three items will determine theextent to which HN infrastructure can be

used to support planned operations. HNSmay dramatically increase the timelinessof response to a developing situation andreduce the strategic airlift and sealiftrequirements necessary to deploy forcesto the AOR and/or JOA.

• Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements(ACSAs). The United States oftensupplies allied and coalition forces withmateriel and receives support andservices in exchange. The Secretary ofDefense is authorized to negotiatemutual logistic support agreements orACSAs with friendly nations in whichUS forces are deployed. ACSAs permitthe reciprocal transfer of logisticsupport, supplies, and servicesbetween the Armed Forces of theUnited States and designatedmultinational partners . Since this canlead to significant economies of force andeffort, US forces continually seek suchsupport agreements in multinationaloperations. Under ACSAs, logisticsupport includes a broad range of goods

Figure VI-2. Multinational Logistics Considerations

Available Host Nation Infrastructure

Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements

Contingency Contracting

Civil Augmentation Program

Third-Party Logistics

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICSCONSIDERATIONS

Available Host Nation Infrastructure

Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements

Contingency Contracting

Civil Augmentation Program

Third-Party Logistics

VI-7

Other Deployment and Redeployment Considerations (Expanded Military Missions)

and services to include food, water,billeting, transportation (includingairlift), port services, communicationsservices, storage services, base operationssupport, waste management services, andconstruction incident to base operationssupport.

• Contingency Contracting. Contingencycontracting is the process of contractingfor locally available supplies, services,and construction in immediatesupport of deploying units, either atstaging locations or a TAA, during acontingency. Properly used, contingencycontracting is an effective forcemultiplier . Contingency contracts maybe used for supplies, services,engineering, construction, and real estate.Satisfying requirements for supplies andservices by contracting may improveresponse time, free transportation assetsfor other important missions, and serveto reduce dependence on the CONUS-based logistics system. Contingencycontracting should not replace HNS orthe existing supply systems where thesesystems are available or operational.However, deployed forces may augmenttheir existing logistic support capabilitythrough contingency contracting toprovide an additional source for criticallyrequired supplies and services.Deployments most suitable foremployment of contingency contractingsupport are those likely to occur in areasof the world where there are few, if any,HNS agreements.

• Civil Augmentation Program. Civilaugmentation programs are separateMilitary Department contractingoptions most often used when HNS isinsufficient or unavailable. Theyemploy pre-existing contracts with USand other vendors to provide support inmany areas including facilities, supplies,services, maintenance, and transportation.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force eachhave separate civil augmentationprograms. The Army’s program is theLogistics Civil Augmentation Program,the Navy’s program utilizes theConstruction Capabilities contract, andthe Air Force’s program is the Air ForceContract Augmentation Program. Thegoals of all Civil AugmentationPrograms are to:

•• Plan during peacetime for the effectiveuse of contractor support in a contingencyor crisis;

•• Leverage global and/or regionalcorporate resources as facility andlogistics force multipliers;

•• Provide an alternative augmentationcapability to meet facility and logisticsservices shortfalls; and

•• Provide a quick reaction tocontingency or crisis requirements.

• Third-Party Logistics. Third-partylogistic operations may also provideadditional resources to MNFCs whenthey are properly coordinated withintratheater transportation policies,requirements, and contingencyprocedures. C2 of the movement ofnonmilitary material arriving in, anddeparting from, a theater of operationson civilian contractor assets must be fullyintegrated into the MNFC’s operationplan to ensure that transportationrequirements are met and to offsettransportation force structure shortfalls.Fully integrated OPLANs should ensurethird-party contractual compliance withDOD policies regarding CRAFparticipation, contingency validationprocedures, TPFDD procedures, ITV,and coordination of civilian operationswithin the DTS. Proper third-partylogistics integration will ensure timely

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JP 3-35

movement coordination, transportationassets validation, and required ITV ofvital support requirements while easingdemands on normally limited port spaceand essential cargo or MHE.

See JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine forMultinational Operations,” for furtherinformation on multinational logistics.

3. Military Operations OtherThan War

MOOTW encompass those operations onthe range of military operations short ofwar such as combatting terrorism, peaceoperations, MSCA, or FHA. One significantdifference that distinguishes these operationsfrom other military operations is the increasedinvolvement of government agenciesoutside the Department of Defense,nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),and private voluntary organizations(PVOs). Increased involvement of theseagencies and organizations results because thecapacity to respond to crisis situations in thisarea of the range of military operationsseldom, if ever, resides within the capabilityof just one agency, organization, or military

force. These operations present twosignificant challenges to militaryorganizations attempting to executes u p p o r t i n g d e p l o y m e n t a n d / o rredeployment operations. The challengesare defining the relationship amongparticipating agencies and organizations(which may impact determination ofmovement priorities and validation ofmovement requirements) and determiningtheir support and movement requirements incompatible military terms (which may impactthe timeliness and effectiveness of militarysupport). Relationships with these agenciesand organizations are more correctly describedas associations or partnerships, since they arenot subject to the military chain of command.Determination of support and movementrequirements for these agencies andorganizations is often complex becauseprocedures to refine and validate theirrequirements may not exist or are notcompatible with military automateddeployment systems.

For more information on MOOTW, see JP3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War.”

Military operations other than war normally involve numerous agencies outsidethe Department of Defense with varied agendas, disparate needs, and differentexpectations.

VI-9

Other Deployment and Redeployment Considerations (Expanded Military Missions)

a. MOOTW. MOOTW encompass theuse of military capabilities across the rangeof military operations short of war. Theseoperations can be applied to complement anycombination of the other instruments ofnational power. MOOTW focus on deterringwar, resolving conflict, promoting peace,and supporting civil authorities in responseto domestic crises. MOOTW may involveelements of both combat and noncombatoperations in peace, conflict, and war. Allmilitary operations are driven by politicalconsiderations. However, MOOTW aremore sensitive to such considerations dueto the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, orlimit potential hostilities. In MOOTW,political considerations permeate all levels andthe military may not be the primary player.These operations usually involve interagencycoordination and may also involve NGO orPVOs. Although MOOTW are generallyconducted OCONUS, some types may beconducted within the United States in supportof civil authorities consistent with establishedlaw.

b. Deployment and/or RedeploymentConsiderat ions. Deployment andredeployment planning and executioncons ide ra t ions fo r MOOTW arefundamentally the same as those for any othermilitary operation. Deployment andredeployment operations supportingMOOTW generally differ from other jointforce operations in that they may involvemore logistics and combat support forces thancombat forces, and they normally involvemore nonmilitary organizations than otheroperations. In general, logistics or combatsupport elements may play a more prominentrole than combat forces in MOOTW becauseof the unique mission requirements of theseoperations. In many instances, logistics andcombat support forces will provide the baseforce for deployment. Moreover, they maybe employed in nonstandard tasks or in

quantities disproportionate to their normalmilitary roles . In some instances, logisticsor combat support elements may precedeother military forces, may be the only militaryforces deployed, or may remain after thedeparture of combat forces to assess theongoing situation and coordinate anyadditional US military operations.

• The immediate need for the supportedcombatant commander is to establisheffective coordination procedures withthe other supporting agencies andorganizations to facilitate execution of theproposed operation. The primary challengefor commands executing deployment orredeployment in support of MOOTW orinteragency support is development of theTPFDD to control execution of theoperation; specifically, the effort to refine,validate, and coordinate movementrequirements for the total force. Once arequirement is validated, the supportedcombatant commander must put this validrequirement in proper format, enter it intoJOPES, and validate the requirement toUSTRANSCOM before lift will bescheduled.

• In all circumstances, the supportedcombatant commander will validatemovement requirements and priorities formilitary support. In CONUS supportscenarios, TPFDD validation of DODand non-DOD requirements rest withFORSCOM in its role as lead operatingagent for USACOM. Non-DODmovement requirements and priorities forUS domestic disaster relief operationswill be forwarded through the FEMA-appointed federal coordinating officer tothe appropriate DCO. The responsibilityfor validation of OCONUS non-DODmovement requirements and prioritiesrequiring military strategic lift supportmay be less clearly defined.

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• OCONUS non-DOD movementrequirements and priorities may bevalidated by the appointed lead agencyrepresentative, may be articulated ininterdepartmental memorandums ofagreement or, in a worst case situation,may have to be coordinated among theindividual participants. QuantifyingOCONUS movement and sustainmentrequirements may be difficult since mostagencies outside of the Department ofDefense may not have deployment databases and do not practice deploymentoperations on a regular basis. Capturingpassenger data and cargo descriptionsmay require extraordinary effort on thepart of military transportation plannersto maintain accountability of deployingor redeploying passengers andequipment. Close coordinationbetween military transportationplanners and nonmilitary agencies iscritical. Cooperation is key, sincenonmilitary organizations are normallyunder no legal obligation to comply withmilitary directives.

Capturing movement requirements in compatible military termsis often difficult for planners.

“. . .America’s forces must in the futurebe capable of operating in, andcontributing toward, three distinct policyenvironments: joint military, or inter-Service, operations; the interagencyprocess; and multinational efforts.”

Admiral Paul David Millerformer Commander in Chief, US

Atlantic Command

4. Interagency SupportOperations

Throughout the range of militaryoperations, the common thread during mostmajor operations today is the broad range ofagencies, many with indispensable practicalcompetencies and major legalresponsibilities, that interact with the ArmedForces of the United States. Interagencysupport operations normally occur duringMOOTW (i.e., humanitarian assistance), butcan also occur in war. Increased involvementof military forces in civil activity at homeand abroad is matched, in part, by an increasein situations (primarily overseas) in which

VI-11

Other Deployment and Redeployment Considerations (Expanded Military Missions)

civil agencies face emerging post-Cold Warfactors and military threats not previouslyconfronted. These organizations are drawncloser to military forces by necessity, becausetheir missions may fail without militarysupport or protection. Because the solutionto a crisis seldom, if ever, resides within thecapability of just one agency or organization,campaign or operation plans must be craftedto leverage the core competencies of myriadagencies, synchronizing their efforts withmilitary capabilities toward a single objective.Often during interagency support operations,the military plays a supporting role to othernational agencies. For this reason, militaryobjectives need to be coordinated with

associated diplomatic, economic, andinformational objectives. Again, much of theinformation, guidance, and doctrine providedfor US joint operations are applicable tointeragency support operations. However,each organization brings its own culture,philosophy, goals, practices, and skills tothe interagency table. This diversity is thestrength of the interagency process,providing a cross-section of expertise,skills, and abilities in response to any crisissituation.

For additional information, see JP 3-08,“Interagency Coordination During JointOperations,” Volumes I and II.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIJOINT TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND ASSESSMENTS

VII-1

1. General

The NMS establishes two nationalmilitary objectives; promote peace andstability and, when necessary, defeatadversaries. Fulfilling these objectivesrequires the Armed Forces of the United Statesto possess a robust capability to deploy andredeploy in response to mission taskings.Effective deployment and redeployment ofpersonnel, equipment, and materiel to supportjoint operations depends on the ability totrain and exercise the way the United Statesintends to employ a joint military force.Strategic mobility is an ongoing CJCSCommended Training Issue (CCTI). Tofurther focus joint training, joint operationaltasks (including deployment, redeployment,and supporting tasks) are listed in the

“Joint and combined exercises, security assistance, and military-to-militarycontacts produced valuable relationships and infrastructure within the regionthat contributed to the creation of a militarily effective coalition.”

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

universal joint task list (UJTL) . This tasklisting provides a common frame ofreference and outlines basic mission tasksfor training multiple combatant commandsand joint force components. Combatantcommanders are responsible for ensuring thatpersonnel responsible for deployment andredeployment planning and execution, receiveappropriate training, are regularly exercised, andare formally assessed on their ability to providethe required resources at the appropriate placeand time to support joint operations.

For additional information, see CJCSM3500.03, “Joint Training Manual for theArmed Forces of the United States,” CJCSM3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task List Version3.0,” and CJCSI 3500.2A, “Joint TrainingMaster Plan.”

Joint training and exercises provide the foundation to improvedjoint force mission capability.

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2. Core Competencies andCJCS Commended TrainingIssues

Joint force operations meld the “corecompetencies” of the Services to bestaccomplish the assigned mission. Combatantcommanders have the responsibility to ensurethat assigned, attached, and supporting forcesare prepared to execute and accomplishassigned mission taskings in their AOR. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff overseesactivities of the combatant commanders andadvises the NCA on joint force capability andreadiness. As part of this oversight, theChairman’s Readiness System (CRS)prioritizes training issues by identifyingCCTIs and provides a means to focusresources to fix joint force deficienciesthrough the Joint Training Master Plan(JTMP).

a. Core Competencies. Roles andfunctions provide the basis for the unique corecompetencies each Service brings to jointforce operations. Each of the MilitaryDepartments and Services, coordinating asappropriate with the other Departments andServices and with the combatant commands,has the responsibility for organizing, training,equipping, and providing forces to fulfill

certain specific roles and for administeringand supporting these forces. Thisresponsibility includes the formulation ofService doctrine for the functions involved,the internal structure and composition offorces, unit and individual training, and thetypes and quantities of equipment and suppliesto be developed and procured. Thisresponsibility, however, is subject to thecombatant commander’s authority to organizeassigned forces and ensure their preparednessas necessary to accomplish a specific mission.Combatant commanders evaluate andfocus joint force preparedness throughmission-tailored joint training and exerciseprograms.

b. CJCS Commended Training Issues.CCTIs are special-interest items developedfrom all-source lessons learned, readinessreports, and operational assessments.These issues are incorporated into the JTMPto ensure appropriate visibility by thecombatant commands in developing their jointtraining plans. Each command shouldconsider CCTIs for special emphasis in theupcoming training cycle and assess theprescribed CCTIs in relation to their theaterconditions as a key joint training readinessindicator. CCTIs are identified for immediateand ongoing action. Strategic mobility is one

Each Service brings unique core competencies to joint force operations.

VII-3

Joint Training, Exercises, and Assessments

of the eight current ongoing actions toimprove long-term interoperability andenhance joint operations.

3. Joint Training

The primary purpose of joint training isto prepare US forces to conduct joint andmultinational operations. Above all, thejoint training system is designed to ensure thatthe Armed Forces of the United States aretrained to fight and win our nation’s wars. Thejoint training system provides an integrated,requirements-based methodology fortailoring training programs to the assignedmissions consistent with command prioritiesand available resources. This systememphasizes a direct linkage between the NMS,combatant command mission requirements,and training. The ultimate result is trainedand ready personnel able to effectively executejoint and multinational operations.

a. Individual Training. Individualtraining is a Service responsibility. The goalof individual training is to train thosepersonnel responsible for planning andexecuting deployment and redeploymentoperations consistent with current jointdeployment and redeployment doctrine.Classroom training for JOPES operators isavailable through USTRANSCOM’s JOPESBasic Operators Course and the GTN User’sCourse at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.Course information and scheduling isavailable through the JOPES TrainingOrganization.

b. Universal Joint Task List. The UJTLoutlines joint force collective training tasks.CJCSM 3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task ListVersion 3.0,” contains a comprehensivehierarchical listing of the tasks that may beperformed by a joint military force. The UJTLalso contains a common language ofconditions that is used to describe theoperational context in which tasks areperformed. Additionally, the UJTL lists the

measures of performance for each UJTL task.These measures are used to develop standardsof performance consistent with missionrequirements. The UJTL does not address“how a task is performed” (found in jointdoctrine) or “who performs the task” (foundin the concept of operations). The UJTLhelps identify “what” is to be performedin standardized joint warfare terms. TheUJTL outlines deployment and redeploymenttasks and supporting tasks at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels of warfare formission-essential task list development.

c. Categories of Training Programs.Joint Service interoperability is critical towarfighting. Rather than focusing on onespecific Service, combatant commanders arenow capabilities-centered, which oftenrequires blending the unique skills andcapabilities individual Services have to offerto accomplish the mission. To prepare airmen,sailors, soldiers, and Marines to meet theneeds of combatant commanders facingcontingencies around the world, joint forcetraining is organized into categories oftraining . A broad spectrum of training andexercise events are sponsored at variouscommand levels. Military training spans thoseevents that fall within the following categories.

• Category 1: Service Training (USOnly). Military training based onService policy and doctrine to prepareindividuals and interoperable units.Service training includes basic, technical,operational, and component-sponsoredinteroperability training in response tooperational requirements deemednecessary by the combatant commandsin order to execute assigned missions.

• Category 2: Component InteroperabilityTraining (US Only). Operationaltraining based on joint doctrine or jointtactics, techniques, and procedures inwhich more than one Service componentparticipates. This training normally

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JP 3-35

includes CINC or Service initiatives toimprove responsiveness of assignedforces to combatant commanders.Conducted under the auspices of acomponent commander, the purpose isto ensure interoperability of combat,combat support services, and militaryequipment between two or more Servicecomponents.

• Category 3: Joint Training (US Only).Military training based on joint doctrineto prepare joint forces and joint staffs torespond to operational requirementsdeemed necessary by combatantcommanders to execute their assignedmissions.

• C a t e g o r y 4 : M u l t i n a t i o n a lInteroperability T raining. Militarytraining based on multinational, joint, andService doctrine, as applicable, to prepareunits in response to NCA-approvedmandates. The purpose is to ensureinteroperability of combat, combatsupport forces, and military equipmentbetween US Service component(s) andother nation(s) forces.

• Category 5: Joint and/or MultinationalTraining. Military training based onmultinational, joint, and Service doctrine,as applicable, to prepare units in responseto NCA-approved mandates. Thepurpose is to prepare joint forces under amultinational command arrangement.

• Category 6: Interagency and/orIntergovernmental Training. Militarytraining based on NCA-derived standardoperating procedures, as applicable, toprepare interagency and/or internationaldecision makers and staffs in responseto NCA-approved mandates.

4. Joint and MultinationalExercises

Joint exercises offer an opportunity for jointforce personnel to plan and executedeployment and redeployment operations.Exercises involving multinational forces offeran opportunity for US forces to demonstratetheir proficiency at deployment andredeployment operations to supportconcepts of operation involvingmultinational partners , while affording USplanners the opportunity to benefit fromlearning allied and/or coalition capabilitiesand limitations. Joint and multinationalexercises are conducted as part of the CJCSJoint Exercise and Training Program.

a. CJCS Joint Exercise and TrainingProgram. The CJCS Joint Exercise andTraining Program is the Chairman’sprincipal vehicle for achieving joint andmultinational training . The exercises withinthe program provide an opportunity to utilizestrategic transportation and C4I systems andevaluate their readiness and supportabilityacross the full range of military operations.Additionally, exercises and training eventsdemonstrate US resolve and capability toproject military presence anywhere in theworld in support of US national interests andcommitments to its allies. The CJCS JointExercise and Training Program has threecomponents: CJCS-Sponsored Exercises;USACOM and/or USSOCOM Common JointTask Training Programs; and CINC-Sponsored Joint Training Programs.

b. CJCS Exercise Program Funding.Instructions for the funding of the CJCS JointExercise and Training Program are containedin CJCSI 3511.01, “CJCS Exercise ProgramFunding.” In accordance with this instruction,exercises conducted by combatant

VII-5

Joint Training, Exercises, and Assessments

commanders using joint transportation fundswill ensure that deployment and/orredeployment issues are addressed throughoutthe exercise.

c. Exercise Planning Considerations.When conduc t ing dep loyment o rredeployment operations in exercises,fundamental considerations must be given tothe items shown in Figure VII-1.

d. Use of Modeling and Simulation.Conduct of computer assisted exercises usingmodern M&S systems and techniques tosimulate execution of real world TPFDDsmay be used to identify deficiencies in realworld deployment concepts and TPFDD.Deployment exercises can also providevaluable training to joint and Service staffsand can be conducted during exercisessponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, combatant commands, or Services.

5. Assessments

Joint operation planning prepares for theuse of existing capabilities to achieveobjectives defined in the NMS. Execution of

the resultant plans during contingencies, jointtraining, and exercises provides ameasurement of the nation’s ability tosuccessfully prosecute the NMS within theconstraints of available forces and resources.This measurement provides a means ofassessing the balance between strategy andcapabilities, assessing joint force readiness,and focusing the acquisition of additionalresources and capabilities. Assessment is avital component of joint force training andexercise programs. M&S systems andtechniques can significantly enhanceassessment capability during deploymentplanning and exercises during whichdeployment staffs actually executetransportation plans and associated TPFDDs.

a. Preparedness and Capability. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has theresponsibility to monitor and assess thereadiness of US military forces to fight andmeet the demands of the NMS. The CRSsupports the Chairman in meeting thisresponsibility. UJTLs provide thefoundation for joint force exerciseassessment. Joint operation plans provide thefoundation for the CRS because they are the

Joint training programs must incorporate deployment and redeploymenttraining objectives to improve strategic mobility.

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Figure VII-1. Exercise Planning Considerations

standards against which readiness is measuredin the joint monthly readiness review. Thissenior forum is designed to assess both unitreadiness, as reported by the Services, andjoint readiness, as reported by the combatantcommanders.

b. Operational Plans and InteroperabilityDirectorate, Joint Staff (J-7), Evaluationand Analysis Division (EAD). The J-7,EAD conducts formal assessments ofCJCS-sponsored exercises for the CRS.Observations and issues are provided to theChairman for assessing national warfightingcapabilities and programming improvement.The Joint After Action Reports System and

Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systemarchive key joint operational issues for futureexercise and operation planning.

c. Deployment and RedeploymentExercise Assessment. Deployment andredeployment evaluation criteria should bemeasurable and compatible with theoverall exercise constraints. The exercisesponsor should establish broad objectives thatcan be translated into more specific objectivesduring exercise planning conferences andreflected within the exercise schedule. At aminimum, the following aspects of exercisedeployment and redeployment operationsshould be evaluated.

EXERCISE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Developing specific, measurable, and attainabledeployment and/or redeployment exerciseobjectives.

Providing for sufficient deployment orredeployment actions to support the objectives ofthe exercise.

Creating as realistic a deployment orredeployment exercise environment as possible.

Assessing and evaluating deployment orredeployment operation planning and execution.

Exercising intelligence support to deployment andredeployment operations.

VII-7

Joint Training, Exercises, and Assessments

• Intelligence support for deployment andredeployment operations.

• Movement management plans to includeC2, battlespace management, andmechanism for enforcement of thecombatant commander’s priorities atnodes.

• Proper use of all available planningproducts and support.

• Use of TPFDDs to exercise JOPESoperators and planners.

• Optimal use of all available componentand allied and/or coalition lift assets.

• Force protection measures employedduring deployment and redeploymentoperations.

“INTERNAL LOOK was a joint exercisewith all Services and componentcommands represented and thoroughlyintegrated. . . [Exercise] INTERNALLOOK provided an essential commonframework to participants during thewar. When actual deployments beganduring [Operation] DESERT SHIELD,planners would routinely remark, “Wedid this on [Exercise] INTERNALLOOK.”

Certain V ictory: The US Army inthe Gulf W ar, by BrigadierGeneral Robert H. Scales

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ADELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESSES

A-1

1. Introduction

Deployment and redeployment planning isan integral part of joint operation planning.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stafftransmits the orders of the President andSecretary of Defense to the combatantcommanders and oversees the activities of thecombatant commands. The Services and theirmajor logistics agencies participate in jointoperation planning through execution of theirresponsibilities to organize, train, equip, andprovide forces for assignment to thecombatant commands; administer and support

those forces; and prepare plans implementingjoint strategic mobility, logistics, andmobilization plans. However, the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatantcommanders have primary responsibility forplanning the employment of forces, includingdeployment and redeployment operations.

2. Joint Operation Planningand Execution System

JOPES is the integrated joint C2 systemused to plan and execute all militaryoperations (see Figure A-1). It is the system

Figure A-1. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and CrisisAction Planning Process Functional Alignment

JOPES DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS AND CRISISACTION PLANNING PROCESS FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT

DELIBERATEPLANNINGPROCESS

CRISIS ACTIONPLANNINGPROCESS

APPROVED FORFURTHER PLANNING

PHASE IINITIATION

PHASE IICONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IIIPLAN

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IVPLAN

REVIEW

PHASE VSUPPORTING

PLANS

ALERTORDER

EXECUTE

PHASE ISITUATION

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IIICOA

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IVCOA

SELECTION

PHASE VEXECUTIONPLANNING

PHASE IICRISIS

ASSESSMENT

PHASE VIEXECUTION

THREATIDENTIFICATION& ASSESSMENT

STRATEGYDETERMINATION

COURSE OFACTION

DEVELOPMENT

DETAILEDPLANNING

WARNINGORDER

JOINTSTRATEGIC

CAPABILITIESPLAN

IMPLEMENTATION

A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-35

used by the JPEC to conduct joint operationplanning. The process of force projection isan integral part of the JOPES. JOPES is usedto track requirements, departures, and arrivalsin the scheduling and movement subsystemof JOPES. Additionally, JOPES providesusers with an ordered and comprehensive setof procedures for resolving complex strategicmobility force deployment and sustainmentproblems. It includes an operation planningprocess, an ADP support system, andprocedures to support the planning process.Currently the joint community is workingtowards standardized, functionally integratedprocesses and automation tools to supportdeployment execution and management. Thiseffort is tied to three critical goals for 21stcentury power projection: increase the speedof deployment; decrease the logistics footprintof deployed forces; and improve informationmanagement to provide full dimensionalawareness. The primary JOPES referencedocument for deployment and redeploymentexecution is CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis ActionTime-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution.”

3. Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning (see Figure A-2)is directed toward the employment of militaryforces within the context of a military strategyto attain specified objectives. In peacetime,the process is deliberate planning. In crisissituations, it is CAP.

For a more detailed explanation of the jointplanning process, its components, and theirfunctions, see JP 5-0, “Doctrine for PlanningJoint Operations,” CJCSM 3122.01, “JointOperation Planning and Execution SystemVol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures),”and CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint OperationsPlanning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning Formats and Guidance).”

a. Deliberate Planning. Deliberateplanning is designed as a cyclic process during

peacetime conditions and provides to theJPEC an opportunity to develop and refineplans to be used in wartime (see Figure A-3).It is the process used when time permits thetotal participation of the commanders andstaffs of the JPEC. The plan is based onpredicted conditions that will be counteredwith resources available during the planningcycle. Results of the deliberate planningprocess are documented in OPLANs,CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, and thesupporting TPFDD and/or TPFDL for eachplan. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANsare developed by the combatant commandersin response to CJCS requirements, JSCPtasking, and self-determined contingencies.FUNCPLANs are used for military operationsin a peacetime or permissive environment forspecific functions or discrete tasks. They mayalso be prepared for peacetime operations(e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations).Forces and sustainment requirements aredeveloped by the supported combatantcommander during the TPFDL development.FUNCPLANs are sourced by the Services,supporting combatant commanders, anddefense agencies. Transportation feasibilityanalysis is conducted by USTRANSCOM inconjunction with the supported combatantcommander during the deliberate planningprocess. Analysis is conducted using models,simulations, and transportation expertise.Dependable transportation feasibility analysisis contingent on accurate combatant commandanalysis of theater transportability.

b. Crisis Action Planning. CAPprocedures provide for the transition fromplanning of military operations to theirexecution. Deliberate planning supports CAPby anticipating potential crises and developingjoint OPLANs that facilitate the rapiddevelopment and selection of a COA andexecution planning during crises. CAPincludes the consideration and exploitation ofdeliberate joint operation planning wheneverpossible. An adequate and feasible military

A-3

Deliberate and C

risis Action P

lanning Processes

JSCPUPDATE &MAINTAIN

DATA BASES

IICONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

IINITIATION

IIIPLAN

DEVELOPMENT

IVPLAN

REVIEW

VSUPPORTING

PLANS

TPFDDMAINTENANCE

JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY

NOPLAN

ISITUATION

DEVELOPMENT

IICRISIS

ASSESSMENT

IIICOURSE OF

ACTIONDEVELOPMENT

IVCOURSE OF

ACTIONSELECTION

VEXECUTIONPLANNING

VIEXECUTION

CRISIS ACTIONPLANNING

OPORD

AND/OR

CJCSWARNING

ORDER

CJCSEXECUTEORDER

CJCSPLANNING

ORDER

CJCSALERTORDER

EXPANDDEVELOP

DEPLOYMENTDATA BASE

DETERMINEFEASIBLE

COURSES OFACTION

CONPLAN OPLAN

ESTABLISH DATA BASE

ESTABLISH DATA BASE

JOPES

DEPLOYMENTDATA BASE

TPFDD?

TPFDD

DEPLOYMENTPLANS / SCHEDULES

MONITORMOVEMENTC

RISIS

MODIFY

Figure A-2. Joint Planning Summary

A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-35

Figure A-3. Comparing Crisis Action Procedures With Deliberate Planning Procedures

COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURESWITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

18-24 months

Participates fully

5 Phases from initiation tosupporting plans

JSCP to combatantcommander, who assignstasks with planning or otherwritten directive

Apportioned in JSCP

Planning Directive issuedby combatant commanderafter planning guidancestep of conceptdevelopment phase

Communicates thecombatant commander'sdecision to staff andsubordinate commanders

Combatant commanderdecides COA with CJCSreview

When operation plan isimplemented, it is convertedto an OPORD, andexecuted with an Executeorder

OPLAN with supportingTPFDD or CONPLAN withor without supportingTPFDD

DELIBERATEPLANNING

DELIBERATEPLANNING

Hours or days

For security reasons,possibly very limited toclose-hold procedures

6 Phases from situationdevelopment to execution

Warning order tocombatant commander,who assigns tasks withevaluation requestmessage

Allocated in the Warning,Planning, Alert, orExecute order

Warning order fromChairman of the JointChiefs of Staff; combatantcommander's evaluationrequest

Communicatesrecommendations ofcombatant commander tothe CJCS-NCA

NCA decide COA

Execute order

Campaign Plan (if reqd)with supporting OPORDsor OPORD withsupporting TPFDD

CRISIS ACTIONPLANNING

CRISIS ACTIONPLANNING

Time available toplan

JPEC involvement

Phases

Document assigningtask

Forces for Planning

Early planningguidance to staff

Commander'sestimates

Decision of COA

Execution Document

Products

Time available toplan

JPEC involvement

Phases

Document assigningtask

Forces for Planning

Early planningguidance to staff

Commander'sestimates

Decision of COA

Execution Document

Products

Hours or days

For security reasons,possibly very limited toclose-hold procedures

6 Phases from situationdevelopment to execution

Warning order tocombatant commander,who assigns tasks withevaluation requestmessage

Allocated in the Warning,Planning, Alert, orExecute order

Warning order fromChairman of the JointChiefs of Staff; combatantcommander's evaluationrequest

Communicatesrecommendations ofcombatant commander tothe CJCS-NCA

NCA decide COA

Execute order

Campaign Plan (if reqd)with supporting OPORDsor OPORD withsupporting TPFDD

18-24 months

Participates fully

5 Phases from initiation tosupporting plans

JSCP to combatantcommander, who assignstasks with planning or otherwritten directive

Apportioned in JSCP

Planning Directive issuedby combatant commanderafter planning guidancestep of conceptdevelopment phase

Communicates thecombatant commander'sdecision to staff andsubordinate commanders

Combatant commanderdecides COA with CJCSreview

When operation plan isimplemented, it is convertedto an OPORD, andexecuted with an Executeorder

OPLAN with supportingTPFDD or CONPLAN withor without supportingTPFDD

A-5

Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Processes

response to a crisis demands a flexibleadaptation of the basic planning process thatemphasizes the time available, rapid andeffective communications, and the use ofpreviously accomplished joint operationplanning whenever possible. In crisissituations, the JPEC follows formallyestablished CAP procedures to adjust andimplement previously prepared jointdeliberate plans or to develop and execute

OPORDs where no useful joint deliberateplan exists for the evolving crisis. Acampaign plan may also be developed ifwarranted by the scope of contemplatedoperations. CAP procedures provide for therapid and effective exchange of informationand analysis, the timely preparation ofmilitary COAs for consideration by the NCA,and the prompt transmission of NCAdecisions to supported commanders.

A-6

Appendix A

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BJOINT DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, AND

JRSOI PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

B-1

Annex A Joint Deployment Process Map DescriptionB Joint Redeployment Process Map DescriptionC JRSOI Process Map Description

B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX BJOINT DEPLOYMENT PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

B-A-1

See Figure B-A-1.

1. Analyze Mission

Military operations begin with an event thatrequires movement of forces to somewherein the world. This can be a planned or no-notice movement. The process begins withdevelopment of COAs, includes selection ofthe desired COA, and ends with thedevelopment of orders and their transmission.

a. Receive Initial Notification. Unitsreceive informal notification of impendingoperations via any communication means.

b. Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.Based on early information acquired, plannersassess potential scenario developments,mission requirements, and COAs.

• Evaluate Deployed LocationRequirements, Capabilities, andAvailable WRM. Planners collectintelligence on theater terrain, weather,infrastructure, and prepositionedequipment and/or supplies.

• Review Installation Capabilities andSupport Requirements. Deploymentinstallations assess the operational tempo,movement requirements, facilities,equipment, and deploying force supportrequirements.

c. Receive Warning Order. Formalnotification is received which directsdeployment planning and preparation.

d. Receive TPFDD Guidance. Supportedcombatant commander tailors basic TPFDDLOI as necessary to plan and execute specificmission. Force providers add guidance tosubordinate headquarters as necessary.

2. Structure Forces

A critical step in planning militaryoperations is to identify all forces required tomeet the mission. Force structuring includesestablishing the command structure, taskingassigned forces (including active componentand RC or other assigned forces) and endswith a defined force to accomplish missionobjectives.

a. Source, Tailor, and Prioritize ForceStructure. Deploying units are sourced andtask-organized to meet mission requirementsand to fill supported combatant command,JTF, or component force requirements.Combatant commanders, JTFs, orcomponents prioritize force flow within theoverall structure based on operational needsand strategic lift limitations.

• Develop Deployment Data. Deployingunits provide passengers (PAX) and/orequipment lists for TPFDD refinement.

• Verify Accompanying Supplies.Ensure that units identify plannedaccompanying supplies.

b. Establish Command Relationships.Joint Staff confirms supported command,supporting combatant command, and agencyrelationships by message for a givenoperation.

3. Validate Deployment Data

Execution procedures are used bycombatant command components, supportingcombatant commanders, and providingorganizations to confirm to the supportedcommander and USTRANSCOM that allinformation records in a TPFDD are not onlyerror-free for automation purposes, but also

B-A

-2

Annex A

to Appendix B

JP 3

-35

ReceiveWarning

Order

Verify AccompanyingSupplies

Develop DeploymentData

Source, Tailor, & PrioritizeForce Structure

EstablishCommand

Relationships

Refine & SubmitDeployment

Data

Receive SupportedCombatant

Commander-Approved Time-

Phased Force andDeployment Data

(TPFDD)

ConfirmMovementClearances

Build &Publish

Schedule ofEvents

AssessLift Schedule

ReceiveMilitary TrafficManagement

CommandPort Call

ReceiveStrategic

MovementSchedule

DevelopInitial Loadand/or Stow

Plans

ConductMovement

Coordination& SupportMeeting

Identify &Resolve

Shortfallsand/or

Limitations

IdentifyContainers, Flat

Racks, Material- &Cargo-Handling

Equipment,Pallets,& Local

TransportationRequirements

Activate DeploymentCommand & Control

& SupportOrganizations

AssemblePersonnel &

Cargo

SequenceLoads

Conduct UnitInspection,

Load Equipment,& Process

Documentation

EstablishSupport

Organizationsat Port of Entry

(POE)

Move to POE

ConductMovement

ControlOperations

Arrive &ReportStatus

Assemble& Sequence

Loads

Conduct POEInspections &

Complete FinalPassangers

and/or CargoDocumentation

Load& Lift

ReportStatus

SubmitDepartureReports

JOINT FORCE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

Joint FunctionalAreas

JointProcesses

Predeployment Activities

Analyze Mission

Receive InitialNotification

ReceiveTPFDD

Guidance

Conduct InitialMission Analysis

Evaluate Deployed LocationRequirements, Capabilities,

& Available War ReserveMateriel

Review InstallationCapabilities &

SupportRequirements

Validate Deployment DataStructure Forces

Predeployment Activities

Assemble and Marshal Forces Conduct POE Operations

Move to and Activation at POE

Schedule MovementPrepare the ForcePersonnel, Supplies, & Equipment

Predeployment Activities

JOINT FORCE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

Figure B-A-1. Joint Force Deployment Process

B-A-3

Joint Deployment Process Map Description

accurately reflect the current status, attributes,and availability of units and requirements.Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers,and cargo details should be confirmed withthe unit before validation occurs.

a. Refine and Submit Deployment Data.Force structure must be further described interms of deployment data to facilitate logisticsplanning, movement, and sustainment. Theresult of this process is the development ofthe TPFDD. The TPFDD translatesoperational requirements into logistics terms(i.e., how much, when, and where) in order todeploy, prioritize, and schedule the flow ofthe force into the theater.

b. Receive Supported CombatantCommander-Approved TPFDD. Supportedcombatant commander receives Servicecomponent force requirement anddeployment data and merges this data into itsTPFDD. The supported combatantcommander then reviews, analyzes, andprioritizes flow as necessary and sends the endproduct to USTRANSCOM for atransportation feasibility review. Thecompleted review is coordinated with thesupported combatant commander forresolution of transportation conflicts. The endresult of this process is the supportedcombatant commander-approved TPFDD.Deploying units prepare for movement basedon this TPFDD. Changes may occur duringdeployment, and incremental changesaffecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel,Supplies and Equipment)

Multiple actions, events, and activities mustbe accomplished to get the force ready todeploy. Planned requirements (representedby the TPFDD) are communicated to taskedunits and supporting agencies, which takeactions to prepare and organize the actualpeople, supplies, and equipment formovement. This process also includes getting

support organizations prepared to conductdeployment operations.

a. Activate Deployment C2 and SupportOrganizations. Task organize to supportrequirements for movement control elements(e.g., A/DACG, MCCs, POGs, TALCE).

b. Identify Containers, Flat Racks,MHE, Cargo Handling Equipment (CHE),Pallets, and Local TransportationRequirements. Supporting activities receivecontainer and/or 463L pallet requirementsfrom units, assess capability to meet theserequirements, and determine MHE and/orCHE requirements to move containers andpallets from storage sites to unit areas.

c. Identify and Resolve Shortfalls and/or Limitations. Units identify personnel and/or equipment shortfalls against authorizationsor mission requirements. Force providers takenecessary actions.

d. Conduct Movement Coordinationand Support Meeting. Commands at alllevels review planning and execution statusand assign tasks to resolve support issues.

e. Develop Initial Load and/or StowPlans. Based on anticipated types of lift, unitsdevelop initial load and/or stow plans.

5. Schedule Movement

Movement scheduling is an iterativeprocess at every level of supported andsupporting commands in order to get the rightpeople, supplies, and equipment to the rightplace at the right time.

a. Receive Strategic MovementSchedule. As received from validatedTPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets arescheduled and registered in JOPES. Thesemovement schedules are utilized bycommands in support of movement planning,coordination, and execution.

B-A-4

Annex A to Appendix B

JP 3-35

b. Receive MTMC Port Call. As strategicsealift schedules are being developed, unitsand/or installations receive MTMCDeployment Support Command call forwardmessages directing movement to SPOEs indesignated windows. For amphibiousoperations, MTMC port calls do not apply.

c. Assess Lift Schedule. Commandsassess ability to meet strategic lift schedules.Allocation of unit line numbers (ULNs) tocarriers is accomplished in JOPES. ULN liftshortfalls and available lift are identified tothe TCCs.

d. Build and Publish Schedule of Events.Movement instructions are published inaccordance with JOPES carrier schedules andpriority of force movement.

e. Confirm Movement Clearances.Movement control elements confirmmovement clearances with HN, state, andgovernmental agencies.

6. Assemble and MarshalForces

Assembly and marshalling involvesbringing together people, supplies, andequipment in preparation for final movement.Support functions are established andpositioned to expedite and control themovement and throughput of the forcethrough the deployment pipeline.

a. Assemble Personnel and Cargo.Conducted within home and/or intermediatemarshalling areas in support of movementpreparations.

b. Conduct Unit Inspection, LoadEquipment, and Process Documentation.Preparations and inspections for movementoperations are completed. Documentation ismarried up with cargo and equipment.

c. Sequence Loads. Loads are staged andsequenced in support of movement to POEsbased upon priority of force movementschedules.

d. Establish Support Organizations atPOE. POEs deployment supportorganizations, identified in par 4.a. above, areestablished in support of movementoperations.

e. Move to POE. Movement to thedesignated POEs is conducted in accordancewith movement instructions.

f. Conduct Movement ControlOperations. Movement control elementscoordinate, monitor, and report movement inaccordance with movement instructions.

7. Conduct POE Operations

Port operations begin the strategic leg ofthe deployment pipeline. Essential actions areaccomplished at the POE to complete andfinalize all unit movement responsibilities.The result is the load and launch of thestrategic conveyance. Critical information isprovided to C2 and forward support elementsto facilitate efficient onward movement of theforce to the POD.

a. Arrive and Report Status. Arrival offorces and equipment at the designateddeparture POEs. Arrival reporting is done bythe deployment support organizations and unitas directed.

b. Assemble and Sequence Loads.Personnel, cargo, and equipment are stagedand sequenced in the established departurePOE unit marshalling areas.

c. Conduct POE Inspections andComplete Final PAX and/or CargoDocumentation. These inspections are

B-A-5

Joint Deployment Process Map Description

conducted within the departure POE alertholding area and/or call forward areas inaccordance with the DefenseTransportation regulations and jointprocedures and policies.

d. Load Lift and Report Status areconducted within the departure POE loadingramp areas. Load lift reports are submitted

as directed between the POE supportagencies, unit, and component forces.

e. Submit Departure Reports. DepartureStatus reports are submitted by thedeployment support organizations inaccordance with Service guidance to thecommand element(s) in support of JOPESreporting requirements.

B-A-6

Annex A to Appendix B

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX BJOINT REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

B-B-1

See Figure B-B-1.

1. Analyze Mission

Redeployment operations will normallybegin when the unit is notified that its missionis complete or when it has received orders toredeploy to another theater in support of othermissions.

a. Receive Initial Notification. Unitsreceive informal notification of impendingredeployment via any communication means.

b. Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.Based on early information acquired, plannersassess current tactical situation and unit statusand conduct preliminary analysis ofredeployment mission requirements.

c. Receive Warning Order and TPFDDGuidance. Formal notification receivedwhich directs redeployment planning andpreparation. The supported combatantcommander tailors basic TPFDD LOI asnecessary to plan and execute redeploymentoperations. Unit commanders provideadditional guidance to subordinateheadquarters as necessary.

d. Identify HN, Contract, CommandCapabilities, and Support Requirements.Commanders at all levels assess HN, contract,command capabilities, and supportrequirements for movement, to includefacilities, security, supply and services, andequipment processing and turn-in.Additionally, the requirements for customs,environmental protection, and agriculturalinspections are reviewed.

2. Structure Forces

A critical step in planning is to identify allforces selected to redeploy, as well as theforces that will support the operation.Redeploying forces receive guidance onreconstitution and reorganization, includingequipment disposition. Support forcestructuring includes establishing the commandstructure and assigning redeployment tasks toforces, and ends with a defined force toaccomplish redeployment mission objectives.

a. Move to TAA. Upon completion oftactical operations and based on combatantcommand guidance, the unit will move todesignated TAA.

• Conduct Reconstitution andReorganize. Upon arrival in the TAA,units conduct recovery andreconstitution; reorganization; and awaitmovement instructions from theirsupporting movement control element orhigher headquarters.

• Process Personnel and Equipment.Units account for and process personnel,identify and process excess equipment,clean, decontaminate, pack and load unitequipment in accordance with customsand/or agriculture guidance, and developinitial unit movement data.

b. Tailor and Prioritize Force Structure.Redeploying and supporting units are task-organized to meet redeployment missionrequirements and to fill combatant command,JTF, or component force requirements.Combatant commands, JTFs, or components

B-B

-2

Annex B

to Appendix B

JP 3

-35

JOINT FORCE REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS

Joint FunctionalAreas

JointProcesses

Analyze Mission

ReceiveInitial

Notification

ReceiveWarningOrder &TPFDD

Guidance

ConductInitial

MissionAnalysis

Identify Host Nation,Contract, & CommandCapabilities & Support

Requirements

Refine RedeploymentData

Move to Tactical AssemblyArea

Structure Forces

Conduct Reconstitution &Reorganize

Process Personnel &Equipment

Identify Equipment Status to Include WarReserve Materiel (WRM) & Excess Materiel

Tailor & PrioritizeForce Structure

DevelopRedeployment

Data

Refine & SubmitRedeployment

Data

Establish SupportOrganizations

Coordinate HostNation & Contract

SupportRequirements

Conduct MovementCoordination &

Support Meeting

DevelopInitial Loadand/or Stow

Plans

Turn-inWRM &ExcessMateriel

Receive SupportedCombatant

Commander-ApprovedTime-Phased Force and

Deployment Data(TPFDD)

Movement to POD

Prepare to Receive the Force Conduct POD Operations Conduct Destination Reception

Further Employment or Demobilization

ConductMovement

Coordination &Support Meeting

ReceivePersonnel &

Cargo

EstablishSupport

Organizations atPOE &

Installation

ProcessPersonnel &

Equipment forMovement

CoordinateTransportation

for OnwardMovement

Complete UnitInspections &

Process MovementDocuments

PrepareInstallationto ReceiveEquipment

Report Status &Submit

DepartureReports

IdentifyInstallation

SupportRequirements

Submit ArrivalReports

ArriveDestination

ProcessPersonnel &Equipment

Prepare forFuture Missions

Conduct UnitReception

Conduct UnitReception

Demobilization ofReserves

Schedule Movement Assemble & Marshal Forces Conduct POE Operations

Prepare the ForcePersonnel, Supplies, & Equipment

Redeployment Activities

ReceiveStrategic

MovementSchedule

Receive MilitaryTraffic ManagementCommand Port Call

Build & PublishSchedule of

Events

Move toStaging Area

Move to POE Arrive &ReportStatus

Assemble& Sequence

Loads

Load Lift,Report

Status &Submit

DepartureReports

ConductInspections &

Complete FinalPAX and/or

CargoDocumentation

Assess LiftSchedule

SequenceLoads

ConfirmMovementClearances

AssemblePersonnel &

Cargo

ConductMovement

ControlOperations

Conduct UnitInspection, Load

Equipment, &Prepare

Documentation

EstablishSupport

Organizationsat Port of

Entry (POE)

Redeployment Activities

Movement to POE

JOINT FORCE REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS

Identify Containers, FlatRacks, Material &Cargo Handling

Equipment, Pallets, &Local Transportation

Requirements

Figure B-B-1. Joint Force Redeployment Process

B-B-3

Joint Redeployment Process Map Description

prioritize force flow within the overallstructure based on operational needs andstrategic lift limitations.

c. Develop Redeployment Data.Redeploying units provide PAX and/orequipment lists for TPFDD refinement.

d. Identify Equipment Status to IncludeWRM and Excess Materiel. Redeployingunits must assess equipment status andcoordinate the turn-in of WRM and excessequipment in accordance with Serviceheadquarters turn-in or dispositioninstructions.

3. Refine Redeployment Data

Units confirm readiness, movementavailable dates, PAX, and cargo details tohigher commands. Combatant commandcomponents and supporting commandersprovide confirmation to the supportedc o m m a n d e r , w h o v a l i d a t e s t oUSTRANSCOM that the data in the TPFDDis error-free and accurately reflects the currentstatus, attributes, and availability of units andrequirements.

a. Refine and Submit RedeploymentData. The redeployment force structure mustbe further described in terms of redeploymentdata to facilitate logistics planning, movement,and sustainment. The result of this process isthe development of the TPFDD. The TPFDDtranslates operational requirements intologistics terms (i.e., how much, when, andwhere) in order to deploy, prioritize, andschedule the flow of the force out of the theaterto home station or to another operationallocation.

b. Receive Supported CombatantCommander-Approved TPFDD. Thesupported combatant commander receivesService component force requirements and/or redeployment data and merges this data intoits TPFDD. The supported combatant

commander then reviews, analyzes, and re-prioritizes flow as necessary and sends the endproduct to USTRANSCOM for atransportation feasibility review. Thecompleted review is coordinated with thesupported combatant commander forresolution of transportation conflicts. The endresult of this process is the supportedcombatant commander-approved TPFDD.Redeploying units prepare for movementbased on this TPFDD. Changes may occurduring redeployment and incremental changesaffecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel,Supplies, and Equipment)

Multiple actions, events, and activitiesmust be accomplished to get the force readyto redeploy. Planned requirements(represented by the TPFDD) arecommunicated to tasked units and supportingagencies, who take action to prepare andorganize the actual people, supplies, andequipment for movement. This process alsoincludes getting support organizationsprepared to conduct redeploymentoperations. Preparations are made toprocess WRM and excess materiel.

a. Establish Support Organizations.Task organize to support requirements formovement control elements (e.g., A/DACG,MCCs, POGs, TALCE).

b. Conduct Movement Coordinationand Support Meeting. Commands at alllevels review planning and execution statusand assign tasks to resolve support issues.

c. Identify Containers, Flat Racks,MHE, CHE, Pallets, and LocalTransportation Requirements. Supportingactivities receive container and/or 463L palletrequirements from units, assess capability tomeet these requirements, and determine MHEand/or CHE requirements to move containersand pallets from storage sites to unit areas.

B-B-4

Annex B to Appendix B

JP 3-35

d. Coordinate HN and ContractSupport Requirements. HN and contractsupport play a vital role in redeploymentoperations. Coordination must be made forvarious functions to include convoy supportcenters, communications, MHE, POE support,and other key support functions.

e. Turn-in WRM and Excess Materiel.Units must clean, process, and turn-in WRMand excess materiel in accordance withService disposition instructions.

f. Develop Initial Load and/or StowPlans. Based on anticipated types of lift, unitsdevelop initial load and/or stow plans.

5. Schedule Movement

Movement scheduling is an iterativeprocess at every level of supported andsupporting commands in order to get the rightpeople, supplies, and equipment to the rightplace at the right time.

a. Receive Strategic MovementSchedule. As received from validatedTPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets arescheduled and registered in JOPES. Thesemovement schedules are utilized bycommands in support of movement planning,coordination, and execution.

b. Receive MTMC Port Call. As strategicsealift schedules are being developed, unitsand/or installations receive MTMC AreaCommand call forward messages directingmovement to SPOEs in designated windows.For amphibious operations, MTMC port callsdo not apply.

c. Assess Lift Schedule. Commandsassess ability to meet strategic lift schedules.Allocation of ULN(s) to carriers isaccomplished in JOPES. ULN lift shortfallsand available lift are identified to the TCCs.

d. Build and Publish Schedule of Events.Movement instructions are published insupport of JOPES carrier schedules andpriority of force movement.

e. Confirm Movement Clearances.Movement control elements confirmmovement clearances with HN, state, andgovernmental agencies.

6. Assemble and MarshalForces

Assembly and marshalling involvesbringing together people, supplies andequipment in preparation for movement.Support functions are established andpositioned to expedite and control themovement from TAA to SAs and throughputof the force through the redeploymentpipeline.

a. Move to SA. Upon receipt of movementinstructions from higher headquarters and thesupporting movement control element, forcesare moved to the SA.

b. Assemble Personnel and Cargo.Personnel and cargo assembly is conductedwithin the SA and/or intermediatemarshalling areas in support of movementpreparations.

c. Conduct Unit Inspection, LoadEquipment, and Prepare Documentation.Preparations and inspections for movementoperations are completed. In preparation foragricultural inspections, units wash downequipment either in the SA or at the POE.Documentation is prepared and attached tocargo and equipment.

d. Sequence Loads. Loads are staged andsequenced in support of movement to POEsbased upon priority of force movementschedules.

B-B-5

Joint Redeployment Process Map Description

e. Establish Support Organizations atPOE. POE redeployment support organizations,identified in par 4.a. above, are established insupport of movement operations.

f. Move to POEs. Movement to thedesignated POEs is conducted in accordancewith movement instructions.

g. Conduct Movement ControlOperations. Movement control elementscoordinate, monitor, and report movement inaccordance with movement instructions.

7. Conduct POE Operations

Port operations begin the strategic leg ofthe redeployment process. Essential actionsare accomplished at the POE to complete andfinalize all unit movement responsibilities.The result is the load and launch of thestrategic conveyance. Critical information isprovided to C2 and forward support elementsto facilitate efficient onward movement of theforce to the POE.

a. Arrive and Report Status. Arrival offorces and equipment at the designated POEs.Arrival reporting is completed in accordancewith Service guidance.

b. Assemble and Sequence Loads.Personnel, cargo, and equipment are stagedand sequenced in the established departurePOE unit marshalling areas.

c. Conduct Inspections and CompleteFinal PAX and/or Cargo Documentation(Safety, Customs, and Agricultural).Inspections are conducted within the departurePOE alert holding area and/or call forwardareas in accordance with the DefenseTransportation regulations and jointprocedures and policies. This includes safety,customs, and agricultural inspections andequipment wash down.

d. Load Lift, Report Status, and SubmitDeparture Reports. Cargo and personnelare loaded on lift. Reports are provided withstatus of units, cargo, personnel, lift, terminals,and loading operations. Additionally, reportsare submitted to track the departure ofindividual lift and associated loads.

8. Conduct POD Operations

POD operations include all actions takento download and process unit personnel andequipment at an aerial or SPOD and mayinclude customs and agricultural inspections.

a. Receive Personnel and Cargo.Passengers, unit equipment, and cargo aredownloaded, moved to temporary holdingareas, and consolidated for movement to finaldestination. Units may assist with downloadand movement of equipment. Customs andagricultural inspections may be conducted ifthey were not conducted at the POE, wereconsidered inadequate, or to meet otherrequirements.

• Submit Arrival Reports. Redeploymentsupport organizations submit arrivalreports.

• Conduct Unit Reception. Unitreception will normally include a formalwelcome by a flag officer or designatedrepresentative, a reception with band, andother morale-boosting activities forreturning units.

b. Coordinate Transportation forOnward Movement. Support organizationsarrange transportation of personnel andequipment from POD to installation andsupport non-commercial movements.

c. Process Personnel and Equipment forMovement. Support organizations processand coordinate movement documentation

B-B-6

Annex B to Appendix B

JP 3-35

(e.g., manifests, government bills of lading)for the materiel and equipment that flowsthrough the POD.

d. Complete Unit Inspections andProcess Movement Documents. Unitpersonnel moving organic vehicles,helicopters, or other unit cargo performrequired maintenance, repairs, and safetyinspections. Units also coordinate requiredmovement clearances.

e. Report Status and Submit DepartureReports. Units provide higher headquartersand the Service component with unit statusand departure reports.

9. Conduct DestinationReception

Destination reception includes all actionsnecessary to fully recover the unit to includeits assigned personnel and equipment.Reserve components return to demobilizationstations. Locations are designated byreceiving commands.

a. Arrive Destination. Receivinginstallations provide assistance, as required,to include personal property assistance,equipment processing and storage, andproviding MHE and commercialtransportation assets.

b. Conduct Unit Reception. Unitreception may include a formal or informalceremony which may be a follow-on to thereception at the POD.

c. Process Personnel and Equipment.Installations and units conduct personnel andequipment processing operations.

d. Demobilization of Reserves. Reserveunits and individuals are demobilized andreturn to home station.

e. Prepare for Future Missions. Uponcomplete recovery of unit personnel andequipment, units can begin preparation forfuture missions.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX BJRSOI PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTION

B-C-1

See Figure B-C-1.

1. Conduct POD Operations

The deploying force will arrive in thetheater at APODs and SPODs. Reception isthe process of expeditiously offloading,marshalling, and transporting equipment,personnel, and materiel to complete thestrategic deployment phase to a sea, air, orsurface transportation POD. Receptionoperations at the POD include all thosefunctions necessary to receive and clear unitpersonnel and equipment through the POD.

a. Receive Personnel and Cargo.Personnel and cargo are offloaded at terminals.The support organization analyzes ITV datato determine how and where the arrivingpersonnel and cargo are to be moved toappropriate holding areas. Status reports areprovided to higher headquarters. The unitsare advised of the general situation and maybe tasked for personnel to work on variouswork parties (i.e., drivers for off-loading, PSA,security, cargo off-load).

b. Process Personnel and Cargo forMovement and Prepare Documentation.Personnel and cargo are received andprocessed for movement. Unit personnel andcargo may move on unit equipment and/orcommon-user transportation. Appropriatedocumentation is prepared for subsequentmovement.

c. Move to SA. Unit personnel and cargowill usually move to an SA. In somesituations, unit personnel and cargo may movedirectly to the TAA. If movement is to anSA, preparations begin there for onwardmovement to the TAA. In certain instances,the POD, SA, and TAA may be collocated;however, this is not recommended.

d. Conduct Movement ControlOperations. Movement control elementscoordinate, monitor, and report movement inaccordance with movement instructions. Themovement control system also establishesprocedures with HN, commercial contractors,and allied forces on the use of availabletransportation resources.

2. Prepare the Force (Personnel,Supplies, and Equipment)

Units arrive at the SA and beginpreparations for movement to the TAA.Staging is the assembling, temporary holding,and organization of arriving personnel andmateriel into units and forces, followed bypreparation for onward movement and tacticaloperations. Support activities in the SAprovide life support until units become self-sustaining. In the SA, C2 organizations arestood up to monitor status, receive reports,prioritize movement, provide local security,monitor throughput of subordinate units, andforward status to higher headquarters. Theforce is prepared for movement to the TAA.Equipment and cargo, including WRM, arereceived, accounted for, and distributed. Unitsprepare for onward movement by assembling,processing, and accounting for personnel;performing maintenance and operationschecks on equipment; and verifying and/ormodifying load plans for movement from theSA to TAA. When the unit has received itsmovement mission, adequate intelligence, andis task-organized in accordance withcommand guidance, it makes final movementpreparations and departs the SA.

a. Establish C2, Security and Unit Area.C2 and command post operations areestablished and liaison elements are sent tohigher, adjacent, external, and subordinateorganizations as the mission requires. C2 is

B-C

-2

Annex C

to Appendix B

JP 3

-35

FORCE JRSOI PROCESS

Joint FunctionalAreas

JointProcesses

Reception Staging

Conduct POD OperationsPrepare the Force

Personnel, Supplies, & Equipment

ReceivePersonnel &

Cargo

Move toStaging Areas

ConductMovement

ControlOperations

Process Personnel &Cargo for

Movement &Prepare Documentation

EstablishCommand &Control (C2),Security, &Unit Area

Establish C2,Security, &Unit Area

Report Status

Report Status

CoordinateSupport

Requirements

CoordinateSupport

Requirements

Conduct ForceAssembly &

Accountability

IntegrateCommand,

Control,Communications,and Computers

with GainingCommand

Integratewith Combat

Service Support

Conduct FieldTraining Exercise

& Rehearsals

ConfirmMission

Readiness

Assemble &Process

Personnel

ReceiveEquipment,

War ReserveMateriel &Supplies

ConductTraining &Perform

EquipmentOperability

Checks

Integration

Conduct TAA Operations Complete Force Integration

CoordinateMovementSecurity

Requirements

Move to TacticalArea Assembly

ConductMovement

ControlOperations

Process Personnel& Cargo forMovement &

PrepareDocumentation

SequenceLoads

Onward MovementAssemble and Marshal Forces

Staging

Figure B-C-1. Force JRSOI Process

B-C-3

JRSOI Process Map Description

established with higher headquarters andunits maintain close coordination with higherheadquarters as they make final preparations.Units ensure that security operations areestablished in accordance with the security plan.

b. Report Status. Units continuouslymonitor the status of preparation in keyoperational and logistic areas as they preparefor the mission and report status to higherheadquarters. Movements and the status ofunits and forces should be reported from allnodes where JRSOI operations are beingconducted.

c. Coordinate Support Requirements.Coordination is established with the SAsupport activities to provide logistic supportand services.

d. Assemble and Process Personnel. Unitsprepare for onward movement by assembling,processing, and accounting for personnel.Personnel are accounted for and processed inaccordance with command guidance, JRSOIdirectives, and unit standing operatingprocedure. Units are task-organized to executethe mission based on combatant commandguidance and the operational environment.

e. Receive Equipment, WRM, andSupplies. Units receive their equipment,equipment augmentation, WRM, and suppliesas required. Equipment, cargo, and suppliesare received, accounted for, and distributedin accordance with logistics guidance. Unitsperform maintenance and operational checkson equipment.

f. Conduct Training and PerformEquipment Operability Checks. Trainingis conducted in key mission-essential tasks.Equipment is checked to ensure that it iscombat ready and mission capable.

3. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshalling involvesbringing together people, supplies, andequipment in preparation for onwardmovement. Onward movement is the processof moving units and accompanying materielfrom reception facilities and marshalling orstaging areas to TAAs or other theaterdestinations, moving arriving non-unitpersonnel to gaining commands, and movingarriving sustainment materiel from receptionfacilities to distribution sites. Supportfunctions are established and positioned toexpedite and control the onward movementof the force to the TAA.

a. Process Personnel and Cargo forMovement and Prepare Documentation.Load plans are developed and checked toensure that essential equipment and suppliescan be transported. External movementrequirements are identified and movementrequests are submitted.

b. Sequence Loads. Loads are sequencedto ensure the most efficient use of availabletransportation assets. Safety and security ofthe force are also considered when makingdecisions during sequence planning.

c. Coordinate Movement SecurityRequirements. Units ensure that securityoperations are established in accordancewith the security plan and monitor themovement.

4. Onward Movement

The unit moves to the TAA in accordancewith movement and security instructions.

a. Move to TAA. Units depart SAs forthe TAA.

B-C-4

Annex C to Appendix B

JP 3-35

b. Conduct Movement ControlOperations. A movement control elementcoordinates movement requirements with thesecurity force and confirms that movementclearances have been approved. Departure,en route, and arrival status are monitored andreported.

5. Conduct TAA Operations

The TAA is a location designated by thecombatant commander where units willtransfer authority to their gaining commandsand from which they can be integrated intothe force and be tactically employed. Unitsarrive at the TAA and continuously monitorthe status of preparation in key operationaland logistic areas as they prepare for themission. Coordination is also made for TAAsecurity operations. Unit reports to higherheadquarters ready for operations whenJRSOI operations are completed.

a. Establish C2, Security, and UnitArea. C2 or command post operations areestablished and liaison elements are sentto higher, adjacent, external, andsubordinate organizations as the missionrequires. C2 is established with higherheadquarters, and units maintain closecoordination with higher headquarters asthey make final preparations.

b. Report Status. Units continuouslymonitor the status of preparation in keyoperational and logistic areas as they preparefor the mission and report status to higherheadquarters. Movements and the status ofunits and forces should be reported from allnodes where JRSOI operations are beingconducted.

c. Coordinate Support Requirements.Coordination is established with the TAAsupport activities to provide logistic supportand services.

d. Conduct Force Assembly andAccountability. Units perform a final unitassembly accountability of equipment,supplies, and personnel and report status tothe gaining and losing command.

6. Complete Force Integration

Integration is the process of establishingforce projection units into coherentoperational units under the C2 of the supportedcombatant commander. The JRSOI processends when the unit commander has reportedready for operations and the unit integrateswith its higher headquarters. The unit isintegrated with logistics and operationalcomponents of the gaining command andcompletes any final command directedtraining and activities before being committedto operational missions.

a. Integrate C4 with Gaining Command.C4 is completely integrated between thegaining command, supporting commands,units, JRSOI organizations, and commandersat all levels to facilitate the timely and accurateexchange of critical information. Thereceiving commander must establish positiveC2 over the arriving unit in the TAA.

b. Integrate with Combat ServiceSupport (CSS). The unit establishes directsupport relationships with various supportelements in the CSS structure to includesupply, services, maintenance, and medical.

c. Conduct Field Training Exercises (FTX)and Rehearsals. Units conduct FTXs andrehearsals as part of final training preparation.

d. Confirm Mission Readiness.Commanders report their units status inaccordance with the readiness criteriaestablished by the supported combatantcommander and confirm when ready toexecute their assigned missions.

APPENDIX CTIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA

REFINEMENT

C-1

1. TPFDD Refinement

The supported combatant commander, incoordination with supporting commandersand Services, establishes joint forcemovement requ i rements . Th is isaccomplished by developing a deploymentand/or redeployment data base in JOPES. Thedata base can be developed from an existingor modified OPLAN TPFDD, or a totally newdata base can be built in a no-plan situation.The supporting and supported commanders,along with appropriate Service operations,logistics, and personnel staffs, review this database, source the various requirements, andthen refine or establish detai ledtransportation requirements. Whencompleted, USTRANSCOM TCCs extractsupported combatant commander-validatedrequirements incrementally for schedulinginto JOPES. Forces and resources arenormally refined during TPFDD refinementconferences during the deliberate planningprocess. The refined portion of the TPFDDwill be submitted as Appendix 1, “Time-Phased Force and Deployment List”, to AnnexA, “Planning Guidance - Task Organization”of the OPLAN.

For detailed information on TPFDDrefinement, see CJCSM 3122.01, “JointOperation Planning and Execution System,Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).”

a. The TPFDD refinement process consistsof several discrete steps that may be conductedsequentially or concurrently, in whole or inpart. These steps support the other elementsof the plan development phase of the jointplanning process, forces planning, supportplanning, transportation planning, andshortfall identification, and are collectively

referred to as TPFDD refinement. Thenormal TPFDD refinement process consistsof sequentially refining forces (to include non-unit personnel), logistics (to include bothaccompanying supplies and non-unitresupply), and transportation data to developa TPFDD file that supports a feasible andadequate OPLAN. Data base size and timeconstraints may cause overlap of severalrefinement phases.

b. The TPFDD file for regional plans willnormally be refined using two refinementconferences, a combined forces and logisticsconference, and a transportation conference.The TPFDD files for global planning willnormally be refined at three separateconferences (forces, logistics, andtransportation conferences) because of thenumber of plans undergoing concurrentrefinement to meet a common planning task.Refinement conferences may be combinedtogether or omitted as required to allow forthe best refinement of a single OPLAN or afamily of OPLANs established for a commonplanning task.

• Forces refinement is conducted incoordination with supported andsupporting commanders, Services, theJoint Staff, and other supporting agencies.USTRANSCOM will normally host forcesrefinement conferences at the request ofthe supported combatant commander.The purpose of forces refinement is toconfirm that forces are sourced andtailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, andService guidance and to assess theadequacy of combat support and CSSforce apportionment and resolveshortfalls. USTRANSCOM providessealift and airlift capability estimates

C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-35

based on lift apportionment throughoutthe process to ensure transportationfeasibility.

• Logistics refinement is primarilyconducted by the Service sourcingagencies, DLA, and combatant commandcomponents under the overall directionof the Joint Staff and/or the supportedcommander. USTRANSCOM willnormally host logistics refinementconferences for the Joint Staff and thesupported combatant commander. Thepurpose of logistics refinement ist o confirm sourcing of logisticsrequirements in accordance with JSCP,Joint Staff, and Service guidance and toassess (by the Joint Staff and thesupported combatant commander) theadequacy of resources provided bysupport planning, including completemedical and civil engineering planning.Since logistics sourcing is computedagainst a force structure, a frozen forcesbaseline is a prerequisite to calculatingsustainment requirements.

• Transportation refinement is conductedby USTRANSCOM in coordination withthe Joint Staff, Services, and supportedand supporting combatant commands.USTRANSCOM will normally hosttransportation refinement conferences.The purpose of transportation refinementis to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensurethat they are transportation feasible andconsistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, andService guidance. Transportationrefinement simulates the plannedmovement resources to ensure that theplan is transportation feasible.USTRANSCOM uses transportationexpertise and computer simulation todetermine transportation feasibility. Inturn, the supported commander adjustsTPFDD requirements as necessary toremain within lift capability.

• Following TPFDD refinement, thesupported commander completes thedocumentation of the plan andcoordinates distribution of the TPFDDwithin the JOPES network asappropriate. The supported CINC thensubmits the OPLAN with the TPFDD fileto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff for review.

c. Upon completion of force and logisticsTPFDD refinement, USTRANSCOM willassess the gross transportation feasibility ofthe OPLAN. If grossly transportation feasibleat that stage, the Joint Staff, in coordinationwith the supported commander, may deem theOPLAN “effective for planning.” The term“effective for planning” recognizes that thework to date is valid and current and could beused for execution prior to submission of thefinal OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designationis predicated on the fact that the combatantcommander’s strategic concept for the planhas received CJCS approval, current forceshave been sourced and approved, sustainmentrequirements have been generated, and thegross transportation feasibility check indicatedthe plan was transportation-feasible.

2. TPFDD Maintenance

The objective of TPFDD maintenance is tosystematically and effectively incorporaterequired changes to TPFDD files and strategiclift apportionment in a standardized mannerat defined intervals after the TPFDD becomeseffective for execution. By performingTPFDD maintenance at standard intervals, thesupported commander’s TPFDD remains aviable data base that is as up to date as possiblethroughout the JSCP effective period.Keeping the TPFDD viable will support asmooth transition to the next JSCP period andpotentially save valuable time shouldexecution planning be directed during a crisis.Supported combatant commanders will ensurethat TPFDD changes are loaded at scheduled

C-3

Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Refinement

intervals coordinated and published by theJoint Staff J-7. The Joint Staff JOPESNetwork Operations Control Center will

monitor the update process and reportproblems and noncompliance to the Joint StaffJ-7.

C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS, DEPLOYMENT

ORDERS, REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS, ANDREQUEST FOR FORCES

D-1

Annex A Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Preparation OrderB Sample Format for CJCS Deployment OrderC Sample Format for CJCS Redeployment OrderD Sample Format for Request for Forces Message

D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-35

1. Purpose

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffcan issue a deployment preparation order,deployment order, or redeployment order afterauthorization by the Secretary of Defense.These orders are used to increase thedeployability posture of units, decreasedeployability posture of units, deploy forces,redeploy forces, and direct any other actionthat would signal planned US military actionor its termination in response to a particularcrisis event or incident.

2. Use of Order

The deployment preparation, deploymentorder, or request for forces will be issued upondecision of the NCA to commencepreparations for the conduct of a military

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS, DEPLOYMENTORDERS, REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS, AND

REQUEST FOR FORCES

operation (see Figure D-1). These orders maybe issued at any point in the CAP developmentprocess. Deployment preparat ion,deployment orders, and request for forces maybe incorporated within warning orders,planning orders, and alert orders, ifappropriate, and approved by the NCA. Adeployment preparation order can be used topropose C-day and L-hour or to indicate theCJCS-established C-day and L-hour. Aredeployment order is or will be issued upondecision to redeploy forces to home stationor another location.

3. Transmission of Orders

The deployment preparation order,deployment order, redeployment order, andrequest for forces are normally issued byrecord communication using a precedence of

Figure D-1. Deployment Order Matrix

DEPLOYMENT ORDER MATRIX

INTENDEDACTION

COMBATANT COMMANDREQUIRES ADDITIONAL FORCES(I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCETO US CENTRAL COMMAND)

DEPLOYMENTORDER REQUIRED

SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAPPROVAL REQUIRED

DEPLOY PART(S) OFUNIT(S) (SQUAD TO US CENTRALCOMMAND)

INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL ANDEQUIPMENT

RESUPPLY, SUSTAINMENT, NON-UNIT RELATED PERSONNELAND/OR EQUIPMENT (BEANS,BULLETS, ETC)

NOTE: * Unless directed by the Secretary of Defense, e.g., counterdrugs

YES YES

YESYES

NO*

NO

NO*

NO

D-3

Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, RedeploymentOrders, and Request for Forces

IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation issuf f ic ient ly t ime-sens i t ive , vo icecommunication or electronic teleconferencescan be used first to pass information. A recordcommunication will be forwarded as soon aspracticable.

4. Addressees

An addressee indicator group (AIG) willnormally be used in CAP messages. Actionaddressees in the AIG are combatantcommanders and the Director, NationalSecurity Agency. The C2 paragraph willdesignate supported and supportingcommanders. Information addressees willinclude the Secretary of Defense, Secretaryof State, the White House Situation Room,Defense agencies, and others as appropriate.Interested commanders, heads of Defenseagencies, and component commanders maybe included as information addressees to speeddissemination and facilitate planning. Actionrecipients of the implementing order shouldinclude the same addressees as theimplementer in their responses to ensure thatappropriate agencies are kept informed.

5. Contents

When prior execution planning has beenaccomplished through adaptation of anexisting plan or the development of anemergency OPORD, most of the guidancenecessary for deployment preparations willhave already been passed to implementingcommands in the warning order, planningorder, or alert order. If a crisis situationrequires an increase in deployability posture,movement of forces, or establishment of a JTF(not addressed in warning orders, planningorders, alert orders, or execute orders), thedeployment or deployment preparation ordermust pass all essential guidance to effect theseactions. This order will, in the first paragraph,include the appropriate authority (e.g., “TheSecretary of Defense has authorized themovement of forces....”).

See Annex A, “Sample Format for CJCSDeployment Preparation Order,” Annex B,“Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Order,”Annex C, “Sample Format for CJCSRedeployment Order,” and Annex D, “SampleFormat for Request for Forces Message.”

D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX DSAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT

PREPARATION ORDER

D-A-1

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FLCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VAUSCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GECDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GAUSCINCPAC HONOLULU HIUSCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB COUSCINCSO MIAMI FLUSCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FLUSCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NEUSCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB ILDIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MDINFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DCSECSTATE WASHINGTON DCSECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIVCSA WASHINGTON DCCNO WASHINGTON DCCSAF WASHINGTON DCCMC WASHINGTON DCCDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB COHQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//DISA WASHINGTON DCDIA WASHINGTON DCDLA CAMERON STATION VAHQ DMA FAIRFAX VACIA WASHINGTON DCNIMA WASHINGTON DCCDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VACOMSC WASHINGTON DCCOMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GAUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//COMUSNAVCENTCINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VACG FMFLANTUSTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FLCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HICOMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

D-A-2

Annex A to Appendix D

JP 3-35

CG FMFPACCINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UKACC LANGLEY AFB VACDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FLJOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATIONALERT ORDER//ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//AMPN/DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER//TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/( ) THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ALERTING OFFORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) USCINCCENT PREPARE TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT IN ACCORDANCEWITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

4. ( ) USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGECREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS STATED ABOVE.

5. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV __.

D-A-3

Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Preparation Order

B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTSAS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

D. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BYUSCINCCENT.

E. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

10. ( ) TRANSPORTATION FUNDING.

11. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BYAPPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING INACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE, SITUATIONMONITORING MANUAL. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITHCJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCCINCENTOPLAN..XXXX.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.//GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, SERVICES, AND DEFENSEAGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSEPROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAININGCOMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THELOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THEAOR BOUNDARY).//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

D-A-4

Annex A to Appendix D

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX DSAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

D-B-1

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VAUSCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GECDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GAUSCINCPAC HONOLULU HIUSCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB COUSCINCSO MIAMI FLUSCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FLUSCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NEUSCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB ILDIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MDACC LANGLEY AFB VAINFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DCSECSTATE WASHINGTON DCSECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIVCSA WASHINGTON DCCNO WASHINGTON DCCSAF WASHINGTON DCCMC WASHINGTON DCCDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB COHQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//DISA WASHINGTON DCDIA WASHINGTON DCDLA CAMERON STATION VAHQ DMA FAIRFAX VACIA WASHINGTON DCNIMA WASHINGTON DCCDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VACOMSC WASHINGTON DCCOMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GAUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//COMUSNAVCENTCG FMFLANTUSTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FLCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HICOMPACAF HICKAM AFB HICG FMFPAC

D-B-2

Annex B to Appendix D

JP 3-35

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UKCDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FLJOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,ALERT ORDER//ORDTYP/DEPLOYORD/CJCS//TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A DEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HASAUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO BLUELAND INANTICIPATION (OR SUPPORT) OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR, IF REQUIRED,WRITE A SHORT, CONCISE MISSION STATEMENT.//GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) USCINCCENT. BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED INUSCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES OUTSIDE OFBLUELAND IS WITHHELD PENDING NCA DECISION.

4. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.PROVIDE AIR REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

5. ( ) COMACC. AS A RESOURCE MANAGER AND WITH THE CONCURRENCEOF THE FORCES FOR OWNING AND GAINING COMMAND, SOURCE THE FORCESLISTED BELOW TO MEET USCINCXXX REQUIREMENTS.

6. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

D-B-3

Sample Format for CJCS Deployment Order

9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV __.

B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND/OR MONITORDEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTINGCOMMANDER.

D. ( ) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

E. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVEPOSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

11. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BYAPPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING ORPLANNING ORDER.

14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE, SITUATION MONITORING MANUAL . AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE CJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTIONREPORTING SYSTEM.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

17. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

18. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

D-B-4

Annex B to Appendix D

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX DSAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS REDEPLOYMENT ORDER

D-C-1

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VAUSCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GECDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GAUSCINCPAC HONOLULU HIUSCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB COUSCINCSO MIAMI FLUSCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FLUSCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NEUSCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB ILDIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MDACC LANGLEY AFB VADEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DCCDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FLINFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/DOCDIVSECSTATE WASHINGTON DCSECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//CSA WASHINGTON DCCNO WASHINGTON DCCSAF WASHINGTON DCCMC WASHINGTON DCCDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB COHQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//DISA WASHINGTON DCDIA WASHINGTON DCDLA CAMERON STATION VAHQ DMA FAIRFAX VACIA WASHINGTON DCNIMA WASHINGTON DCCDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VACOMSC WASHINGTON DCCOMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GAUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//COMUSNAVCENTCINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VACG FMFLANTUSTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL

D-C-2

Annex C to Appendix D

JP 3-35

CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HICOMPACAF HICKAM AFB HICG FMFPACCINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UKJOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,ALERT ORDER//ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEHAS AUTHORIZED THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF USFORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REDUCED THREAT IN THE AORPERMIT THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCESDEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//GENTEXT/MISSION

2. ( ) /REDEPLOY FORCES RETURNING TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDINGCOMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS ACCORDING TO THE TIMETABLEDETERMINED BY USCINCCENT. MAINTAIN A DEFENSIVE COMBAT POSTUREFOR PHASED DRAWDOWN.//GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) USCINCCENT. REDEPLOY FORCES TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDINGCOMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.PROVIDE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. ( ) USCINCEUR, USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC,USCINCTRANS, CINCFOR, COMACC, CDRJCSE, AND SECTRANS. BE PREPAREDTO RECEIVE REDEPLOYING FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3ABOVE.

5. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE AIR REFUELING AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFTSUPPORT AS REQUIRED. TAKE ACTION AS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH AIR

D-C-3

Sample Format for CJCS Redeployment Order

BRIDGE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT. ENSUREMAXIMUM USE OF ORGANIC STRATEGIC AIRLIFT. PRESENT CRAFAUTHORITIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.

6. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) R-DAY, L-HOUR, 250001Z FEB ___.

B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. ( ) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

D. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVEPOSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

E. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING ORPLANNING ORDER.

F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

11. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BYAPPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILYSITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE,SITUATION MONITORING MANUAL. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING INACCORDANCE WITH CJCSI 3150.25 JOINT AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM.

14. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

D-C-4

Annex C to Appendix D

JP 3-35

17. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNINGORDER.

18. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTINGCINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, ASAPPROPRIATE. ALSO STATE THAT THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S) THAT THEGAINING COMMANDER WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ARE TERMINATEDAND THAT REDEPLOYING FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED BACK (NORMALLY ATTHE AOR BOUNDARY) TO THE PROVIDING COMMANDER(S) WHO WILLEXERCISE THEIR ORIGINALLY AUTHORIZED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX DSAMPLE FORMAT FOR REQUEST FOR FORCES MESSAGE

D-D-1

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-JOD//

INFO: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CSA WASHINGTON DCCNO WASHINGTON DCCSAF WASHINGTON DCCMC WASHINGTON DCCOMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OP/G-OPD//JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J1/J3/J3-JOD/J4/J4-LRC//USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ1/TCJ3/TCJ4//USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ3/ECJ35/ETCC//USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI/J1/J3/J30/J31/J4/J5USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ1/SCJ3//USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3/SOJ5/7//CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J1/J3/J33/J54/J4LRC//USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO//J1/J3//

CLASSIFICATION

EXER/EXERCISE NAME//

OPER/OPERATION NAME//

MSGID/GENADMIN/ORGINATOR/MESSAGE SERIAL#//

SUBJ/REQUEST FOR FORCES (U)

REF/A/TYPE OF REF/ORIGINATOR/DATE OR DTG/SER#/SPECIAL NOTATION//

AMPN/FREE TEXT TO EXPLAIN PRECEDING REF SET//

POC/NAME/RANK/OFFICE/LOCATION/PHONE//

NARR/THIS IS A REQUEST FOR FORCES. SUPPORTED CINC HAS DETERMINEDTHE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO (SPECIFY COMMAND) AORMAY BE REQUIRED. REQUEST NCA AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONALFORCES TO THE (SPECIFY COMMAND) AOR.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE.//GENTEXT/MISSION/

D-D-2

Annex D to Appendix D

JP 3-35

2. ( ) PROVIDE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISSION WHICH DEPLOYING FORCESWILL BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM.//GENTEXT/FORCE REQUIREMENTS/

3. ( ) DESCRIPTION. FOR FORCES WHICH WILL DEPLOY AS A UNIT, PROVIDEBASIC UNIT IDENTIFICATION (E.G., 1 X INFANTRY BATTALION) ORDESCRIPTION OF THE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED (E.G., 6 X HARM CAPABLEAIRCRAFT). USE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL) (CJCSM 3500.04)TERMINOLOGY AS APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE REQUIRED CAPABILITIES. INTHE CASE OF NON-UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (E.G., INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES ORAD-HOC GROUPS OF PERSONNEL) PROVIDE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNELAND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION WHICH SUMMARIZES THE NATURE OF THEDEPLOYING PERSONNEL (E.G., 35 SUPPORT PERSONNEL INCLUDING MOTORTRANSPORT OPERATORS, VEHICLE MECHANICS, PETROLEUM SUPPLYSPECIALISTS, POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT OPERATORS, ETC).

4. ( ) DESTINATION. ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF DEPLOYING FORCESWITHIN THE AOR.

5. ( ) DATE REQUIRED. DATE FORCES ARE REQUIRED TO BE MISSIONCAPABLE AT DESTINATION. DESCRIBE MILESTONES WHICH MAY IMPACT THETIMELINE FOR FORCE DEPARTURE, ARRIVAL IN THEATER, INTRA-THEATERMOVEMENT, TRAINING, ETC.

6. ( ) DURATION. ESTIMATE THE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM LENGTH OF THEDEPLOYMENT.

7. ( ) TRAINING. PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICETRAINING OR JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

8. ( ) OTHER. SUPPORTED CINC PREFERENCES AND PRIORITIES. IF APARTICULAR SOURCE FOR FORCES IS REQUESTED, PROVIDE RATIONALE.SPECIFY WHETHER ANY REQUESTED FORCES ARE LD/HD ASSETS ANDSUBJECT TO GLOBAL MILITARY FORCE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. DISCUSSCONSTRAINTS REGARDING THE USE OF RESERVES TO MEET THE TASKING.INDICATE WHETHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED BY DEPLOYINGPERSONNEL, ETC. INDICATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IF DIFFERENT FROMTHOSE IN EXISTENCE.

9. ( ) FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA TO SUPPORT THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL BECONTAINED IN PLAN ID (PID) XXXX, FORCE MODULE (FM) XXX.REDEPLOYMENT PID IS XXXXX. NEWSGROUP XXX.XXX.XXX WILL BE USEDTO COORDINATE THIS DEPLOYMENT.

10. ( ) IN ORDER TO MEET DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE, REQUEST SUPPORTINGCINCS PROVIDE SOURCING VERIFICATION NO LATER THAN DTG TO SUPPORT

D-D-3

Sample Format for Request for Forces Message

IMMEDIATE TPFDD VALIDATION UPON RELEASE OF DEPLOYMENT/EXECUTEORDER.//GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. ( ) ESTIMATED LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS. INCLUDE LOGISTICSESTIMATES FOR DEPLOYMENT DRAWN FROM PRELIMINARY COORDINATIONAND RESEARCH. INCLUDE NEED FOR INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES OROPENING OF OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE SUPPORTED CINCAOR. INCLUDE FUNDING SOURCE RECOMMENDATIONS. INCLUDETRANSPORTATION PRIORITY CODE RECOMMENDATIONS.

12. ( ) DEPLOYMENT AND TRAVEL TO HIGH-TERRORIST THREAT AREAS.INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL STATUS OF DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ANDIDENTIFICATION OR DESCRIPTION OF THE DOCUMENT OR AGREEMENT THATDEFINES THAT STATUS, IF ANY. INCLUDE ANTITERRORISM/FORCEPROTECTION GUIDANCE. REQUESTING CINC MUST CERTIFY THE FOLLOWING:“THE TERRORIST THREAT FOR AREAS IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND UNITSWILL DEPLOY HAS BEEN REVIEWED. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE PERSONNELIS CERTIFIED TO BE NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.” THIS PARAIS REQUIRED.

13. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE ASAPPROPRIATE.

14. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. IDENTIFY ANTICIPATED COMMANDRELATIONSHIPS IF DETERMINED.

15. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. IDENTIFY PERTINENTCOMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

16. ( ) POINTS OF CONTACT. LIST SUPPORTED CINC POCS TO INCLUDE:PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND JOPES AS A MINIMUM.

CLBY

REASON

DECLON

D-D-4

Annex D to Appendix D

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX EREFERENCES

E-1

The development of JP 3-35 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Title 10 United States Code.

2. DOD Directive 2000.12, “DOD Combating Terrorism Program.”

3. DOD Directive 5030.49-R, “Customs Inspections.”

4. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its MajorSubordinate Components.”

5. DOD Regulation 4140.1-R, “DOD Material Management Regulation.”

6. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part I, PassengerMovement.”

7. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part II, CargoMovement.”

8. DOD Regulation 4500.9-R, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part III, Mobility.”

9. DOD 4500.9-R-1, “Management and Control of the DOD Intermodal Container System.”

10. CJCS Handbook 5260, “Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.”

11. CJCSI 3110.01A, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).”

12. CJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplement to Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

13. CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

14. CJCSI 3151.01, “Global Command and Control System Common Operational PictureReporting Requirements.”

15. CJCSI 3500.2A, “Joint Training Master Plan.”

16. CJCSI 3511.01, “CJCSI Exercise Program Funding.”

17. CJCSM 3113.01, “Theater Engagement Planning.”

18. CJCSM 3122.01, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (PlanningPolicies and Procedures).”

E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-35

19. CJCSM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Developmentand Deployment Execution.”

20. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

21. CJCSM 3150.05, “Joint Reporting Structure, Situation Monitoring Manual.”

22. CJCSM 3500.03, “Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.”

23. CJCSM 3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0.”

24. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

25. JP 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

26. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

27. JP 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace.”

28. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

29. JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

30. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

31. JP 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”

32. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” Volumes I and II.

33. JP 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

34. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

35. JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

36. JP 3-17, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.”

37. JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”

38. JP 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities.”

39. JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

40. JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

41. JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations.”

E-3

References

42. JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”

43. JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”

44. JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

45. JP 4-01, “Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.”

46. JP 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations.”

47. JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations.”

48. JP 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”

49. JP 4.01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Distribution in JointOperations.”

50. JP 4-01.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water Terminal Operations.”

51. JP 4-01.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore(JLOTS).”

52. JP 4-01.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and for Use of Intermodal Containers in JointOperations.”

53. JP 4-01.8, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging,Onward Movement, and Integration.”

54. JP 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

55. JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

56. JP 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

57. JP 4-05.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization andDemobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.”

58. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

59. JP 5-00.2, “ Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

60. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.”

61. FM 55-1, “Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations.”

E-4

Appendix E

JP 3-35

62. FM 55-10, “Movement Control in a Theater of Operations.”

63. FM 55-60, “Army Terminal Operations.”

64. FM 55-65, “Strategic Deployment.”

65. FM 55-80, “Army Container Operations.”

66. FM 100-17, “Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.”

67. FM 100-17-1, “Army Prepositioned Afloat Operations.”

68. FM 100-17-3, “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.”

69. FM 100-17-4, “Deployment: Fort to Port.”

70. AFDD 2-4, “Combat Support.”

71. AFDD 2-6, “Air Mobility.”

72. AFDD 2-6.1, “Airlift Operations.”

73. AFI 10-403, “Deployment Planning.”

74. AFPAM 10-417, “USAF Deployment Management.”

75. FMFM 1-5, “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations.”

76. H-2E-3119, “Joint Maritime Prepositioning Force Staff Planning.”

77. MCO P3000.17, “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Planning and Policy Manual.”

78. OH 4-11, “Maritime Prepositioned Deployment.”

79. NDP 4, “Naval Logistics.”

80. NDP 5, “Naval Planning.”

81. NWP 3-02.3, “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations.”

82. NWP 4-01, “Naval Transportation.”

83. NWP 4-01.1, “Navy Expeditionary Shore Based Logistics Support & RSOI Operations.”

84. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), “US Army Transportation School ForceDeployment Rock Drill - Read Ahead,” Nov 1996.

E-5

References

85. Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), “JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations.”

86. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, “Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness,” 4December 1998.

87. Lidy, A. Martin, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), “Recommendations for ImprovingJoint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI).”

E-6

Appendix E

JP 3-35

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

F-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theUnited States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Transportation Command. TheJoint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ5-S//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4-JDD/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

F-2

Appendix F

JP 3-35

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreementA/DACG arrival/departure airfield control groupADANS AMC Deployment Analysis SystemADP automated data processingAFB Air Force BaseAFFOR Air Force forcesAFWA Air Force Weather AgencyAIG addressee indicator groupAIT automatic identification technologyAMC Air Mobility CommandAMS Asset Management SystemAOR area of responsibilityAPOD aerial port of debarkationAPOE aerial port of embarkationAPS aerial port squadronATMCT air terminal movement control team

C2 command and controlC3 command, control, and communicationsC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA civil affairsCAA command arrangement agreementCAMPS Consolidated Air Mobility Planning SystemCAP crisis action planningCCTI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commended Training

IssueCHE cargo handling equipmentCIN cargo increment numberCINC commander in chiefCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCONUS continental United StatesCOP common operational pictureCRAF Civil Reserve Air FleetCRS Chairman’s Readiness SystemCSS combat service supportCULT common-user land transportation

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-35

DA Department of the ArmyDCO defense coordinating officerDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility ForcesDISA Defense Information Systems AgencyDLA Defense Logistics AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDOMS Director of Military SupportDOS Department of StateDOT Department of TransportationDTS Defense Transportation System

EAD Evaluation and Analysis DivisionELIST enhanced logistics intratheater support tool

FEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFHP force health protectionFMCC force movement control center (USMC)FNMOC Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic CenterFORSCOM United States Army Forces CommandFTX field training exerciseFUNCPLAN functional plan

GCCS Global Command and Control SystemGCSS Global Combat Support SystemGDSS Global Decision Support SystemGR graduated responseGTN global transportation network

HN host nationHNS host-nation support

IC3 integrated command, control, and communicationsICP inventory control pointIO information operationsISB intermediate staging baseITO installation transportation officerITV in-transit visibility

J-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of a joint

staffJFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for TransportationJFC joint force commanderJIC joint intelligence centerJICTRANS Joint Intelligence Center for Transportation

GL-3

Glossary

JIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJLOTS joint logistics over-the-shoreJMC joint movement centerJMCG Joint Mobility Control GroupJOA joint operations areaJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJPAV joint personnel asset visibilityJPEC Joint Planning and Execution CommunityJRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integrationJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJTAV joint total asset visibilityJTF joint task forceJTMP Joint Training Master Plan

LMCC logistics movement control centerLOC line of communicationsLOI letter of instructionLOTS logistics over-the-shoreLRC logistics readiness center

M&S modeling and simulationMAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMCC movement control centerMCIP military command inspection programMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time availableMHE materials handling equipmentMNFC multinational force commanderMOOTW military operations other than warMSC Military Sealift CommandMSCA military support to civil authoritiesMTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NALSS naval advanced logistic support siteNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNFLS naval forward logistic siteNGO nongovernmental organizationNIMA National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNMS National Military StrategyNOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationNOACT Navy Overseas Air Cargo TerminalNRP non-unit-related personnel

OCONUS outside the continental United StatesOPCON operational control

GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-35

OPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPSEC operations security

PA public affairsPAX passengersPOD port of debarkationPOE port of embarkationPOG port operations groupPOL petroleum, oils, and lubricantsPREPO prepositioned force, equipment, or suppliesPSA port support activityPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization

RC Reserve componentRM risk managementRRF Ready Reserve Force

SA staging areaSATCOM satellite communicationsSMO strategic mobility officerSOF special operations forcesSPM single port managerSPOD seaport of debarkationSPOE seaport of embarkation

TAA tactical assembly areaTAACOM Theater Army Area CommandTALCE tanker airlift control elementTAMS transportation analysis, modeling, and simulationTAV total asset visibilityTC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for

Movement System IITCC transportation component commandTD theater distributionTEP theater engagement planningT-JTB Theater-Joint Transportation BoardTMO transportation management officeTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTPFDL time-phased force and deployment listTPRC theater planning response cell

UCP Unified Command PlanUJTL universal joint task listULN unit line numberUN United NationsUSACOM United States Atlantic Command

GL-5

Glossary

USCG United States Coast GuardUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation CommandUSDA United States Department of AgricultureUSPACOM United States Pacific CommandUSPS United States Postal ServiceUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUSSPACECOM United States Space CommandUSSTRATCOM United States Strategic CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destructionWRM war reserve materiel

aerial port. An airfield that has beendesignated for the sustained air movementof personnel and materiel, and to serve asan authorized port for entrance into ordeparture from the country in whichlocated. (JP 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planningdirective from the Secretary of Defense,issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, that provides essential guidancefor planning and directs the initiation ofexecution planning for the selected courseof action authorized by the Secretary ofDefense. 2. A planning directive thatprovides essential planning guidance anddirects the initiation of execution planningafter the directing authority approves amilitary course of action. An alert orderdoes not authorize execution of theapproved course of action. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formalagreements (i.e., treaties) between two ormore nations for broad, long-termobjectives which further the commoninterests of the members. (JP 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution oflimited resources among competingrequirements for employment. Specificallocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclearweapons, forces, and transportation) aredescribed as allocation of air sorties, nuclearweapons, etc. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense,distribution for planning of limitedresources among competing requirements.Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties

and forces for planning) are described asapportionment of air sorties and forces forplanning, etc. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. Alsocalled AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.2. In naval usage, a predefined area ofenemy terrain for which supporting shipsare responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity andby observation. Also called AOR. (JP1-02)

assembly area. 1. An area in which acommand is assembled preparatory tofurther action. 2. In a supply installation,the gross area used for collecting andcombining components into complete units,kits, or assemblies. (JP 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to betransferred from a supporting commanderto the combatant command (commandauthority) or operational control of asupported commander during the executionof an operation order approved by theNational Command Authorities. (JP 1-02)

available-to-load date. A day, relative toC-day in a time-phased force anddeployment data, that unit and nonunitequipment and forces can begin loading onan aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation.Also called ALD. (JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-6 JP 3-35

battlespace. The environment, factors, andconditions which must be understood tosuccessfully apply combat power, protectthe force, or complete the mission. Thisincludes the air, land, sea, space, and theincluded enemy and friendly forces,facilities, weather, terrain, theelectromagnetic spectrum, and informationenvironment within the operational areasand areas of interest. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

CINC’s required date. The original daterelative to C-day, specified by thecombatant commander for arrival of forcesor cargo at the destination; shown in thetime-phased force and deployment data toassess the impact of later arrival. Alsocalled CRD. (JP 1-02)

CINC’s Strategic Concept. Final documentproduced in Step 5 of the conceptdevelopment phase of the deliberateplanning process. The CINC’s strategicconcept is used as the vehicle to distributethe CINC’s decision and planning guidancefor accomplishing joint strategiccapabilities plan or other Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCSapproval of the strategic concept becomesthe basis of the plan for development intoan operation plan or operation plan inconcept format. Formerly called “theconcept of operations.” Also called CSC.(JP 1-02)

closure. In transportation, the process of aunit arriving at a specified location. Itbegins when the first element arrives at adesignated location, e.g., port of entry/portof departure, intermediate stops, or finaldestination, and ends when the last elementdoes likewise. For the purposes of studiesand command post exercises, a unit isconsidered essentially closed after 95percent of its movement requirements forpersonnel and equipment are completed.(JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement betweentwo or more nations for common action.(JP 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. (JP 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. Alogical process of reasoning by which acommander considers all the circumstancesaffecting the military situation and arrives

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at a decision as to a course of action to betaken to accomplish the mission. Acommander’s estimate which considers amilitary situation so far in the future as torequire major assumptions is called acommander’s long-range estimate of thesituation. (JP 1-02)

common user airlift service. The airliftservice provided on a common basis for allDOD agencies and, as authorized, for otheragencies of the US Government. (JP 1-02)

common-user military land transportation.Point-to-point land transportation serviceoperated by a single Service for commonuse by two or more Services. (JP 1-02)

common-user ocean terminals. A militaryinstallation, part of a military installation,or a commercial facility operated undercontract or arrangement by the MilitaryTraffic Management Command whichregularly provides for two or more Servicesterminal functions of receipt, transit storageor staging, processing, and loading andunloading of passengers or cargo aboardships. (JP 1-02)

common-user sealift. The sealift servicesprovided on a common basis for allDepartment of Defense agencies and, asauthorized, for other agencies of the USGovernment. The Military SealiftCommand, a transportation componentcommand of the US TransportationCommand, provides common-user sealiftfor which users reimburse the transportationaccounts of the Transportation WorkingCapital Fund. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02)

common-user transportation. Transportationand transportation services provided on acommon basis for two or more Departmentof Defense agencies and, as authorized,

non-DOD agencies. Common-user assetsare under the combatant command(command authority) of USCINCTRANS,excluding Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphicstatement, in broad outline, of acommander’s assumptions or intent inregard to an operation or series ofoperations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plansand operation plans; in the latter case,particularly when the plans cover a seriesof connected operations to be carried outsimultaneously or in succession. Theconcept is designed to give an overallpicture of the operation. It is includedprimarily for additional clarity of purpose.(JP 1-02)

concept plan. An operation plan in conceptformat. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involvingmilitary forces caused by natural disasters,terrorists, subversives, or by requiredmilitary operations. Due to the uncertaintyof the situation, contingencies require plans,rapid response, and special procedures toensure the safety and readiness of personnel,installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that wouldaccomplish, or is related to, theaccomplishment of a mission. 2. Thescheme adopted to accomplish a task ormission. It is a product of the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemconcept development phase. The supportedcommander will include a recommendedcourse of action in the commander’sestimate. The recommended course ofaction will include the concept ofoperations, evaluation of supportabilityestimates of supporting organizations, andan integrated time-phased data base ofcombat, combat support, and combat

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service support forces and sustainment.Refinement of this data base will becontingent on the time available for courseof action development. When approved,the course of action becomes the basis forthe development of an operation plan oroperation order. Also called COA. (JP1-02)

course of action development. The phaseof the Joint Operation Planning andExecution System within the crisis actionplanning process that provides for thedevelopment of military responses andincludes, within the limits of the timeallowed: establishing force and sustainmentrequirements with actual units; evaluatingforce, logistic, and transportationfeasibility; identifying and resolvingresource shortfalls; recommending resourceallocations; and producing a course ofaction via a commander’s estimate thatcontains a concept of operations,employment concept, risk assessments,prioritized courses of action, and supportingdata bases. (JP 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving athreat to the United States, its territories,citizens, military forces, possessions, orvital interests that develops rapidly andcreates a condition of such diplomatic,economic, political, or military importancethat commitment of US military forces andresources is contemplated to achievenational objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemprocess involving the time-sensitivedevelopment of joint operation plans andorders in response to an imminent crisis.Crisis action planning follows prescribedcrisis action procedures to formulate andimplement an effective response within thetime frame permitted by the crisis. 2. Thetime-sensitive planning for the deployment,employment, and sustainment of assigned

and allocated forces and resources thatoccurs in response to a situation that mayresult in actual military operations. Crisisaction planners base their plan on thecircumstances that exist at the time planningoccurs. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System processinvolving the development of jointoperation plans for contingencies identifiedin joint strategic planning documents.Conducted principally in peacetime,deliberate planning is accomplished inprescribed cycles that complement otherDepartment of Defense planning cycles inaccordance with the formally establishedJoint Strategic Planning System. 2. Aplanning process for the deployment andemployment of apportioned forces andresources that occurs in response to ahypothetical situation. Deliberate plannersrely heavily on assumptions regarding thecircumstances that will exist when the planis executed. (JP 1-02)

demobilization. The process of transitioninga conflict or wartime military establishmentand defense-based civilian economy to apeacetime configuration while maintainingnational security and economic vitality. (JP1-02)

deployability posture. The state or stage ofa unit’s preparedness for deployment toparticipate in a military operation, definedin five levels as follows: a. normaldeployability posture. The unit isconducting normal activities. Commandersare monitoring the situation in any area oftension and reviewing plans. No visibleovert actions are being taken to increasedeployability posture. Units not at homestation report their scheduled closure timeat home station or the time required to returnto home station if ordered to return beforescheduled time and desired mode oftransportation are available. b. increased

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deployability posture. The unit is relievedfrom commitments not pertaining to themission. Personnel are recalled fromtraining areas, pass, and leave, as required,to meet the deployment schedule.Preparation for deployment of equipmentand supplies is initiated. Pre-deploymentpersonnel actions are completed. Essentialequipment and supplies located atcontinental United States (CONUS) oroverseas installations are identified. c.advanced deployability posture. Allessential personnel, mobility equipment,and accompanying supplies are checked,packed, rigged for deployment, andpositioned with deploying unit. The unitremains at home station. Movementrequirements are confirmed. Airlift, sealift,and intra-CONUS transportation resourcesare identified, and initial movementschedules are completed by theTransportation Component Commands. d.marshaled deployability posture. The firstincrement of deploying personnel, mobilityequipment, and accompanying supplies ismarshaled at designated ports ofembarkation but not loaded. Sufficientaircraft or sealift assets are positioned at,or en route to, the port of embarkation,either to load the first increment or to sustaina flow, as required by the plan or directivebeing considered for execution. Supportingairlift control elements (ALCEs), stagecrews (if required), and support personneladequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload,en route, and offload locations will bepositioned, as required. e. loadeddeployability posture. All first incrementequipment and accompanying supplies areloaded aboard ships and prepared fordeparture to the designated objective area.Personnel are prepared for loading onminimum notice. Follow-on increments ofcargo and personnel are en route oravailable to meet projected ship loadingschedules. Sufficient airlift is positionedand loaded at the port of embarkation to

move the first increment or to initiate andsustain a flow, as required by the plan ordirective being considered for execution.Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (ifrequired), and support personnel adequateto sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route,and offload locations are positioned, asrequired. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the changefrom a cruising approach or contactdisposition to a disposition for battle. 2.The movement of forces within areas ofoperation. 3. The positioning of forces intoa formation for battle. 4. The relocation offorces and materiel to desired areas ofoperations. Deployment encompasses allactivities from origin or home stationthrough destination, specifically includingintra-continental United States, intertheater,and intratheater movement legs, staging,and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

deployment data base. The JOPES (JointOperation Planning and Execution System)data base containing the necessaryinformation on forces, materiel, and fillerand replacement personnel movementrequirements to support execution. Thedata base reflects information contained inthe refined time-phased force anddeployment data from the deliberateplanning process or developed during thevarious phases of the crisis action planningprocess, and the movement schedules ortables developed by the transportationcomponent commands to support thedeployment of required forces, personnel,and materiel. (JP 1-02)

deployment order. A planning directive fromthe Secretary of Defense, issued by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thatauthorizes and directs the transfer of forcesbetween combatant commands byreassignment or attachment. A deploymentorder normally specifies the authority that

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the gaining combatant commander willexercise over the transferred forces. (JP1-02)

deployment planning. Operational planningdirected toward the movement of forces andsustainment resources from their originallocations to a specific operational area forconducting the joint operationscontemplated in a given plan. Encompassesall activities from origin or home stationthrough destination, specifically includingintra-continental United States, intertheater,and intratheater movement legs, stagingareas, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

deployment preparation order. An orderissued by competent authority to moveforces or prepare forces for movement (e.g.,increase deployability posture of units). (JP1-02)

earliest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as theearliest date when a unit, a resupplyshipment, or replacement personnel can beaccepted at a port of debarkation during adeployment. Used with the latest arrivaldata, it defines a delivery window fortransportation planning. Also called EAD.(JP 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational, ortactical use of forces. (JP 1-02)

employment planning. Planning thatprescribes how to apply force/forces toattain specified military objectives.Employment planning concepts aredeveloped by combatant commandersthrough their component commanders. (JP1-02)

execute order. 1. An order issued by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bythe authority and at the direction of theSecretary of Defense, to implement aNational Command Authorities decision to

initiate military operations. 2. An orderto initiate military operations as directed.(JP 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemcrisis action planning process that providesfor the translation of an approved course ofaction into an executable plan of actionthrough the preparation of a completeoperation plan or operation order.Execution planning is detailed planning forthe commitment of specified forces andresources. During crisis action planning,an approved operation plan or otherNational Command Authorities-approvedcourse of action is adjusted, refined, andtranslated into an operation order.Execution planning can proceed on thebasis of prior deliberate planning, or it cantake place in the absence of prior planning.(JP 1-02)

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion.The determination of whether the assignedtasks could be accomplished by usingavailable resources. (JP 1-02)

force closure. The point in time when asupported joint force commanderdetermines that sufficient personnel andequipment resources are in the assignedoperational area to carry out assigned tasks.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

force planning. Planning associated with thecreation and maintenance of militarycapabilities. It is primarily the responsibilityof the Military Departments and Servicesand is conducted under the administrativecontrol that runs from the Secretary ofDefense to the Military Departments andServices. (JP 1-02)

force projection. The ability to project themilitary element of national power from the

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continental United States (CONUS) oranother theater, in response torequirements for military operations. Forceprojection operations extend frommobilization and deployment of forces toredeployment to CONUS or home theater.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities,and equipment, in all locations andsituations, accomplished through plannedand integrated application of combattingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services,and supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. units, their origins, ports ofembarkation, and movement characteristicsto satisfy the time-phased forcerequirements of a supported commander.(JP 1-02)

force tracking. The identification of unitsand their specific modes of transport duringmovement to an objective area. (JP 1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the conductof military operations in a peacetime orpermissive environment developed bycombatant commanders to addressrequirements such as disaster relief, nationassistance, logistics, communications,surveillance, protection of US citizens,nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation,and continuity of operations, or similardiscrete tasks. They may be developed inresponse to the requirements of the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiativeof the CINC, or as tasked by the supportedcombatant commander, Joint Staff, Service,or Defense agency. Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiatedplans is not normally required. (JP 1-02)

international organization. Organizationswith global influence, such as the UnitedNations and the International Committeeof the Red Cross. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems,units or forces to provide services to andaccept services from other systems, units,or forces and to use the services soexchanged to enable them to operateeffectively together. 2. The conditionachieved among communications-electronics systems or items ofcommunications-electronics equipmentwhen information or services can beexchanged directly and satisfactorilybetween them and/or their users. Thedegree of interoperability should be definedwhen referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

joint deployment community. Thoseheadquarters, commands, and agenciesinvolved in the training, preparation,movement, reception, employment,support, and sustainment of military forcesassigned or committed to a theater ofoperations or objective area. The jointdeployment community usually consists ofthe Joint Staff, Services, certain Servicemajor commands (including the Servicewholesale logistic commands), unified andspecified commands (and their Servicecomponent commands), transportationoperating agencies, joint task forces (asapplicable), Defense Logistics Agency, andother Defense agencies (e.g., DefenseIntelligence Agency) as may be appropriateto a given scenario. Also called JDC. (JP1-02)

joint deployment system. A system thatconsists of personnel, procedures,directives, communications systems, andelectronic data processing systems todirectly support time-sensitive planning andexecution, and to complement peacetime

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deliberate planning. Also called JDS. (JP1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments, operating under a single jointforce commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning forcontingencies which can reasonably beanticipated in an area of responsibility orjoint operations area of the command.Planning activities exclusively associatedwith the preparation of operation plans,operation plans in concept format,campaign plans, and operation orders (otherthan the single integrated operation plan)for the conduct of military operations bythe combatant commanders in response torequirements established by the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operationplanning is coordinated at the national levelto support Secretary of DefenseContingency Planning Guidance, strategicrequirements in the National MilitaryStrategy, and emerging crises. As such,joint operation planning includesmobilization planning, deploymentplanning, employment planning,sustainment planning, and redeploymentplanning procedures. Joint operationplanning is performed in accordance withformally established planning andexecution procedures. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. A continuously evolving systemthat is being developed through theintegration and enhancement of earlier

planning and execution systems: JointOperation Planning System and JointDeployment System. It provides thefoundation for conventional command andcontrol by national- and theater-levelcommanders and their staffs. It is designedto satisfy their information needs in theconduct of joint planning and operations.Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) includes joint operationplanning policies, procedures, and reportingstructures supported by communicationsand automated data processing systems.JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and executemobilization, deployment, employment,and sustainment activities associated withjoint operations. Also called JOPES. (JP1-02)

joint operation planning pr ocess. Acoordinated Joint Staff procedure used bya commander to determine the best methodof accomplishing assigned tasks and todirect the action necessary to accomplishthe mission. (JP 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to describemilitary actions conducted by joint forces,or by Service forces in relationships (e.g.,support, coordinating authority), which, ofthemselves, do not create joint forces. (JP1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea,and airspace, defined by a geographiccombatant commander or subordinateunified commander, in which a joint forcecommander (normally a joint task forcecommander) conducts military operationsto accomplish a specific mission. Jointoperations areas are particularly usefulwhen operations are limited in scope andgeographic area or when operations are tobe conducted on the boundaries betweentheaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint planning and execution community.Those headquarters, commands, and

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agencies involved in the training,preparation, movement, reception,employment, support, and sustainment ofmilitary forces assigned or committed to atheater of operations or objective area. Itusually consists of the Joint Staff, Services,Service major commands (including theService wholesale logistics commands),unified commands (and their certain Servicecomponent commands), subunifiedcommands, transportation componentcommands, joint task forces (as applicable),Defense Logistics Agency, and otherDefense agencies (e.g., DefenseIntelligence Agency) as may be appropriateto a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (JP1-02)

Joint Strategic Planning System. Theprimary means by which the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultationwith the other members of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and the combatant commanders,carries out his statutory responsibilities toassist the President and Secretary ofDefense in providing strategic direction tothe Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans;prepares and reviews contingency plans;advises the President and Secretary ofDefense on requirements, programs, andbudgets; and provides net assessment on thecapabilities of the Armed Forces of theUnited States and its allies as compared withthose of their potential adversaries. Alsocalled JSPS. (JP 1-02)

latest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day,that is specified by a planner as the latestdate when a unit, a resupply shipment, orreplacement personnel can arrive andcomplete unloading at the port ofdebarkation and support the concept ofoperations. Also called LAD. (JP 1-02)

marshalling. 1. The process by which unitsparticipating in an amphibious or airborneoperation group together or assemble whenfeasible or move to temporary camps in the

vicinity of embarkation points, completepreparations for combat, or prepare forloading. 2. The process of assembling,holding, and organizing supplies and/orequipment, especially vehicles oftransportation, for onward movement. (JP1-02)

marshalling area. A location in the vicinityof a reception terminal or prepositionedequipment storage site where arriving unitpersonnel, equipment, material, andaccompanying supplies are reassembled,returned to the control of the unitcommander, and prepared for outwardmovement. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling andorganizing national resources to supportnational objectives in time of war or otheremergencies. 2. The process by which theArmed Forces or part of them are broughtto a state of readiness for war or othernational emergency. This includesactivating all or part of the ReserveComponents as well as assembling andorganizing personnel, supplies, andmateriel. Mobilization of the Armed Forcesincludes but is not limited to the followingcategories: a. selective mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forcesresulting from action by Congress and/orthe President to mobilize ReserveComponent units, individual readyreservists, and the resources needed for theirsupport to meet the requirements of adomestic emergency that is not the resultof an enemy attack. b. partialmobilization—Expansion of the activeArmed Forces resulting from action byCongress (up to full mobilization) or by thePresident (not more than 1,000,000 for notmore than 24 consecutive months) tomobilize Ready Reserve Component units,individual reservists, and the resourcesneeded for their support to meet therequirements of a war or other national

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emergency involving an external threat tothe national security. c. full mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forcesresulting from action by Congress and thePresident to mobilize all ReserveComponent units in the existing approvedforce structure, all individual reservists,retired military personnel, and the resourcesneeded for their support to meet therequirements of a war or other nationalemergency involving an external threat tothe national security. Reserve personnel canbe placed on active duty for the duration ofthe emergency plus six months. d. totalmobilization—Expansion of the activeArmed Forces resulting from action byCongress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel,beyond the existing force structure, and theresources needed for their support, to meetthe total requirements of a war or othernational emergency involving an externalthreat to the national security. (JP 1-02)

movement schedule. A schedule developedto monitor or track a separate entity whetherit is a force requirement, cargo or personnelincrement, or lift asset. The schedulereflects the assignment of specific liftresources (such as an aircraft or ship) thatwill be used to move the personnel andcargo included in a specific movementincrement. Arrival and departure times atports of embarkation, etc., are detailed toshow a flow and workload at each location.Movement schedules are detailed enoughto support plan implementation. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, typicallyorganized within the structure of a coalitionor alliance. (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. Anoverseas location used as the primarytransshipment point in the theater ofoperations for logistic support. A navaladvanced logistic support site possesses fullcapabilities for storage, consolidation, andtransfer of supplies and for support offorward-deployed units (includingreplacements units) during majorcontingency and wartime periods. Navaladvanced logistic support sites, with portand airfield facilities in close proximity, arelocated within the theater of operations butnot near the main battle areas, and mustpossess the throughput capacity required toaccommodate incoming and outgoingintertheater airlift and sealift. When fullyactivated, the naval advanced logisticsupport site should consist of facilities andservices provided by the host nation,augmented by support personnel located inthe theater of operations, or both. Alsocalled NALSS. See also naval forwardlogistic site. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

naval forward logistic site. An overseaslocation, with port and airfield facilitiesnearby, which provides logistic support tonaval forces within the theater of operationsduring major contingency and wartimeperiods. Naval forward logistic sites maybe located in close proximity to main battleareas to permit forward staging of services,throughput of high priority cargo, advancedmaintenance, and battle damage repair.Naval forward logistic sites are lined to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sitesby intratheater airlift and sealift, but mayalso serve as transshipment points forintertheater movement of high-prioritycargo into areas of direct combat. Inproviding fleet logistic support, navalforward logistic site capabilities may rangefrom very austere to near those of a navaladvanced logistic support site. Also called

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NFLS. See also naval advanced logisticsupport site. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

nongovernmenta l organizat ions.Transnational organizations of privatecitizens that maintain a consultative statuswith the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations. Nongovernmentalorganizations may be professionalassociations, foundations, multinationalbusinesses, or simply groups with acommon interest in humanitarian assistanceactivities (development and relief).“Nongovernmental organizations” is a termnormally used by non-United Statesorganizations. Also called NGO. See alsoprivate voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carryingout of a strategic, tactical, service, training,or administrative military mission; theprocess of carrying on combat, includingmovement, supply, attack, defense andmaneuvers needed to gain the objectives ofany battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercisedthrough subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. Operationalcontrol normally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commander inoperational control considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction forlogistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by acommander to subordinate commanders forthe purpose of effecting the coordinatedexecution of an operation. Also calledOPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for theSingle Integrated Operation Plan, for theconduct of military operations. Plans areprepared by combatant commanders inresponse to requirements established by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andby commanders of subordinate commandsin response to requirements tasked by theestablishing unified commander. Operationplans are prepared in either a completeformat (OPLAN) or as a concept plan(CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can bepublished with or without a time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD) file.a. OPLAN—An operation plan for theconduct of joint operations that can be usedas a basis for development of an operationorder (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies theforces and supplies required to execute theCINC’s Strategic Concept and a movementschedule of these resources to the theaterof operations. The forces and supplies areidentified in TPFDD files. OPLANs willinclude all phases of the tasked operation.The plan is prepared with the appropriateannexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files asdescribed in the Joint Operation Planning

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and Execution System manuals containingplanning policies, procedures, and formats.Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN—Anoperation plan in an abbreviated format thatwould require considerable expansion oralteration to convert it into an OPLAN orOPORD. A CONPLAN contains theCINC’s Strategic Concept and thoseannexes and appendixes deemed necessaryby the combatant commander to completeplanning. Generally, detailed supportrequirements are not calculated and TPFDDfiles are not prepared. Also calledCONPLAN. c. CONPLAN withTPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD isthe same as a CONPLAN except that itrequires more detailed planning for phaseddeployment of forces. (JP 1-02)

planning order. 1. An order issued by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff toinitiate execution planning. The planningorder will normally follow a commander’sestimate and a planning order will normallytake the place of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff alert order. NationalCommand Authorities approval of aselected course of action is not requiredbefore issuing a Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff planning order. 2. Aplanning directive that provides essentialplanning guidance and directs the initiationof execution planning before the directingauthority approves a military course ofaction. (JP 1-02)

port of debarkation. The geographic pointat which cargo or personnel are discharged.May be a seaport or aerial port ofdebarkation. For unit requirements, it mayor may not coincide with the destination.Also called POD. (JP 1-02)

port of embarkation. The geographic pointin a routing scheme from which cargo orpersonnel depart. May be a seaport or aerialport from which personnel and equipment

flow to port of debarkation. For unit andnonunit requirements, it may or may notcoincide with the origin. Also called POE.(JP 1-02)

power projection. The ability of a nation toapply all or some of its elements of nationalpower — political, economic,informational, or military — to rapidly andeffectively deploy and sustain forces in andfrom multiple dispersed locations torespond to crises, to contribute todeterrence, and to enhance regionalstability. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

private voluntary organizations. Private,nonprofit humanitarian assistanceorganizations involved in development andrelief activities. Private voluntaryorganizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” isoften used synonymously with the term“nongovernmental organizations.” Alsocalled PVO. (JP 1-02)

ready-to-load date. The day, relative toC-day, in a time-phased force anddeployment data when the unit, nonunitequipment, and forces are prepared todepart their origin on organic transportationor are prepared to begin loading on USTransportation Command-providedtransportation. Also called RLD. (JP 1-02)

recovery and reconstitution. (1) Thoseactions taken by one nation prior to, during,and following an attack by an enemy nationto minimize the effects of the attack,rehabilitate the national economy, providefor the welfare of the populace, andmaximize the combat potential ofremaining forces and supporting activities.(2) Those actions taken by a military forceduring or after operational employment torestore its combat capability to fulloperational readiness. (This term and its

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definition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

redeployment. The transfer of forces andmateriel to support another joint forcecommander’s operational requirements, or toreturn personnel, equipment, and materiel tothe home and/or demobilization stations forreintegration and/or out-processing. (Thisterm and its definition modify the existingterm and its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

required delivery date. A date, relative toC-day, when a unit must arrive at itsdestination and complete offloading toproperly support the concept of operations.Also called RDD. (JP 1-02)

scheduled arrival date. The projected arrivaldate of a specified movement requirementat a specified location. (JP 1-02)

security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit,an activity or installation to protect itselfagainst all acts designed to, or which may,impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition thatresults from the establishment andmaintenance of protective measures thatensure a state of inviolability from hostileacts or influences. 3. With respect toclassified matter, it is the condition thatprevents unauthorized persons from havingaccess to official information that issafeguarded in the interests of nationalsecurity. (JP 1-02)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment,personnel, materiel, or capability, reflectedas the difference between the resourcesidentified as a plan requirement and thoseapportioned to a combatant commander forplanning, that would adversely affect thecommand’s ability to accomplish itsmission. (JP 1-02)

stage. 1. An element of the missile orpropulsion system that generally separatesfrom the missile at burnout or cut-off.Stages are numbered chronologically inorder of burning. 2. To process, in aspecified area, troops which are in transitfrom one locality to another. (JP 1-02)

staging. Assembling, holding and organizingarriving personnel, equipment, andsustaining materiel in preparation foronward movement. The organizing andpreparation for movement of personnel,equipment, and materiel at designated areasto incrementally build forces capable ofmeeting the operational commander’srequirements. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne—A general locality between the mountingarea and the objective of an amphibious orairborne expedition, through which theexpedition or parts thereof pass aftermounting, for refueling, regrouping ofships, and/or exercise, inspection, andredistribution of troops. 2. Othermovements—A general locality establishedfor the concentration of troop units andtransient personnel between movementsover the lines of communications. Alsocalled SA. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02)

strategic airlift. The common-user airliftlinking theaters to the continental UnitedStates (CONUS) and to other theaters aswell as the airlift within CONUS. Theseairlift assets are assigned to the Commanderin Chief, United States TransportationCommand. Due to the intertheater rangesusually involved, strategic airlift is normallycomprised of the heavy, longer range,intercontinental airlift assets but may be

GL-19

Glossary

augmented with shorter range aircraftwhen required. (JP 1-02)

strategic mobility. The capability to deployand sustain military forces worldwide insupport of national strategy. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force whichaids, protects, complements, or sustainsanother force in accordance with adirective requiring such action. 2. A unitwhich helps another unit in battle.Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire maybe used as a support for infantry. 3. Apart of any unit held back at the beginningof an attack as a reserve. 4. An elementof a command which assists, protects, orsupplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plansor operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan preparedby a supporting commander or asubordinate commander to satisfy therequests or requirements of the supportedcommander’s plan. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel,logistic, and other support required tomaintain and prolong operations or combatuntil successful accomplishment or revision

of the mission or of the national objective.(JP 1-02)

tactical assembly area. An area that isgenerally out of the reach of light artilleryand the location where units make finalpreparations (pre-combat checks andinspections) and rest, prior to moving to theline of departure. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

terr orism. The calculated use of unlawfulviolence or threat of unlawful violence toinculcate fear; intended to coerce or tointimidate governments or societies in thepursuit of goals that are generally political,religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

theater airlift. That airlift assigned orattached to a combatant commander otherthan Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command, which providesair movement and delivery of personnel andequipment directly into objective areasthrough air landing, airdrop, extraction, orother delivery techniques; and the airlogistic support of all theater forces,including those engaged in combatoperations, to meet specific theaterobjectives and requirements. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.The Joint Operation Planning andExecution System data base portion of anoperation plan; it contains time-phasedforce data, non-unit-related cargo andpersonnel data, and movement data for theoperation plan, including: a. In-place units.b. Units to be deployed to support theoperation plan with a priority indicating thedesired sequence for their arrival at the portof debarkation. c. Routing of forces to bedeployed. d. Movement data associatedwith deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnelmovements to be conducted concurrentlywith the deployment of forces. f. Estimate

GL-20

Glossary

JP 3-35

of transportation requirements that mustbe fulfilled by common-user lift resourcesas well as those requirements that can befulfilled by assigned or attachedtransportation resources. Also calledTPFDD. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment list. AJoint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem data base located at Appendix 1 toAnnex A of deliberate plans. It identifiestypes and/or actual units required tosupport the operation plan and indicatesorigin and ports of debarkation or oceanarea. This listing is to include both a. In-place units; and b. Units to be deployed tosupport the deliberate plan. Also calledTPFDL. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

transportation closure. The actual arrivaldate of a specified movement requirementat port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)

transportation feasibility. Operation plansand operation plans in concept format areconsidered transportation feasible when thecapability to move forces, equipment, andsupplies exists from the point of origin tothe final destination according to the plan.Transportation feasibility determinationwill require concurrent analysis andassessment of available strategic and theaterlift assets, transportation infrastructure, andcompeting demands and restrictions. a. Thesupported commander of a combatantcommand (CINC) will analyze deployment,joint reception, staging, onward movement,and integration (JRSOI), and theaterdistribution of forces, equipment, andsupplies to final destination. b. SupportingCINCs will provide an assessment onmovement of forces from point of origin

to aerial port of embarkation and/or seaportof embarkation. c. The Commander inChief, United States TransportationCommand will assess the strategic leg ofthe time-phased force and deployment datafor transportation feasibility, indicating tothe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand supported CINC that movements arriveat the port of debarkation consistent withthe supported CINC’s assessment of JRSOIand theater distribution. d. Followinganalysis of all inputs, the supported CINCis responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

validate. Execution procedure used bycombatant command components,supporting combatant commanders, andproviding organizations to confirm to thesupported commander and USTransportation Command that all theinformation records in a time-phased forceand deployment data not only are error-freefor automation purposes, but also accuratelyreflect the current status, attributes, andavailability of units and requirements. Unitreadiness, movement dates, passengers, andcargo details should be confirmed with theunit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice ofan order or action which is to follow. 2. Acrisis action planning directive issued bythe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffthat initiates the development andevaluation of courses of action by asupported commander and requests that acommander’s estimate be submitted. 3. Aplanning directive that describes thesituation, allocates forces and resources,establishes command relationships,provides other initial planning guidance,and initiates subordinate unit missionplanning. (JP 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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