Johnston the Gongsun Longzi a Translation and an Analysis of Its Relationship to Later Mohist Writings

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ian johnston

THE GONGSUN LONGZI: A TRANSLATION ANDAN ANALYSIS OF ITS RELATIONSHIP TOLATER MOHIST WRITINGS

Of the seven works listed in the Han Shu under the School ofNames (Mingjia),1 the Gongsun Longzi (GSLZ) is the only one thatsurvives in original form, at least in part. In this work, textual issuesare relatively unobtrusive, but there are significant questions aboutthe nature and significance of the philosophical arguments being

advanced and about the authenticity of some of the chapters.The purpose of presenting a new translation of a work that hasalready been translated a number of times and whose individualchapters have, in some cases, attracted particular and specific atten-tion2 is to embody the relatively recently articulated view thatthe work seen as a whole (or as the whole that is currently availableto us) presents an important and coherent philosophical position,and that the work should be considered as a whole, and that thetraditional order of the chapters should be revised to give proper

form to this position.3

Issues of authenticity are not considered indetail here. The five non-biographical chapters are accepted asgenuine pre-Qin writings.4 The biographical chapter (Jifu) is added asan appendix.

The Later Mohists (LM), represented by the six dialectical chap-ters of the Mozi (chapters 4045), were clearly engaging with thesame issues as Gongsun Long, perhaps even in direct debate. Thesesix chapters are, however, bedeviled by textual uncertainty and havereceived much less than their due attention from Western scholars.5

The second part of this article gives brief consideration to the rela-

tionship of the LM chapters to the GSLZ, examining each chapterof the latter in turn in the hope of casting some light on thisrelationship.

IAN JOHNSTON, honorary research associate, Department of Asian Languages,University of Tasmania. Specialties: early Chinese philosophy, Chinese poetry, ancient

Greek theories of medicine. E-mail: [email protected] of Chinese Philosophy 31:2 (June 2004) 271295 2004 Journal of Chinese Philosophy


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The GONGSUN LONGZI: A Translation6

GSLZ1: On Names and Entities (MINGSHILUN)

I

Heaven and earth, and what they give rise to, are things.When a thing is taken to be the thing which the thing is and there is

no going beyond, it is an entity.When an entity is taken to be the entity which the entity is and there

is no being empty, it is in position.If it goes away from its position it is out of position.

If it is positioned in its position it is correct.It is by means of what is correct that one corrects what is not correct.It is not by means of what is not correct that one calls into doubt what

is correct.Its being made correct is correcting what it is as an entity.Correcting what it is as an entity is correcting its name.

II

If its name is correct then it corresponds to [specifically designates]that or this.

If you name it that, and that [the name] does not correspond to[specifically designate] that [the entity], then that does notwork in naming.

If you name it this, and this [the name] does not correspond to[specifically designate] this [the entity], then this does not workin naming.

This is to take as valid what is not valid.

Taking as valid what is not valid is confusion.Therefore, if that [the name] and that [the entity] are valid for

that, then there is a correspondence with respect to that, andthe naming works for that.

[Likewise], if this [the name] and this [the entity] are valid forthis, then there is a correspondence with respect to this,and thenaming works for this.

This is to take as valid what is valid.Taking as valid what is valid is correctness.

Therefore, for that [the name] and that [the entity] to stop atthat, and for this [the name] and this [the entity] to stop atthis, is admissible.

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[Conversely], for there to be that [the name] and this [the entity]so there is that as well as this, or for there to be this [thename] and that [the entity] so there is this as well as that, is

inadmissible.

III

A name names an entity.If one knows that this is not this, or if one knows that this is not

at this, then it is not named [this].If one knows that that is not that, or if one knows that that is

not at that, then it is not named [that].

Great, indeed, were the enlightened rulers of old.They investigated names and entities and were careful with regard to

what they named.Great, indeed, were the enlightened rulers of old.

GSLZ2: On White and Horse (BAIMA LUN)

I

INT: Is [a] white horse is not [a] horse admissible?GSL: It is admissible.INT: How so?GSL: Horse is what names form.

White is what names color.What names color is not what names form.Therefore I say: [A] white horse is not [a] horse.

II

INT: There is a white horse [so] it is inadmissible to say there is nota horse.

In the case of it being inadmissible to say there is not a horse,is there not a horse?

There being a white horse is taken as there being a horse [so]how is a white horse not a horse?

GSL: When a horse is sought, yellow and black horses may both be

sent.When a white horse is sought, yellow and black horses may notbe sent.

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If a white horse is, in fact,a horse, this is a case of what is soughtbeing identical.

If what is sought is identical, a white [horse] is not different

from a horse.If what is sought is not different, how is there may be andmay not be with respect to yellow and black horses?

That may be and may not be are mutually exclusive isevident.

Therefore yellow and black horse are the same in that they maybe taken to correspond to there being a horse, but may notbe taken to correspond to there being a white horse.

This verifies [a] white horse is not [a] horse.

III

INT: You take a horse that has color not to be a horse yet the worlddoes not have horses without color.

A world without horsesis that admissible?GSL: Horses fundamentally have color, therefore there are white horses.

If horses were not colored there would be horses and that isallhow would you choose a white horse?

Therefore [a] white [horse] is not [a] horse.

A white horse is horse combined with white.Horse combined with white is not horse.Therefore I say: [A] white horse is not [a] horse.

IV

INT: Horse not combined with white is horse; white not combinedwith horse is white.

Joining horse and white [forms] the double name, white

horse.This is to take combined with to be the name of what is not

combined withsurely this is inadmissible.Therefore to say, [a] white horse is not [a] horse is

inadmissible.GSL: In the case of white, it is not fixed to that which is white; setting

it aside is possible.In the case of white horse, this says white is fixed to that which

is white.

What is fixed to that which is white is not [identical with] white.In the case of horse, there is not rejecting or selecting in termsof color, therefore yellow and black horses both meet therequirements [for a horse].

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In the case of white horse, there is rejecting or selecting interms of color, yellow and black horses all being rejected onthe basis of color.

Therefore only a white horse alone may meet the requirement.What does not involve rejection is not [identical with] whatdoes involve rejection.

Therefore I say, [a] white horse is not [identical with] [a]horse.

V

INT: If it is inadmissible to say there is not a horse when there is a

white horse, there is setting aside the saying of white.If there is not setting aside, it is inadmissible to say there is a

horse when there is a white horse.Therefore what is taken as there being a horse is to take horse

alone as there being a horse, and not there being a whitehorse as there being a horse.

Therefore in the case of taking there to be a horse, it is inad-missible to take saying horse is horse.

GSL: To take there being a white horse as there being a horse, and

to say there being a white horse is for there to be a yellowhorseis this admissible?INT: It is inadmissible.GSL: To take there being a horse as different from there being a

yellow horse is to differentiate a yellow horse from a horse.To differentiate a yellow horse from a horse is to take a yellow

horse as not being a horse.To take a yellow horse as not being a horse yet to take a white

horse as being a horsethis is like a flying creature enteringa pool or the inner and outer coffins being in different

places.These are the worlds perverse words and confusing

statements.

GSLZ3: On Hard and White (JIANBAI LUN)

I

INT:Hard, white and stone are threeis that admissible?GSL: It is not admissible.

INT: Is two admissible?GSL: It is admissible.



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INT: How so?GSL: Without the hard one gets the whitetwo are raised.

Without the white one gets the hardtwo are raised.

II

INT: If you get its whiteness you cannot say there is not whiteness.If you get its hardness you cannot say there is not hardness.Yet it is the stone that is thus, so are there not three?

GSL: Seeing, you do not get its hardness but you do get its whitenessso there is not hardness.

Touching, you do not get its whiteness but you do get its hard-

ness so there is not whiteness.

III

INT: In a world without whiteness it would not be possible to seethe stone.

In a world without hardness it would not be possible to feel thestone.

Hard, white and stone do not exclude one anotheris it pos-

sible to hide the third?GSL: It hides itself. It is not that it is hidden and so concealed.

IV

INT: Its whiteness, its hardness, and the stone certainly achievefilling of one another.

How is there concealing itself?GSL: Getting its whiteness, getting its hardness, the seen and the not

seen, are separate.The one and the two do not fill each other and are therefore

separate.Being separate is being concealed.

V

INT: The stones whiteness, the stones hardness, the seen and the

not seen, the two and the three, are like breadth and lengthand mutually fill one another.Is this a false raising?

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GSL: A thing that is white does not limit [fix] its whiteness.A thing that is hard does not limit [fix] its hardness.What is not limited [fixed] is shared [general].

How is it the stones [specific attribute]?

VI

INT: If you touch the stone and it is not hard, it is not a stone.If it is not a stone there is not that which selects white.Hard, white and stone not being separate from one another was

originally the case and was never otherwise.GSL: The stone is one, hard and white are two, and exist in the stone.

There is, then, the known in it and there is the not known in it.There is the seen in it and there is the not seen in it.Therefore the known and the not known are separate from one

another; the seen and the not seen are hidden from oneanother.

Because of the concealment, who is to say there is notseparation?

VII

INT: The eye is not able [to perceive] hardness; the hand is not able[to perceive] whiteness.

[Still], it cannot be said that there is not hardness and it cannotbe said that there is not whiteness.

They [the senses] differ in their duties; one does not substitutefor the other.

Hard and white are bounded in the stonehow are theyseparate?

GSL: Hardness not joined with stone is hardness and things share[it].

Not joined with things it is hardness, and hardness is essentiallyhardness.

There is not a hard stone thing and hardness.The world does not have what is like hardness; hardness is con-

cealed.If white is fundamentally not able to exist by itself, how is it

able to make white stones and things?

If white is essentially whiteness, how are there not white thingsand white?The same goes for yellow and black.



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If stones did not have [these],how could one select a hard whitestone?

Therefore there is separation. Separation is because of this.

The results of sense perception and cognition are dissimilar dueto this.Moreover it is like whiteness is seen by means of the eyes, and

the eyes see by means of light, nevertheless light does notsee.

Then light and the eyes do not see yet the spirit sees.The spirit [itself] does not see, and seeing is separate.Hardness is known by means of the hand; the hand knows by

means of striking.This is striking and the hand knowing but [striking] not

knowing, and the spirit also not knowing.Ah, the spirit! This is to speak of separation.Separation is a consequence of the world so it is correct to take

these things as independent.

GSLZ4: On Conjunction and Change (TONGBIAN LUN)7

I

INT: Does two comprise one?GSL: Two does not comprise one.INT: Does two comprise right?GSL: Two does not comprise right.INT: Does two comprise left?GSL: Two does not comprise left.INT: Is it admissible to say right is two?GSL: It is inadmissible.INT: Is it admissible to say left is two?

GSL: It is inadmissible.INT: Is it admissible to say left combined with right is two?GSL: It is admissible.

II

INT: Is it admissible to say changed negates not changed?GSL: It is admissible.

INT: If right is combined with, is it appropriate to say it ischanged?GSL: It is admissible.INT: What is changed?

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GSL: Right.INT: If right is changed, how is it admissible to speak of right?

If [right] is not changed, how is it admissible to speak of

changed?If two does not comprise left and also does not comprise right,how is it that two is left combined with right?

GSL: Ram joined with ox is not horse; ox joined with sheep is notfowl.

III

INT: How is this so?

GSL: Ram combines with ox although different.Ram has upper incisors, ox does not, yet that ram-ox is not ram

or not ox is inadmissible.This they do not both have, yet they are bounded in a

class.Ram has horns, ox has horns, yet that ram is ox, or ox is ram,

is inadmissible.This they do both have, yet they are not of the same class.Ram-ox has horns, horse does not have horns.

Horse has a horse-hair tail, ram-ox does not have a horse-hairtail.Therefore it is said that ram joined with ox is not horse.In the case of not-horse, there is no horse.In the case of no-horse, ram is not two and ox is not two, yet

ram and ox are two.This is both ram and ox but not horse being admissible.It is raised in this way because the classes are not the

same.This is what was raised regarding right and left.

IV

GSL: Ram-ox has fur, fowl has feathers.In speaking of fowls foot, it is one; in counting a fowls feet

there are two; two and onetherefore three.In speaking of ox-rams foot, it is one; in counting the feet there

are four; four and onetherefore five.

Ox-rams feet are five; fowls feet are three.Therefore it is said: Ox joined with ram is not fowl.On the basis of what they do not have they are not fowl.In taking horse and taking fowl, horse is preferred.



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It should be judged on the basis of useful and not useful, noton the basis of class.

Raising this is to confuse names; this is called wild raising.

V

INT: Pass to other differentiations.GSL: Green combined with white is not yellow; white combined with

green is not jade-green.INT: How is this so?GSL: Green and white are not mutually combined but if they are

mutually combined, they are contrary and opposing.

They are not mutually adjoining but if they are mutuallyadjoining, [this] does not harm their direction.

Not harming their direction lies in their being contrary andopposing.

Each is appropriate to its place [and like] left and right, theydo not mix.

Therefore, being made one in green is not possible [just as]being made one in white is not possible.

How, then, are they to be yellow?

Yellow is pure [primary]: this is correct raising.It is like prince and minister in relation to the kingdom [whichis] therefore strong and enduring.

Moreover, if green is mixed with white, then white does notovercome.

That white is sufficient to overcome, yet does not overcome, is[related to] wood subduing metal.

Wood subduing metal is jade-green, so jade-green then is nota correct raising.

Green and white are not mutually combined, yet if they are

mutually combined and do not overcome each other, thenthe two are distinct.

When they contend and the two are distinct, then the color isjade-green.

Of the two examples, yellow is preferable to jade-green.Yellow is like horsein its combining it forms a class.Jade-green is like fowlin its combining it does violence [to

class].If there is violence then prince and minister contend, and the

two are distinct.In the case of the two being distinct, there is confusion notclarity, which negates correct raising.

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In the case of negating correct raising, name and entity arenot as they should be and mixed colors appear, so it is saidthat the two are distinct.

When the two are distinct, the Way is lost and has no means ofbeing made correct.

GSLZ6: On Zhi and Wu (ZHIWU LUN)8

I

Wu are in no case not zhi, yet zhi are not zhi.If the world did not have zhi, wu would have no means of being

spoken of as wu.In the case of there not being zhi, how would the world and wu be

spoken of as zhi?Zhi are what the world does not have.Wu are what the world does have.To take what the world does have to be what the world does not have

is inadmissible.If the world did not have zhi, wu could not be spoken of as zhi.In the case of it being inadmissible to speak ofzhi, there are not zhi.

In the case of there not being zhi, wu are in every case not zhi.If the world did not have zhi, yet wu could not be spoken of as notzhi, this would negate there not being zhi.

The negation of there not being zhi allows wu in every case to be zhi.Wu are in every case zhi, yet zhi are not zhi.

II

That the world does not have zhi gives rise to wu each having a name

which is not the zhi.It [the name] is not the zhi yet it is used to speak about the zhi, which

is to join what is not the zhi.To take what is not a zhi [i.e., a wu], and to proceed to [i.e., by naming]

what is a zhi, is inadmissible.In fact, zhi are what the world joins.In the case of the world joining zhi, wu cannot be spoken of as not

zhi.In the case of not being able to be spoken of as not zhi, there is nega-

tion of there not being zhi.In the case of negation of there not being zhi, wu are in every casezhi.



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Zhi negate there not being zhi.Zhi combined with wu are not zhi.If the world did not have wu, who could directly speak ofzhi.

[If] the world did not have zhi, who could directly speak of the notzhi [i.e., the wu].[If] the world had zhi, not wu and zhi, who could directly speak of

not zhi, or could directly speak of there not being wu not zhi.Moreover zhi are fundamentally and of themselves not the not zhi;

do they not wait on wu and then combine [with them] to be zhi?

Related Later Mohist Passages

I. Mingshi LunThe issue ofming and shi and their inter-relationship, fundamen-

tal of course in early Chinese philosophy, is given considerable atten-tion in the LM chapters. Thus, in the Daqu (DQ11), there is thestatement: That which all sages first attend to is the necessary cor-respondence of names and entities. Name and entity are not neces-sarily in accord, although this is, it must be said, a very contentioussection of the DQ.9 Also in theXQ1, in outlining the program ofbian(disputation), one of the components is categorized as examining the

principles of name and entity,while later in the same section it is saidthe names (ming) are used to pick out (ju) entities (shi).In the C&Es10 there is analysis not only of the primary terms ming

andshi (A78 for the former, A11 & A31 for the latter) but also def-initions of the other important terms within the GSLZessay, specif-ically wei (A79), wu (B3, B10, B80),ju (A31), zhi (to stopA50,B1), and zai (B53). Although, with respect to these terms, there issome variation in focusfor example,shi is defined in relation to rongin A11basically there is equivalence of meaning and usage acrossthe two texts. This particularly applies to the quasi-technical usage of

both zhi and zai. Thus, in the MSL II the sense ofzhi is of a namestopping at (i.e., being restricted to) a particular object or kind ofobject. This is also the sense in which it is used in the E of A50aname stops at the extremes of the range of the entity in question.

Two pairs ofC&Es are of particular importance in relation to theMSL. In the first pair,A78 identifies three different types of functionfor ming (generalizing, classifying, and particularizing) while A79defines wei, used extensively in MSL II and III. Among three possi-ble uses for wei,ju (to raise, to pick out) is included, looking back to

its definition as picking out an entity in A31. In the second pair,B68shows a clear correspondence insofar as the first two of the threeinstances given in the E match the final two statements of MSL II,

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although phrased slightly differently. It must be noted, however, thatthe C for B68 is quite problematical and also that an additionalinstance considering the applicability of this and that is given in

the E. In B72, if one accepts the emendation of the head character,there is close correspondence to the initial statement ofMSL II, theclaim being that what is said (or predicated) of something must cor-respond to (specifically designate) that something for the saying towork. In the C&E, unlike the MSL, specific examples are given.

In summary then, names and entities is an important and recur-ring topic in the LM chapters of the Mozi. Moreover, not only is thisimportance clearly apparent but also the focus is broadly the sameas in the GSLZ, particularly the MSL. Although there have beendifferent opinions on the concordance or otherwise of the views

expressed by GSL and the LM,11 the over-riding impression is one ofessential similarity. That is, the world consists of things (wu), which intheir particular and individual manifestations are entities (shi).Names (ming) are applied to, or used to name (wei), entities in orderto identify them consistently. To be effective the name must be ableto designate specifically the entity in question by having a valid orproper scope (i.e., not going beyond) and by having sufficientcontent (i.e., not being empty). Only in this way can names be cor-rectly applied. This, for the School of Names, is the essence of the

program of making names correct.

II. Baima Lun

There is very little in the LM writings specifically related to theBaima Lun (BML). There are, however, in the XQ two apparentlyunequivocal statements of opposition to the GSL position. In the first(XQ5) the LM writes:A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horseis to ride a horse. A black horse is horse. To ride a black horse is toride a horse. In the second (XQ9) it is said: A white horse is a horse.

In the statement, some horses are white, there must be at least twohorses, one of which is white. There cannot be the case of one horseand some are white. Other related references include A78 wherehorse is identified as a classifying name and also the very prob-lematic B82, which, despite the absence of any mention of horse orwhite,Tan Jiefu takes to be about the white horse argument with this-this representing the Mingjia position (i.e., a white horse is a horse)and this-not this representing the contrary (i.e., white horse is nothorse), which he describes as the Xingmingjia position, indicating

GSL.12

In the expression of this apparently divergent position, the LMdoes give the impression at least of writing in rebuttal of GSLs claim.



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It is, moreover, notable that this presumed response is in the natureof a peremptory dismissal rather than a reasoned refutation. A some-what different interpretation is offered by Wu Feibai. He identifies a

chronological sequence in the development of the white horse dis-cussion which places GSLs argument as a response to earlier views,there being a progressive recognition of the difference betweengeneral and specific names (gongming and bieming). Important in thispresumed sequence are Mencius VIA.3 and 4, C&Es B3 and B67, andthe XQ and DQ references given above. Wu presents a plausibleargument which, at the very least, should remind us of the uncertaintysurrounding the chronology of these texts and their putativeauthors.13

III. Jianbai Lun

Aspects of the hard and white argument are raised in a consid-erable number ofC&Esin excess of twenty. The focus here will beconfined to those judged to be of particular relevance. Most impor-tant are the three C&Es: A65, A66, and A67. Thus, A66 contains theexplicit statement that hard and white are not mutually exclusive,which is identical with the initial part of the final statement by theInterlocutor inJBL III. The E for A66 extends the discussion ofying

(to fill), which is the subject of A65 and the central issue of theexchange between GSL and his Interlocutor inJBL IV. Do the prop-erties/attributes hard and white fill (ying) the stone (the Inter-locutors position), or are they separate (GSLs position)? A67essentially reiterates this point. In the C the termying is defined asboth obtained,which is again contrary to GSLs position in theJBLwhere he describes hard and white as separately obtained. TheLMs (and Interlocutors) argument is, then, that in a body in whichboth are present, such as a stone, hard and white are mutuallyco-extensive.

Other C&Es of direct relevance include B5, B15, and B16, each ofwhich, despite notable textual difficulties, appears to articulate ananti-GSL position. Of particular interest are B37 and B38, the formerbeing important also in Grahams argument that the JBL is a laterforgery.14 With a head character yu (the preposition), there is, in theE, the following clear statement in opposition to GSL: The stone isone, hard and white are two, and are in the stone. B38 continues thisline of argument, utilizing the contentious character zhi (to point),and will be considered in relation to GSLZ5 (Zhiwu Lun) where it

has generated so much difficulty. The argument in B38, and by exten-sion that in the ZWL, does, however, appear to bear on the hard andwhite issue, although it is not mentioned as such.

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Less immediately relevant are the C&Es B4, B6, B46, B47,and B48,which are, in part, to do with perception and the role of mind insynthesizing the data acquired by primary perception. There is also

mention on two occasions in the DQ (DQ11 and DQ13) of proper-ties filling an entity, although GSLs termying is not used.It would seem, then, that GSLs JBL and the LM writings con-

sistently advance quite opposing views on the subject of hard andwhite, although the matter is contentious. As alluded to above,Graham,for example, argues that the LM writings provided the mate-rial for the later, supposedly forged, version of theJBL.15 To summa-rize, GSLs position is that there are two possible forms of perceptionof the hard white stone. One is by vision as a white stone and oneis by touch as a hard stone. The two are the work of different sense

modalities, hence their separation. Moreover, they are hidden inthat the non-appropriate sense modality cannot perceive the otherquality, although the mind can make the synthesis. For GSL then, theissue emerges as to whether these attributes (hard and white)have an existence independent of the stone, or any other body, inwhich they are manifest. It does seem that GSL is committed to pos-tulating the independent existence of these, and by extension other,attributes, although the translation as given allows some ambiguity onthis point.

For the LM there are, in the hard white stone, three things.Although not explicitly stated, the question of how they are perceivedis irrelevant to the reality. There is the stone (the substance), andthere are its two attributes (hard and white), which are co-extensivethroughout the stone, that is, they fill the stone, but there must bea stone for them to fill. There are obviously important ramificationsof these opposing positions, which, in Western terms, involve issuesrelating to substance and attribute, to the ontological status of uni-versals, and to questions of epistemology. It is these issues that appearto be addressed, at least in part, in the ZWL and in C&Es B38 and

B39.

IV. Tongbian Lun

Taking the TBL to be about the conjunction of entities to formclasses, and the issue of whether, in various classes, the componentsthereof preserve their individual identity or change, the relevant LMpassages may be divided into three groups as follows: (i) Those withgeneral reference to classes and classification. (ii) Those with specific

reference to numbersthere is none that considers left and rightcorresponding to TBL I and II. (iii) Those that consider classes interms of domestic animalscorresponding to TBL III. The final two



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sections of the TBL (TBL IV & V) are of doubtful authenticity andhave no significant corresponding passages in the LM writings.

(i) General references: Of these, four are worthy of particular note.

In the C of B2,the observation is made that making inferences aboutclass is difficult, the problem being variability of scope. In B7 thereis the statement that different classes are not comparable, this beingexemplified in the E by several pairings of disparate things, forexample cicadas and zithers. The C for B12 reads: In combining tobe one there is either conforming or there is not. No E is added herebut the issue is further considered in B13 where the C reads: Thereis combining together and there is particularizing one part. In thiscase the E considers both domestic animals (specifically ox and horse)and also fingers. The most important general statement is, however,

to be found in B65, which is given in full as follows:

C: When things belong together under one criterion this completesa class, like the collecting together of squares. The explanation liesin squareness.

E: One: When squares complete a class they all have one criterion,although they are different, some being wood and some being stone.This does not, however, harm their mutual coming together. Theycomplete a class, like squares. All things are like this.

(ii) Numbers: There are four definitions of relevance. In A2, defin-

ing part (ti), 1 is identified as part of 2. In the paired definitionsof decrease and increase (A45, A46), the former is characterizedas a part going, the decrease applying to what remains. In A60, inthe definition of to double (bei), the E states: In the case of 2 cheand 1 che [the difference is] simply doing away with 1. Two otherC&Es that have some relation to the combination of numbers are B4and B59. In the former, which has one (yi) as the head character,the C states: One is said of a part done away with while the E says:If of two, one is lost, it is not joined with the part remaining. In thelatter, the C states that 1 is less than 2 yet more than 5. This is,

however, a very problematical C&E, particularly in terms of inter-pretation. Overall, then, although there are several C&Es thatconsider numerical combination, these considerations are, in fact,somewhat different from those in the TBL I and II.

(iii) Domestic animals: Comparison of the two positions (GSL inthe TBL and the LM) with respect to domestic creatures is difficult,not least because GSL considers four creatures (ram, ox, horse, fowl)while the LM considers only two (ox, horse), and also fewer criteria.Two of the C&Es already referred to do give some consideration to

this topic. In the E of B2, distinctions are made between the class offour-footed animals, two of the smaller component classes (ox, horse),and the larger class, the totality of things. In the E for B13 there is

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the statement: Combining as one is like ox-horse being four-footed.Only this is like ox and horse [separately]. If you count ox and youcount horse, then ox and horse are two. If you count ox-horse, then

ox and horse are one. The most important C&Es are, however, B66,which has a head character kuang in relation to ju (kuang ju, wildraising), and B67, which has a head character niu (ox) as part of thecombined class ox-horse.

What GSL appears to be saying in the TBL III and IV is that youcan join ram and ox to form one class, although their dentition isdifferent. Nonetheless, they also constitute separate classes, althoughboth have horns. The combined class ram-ox is distinguishable fromthe class horse on the basis of the nature of the tail. A similar argu-ment can be advanced with regard to fowl on the basis of the pres-

ence or absence of feathers, or the number of feet. So, in essence, onecan combine ox and ram into a combined class ox-ram, and thiscombined class is distinguishable from both the classes horse andfowl, although on different grounds. The LM makes the distinctionbetween the classes ox and horse on the basis of the presence orabsence of horns. It cannot be on the basis of incisors or tailsthis iswild raising. Moreover, the combined class ox-horse is not oxand not horse. Is this intended as a refutation of GSL?

Any conclusions must, it would seem, remain tentative, given not

only the discrepancies spoken of in relation to creatures and criteria,but also the textual difficulties in the C&Es. It is not surprising, then,that several important contributions embody quite conflicting views.Both Qian Mu and Wu Feibai pay close attention to the connectionbetween the TBL and the LM writings, the former especially in hiscommentary on the final section of the TBL,16 and the latter in hisstrongly presented view that the argument in the TBL is primarilyabout change in relation to the ming/shi nexus.17 Tan Jiefu, particu-larly with respect to B66 and B67, finds evidence of conflict betweenthe two positions along the lines ofXingmingjia versus Mingjia, as

elsewhere.18 The most detailed consideration is that given by MouZongsan, which is amplified, particularly in relation to modern viewsof concept and class, by Cheng.19

The likelihood is, then, that there is some opposition between GSLand the LM, or perhaps criticism of the former by the latter, on issuesof class, but that, as things stand, the situation is less than entirelyclear.

V. Zhiwu Lun

The ZWL has presented all commentators, both Chinese and other-wise, with very considerable difficulties of interpretation. Although



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there are several identifiably separate problems, the major one isundoubtedly the meaning of zhi itself. In LM writings, there are anumber of instances where zhi clearly means finger (e.g., DQ2).

There are, however, other instances where the meaning is obviouslynot finger and where the usage may relate more or less closely tothat in GSLs ZWL. These are, specifically, C&Es B38 and B39 as wellas DQ9, 13, and 15.

Considering the C&Es first, it is important to recognize theircontext in that these two C&Es immediately follow a C&E abouthard and white, B37, which reads:

C: In one, there is the known in it and there is the not known in it.The explanation lies in existing.

E: In: Stone is one, hard and white are two, and are in the stone.Therefore,there is the known in it and there is the not known in itis permissible.

The pointing out in B38 should, then, almost certainly be takenas relating to the stone and its two attributes or qualities, hard andwhite. The LM identifies a tripartite division ofzhi (pointing): (i)zhi, or single pointing to any one of the three, that is, hard,white, or stone. (ii)jian zhi, or combined pointing to any twoof the three. (iii) heng zhi, or crosswise pointing to all three

together. In B39 there is consideration of things that can be knownabout but cannot be pointed to. Although there are some textual dif-ficulties with the examples, the argument seems clearthings likespring (the season), a runaway servant, and the distinctionbetween pup and dog, cannot be identified by ostension.

Of the three instances in the DQ where zhi is used such that it maynot mean finger, one (DQ13) is so troubled by textual difficultiesthat it would be dangerous to draw any conclusions from it. In theother two (DQ9, DQ15) the usage of zhi is very similar. In bothinstances a number of commentators emend the text to allow zhi to

be read as finger (a mans finger), but if the text is not emended, ameaning similar to that in the ZWL is appropriate. Thus Wu Yujiang,in a detailed comment on DQ15, makes specific reference to theZWL: Zhi is, in fact, the zhi of the GSLZs wu mo fei zhi (thingsare in no case without attributes/manifestations). Ren zhi are a mansattributes/manifestations. To speak of a mans attributes/manifesta-tions is not to speak of the man as he is in himself. Thus it is said: onemans attributes/manifestations are not one man. Nevertheless, whatis known as one man is also [known] through his various attri-

butes/manifestations. Set aside these various attributes/manifesta-tions and you may not be able to know the man. Therefore it is said:this one mans attributes/manifestations are indeed this one man.20

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From the comparison of the GSL essay and these LM passages itseems reasonable to conclude that both are using zhi in the samequasi-technical sense, the purpose being to facilitate the analysis of

the relationship between an object as a whole (wu) and its attributes(zhi), which can be separately indicated or denoted. In the GSL essay,despite the difficulties due to its terse and enigmatic style, it is prob-able that Mou Zongsan is correct in his brief enumeration of thelimited number of claims being made: (i) wu are not zhi; (ii) zhi com-bined with wu are not zhi; and (iii) zhi are zhi, and wu are wu.21 TheLM do not seem to be articulating a position contrary to this, that is,that wu and zhi are distinct. They do, however, appear to be extend-ing the discussion, albeit very briefly, to things that cannot be pointedto (B39). In neither text is there analysis of the issue of the relation-

ship between percept and concept, or that of concepts generally,including those that have no related wu, recent discussions of theZWL notwithstanding.22

Conclusions

The objective of this article has been to provide a new, complete trans-lation of the GSLZ that takes into account the substantial amount

of recent material on this work, and to examine its relationshipto the LM chapters of the Mozi. One of the key features ofthis reappraisal of the GSLZ is the recognition of the MSL,here placed first, as a critically important component of the work,thereby countering Grahams claim that this short essay shouldbe dismissed as trivial.23 Four conclusions might be drawn from thispresentation.

First, the GSLZ is fundamentally about the establishment of asecure foundation for the program of correcting names, that is, ofachieving a proper correlation between entities and names. This is

what is made clear in the MSL. The remaining four essays essentiallyexplore areas of difficulty within this overall program. Thus, the BMLoffers a dialogue on the question of double names, specifically theaddition of an adjective to a noun; theJBL examines the issue of therelationship between substance and attribute, which again bears ondouble or compound names; the TBL treats of altered names result-ing from inclusion of a named entity in a conjoined entity or a class,while the ZWL addresses some of the issues raised by the three pre-ceding dialoguesbasically that the thing or object that presents to

sense perception is a compound of substance and attributes that canbe separately pointed to and are therefore different from the total-ity of the thing (wu).



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Second. the LM writings most certainly focus on the same set ofissues as the GSLZ, although their range is far wider, considerableattention being given to issues with no counterparts in the GSLZ. On

this point it is an intriguing but presently unanswerable questionwhether these issues were addressed in the supposedly missing chap-ters of the GSLZ.24

Third, on the topics common to the GSLZand the LM writings,there are areas of concordance of viewpoint; specifically the natureand importance of the name/entity relationship, the foundationalposition of the correction of names program, and aspects of classas they pertain to naming. There are also areas of discordance, suchas the white horse issue and aspects of the substance/attribute rela-tionship as raised in the JBL. There also appears to be a somewhat

different position taken on the matter of the relationship between wuand zhi, although without a precise understanding of the meaning ofthe latter term in this debate, it is hard to be sure.

Fourth, on the temporal relationship between the GSLZand theLM writings, one must at present agree with Wu Feibais observation:In the study of the GSLZ and the Mobian, which was prior andwhich was subsequent cannot now be known.25 Nonetheless, there isthe impression that at least in part the LM writings were in responseto GSLs arguments, particularly where they bear on the central doc-

trines of Mohism.

UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIATasmania, Australia

Endnotes

* I am indebted to those who participated in a most stimulating workshop on my trans-lations of Mingjia and Later Mohist texts at the Needham Research Institute inCambridge in June 2003, organized by Geoffrey Lloyd, Christopher Cullen, and Sue

Bennett and attended also by Timothy Barrett, Anne Cheng, Michael Loewe, JohnMoffett, Jean-Paul Reding, Roel Sterckx, Kim Taylor, and Paul Thompson. I thank themfor their valuable criticisms and suggestions. In addition,I would particularly like to thankGeoffrey Lloyd whose interest in this work over a number of years is greatly appreciatedand who had the idea for the workshop and also John-Paul Reding who let me have acopy of his part-German, part-English translation of the GSLZ.

1. Under the School of Names, the Han Shu (Yiwen Zhi, vol. 6, pp. 17361737) listsseven works totaling 36pian. Apart from the Gongsun Longzi, there are the worksattributed to Deng Xi and Yin Wen (although both works now bearing the names ofthese two philosophers are considered to be post-Han compilations); a work by HuiShi possibly partly preserved in the several lists of paradoxes in works such as theZhuangzi; and works by Mao Gong, Huang Gong, and Cheng Gongsheng of which

there is now no trace.2. A comprehensive list of non-Chinese writings on the GSLZ, including both complete

translations and studies of individual chapters or particular aspects, is given by Feng

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Yaoming (Gongsun Longzi) (Taipei: Dongda Tushu, 2000), pp. 262271, and by H.Vittinghof,Recent Bibliography in Classical Chinese PhilosophyJournal of ChinesePhilosophy 28 (2001):168170.

3. See particularly Cheng Chung-ying, Philosophical Significance of Gongsun Long: ANew Interpretation ofZhi as Meaning and Reference,Journal of Chinese Philoso-

phy 24 (1997):139177.4. The issue of authenticity is given a recent, detailed, and even-handed treatment by

Feng Yaoming, pp. 824.5. Among Western scholars the views of A. C. Graham, as set out in his detailed work,

Later Mohist Logic, Science and Ethics (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978),have been dominant. It is important, however, to recognize that in many instances histextual emendations and re-arrangements and his interpretations are at odds withthose of various Chinese commentators.

6. The following translation is based on a study of many Chinese texts and commen-taries. A detailed list of such works is provided by Feng Yaoming, pp. 249262. Thoseon whom particular reliance was placed include Wu Feibai, Qian Mu, Chen Guimiao,Mou Zongsan, Hu Quyuan & Chen Jinkun, Tan Jiefu, Wu Yujiang, Ding Chengquan,

Zhou Yunzhi, and Feng Yaoming himself. In the absence of the Chinese text,specific textual issues are not considered here.A full Chinese text with detailed anno-tation and commentary to accompany the translation can be obtained from theauthor.

7. There is variation in how tong is understood in the title. Different versions offeredby translators include: On Variation and Divergence (Y. P. Mei); Discourse on Con-clusions Drawn from Changes (M. Perleberg); On the Explanation of Change (ChanWing-tsit);Thinking through Change (J-P Reding); Sur le Muable et le Immuable (I.K. Kou). One modern Chinese version (Ding Chengquan, p. 53) equates tong with

xianghu rongtong (mutually blending or permeating).8. The central problem (but by no means the only one) in this brief and enigmatic argu-

ment is the meaning ofzhi. Clearly, on this issue context is of paramount importance.The variety of versions in translation and in explanations in modern Chinese editionsand commentaries attest to the magnitude of the problem. I have thought it best tosimply transliterate the two key terms and then consider possible meanings sepa-rately. It is notable that Cheng Chung-ying, who has engaged with the problems ofthis essay over many years, transliterates zhi in his recent partial translation (pp.171172).

9. Comments on the Daqu (DQ) andXiaoqu (XQ) are based on the translation givenin I. Johnston, Choosing the Greater and Choosing the Lesser: A Translation andAnalysis of the Daqu and Xiaoqu Chapters of the Mozi,Journal of Chinese Philos-ophy 27 (2000):375407. The section numbers are those used in that article.

10. The translations and the numbering of the Canons and Explanations are the authorsown. Details are available on request.

11. See Zhou Yunzhi, Mingbian Xuelun (Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu, 1995), pp. 5765.

12. Tan Jiefu, Mobian Fawei (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1964), pp. 349350.13. See Wu Feibai, Zhongguo Gu Mingjia Yan (Beijing: Zhongguo Tiedao, 1983), pp.548555.

14. See A. C. Graham, The Hard and White Disputations of the Chinese SophistsBulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 30 (1967):358368, and also hisLater Mohist Logic, Science and Ethics, pp. 170176.

15. A. C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Science and Ethics, pp. 404406.16. Qian Mu, Hui Shi Gongsun Long (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931), pp. 5771.17. Wu Feibai, pp. 531537.18. Tan Jiefu, pp. 325329.19. Cheng Chung-ying, pp. 162168.20. Wu Yujiang, Mozi Jiaozhu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993), p. 639, note 166.21. Mou Zongsan Mingjia yu Xunzi (Taipei: Tiawan Xuesheng Shuju, 1994), preface,

p. 4.22. J-P Reding, Gongsun Long on what is not: Steps toward the deciphering of the

Zhiwulun, Philosophy East and West52 (2002):190206.



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23. Graham wrote that the MSL . . . contains nothing but the commonplace that wordsmust be used in accordance with the things to which they refer expressed in veryobscure and sententious language. See The Composition of the Gongsuen LongTzyy,Asia Major(NS) 5 (195556):147183, (p. 149).

24. That is the discrepancy between the five chapters (apart from the biographicalchapter) included in current editions and the 14pian listed in the Han Shu. See note1 above.

25. See Wu Feibai, p. 501.

Appendix: GSLZ6: A Treasury of Traces (JIFU)

Gongsun Long was a dialectician of the Six Kingdoms period. Heabhorred divergence and disorder with regard to name and entity so,because of the abundance of his talent, he fashioned the Shoubai

[Preserving the White] discussion. Taking things as examples, heused the Shoubai argument to say that white horse is not horse. Withrespect to white horse is not horse, he said that white is whatnames color and horse is what names form. Color is not form andform is not color. In speaking of color it is not valid to combine form.In speaking of form it is not proper to attach color. Now to join [them]and take [them] to be one thing is wrong. It is like seeking a whitehorse in a stable and there is not one, yet there is a black coloredhorse. This being so, it is inadmissible to consider there to be a white

horse. If it is inadmissible to consider there to be a white horse thenthe horse which is sought is lost. If it is lost then a white horse is ulti-mately not a horse. He wished to extend this debate as a way of cor-recting name and entity, and so transform the empire.

Long and Kong Chuan met at the house of Prince Ping-yuan ofZhao. Chuan said: Formerly, Sir, I heard that you were noble andrighteous and have wished to be your pupil for a long time but I donot accept your taking a white horse to be not a horse. I ask you todo away with this artifice. Then Chuan will request to be your pupil.Long said: Your words are perverse. The way I acquired my reputa-

tion was just through the white horse discussion. If you now causeme to discard this, then I have no means of teaching. Moreover, thedesire for a teacher comes from ones wisdom and learning being infe-rior. Now you would cause Long to discard this, which is first to teachme and afterwards have me as your teacher. First to teach me andafterwards have me as your teacher is perverse. Further, white horseis not horse is something Zhong Ni accepted. I have heard that theKing of Chu took up the Fan-ruo bow and loaded it with theWang-gui arrow in order to shoot at dragon and rhinoceros in Yun-

meng park, but he lost his bow. The attendants asked if they mightseek it. The King said: Stop! A Chu king has mislaid his bow, a Chuman will find it. Why seek it? When Zhong Ni heard this he said:

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The King of Chu is benevolent and righteous yet does not get to theroot of the matter. He should say, a man lost the bow and also, a manwill find it, that is all. Why must there be Chu? In this way Zhong

Ni differentiated a Chu man from what is called a man. For it to beright for Zhong Ni to differentiate Chu man from what is calledman and wrong for Long to differentiate white horse from what iscalled horse, is perverse. You, Sir, cultivate Confucian methods yetyou reject what Zhong Ni accepted. If you wish to learn, yet wouldcause Long to do away with what he teaches, then although therewere a hundred Longs, certainly none would be able to set themselvesproperly before you. Kong Chuan had no way of replying.

Gongsun Long was a guest of Prince Ping-yuan of Zhao. KongChuan was a descendant of Confucius. Chuan met Long. Chuan

spoke to Long, saying:When I lived in Lu, from my lowly position Ihad long heard of your reputation, admired your wisdom andesteemed your virtuous conduct. For a long time I have wished tobecome your pupil and now I have seen you. Nevertheless, there isthat of yours which I do not accept, and it is the only thing of yoursthat I do not accept, which is to take a white horse not to be a horse.I entreat you to do away with the white horse is not a horse teach-ing and Chuan will ask to be your pupil. Gongsun Long replied:Your words are perverse. Longs teaching is by means of the white

horse is not a horse Cause me to do away with this and then there isnothing with which to teach. Still to study with me when I havenothing with which to teach is perverse. Moreover, your desire tostudy with me implies that in wisdom and scholarship you are not myequal. Now to instruct me to do away with white horse is not a horse,is first to teach someone and afterwards learn from him. First to teachsomeone and afterwards learn from him is inadmissible.

Your teaching me is like the King of Qi speaking to Yin Wen. TheKing of Qi spoke to Yin Wen, saying:I have a great love of scholarsyet in the kingdom of Qi there are no scholarswhy is that? Yin

Wen replied: I wish to hear what the great king has to say aboutscholars.The King of Qi had no way of replying. Yin Wen said: Nowsuppose in this place there were a man who, in serving his prince wasloyal, in serving his parents was filial, in intercourse with friends wassincere, and in his dealings with fellow villagers was agreeable. If hehad these four characteristics could he be called a scholar?The Kingof Qi replied:Excellent! This is truly someone I would call a scholar.Yin Wen said: If your Majesty were to obtain this man would you bewilling to make him a minister? The King replied: That is my wish

yet it is not possible to obtain [such a man].At that time the King of Qi loved courage, whereupon Yin Wensaid: Suppose there were this man, in a wide hall among a crowd of



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people, who suffered an insult yet, finally, did not dare to contend.Would your Majesty subsequently consider him for office? The Kingreplied: How is he a scholar? To suffer humiliation and not contend

is disgraceful! If he were disgraced then I would not consider him foroffice. Yin Wen said: Although he was humiliated and did notcontend, he has not lost his four characteristics. As this man has notlost his four characteristics, that whereby he was deemed to be ascholar is still so. On one hand your Majesty considers him for officeyet on the other hand does not. Does that mean then that someonewho was spoken of as a scholar is now not a scholar. The King of Qihad no means of reply.

Yin Wen said: Now suppose there were a prince who intended tobring order to his kingdom. If a man has a fault then he condemns

him; if he does not have a fault then he also condemns him. If a manhas merit then he rewards him; if he does not have merit then he alsorewards him. Is it admissible for him to complain that the people arenot in order? The King of Qi replied: It is inadmissible. Yin Wensaid: In my humble view your subordinates, in administering Qi, usethis kind of method. The King replied: In my administration of thekingdom I believe it is as you say [so] although the people are not inorder, I dare not complain. Is it that I have not considered thematter?

Yin Wen said: Would I dare say this without explanation? TheKings command states: One who kills a man, dies; one who woundsa man is punished. That the people, fearing the Kings command,suffer humiliation and finally do not dare to contend, is to keep intactthe Kings command. Yet your Majesty says: One who suffers humil-iation yet does not dare to contend is disgraceful. To call him dis-graceful is to condemn him. The man is without fault yet your Majestycondemns him and, as a consequence, removes his name from the reg-ister and does not consider him for office. Not to consider him foroffice is to punish him. This is a case of a man not transgressing yet

your Majesty punishing him. Moreover, your Majesty heaping dis-grace on one who does not dare contend necessarily glorifies one whodoes dare contend. To glorify one who dares to contend is to recog-nise him as right. The man is not right yet your Majesty recogniseshim as right and certainly considers him for office. Certainly to con-sider him for office is to reward him. That is a case of a man not havingmerit yet your Majesty rewarding him. What your Majesty rewards,the officials punish with death; what your Majesty deems right, thelaw condemns. If these four, rewarding, punishing, deeming right and

condemning, are confused with each other, although [a ruler] wereten times [as worthy as] the Yellow Emperor he could not bring aboutorder. The King had no mean of reply.

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Therefore, Long takes your words to be like those of the King ofQi. You know to take issue with a white horse is not a horse but nothow to take issue with its explanation. This is like knowing the name

good scholar but not knowing how to identify the class.

Chinese Glossary

Baima Lun Mozi Jiaozhu

bei niu

bieming pian

Chen Guimiao Qian Mu

Chen Jinkun ren zhiDaqu rong

Deng Xi shi

Ding Chengquan Tan Jiefu

Feng Yaoming ti

gongming Tongbian Lun

Gongsun Long[zi] wei

Han Shu wu

heng zhi wu mo fei zhiHu Quyuan Wu Feibai

Hui Shi Gongsun Wu Yujiang

Longzi xianghu rongtong

jian zhi Xiaoqu

Jianbai Lun Xingmingjia

Jifu yi

ju Yin Wen

kuang ying

kuang ju Yiwen Zhi

ming zai

Mingbian Xuelun zhi

Mingjia zhi

Mingjia yu Xunzi Zhiwu Lun

Mingshi Lun Zhongguo Gu

Mobian Fawei Ming-Jia Yan

Mou Zongsan Zhou Yunzhi

Mozi Zhuangzi


Documents

Johnston the Gongsun Longzi a Translation and an Analysis of Its Relationship to Later Mohist Writings